Reviewer in Political Law2

REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
Constitutional Law
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of police power, x x x The ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests through th
exercise of police power.
b) Lawful Means: The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.
See: Ynotv. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148SCRA 659; Tablarin v. Gutierrez,
152 SCRA 730; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182.
i) Police power concerns government enactments, which precisely
interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare or th
common good. Athorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the
issuance of DOLE Order No. 3 (establishing various procedures and requirements
for screening performing artists as a prerequisite to the processing of any cont
ract
of employment by POEA) shows that the assailed order was issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power [JMM
Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319].
ii) However, Sec. 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772, which
mandates newspapers of general circulation in every province or city to provide
free print space of not less than 1/2 page as Comelec space, was held to be an
invalid exercise of the police power in Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 2
44
SCRA 272,, there being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or
imperious public necessity for the taking of print space, nor that the resolutio
n was
the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity. [This was held to
be an exercise of the power of eminent domain, albeit invalid, because the
Comelec would not pay for the space to be given to it by the newspapers.]
Similarly, in City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, the Quezon
City ordinance which required commercial cemetery owners to reserve 6% of
burial lots for paupers in the City was held to be an invalid exercise of the po
lice
power, but was, instead, an exercise of the power of eminent domain which would
make the City liable to pay the owners just compensation.
iii) The proper exercise of the police power requires compliance
with the following requisites: (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intereference by the
State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. An ordinance
aimed at relieving traffic congestion meets the first standard; but declaring bu
terminals as nuisances per se and ordering their closure or
OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

Constitutional Law 53
relocation contravenes the second standard [Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC
Liner, G.R. NO. 148339, February 23, 2005].
iv) In Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, the
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of criminal
charges against respondents local government officials who had ordered and
carried out the demolition of a fishpond which purportedly blocked the flow of t
he
Pasak River in Sasmuan, Pampanga, The Court agreed with the findings of the
Ombudsman that those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond
were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general pub
lic .
5. Additional Limitations [When exercised by delegate]:
a) Express grant by law [e.g., Secs. 16, 391,447, 458 and 468, R. A.
7160, for local government units]
b) Within territorial limits [for local government units, except when
exercised to protect water supply],
c) Must not be contrary to law. [Activity prohibited by law cannot, in the
guise of regulation, be allowed; an activity allowed by law may be regulated, bu
not prohibited.] See: De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569; City Government of
Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759; Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480.
i) In Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No.
102782, December 11,1991, reiterated in Tatelv. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No.
40243, March 11, 1992, and in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097,
July 20, 1994, the Supreme Court declared that for municipal ordinances to be
valid, they: [a] must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; [b] must n
ot be
unfair or oppressive; [c] must not be partial or discriminatory; [d] must not pr
ohibit,
but may regulate, trade; [e] must not be unreasonable; and [f] must be general i
application and consistent with public policy.
ii) In City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12,
2005, the Supreme Court declared as an invalid exercise of the police power City
of Manila Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited the establishment or operation of
businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities in the Ermita-Malate area . Concedely, the ordinance was enacted with
the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of th
Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Despite its virtuous aims, however, the
enactment of the ordinance has no statutory or constitutional

Constitutional Law
authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies cannot prohibit the operation of
sauna and massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs,
supper clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns, or order the
ir
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws, not even in the guise of police power.
iii) The authority of a municipality to issue zoning classification is an
exercise of the police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinanc
is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given.political subdivision into specific l
and
uses as present and future projection of needs [Pasong Bayabas Farmers
Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 142359 and 142980, May 25, 2004].
C. Power of Eminent Domain
1. Definition/Scope. Also known as the power of expropriation,
a) See: Sec. 9, Art. Ill; Sec. 18, Art. XII; Secs. 4 & 9, Art. XIII.
b) Distinguished from police power. Police power is the power of the
State to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and
property. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to
condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
Although both police power and eminent domain have the general welfare for their
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used
as
an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the
two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a

noxious purpose, hence no compensation is paid. Likewise in the exercise of poli
ce
power, property rights of individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State. Where a
property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would b
injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a
property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is n
eed
to pay just compensation. In the exercise of police power, the State restricts t
he
use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rig
hts
which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the
public.
Use of the property by the owners is limited, but no aspect of the property is u
sed
by or for the benefit of the public. The deprivation of use can, in fact, be tot
al, and
it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the pro
perty
or any interest therein. If, however, in the regulation of
OUTLINE ' REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, suc
restriction constitutes compensable taking [Didipio Earth-Savers MultiPurpose
Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006].
c) It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State
that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the
Constitution, in mandating that private property shall not be taken for public us
without just compensation , merely imposes a limit on the government s exercise
of this power and provides a measure of protection to the individual s right to
property. An ejectment suit should not ordinarily prevail over the State s power o
eminent domain [Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2,
1998] .
d) The acquisition of an easement of a right of way falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain [Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000]. In National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Develoment Corporation,437 SCRA 60, it
was reiterated that an action for a right of way filed by an electric power comp
any
for the construction of transmission lines falls within the scope of the power o
eminent domain. As held in Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620, the power of eminent
domain normally results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possessi
on of,
the expropriated property. But no cogent reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned
property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real pr

operty
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of a right of way.
e) Jurisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain is with the Regional
Trial Court. While the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in
monetary terms for the court is duty bound to determine the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property
it is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit [Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v. Heirs of Francisco
Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000], This is reiterated in Bardillon v.
Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003.
f) In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff s matter
of right to dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner may have
already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff s right in
expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court
approval and to certain conditions [National Power Corporation v. Pobre, G.R. No
106804, August 12, 2004]

Constitutional Law
2. Who may exercise the power. Congress and, by delegation, the
President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even private
enterprises performing public services.
a) Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain;
they can exercise the power only when expressly authorized by the Legislature.
Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code confers such power to local governments,
but the power is not absolute; it is subject to statutory requirements [Masikip
v.
City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006; Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R.
No. 155746, October 3, 2004]. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local
government units under R.A. 7160 cannot be understood as equal to the pervasive
and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. The
power of eminent domain must, by enabling law, be delegated to local
governments by the national legislature, and thus, can only be as broad or
confined as the real authority would want it to be [Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002].
b) The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the
State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private right
s.
Hence, strict construction will be made against the agency exercising the power.
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its com
plaint,
it made a written, definite and valid offer to acquire the property, as required
under
Sec. 19, R.A. 7160 [Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of
Pasig, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005],
c) The exercise of the power of eminent domain is clearly superior to

the final and executory judgment rendered by the court in an ejectment case
[Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 716].
d) In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538, it was
held that when the statutory life of the Iron & Steel Authority (ISA), a nonincorporated entity of
government, expired in 1988, its powers, duties and
functions, as well as its assets and liabilities, reverted to and were re-assume
d by
the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of any special provision of law
specifying some other disposition thereof. Accordingly, the Republic may be
substituted as party plaintiff in the expropriation proceedings originally insti
tuted
by ISA.
e) In San Roque Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 163130, September 7,
2007, the Supreme Court said that time and again, we have declared that eminent
domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. If the Repub
lic
had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of
things, it would have led to the cancellation of the title or at least, the anno
tation

of the lien in favour of the government on the certificate of title. Thus, while
the
general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistak
es
or errors of its officials or agents, this rule, however, admits of exceptions,
one of
which is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness o
fa
policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens system.
3. Requisites for exercise:
a) Necessity
i) When the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of
necessity is generally a political question [Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan
v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 640]; but when exercised by a delegate,
the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a
justiciable question [Republic v. La Orden de Po. Benedictinos, 1 SCRA 649].
ii) The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter
properly addressed to the Regional Trial Court in the course of the expropriatio
proceedings. If the property owner objects to the necessity of the takeover, he
should say so in his Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire
into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determin
whether there is a genuine necessity for it [Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of
Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003].
iii) The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government

may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property
was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impell
ed
the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the
choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized housing project [Lagca
v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004].
b) Private Property ,
i) Private property already devoted to public use cannot be
expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a general grant of author
ity
[City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349].
ii) All private property capable of ownership may be expropriated,
except money and choses in action. Even services may be subject to eminent
domain [Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620].

58 Constitutional Law
c) Taking in the constitutional sense.
i) May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner,
material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary u
ses
for which the property was intended. In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, 9 Phil
215, the imposition of an easement of a 3-meter strip on the plaintiff s property
was
considered taking. In People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil 44, a municipal ordinance
prohibiting a building which would impair the view of the plaza from the highway
was likewise considered taking. In these cases, it was held that the property ow
ner
was entitled to payment of just compensation.
ii) Thus, in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1,
the Court said that the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always
result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it
may only
result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title or possession. In this case, while it is true that the pla
intiff is
only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defenda
nts
of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upo
n the
defendants that below said transmission lines, no plant higher than three meters
is allowed. Besides, the high-tension current conveyed by the transmission lines
poses continuing danger to life and limb.
iii) In Republic v. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336, the Supreme Court
enumerated the following requisites for valid taking: the expropriator must ente
ra
private property; entry must be for more than a momentary period; entry must be
under warrant or color of authority; property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and utilization of th
property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficia
enjoyment of the property.
iv) Where there is taking in the constitutional sense, the property
owner need not file a claim for just compensation with the Commission on Audit;
he may go directly to court to demand payment [Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA
360; de los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11; Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212].
v) The owner of the property can recover possession of the
property from squatters, even if he agreed to transfer the property to the
Government, until the transfer is consummated or the expropriation case is filed
[Velarma v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 400].
OJTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

d) Public use.
i) Concept. As a requirement for eminent domain, public use is the
general concept of meeting public need or public exigency. It is not confined to
actual use by the public in its traditional sense. The idea that public use is str
ictly
limited to clear cases of use by the public has been abandoned. The term public
use has now been held to be synonymous with public interest , public benefit ,
public welfare , and public convenience [Reyes v. National Housing Authority,
G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003].
ia) The public use requirement for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changin
conditions. It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be benefi
cially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use [Estate
of
Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001]. The meaning of
public use has also been broadened to cover uses which, while not directly
available to the public, redound to their indirect advantage or benefit [Heirs o
Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220].
ib) Thus, in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284
SCRA 716, the fact that the property is less than Vi hectare and that only a few
could actually benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its public use
character, inasmuch as public use now includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage, including, in particular, urban land reform and
housing.
ic) The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by

Iglesia ni Cristo members than most others could well be true, but such peculiar
advantage still remains merely incidental and secondary in nature. That only few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not necessari
ly
diminish the essence and character of public use [Manosca v. Court of Appeals,
252 SCRA 412].
ii) When exercised by a local government unit. By express legislative
authority granted by Congress in Sec. 19, RA 7160, local government units may
expropriate private property for public use, or purpose, or welfare, for the ben
efit
of the poor and the landless. Thus, in Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 568,
the Supreme Court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (of Agusan del Sur)
was without authority to disapprove Bunawan Municipal Resolution No. 43-89
because, clearly, the Municipality of Bunawan has the authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate
the assailed resolution.

