CRIM LAW I CASES Batch 3

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 89684. September 18, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERARDO SAZON, alias

"INSIK", Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Benjamin P. Sorongon for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz,
La Paz, Iloilo City, herein accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias
"Toto," were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, 1 in an amended
information dated October 18, 1983. 2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not
guilty, since Cornelio Altejos was not apprehended and has since remained at large.
After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was
further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital bills,
expenses for the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney’s fees, and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
the victim.
The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are hereinunder set forth as
synthesized by the court a quo from the testimonies of the witnesses, 3 and as clarified and amplified
by us from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was accosted
by appellant near the barangay hall for allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and his
companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which caused
the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longno, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped the
fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his native
dialect said, "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid," ("Watch out Inday for I will kill you") to which
Longno retorted, "Just do it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o’clock P.M., appellant and his cousin,
Cornelio Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the store of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by.
Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-consumed and followed Longno.
Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete,
Samuel Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by saying,
"Upod ako dira." ("I’ll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived and
appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to do?").
Longno then faced appellant and said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.").
Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete,
Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for the
gun. It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after which
both appellant and Altejos ran away.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay, tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto." ("Father,
I was shot by Insik and stabbed by Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters before he fell.
His father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the ground. Rushed to the St.
Paul’s Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of death was
hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound.
Appellant’s version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-
defense. He claims that on September 17,1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00
o’clock P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22 caliber revolver
repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant
saw Longno from a distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are not
afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a lesson." 4
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the same.
He, therefore, parried the gun but it fired hitting one of appellant’s left fingers which was later
amputated. It was then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant
and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno
but he was brushed aside by the latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to
appellant, "I stabbed Inday, run," and so he and Altejos ran away. 5
Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in complete self-
defense.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder and in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua when the prosecution has not established by competent evidence the
existence of conspiracy and the presence of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength. 6
Appellant’s version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself had admitted the killing. 7
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the
presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself. 8
In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to
establish the primary element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea
of self-defense must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the accused, and by the lone
alleged eyewitness for the defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of their
inherent inconsistency and conflict with each other.cralawnad
Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly fired a shot at you?
A One (1) meter.
Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to recognize what kind of a gun was that allegedly
used by Inday Longno?
A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the body of the gun.
Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a pistol or a revolver?
A Because immediately after he said those words ‘Maybe you want to learn a lesson’ he immediately
drew his gun and I was able to parry.
x x x
Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm near the elbow, was he still holding that
gun he used in shooting you hitting you at the left palm?
A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.
Q Did you not pick up the gun?
A No, sir." 9
On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness).
Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, what was
Gerardo Sazon doing?
WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the gun and the gun fired.
x x x
Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what
hand was he holding that gun when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
A His right hand.
ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness).
Q You said, that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was being pointed to him, what hand did
Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in brushing that gun?
A His left hand.
Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what else if any did he do?
A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday.
COURT: (To the witness)
Q What hand?
A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.
x x x
Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside and who was brushed aside?

Q Inday parried Cornelio Altejos (sic).
COURT: (To the witness).
Q And, what happened next?
A Cornelio Altejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.
Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?
A Yes, sir.
Q When Cornelio Altejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday, what was Gerardo Sazon and
Wilfredo Longno doing if they were doing anything?
A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.
Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that time?
A Inday’s weapon." 10
The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant and
the victim supposedly grappled. While appellant claimed that the victim’s weapon fell to the ground,
witness Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled for the latter’s gun. The latter
statement is itself difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly holding
with his right hand the gun which he used in shooting Longno.
It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the
homogeneity of the answers to the inquiry could very well have established the existence of not only a
single gun. Had this prevarication not been exposed, said testimonies could have bolstered the defense
theory that the victim himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus establish
the element of unlawful aggression contrived by the defense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is
sustained by the evidence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only because he
admitted that he was one of those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo Longno but also because he
wilfully falsified the truth when he testified that the deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the
body and that he saw blood come out just below the right breast of the deceased. The physical
evidence in this case showed that there was no wound on the right breast of the deceased nor on any
part of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the deceased was only on his left forearm.
Considering that he testified that there were no other persons there during the incident except the
accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos when the overwhelming weight of evidence is that there
were a lot of other people during the incident (this) showed that this witness had small regard for the
truth." 11
Coming back to appellant’s representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after
Altejos stabbed the victim is another instance which renders his version highly suspect. While stating
on direct examination that he ran to the main road, 12 he claimed on cross-examination that he only
walked a short distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was wounded. 13 The
latter statement is itself inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same proceeding that he
was brought by a policeman to the hospital. 14 This irresolution on the part of the appellant was
obviously to avoid any imputation of guilt against him arising from his flight. 15
At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence in
the case. Again, we quote the trial court with approval:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a gun and fired at
him is not borne out by the physical evidence in this case. The paraffin test conducted on the cadaver
of the deceased showed that the hands of the deceased were negative for gunpowder residues
indicating that he did not fire a gun during the incident. The other parts of his body like his forearm
and his abdomen bore strong traces of gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the
accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there was only one gun during the
incident and that the gun belonged to and/or was used by the accused Gerardo Sazon. That a part of
one of his fingers was blown off at very close range, according to Dr. Ely Canja, strongly indicated that
the accused accidentally hit his finger when he and the deceased grappled for the possession of the
gun." 16
In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While the
presence or absence of nitrates cannot indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or has not
fired a gun, the following testimony on direct examination by prosecution witness Zenaida Sinfuego, a
forensic chemist whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this
verification:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"Atty. E. Original:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the person of Wilfredo Longno?
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On the cadaver?
Atty. E. Original:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q On the cadaver?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No. C-200-83, result of the paraffin test on
the cadaver of Wilfredo Longno, please compare this carbon original to the original copy in your
possession whether it is the same?
A The same.
x x x
Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin casts taken from the left and right hands of
the cadaver of one Wilfredo Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of same subject
and one piece paraffin cast taken from the left side of the abdomen. Purpose of laboratory
examination: to determine the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned
specimens. Findings, cast from hands — negative for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates).
Cast from forearm — positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in, 2 1/2
in, 3 in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the abdomen — positive for the presence of
gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the center and in the 1 and 2 in radius. In the layman’s language Mrs.
Sinfuego, will you please explain to the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?
A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder residues that means that, no blue
specks were found in the hands of the cadaver.chanrobles law library
Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is negative?
A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.
Q Within what time-span?
A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.

Q When was this examination conducted?
A Last September 18, 1983.
Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has been marked as Exhibit ‘D’ regarding the
paraffin test conducted on the right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there states,
positive for gunpowder residues, what is the implication?
A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a gun.
Q Within what time span?
A Within three days.
Q Within three days?
A Within three days.
Q From the examination?
A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.
Q And when was the examination conducted?
A Last September 19, 1983, Your Honor.
Q September?
A Nineteen.
Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17, 1983?
A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.
Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which left the powder burns, was it possible
that he fired a gun on September 17?
A Yes, Your Honor." 17
On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be (sic) positive for nitrates?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In what instance?
A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is possible that it was carried by the wind.
Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person who has not fired a gun?chanrobles
law library : red
A Also from the fertilizer.
Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for nitrates?
A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction, from contaminance (sic) for the nitrates
will take effect between two to three minutes.
Q Can you determine on your examination whether the nitrates found was (sic) the nitrates left by
gunpowder residues or by fertilizer can you distinguish that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused, could you determine where did it (sic)
come from?
A Gunpowder residues." 18
Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in evidence
to establish in any reasonable degree the probability of the offense charged, 19 e.g., the quarrelsome
nature of the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression. Nonetheless, such
evidence, seeking to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over facts sufficiently proven
by the prosecution during the trial belying such aggression. These observations find application in the
instant case where the defense presented and now argue on character evidence consisting of criminal
charges involving minor offenses which had been filed against the deceased, but not one of which
resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed, except for one case which was sent to the archives.
20
Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and
in the absence of any showing that the Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard
the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling
reason, therefore, lies for this Court to disturb the trial court’s finding that appellant did not act in self-
defense. 21
The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not
murder. The trial court correctly held that the killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however,
ruled that there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records sorely wanting
in evidence to support the latter conclusion.
The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the
deceased passed by the store where appellant and Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter followed
the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.
To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. 22
In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that
incident of September 15, 1983, warning the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince
us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided to kill the
victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and,
worse, publicly announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the
part of Appellant.
Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim passed
by cannot be taken as manifestly indicating that appellant had clung to his determination to kill the
victim. No evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely waited there for the deceased. Nor
was there any showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to warrant and
explain appellant’s waiting for the former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may have been
purely accidental is not a remote possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it was the belligerent
and defiant demeanor of the victim when confronted by appellant near the public faucet that
precipitated assault.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim was
the result of meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder. 23 The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be proved in
an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the
offense. 24 Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior strength may aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is
clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it. 25 In the absence of any
evidence to show that the accused purposely sought to use their superior strength to their advantage
in the present case, a finding to that effect by the trial court cannot be sustained.
Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment,
since the existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of
appellant and Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him thereafter reveal a
concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the
accused shot the victim in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant’s gun,
Altejos stabbed the victim to death, indicate closeness and coordination of their action geared towards
a common purpose, that is, to kill the victim. 26 Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is
not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, 27 as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a
conspiratorial agreement.
It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this
does not negate the existence of a conspiracy. True, conspiracy generally involves evident
premeditation, but this circumstance requires for its raison d’etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense
for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time element
is not an indispensable requirement for a conspiracy to exist. 28 Consequently, we find that there was
a conspiracy between appellant and Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing, we cannot
consider evident premeditation against Appellant.
The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. 29 The act of one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the
accused. Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over him and he can neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him
are, therefore, obiter and with no binding effect on him. 30
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs
of the deceased is hereby MODIFIED by disallowing the grant of attorney’s fees for lack of basis, and
increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the Court en
banc on August 30, 1990.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., is on leave.
Endnotes:
1. Judge Sixto R. Guanzon, presiding.
2. Original Record, 15.
3. Rollo, 32-35.
4. Ibid., 38-39.
5. Ibid., 39.
6. Ibid., 56.
7. People v. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285, June 28, 1989.
8. People v. Batas, Et Al., G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989.

9. TSN, March 1, 1988, 16-17.
10. TSN, September 17, 1985, 10-14.
11. Rollo, 40.
12. TSN, October 12, 1987, 244.
13. TSN, March 1, 1988, 270.
14. Ibid., 264.
15. See U.S. v. Alegado, 25 Phil. 510 (1913).
16. Rollo, 41-42.
17. TSN, February 8, 1984, 30-32.
18. Ibid., 34-35.
19. Section 51, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
20. TSN, February 26, 1988, 231-233.
21. People v. Alvarez, etc., 163 SCRA 745 (1988).
22. People v. Talla, Et Al., G.R. No. L-44414, January 18, 1990.
23. U.S. v. Balagtas, Et Al., 19 Phil. 164 (1911).
24. People v. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614 (1984); People v. Atienza, 148 SCRA 147 (1987).
25. People v. Salcedo, Et Al., 172 SCRA 78 (1989).
26. People v. Kindo, Et Al., 95 SCRA 553 (1980).
27. People v. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622 (1986); People v. Cantre, Et Al., G.R. No. 70743, June 4, 1990.
28. People v. Custodio, Et Al., 97 Phil. 698 (1955); People v. Arcamo, etc., Et Al., 105 SCRA 707
(1981).
29. People v. Tala, Et Al., 141 SCRA 240 (1986).
30. People v. Eswan, Et Al., G.R. No. 84713, June 4, 1990.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-38175. September 28, 1984.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO LACHICA and JILLY

SIGADOR, Accused-Appellants.
Agnes Cacanindin for Accused-Appellants.

DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder before the Criminal Circuit Court of Rizal, Romeo Lachica and Jilly
Sigador were found guilty as charged and sentenced to the supreme penalty of death.
The crime was committed in the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinglupa. Lachica was detained therein,
pending review by this Court of the two death penalties imposed upon him by the then Court of First
Instance of Davao del Norte for the crimes of "double murder and double frustrated murder," 1
committed while he was serving sentence as a convict in the Davao Penal Colony at Panabo, Davao del
Norte; while Sigador was awaiting execution of the death sentence meted out by the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Sur, and affirmed by this Court in a per curiam decision in L-24877 dated June
30, 1969. 2
Pursuant to the final judgment in L-24877, Jilly (Gelly) Sigador was executed by electrocution on June
26, 1974. As the charge against him has become moot and academic, this mandatory review will deal
only with the conviction of Lachica.
The evidence on record discloses the following facts: In the morning of March 28, 1971, Dominador
Aguilar, also a prisoner in the New Bilibid Prisons, was stabbed inside his cell in Dormitory 1-C. He died
instantly. Dr. Rodulfo Soratos of the NBI, who performed the autopsy, found that the deceased
sustained eight (8) stab wounds, the most serious of which was the injury which penetrated his left
lung and perforated the ventricles of the heart.
Immediately after the incident, the assailants, identified as Romeo Lachica and Jilly Sigador, were
pursued by the prison guards. Cornered after a brief chase near the main gate of Dormitory 1-C, they
voluntarily gave themselves up and surrendered to prison guard Baldovino the knives they admittedly
used in attacking the victim.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Lachica and Sigador were then investigated by the officers of the Investigation Section of the New
Bilibid Prison; and they gave their respective statements confessing responsibility for killing the
deceased. 3 Pertinent portions of Lachica’s statement read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"T Bakit ka naririto ngayon sa Tanggapan ng Pangkat ng Pagsisiyasat?
S Dahil po sa ako ay isa sa mga nanaksak kanina.
T Kailan nangyari itong sinasabi mong pananaksak?
S Ngayon pong araw na ito humigit-kumulang ay mga ika 10:30 ng umaga.
T Sino naman ang tinutukoy mo na sinaksak mo?
S Si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar po.
T Saan nangyari itong sinasabi mong pananaksak mo kay Dominador Aguilar?
S Sa loob po ng selda 43 ng Dormitoryo I-C.
T Bakit mo sinaksak itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Dahil po sa si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar ang siyang mastermind sa saksakang naganap noong
ika-28 ng Septiembre 1970.
T Papaano mo natiyak na itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar ang siyang mastermind sa saksakang
naganap noon, sang-ayon sa sinasabi mo?
S Sapagkat ako po ay dating miembro ng ‘Commando Gang’ at kilala ko po siya (Dominador Aguilar)
na isang Bosyo ng Commando at siya rin ang supplier ng matalas.
T Sino o sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasama mo ng pananaksak kay bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Si bilanggong Gilly Segador po at si Rodolfo Andaya na kapwa mga taga Dormitory 1-D rin po
(Prisoner Lachica pointing his finger to prisoners Gilly Segador #8182-D and Rodolfo Andaya #47015-
P).
T Kailan po ninyo binalak na saksakin itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Kagabi po nang mga pasadong alas 9:00 ng gabi pinag-usapan po namin nina bilanggong Segador at
Andaya na saksakin si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar.
T Ano ang ayos nitong si bilanggong Aguilar ng siya ay iyong saksakin?
S Nakaupo po siya at nagsusulat sa loob ng Selda 43 ng Dormitory I-C na paharap sa pintuan.
T Ilang beses mong sinaksak itong si bilanggong Dominador Aguilar?
S Hindi na po matandaan, pero sa palagay ko po ay mga limang beses."cralaw virtua1aw library
Lachica and Sigador were thereafter charged with the crime of murder. Assisted at the arraignment by
counsel de oficio Atty. Jose O. Galvan, they voluntarily pleaded guilty to the crime charged. When
informed by the court of the consequences of their plea of guilty, they manifested that they were fully
aware of the fact that "they would be punished in accordance with law." Whereupon the trial court
promulgated in open court a sentence convicting the accused of the crime charged and imposing on
each of them the supreme penalty of death.chanrobles law library
The trial court subsequently ordered the prosecution to present evidence for the purpose of
determining the degree of culpability of the accused. At the hearing, the prosecution adduced the
testimony of Rodolfo Andaya, a co-prisoner of the accused. He declared that in the morning of March
28, 1971, Lachica and Sigador met with him and informed him of their plan to kill Dominador Aguilar.
Since the slaying of some of their co-prisoners from Dormitory I-D on September 28, 1970, which
Aguilar masterminded, their determination to take revenge on Aguilar had been frustrated by the tight
security measures adopted by the prison authorities. At 10:00 o’clock in the morning of March 28,
1971, Lachica, Sigador and Andaya — the trial court found that the latter was forced by the two
accused to go with them — waited for the prison guard to bring the prisoners’ food inside Dormitory I-
C, and once the gate was opened and the guard had entered, they stealthily slipped inside Dormitory
I-C and quickly proceeded to Cell 43 where Aguilar was confined. Without warning, Lachica repeatedly
stabbed the victim who was seated on a chair. Despite the wounds he sustained, Aguilar attempted to
escape his assailants by running to another cell. The accused pursued him, and when they caught up
with the wounded man, Sigador stabbed him several times until he collapsed. Thereafter they went
out, and as they were looking for a place to hide, they ran into Baldovino, a prison guard, to whom
they gave themselves up and surrendered their knives.
Testifying in his defense, Lachica gave his version of the incident thus: At 10:00 in the morning of
March 28, 1971, he went to Dormitory I-C to watch a television show of a horse race program being
telecast at the time. While betting with the inmates of Dormitory I-C, an altercation arose between him
and Aguilar. As one word led to another, Aguilar threatened accused with the words, "Baka hindi ka na
makalabas nang buhay dito sa Dormitory I-C." Because he suspected that the deceased would kill him,
and rather than wait to be assaulted, he beat Aguilar to the attack by suddenly stabbing him.
Thus, the accused would seek exemption from criminal liability on the theory of self-defense.
Unlawful aggression is the primordial element of self-defense. For the right to exist, it is necessary that
the accused be attacked, or at least be threatened with an attack in an immediate and imminent
manner, such as brandishing a knife with which to stab or pointing a gun to the accused. 4 But when
the commission of an act is in response to a mere threat or menacing posture of an unarmed victim, as
in the case at bar the defense cannot be invoked.
From the facts testified to by the accused, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the deceased had
the least intention of inflicting harm on the accused. In fact the latter did not receive any injury at all
because neither the victim nor any of his companions was armed at the time the intimidating words
were uttered.chanrobles law library
As heretofore pointed out, Accused had pleaded guilty to the crime charged. Considering the gravity of
the offense, a hearing was conducted by the trial court, but only for the purpose of ascertaining the
degree of culpability of the accused. In his extrajudicial statement, 5 the accused had freely and
positively acknowledged having inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the victim. At the hearing a
quo, no attempt whatever was made to repudiate said confession. Such confession therefore
constitutes the strongest evidence of his guilt. The fact that the accused had not been informed of his
right to silence and to counsel, as stressed by appellant’s counsel, does not detract from this
conclusion, since the confession in question was obtained before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. 6
The facts on record adequately support the lower court’s conclusion that the crime was committed with
treachery and evident premeditation. The fact that accused Lachica is a quasi-recidivist — the new
offense (murder) having been committed while he was serving sentence for a previous crime — more
than justifies the death sentence meted out by the lower court. Quasi recidivism is a special
aggravating circumstance which imposes the maximum of the penalty for the new offense without
regard to the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances (People v. Bautista, 65
SCRA 460; Article 160, Revised Penal Code).
However, for lack of the necessary votes, the penalty is hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua. Some
Justices hold the view that the death sentence should not be imposed as the accused has been
incarcerated for more than ten years. Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Dominador Aguilar in the amount of P30,000.00. Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave.
Endnotes:
1. In its decision dated November 21, 1980, this Court commuted the sentence to two reclusion
perpetua (101 SCRA 246).
2. 28 SCRA 642.
3. Exhibits "F" and "G."
4. 1 Viada, 5th Ed., 173, p. 3275.
5. Exhibit "F."
6. Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 79168. August 3, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO CAGALINGAN y ROMINA,

JOVITO CAGALINGAN y ROMINA and VICTOR ROMINA, JR. y VELANCIO, Defendants-
Appellants.
Juan T. Antonio, for Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the accused from the judgment * rendered in Criminal Case No. X-87-
187 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan at Aparri, finding them guilty of the crime of Murder and
sentencing the accused Jovito Cagalingan y Romina and Victor Romina, Jr. y Velancio to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; the accused Alfredo Cagalingan y Romina, to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering all of said accused
to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Joemar Desor the amounts of P11,500.00, as
actual damages, and P30,000.00, as indemnity for the death of said Joemar Desor, and the costs of
suit.
The facts of the case, according to the People’s counsel, are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On or about 1:30 in the afternoon of June 4, 1984 at Looban, Block 14, Centro, Aparri, Cagayan, eight
persons were playing bingo in the house of the spouses Alfredo and Benita Flores. Two of the players
were Lory Bunabon and Veron Cagalingan (pp. 6-7, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984). Not long after her arrival and
while seated at the door of the balcony, Lory Bunabon saw the accused Jovito Cagalingan about six
meters away holding a basket containing claws of crabs. Joemar Desor (the victim) approached Jovito,
took hold of the basket, and jokingly asked the latter to give him the crabs so that he could roast
them. Jovito refused saying that he was bringing them home for their viand (pp. 50-53 and 58-59, tsn,
Dec. 11, 1984).
Soon thereafter, the two were laughing although each of them was grappling for the possession of the
basket (pp. 53-54, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
In order to gain advantage over Jovito to secure the possession of the basket, Joemar held the throat
of Jovito with his right hand (pp. 51-54, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984). Jovito however was able to remove the
hand of Joemar and went at the back of the latter (p. 80, tsn, Dec. 11, 1989).
Veron Cagalingan, wife of Alfredo Cagalingan, saw them and shouted that Jovito was being killed by
Joemar. This impelled accused Alfredo Cagalingan, who was inside the house of his parents-in-law
Alfredo and Benita Flores, to jump out of the house and proceed to the scene. Holding a bolo
measuring 15 1/2 inches long (Exh. C), Alfredo went behind Joemar and stabbed him twice on the right
side of his body parallel to his navel (pp. 9-10, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
Jovito who was able to free himself from Joemar drew his nine-inch kitchen knife from his waist and
also stabbed the victim twice (pp. 11-12, tsn, Dec. 11, 1984).
While the stabbing was being perpetrated, Accused Victor Romina, Jr. jumped out of the window of his
house to join the other accused. Using a nine-inch kitchen knife (Exh. D), he also stabbed Joemar
once. The latter at the time was already immobile, lying prostrate on the ground (p. 12, tsn, Dec. 11,
1984).
Mercedes Desor, mother of the victim, heard the commotion and rushed to the crime site. There, she
saw his (sic) son Joemar lying prostrate on the ground with the three accused still holding the bladed
weapons dripping with blood. At this juncture, Alfredo Cagalingan was heard uttering a challenge
saying ‘who else still is brave man companion of Joemar Desor’ (pp. 27-28, tsn, May 15, 1985).
Thereafter, Alfredo and Jovito Cagalingan went towards the direction of the police precinct while Victor
Romina, Jr. ran eastward towards the Ryan Cinema (p. 28, tsn, May 15, 1989).
The mother of the victim embraced and pulled her son up but both of them fell down. She screamed
for help. Her nephew and cousin responded and brought Joemar to the Aparri Emergency Hospital
where the victim was treated by a certain Dr. Macro Ayuyang (pp. 28, 29, tsn, May 15, 1985).
Unfortunately, Joemar died after then (sic) minutes from arrival due to loss of blood (pp. 3-8, tsn, Aug.
12, 1985).
Dr. Romulo de Rivera, Municipal Health Officer of Aparri, Cagayan, conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim and submitted his medico-legal necropsy report (Exh. H) containing the following
findings, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘1. stabbed wound — 4.0 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 11.0 cm. depth below the right axilla directed inward with
sharp end backward.
2. stabbed wound — 6.0 cm. x 3.0 cm. x 22.0 cm. in depth over the right flank with 8th rib fractured
sharp end anteriorly.
3. stabbed wound — 4.0 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 26.0 cm. in depth perpendicular end of the wound with sharp
end downward.
4. stabbed wound — 3.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 6.0 cm. over the right lumber region with sharp end upward.
5. stabbed wound — 2.0 cm. x 1.0 cm. x 5.0 cm. along left infra-axillary region with sharp end
downward.
CAUSE OF DEATH: shock secondary to hemorrhage due to multiple stabbed wounds.’
On the basis of the foregoing happenings, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan, after due
preliminary investigation, filed the corresponding Information for murder against the three accused-
appellants with the Regional Trial Court." 1
The defendant-appellant Alfredo Cagalingan, while admitting having inflicted injuries upon the
deceased Joemar Desor, insisted that he acted in legitimate defense of his brother when he inflicted
the mortal wounds which resulted in the death of the said Joemar Desor. His version of the incident is
summarized by the trial court as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that about 1:30 in the afternoon of June 4, 1984, he was inside their house, owned by his
parents-in-law Alfredo Torres and Benita Flores, at Looban, Aparri, Cagayan, listening to a radio drama
when he heard screams from the bingo players. Looking through the window he saw Joemar Desor on
top of his brother Jovito, about seven meters away, lying on the ground being strangulated by Joemar.
He went to pacify Joemar telling him ‘do not do that manong we are but one.’ Joemar answered ‘even
all of you.’ When Joemar partly unsheathed his knife he stabbed him several times with a big bolo
(Exh.’5’-defense, Exh.’C’-prosecution), thinking that Joemar will kill his brother with his (Joemar’s)
stainless steel knife (Exh.’1’-defense). Thereupon he went to the police headquarters and surrendered
to Pat. Edwin Reyes telling him ‘sir, I am surrendering because I killed somebody, Joemar Desor.’" 2
The accused-appellant, Jovito Cagalingan, upon the other hand, denied having stabbed the deceased
Joemar Desor. He claimed that while he was on his way home, at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon
of 4 June 1984, he was suddenly boxed on his right cheek by Joemar Desor. He just cried and went
away because Joemar Desor was bigger than he and was the recognized "kingpin" of the
neighborhood. But Joemar Desor followed and boxed him several times on the chest causing him to
fall. When he fell, Joemar Desor went astride him and sat on his belly, and then held his neck, choking
him. As a result, he lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, he saw his brother, Alfredo
Cagalingan, jumping out from the window of their house and coming to them. Alfredo then stabbed
Joemar Desor with a bolo. After a while, Pat. de la Cruz of the local police arrived at the scene and he
(Jovito) was brought to the police precinct. 3
The defendant-appellant Victor Romina, Jr. also denied having stabbed the deceased Joemar Desor and
interposed the defense of alibi. He declared that at about 12:20 o’clock in the afternoon of 4 June
1984, he went to see a movie at the Ryan Cinema with his friend, one Ferdinand from Faire, Cagayan.
At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his name was flashed on the screen of the cinema as "wanted
outside." He went outside and was met by policemen who then arrested him and brought him to the
police station for investigation. 4
His testimony was corroborated by Ferdinand Ugale who declared that he and Victor Romina, Jr. went
to see a movie at the Ryan Cinema at about 12:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 4 June 1984; and that
while they were watching a movie, the name of Victor Romina, Jr. was flashed on the screen as
"wanted outside" and Victor Romina, Jr. left him inside the moviehouse. 5
In support of their appeal, the defendants-appellants claim that the trial court erred: (1) in not holding
that the accused Alfredo Cagalingan killed the deceased Joemar Desor in defense of his relative; (2) in
not holding that Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. had no participation in the killing of the said
Joemar Desor; and (3) in sentencing the accused Jovito Cagalingan to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
1. The appellants first claim that the trial court seriously erred in finding that unlawful aggression was
not present in the killing of Joemar Desor. They argue that there was unlawful aggression on the part
of the deceased because the latter was strangulating Jovito Cagalingan when he was stabbed by
Alfredo Cagalingan.
A review of the evidence, however, fails to lend credence to the appellants’ claim that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. Lory Bunabon categorically stated that the deceased
Joemar Desor and the appellant Jovito Cagalingan were laughing and joking as they were grappling for
the possession of the basket of crabs which Joemar Desor wanted to get from Jovito Cagalingan. For
unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. 6 Here, there
was no danger to the life of Jovito Cagalingan as they (Jovito and Joemar) were in a frolicsome mood.
Besides, it would appear that the deceased was unarmed at the time and sustained five (5) stab
wounds in different parts of his body, 7 which indicates that the act (stabbing) was not in defense of a
relative but a determined effort to kill the deceased.chanrobles law library : red
It would also appear that when Alfredo Cagalingan voluntarily surrendered to the police, he did not
inform the latter that he killed the deceased in order to protect the life of his brother Jovito. He merely
said that he accidentally injured one Desor. 8 As stated by the Court in one case, 9 "if he had really
acted in self-defense, the probability is that he would have immediately informed the authorities of
that fact if only to minimize his guilt if not to exculpate himself."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. We also find no merit in the claims of the appellants Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. that
they did not participate in the commission of the crime. Lory Bunabon positively identified the said
appellants as among those who stabbed the deceased Joemar Desor. 10 Lory Bunabon could not have
been mistaken in her identification of the appellants (Jovito and Victor) as perpetrators of the crime
because she was near them and the protagonists were her immediate neighbors in the community.
Besides, the trial court found that the testimony of Jovito Cagalingan "is replete with self-contradiction
— a mark of untruthfulness and incredulousness" 11 and we find nothing in the record which would
justify our setting aside said finding.
As for the alibi of Victor Romina, Jr. that he was inside the Ryan Cinema at the time of the commission
of the crime, suffice it to state that the said moviehouse is only about 100 to 150 meters away from
the scene of the crime and the said appellant has not shown that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Besides, his alibi cannot prevail over his
positive identification by Lory Bunabon.
3. Finally, the appellants claim that the penalty of reclusion perpetua, imposed by the trial court upon
the appellants Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. is excessive. Appellants argue that with the
elimination of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for Murder was accordingly
reduced.
The contention is without merit. This issue had been laid to rest in the case of People v. Muñoz, 12
where the Court ruled that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution does not change the
periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except that it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The Court therein further ruled
that the range of the medium and minimum penalties for murder remains unchanged.chanrobles law
library : red
We find, however, that Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. are only accomplices in the crime
since their participations therein were not absolutely indispensable in the commission of the crime.
Lory Bunabon declared that Jovito Cagalingan stabbed the deceased Joemar Desor after Alfredo
Cagalingan had stabbed the deceased at the back, while Victor Romina, Jr. stabbed the said deceased
while the latter was already lying prostrate on the ground. 13 While the acts of Jovito Cagalingan and
Victor Romina, Jr. show a community of design with the principal, Alfredo Cagalingan, who inflicted the
fatal wound, and they (Jovito and Victor) cooperated in hastening the victim’s death, the said
appellants’ acts were not absolutely indispensable in the commission of the crime. A person who
assaults a victim already fatally wounded by another is only regarded as an accomplice. 14
The penalty for appellants Jovito Cagalingan and Victor Romina, Jr. as accomplices must be modified.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prison mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
With the modification above indicated, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects, with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* Penned by Judge Ricardo A. Daculi.
1. Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-7.
2. Decision, pp. 13-14.
3. tsn of June 18, 1986, pp. 3-6, 8.
4. tsn of July 22, 1986, pp. 2-5.
5. tsn of August 21, 1986, pp. 4-5.
6. People v. Sabio, G.R. No. L-23734, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 901.
7. Exhibit H.
8. tsn of May 15, 1985, p. 5.
9. People v. Sarol, G.R. No. 66240, October 8, 1985, 135 SCRA 125, 130-131.
10. tsn of December 11, 1984, p. 9.
11. Decision, p. 43.
12. G.R. Nos. L-38969-70, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 107.
13. tsn of December 11, 1984, pp. 11-13; tsn of December 12, 1984, pp. 81-82.
14. People v. Antonio and Desargo, 73 Phil. 421.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46485. November 21, 1979.]

NORMAN LACSON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Coronel Law Office for Petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for Respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 promulgated on April
26, 1977, affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VIII, in Criminal
Case No. 0429-V, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Norman Lacson" convicting the accused,
petitioner herein, of the crime of frustrated homicide penalized under Art. 249, in connection with Art.
50 of the Revised Penal Code, but declaring him entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense considering that two of the three requisites mentioned in Art. 11, No. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code are present, namely, unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself and, taking into consideration the provisions of Art. 13, No. 1 and
Art. 69, both of the said Revised Penal Code, imposed upon him a straight penalty of imprisonment of
Four (4) Months of arresto mayor, and ordered the said accused to indemnify the offended party,
Jimmy Pitalio, in the amount of P500.00, and to pay the costs of the suit. 2
The petitioner was originally charged under two (2) informations. In Criminal Case No. 0429-V, 3 he
was accused of frustrated homicide for having shot one Jimmy Pitalio on January 23, 1972 in the
municipality of Valenzuela, province of Bulacan. The petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 0430-
V 4 with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition for having in his possession a Commanche Chief
Caliber .22 Magnum revolver which was not licensed in his name. This was the same gun he used in
shooting Jimmy Pitalio.
The two criminal cases were tried jointly. Thereafter the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the
petitioner of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 0430-V and
convicting said petitioner of the crime of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 0429-V. 5
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by
the trial court: 6
"ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED WHEN HE
ATTACKED APPELLANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE
MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO DEFEND HIMSELF.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LEGITIMATE SELF-
DEFENSES."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in toto 7 and denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of said decision in a resolution dated June 20, 1977. 8
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors: 9
"ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION OF THE

TRIAL COURT THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT ARMED WITH A KNIFE WHEN HE ATTACKED THE
PETITIONER.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION OF THE

TRIAL COURT THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT AS WITNESSES HIS MAID, HIS
HELPER AND HIS WIFE TO CORROBORATE HIS TESTIMONY RENDERS THE DEFENSE VERSION
UNWORTHY OF CREDENCE.
III
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE THE OFFENDED PARTY WAS
NOT ARMED WITH A KNIFE WHEN HE ATTACKED THE PETITIONER, THERE WAS NO REASONABLE
NECESSITY FOR THE LATTER TO USE HIS WIFE’S GUN TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE.
IV
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM COMPLETE SELF-
DEFENSE, RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED
IS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES ONLY AND NOT FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE."cralaw virtua1aw library
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are: 10
"Norman Lacson, Jimmy Pitalio, Carlos Tan and Enrique Masacote were neighbors in General Tiburcio
de Leon, Valenzuela, Bulacan. At about noon on January 23, 1972, Carlos Tan invited Masacote and
Pitalio to the birthday party of his son in their house. While they were eating and drinking in the yard,
Tan told Pitalio that the laborers of Lacson were leaving their work. Tan also asked Pitalio to find out
whether the latter could get the balance of his unpaid wages from Lacson. Pitalio went to Lacson’s
residence, kicked open the gate of appellant’s residence, and forced his way inside the yard. Appellant
and his wife had just arrived and were alighting from their car when Pitalio, under the influence of
liquor, confronted Mrs. Lacson and asked her to produce their truck driver named Serafica, saying:
‘Pag hindi mo siya hinarap sa akin ay may mangyayari.’ Appellant remonstrated with Pitalio to abide by
the law. This enraged Pitalio who replied: ‘Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!’ Taking the Magnum .22
caliber pistol of his wife from her handbag, the appellant then fired it once at Pitalio’s chest."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Thereafter Mrs. Lacson brought Pitalio to the hospital. There Pitalio’s gunshot wound was treated and
operated on (Exhibit ‘A’). Pitalio’s confinement in the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital lasted from
January 23 to February 2, 1972. The medical certificate issued unto him stated that his injury would
incapacitate him for more than thirty (30) days."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its analysis of the evidence for the prosecution and for the defense, the trial court found that: 11
"Jimmy Pitalio, on the witness stand, admitted that at the time of the incident he had drunk beer in the
house of Carlos Tan but denied being drunk. The Court believes, however, that at the time he was
under the influence of liquor so much so that although he knew that the balance of his salary which
was a measly P1.00 in amount was due to him from the driver, he pressed Mrs. Lacson for the
nonpayment and as a matter of fact, according to him, he told Mrs. Lacson ‘Never mind, Mrs. Lacson,
alam kong ginigipit ninyo ako.’ Again, the fact that Jimmy Pitalio was known as a person of bad
character in the locality is shown by the uncontradicted testimony of the accused who testified that
Carlos Tan and Masacote warned him about Jimmy Pitalio and, by the fact that Jimmy Pitalio was
convicted of serious physical injuries against his own uncle (Exhibit 4), and likewise by the fact that he
admitted having stoned the house of accused Norman Lacson together with other companions."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The petitioner invoked self-defense. His evidence is that Jimmy Pitalio attacked him with a knife, and in
order to prevent or repel the aggression he took the gun of his wife from her handbag and shot at the
offended party.
The trial court rejected petitioner’s theory of complete self-defense. However, it ruled that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, stating thus: 12
"Considering, therefore, the fact that at the time of the incident the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, was
drunk and considering his bad character, the Court believes, therefore, that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Jimmy Pitalio. It was Jimmy Pitalio who provoked the incident by going in a
drunken condition to the house of the accused. The fact that Pitalio was of a violent temperament,
strong and aggressive, previously convicted of serious physical injuries against his own uncle, plus the
fact that he entered the residence of the accused in this case, makes the Court conclude that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party in this case."cralaw virtua1aw library
The trial court held that there was no reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
unlawful aggression but found that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
because: 13
"That there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in this case is very clear
because it was Jimmy Pitalio who himself provoked the incident by accusing the wife of the accused of
depriving him of his wages. The Court therefore finds that although there was no reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel, the first requisite of unlawful aggression was present, as
well as the third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself."cralaw virtua1aw library
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of
complete self-defense. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the offended party and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
petitioner. Both said courts, however, found the use of the gun by the petitioner as an unreasonable
means to repel the unlawful aggression of the offended party, Jimmy Pitalio, apparently on the belief
that the latter did not have any weapon.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The petitioner testified that the offended party was armed with a "kris like" knife when he confronted
Mrs. Lacson and the accused. The trial court found that when the petitioner remonstrated with Pitalio
to abide by the law, Pitalio was enraged and replied "Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!" Implicit in this
statement of Pitalio is that he was referring to something as "ito ang batas." This statement of Pitalio
tends to corroborate the testimony of the petitioner that the offended party was armed with a "kris-
like" knife. The trial court did not state to what Pitalio, the offended party, referred when he said." . .
ito ang batas!" before he was fired at by the petitioner. The statement could not have simply referred
to the fists of the offended party. It is contrary to normal human behavior for the petitioner to have
taken the pistol of his wife from her handbag and fired at Pitalio if Pitalio did not have any weapon at
all. The only logical conclusion is that Pitalio had a knife when he said "Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!."
The phrase "ito ang batas" could only have referred to a weapon.
In People v. Boholst-Caballero, 14 this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the incident
object of the accusation, the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or
circumstances which can be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a
testimony, for after all the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence,
so much so that when a court as a judicial fact-finder pronounces judgment that a set of facts
constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal knowledge but as the result of an
evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be proved."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Considering the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Jimmy Pitalio, the offended
party, was drunk at the time he was shot; that Pitalio was known as a person of bad character in the
locality; that Pitalio had been convicted of serious physical injuries committed against his own uncle;
that on a previous occasion, Pitalio admitted having stoned the house of petitioner, Norman Lacson;
and the fact that Pitalio had intruded into the residence of the accused, the use by the petitioner of a
gun as the only available weapon to repel the aggression cannot be considered as an unreasonable
means of defending himself and his wife from the offended party.
This Court explained the meaning of reasonable means employed thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That there is reasonable necessity of the means employed by herein appellant to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression cannot seriously be disputed.’Reasonable necessity of the means employed does
not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires
is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, the instinct, more than the reason, that
moves or impels the defense and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done,
but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury . . .’ As WE stated in the case of People v. Lara, in
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience
to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon
this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the
consequences." 15
In the instant case, there was an imminent danger of the lives of the petitioner and of his wife from the
unlawful attack of an enraged, drunken, and armed Pitalio. The gun in the bag of his wife, who was
beside him, afforded the petitioner the only reasonable means to ward off the attack.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
The petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense. It is no longer necessary
to discuss the other errors assigned by him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the information in Criminal Case No. 0429-V of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Endnotes:
1. Annex "A", Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-35.
2. Record of Criminal Case No. 0429-V, p. 132.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
4. Ibid., p. 124.
5. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
6. Rollo, p. 37; Brief for accused-appellant, pp. 1-2.
7. Ibid., pp. 39-46.
8. Ibid., p. 120, as stated in Respondent’s Brief, p. 3.
9. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
10. Decision, CA, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 39-40.
11. Decision, CFI-Bulacan, pp. 79, Record of Criminal Case No. 0429-V, pp. 129-130.
12. Decision, CFI, p. 8; Ibid., p. 130.
13. Decision, CFI, pp. 8-9; Ibid., p. 131.
14. 61 SCRA 180, 191.
15. People v. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522, 534-535.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118423. June 16, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CESARIO SANCHEZ @ SATUR, REMEGIO JOSE @