iia) However, note that in Municipality of Paranaque v. V. M.
Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 676, the Supreme Court declared that there was
lack of compliance with Sec. 19, R.A. 7160, where the Municipal Mayor filed a
complaint for eminent domain over two parcels of land on the strength of a
resolution passed by the Sanggunian Bayan, because what is required by law is
an ordinance.
iib) In Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13,
2004, the Supreme Court said that condemnation of private lands in an irrational
or piecemeal fashion, or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate
no more than a few tenants or squatters, is certainly not the condemnation for
public use contemplated by the Constitution. This deprives a citizen of his prop
erty
for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. Moreover
prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and
definite offer to buy petitioners property, as required by Sec. 19, R.A. 7160.
e) Just compensation.
i) Concept. The full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it is the
fair market value of the property. It is settled that the market value of the pr
operty
is that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and
received therefor .
ia) The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a
part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not res
tricted
to payment of the market value of the portion actually taken. In addition to the
market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to payment of consequenti
al
damages, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from t
he
total compensation must be deducted the value of consequential benefits, if any,
provided consequential benefits shall not exceed consequential damages
[National Power Corporation v. Spouses Chiong, G.R. No. 152436, June 20, 2003].
ib) Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also payment within a reasonable time from its
taking [Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001].
ic) The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the
discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to R.A. 7432 (Senior Citizens Act)
is
a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public u
se,
since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from

the State, but from the private establishments concerned [Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 148512, June 26,
2006; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation, G.R. No.
148083, July 21, 2006],
ii) Judicial prerogative. The ascertainment of what constitutes just
compensation for property taken in eminent domain cases is a judicial prerogativ
e,
and PD 76, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor
or the declared valuation by the owner, is unconstitutional [EPZA v. Dulay, 148
SCRA 305]. PD 1533 and PD 42, insofar as they sanction executive determination
of just compensation in eminent domain cases, are unconstitutional [Panes v.
Visayas State College of Agriculture, 263 SCRA 708]. Another Presidential Decree
(PD 1670) which authorizes the City Assessor to fix the value of the property is
also unconstitutional [Belen v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 59]. This declaration
of unconstitutionality may be given retroactive effect [Republic v. Court of App
eals,
227 SCRA 401].
iia) In Republic (DAR) v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758, it was
held that under R.A. 6657 (CARL), the decision of the provincial adjudicator nee
not be appealed to the DARAB before resort may be made to the RTC. The RTC,
as special agrarian court, is given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases, namely: (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses und
er
R.A. 6657.
iii) Need to appoint commissioners. In Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda,
206 SCRA 196, the Supreme Court held that in an expropriation case where the
principal issue is the determination of the amount of just compensation, a trial
before the commissioners is indispensable, in order to give the parties the
opportunity to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Trial with th
aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.
iiia) While commissioners are to be appointed by the court for the
determination of just compensation, the latter is not bound by the commissioners
findings [Republic v. Santos, 141 SCRA 30; Republic (MECS) v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 572], However, the court may substitute its own
estimate of the value of the property only for valid reasons, to wit: (a) the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them;
(b) they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence; or (c) where the
amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive [National Power
Corporation v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007].

iiib) But trial by commissioners is not mandatory in agrarian
reform cases, because Sec. 58 of R.A. 6657 provides that the appointment of a
commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the special agrari
an
court (SAC), or upon the instance of one of the parties. Thus, the modality prov
ided
in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court for the appointment of 3 commissioners is not
compulsory on the SAC [Spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 170422, March 7, 2008].
iv) Form of compensation. Compensation is to be paid in money and
no other. But in Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
supra., 175 SCRA 343, it was held that in agrarian reform, payment is allowed to
be made partly in bonds, because under the CARP, we do not deal with the
traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain; we deal with a revolutionar
kind of expropriation .
iva) However, in Land Bank v. Court of Appeals (and
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals), 249 SCRA 149, reiterated in
Sta. Rosa Realty & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112526,
October 12, 2001, the Court declared that, as explicitly provided by Sec. 16(e),
R.A. 6657, the deposit of compensation must be in cash or in Land Bank bonds ,
not in any other form, and certainly not in a trust account . While the Association
ruling allowed a deviation in the traditional mode of payment other than cash, t
his
did not dispense with the settled rule.that there must be payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred. Thus,
in
the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, 258 SCRA 404, the Court said
that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by DAR of the compensation in cash or in Land Bank bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate o
Title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The provision is very clea
r and
unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction, which
would include the opening of trust accounts within the coverage of the term
deposit .
v) Withdrawal of deposit by rejecting landowner. In the same
Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration [Land Bank v. Court of Appeals], th
Supreme Court also allowed the withdrawal by the rejecting landowner of the
money deposited in trust pending the determination of the valuation of the prope
rty.
By rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely
exercising his right to seek just compensation. If we are to affirm the withhold
ing
of the release of the offered compensation despite depriving the
OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

owner of the possession and use of his property, we are in effect penalizing the
latter for simply exercising a right. Without prompt payment, compensation canno
be considered just , for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. To
allow the taking of the landowners properties, and in the meantime leave them
empty-handed by withholding payment of just compensation while the government
speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for governm
ent
to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowner
when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned.
vi) Reckoning point of market value of the property. Compensation
is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain,
but
where the filing of the complaint occurs after the actual taking of the property
and
the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to
which the government devotes the property expropriated, just compensation is
determined as of the date of the taking [National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 254 SCRA 577]. See also: Republic v. Lara, 50 O.G. 5778; Republic v.
Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336; Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, 96 SCRA
831; National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, supra.; Belen v. Court of Appeals,
195 SCRA 59.
via) However, in Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June
28, 2001, the Supreme Court said that in the instances where the appropriating
agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, just compensatio
n
shall be determined as of the time of the taking, not as of the time of the fili
ng of
the complaint for eminent domain. Thus, it was declared that the value of the
property must be determined either as of the date of the taking or the filing of
the
complaint, whichever comes first .
vib) It should be noted that the principal criterion in determining
just compensation is the character of the land at the time of the taking. In Nat
ional
Power Corporation v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998, where the
trial judge based his computation-on the price of lots in the adjacent developed
subdivision
although the five parcels were agricultural but later reclassified a
residential the Supreme Court said that the trial judge had no valid basis for h
is
computation. The tax declaration is only one of the factors to be used in
determining the market value of the property for purposes of arriving at the amo
unt
to be paid by way of just compensation [Republic v. Ker & Co., G.R. No. 136171,
July 2, 2002].
OUTLINE I REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

vie) When eminent domain is exercised by a local government
unit, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of th
property [Sec. 19, R.A. 7160]. This was applied in City of Cebu v. Spouses
Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002, precisely because the expropriator was
the City of Cebu, a local government unit, and the Rules of Court cannot prevail
over R.A. 7160, a substantive law. In Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao, G.R. No.
146091, July 28, 2008, it was held that the value of the property shall be
ascertained as of the date it was actually taken, because it is as of that time
that
the real measure of the owner s loss may be fairly adjudged.
vii) Entitlement of owner to interest. In Nepomuceno v. City of
Surigao, supra., it was held that once the value of the property is fixed by the
court,
the amount shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected.
National Power Corporation v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542, fixes the interest due the
property owner at the rate of 6% per annum, prescribed in Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code, and not 12% per annum under Central Bank Circular No. 416, because the
latter applies to loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits, or judgments
involving such loans or forbearance of money goods or credits. The kind of inter
est
involved here is by way of damages, hence Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies.
viia) In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest
of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be
stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the na
ture
of damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the obligation on the pa
rt
of government one of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of
damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just
compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of
just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. In this case, the replace
ment
of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of
compensation, for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred
by the lack of due process. Thus, the compensation due Wycoco should bear 12%
interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to
the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds [Wycoco
v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004].
viii) Who else may be entitled to just compensation. Entitlement to
the payment of just compensation is not, however, limited to the owner , but
includes all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned,
including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory
contract. But where, as in this case, the intervenors had no longer

any legal interest in the property because at the time of the expropriation thei
claim of ownership had already been resolved and put to rest, then they are not
entitled to be impleaded as parties or to payment of just compensation [Knechtv.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108015, May 20, 1998],
ix) Title to the property. Title does not pass until after payment
[Visayan Refining v. Camus, 40 Phil 550], except in agrarian reform [Resolution
on Motion for Reconsideration, Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404].
ixa) Thus, the owner of land subject to expropriation may
still dispose of the same before payment of just compensation [Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000].
ixb) Taxes paid by owner after taking by the expropriator
are reimbursable [City of Manila v. Roxas, 60 Phil 215].
x) Right of landowner in case of non-payment of just
compensation. As a rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation
proceeding does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the
expropriated lots , but only to demand payment of the fair market value of the
property [Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July
2, 2002; Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20,
2003].
xa) However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Vicente Lim,
G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005, the Supreme Court said that the facts of the cas
do not justify the application of the rule. In this case, the Republic was order
ed to
pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings, and
the second, in the action for recovery of possession, but it never did. Fifty se
ven
(57) years passed since the expropriation case was terminated, but the Republic
never paid the owners. The Court construed the Republic s failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstances,
recovery of possession is in order. It was then held that where the government
fails to pav iust compensation within five years from the finality of the judgme
nt in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property.
f) Due process of law. The defendant must be given an opportunity
to be heard. In Belenv. Court of Appeals, supra., the Supreme Court declared PDs
1670 and 1669 unconstitutional for violating the due process clause because the
decrees do not provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the
petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation or the

reasonableness of the compensation to be paid for the property. See also
Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 716.
4. Writ of Possession. The issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial upon the [i] filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in f
orm and
substance, and [ii] upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent
to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property sought to be
expropriated per current tax declaration [Biglang-Awa v. Judge Bacalla, G.R. Nos
139927-139936, November 22, 2000; Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba,
Laguna, supra.]. The determination of whether the taking of the property is for
public purpose is not a condition precedent before the court may issue a writ of
possession. Once the requisites mentioned above are established, the issuance
of the writ becomes a ministerial matter for the expropriation court [Francia, J
r. v.
Municipality of Meycauayan, G.R. No 170432, March 24, 2008].
a) A hearing will have to be held to determine whether or not the
expropriator complied with the requirements of R.A. 7279. It is, therefore,
premature for the Court of Appeals to insist on finding whether petitioner resor
ted
to the other modes of acquisition provided in RA 7279, as this question will hav
to await the hearing on the complaint itself [City of Manila v. Serrano, G.R. No
142302, June 20, 2001]. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to determine if
writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the
requirements for socialized housing. Once the two requisites above are complied
with, then the writ of possession shall issue as a ministerial duty [City of Ilo
ilo v.
Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 154616, November 25, 2004].
5. Plaintiff s right to dismiss the complaint in eminent domain. In
expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff s matter-of-right to
dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner may have already
suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff s right to dismiss the
complaint has always been subject to Court approval and to certain conditions
[National Power Corporation & Pobre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 106804 August
12, 2004].
6. Right to repurchase or re-acquire the property. In Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495,
November 27, 2000, it was held that the property owner s right to
repurchase the property depends upon the character of the title acquired
by the expropriator, i.e., if land is expropriated for a particular purpose with
the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned, the property
shall revert to the former owner, then the former owner can re-acquire the
property. In this case, the terms

of the judgment in the expropriation case were very clear and unequivocal,
granting title to the lot in fee simple to the Republic. No condition on the rig
ht to
repurchase was imposed.
a) In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of nonpayment,
respondents ignore the fact that that the right of the expropriatory authority i
different from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales to which the remedy of
rescission may perhaps apply. Expropriation is an in rem proceeding, and after
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent
title [Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002].
7. Expropriation under Sec. 18, Art. XII: The State may, in the interest of
national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other
private enterprises to be operated by the Government .
a) Distinguish this from Sec. 17, Art. XII: In times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with
public interest .
i) In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R.
No. 155001, Baterina v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No.
155547, Lopez v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No. 155661, Ma
05, 2003, the Supreme Court said that PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual
stipulation, contravene this constitutional provision, and obligate the governme
nt
to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal complex . The
constitutional provision envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the tim
es
necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct the operation of an
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest . It is t
he
welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in
determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business. Clear
ly,
the State, in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power.
ii) Note that the temporary takeover by the government extends
only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such,
the government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the sai
business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary.
The private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise,
claim just compensation for the use of said business and

its properties, as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of th
police power and not the power of eminent domain [Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO, supra.].
iii) In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., the Court declared that
Sec. 17, Art. XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private businesses affected with public interest is j
ust
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed in Congress. Thus,
when Sec. 17, Art. XII, provides that The State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms and conditions prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected
with
public interest , it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether the President
may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress delegates it to the
former pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
8. Expropriation under Secs. 4 and 9, Art. XIII.
a) Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. See Association of Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra., on the constitutionality of
the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, being an exercise of the police power of
the State, using eminent domain as an instrument to accomplish the police
objective. In Sta. Rosa Realty & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112526, October 12, 2001, it was held that to the extent that the CARL prescribe
retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for
the
regulation or private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where to
carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess o
f
the maximum area allowed, there is also taking under the power of eminent
domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the land,
but the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the beneficiary. See also Pa
ris
v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 139083, August 30, 2001, on the validity of the retention l
imits.
b) R.A. 7279 fUrban Development and Housing Act of 1992j.
i) In Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA
716, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has becom
ea
paramount task of Government in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in
urban areas, particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, local government units
are not given an unbridled authority when exercising this power in pursuit of
solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, i.e., Se
c. 1
and Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the Constitution. Thus, even

Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code imposes certain restrictions on the exercis
of the power of eminent domain. R.A. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992)
the governing law which deals with the subject of urban land reform
and housing
provides the order in which lands may be acquired for socialized
housing, and very explicit in Secs. 9 and 10 thereof is the fact that privatelyowned
lands rank last (6th) in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housin
g.
Expropriation proceedings may, therefore, be resorted to only when the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
must be deemed mandatory because they are the only safeguards in securing the
right of owners of private property to due process when their property is
expropriated for public use. This was reiterated in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R.
No. 155746, October 13, 2004].
ii) In City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January
29, 2001, the Supreme Court reiterated that under RA 7279, lands for socialized
housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2)
alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered, abandoned or idle lands;
(4)
lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
Program sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement sites which have not yet been
acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately
owned lands. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions, namely: [a]
it
shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted; and [b] parcels owned by small property owners are exempt from such
acquisition. Small property owners are [1] owners of residential lands with an a
rea
not more than 300 sq. m. in highly urbanized cities and not more than 800 sq. m.
in other urban areas; and [2] they do not own residential property other than th
same. In this case, the respondents fall within the classification of small prop
erty
owners.
D. Power of Taxation
1. Definition; nature and scope of power.
2. Who may exercise. Primarily, the legislature; also: local legislative bodies
[Sec. 5, Art. X, Constitution]; and to a limited extent, the President when gran
ted
delegated tariff powers [Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI],
3. Limitations on the exercise.
a) Due process of law: tax should not be confiscatory.
i) With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the
nature, object, extent, coverage and situs of taxation. But where a tax

Constitutional Law
measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of
property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for despite all its plenit
ude, the
power to tax cannot override constitutional prescriptions. This postulate, howev
er,
has not been demonstrated in the challenge to the constitutionality of the Simpl
ified
Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNITS) [Tan v. del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324].
b) Equal protection clause: Taxes should be uniform and equitable [Sec.
28 (1), Art. VI].
c) Public purpose. See: Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, infra..
i) Tax for special purpose [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]: Treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only; when purpose is fulfilled, the balance,
if
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government. See: Osmena v.
Orbos, 220 SCRA 703.
4. Double Taxation. Additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the
same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose.
See: Punzalan v. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil 46.
a) Despite lack of specific constitutional prohibition, double taxation will
not be allowed if the same will result in a violation of the equal protection cl
ause.
5. Tax Exemptions. Requisite: No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress [Sec
28 (4), Art. VI, Constitution].
a) Sec. 28 (31 Art. VI: Charitable institutions, churches and

parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and
all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used f
or
religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
b) Sec. 4 (3) Art. XIV: All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties, x x x Proprietary educational
institutions, including those co-operatively owned, may likewise be entitled to
such
exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on
dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
SE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

c) Sec. 4 (41 Art. XIV: Subject to conditions prescribed by law, ail grants,
endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly and exclusively
for
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
d) Where tax exemption is granted gratuitously, it may be revoked at
will; but not if granted for a valuable consideration. See Mactan Cebu Internati
onal
Airport Authority v. Marcos, 261 SCRA 667; Casanova v. Hord, 8 Phil 125; Lladoc
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292.
6. Police Power v. Taxation. In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No.
159796, July 17, 2007, the Court made a conservative and pivotal distinction
between police power and taxation, holding that the distinction rests in the pur
pose
for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose an
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is t
he
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the Universal Charge
imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is an exaction that invokes the State s police
power, particularly its regulatory dimension, gleaned from Sec. 34 itself which
enumerates the purposes of the Universal Charge which can be amply discerned
as regulatory in character.
a) License fee v. Tax
i) License fee is a police measure; tax is a revenue measure.
ii) Amount collected for a license fee is limited to the cost of permit
and reasonable police regulation [except when the license fee is imposed on a
non-useful occupation, as in Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board of

Manila, infra.]; amount of tax may be unlimited provided it is not confiscatory.
iii) License fee is paid for the privilege of doing something, and may
be revoked when public interest so requires; Tax is imposed on persons or
property for revenue. See: Compania General de Tabacos v. City of Manila, 8
SCRA 367.
b) Kinds of license fee
i) For useful occupations or enterprises.
ii) For non-useful occupations or enterprises. When a license fee
is imposed in order to discourage non-useful occupations or enterprises, the
amount imposed may be a bit exorbitant [Physical Therapy Organization v.
Municipal Board of Manila, infra.].

Constitutional Law
7. Supremacy of the national government over local governments in
taxation. When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government
instrumentalities, the exercise of the power is construed strictly against local
governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax [Manila International Airport Authority (MI
AA)
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006], In this case, the Supreme
Court ruled that airports, lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real esta
te
tax for the following reasons: (a) MIAA is not a government-owned or -controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government; and (b) the real
properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines, and thus, exemp
from local taxation.

V. PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
A. Preamble
1. Does not confer rights nor impose duties.
2. Indicates authorship of the Constitution; enumerates the primary aims
and aspirations of the framers; and serves as an aid in the construction of the
Constitution. B. Republicanism [Sec. 1. Art. II: The Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them ].
1. Essential features: representation and renovation.
2. Manifestations.
a) Ours is a government of laws and not of men [Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39
Phil 778].
b) Rule of the majority. [Plurality in elections]
c) Accountability of public officials.
d) Bill of Rights.
e) Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws.
f) Separation of powers.
i) Purpose: To prevent concentration of authority in one person or
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exerci
se to
the detriment of republican institutions. To secure action, to forestall overacti
on,
to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency [Pangasinan Transporation Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 40 O.G. 8th Supp. 57]. See also Tuason v. Register
of Deeds of Caloocan City, 157 SCRA 613; In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246.
ii) In La Bugal-B Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G.R. No.
127882, December 1, 2004, the Court restrained itself from intruding into policy
matters to allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the
mineral resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign group
to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable
employment opportunities in the country. The Judiciary is loath to interfere with
the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official functions .
Let the development of the mining industry be the

responsibility of the political branches of government. The questioned provision
s of
R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.
iii) Application: Not doctrinaire nor with pedantic rigor ; not
independence but interdependence .
iiia) In the absence of any administrative action taken against the
RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former s certificate of service,
the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme
Court s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers [Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA
464].
iv) Principle of Blending of Powers. Instances when powers are not
confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by seve
ral
departments, e.g., enactment of general appropriations law.
v) Principle of Checks and Balances. This allows one department to
resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses
committed by the other departments, e.g., veto power of the President as check o
improvident legislation, etc..
vi) Role of the Judiciary. The judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies i
nvolving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse, of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government .
via) Note that when the court mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not

its
own superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil 139] Read The Power of Judicial Review, supra. See also:
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792.
vib) The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given
power has been validly exercised by a particular department is whether or not th
power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its
exercise since the conferment is usually done expressly. However, even in the
absence of express conferment, the exercise of the power may be justified under
the doctrine of necessary implication, i.e. that the grant of an express power c
arries
with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it. Note also that
there
are powers which although not expressly

conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or incidental, e.g., the President s
power to deport undesirable aliens which may be exercised independently of
constitutional or statutory authority, because it is an act of State . See also:
Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760, where the Supreme Court justified the
action of President Aquino in banning the return of the Marcoses to the Philippi
nes
on the basis of the President s residual powers.
vie) Political and justiciable questions. A purely justiciable
question implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for
said breach of right [Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642]. In Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy, supra., the Supreme Court ruled that what the petitioners raised were
justiciable questions, considering that the statement of facts and definition of
issues clearly show that the petitioners are assailing R.A. 8180 because its
provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom . In
Tanada v. Angara, supra., the petition seeking the nullification of the Senate
concurrence of the President s ratification of the Agreement establishing the Worl
Trade Organization (WTO), was held to present a justiciable controversy, because
where an action is alleged to infringe the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right
but the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
vic1) The term 'political question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely a question of policy. It refers to those questions whi
ch,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capac
ity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the

legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure [Tanada v.
Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101]. Thus, in Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No.
134577, November 18, 1998, where Senator Defensor-Santiago questioned the
election of Senator Guingona as Minority Floor Leader, the Supreme Court said
that it has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusiv
realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to pr
otect
and uphold --- the very duty that justifies the Court s being. Constitutional resp
ect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevent this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Cour
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judici
ous in
upholding the rule and the majesty of the law. See also Bagatsing v. Committee
on Privatization, supra., where it was held that the decision of PNOC to privati
ze
Petron and the approval of such by the Committee on Privatization, being in
accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the Courts, because
such acts are an exercise of executive functions over which the Court will not p
ass
judgment nor inquire

into the wisdom of. For further application of the political question principle, r
ead
Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, and Romulo v. Yniguez, 141 SCRA 263.
vic2) But remember that the scope of the political question
doctrine has been limited by the 2nd paragraph, Sec. 1, Art. VIII, particularly
the
portion which vests in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not there
has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government .
g) Delegation of Powers
i) Rule: Potestas delegata non potest delegare , based on the
ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty t
o be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and no
through the intervening mind of another.
ia) While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into
operator s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed to relinquish or share i
ts
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
PAGCOR cannot delegate its power, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to
show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCR
649, the Court clarified that since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate
jai-alai, it cannot, even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor, ope
rate jaialai
in the City of Manila . By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate
legislative franchise, and not ride on PAGCOR s franchise if it were to legally
operate on-line Internet gambling [Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January
14, 2004],
ii) Permissible delegation:
iia) Tariff Powers to the President, as specifically provided in Sec.
28(2), Art. VI: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may imp
ose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other dut
ies
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government .
iia1) The Tariff and Customs Code grants such stand-by
powers to the President. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter on imported crude oil, and P1.00
per
liter on imported oil products, as a valid exercise of delegated

legislative authority underthe Tariff and Customs Code. In Philippine Interislan
Shipping Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100481, January 22, 1997, it
was held that the fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When the s
ame
is delegated to the President, he may exercise it directly, e.g., issuance of th
questioned Executive Order 1088, without thereby withdrawing an earlier
delegation made to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). But when the President
directly exercises the delegated authority, the PPA may not revise the rates fix
ed
by the former.
iib) Emergency Powers to the President, as provided in Sec.
23(2), Art. VI: In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restricti
ons
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof .
iib1) An example of this is R.A. 6826, approved on
December 20,1989. The President issued National Emergency Memorandum
Orders (NEMOs) in the exercise of delegated legislative powers. See: Araneta v.
Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368; Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil 603.
iib2) A distinction has to be made between the President s
authority to declare a state of emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To
the first, since Sec. 18, Art. VII, grants the President such power, no legitima
te
constitutional objection can be raised. To the second, manifold constitutional