OSING, RODRIGO ABAYAN @ LUDRING, FEDERICO ROBIOS @ RICO, GAUDENCIO CONTAWE
@ GODING, accused-appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated September 29, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis,
Pangasinan, Branch 50, in Criminal Case No. V-0092 finding appellants Cesario Sanchez, Remegio
Jose, Rodrigo Abayan, Federico Robios, and Gaudencio Contawe guilty of the crime of Murder and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
Hilario Miranda jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity, the amount of P38,000.00
as actual damages, the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and attorneys fees (for the private
prosecutor) in the amount of P10,000.00.
The five (5) appellants, Cesario Sanchez, Remegio Jose, Rodrigo Abayan, Federico Robios, and
Gaudencio Contawe, are all farmers and residents of Villasis, Pangasinan. They are townmates of the
victim, Hilario Miranda, who was the incumbent barangay captain at the time of the stabbing incident.
The prosecutions evidence reveals that on November 23, 1986, Hilario Miranda, together with Rene
Alegre, Jessie Pajimola, Romulo Marquez, Freddie Miranda, Eladio Miranda and several others, went to
his fishpond to celebrate the birthday of his daughter, Grace. At around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon,
Hilario Miranda and his companions headed home to Barangay Villanueva, Bautista, Pangasinan. 2 When
the group reached the provincial road at Barangay Villanueva, appellant Sanchez blocked the middle of
the road3 while the other appellants Jose, Contawe, Abayan, Robios, and Callo were some twenty (20)
to twenty-five (25) meters behind him.4 Contawe, Robios, and Callo were holding their bolos; Jose had
his bolo sheathed on his shoulder, while Abayan was holding two (2) fist-size stones.5 Appellant
Sanchez confronted Hilario Miranda about his accusation that Sanchez was stealing ipil-ipil wood and
fish.6Thereafter, an argument ensued. Prosecution witness Marquez testified on said incident as
follows:7
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ROMULO T. MARQUEZ BY ATTY. BENJAMIN RAFAEL
Q: What was the argument about?
A: As far as I could recall, the barangay captain have (sic) known that Cesario Sanchez was stealing
firewoods and fish during nighttime and when Cesario Sanchez met the barangay captain what I heard
was that, in Ilocano: Apay ngay, Capitan ta pabpabasolennak nga agtaktakaw ti ipil-ipil yo ken
lames? (Why is it, Captain, that you are blaming me of stealing ipil-ipil firewood and fish?)
Q: Were those the first words uttered by Cesario Sanchez when he met the Barangay Captain?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What was the reaction of the barangay captain when Cesario Sanchez said those words?
A: There was an immediate argument, Your Honor.
Q: What did he (victim) say?
A: The barangay captain answered, Agpaypayso met nga agtaktakaw ka ti ipil-ipil ken agtiltiliw ka ti
lames. (It is also true that you are stealing ipil-ipil woods and you are catching fish.)
Renato Alegre, Mirandas son-in-law, tried to pacify Miranda by saying that is enough, Manong.8 As the
argument between Sanchez and Miranda heated up, Sanchez moved back towards his companions
Jose, Callo, Robios, Contawe and Abayan, who then encircled the group of the victim in such a way
that nobody could move.9 Freddie Miranda, the victims son, asked Abayan who was then holding two
stones10 [w]hy are you stoning us?.11 Abayan replied, You from the east are boastful.12 Jose went near
one of the victims companions (Jessie Pajimola) and told her in the Ilocano dialect Saan kayo nga
makiramraman (Dont interfere).13 Jose passed by the back of Hilario Miranda and nodded at Sanchez.
Upon seeing the signal, appellant Sanchez pulled a knife from the sleeve in his left arm 14 and stabbed
the victim in the stomach.15Freddie Miranda, the son of the victim, tried to chase Sanchez but he
(Freddie) was blocked by appellant Jose who was holding his bolo in a striking position and who told
him Saan mo nga itultuloy ta sica ti sumaruno (Dont continue or else you will be the next). 16 The other
appellants were also holding their bolos in a striking position. 17Hence, Freddie had no choice but to
return to his father who was badly hurt but valiantly trying to remain standing. Freddie pulled out the
weapon from his fathers stomach. The weapon was later turned over to Pfc. Rodolfo Tagulao, Jr.,
member of the Integrated National Police of Bautista, Pangasinan.18 Freddie Miranda and Renato Alegre
hailed a passing tricycle and brought the victim to the hospital. Unfortunately, the victim died along
the way.
On September 1, 1987, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jaime V. Veniegas charged Cesario Sanchez,
Remegio Jose, Rodrigo Abayan, Federico Robios, Eugenio Contawe, and Basilio Callo with the crime of
Murder under the following Information:19cräläwvirtualibräry
The undersigned hereby accuses REMEGIO JOSE @ GODING, RODRIGO ABAYAN @ LUDRING,
FEDERICO ROBIOS @ RICO, GAUDENCIO CONTAWE @ GODING of the crime of MURDER committed as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of November 1986, in the afternoon, at Barangay Villanueva,
Municipality of Bautista, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with CESARIO SANCHEZ @ SATUR and BASILIO
CALLO who are still at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike HILARIO MIRANDA thereby inflicting upon him the following
wounds:
xxx
- Stabbed wound, about 3.5 cm., bleeding, midaxillary line, left, subcostal border, 19 cm. deep.
xxx
which wounds directly caused the death of said Hilario Miranda.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Villasis, Pangasinan, September 1, 1987.
Of the six (6) accused, only four (4) were initially arrested and brought to trial, namely Rodrigo
Abayan, Gaudencio Contawe, Federico Robios, and Remegio Jose. Accused Basilio Callo eluded arrest
and remains at-large up to present. Before promulgation of sentence, appellant Cesario Sanchez was
arrested on March 26, 1991. The trial court suspended promulgation of sentence pending trial of
appellant Cesario Sanchez.
Upon arraignment, the four (4) appellants Abayan, Contawe, Robios and Jose, duly assisted by
respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty. Appellant Sanchez later entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented six (6) witnesses: (1) Dr. Nestor C. Pascual, Municipal Health
Officer of Bautista, Pangasinan; (2) Cpl. Abdiel Agustin of the INP of Bautista, Pangasinan; (3) Freddie
C. Miranda, the victims son; (4) Romulo T. Marquez; (5) Jessie C. Pajimola; and (6) Mrs. Rufina C.
Miranda, the victims widow.
Dr. Nestor C. Pascual, the Municipal Health Officer of Bautista, Pangasinan, testified that he performed
a post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Hilario Miranda and found the cause of death to be
cardiorespiratory failure due to hypovolemic shock resulting from the bleeding wound due to the stab
wound.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Cpl. Abdiel Agustin testified that he conducted the investigation of the death of Hilario Miranda upon a
report given by OIC Police Corporal Amado Santiago.21 He identified the weapon (Exhibit F) which was
submitted on the night of November 23, 1986 to Patrolman Rodolfo Tagulao Jr., another member of
the INP-Bautista, Pangasinan. He testified that he attempted to contact the suspects (appellants
Sanchez, Jose, Contawe, Abayan, Robios and Callo), but despite diligent efforts, he could not locate
them. He left word with their respective wives to come to the office (police station) for their
statements, but they did not report to him. An informer later told him that appellants were all in
hiding.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Romulo T. Marquez, one of the companions of the victim, testified that appellant Sanchez confronted
the victim regarding the theft of some wood and fish, and thereafter, a heated argument ensued.
Appellants surrounded their group and Sanchez stabbed the victim in the stomach. He drew a sketch of
the relative positions of the assailants and the victim. 23 His testimony was corroborated by the
testimonies of Freddie Miranda and Jessie Pajimola.
Rufina C. Miranda testified that her husband was earning an income of P100,000.00 per annum derived
from the fishpond, agricultural land holdings and employment with National Irrigation Authority (NIA),
and that she spent a total of P38,000.00 as funeral expenses.24cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, the defense presented Alberto Parcasio and Pedro Soriano as common witnesses.
The four (4) appellants, Abayan, Robios, Contawe and Jose testified on their behalf, while appellant
Sanchez likewise took the stand on his behalf.
Alberto Parcasio testified that while he was taking care of his granddaughter in his yard (some 15
meters from the incident), he saw Sanchez stab the victim and then run away. He claimed that he did
not see appellants Abayan, Robios and Contawe within the vicinity of the crime but only saw them after
the victim was already loaded in the tricycle. He only saw appellant Jose half an hour after the
incident.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Pedro Soriano, a bystander, testified that while he was in the yard of appellant Contawe, he saw Hilario
Miranda assault Sanchez after which Sanchez stabbed the victim. Soriano then entered his house
because he became afraid of what was happening.26cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellants Abayan, Robios and Contawe, testifying on their behalf, claimed that they were mere
bystanders in the affray and that they were included in the complaint for the sole reason that they
belonged to the Liberal Party, while the victim belonged to the rival Nationalista
Party.27cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant Abayan testified that while he was on the provincial road on the way to get his cow, from a
distance of some 30 meters away, he saw Sanchez stab the victim on the stomach and then run away.
He saw Freddie Miranda chase Sanchez while some people called for a tricycle. He denied holding two
stones and attempting to throw them at the victim. He denied surrounding the group of the victim and
claimed that he never saw Romulo T. Marquez in the vicinity of the crime. He further denied going into
hiding after the incident.28cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant Robios testified that while he was pumping water in front of his house some thirty (30)
meters from the incident, he saw Sanchez stab the victim in the stomach. He was afraid to get near
because Freddie Miranda was holding the knife and might run amuck. He claims he was included in the
complaint because he failed to support the victims candidacy during the previous
elections.29cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant Contawe testified he was with Pedro Soriano, watching over his grandchildren in his house
some fifteen (15) meters away from the incident when he saw Sanchez stab the victim in the
stomach.30 Then he saw Sanchez run to his (Sanchez) house some twenty (20) meters away. 31 He
claimed that he was included in the complaint because he refused to support the candidacy of the
victim in the previous elections.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant Jose testified that while he was cooking in the kitchen, he heard a womans voice saying Ay
Natayen (Somebody died). He went out and saw the victim being held by the latters son-in-law. He
asked Freddie Miranda what happened, and the latter told him to get a ride. After the victim was
loaded on the tricycle, he then returned to his cooking. He denied the testimonies of Freddie Miranda,
Jessie Pajimola and Romulo Marquez that he was one of those who surrounded the victim and his
companions and that he was the one who gave the signal to Sanchez to stab the
victim.33cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution presented Cpl. Rodolfo Tagulao of the INP-Bautista, Pangasinan, and Romulo T.
Marquez as rebuttal witnesses.
Cpl. Rodolfo Tagulao, warrant officer of the INP-Bautista, Pangasinan, testified that he attempted to
serve the warrant of arrest on appellants by going to their respective residences four times but he
failed to apprehend any of the appellants. When an alias warrant of arrest was issued by the Regional
Trial Court, appellants appeared before him and informed him that they had already posted their
respective bail bonds.34cräläwvirtualibräry
On May 4, 1989, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence which was duly admitted by the
court.
On March 26, 1991, appellant Sanchez was arrested by the police. Trial as to him commenced, and he
called prosecution witness Dr. Nestor Pascual and defense witness Alberto Parcasio as his witnesses,
who reiterated their earlier testimonies. Appellant Sanchez, testifying on his behalf, admitted that he
stabbed Miranda, but claimed that it was in self-defense. He testified that while he was on his way to
Obillo to thresh palay, he was met by the victim and his companions who were drunk. The victim
commanded his companions to maul him because he (Sanchez) voted for Cory (Aquino) in the last
presidential elections. He tried to evade them but somebody met him and the victims group
surrounded him.35 The victim boxed him three times and ordered his (the victims) son to get the gun.
It was then that he turned around and stabbed the victim with his bolo. 36 He then ran away and spent
the night in the ricefields.37 He claimed that he did not see any of his co-accused at the locus
criminis.38cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 29, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision 39 finding all appellants, except Callo who
remains at-large, guilty of Murder. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Cesario Sanchez, Remegio Jose, Rodrigo Abayan, Federico
Robios and Eugenio Contawe a.k.a. Gaudencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and hereby sentences each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay to the heirs of Hilario Miranda, jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the life of said Hilario Miranda; the amount of P38,800.00 as actual damages; the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and attorneys fees (for the private prosecutor) in the
amount of P10,000.00.
Costs against all the accused jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellants now interpose their respective appeals. Appellants Jose and Contawe assign the
following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED CONSPIRED IN CAUSING THE DEATH OF
HILARIO MIRANDA.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF MURDER.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS,
ROMULO MARQUEZ, FREDDIE MIRANDA AND JESSIE PAJENIDA (sic).
Appellants Abayan and Robios claim that -
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AS
THESE WERE NOT OFFERED IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY THE RULES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS BASED ON A FINDING OF CONSPIRACY.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE APPELLANTS ACTED IN UNITY TO
ACHIEVE A COMMON DESIGN TO ELIMINATE AND KILL HILARIO MIRANDA.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANTS RODRIGO ABAYAN AND FEDERICO
ROBIOS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
For his part, appellant Sanchez assigns the following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE ACCUSED (sic) EVIDENCE SHOWING SELF-
DEFENSE.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED CESARIO SANCHEZ AND IMPOSING UPON
HIM THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.
In sum, appellants raise the following pertinent issues: first, whether or not the trial court erred in
giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Romulo Marquez, Freddie Miranda and Jessie
Pajimola. Second, even assuming that these witnesses are credible, whether or not the trial court erred
in considering their testimonies as these were not offered in the manner required by the Rules of
Court. Third, whether or not the lower court erred in finding that conspiracy existed among accused-
appellants. Fourth, whether or not appellant Cesario Sanchez acted in self-defense.
Appellants Jose and Contawe contend that the uniformity of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses Romulo T. Marquez and Freddie C. Miranda indicate that their testimonies were coached and
should be disbelieved. On the contrary, however, we find the testimonies of these witnesses
straightforward, credible, and replete with details of the commission of the crime, as shown in several
sketches of the respective positions of the assailants at the time of the incident. 40 These witnesses
never wavered in the face of rigorous cross-examination by the respective counsels of the appellants.
Furthermore, the material points in their testimonies, particularly the identities of the assailants, were
corroborated by the testimony of prosecution witness Jessie Pajimola.
Appellants Jose and Contawe contend that since the judge who rendered the decision was not the one
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, said judge was not in a position to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses and their manner of testifying and therefore, not in a position to gauge their
credibility. Appellants then proceeded to invoke our ruling in People v. Bautista, 236 SCRA 102, 106-
107 (1994), wherein we held that:
It is obvious that these are factual conclusions of the trial court which are ordinarily respected on
appeal owing to the position of the trial judge who personally saw and heard the witnesses testify. This
rule, however, need not apply in its full rigor to the case at bench, where two judges conducted the
trial and the decision was eventually written by a third.
However, appellants conveniently overlooked the succeeding paragraph of the same decision wherein
we affirmed the factual findings of the lower court, stating thus:
Still, Judge Dizon-Capulong, while recognizing this handicap, concluded that the trial was properly
conducted by her predecessors and that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the
culpability of the accused-appellant.
Indeed, while the incumbent judge of the trial court did not hear Romulo Marquez, Freddie Miranda and
Jessie Pajimola testify, there is nothing in their testimonies as recorded in the transcript of
stenographic notes which would render their testimonies suspicious and unbelievable. On the other
hand, we find their testimonies to be consistent with, and corroborate, each other in respect of the
main incident and the identities of all the accused. A thorough and careful review of the entire records
of the case has not convinced us to depart from the factual findings of the lower court.
Further, the defenses of appellants consist of denial and alibi. The prevailing rule is that alibi, being the
weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, cannot prevail over and is
worthless in the face of the positive identification by the accused. 41 The established doctrine requires
the accused to prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the locus criminis or its
immediate vicinity.42 This, appellants miserably failed to do. In fact, all of them admitted to being
within a thirty-meter radius from the locus criminis when the killing occurred, hence it was not
physically impossible for them to have participated in the commission of the crime, and thereafter
dispersed in order to avoid any further entanglement in the case.
Appellants Abayan and Robios further contend that the trial court should have disregarded the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses since these were not offered at the time when the witnesses
were called to testify, as required by Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. -The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Section 35 of the same Rule further requires that the offer must be made at the time the witness is
called to testify. Thus -
SEC. 35. When to make offer. -As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the
time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a partys testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
Appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not formally offered as
required by the Rules, and therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. Indeed, a
perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes will show that no formal offer of testimonial evidence
was made prior to or after the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. However, the transcripts also
reveal that in spite of the lack of formal offer of the testimonial evidence, appellants failed to object to
the presentation of such evidence, and even subjected the prosecution witnesses to a rigorous cross-
examination.43 Thus, in People v. Cadocio, 228 SCRA 602, 609 (1993) and People v. Java, 227 SCRA
668, 679-680 (1993), we had occasion to rule that:
Indeed, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be considered,
it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. This is necessary because a judge has to rest
his findings of fact and his judgment only upon the evidence formally offered by the parties at the trial.
(People v. Pecardal, G.R. No. 71381 [1986]).
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective on July
1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is called to
testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the trial after all the
witnesses had testified. With the invocation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be
presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness who would be testifying on irrelevant
matter or on facts already testified to by other witnesses and should therefore, be stopped from
testifying further.
In the case at bar, we note that Pastor Valdez was not one of the witnesses originally intended to be
presented by the prosecution. He was merely called to the witness stand at the latter part of the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence. There was no mention why his testimony was being
presented. However, notwithstanding that his testimony was not formally offered, its presentation was
not objected to either. Section 36 of the aforementioned Rule requires that an objection in the course
of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below,
an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. (Asombra v. Dorado, 36 Phil.
883). (italics supplied)
Thus, the failure of the defense to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of the prosecutions
testimonial evidence results in the waiver of any objection to the admissibility thereof. Appellants
belated invocation of the strict interpretation of the Rules of Evidence to suit their purposes is clearly
misplaced.
Appellants were convicted of murder on the theory of conspiracy. It is well-settled that conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it.44Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect
to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by
which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the
accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. In
such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed
equally guilty of the crime committed.45 The proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances.46 Thus, we find that the following facts, pieced together,
indubitably prove the existence of conspiracy:
(1) The presence of appellants on the provincial road at the north end of Barangay Villanueva, armed
with bolos and stones. Abayan was holding two fist size stones, while the Contawe, Jose and Remigio
were holding their bolos in a striking position;
(2) The act of appellant Sanchez in confronting the victim while Abayan, Contawe, Jose and Remigio
were surrounding the victims companions indicates concert of actions of the appellants;
(3) The act of Jose during the confrontation in moving from one side of the road to the other while,
and while passing at the back of the victim, giving the go-signal to appellant Sanchez, who after seeing
the signal, stabbed the victim;
(4) The act of Jose in blocking the way of Freddie Miranda in chasing Cesario Sanchez;
(5) The fact that all the accused fled town after the incident without satisfactory explanation for their
absence.
As can be gleaned from the above circumstances, appellants acted together with one purpose and
design to kill Hilario Miranda. While only one of them dealt the fatal stab wound, all of them are liable
for the killing of the victim.
It is true that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and ones mere
presence in the crime scene does not make an accused a conspirator. However, the co-accused were
not merely present in the crime scene, they directly participated in the criminal design of appellant
Sanchez by their concerted acts. Indeed, for collective responsibility among the herein accused to be
established it is not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or agreement to commit the
assault; it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the accused by their acts manifested a
common intent or desire to attack the victim, so that the act of one accused became the act of
all.47cräläwvirtualibräry
As to appellant Sanchez claim of self defense, it is basic that for self-defense to prosper, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.48 The justifying circumstance of self-
defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking
it.49 Where the accused has admitted that he is the author of the death of the deceased, it is
incumbent upon the appellant, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove this justifying circumstance
(self-defense) claimed by him, to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence, and not on the weakness of the prosecution for even if it were weak, it could not
be disbelieved after the accused admitted the killing. 50 And more so when his co-appellants themselves
categorically testified that they saw appellant Sanchez stab the victim, without corroborating his claim
of self-defense. In addition, the prosecution witnesses, in clear and concise language, positively and
steadfastly maintained that appellant together with his five companions, armed with bolos in a striking
position, surrounded the victim and his companions, whereupon Sanchez stabbed the victim in the
stomach. Moreover, the conduct of the appellant Sanchez is not consistent with one who killed in self-
defense. The accuseds flight from the scene of the crime is a strong indication of guilt. 51 Flight is a
badge of guilt when it is done to escape from the authorities or to escape prosecution. 52 In this case,
appellant Sanchez himself testified that after the killing, he ran away and hid in a banana plantation for
three (3) hours.53 Then when it was dark, he went home but he found that his wife and child had
already left because their house was stoned by some persons. Appellant Sanchez then spent the night
in the ricefield because he was afraid of persons roaming around.54 While appellant claims that he then
stayed in his house for three days and even sent Rodolfo Doctor to the police station to tell them of his
intention to surrender, and that said person came back and advised him to go away because he would
be salvaged,55 such testimony is unbelievable in the light of the testimony of Cpl. Abdiel Agustin that
he went to the houses of all appellants four times but could not locate them. 56cräläwvirtualibräry
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the evidence on record does not show unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim. Rather, it was appellant Sanchez who was the unlawful aggressor. He
confronted the victim on the provincial road wherein, after a heated argument, he stabbed the victim.
Even if the response of the victim to the query of Sanchez regarding the theft of fish and wood might
have hurt the pride of Sanchez, the trial court correctly observed that such petty question of pride
does not justify the wounding and killing of Hilario Miranda. Hence, the invocation of self-defense by
Sanchez must fail.
We also find that the killing of the victim was attended with treachery since the stabbing was sudden
and unexpected, and the victim was not only unarmed, but was unable to defend himself. To sustain a
finding of treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.57 These conditions were amply
demonstrated in the instant case.
We also hold that the appellants in assaulting and eventually killing the victim, took advantage of their
superior strength. They were six (6), armed with bolos and stones, as against the victim, who was
without means of defending himself. However, when treachery qualifies the crime of Murder, the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the
former.58cräläwvirtualibräry
At the time of the commission of the crime on November 23, 1986, the penalty for Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was then reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, when there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, which is reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of damages, the Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Hilario V. Miranda. However, the award of P38,000.00 as actual damages must be reduced, as the duly
documented receipt for the funeral services is only P13,000.00 (Exh. P-2). We have held that only
expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with
the death of the victim should be allowed.59 The award of actual damages cannot be based on the
allegation of a witness without any tangible document to support such claim.60 The Court finds the
award of moral damages recoverable under Article 2219(1), in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code
in the amount of P100,000.00 to be excessive. As moral damages are not intended to enrich the
prevailing party61an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages would be keeping with the purpose of the
law. The award of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees appears to be reasonable and is therefore sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, in Criminal
Case No. V-0092 finding accused-appellants Cesario Sanchez, Remegio Jose, Rodrigo Abayan, Federico
Robio and Gaudencio Contawe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as to the
award of damages as follows: accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable for and hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Hilario
V. Miranda, P13,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., no part. On official leave.
Endnotes:
1
Penned by Judge Alfonso G. Abad.
2 TSN, July 22, 1988, pp. 6-7; TSN, November 18, 1988, p. 3.
3
TSN, July 22, 1988, p. 27.
4 Id. at 28.
5
TSN, July 22, 1988, p. 8; TSN, November 18, 1988, p. 20.
6 TSN, July 22, 1988, p. 18.
7 TSN, July 22, 1988, pp. 17-18; TSN, August 1, 1991, pp. 15-16. Italics supplied.
8 TSN, July 22, 1988, p. 22.
9 TSN, July 22, 1988, p. 20; TSN, November 11, 1988, pp. 10, 20.
10
TSN, November 11, 1988, p. 9.
11 Id. at 6, 9.
12 TSN, November 11, 1988, p. 6; TSN, May 20, 1993, p. 22.
13
TSN, February 23, 1989, pp. 9, 21; TSN, April 5, 1989, p. 4.
14 TSN, January 31, 1990, pp. 10, 11-A.

15 Sworn statement of Jessie C. Pajimola, Exhibit D, Rollo, p. 4; TSN, November 18, 1988, p. 11.
16 Sworn statement of Freddie C. Miranda, Exhibit B, Rollo, p. 2; TSN, November 11, 1988, p. 10; TSN, July 22, 1988, p. 12.
17
TSN, November 11, 1988, p. 13. Emphasis supplied.
18 Id at 12-13.
19
Rollo, pp. 2-3.
20 TSN, January 28, 1988, pp. 3-11.
21 TSN, June 1, 1988, pp. 1-4.
22 Id. at 3-17.
23 TSN, July 22, 1988, pp. 8-11.
24 TSN, April 13, 1989, pp. 5-6, 16.
25 TSN, January 26, 1990, pp. 12-13.
26
TSN, February 2, 1990, pp. 6, 12.
27 TSN, March 16, 1990, pp. 10-11; TSN, May 10, 1990, pp. 10-11; TSN, May 23, 1990, pp. 8-9.
28 TSN, March 16, 1990, pp. 5, 8-10; TSN, March 30, 1990, pp. 18-20.
29
TSN, May 10, 1990, pp. 125.
30 TSN, May 23, 1990, pp. 5, 8.
31
Id. at 7.
32
Id. at 9.
33 TSN, June 1, 1990, pp. 4-5.
34 TSN, October 18, 1990, pp. 4-11.
35 TSN, February 4, 1993, pp. 6-8.
36 TSN, April 22, 1993, pp. 12-13, 18-19.
37 TSN, April 29, 1993, p. 7.
38 TSN, May 20, 1993, p. 3.
39 Rollo, pp. 47-79.
40 Records, p. 603.
41 People v. Quiamco, 268 SCRA 529 (1997).
42People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485, August 31, 1998, p. 49; People v. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316, 333 (1998); People v. Ballesteros, 285
SCRA 438 (1998); People v. Sumbillo, 271 SCRA 428, 444 (1997).
43TSN, January 28, 1988, pp. 11-15; TSN, July 22, 1988, pp. 16-30; TSN, August 5, 1988, pp. 3-18; TSN, November 18, 1988, pp. 2-
21; TSN, February 23, 1989, pp. 16-23; TSN, April 5, 1989, pp. 2-9.
44 Article 8, second par., Revised Penal Code.
45 People v. Quinao, et. al., 269 SCRA 495 (1997).
46 People v. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 (1995).
47
See People v. Cercano, 87 SCRA 1 (1978).
48People v. Enriquito Unarce, 270 SCRA 756 (1997), citing People v. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 (1996); People v. Morin, 241 SCRA 709
(1995); People v. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 (1994); People v. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37 (1996); People v. Bernal, 254 SCRA 659 (1996); Article
11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code.
49
People v. Nacuspag, 115 SCRA 172, 180 (1982).
5050 People v. Picardal, 151 SCRA 170, 176 (1987).
51
People v. Salcedo, 151 SCRA 220 (1987).
52 People v. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 (1998).
53
TSN, April 29, 1993, p. 6.
54 Id., p. 7.
55
Id., p. 8.
56 TSN, June 1, 1988, p. 3.
57 People v. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711, 725 (1997).
58 People v. Violin, et. al., 266 SCRA 224 (1997); People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713 (1997); People v. Datun, 272 SCRA 380 (1997).
59 Fuentes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430 (1996).
60 David v. Court of Appeals and People, 290 SCRA 727 (1998).
61
People v. Padlan, 290 SCRA 388 (1998); People v. Wenceslao, 212 SCRA 560 (1992); People v. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279 (1992).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76235. January 21, 1991.]
PROCERFINA OLBINAR, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO

JIMENEZ, Respondents.
Rufino Mayor and Isidro M. Ampig for petitioner.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
In the Municipal Circuit Court of Babak-Samal, Davao Province, Procerfina Olbinar was indicted,
arraigned and tried for the felony of serious physical injuries committed with the use of a bolo against
the person of Fernando Jimenez on or about June 8, 1980 in Barangay Caliclic, Babak, Davao. 1 The
prosecution presented its proofs in due course, tending to show that in the evening of June 8, 1980 —
1) a certain Romeo Cahilog was boxing Emiliano Olbinar, Procerfina’s husband;
2) Fernando Jimenez was trying to break up the assault by pulling Romeo Cahilog from behind;
3) at this point, Procerfina came and with a bolo hacked Fernando Jimenez "in the right ear;" a second
blow also aimed at Fernando was parried by the latter with his left hand;
4) Fernando cried out that he had been hacked after which he lost consciousness;
5) Fernando sustained a wound in the left ear and a broken left forearm.
Procerfina sought, in her turn, to establish by her own evidence that she had acted in legitimate
defense of her husband and should therefore be exculpated. According to her —
1) from the kitchen of her home, she heard her husband shouting for help;
2) she ran to the scene and saw Fernando Jimenez and Romeo Cahilog mauling her husband who,
bloodied, was down on the ground;
3) she tried to stop the assailants; but not succeeding, she had swiftly run back to her home, taken a
bolo and returned to the scene;
4) Fernando Jimenez intercepted her and tried to grab the bolo from her;
5) to avoid being disarmed, she wildly brandished the bolo and in the process hit Jimenez, and thus
succeeded in stopping the attack on her husband.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The trial court concluded from the evidence that she could be credited only with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of relative pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 11 in relation to
paragraph 1, Article 13, of the Revised Penal Code.
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights provided that the following circumstances
concur:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees,
and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part
therein."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter (i.e., justifying and exempting circumstances), when all
the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases
are not attendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
In a decision rendered on June 29, 1982, 2 the Court thus found Procerfina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony charged, and appreciating in her favor said special mitigating circumstance
(incomplete defense of spouse), "and another ordinary mitigating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful (as) to have produced passion and obfuscation," sentenced her "to suffer
imprisonment of 21 days of arresto menor, to pay the cost of P10.00 and in concept of recovery of civil
liability, to pay to Fernando Jimenez the amount of P3,622.50 to cover hospital bills partly paid and
payable to San Pedro Hospital; and the amount of P618.30 to cover cost of medicine purchased from
different boticas or pharmacies."cralaw virtua1aw library
On appeal perfected by Procerfina, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Circuit
Court, 3 in a decision promulgated on August 19, 1986. 4 From this adverse decision, Procerfina has
come to this Court pleading for reversal thereof and her absolution of the crime. Her plea will be
heeded; her prayer, granted.
The Trial Court conceded that there was unlawful aggression by Fernando Jimenez and one Romeo
Cahilog against Procerfina’s husband, Emiliano. The Court declared itself "aware of Criminal Case No.
877" also pending before it "where Fernando Jimenez . . . (and) Romeo Cahilog were charged with
Physical Injuries in the same incident, . . . (and in which case) Fernando Jimenez . . . with his co-
accused entered a plea of guilty and were appropriately sentenced in accordance with the law
applicable." The criminal complaint which initiated said Criminal Case No. 877, dated June 18, 1980, 5
alleged that —
". . . on or about 7:20 o’clock in the evening of June 8, 1980, at Barangay Caliclic, Babak, Davao . . .
(both said) accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, confederating and helping
one another, attack, assault, box and kick Emiliano Olbinar hitting [him] in the face and in different
parts of the body while the latter was sitting on the bench near the store of Procerfina Olbinar, his wife,
causing him physical injuries which would require medical attendance with healing period for TEN (10)
days barring complications . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Nevertheless the Court held that the means employed by Procerfina to prevent or repel the aggression
against her husband were not reasonably necessary. It considered as "worthy with truth . . . the
prosecution’s side of the story that accused hacked Fernando Jimenez twice, directed on the head with
the use of a bolo at the height of anger after seeing her husband mauled, an act or means employed
by her beyond the realm of reasonable necessity to repel the aggression under paragraph 2, Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same conclusion was arrived at by the Court of Appeals. It noted that complainant, Fernando
Jimenez, did "not appear to be armed," nor did it appear "that the life of her husband was under
serious threat. Yet, appellant used a bolo to hack the complainant at his ear. Another blow wounded
the parrying arm of the complainant and broke his elbow." 6
The Court of Appeals also ruled that Fernando’s "version that he was hacked at his head while breaking
up the fight between appellant’s husband and Cahilog" was more credible. 7 The ruling is obviously
erroneous being contrary to the undisputed fact expressly and solemnly admitted by Fernando Jimenez
— when he and his co-accused, Romeo Cahilog, entered a plea of guilty when arraigned in Criminal
Case No. 877, supra — that at the time they were attacking, boxing and kicking Emiliano Olbinar,
hitting (him) in the face and in different parts of the body, cooperating with and helping each other.
This belies Fernando’s protestations that the fight transpired only between Romeo Cahilog and
Procerfina’s husband, and he (Fernando) was merely trying to break up the fight and pacify the
protagonists.
It being incontrovertible that both Romeo Cahilog and Fernando Jimenez attacked Emiliano and beat
him up so severely as to cause his incapacity for labor and require that he undergo medical treatment
for ten days or so, it is not improbable, as Procerfina testified, that he had fallen to the ground and his
face had been bloodied, because of the assault. Procerfina had not seen the commencement of the
assault on her husband. She had no way of knowing if her husband had given sufficient provocation
therefor. All that she saw, on responding to her husband’s cry for help, was that he was on the ground,
there was blood on his person, and two men were boxing and kicking him. After she had tried vainly to
get the men to stop beating her husband, she had gotten a bolo from her home and rushed back to
defend her fallen spouse who, for all she knew, was already seriously wounded. Unarmed, and her
husband to all appearances already hors de combat, she evidently could offer no reasonable defense,
or otherwise cause cessation of the assault on her husband. And whatever might have transpired
immediately on her return with the bolo — whether she forthwith sailed into the two assailants, or
whether Fernando Jimenez had indeed tried to prevent her from helping her husband and sought to
disarm her to prevent her in consequence of which she had flailed wildly about with her weapon, and
inflicted the injuries in question on him — the fact of the matter is that under the circumstances, she
obviously felt the compelling urgency for swift action to stop the assault on her prostrate husband, and
there was nothing else she could do towards this end except to try to hit out at his attackers. She must
have been near panic. She had no time to think. She had to act, and act quickly. The circumstances
certainly afforded her no time to investigate the nature of her husband’s injuries, determine if he was
in danger of death, analyze the situation and ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by
which with her bolo she could stop her husband’s mauling — whether she should use the flat, not the
sharp edge of the weapon, should first announce that she had a bolo and would use it if they did not
cease in their nefarious acts, etc.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Court is therefore satisfied that Procerfina had acted in justifiable defense of her husband. In the
situation in which she had found herself, she was justified in believing that her husband was the victim
of an unlawful aggression by two (2) men, who had gotten the better of him and had already
succeeded in bloodying his face and dropping him to the ground; she had no way of knowing if her
husband had given provocation for the attack; she herself had not given any such provocation; and the
means employed by her were not in the premises unreasonable considering that without any weapon,
she was no match for either of the assailants, much less both of them.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 19, 1986 is REVERSED and another
rendered, ACQUITTING the petitioner, with costs de officio. The bond for her provisional liberty is
cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. In June, 1986, the original criminal jurisdiction of municipal circuit courts was concurrent with that
of Courts of First Instance in the eleven so-called special cases provided in Sec. 87 (b) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, where the penalty provided by law was imprisonment for more than six
months or a fine of more than two hundred pesos. Among these special cases were" (2) Assaults
where the intent to kill is not charged or evident upon the trial," i.e., physical injuries [SEE Feria: Civil
Procedure, 1969 ed., pp. 107-108, and Annotations on BP 129 and the Interim Rules and Guidelines of
the Supreme Court, 1983 ed., Phil. Legal Studies, Series No. 1, pp. 29-30, citing Peo. v. Palmon, 86
Phil. 350; Natividad v. Robles, 87 Phil. 834, and Peo. v. Nazareno, 70 SCRA 531). Said concurrent
jurisdiction was eliminated by BP 129.
2. Rendered on June 29, 1982 by Judge Jose T. Suelto, Municipal Circuit Court of Babak-Samal, Davao
(copy appended to petitioner’s brief filed in the Court of Appeals; Rollo, p. 15)
3. Appeals from judgments of conviction rendered by inferior courts in the exercise of concurrent
original jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance were appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court (Feria, Civ. Procedure, op. cit., p. 108, citing Andico v. Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968).
4. Rollo, pp. 10-14; written for the Twelfth Division by Puno, J., with whom concurred Campos, Jr. and
Aldecoa, Jr., JJ.,
5. Rollo, p. 51.
6. Id., p. 12.
7. Id., p. 12.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31139 October 12, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RENATO MORAL, ABRAHAM ANTONIO,
and LEOPOLDO PEDRIGOSA, defendants, ABRAHAM ANTONIO and LEOPOLDO
PEDRIGOSA, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon A. Gonzales for defendant Leopoldo Pedrigosa.
Felix Falgin for defendant Abraham Antonio.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-160-Rizal (19290) of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, the State
charged Renato Moral, as principal, and Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham Antonio, as accomplices, of
the crime of murder committed, as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1969, in the municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Renato Moral, conspiring
and confederating together with his principal co-accused, Alexander Moral, who is still at large, and
both the two of them mutually helping and aiding one another, at night time, a circumstance
deliberately sought to insure success in the commission of the crime, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and by means of treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and stab with knives one Teodoro Casa who, as a result thereof, sustained stab wounds on the
vital parts of his body which directly caused his death;
That the accused accomplices, Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham Antonio, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cooperate in the commission of the crime by the principal accused by simultaneous acts,
that is, by then and there throwing stones at said Teodoro Casa.
The People's version of the facts of the case is, as follows:
Ang usapin ay nagpatuloy laban kina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa at Abraham Antonio lamang,
sapagkat si Alexander Moral ay hindi pa nadarakip hanggang sa
kasalukuyan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ang panig ng taga-usig na Pamahalaang Pampurok na Tagausig na si Cornelio M. Melendres, ay