issues arise. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately-owned public utilities or businesses aqffected with public interest,
requires a delegation from Congress. Sec. 17, Art. XII, must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private businesses
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed in Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII, provides that the
State may, during the emergency aqnd under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public util
ity or
business affected with public interest , the State refers to Congress, not the
President. Whether the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress delegates it to the former pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.].
iic) Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art. X;
Sec. 2, Art. XVII; Republic Act 6735). See: People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, which wa
decided under the 1935 Constitution, where the Supreme Court said that courts
have sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at

large. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are specific provisions where the peop
le
have reserved to themselves the function of legislation.
iic1) Referendum vs. Plebiscite. Referendum is the power of
the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for t
he
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: referendum on statutes which refers t
a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congre
ss;
and referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a la
w,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies. Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Consti
tution
is approved or rejected by the people [Sec. 2 (c) and (e), Republic Act No. 6735
].
iid) Delegation to local government units (See: R.A. 7160).
Such legislation (by local governments) is not regarded as a transfer of general
legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local
regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject, of course, to the
interposition of the superior in cases of necessity [Peopje v. Vera, supra.]. Thi
recognizes the fact that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the
national lawmaking body on matters of purely local concern, and are in a better
position to enact appropriate legislative measures thereon.
iie) Delegation to Administrative Bodies The power of
subordinate legislation. In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., v.

POEA, 243 SCRA 666, POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 01-94, increasing
and adjusting the rates of compensation and other benefits in the Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers, was held to be a valid exercise of delegated
legislative authority, inasmuch as it conforms to the sufficient and valid stand
ard
of fair and equitable employment practices prescribed in E.O. 797. In Osmena v.
Orbos, supra., it was held that there was no undue delegation of legislative pow
er
in the authority granted by legislature to the Energy Regulatory Board to impose
additional amounts to augment the resources of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund.
See also: Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730; Eastern Shipping v. POEA, 166
SCRA 533. But in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, supra., the authority
given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above th
existing authorized fare was held to be illegal for being an undue delegation of
power.
iie1) In Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, Sec. 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code (authorizing the President to create
municipalities through executive orders) was declared unconstitutional for being
an undue delegation of legislative power However, in Municipality of San Narciso
(Quezon) v. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11, E.O 353 creating the Municipal

District of San Andres in 1959 was not declared unconstitutional because it was
only after almost 30 years that the legality of the executive order was challeng
ed;
throughout its 30 years of existence, the municipal district had exercised the
powers and authority of a duly created local government institution, and the Sta
te
had, at various times, recognized its continued existence. Likewise, the Pe/aez
ruling was not applied in Municipality of Candihay, Bohol v. Court of Appeals, 2
51
SCRA 530, because the municipality had been in existence for 16 years before the
Pe/aez ruling was promulgated, and various governmental acts throughout the
years all indicate the State s recognition and acknowledgment of the existence of
the municipal corporation, In Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental v. Bor
ja,
265 SCRA 182, not only was the Municipality of Sinacaban in existence for 16
years before the Pe/aez ruling, but that even the State and the Municipality of
Jimenez itself had recognized Sinacaban s corporate existence (by entering into
an agreement concerning common boundaries, and that Sinacaban had attained
de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country which considered
Sinacaban as part of the 2nd district of Misamis Occidental.
iii) Tests for valid delegation: Both of the following tests are to be
complied with [Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569; Tatad v. Secretary of
Energy, supra.]:
iiia) Completeness Test. The law must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will
be
nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it. Se
e
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1.
iiib) Sufficient standard test. A sufficient standard is intended to
map out the boundaries of the delegate s authority by defining the legislative pol
icy
and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. T
his
is intended to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the legisl
ature
to the delegate. The standard is usually indicated in the law delegating legisla
tive
power. See Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.; de la Liana v. Alba, 11
SCRA 294; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323.
iiibl) On the challenge relative to the validity of the provision
of R.A. 6734 which authorized the President to merge , by administrative
determination, the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao, in Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253, the Court
said that the legislative standard need not be expressed, it may simply be gathe
red
or implied; neither should it always be found in

the law challenged, because it may be found in other statutes on the same subjec
t.
In this case, the standard was found in R.A. 5435 on the power of the President
to
reorganize the Executive Department to promote simplicity, economy and to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated soci
al
and economic development .
iiib2) In Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy, supra.,
even as the Supreme Court found that R.A. 8180 contained sufficient standards
for the delegation of power to the President to advance the date of full deregul
ation
(of the oil industry) , Executive Order No. 392 constituted a misapplication of R.
A.
8180, because the President rewrote the standards set forth in the law when he
considered the extraneous factor of depletion of OPSF funds.
iiib3) In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796,
July 17, 2007, the Court held that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entire
ty,
in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and condi
tions,
and that it contains sufficient standards. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, amon
others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, relia
bility,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power , and watershed
rehabilitation and management are sufficient standards, as they provide the
limitations on the Energy Regulatory Commission s power to formulate the

Implementing Rules and Regulations.
C. The Incorporation Clause [Sec. 2. Art. II: The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of p
eace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations"].
1. Read along with the Preamble; Secs. 7 & 8 (independent foreign policy
and nuclear-free Philippines), Art. II; and Sec. 25 (expiration of bases agreeme
nt),
Art. XVIII.
2. Renunciation of war. The historical development of the policy condemning
or outlawing war in the international scene:
a) Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided conditions for the
right to go to war;
b) Kelloqq-Briand Pact of 1928. also known as the General Treaty for
the Renunciation of War, ratified by 62 States, which forbade war as an instrumen
of national policy .

c) Charter of the United Nations. Art. 2 of which prohibits the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a St
ate.
3. Doctrine of incorporation. By virtue of this clause, our Courts have applied
the rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not
previously been subject of statutory enactments, because these generally
accepted principles of international law are automatically part of our own laws.
See
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282; Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113.
a) The phrase generally accepted principles of international law
refers
to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all stat
es,
e.g., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, sovereign immunit
y,
a person s right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda
[Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R.
No. 173034, October 9, 2007],
b) Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or by incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law principle be transforme
into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law [Pharmaceutical an
Health Care Association v. Duque, supra.]
c) The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals

or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a co
nflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or st
atute
of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to
give
effect to both. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable an
da
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal cour
ts.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115, the reason given by the Court was that the
Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which
cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. In
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 and In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984, on the basis
of separation of powers and the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court,
respectively. The high tribunal also noted that courts are organs of municipal l
aw
and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
d) However, as applied in most countries, the doctrine of incorporation
dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing with, and are

not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle of
lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect. In states where the constitution is the h
ighest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and trea
ties
may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution [Secretary of J
ustice
v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, citing Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed.]. The same rule was applied in Philip Morris, Inc. v
Court of Appeals, where the Supreme Court said that the fact that international
law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primac
of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
4. See: Chapter I, General Principles, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
infra..
D. Civilian Supremacy fSec. 3. Art. II: Civilian authority is, at all times, supr
eme
over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the p
eople
and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integr
ity of
the national territory"].
1. Read Sec. 18, Art. VII (Commander-in-Chief clause).
2. See Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279.
E. Duty of Government; people to defend the State fSec. 4. Art. II: The prime
duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all ci
tizens
may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military o
civil service. Sec. 5. Art. II: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are esse
ntial
for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings Of democracy. ].
1. Read Secs. 4 & 5, Art. XVI (Armed Forces of the Philippines provisions).
2. See People v. Lagman and Zosa, 66 Phil. 13
3. Right to bear arms. The right to bear arms is a statutory, not a
constitutional right. The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a
property right. Neither does it create a vested right. Even if it were a propert
y right,
it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police powe
r.
The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against
violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is t
o be
construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties [Chavez
v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004].

a) The first real firearms law is Act No. 1780, enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 12, 1907, to regulate the importation, acquisition,
possession, use and transfer of firearms. Thereafter, President Marcos issued
P.D. 1856, which was amended by R.A. 8294. Being a mere statutory creation,
the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right
[Chavez v. Romulo, supra.].
F. Separation of Church and State fSec. 6. Art. II: The separation of Church
and State shall be inviolable."]
1. Reinforced by:
a) Sec. 5, Art. Ill (Freedom of religion clause).
b) Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-C (religious sect cannot be registered as
political party).
c) Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from the religious
sector).
d) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation for
sectarian benefit)
2. Exceptions:
a) Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI: (Churches, parsonages, etc., actually, directly
and exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation).
b) Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI: (Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian
benefit, except when priest, etc., is assigned to the armed forces, or to any pe
nal
institution or government orphanage or leprosarium).
c) Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV: (Optional religious instruction for public
elementary and high school students).
d) Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIV: (Filipino ownership requirement for educational
institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards).

3. See discussion on FREEDOM OF RELIGION, infra.
G. Independent foreign policy and nuclear-free Philippines fSec. 7, Art.
II: The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with
other
states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self determination. Sec.

8, Art. II: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory. ]
1. Refer to Sec. 2, Art. II; Sec. 25, Art. XVIII.
2. See: Opinion, Secretary of Justice, S. 1988.
3. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, the
Supreme Court said that these provisions, along with Sec. 2, Art. II, Sec. 21, A
rt.
VII, and Sec. 26, Art. XVIII, betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
H. Just and dynamic social order fSec. 9. Art. 11: The State shall promote a
just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence o
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequa
te
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an
improved quality of life for all. ] 1. Read Preamble.
/. Promotion of Social Justice fSec. 10. Art. II: The State shall promote social
justice in afl phases of national development. ] See Calalangv. Williams, 70 Phil
726;Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194; Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611;
Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA 459.
J. Respect for human dignity and human rights fSec. 11. Art. II: The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights. ] Read also Secs. 17-19, Art. XIII.
K. Family and youth fSec. 12. Art. II: The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous so
cial
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearin
of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. Sec. 13. Art. II: The State recognizes the
vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculca
te in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs. ] 1
1. Read also Art. XV and Art. 52, Civil Code. See Meyer v. Nebraska,
263 U.S. 393; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 266 U.S. 510; Cabanas v.
Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94.