nagharap ng mga katibayan upang patunayan ang kasalanang pagpatay na ibinibintang sa mga
nasasakdal. Na noong ika-siyam at kalahati (9:30) ng gabi, ika-3 ng Mayo, 1969, si Teodoro Casa ay
nasawi dahilan sa mga tinamong sugat na bunga ng pananakit ng mga nasasakdal na sina Renato
Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham Antonio, at Alexander Moral, na ang hull ay nakakalaya pa
hanggang sa kasalukuyan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ang nasawing si Teodoro Casa ay nakatira sa itaas ng isang paupahang bahay sa daang General del
Pilar, Bangkal, Makati, Rizal na kasama ang kanyang kapatid na si Luz Casa at ang asawa niyang si
Ceferino Cerbo, sa bahay na ito ay umuupa rin sa silong ang magkapatid na Moral, mga kabilang sa
mga nasasakdal sa usaping ito.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tatlong linggo bago nasawi si Teodoro Casa, ang mga akusadong sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo
Pedrigosa, Abraham Antonio at si Alexander Moral, ay nagkaroon ng inuman ng alak sa silong ng
bahay na kanilang inuupahan. Sila ay qqqnag inuman hanggang sa sila ay mangagkalasingan at ang
bawat isa sa kanila ay sumisigaw at kumakanta tanda ng kanilang kalasingan. Ang isa sa pangkat ay
nagsabi pa ng ganito: 'Putang ina ninyong lahat, hinahamon namin kung sino ang magsasabi na kami
ay nakatira sa bahay ng manok.' Ang mga kaguluhang bunga ng pag-iinuman ng alak ng pangkat na
ito ay hindi minabuti ng kanilang kasambahay na si Teodoro Casa dahilang sila ay nabubulahaw lalung-
lalo na ang kanyang kapatid na si Luz Casa na may anak na apat na buwan ang gulang. Dahil dito ay
kinausap ni Teodoro Casa ang mga akusadong sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham
Antonio, at si Alexander Moral, at kanyang pinakiusapan na huminahon sila at itigil ang kanilang pag-
iingay, subalit ipinagwalang bahala ang pakiusap na ito at ang nasabing pangkat ay nagpatuloy sa
kanilang pag-iingay. Ang ginawa ni Teodoro Casa ay nagtungo sa bahay ng may-ari ng bahay na
kanilang inuupahan upang ipaalam ang bagay na iyon. Hindi nagtagal, ang may-ari ng bahay ay
dumating at nakiusap din sa mga akusado na huwag gagawa ng anumang kaingayan na
nakabubulahaw sa mga kasambahay nila. Subalit sa kabila ng mga pakiusap na ito ng may-ari ng
bahay, ang mga nasasakdal na sina Renato Moral, Leopoldo Pedrigosa, Abraham Antonio, at si
Alexander Moral ay nagpatuloy sa kanilang madalas na pag-iinuman at panggugulo sa loob ng
kabahayan. At noon ngang ika-siyam at kalahati (9:30) ng gabi, Sabado noon ng ika-3 ng Mayo, 1969,
habang ang nasabing pangkat ay nag-iinuman na naman ng alak, si Luz Casa ay nakarinig ng salita
buhat kay Renato Moral, na ganito ang sinasabi, "Yayariin natin si Teodoro Casa." Di naglaon ay
dumating buhat sa pagtatrabaho ang nasawing si Teodoro Casa at bago siya naghapunan ay nagtungo
muna siya sa kanilang palikuran. Samantalang si Luz Casa, sa pangambang isagawa ng pangkat ang
kanilang masamang balak ay sinundan niya ang kanyang kapatid. Nakita niya na nang lumabas mula
sa palikuran ang kapatid niyang si Teodoro Casa, ito ay sinalubong ni Renato Moral na may hawak na
patalim at kapagdaka ay sinaksak si Teodoro Casa, kasabay ang sabing, 'Yayariin kita Bagamat
sugatan si Teodoro Casa nakuha pa rin niyang tumakbo ng palabas ng bahay. Siya ay sinundang mull
ni Renato Moral, sumugod na rin ang kapatid niyang si Alexander Moral pati ang mga kasabwat na sina
Leopoldo Pedrigosa at Abraham Antonio. Nang abutan ng magkapatid na Moral si Teodoro Casa,
sinaksak ni Alexander Moral sa likod ang nasawi samantalang sinaksak muli sa harapan ni Renato
Moral si Teodoro Casa. Nang nakadapa na sa lupa ng pasubsob ang nasawi ay siya'y pinagpupukpok ng
bato at bote sa ulo ni Abraham Antonio, samantalang ang isa pang kasabwat na si Leopoldo Pedrigosa
ay pinagpupukpok din ng bote ang iba't ibang bahagi ng katawan ng biktima. Dahilan sa kabiglaanan
at matinding pagkatakot, walang nagawa si Luz Casa kundi ang magsisigaw at magtitili ng paghingi ng
saklolo sa mga kalapit-bahay. Ang mga pangyayaring unang nababanggit ay sa ngayon sa pahayag ni
Luz Casa pangunahing saksi ng taga-usig.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ang panig ng taga-usig ay nagharap ng iba pang mga saksi na nagpapatunay at kumikilala na
pinaslang ng mga nasasakdal si Teodoro Casa. Ang mga saksing ito ay sina Andres Guinanao at
Ceferino Cerbo, ang huli ay bayaw ng nasawi. Kinilala nila na ang sumaksak sa nasawi ay ang mga
magkapatid na Moral, sina Renato at Alexander. Kinilala rin nila na matapos masaksak ang nasawi, si
Abraham Antonio ay pinagbabato at pinagpupukpok ng bote sa ulo ang nasawi, samantalang si
Leopoldo Pedrigosa ay tuwirang tumulong din sa pamamagitan ng pagpukpok ng bote sa iba't ibang
bahagi ng katawan ng nasawi. Ipinahayag pa rin ni Ceferino Cerbo, bayaw ng nasawi na tinangka
niyang awatin at pigilin ang mga magkapatid na Moral pati ang mga kasabwat nila sa pananakit sa
kanyang bayaw, ngunit sa halip ay siya'y binigwasan ng saksak ng magkapatid na Moral at siya'y
nasugatan, katunayan nagprisinta ng isang certifico ng pagkakagamot ang nasabing saksi, na ngayon
ay bahagi ng mga kasulatan ng usaping ito.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Kabilang pa rin sa mga saksi ng taga-usig ay si Cpl. Manolo Dizon, Kagawad ng Kagawaran ng Pulisya
ng bayan ng Makati, Rizal, na siyang nag-imbestiga sa krimeng naganap at siya'y nagbigay ng ulat na
nagpapatunay na ang mga may kagagawan sa naganap na krimen ay ang mga magkapatid na Moral,
na sina Renato at Alexander, at ang mga kasabwat nilang sina Abraham Antonio at Leopoldo
Pedrigosa, ito ay napapaloob sa nasabing ulat na may markang 'Exhibit C'. Si Pfc. Conrado de Gamo,
Kagawad ng nasabing Kagawaran ng Pulisya ay nagpahayag din na kanyang naaresto si Renato Moral
na natagpuan niyang nagtatago sa ilalim ng kama ng bahay na
pinagtataguan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Dahilan sa mga malulubhang sugat na tinamo ni Teodoro Casa bunga ng mga pananakit ng mga
nasasakdal, siya ay namatay ng oras ding yaon, at hindi na nagkaroon ng pagkakataong Idulog sa
pagamutan upang iligtas ang buhay niya, ng mga kaanak nito.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ang bangkay ng nasawing si Teodoro Casa ay sinuri ni Dr. Dario C. Nalagan isang opisyal ng Medico-
Legal ng "National Bureau of Investigation". Ayon sa kanyang "Necropsy Report", na may markang
"Exhibit A" ang nasawi ay nagtamo ng mga sugat na sumusunod: ...
The accused Renato Moral denied having inflicted the wounds on Teodoro Casa which resulted in the
latter's death. He declared that on May 3, 1969, he was working as a mason in White Plains, Quezon
City. After washing up at the end of the working day, he got his wages and went to the house of
Rodolfo Reodique at Bangkal, Makati, Rizal, arriving thereat at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening. From
there, he and Alexander Moral and his cousin, Abraham Antonio, went to the house of Alexander Moral
at Gen. del Pilar Street, also at Bangkal, Makati, Rizal. Upon arrival at the house of Alexander Moral, at
about 9:00 o'clock that evening, he requested Abraham Antonio to buy some rice for their supper.
When Abraham Antonio returned with the rice, he (Renato Moral) went to the faucet at the back of the
house in order to wash it. While at the faucet, the deceased Teodoro Casa, who was with his brother-
in-law Ceferino Cerbo, hit him repeatedly with a beer bottle on the head. He tried to parry it, but he
did not know if Teodoro Casa was hit by his "stab". His face was bloody and he tried to run towards the
street, but his way was blocked by Andres Ginanao who was holding a piece of wood. When Teodoro
Casa and Ceferino Cerbo caught up with him, he was again hit several times by Teodoro Casa. Then,
he fainted. When he regained consciousness, he ran towards the house of his friend Rodolfo
Reodique. 1
The accused Abraham Antonio, for his part, invoked defense of stranger, claiming that when he saw his
friend Renato Moral being attacked by Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo, he came to the succor of his
friend by throwing a stone at the latter's assailants, His testimony reads, as follows:
Q On May 3, 1969 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening do you know where you were?
A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Where?
A I was with Renato Moral and Alexander Moral, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Where?
A At Bangkal, Makati, Rizal, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Where did you come from on May 3, 1969 before you go to Bangkal, Makati, Rizal?
A From White Plains, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q And where did you proceed when you go to Bangkal?
A After we have came from White Plains, we proceeded to the house of Rodolfo Reodique,
Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q After coming from the house of Rodolfo Reodique, where did you go?
A We went to the house of Alexander Moral, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Were you able to reach the house of Alexander Moral?
A Yes, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q And when you reached the house of Alexander Moral, what did you do?
A When we reached there I was asked to buy rice, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Did you buy rice?
Q After buying rice, what did you do?
A After I have bought rice Alexander Moral and Renato Moral washed the rice,
Q Did they wash the rice?
Q What about you, what did you do?
A I was pumping the gas stove, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q When Renato Moral and Alexander Moral were washing the rice and you were pumping the gas
stove, do you know what happened, if any?
A I heard a shout at the side of the house, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q And when you heard that shout, do you know who shouted?
A I do not know whose voice, I just heard the word, 'aray', Sir.
Q What did you do when you heard that shout?

A I went out, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q When you went out, what did you see outside?
A I saw somebody ran around the house of Alexander Moral, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Do you know the person who was running around the house of Alexander Moral?
A I do not know him, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q And where did you go when you heard somebody shouted and you saw somebody was running
around the house?
A I went to the road because the person who was running around the house went to that direction,
Q When you went to the direction of the road, did you see that person whom you said that running
around the house and went to the direction of the road?
Q Who was that person?
A I saw Renato Moral being hit by someone, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Did you know the person who was hitting Renato Moral?
Q Who?
A Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q When this Renato Moral was being hit by Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo, what happened to
Renato Moral?
A When I saw the two, Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo hitting Renato Moral I got a stone and threw
at, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q When you threw stone, did you hit somebody?
A I do not know if somebody was hit because Teodoro Casa chased me, Sir.
Q What about Alexander Moral, do you know where was he at that time?
A He was there, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Do you know what Alexander Moral doing at that time, if any when Renato Moral was being molded
(mauled) by Teodoro Casa and Ceferino Cerbo?
A No, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q What about Leopoldo Pedrigosa, do you know where he was at that time?
Q Where was he?
A He was at the house of Rodolfo Reodique, Sir. 2

The accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the
crime and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he remained in the house of Rodolfo
Reodique, a place about 20 meters away from the residence of Teodoro Casa where the stabbing
incident took place, after Renato Moral and Abraham Antonio went to the house of Alexander Moral and
came to know of the incident only when Renato Moral and Abraham Antonio, who were both wounded,
returned to the house of Rodolfo Reodique. 3
The trial court, however, rejected the defendants' claims and found them guilty of the charge and
sentenced each of them to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On September 18, 1975, the accused Renato Moral died while confined at the New Bilibid Prisons at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, and the case against him was dismissed. 4
The death sentence having been imposed, the case is now before the Court for mandatory
review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa insists on his innocence and assails the trial court for believing the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution which he claims to be unreliable and untrustworthy in
view of contradictions and discrepancies in their testimonies which impair their credibility. He further
claims that the imposition of the death penalty is unwarranted as he had only been charged and found
guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime and not as a principal
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The accused Abraham Antonio also assails the trial court for giving credit to the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution which are allegedly biased and inherently weak; and for sentencing him
to suffer the death penalty since he, like his co-accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa, had only been charged
and found guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime.
After examining the record of the case, We find no compelling reasons to disturb the findings of fact of
the trial court. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the participation of the accused
in the commission of the crime are clear, precise, positive and straightforward and included details
consistent with human nature and experience. There was also no doubt as to their ability to Identify
the assailants as the place was illuminated and the deceased, as well as the accused, are well known to
them. While it may be true that there were flaws or discrepancies in their statements, concerning the
incident, the said flaws or discrepancies refer to minor details and are not of such magnitude as to
destroy their credibility or the veracity of their declaration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The defense of alibi interposed by the accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa is weak and unconvincing. According
to him, he was in the house of his friend, Rodolfo Reodique, when the incident complained of happened
and came to know of the stabbing incident only when Renato Moral and Abraham Antonio returned to
the house of Rodolfo Reodique. However, the house of Rodolfo Reodique was only 20 meters away
from the residence of the victim, Teodoro Casa, where the incident happened so that it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Moreover,
the actual participation of Leopoldo Pedrigosa in the commission of the crime was vividly described by
witnesses for the prosecution. His denial cannot stand against the positive declarations of the said
witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The defense of Abraham Antonio that he acted in defense of stranger is untenable. In order to invoke
defense of strangers, the accused must prove unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or
killed by the accused; that there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression; and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other
evil motive. In the instant case, it had been established that when the deceased Teodoro Casa
descended from their second floor apartment to answer a call of nature at their backyard, he was
followed by the accused Renato Moral who, without any provocation, stabbed the deceased saying:
"Yayariin kita"; that when the said deceased tried to escape by running away, he was pursued by
Renato Moral and Alexander Moral who took turns in stabbing him, as a result of which, he fell to the
ground; that while the deceased was lying prostrate on the ground, Abraham Antonio hit him on the
head with a bottle and a stone; that, not to be outdone, Leopoldo Pedrigosa also hit the victim on
various parts of his body with a stone; and that it was only when Renato Moral said: "Bagsak na iyan.
Patay na iyan" that they stopped.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As could be seen, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Teodoro Casa since it
was the accused Renato Moral who stabbed the deceased without any provocation and, hence, the
aggressor. There was also no reasonable necessity of the means employed since the deceased was
unarmed at the time, 5 and was already lying prostrate on the ground and bleeding from his wounds
inflicted upon him by Alexander Moral and Renato Moral when the accused Abraham Antonio hit him
with a stone. Accordingly, the accused Abraham Antonio cannot be said to have legally acted in
defense of a stranger when he hit the deceased with a stone.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery, since the deceased Teodoro Casa was stabbed
suddenly and unexpectedly by Alexander Moral and Renato Moral as he came out of the toilet after
answering a call of nature. The attack was such that the deceased was unable to prepare a defense for
himself thus enabling his assailants to accomplish their criminal act without any risk to themselves
arising from the defense that the deceased might put up. The accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo
Pedrigosa were correctly adjudged guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime. It is an
established fact that after Renato Moral and Alexander Moral had delivered mortal stab wounds upon
the deceased Teodoro Casa, the accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa took turns in hitting
him with beer bottles and stones. It has been held that the infliction of wounds by a co accused after
the principal accused had delivered the fatal blows is guilty thereof as an accomplice. 6
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
nocturnity, abuse of superior strength, and intoxication in fixing the penalty imposed upon the
accused. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be considered against the
accused since there is no evidence of a plan to kin the victim and that sufficient time had elapsed from
the conception of the plan and its execution to allow the accused to cooly reflect upon the
consequences of their act and permit their conscience to overcome the resolution of their will In the
instant case, Luz Casa declared that she heard the accused Renato Moral remark: "Yayariin natin si
Teodoro Casa pagdating niya" while the accused were drinking, which started at about 5:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, and sometime before Teodoro Casa arrived at 9:30 o'clock that night. 7 She was not
precise, however, as to the exact hour when she heard Renato Moral utter those words, so that only a
few hours, if not minutes, had elapsed from the time Renato Moral made the remark up to the arrival
of Teodoro Casa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nocturnity cannot also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance since there is no evidence that
the accused had purposely sought the cover of the darkness of the night to commit the crime; nor is
there evidence that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. Besides, Andres Ginanao
declared that the place where the stabbing incident took place was illuminated by a big bulb from a
Meralco Street post. 8 Ceferino Cerbo also declared that the back of their house where the toilet was
situated was well lighted. 9
Abuse of superior strength cannot also be appreciated in fixing the penalty since abuse of superiority is
absorbed in treachery. 10
The alternative circumstance of intoxication was also appreciated by the trial court as an aggravating
circumstance. Said the Court:
Napatunayan din na ang mga nasasakdal ay may ugaling umiinom ng alak at sinadya nila ang
pagiinuman ng alak ng araw na isagawa nila ang krimen.
The record, however, does not show excessive and habitual use of intoxicating drinks, or that the
accused purposely got drunk in order to commit the crime. Luz Casa merely declared that the accused
were drinking liquor on the night in question and were telling stories, 11 and that they were singing,
laughing, and shouting and were very jolly. 12 While she further said that the accused used to drink
liquor every Saturday night, her testimony is not competent proof that the accused are drunkards
whose habit is to get drunk, and whose inebriety has become habitual, in order that intoxication may
be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, the fact that the accused were
intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime should instead, be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The trial court further erred in imposing the death penalty upon the accused Leopoldo Pedrigosa and
Abraham Antonio who were merely charged, and found guilty, as accomplices in the commission of the
crime. Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consumated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission
of the consummated felony. Since the imposable penalty upon the principal of a consumated crime of
murder is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death, 13 the penalty to be imposed upon the
accomplice is not death, as decreed by the trial court, but, the penalty next lower in degree which
is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from 10 years
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Considering that there is one mitigating circumstance and no
aggravating circumstance to offset it, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the imposable penalty should be from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccionalas
minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be as it is hereby, AFFIRMED with the modification
that the accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa are ordered to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years and
1 day of prision mayor as maximum. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is hereby
increased to P30,000.00. With proportionate costs against the accused Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo
Pedrigosa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. CJ., Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Fernando, C.J., is on leave.
Endnotes:
1 TSN of August 30, 1969. pp. 6-11.
2 TSN of Sept. 2, 1969, pp. 6-11.
3 TSN of Sept. 12, 1969, pp. 4-8.
4 Rollo, pp. 210, 227, 229.
5 TSN of Aug. 21, 1969, Afternoon Session, p. 5.
6 People vs. Azcona, 59 Phil. 580.
7 TSN of Aug. 21, 1969, Morning Session, p. 8.
8 TSN of Aug. 21, 1969, p. 8.
9 TSN of Aug. 22, 1969, Afternoon Session, pp. 9-10.
10 People vs. Camano, G.R. No. L-36662-63, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 668, and cases cited therein.
11 TSN of Aug. 21, 1969, p. 7.
12 Id., p. 27.
13 Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FELIPE DELIMA, Defendant-
Appellant.
Tancinco & Rosales for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.
Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house
of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his
surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose
his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting
with his weapon. These peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalties. He appeals from that judgment which must be reversed.
That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience
with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which,
although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is
hereby acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Araullo C.J., Street. Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-1940-42. March 24, 1949.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IGNACIO LAGATA, Defendant-