2. R.A. 7610, which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses,
was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse ; thus, the Court grants the victim
full
vindication and protection granted under the law [People v. Larin, G.R. No.
128777, October 7, 1998].
L. Fundamental equality of men and women fSec. 14. Art. II: The
State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. ] Read also Sec. 14, Art.
XIII.
1. In Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997, the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage, runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, which is guaranteed all women workers under the
Constitution. While a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried
may be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification where the particular
requirements of the job would demand the same, discrimination against married
women cannot be adopted by the employer as a general principle.
M. Promotion of health and ecology fSec. 15. Art. II: The State shall protect
and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them. Sec. 16. Art. II: The State shall protect and advance the right of th
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature. ] Read also Secs. 11-13, Art. XIII.
1. In Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, it was held that the petitioners,
minors duly joined by their respective parents, had a valid cause of action in
questioning the continued grant of Timber License Agreements (TLAs) for

commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses on a fundamental legal
right: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
2. In C & M Timber Corporation v. Alcala, G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997,
on the issue that the total log ban is a new policy which should be applied
prospectively and not affect the rights of petitioner vested under the Timber
Licensing Agreement, the Supreme Court declared that this is not a new policy bu
a mere reiteration of the policy of conservation and protection expressed in Sec
16, Art. II, of the Constitution.
N. Priority to education, science, technology, etc. fSec. 17. Art. II: The
State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture an

sports, to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development."] Read also Sec. 2, Art.
XIV.
1. In Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA
770, the Court said that the requirement that a school must first obtain governm
ent
authorization before operating is based on the State policy that educational
programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at lea
st
satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical pl
ant
and facilities and administrative and management viability. [See discussion on
Academic freedom, infra.] See also Villarv. TIP, 135 SCRA 706; Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730.
2. However, in Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, and in Philconsa v.
Enriquez, supra., it was held that Sec. 5, Art. XIV, which provides for the high
est
budgetary priority to education, is merely directory; the hands of Congress cann
ot
be so hamstrung as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of
national interest and the attainment of other state policies and objectives.
3. While it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable an
equitable admission and academic requirements, the exercise of this right may be
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety and general welfare. Thus, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge ma

y
be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine,
in
order to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and
ignorance [Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681,
June 21, 2004].
4. See discussion on Art. XIV, infra.
O. Protection to labor rSec. 18. Art. II: The State affirms labor as a primary so
cial
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare
.]
Read also Sec. 8, Art. Ill; Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B; Sec. 3, Art. XIII. 1
1. In JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, 260
SCRA 319, the Supreme Court said that obviously, protection to labor
does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and
social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government s
constitutional duty to

provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As
explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386
in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers, what
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above
all, decent, just and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its s
ons
and daughters to strange lands, because it cannot satisfy their employment needs
at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty bound to provide
them adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.
2. In Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999, the Supreme Court
held that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled
persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified
able-bodied employees; thus, once they have attained the status of regular
workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstandin
written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely
in
charity or accommodation, but in justice for all.
P. Self-reliant and independent economic order [Sec. 19. Art. II: The State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled b
Filipinos. Sec. 20. Art. II: The State recognizes the indispensable role of the
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investments. ] Read also Art. XII.
1. In Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, it was held that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreement does not violate Sec. 19, Art. II, nor Secs. 10 and
12, Art. XII, because the said sections should be read and understood in relatio
n
to Secs. 1 and 13, Art. XII, which require the pursuit of a trade policy that ser
ves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity . The provisions of Art. II are not intended to
be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation. The reason
s for
denying cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and lack of judi
cial
authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making.
2. In Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine
Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998, the Supreme
Court said that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a
policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene
whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare, as reflected
in Sec. 6 and 19, Art. XII. This is reiterated in Pest Management
Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer

and Pesticide Authority. I n Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, the Court held that free
enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations. It must be c
learly
explained and proven by competent evidence how such protective regulations
would result in restraint of trade.
Q. Land Reform rSec. 21. Art. II: The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform. ] Read also Secs. 4-10, Art. XIII. See
Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, supra.
R. Indigenous cultural communities fSec. 22. Art. II: The State recognizes
and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
of national unity and development. ] Read also Secs. 5(2), Art. VI; Sec. 5, Art. X
II;
Sec. 17, Art. XIV. .
S. Independent people s organizations FSec. 23. Art. II: The State shall
encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that
promote the welfare of the nation. ] Read also Secs. 15-16, Art. XIII.
T. Communication and information in nation-building [Sec. 24. Art. II: The
State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nationbuildi
ng. ]
Read also Secs. 10-11, Art. XVI; Sec. 23, Art. XVIII.
U. Autonomy of local governments rSec. 25. Art. II: The State shall ensure
the autonomy of local governments. ] Read also Art. X. See Basco v. PAGCOR,
197 SCRA 52, where the Supreme Court said that local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization , and does not make the local
governments sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio.
1. In Limbonas v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, the Court distinguished

between decentralization of administration and decentralization of power. The
latter is abdication by the national government of governmental powers; while th
former is merely delegation of administrative powers to the local government uni
in order to broaden the base of governmental powers. 2
2. In Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001, the
Supreme Court said that the basic relationship between the national
legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains
control of the local government units although in a significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create
still includes the power to destroy. The

power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True there are no
table
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on local government
units of the power to tax [Sec. 5, Art. X], which cannot now be withdrawn by mer
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal
of local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Ours is st
ill a
unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy
granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the
extent allowed by the central authority.
3. Thus, even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomy
to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the
power of control by Congress and the power of general supervision by the
President [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3,
2002].
a) On the President s power of general supervision, however, the
President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit
if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The President or a
ny of
his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any
directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter
the
wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit
is
a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well a
s the
doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, supra.].
V. Equal access of opportunities for public service fSec. 26. Art. II: The
State shall guarantee equal access of opportunities for public service, and proh
ibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law .] Read also Sec. 13, Art. VII; Secs.
1-2, Art. XIII.
1. In Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, the Supreme
Court said that this provision does not bestow a right to seek the Presidency; i
does not contain a judicially enforceable constitutional right and merely specif
ies
a guideline for legislative action. The provision is not intended to compel the
State
to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into
public office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid
limitation is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.
W. Honest public service and full public disclosure fSec. 27. Art. II: The
State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positi
ve

and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Sec. 28. Art. II:
Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a polic
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. ] Re
ad also
Sec. 7, Art. Ill; Secs 12 & 20, Art. VI; Sec. 20, Art. VII; Sec. 4, Art. IX-D; S
ecs. 4-15
& 17, Art. XI; and Secs. 12 &21, Art. XII. SeeLegaspiv. Civil Service Commission
150 SCRA 530; Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256; Garcia v. Board of
Investments, 177 SCRA 374; Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515.
OUTLINE
REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

VI. BILL OF RIGHTS
A. In general.
1. Definition. The set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and
political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. The Bill of
Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security again
st
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience
with general principles [quoted in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills, 51 SCRA 189]. Generally, any governmental action in violation of
the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also generally self-executing.
a) Civil Rights. Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected wit
h the
organization or administration of government. They include the rights to propert
y,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.. They are righ
ts
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. S
uch
term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced o
redressed in a civil action. '
b) Political Rights. They refer to the right to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, e.g., the righ
t of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right to petition and, in general
the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government [Simon v.
Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994]. 2
2. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003,
the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
was not operative from the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution until the
adoption, on March 24, 1986, of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution.
During this period, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law, because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under the
Bill of Rights, because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
at the time. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

B. Due Process of Law. fSec. 1. Art. Ill: No person shall be deprived of life, li
berty
or property without due process of law x xx .]
1. Origin. By the 39th chapter of the Magna Carta wrung by the barons from
King John, the despot promised that no man shall be taken or imprisoned or
disseized or outlawed, or in any manner destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor
send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land
[per
legem terraef.
2. Definition. A law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial [Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 518], Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice [Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849]. The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play
[Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 32-33].
3. Who are protected. Universal in application to all persons, without regard
to any difference in race, color or nationality. Artificial persons are covered
by the
protection but only insofar as their property is concerned [Smith Bell & Co. v.
Natividad, 40 Phil. 163], The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means
of livelihood [Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275].
4. Meaning of life, liberty and property.
a) Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness,
free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which
make life enjoyable [Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]
See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.
b) Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude, x x x (It) includes the right of the citizen to
be free to
use his faculties in all lawful ways x x x [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,
39
Phil 660],
c) Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and
be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things a person owns; it
includes the right to secure, use and dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197]. i)
i) Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from
it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the de jure
officer s right to office [Nunez v. Averia, 57 SCRA 726], Indeed, the Court
has recognized that

while public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it
is
nevertheless a protected right [Bince v. Commission on Electiions, 218 SCRA
782]. One s employment, profession or trade or calling is a property right, and th
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. Thus, an order of
suspension, without opportunity for hearing, violates property rights [Crespo v.
Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66]. But its proper regulation has been upheld as a
legitimate subject of the police power of the State, particularly when its condu
ct
affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservat
ion
of the State, the public health and welfare, and public morals [JMM Promotion an
Management v. Court of Appeals, supra.].
ii) A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law
under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not ve
st
absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the n
onimpairment
clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public
interest [Republic v. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation, G.R. No.
149927, March 30, 2004]. Mere privileges, such as the license to operate a
cockpit, are not property rights and are revocable at will [Pedro v. Provincial
Board
of Rizal, 53 Phil 123].
iii) The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property
right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outsid
e one s
residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it canno
be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power
[Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534],
iv) The mandatory suspension from office of a public official pending
criminal prosecution for violation of RA 3019 cannot amount to deprivation of
property without due process of law [Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163].
5. Aspects of due process:
a) Substantive. This serves as a restriction on government's law- and rulemaking
powers. The requisites are:
i) The interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the intervention of the State. [See discuss
ion
on Police Power, Chapter IV.]
ii) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals. In
Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil 103, an ordinance requiring all laundry

establishments to issue their receipts in English and Spanish was held valid. In
Yu
Eng Cong v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, the Court declared as unconstitutional a law
prohibiting traders from keeping their books of accounts in a language other tha
English, Spanish or any local dialect. See also Layno v. Sandiganbayan, 136
SCRA 536; Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409.
iia) In GS/S v.Montesclaros, 434 SCRA41, the Supreme Court
declared as invalid Sec. 18, PD 1146, which provides that the surviving spouse
has no right to survivorship pension benefits if the surviving spouse contracted
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified fo
the pension benefit. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory
employees have vested rights in the pension. Thus, where the employee retires
and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits
protected by the due process clause. Sec. 18, PD 1146 is seriously oppressive in
outrightly denying the claim of a dependent spouse for survivorship pension
benefits if the dependent spouse contracted marriage within the three-year
prohibited period.
b) Procedural. This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudi
cial
agencies of government. Requisites:
i) An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it.
ia) In Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194, there was denial of
due process when Commissioner Opinion, who was formerly a law partner of
respondent Pacificador, obstinately insisted in participating in the case, thus

denying the petitioner the cold neutrality of an impartial judge . In Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43, the Court held that the People was denied due
process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecution.
ib) In Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, reiterated in
Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998,
the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and
witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate
and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law. In Rivera v. Civil
Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43, and in Singson v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 274 SCRA 358, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a public
officer who decided the case should not be the same person to decide it on appea
because he cannot be an impartial judge. In GSIS v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128523, September 26, 1998, the police chief inspector who had earlier
recommended that the application for death