Appellant.
Vicente del Villar for Appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles
for Appellee.
DECISION
PERFECTO, J.:
The witnesses in this case testified in substance as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PROSECUTION
1. Eusebio Abria, 20, single, farmer, Jinangutdan, Santa Rita, Samar. — On October 3, 1946, he was in
the provincial jail, detained for illegal possession of firearm, but his case was dismissed. Ignacio Lagata
was a provincial guard. Six prisoners were then assigned to work in the capitol’s plaza: Jesus, Tipace,
Eusebio, Mariano, the witness, and Epifanio Labong. Lagata, their guard, ordered them to go to the
nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was
missing. The nursery is near the provincial hospital in Catbalogan. The place was grassy. Lagata
ordered the five prisoners to call Labong. (4-7). As Labong did not answer, Lagata ordered the five
prisoners to look for him. They followed the trail. Upon reaching the national highway, Lagata called
them. As Labong did not answer their call, Lagata ordered the five to look farther for him. The five
prisoners went towards the mountain. Upon reaching a camote plantation, "I saw footprints. I called
my companions. While we were all in the camote plantation, I did not know that I was shot by Ignacio
Lagata. He was about four meters away from me. He fired at my left arm." At the time the witness was
standing, one of his companions was at his right side and the rest were with Lagata. Tipace was about
three or four meters behind him. All walked almost together at the moment because they wanted to
see the footprints pointed by the witness. "At the moment that he was hit, he immediately called the
attention of Ignacio Lagata, ’Mano, I am wounded.’ He said, ’It is because you did not approach to
me.’" (8- 9). "When I saw that he again manipulated the chamber of his gun, I ran away. When I saw
that my other companions ran away, I ran also. I noticed that my left arm was wounded. When I was
already sitting by the front of the coconut tree, I heard another gun shot." Tipace "is already dead." "I
did not see him anymore. When Ignacio Lagata passed by where I was, I requested him to take me.
He brought me to the justice building. (10). Then he brought me to the Samar Provincial Hospital. My
left arm is amputated just right at the joint between the shoulder and the arm. It is not yet completely
healed." The witness had no intention to run from Lagata. (11). Labong asked Lagata permission to
gather gabi. The other prisoners did not say anything. Lagata told them to go to the nursery. While
they were gathering gabi, Lagata was near them. (12). But he could not see everybody because there
was talahib growing in the place, and it was tall. The witness heard three shots. The second one hit
him. After the first shot, "we were all assembled." (13-14). The witness did not see Tipace being shot.
"The reason as to why I ran was because I was afraid that I might be shot again." (16). His
companions were probably scared and that is why they ran. (17).
2. Mariano Ibañez, 25, married, detained prisoner, Zumarraga, Samar. — On October 3, 1946, he was
in the provincial jail as a detained prisoner. After breakfast, six prisoners were called: Epifanio Labong,
Ceferino Tipace, Eustaquio Galet, Jesus Mañoso, Eusebio Abria and the witness, Mariano Ibañez. They
went to work in the plaza of the provincial jail. At about 11:00 o’clock, they were taking a rest and
while they were taking a rest, the witness heard Lagata inviting the prisoners to go to the nursery to
gather gabi, near the provincial hospital. They scattered to get gabi. "We scarcely got three gabis when
I heard Ignacio Lagata calling us to assemble." The place was grassy with talahib plants growing
thereon. While the prisoners were picking gabi, Lagata was standing by the side of a mango tree. At
the call of Lagata, only five prisoners assembled. Labong was absent, and Lagata ordered them to call
for him. (19-21). "Inasmuch as Epifanio Labong did not answer our call, Ignacio Lagata ordered us to
go to the mountain and look for Epifanio Labong. Eusebio Abria then went to the camote plantation. He
found footprints and he called Ignacio Lagata to inform him that he saw footprints. On account of this
report of Eusebio Abria that he saw flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Epifanio Labong
so Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on the left arm." He was at about three meters from
Lagata. (22). The witness was at the left side of Ceferino Tipace at about two meters from Abria. Abria
said, "Mano, I am wounded." Lagata said in turn, "Come around, assemble here." Abria came to the
right side of Lagata. (23). "Once we were already assembled there, Ignacio Lagata cocked his gun and
shot Ceferino Tipace and when I saw that Ceferino Tipace was hit then I ran away because I had in
mind that had I not ran I would have been shot also." At the time Tipace was "standing and carrying
with him on his left arm some gabi and when he turned to the left that was the time when he was shot
by Ignacio Lagata. The bullet penetrated from the left side of the armpit and came out from the right
side of the body." Tipace was at about two meters then from Lagata. "At about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of that day, I returned to the provincial jail. I did not return immediately because I was
afraid." Tipace was killed. (23-24). One morning, Lagata gave the witness fistic blows on the
abdominal region and kicked him at the back, because the previous night the witness told the prisoners
not to make much noise. "I did not have ill-feeling because he had the right to maltreat me even if I
was not at fault." (29). At the time they were searching for Labong, before the shooting, they were
walking in an ordinary way, looking towards the ground, one after another, at about half a meter from
each other. Lagata was behind all of them. (31).
3. Gilberto C. Rosales, 63, married, president Sanitary Division, Catbalogan, Samar. — On October 17,
1946, the cadaver of Ceferino Tipace was exhumed. (35). The witness found in it, "A gun shot wound
which went through the body from the lower left axillary region to the right shoulder." (36).
4. Eustaquio Galet, 20, married, detained prisoner. — On October 3, 1946, he was one of the six
prisoners who worked in the premises of the capitol building. (38). "We went to the nursery and each
one of us got gabi. The guard, Ignacio Lagata, was under the mango tree. I was about ten meters
away from him. It was grassy in the place where we were picking gabi. Not long after we were called
by Ignacio Lagata because we were going home already. One was missing, Epifanio Labong. Ignacio
Lagata ordered us to call Epifanio Labong but Epifanio Labong did not answer." (39) The talahib plants
growing in the place "were taller than myself." Lagata "ordered us to search for Epifanio Labong. We
went around the place and then crossed the national highway and went up the mountain until we
reached to a place where cogon grass were growing. Eusebio Abria and myself saw flattened grass. We
informed Ignacio Lagata that there was a trace where a person had passed by or he may have gone
that way. Then Ignacio Lagata fired one time. While we were searching for Epifanio Labong each one of
us were bent and leaning looking downward. I heard a gun shot and that was the time when Eusebio
Abria was shot and then once he was hit, he called Ignacio Lagata telling him ’Mano, I am wounded,’
and immediately placed his hand at his wound and then got near to Ignacio Lagata." (40). "Upon
seeing that one of our companions was already shot without fault, I ran away and came down to the
capitol building and then went to the provincial jail and reported the matter to the sergeant of the
guards." His companion then was Jesus Mañoso. They reached the provincial jail at about 12 o’clock
noon. The shooting took place at about 11:30. (41). The witness heard Labong ask Lagata to
accompany the group to the nursery to gather gabi. When he was shot, Abria was bent and leaning his
body downward to the ground while Lagata was behind him. (42). The witness heard the shot that
killed Ceferino Tipace. "I was already descending near the Capitol building that was the time when I
heard the shot." (43). Jesus Mañoso ran away with the witness, but Ceferino Tipace and Mariano
Ibañez remained. The treatment received by the witness from Lagata was good. (44).
5. Pedro Mayuga, 39, married, chief, Samar Provincial Hospital. — On October 3, 1946, prisoner
Eusebio Abria was brought to the hospital with a wound on the upper side of his left arm which was
amputated from the shoulder joint. "The patient was at first given resusciting medical treatment to
combat the shock caused by the hemorrhage and later the shoulder joint was disarticulated." After his
arm was cut, he was confined in the hospital until November 6. (46 47). The wound must have been
produced by a gun shot. There are indications that the shot was fired at close range. Very likely around
five meters. (48). There was no possibility of saving the arm because "all the vital tissues were
destroyed and the bone was completely cut." (49). "Powder-burn was noticeable in all the vital parts of
the tissues destroyed from outward and inward." (50).
DEFENSE
1. Andres Saludario, 49, married, nursery foreman, Catbalogan, Samar. — On October 3, 1946, he saw
Lagata in the nursery guarding six prisoners. (53-54). The prisoners were just within the premises of
the nursery just beyond the mango tree. Lagata was about seven meters from them and he was
looking at them all the time. The place was grassy. The grass was about half a meter tall. (55). The
ground near the hill was covered with cogon and talahib. By the height they could cover a man in
standing position. The witness heard about the disappearance of prisoner Epifanio Labong. At the time,
the witness was already far, because he had to attend to several laborers detained at the capitol
building. When he returned from the capitol building, he was informed that Epifanio Labong
disappeared. (57-59). The witness did not hear any gun shot explosion in the nursery. He saw the
accused guarding the prisoners at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning. (60). The witness stayed in the
nursery until about 8:30, when he came to the capitol building. (61).
2. Ignacio Lagata, 27, married, Catbalogan. — On October 3, 1946, he accompanied the six prisoners
from the provincial jail to the plaza of the provincial capitol. He remained there until 10 o’clock in the
morning, when he told them to return to the provincial jail. The six prisoners requested him to allow
them to get some gabi in the nursery. Lagata went with them to a spot around the mango tree. (63-
64). The grass in the place was knee-high. Lagata was under a mango tree about five meters from the
prisoners. He was watching all of them. They were scattered around the mango tree. (65). While he
was looking back, Epifanio Labong took advantage and escaped. "I did not discover that but when I
called them to assemble I found out that one was missing. I asked the rest of the prisoners as to
where Epifanio Labong was. I told them that what shall we do he is already far and they said that in
that place there is plenty of gabi. I told the prisoners to go to that spot. We went there and the
prisoners were ahead because they know the place. (66). When we arrived at the place, we did not see
Labong and Tipace called our attention telling us that this is the place through which Epifanio Labong
passed." The witness did not see the track of Epifanio Labong but the prisoners, however, were the
ones who indicated to him the place through which Epifanio Labong passed. "I followed them. Up to
above the national highway. When we reached up the place another prisoner called also our attention
telling us that here is the place through which Labong passed and so we went up. When we reached
above, they were already far from me. So I told them to stop because they were already far from me.
They did not heed my order to stop. Then I fired up to the air. They scattered. I could only see two of
them. I also saw one of them running towards the mountain. So I fired at him." It was Eusebio Abria,
and he was at about five meters from him. "He was going up the mountain. After I fired at Eusebio
Abria, I saw him running. I just left him because I was looking for the rest. I saw also Ibañez running.
He was running towards me and then around me. I called his attention and told him to stop from
running or else lie down and give up your arm. He did not heed my order. I fired at him." (6769). The
witness saw Ibañez running before him towards the south road. He was Tipace. One minute elapsed
from the time the witness fired at Abria to the time he fired at Ibañez. The witness fired at them
because he sympathizes with other policemen from whom other prisoners escaped. (70). "Because if it
so happened that a prisoner escaped under my custody, I would be the one to be put in jail and if I
cannot fire at him, I will be the one to be put in jail. "The truth is that they ran away." At the time he
fired at Tipace and Abria, they were running away. (71). "What was in my mind was that if I could
overtake them and not fire at them, I would meet the same situation as what other guards met under
whose custody prisoners escaped and some of them were discharged from their duty." Ibañez testified
against the accused because the latter fired at his father-in-law. (72). One day, the accused
maltreated Ibañez. He slapped him two times. He was the only prisoner he slapped. (73). At the time
they were looking for Labong, the prisoners were walking in line one meter from one to another. The
accused was near them. (77). When he fired at Abria, the latter was about five meters from him and
when he fired at Tipace, the latter was four meters from him. At the time, Tipace was running sidewise
to the accused and he could see where the accused was. His face was facing the accused. (78). When
he fired at Abria, he lost hope to recover Labong. "I was hopeless already." (80) The picking up of gabi
was not part of the work of the prisoners. (81)
Appellant was charged with murder, serious physical injuries and evasion through negligence in three
separate cases which have been tried jointly. Finding him guilty, the trial court sentenced him as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) For Murder (Case No. 809) — Reclusion Perpetua with civil interdiction for life and perpetual
absolute disqualification, indemnify the heirs of Ceferino Tipace Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) and pay
the costs of this action;
"(b) For serious physical injuries (Case No. 810) — An indeterminate imprisonment of two (2) years
and four (4) months as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of this action; and.
"(c) For evasion through negligence (Case No. 811) — An indeterminate imprisonment of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and ten (10)
days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs," (p. 45, rec.)"
The evidence is conclusive to the effect that the escape of prisoner Epifanio Labong was due to the
negligence of the appellant. The six prisoners were supposed to work in the plaza of the provincial
capitol and to return to jail after said work, but appellant allowed them instead to go to the nursery to
gather gabi, without any apparent authority to do so.
Considering that the place was grassy and tall talahib was growing therein, the height of which could
conceal persons in standing position, appellant must have seen immediately that it was a choice place
for any prisoner that may want to escape. Such negligence of appellant is punishable, under article 224
of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance with law.
As regards the shooting of Abria and Tipace, we are convinced that the facts were as narrated by the
witnesses for the prosecution. Abria was shot when he was only three meters away from appellant and
the latter has not even shown that Abria attempted to escape. Tipace was also shot when he was about
four or five meters away from appellant. The latter’s allegation that Tipace was running, — conveying
the idea that said prisoner was in the act of escaping, — appears to be inconsistent with his own
testimony to the effect that Tipace was running sidewise, with his face looking towards appellant, and
with the undisputed fact that Tipace was hit near one axilla, the bullet coming out from the opposite
shoulder. If Tipace’s purpose was to escape, the natural thing for him to do would have been to give
his back to Appellant.
The criminal responsibility of appellant regarding the killing of Tipace can be exacted from him on the
basis of his own testimony. The way he fired at Tipace (whom he misnamed first as Ibañez) is
described by appellant in the following words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"He was running towards me and then around me.

"I called his attention and told him to stop from running or else lie down and give up your arm. He did
not heed my advice.
"Inasmuch as he did not heed my advice so I fired at him.
"His direction while he was running was not exactly towards me but running in front of me to the left
side." (69).
Explaining his reason for firing at Abria and Tipace, appellant gave the following reason: "Because I
sympathize with the other policemen from whom prisoners escaped." (70). "If it so happened that a
prisoner escaped under my custody, I would be the one to be put in jail and if I cannot fire at him, I
will be the one to be put in jail." (71). (Italics ours.)
It is clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. Lagata could have fired at him in self-
defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid his escape. The record does not show that Tipace was bent
on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape. According to Lagata, "he was
running towards and then around me." (Italics ours.) How could anyone in his senses imagine that
Tipace intended to escape by running towards and around the very guard he was supposed to escape
from?
There is no question that the escape of Labong scared appellant, according to him, because of the
experience of other guards who were dismissed from office or even prosecuted because of prisoners
who had escaped under their custody, and that it was his duty to fire against the prisoners if he
wanted to be exempt from any responsibility. Even if appellant sincerely believed, although
erroneously, that in firing the shots be acted in the performance of his official duty, the circumstances
of the case show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners, so as to
seriously wound one of them and kill instantaneously another. While custodians of prisoners should
take all care to avoid the latter’s escape, only absolute necessity would authorize them to fire against
them. Theirs is the burden of proof as to such necessity. The summary liquidation of prisoners, under
flimsy pretexts of attempts of escape, which has been and is being practiced in dictatorial systems of
government, has always been and is shocking to the universal conscience of humanity.
Human life is valuable, albeit, sacred. Cain has been the object of unrelentless curse for centuries and
millennia and his name will always be remembered in shame as long as there are human generations
able to read the Genesis. Twenty centuries of Cristianity have not been enough to make less
imperative the admonition that "Thou shalt not kill," uttered by the greatest pundit and prophet of
Israel. Laws, constitutions, world charters have been written to protect human life. Still it is imperative
that all men be imbued with the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount that the words of the gospels be
translated into reality, and that their meaning fill all horizons with the eternal aroma of encyclic love of
mankind.
As recommended by the prosecution, appellant is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete justifying circumstance defined in paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, appellant should be sentenced for homicide to an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and, in the case of serious
physical injuries, to an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor to two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional.
Feria, Briones, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of six prisoners
charged with murder, assigned to clean the capitol plaza of Samar. On their return to the prison
compound, he gave said prisoners permission to gather gabi, in the presence of the accused who
remained at a distance of about six meters. Instantly, he discovered that prisoner Epifanio Labong had
escaped. The accused then asked the remaining prisoners to help in locating him, but in so doing he
was led by said prisoners to places where escape was much easier. The accused fired his gun in the air
in order to stop the fleeing prisoners. Some of the prisoners were already going to the nearby
mountain apparently in attempt also to escape. Whereupon the accused decided to aim his gun at
those who were fleeing until one of them was hurt and another was killed.
The question now is, under the circumstances, what was the duty of the appellant guard? If he allowed
them to escape, he would have been charged with infidelity in the custody of prisoners. He was
provided with a gun for some purpose. In my opinion, he made use of it legally in the performance of
his official duty. (United States v. Magno, 8 Phil., 320, 321; People v. Delima, 46 Phil., 738.) To hold
otherwise would be to plainly encourage the escape of prisoners, what with the many jailbreaks that
had already taken place.
As stated in the majority opinion, appellant fired at Eusebio Abria because, as the latter himself stated
on direct examination at the trial, he did not approach the appellant guard when called. Indeed, he
further stated that "when I saw my other companions run away, I ran also."cralaw virtua1aw library
Eustaquio Galet, a prosecution witness, on direct question by counsel de oficio, stated: "I heard
Epifanio Labong ask Lagata to accompany the group to the nursery to gather gabi." "About how many
minutes was the interval between the shot of Eusebio Abria and the next shot that you heard?" Galet
answered: "About 15 minutes."cralaw virtua1aw library
The accused fired three shots, one in the air to call the prisoners back or as a warning that they should
not run away; the second hit Abria; and the third hit Ceferino Tipace. "And it was during the time that
the rest were running when you heard the next shot and you ran too?" Asked this question, Abria
answered: "Yes, Sir." As may be seen, the testimony of the very witness for the prosecution confirms
the statement of the accused that he fired at Abria when he was running away with the rest of the
prisoners. (See p. 71, t. s. n.)
PABLO, M. :chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Concurro con la absolucion del acusado.
BENGZON, J.:
I also vote to acquit.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
I concur in this opinion of Mr. Justice Paras.
PEOPLE v. NORMA HERNANDEZ (1959)
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 SLANDER
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-Appellants: Maria Norma Hernandez, Mariano Hernandez (father) & Ramona Martinez
(mother)
FACTS:
 Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after months of
courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his
parents over her home so that they could talk about their marriage.
 When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens and goats and they
agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the uncle’s
roof.
 While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his parents
waited but she never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation.
 Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that she wasn’t really in love
with him. Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she only accepted it
out of obedience to her parents and the uncle’s insistence.
 Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to bring the
chickens and that they should not regret whatever may happen later.
 Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t honestly in love with Vivencio and so she decided
to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage.
 Appellant’s parents also corroborated her testimony.
 RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to
prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
HELD:
Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.
RATIO:
 Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act
of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent
the marriage after mature consideration.
 Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant & appellant before
the incident. There always existed good relations between them for they were neighbours so it
cannot be sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the
marriage.
 Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and it would be utterly
inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the
marriage. If she would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a
marriage without her free consent.
 Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11
par.4, RPC)
– ALP
[https://maroon5partnersandassociates.wordpress.com/2012/06/01/people-v-norma-hernandez-1959/]

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Republic of the Philippines

[G.R. No. 89684. September 18, 1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERARDO SAZON, alias

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Benjamin P. Sorongon for Accused-Appellant.

Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:

Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

A One (1) meter.

Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver?

A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.

Q Did you not pick up the gun?

"ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness).

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A His right hand.

ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness).

A His left hand.

A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday.

COURT: (To the witness)

ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness).

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

COURT: (To the witness).

Q And, what happened next?

A Cornelio Altejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.

Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?

ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness).

A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.

"Atty. E. Original:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Atty. E. Original:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is negative?

A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.

Q Within what time-span?

A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.

A Last September 18, 1983.

Q Within what time span?

A Within three days.

Q Within three days?

A Within three days.

Q From the examination?

A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.

Q And when was the examination conducted?

A Last September 19, 1983, Your Honor.

Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17, 1983?

A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.

A Yes, Your Honor." 17

On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

A Also from the fertilizer.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., is on leave.

1. Judge Sixto R. Guanzon, presiding.

2. Original Record, 15.

7. People v. Bayocot, G.R. No. 55285, June 28, 1989.

8. People v. Batas, Et Al., G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989.

10. TSN, September 17, 1985, 10-14.

11. Rollo, 40.