Constitutional Law
benefits be approved, was held to be biased and should have inhibited himself fr
om
the proceedings.
ib1) But in People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5,
2001, reiterated in People v. Medenilla, G.R. Nos. 131638-39, March 26, 2001,
even as the transcript of stenographic notes showed that the trial court intensi
vely
questioned the witnesses (approximately 43% of the questions asked of
prosecution witnesses and the accused were propounded by the judge), the
Supreme Court held that the questioning was necessary. Judges have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and
have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involve
d,
clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points overlooked by
counsel. Likewise, in People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441, it was held that the judge
should be given reasonable leeway in directing questions to witnesses in order t
elicit relevant facts; it is expedient to allow the judge to question a witness
so that
his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. Thus, in
People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213, reiterated in Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378,
and in People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761, the Supreme Court said that questions
which merely clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence are within the
prerogative of the judge to ask.
ib2) In People v. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530, theSupreme
Court said that the test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to preve
nt
the proper presentation of the case or the ascertainment of the truth in the mat
ter
where he interposes his questions or comments. When the judge remarked that
the testimonies of two witnesses were incredible, that another witness was total
ly
confused and appeared to be mentally imbalanced, and that two witnesses were
liars, his comments were just honest observations intended to warn the witnesses
to be candid to the court. He merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their
contradictory statements.
ic) In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 144464,
November 22, 2001, the Court rejected petitioners' contention that they were
denied due process ostensibly because the Civil Service Commission acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge. The CSC is mandated to hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by it or instituted before it directl
y or on
appeal. Neither can it be denied that petitioners were formally charged after a
prima facie case for dishonesty was found to exist. They were properly informed
of the charges. They submitted an answer and were given the opportunity to
defend themselves.
id) In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R.No. 159190, June 30, 2005,
the petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participat
ed
in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite hishaving earlier

participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Sp
ecial
Prosecutor. The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a
steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the
same person whose decision is under review.
ie) Read also Rule 137, Rules of Court, on disqualification of
judges.
ii) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
iia) It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not
only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant bu
also to afford the latter the opportunity to be heard on the claim made against
him.
Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an
issue of due process as of jurisdiction [Sarmiento v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, Jul
3, 2002].
iib) While jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired by the service of summons, it can also be acquired by voluntary
appearance before the court, which includes submission of pleadings in
compliance with the order of the court or tribunal./De los Santos v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 121327, December 20, 2001],
ill) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. Due
process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be hear
d.
If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee [Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219 May 28,
2004].
iiia) In Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra., Executive
Order 626-A was declared violative of due process because the owner of the
carabaos confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
immediately condemned and punished. In Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, 137
SCRA 628, the closure of radio station DYRE where the order was issued
summarily, without a hearing, was deemed violative of due process. In Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, it was held that the unreasonable delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan violated the
guarantee of due process. In Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, 226 SCRA
66, there was deemed a denial of due process where the notice to petitioner to
report back to work within five days otherwise he would be dropped from the roll
s,
was sent to petitioner s Quezon City address when the office knew where

petitioner was temporarily residing in San Jose, California. In Lim v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002, Supreme Court said that the closure
of Bistro violated the due process clause. Instead of arbitrarily closing down t
he
establishment s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an
opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its lice
nse.
iiib) Unicraft Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134309,
March 26, 2001, states that, even as it is conceded that decisions of Voluntary
Arbitrators are generally accorded finality, where (as in this case) the petitio
ner
was not given the chance to present evidence, there is a violation of the due
process clause, and the Arbitrator s decision is null and void.
iiic) Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the
bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment
which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented
within 90 days from the date of issue. But this presumption does not hold when
the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check
within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check had been
dishonoured. Thus, it is essential for the maker or the drawer to be notified of
the
dishonor of the check, so that he can pay the value thereof, or make arrangement
for its payment within the period prescribed by law. Absent such notice of disho
nor,
the maker or the drawer cannot be convicted of violating B.P. 22, as there would
be a violation of procedural due process [Caras v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
129900, October 2, 2001],

iiid) Not all cases require a trial-type hearing. Due process in
labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach
all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would support their
respective claims [Mariveles Shipyard v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144134,
November 11, 2003; Zacarias v. National Police Commission, G.R. No. 119847,
October 24, 2003]. Thus, there is no denial of due process where the DOLE
regional director decided a case on the basis only of position papers submitted
by
the parties [Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 205]. Indeed, the NLRC and the Labo
Arbiter are authorized to decide a case on the basis of position papers and
documents submitted; the holding of an adversarial trial depends on the discreti
on
of the Labor Arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right
[Fernandez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 105892, January 28, 1998; Vinta Maritime v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998].
iiie) Likewise, in Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272, the
Supreme Court said that Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code is not

repugnant to the due process clause, and the accused is not constitutionally
entitled to another judicial determination of whether he breached the condition
of
his pardon. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316, the Supreme Court
declared that to be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedur
al
due process.
iiif) Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. PD 1069 affords an
extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the peti
tion
is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request
for
extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for ex
tradition.
The extraditee s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage
to accommodate the more compelling interest of the state to prevent escape of
potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information on the
basis of the request for extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a
coequal
branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater powers over matters involving our foreign relations
[Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000;
Cuevas v. Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000].
iiig) This was clarified in Government of the United States of

America v. Judge Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, where the
Supreme Court said that upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its suppo
rting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima
facie finding whether they are sufficient in form and substance, whether they
comply with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditabl
e.
If no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the disc
retion
of the judge. On the other hand, if there is a prima facie finding, the judge mu
st
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at the scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or not
ify
the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be giv
en the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. Thus, also, the grant by th
judge of bail was deemed null and void, as persons to be extradited are presumed
to be flight risks. Accordingly, in the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsidera
tion
[December 17, 2002], the Supreme Court denied with finality Mark Jimenez
motion, saying that extradition is sui generis, and does not fall within the amb
it of
the right to bail.
G-JTJNE ¦ REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

iiigl) The ruling in Purugananwas modified in Government of
HongKong v. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, where
the Supreme Court said that it cannot ignore the modern trend in public
international law which places primacy on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community. In Mejoff v. Director o
Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under
the
Constitution, the principles set forth in the Declaration are part of the law of
the
land. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the Universa
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
iiig2) Citing Chief Justice Puno s Separate Opinion in
Puruganan, the Court, in Government of HongKong, adopted a new standard to
be used in granting bail in extradition cases, denominated clear and convincing
evidence . As Chief Justice Puno explained, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court
for entitlement to bail.
iiih) In Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944, June 21, 2001, it
was held that the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners (who had a
lready
been cleared by the Ombudsman in its original resolution) at the reinvestigation
does not render the subsequent resolution (on reinvestigation) null and void, ev
en
if the said subsequent resolution reinstated the complaint against them. But in
the
Resolution, dated May 29, 2002, on the Motion for Reconsideration in the said
case, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners were denied due process when
the Special Investigator reinstated the complaint against the petitioners withou
their knowledge. At the very least, they should have been notified that the
complaint against them had not yet been finally disposed of. They should have
been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case, to enable them
to
meet any new accusation against them head-on and to prepare for their defense.
iv) The right of a party to cross-examine the witness against
him in a civil case is an indispensable part of due process [Ortigas v. Lufthans
a,
64 SCRA 610], But in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure an
evidence are not strictly applied. Since nothing on record shows that petitioner
asked for cross-examination, he cannot argue that he has been

100 Constitutional La*
deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place [Emin
v. De Leon, G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002]. Likewise, it was held that wher
the petitioners were amply afforded the opportunity to register objections to
respondent s offer of evidence, there was no denial of due process [Rodson Phil.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004].
iiij) The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of
absence of a hearing [Chua v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in
Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004]. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explai
one s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of [Emin v. De Leon, supra.]. In Quintos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 149800,
November 21, 2002, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process
because he subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the Comelec
considered and acted upon, albeit unfavorably.
iiik) In Villaruel v. Fernando, G.R. No. 136726, September 24,
2003, it was held that there was no denial of due process where the appellate
court dismissed petitioner s appeal for failure of the Office of the Solicitor Gen
eral
to file the required memorandum. As a rule, the negligence of counsel binds the
client. Moreover, petitioner in this case is not entirely blameless for the dism
issal
of his appeal. After the OSG s failure to file the answer to the petition for
mandamus and damages, and to have the order declaring the petitioner in default
lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. The
same principle was reiterated in Borromeo Bros. Estate v. Garcia, G.R. no.
139594-95, February 26, 2008.

iiil) There are cases in which notice and hearing may be
dispensed with without violating due process. Among these are the cancellation o
the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime [Suntay v. People,
101 Phil 833], the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrativ
charges [Co v. Barbers, 290 SCRA 717], the distraint of property for tax
delinquency; the padlocking of restaurants found unsanitary or of theaters showi
ng
obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisances per se. And in Equitable
Banking Corporation v. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168. December 14,
2004, the Supreme Court ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Bank s
dishonor of Calderon s credit card, inasmuch as the dishonor was justified under
its Credit Card Agreement which provided that the the cardholder agreed not to
exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the card privilege would be
automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder.
iiim) A person who is not impleaded in a complaint cannot be
bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a

proceeding in which he is a stranger. In this case, the respondent is adversely
affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject
property, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of ine
quity to
allow respondent s title to be nullified without the respondent being given the
opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of th
property. It is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that n
person shall be deprived of property witout due process of law [National Housing
Authority v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945, May 16, 2005].
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is
necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered
meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision
shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the f
acts
and the law on which it is based.
iva) Due process demands that the parties to a litigation be
informed how the case was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court [Insular Life Assurance Co. v.
Young, G.R. No. 140964, January 16, 2002].
ivb) In Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February
15, 2001, it was held that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of d
efault,
because judgments of default are frowned upon unless in cases where it clearly
appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. Where the order of
default is immoderate, there is a violation of due process.

6. Publication as part of due process. In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446,
the Court held that publication is imperative to the validity of laws, president
ial
decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and is an
indispensable part of due process. Thus, in Republic {National
Telecommunications Commission) v. Express Telecommunications, G.R. No.
147096, January 15, 2002, the National Telecommunciations Commission, in
granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate, applied the 1978 Rules o
Practice and Procedure, and not the 1993 Revised Rules, because the latter had
not yet been published (although the same had already been filed with the Nation
al
Administrative Register). 7
7. Appeal and due process. Appeal is not a natural right nor is it
part of due process [Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, 152 SCRA 540];
generally, it may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion.
But where the Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, e.g., in the
cases coming under the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court [Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII], denial of the right to appeal constitutes a
violation of due process. Where

there is a statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also
constitutes a denial of due process.
a) In Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753, the Supreme Court reiterated
that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely
a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Accordingly, the constitutional requirement of due
process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal, beca
use
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence in support of one s case. See also Producers Bank v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002. In Barata v. Abalos, G.R. No. 142888, June 6,
2001, it was held that the failure to provide the complainant the right to appea
l in
certain cases (e.g., from the decision of the Ombudsman) is not a denial of due
process. It may be noted that in appropriate cases involving oppressive or arbit
rary
action, the complainant is not deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under
Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure o
the Ombudsman.
b) In Sajotv. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109721, March 11, 1999, it was
held that there was no denial of due process where the court denied the appeal
due to the negligence of the accused and of his counsel. An appellant must stric
tly
comply with the rules inasmuch as appeal is purely a statutory right.
8. Preliminary investigation and due process. It is doctrinally settled that the

right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely
a right
conferred by statute [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28,
2003]. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity o
the information or otherwise render the same defective. The denial of the motion
for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust the court
of its
jurisdiction over the case [Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September
22, 2006], The right may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it [Benedic
to
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001]. It may be forfeited by
inaction, and cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal [People v. Lagao, G
.R.
No. 118457, April 8, 1997].
a) But where there is a statutory grant of the right to preliminary
investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due process clause [
Go
v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138]. In such cases, the right to preliminary
investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to the
petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process [Yu
sop
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001].
OUTLINE . REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

i) A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on
trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution
and to protect him from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It
is also
intended to protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trial
s.
Thus, while the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component
of due
process in administering criminal justice [Victor Jose Tan Uyv. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, July 27, 2008].
b) It is now provided in Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure, that
a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a
complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is a
least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, without regard to the fine.
i) However, when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint o
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the
absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed b
the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basi
s of
complaint o
the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer. Before the
r
information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of
his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception. After the fi
ling
of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, th
accused may, within 5 days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense
as
provided in this Rule [Sec. 7, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure].
ii) Be that as it may, the lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground
for a motion to quash. The case must be suspended with respect to the petitioner
even if the case is already undergoing trial [Yusop v. Sandiganbayan, supra.]. T
he
right is not waived by the filing of motion to be admitted to bail. But the righ
t is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a p
lea
at arraignment [People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 132635, February 21, 2001;
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, supra],
iii) The preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely
inquisitorial; it is not a trial on the merits, and its sole purpose is to deter
mine
whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent therein is
probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display
of the parties evidence, and upon satisfaction of the investigating

KM Constitutional Law
prosecutor that probable cause exists based on the evidence presented, he may
terminate the preliminary investigation and resolve the case [Judy Ann Santos v.
People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008].
c) A preliminary investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine
whether (1) a crime has been committed, and (2) whether there is probable cause
that the accused is guilty thereof. The public prosecutor determines during the
preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists; thus the decision wheth
er
or not to dismiss the criminal complaint depends on the sound discretion of the
prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigat
ion or
reinvestigation or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable
cause
for the filing of the corresponding information against the offender [Baviera v.
Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168580, February 8, 2007]. In Sanrio Company v. Lim, G.R.
No. 168380, February 8, 2008, the Supreme Court reiterated the policy of noninte
rference
with executive discretion in the determination of probable cause. It held
that a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduc
t of
preliminary investigation.
i) The possible exception to this rule of non-interference, as held in
Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008, is where there
is
an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public prosecutor. Such grave abuse of discretio
n will
then justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive.

d) Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to
speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act
promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said
office
to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years clearly violates this
mandate and the public official s rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is en
titled
to the dismissal of the complaint [Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12,
1999]. This reiterates Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, where the Court said
that unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by t
he
Tanodbayan violated the due process clause. But where the delay is due to the
complexity of the issues involved [Defensor- Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA
214], or is caused by the petitioner s own acts, not by the inaction of the prosec
ution
[Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 559], there is no violation. i)
i) The Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman s
discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman s
findings are essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, supra.].

9. Administrative due process. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635, the Court
enumerated the requisites of administrative due process, as follows: (a) The rig
ht
to a hearing, which includes the right to present one s case and submit evidence
in support thereof; (b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (c) T
he
decision must have something to support itself; (d) The evidence must be
substantial; (e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; (f) T
he
tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent considerati
on
of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and (g) The board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties t
the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision.
a) Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the Comelec
requires notice and hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be
annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation
. In
Namil v. Comelec, G.R. No. 150540, October 28, 2003, the Comelec issued the
questioned order annulling the proclamation on the basis of private respondent s
allegations and the recommendation of the law department, without giving notice
to the candidate proclaimed. Thus, the Comelec order was declared void.
C. Equal Protection of the laws. fSec. 1. Art. Ill: x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws .]
1. Meaning; persons protected. All persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities impose
d.
Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect t
artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.
2. Scope of Equality.
a) Economic. See constitutional provisions on: (i) Free access to courts
[Sec. 11, Art. Ill]; (ii) Marine wealth reserved for Filipino citizens; and Cong
ress
may reserve certain areas of investments [Sec. 2, par. 2, and Sec. 10, Art. XII]
(iii) Reduction of social, economic and political inequities [Secs. 1, 2 and 3,
Art.
XIII]. See Ichong v. Hernandez, supra., Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275;
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. i)
i) In Tan v. Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of RA 7496 limiting the allowable deductions from

gross income of single proprietorships and professionals. It was held that
uniformity of taxation does not prohibit classification, provided the requiremen
ts of
valid classification are complied with.
b) Political. See constitutional provisions on: free access to courts [Sec.
11, Art. Ill]; bona fide candidates being free from harassment or discrimination
[Sec. 10, Art. IX-C]; reduction of social, economic and political inequities [Se
c. 1,
Art. XIII].
i) The Constitution, as a general rule, places the civil rights of
aliens on an equal footing with those of citizens; but their political rights do
not
enjoy the same protection [Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534]. In Peralta v.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, the Court upheld the adoption of block voting, saying that
if a candidate wishes to avail of the advantage of block voting he was free to j
oin
a party. In Ceniza v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 763, the law excluding residents of
Mandaue City from voting for provincial officials was justified as a matter of
legislative discretion , and that equal protection would be violated only if group
within the city were allowed to vote while others were not. In Unido v. Comelec,
104 SCRA 17, the Court denied the request of the opposition for equal time and
media coverage for its Plaza Miranda rally (as that given to President Marcos),
because the head of state of every country in the world must, from the very natur
of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those w
ho
are opposed to him .

ii) In the criminal process, Sec. 11, Art. Ill, insures free access to
the courts. In Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420, petitioners who had
been sentenced to life imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion with murd
er
were ordered released after 12 years of incarceration when, in People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil 515, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime
of rebellion with murder, inasmuch as common crimes are deemed absorbed in
the crime of rebellion. In Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433, the
constitutional mandate for the creation of a special court to hear offenses
committed by public officers was the authority to make a distinction between
prosecution for dishonesty in public service and prosecution for crimes not
connected with public office.
c) Social. See Sec. 1, Art. XIII.
3. Valid Classification. Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may,
nonetheless, be treated differently if there is a basis for valid classification
. The
requisites are:
a) Substantial distinctions which make for real differences.
C-JTiJNE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

i) In Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, where the
petitioners assailed the validity of DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, which
prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways on the basis of RA 2000
(Limited Access Highway Act), the Supreme Court held that there is a real and
substantial distinction between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles.Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal
real and substantial differences exist
between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.
ii) In Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386, it was held that Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a
class by themselves, because of the special risks to which their class was
exposed. In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666,
there was found substantial distinctions between land-based and sea-based
Filipino overseas workers, because of dissimilarities in work environment, safet
y,
danger to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civil and spiritual activi
ties. In
JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, supra., the Court upheld
the classification on the ground that the DOLE Order applies to all performing
artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad, as they are prone to exploita
tion
and abuse being beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, supra., the Court upheld the validity of the law disqualif
ying
from running for the same elective office from which he retired, any retired ele
ctive
provincial or municipal official who has received payment of retirement benefits

and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected. In its Resolution (on the Motion for
Reconsideration), October 30, 1995, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
the Court rejected the contention that the exemption from VAT of electric
cooperatives and sales of realty to the homeless poor violated the equal
protection clause. The classification between electric and other cooperatives re
sts
on a Congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper
electric power to as many people as possible, especially in the rural areas; and
there is a difference between the homeless poor and the homeless less poor ,
because the latter class can afford to rent houses in the meantime that they can
not
yet buy their own homes, while the former cannot. In Ichong v. Hernandez, supra.
the Court upheld the validity of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law despite th
objection that it violated the equal protection clause, because there exist real
and
actual, positive ,and fundamental differences between an alien and a national.
iii) The preventive suspension of a policeman lasting until
termination of the criminal case against him, as provided in Sec. 47, RA 6975
(DILG Act of 1990), does not violate the policeman s right to equal protection

of the laws. There is substantial distinction between policemen and other
government employees; policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law, which
can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. Besides, Sec. 42 of
P.D. 807 (Civil Service Law), which was raised as argument for equal treatment,
refers to preventive suspension in administrative cases, not in criminal cases
[Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538]. In Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, it
was held that the fact that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basi
of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal protection clause. Firstly, th
ere
can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself; secondly, in permitting the filing of complaints in any form and in any
manner , the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoing
finally, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of government because those subject to its jurisdiction are
public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay
or
dismiss investigations held against them. In Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 337, the Supreme Court found
substantial distinction between the print and the broadcast media which would
justify different treatment under B.P. 881, viz: the physical limitations of the
broadcast spectrum, the pervasive presence of the broadcast media in the lives o
Filipinos, and the earlier ruling that the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser than the freedom accorded to the print media. In
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, it was held
that the petitioner s and intervenors right to equal protection of the law was not
violated by the enactment of R.A. 8249 because the law was not directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. Every classification made by law is presumed
reasonable, and the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness.
iv) On the other hand, in People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 13287576,
February 3, 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable basis for valid classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinct
ions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and rest
ricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Likewise
in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845,
June 1, 2000, it was held that there was no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign hires" and local hires as to justify the disparity in
salaries paid to these teachers. In GSIS v. Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441, in
declaring as invalid Sec. 18 of PD 1146
which provides that a surviving spouse
has no right to survivorship pension
OUTLINE i REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

benefits if the surviving spouse contracted marriage with the pensioner within t
hree
years before the pensioner qualified for the pension
theSupreme Court said that
the classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. If the purpose of
the
proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, there is no reason why the proviso
reckons the 3-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for the pen
sion
and not from the date the pensioner died. It lumps all marriages contracted with
in
three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted
primarily for financial convenience. In Re: Request of Assistant Court
Administrators, 40 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable
basis for the exclusion of the Assistant Court Administrator, the Assistant Cler
ks
of Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals and the Division
Clerks of the Court of the Sandiganbayan from the grant of special allowances
provided in R.A. 9227.
b) Germane to the purpose of the law. The distinctions which are the
bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of
the
law.
c) Not limited to existing conditions only.
i) In People v. Cayat, 68 Phil 12, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the law prohibiting members of non-Christian tribes from drinking fo
reign
liquor, on the ground that their low degree of culture and unfamiliarity with th
e drink
rendered them more susceptible to its effects. In Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer o
Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603, the ordinance was declared invalid because it taxes
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, and
none other, such that if a new sugar central is established in Ormoc, it would n
ot
be subject to the ordinance.
d) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
i) In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, Sec. 35,
R.A. 7354, which withdrew franking privileges formerly granted to the judiciary
but
remained with the executive and legislative departments, was declared
unconstitutional, because the three branches of government are similarly situate
d.
In Villegas v. Hui Chiong, supra., the ordinance imposing a work permit fee of
P50.00 upon all aliens desirous of obtaining employment in the City of Manila wa
declared unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and
excessive, and it failed to consider valid substantial differences in situation
among
individual aliens who were required to pay it. In Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, 248
SCRA 700, it was held that when the Mayor issued a permit in favor of unidentifi
ed
vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon the Baclaran Credit
Cooperative, he violated the equal

protection clause because he failed to show that the two were not similarly
situated.
ii) The constitutional right to equal protection of the law is not violated
by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives
only to businesses and residents within the secured area of the Subic Special
Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside
such fenced-in territory. The Constitution does not require absolute equality
among residents; it is enough that all persons under like circumstances or
conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same
obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards
does
not violate the equal protection clause [Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 12741
0,
January 20, 1999]. This was reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners Association v.
Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005.
iia) But the compromise agreement between the PCGG and the
Marcos family providing that the assets to be retained by the Marcos family are
exempt from all taxes violates the equal protection clause. Any special grant of
tax
exemption in favor of the Marcos family would constitute class legislation [Chav
ez
v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998].
D. Searches and seizures. fSec. 2. Art. Ill: The right of the people to be secure
in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no sear
ch
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue, except upon probable cause to be

determined personally by a judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, particularly describing the
place to be searched, or the persons or things to the seized. ]
1. Scope of the protection.
a) The protection is available to all persons, including aliens, whether
accused of a crime or not. Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee
although they may be required to open their books of accounts for examination by
the State in the exercise of police and taxing powers. See Moncada v. People s
Court, 80 Phil 1.
b) The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to
it [Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383]. As such, the right may be waived [Lopez v
Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320], either expressly or impliedly [People v.
Malasugui, infra.], but the waiver must be made by the person whose right is
invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver [People v.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 457].

c) The right applies as a distraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. The protection cannot
extend to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring them within the a
mbit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government [People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57].
This is reiterated in Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271,
October 16, 1997, where the Supreme Court said that the Bill of Rights does not
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by private individuals.
(In this case, petitioner s officer opened an envelope addressed to the respondent
and found therein a check evidencing overprice in the purchase of medicine; the
check was then deemed admissible in evidence.) In People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos.
109279-80, January 18, 1999, the same principle was applied relative to the
memorandum receipt and mission order (to carry firearms) discovered by the
accused-appellant s father- in-law, a private citizen. In People v. Bongcarawan,
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in the baggage of the accused was
found by (private) security officers of the interisland passenger vessel who the
reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and contraband items were carried out without government intervention.
Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not be invoked.
d) What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure
in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved [Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211]
But where the search and consequent seizure offish allegedly caught by the use
of explosives was made without a warrant, and a search warrant was obtained by
the officers only much later, it was held that there was a violation of this
constitutional guarantee [Manlavi v. Gacott, 244 SCRA 50],

e) Objections to the warrant of arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea [People v. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104; People v. Robles, G.R. No.
101335, June 8, 2000]. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of his right agains
unlawful restraint of liberty [People v. Penaflorida, G.R. No. 130550, September
2,
1999, reiterating Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222; People v. Gastador,
G.R. No. 123727, April 14, 1999]. Indeed, even assuming that their arrest was
illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a wai
ver by
the accused of their right to question the validity of their arrest [People v. C
achola,
G.R. Nos. 148712-15, January 21, 2004]. i)
i) The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention, or at least deny him the right to be released [Francisco Juan
Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998].

Constitutional Law
2. Some Procedural Rules.
a) The conspicuous illegality of the arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction
of the trial court, because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless
arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and any objection thereto is waived when
the
person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection [People v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999].
b) It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case
is pending, the Court wherein it is filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has p
rimary
jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has ye
been filed, the executive judges, or their lawful substitutes, in the areas and
for the
offense contemplated in Circular 1-91, shall have primary jurisdiction [Malalaon
v.
Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249], This does not mean, however, that a Court,
whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched, cannot
issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of such search warrant is
necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, tim
and place [llano v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 346]. The determination of the
existence of compelling considerations of urgency, and the subject, time and pla
ce
necessitating and justifying the filing of an application for a search warrant w
ith a
court other than the court having territorial jurisdiction over the place to be
searched and things to be seized or where the materials are found is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court where the application is filed, subje
ct to
review by the appellate court in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction [People v. Chui, G.R. No. 142915-16, February 27,
2004].
c) But the moment an information is filed with the RTC, it is that court which
must issue the warrant of arrest. The MTC Judge who continued with the
preliminary investigation and issued warrants of arrest violated procedure [Espi
no
v. Judge Salubre, AM No. MTJ-00-1255, February 26, 2001]. If the case had
already been remanded to the MTCC, after the information for perjury was
erroneously filed with the RTC, it was error for the RTC Judge not to recall the
warrant of arrest issued, because contrary to her claim, the issuance of a warra
nt
is not a ministerial function of the judge [Alib v. Judge Labayen, AM No. RTJ-00
1576,
June 28, 2001],
d) Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action
based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it
is
not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant or to retrieve things thereunder
seized may be filed only with the issuing court. Such a motion may be filed for
the
first time in either the issuing court or that in which the criminal action is p
ending
[People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June

Constitutional Law
26, 1998]. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The court first
taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the
proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against
forum-shopping [Garaygay v. People, G.R. No. 135503, July 6,
2000] ,
e) The judge may order the quashal of the warrant he issued even after
the same had already been implemented, particularly when such quashal is based
on the finding that there is no offense committed. This does not trench upon the
duty of the prosecutor. The effect of such a quashal is that the items seized sh
all
be inadmissible in evidence [Solid Triangle Sales v. Sheriff, RTC QC, Br. 33, G.
R.
No. 144309, November 30, 2001]. Indeed, when the warrant is shown to be
defective, all evidence obtained from the search shall be inadmissible in eviden
ce
[People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 129035, August 20, 2002].
3. Only a judge may validly issue a warrant. The Constitution grants the
authority to issue a warrant of arrest or a search warrant only to a judge upon
fulfillment of certain basic constitutional requirements. In Salazar v. Achacoso
, 183
SCRA 145, Art. 38 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which grants the Secreta
ry
of Labor and Employment the authority to issue orders of arrest, search and
seizure, was declared unconstitutional, because the Labor Secretary is not a
judge. In Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, an order issued by
PCGG directing the respondent to submit all bank documents which the PCGG
representative might find necessary and relevant to the investigation was held t
o
be in the nature of a search warrant which the PCGG cannot validly issue, becaus
the PCGG is not a Judge.
a) Exception. However, in Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562, it was held that
orders of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities, but only for the
purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, e.g., an order of
deportation or an order of contempt, but not for the sole purpose of investigati
on
or prosecution. This is reiterated in Sy v. Domingo, infra., where the Supreme
Court held that the Bureau of Immigration may issue a warrant of arrest only for
the purpose of carrying out a final decision of deportation or when there is suf
ficient
proof of the guilt of the alien. Thus, in Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318,
the Supreme Court nullified the order of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration, because it was issued simply on the basis of a complaint filed with
the Commission on Immigration against the alien. Similarly, in Board of
Commissioners, Commission on Immigration and Deportation v. Judge de la Rosa,
197 SCRA 853, it was held that a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation is null and void for being unconstitut
ional.
b) An aberrant case is Harvey v. Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, where the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the arrest of pedophiles on orders of
Immigration Commissioner Santiago because there was probable cause,
occasioned by months of surveillance made by CID agents on the suspected
pedophiles. According to the Court, the requirement that probable cause is to be
determined only by a judge does not extend to deportation cases which are not
criminal but purely administrative in nature. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest, as well as the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs
and
posters without warrant. Furthermore, petitioners were found with young boys in
their respective rooms, and under the circumstances, the CID agents had
reasonable ground to believe that petitioners had committed pedophilia which,
though not punished under the Revised Penal Code, is behavior offensive to publi
morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect
the
physical, moral, spiritual and social wellbeing of our youth. [Note that this ca
se
was decided prior to the enactment of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act)].
4. Requisites of a Valid Warrant.
a) Probable Cause. Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious m
an
to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof [People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil 667;
Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33], For a search: such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched [Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800]. See
also Corro v. Using, 137 SCRA 541; Prudente v. Dayrit 180 SCRA 69.
i) Must refer to one specific offense [Asian Surety v. Herrera, 54
SCRA 312; Castro v. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477]. However, in People v. Dichoso, 223
SCRA 174, it was held that the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that
deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and
regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are
closely related or which belong to the same class or species, thus, one search
warrant may be validly issued for several violations thereof. This is reiterated
in
People v. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55 April 19 2001.
ii) Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms
should be such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of a firearm

and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same. In Nala v.
Barroso, G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003, nowhere in the affidavit of the witnes
or the applicant was it mentioned that the petitioner had no license to possess
firearm. Neither was there a certification from the appropriate government agenc
that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. The search warrant is,
therefore, null and void.
iii) In cases involving violation of PD 49 (Protection of Intellectual
Property), a basic requirement for the validity of the search warrant is the
presentation of the master tape of the copyrighted films from which the pirated
films are supposed to have been copied [20th Century Fox v. Court of Appeals,
162 SCRA 655]. But this decision, which was promulgated on August 19, 1988,
should apply only prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on t
he
old doctrine and acted in good faith [Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, 237
SCRA 367, cited in Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 219].
iv) Where a search warrant was issued for the seizure of shabu and
drug paraphernalia, but probable cause was found to exist only with respect to t
he
shabu, the warrant cannot be invalidated in toto; it is still valid with respect
to the
shabu [People v. Salanguit, supra.].
b) Determination of probable cause personally by a judge. In Placer v.
Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463, reiterated in Lim v. Judge Felix, 194 SCRA 292, the
Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministeria
l
function of the judge. While he could rely on the findings of the fiscal, he is
not
bound thereby. Thus, the determination of probable cause depends to a large
extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required
examination of the applicant and the witnesses [Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. No
94902-06, April 21, 1999, citing Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310]. In People v. Intin
g,
187 SCRA 788, the Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of probable
cause is the function of the judge; and the judge alone makes this determination
The same rule applies in election offenses even if, in such cases, the prelimina
ry
investigation is done by the Comelec [People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715]. i)
i) Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest. It is sufficient that the
judge personally determine the existence of probable cause. It is not
necessary that he should personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses [Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393]. In Reyes v. Montesa,
247 SCRA 85, the Supreme Court said that a hearing is not necessary
for the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. The judge should evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the

prosecutor or require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses t
aid him in determining whether probable cause exists. Likewise, in Webb v. De
Leon, 247 SCRA 652, it was held that the judge would simply personally review
the initial determination of the prosecutor to see if it is supported by substan
tial
evidence. He merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of t
he
accused and, in so doing, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. Indeed, in the
preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is no
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation; it is sufficient that the judge should personally evaluate the re
port
and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable
cause [Cruz v. People, 233 SCRA 439], This was reiterated in People v. Court of
Appeals and Cerbo, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999 and in Raro v.
Sandiganbayan, July 14, 2000.
ia) Following established doctrine and procedure, the judge
shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereo
f,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if, on the basis thereof, he finds no probable
cause,
he may disregard the prosecutor s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existen
ce of
probable cause. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the judge t
o
issue a warrant of arrest, even after having personally examined the complainant
and his witnesses for the determination of probable cause. Whether it is necessa
ry
to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to h
is sound
judgment and discretion [Cruz v. Judge Areola, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 06,
2002].
ib) Thus, the determination of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest is within the exclusive province of the judge. In Sales v
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001, the Supreme Court, citing
People v. Judge Inting, 189 SCRA 788, said: (1) the determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge and the judge alone; (2) the preliminary inquir
made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge, as it is the report, the affidav
its,
the transcript of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents
behind the prosecutor s certification which are material in assisting the judge in
his
determination of probable cause; (3) judges and prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper whic
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released; and (4)
only
a judge may issue a warrant of arrest. In this case, the Supreme Court found tha
t
there was undue haste in the filing of the information; the State Prosecutors we
re
over-eager to file the case and secure the warrant of arrest. The Sandiganbayan
should have taken careful note of

the contradictions in the testimony of complainant s witnesses as well as the
improbabilities in the prosecution evidence.
ic) If the judge relied solely on the certification of the Prosecutor
[since all the records of the preliminary investigation were still in Masbate],
then
he cannot be said to have personally determined the existence of probable cause,
and, therefore, the warrant of arrest issued by him is null and void [Lim v. Fel
ix,
194 SCRA 292, reiterated in Roberts v. People, 294 SCRA 307], In Ho v. People,
G.R. No. 106632, October 9, 1997, the warrant of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan was invalidated because it was based merely on the report and
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor; there was no showing that the
court personally determined the existence of probable cause by independently
examining sufficient evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary
investigation. Likewise, it was held that there is failure to comply with this
requirement where the judge merely relied on the resolution of the Panel of
Prosecutors and the latter s certification that probable cause existed. Judges and
prosecutors should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probabl
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or releas
ed.
The first is made by the judge; the second is done by the prosecutor [Allado v.
Diokno, 232 SCRA 192].
ic1) Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure now embodies the rulings in Soliven and Lim, with modifications, as
follows: Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial
Court - Within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, the jud
ge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arreste
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Sec. 7
of
this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may or
der
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice and t
he
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the
complaint or information.
ic2) Thus, in Okabe v. Judge Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185,
May 27, 2004, the Supreme Court found the respondent judge to have committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding
probable cause for the petitioner s arrest, because the investigating prosecutor
had submitted to the respondent judge only the resolution after his preliminary
investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the private

complainant. The prosecutor failed to include the affidavits of the witnesses of
the
private complainant, and the latter s reply affidavit, the counter-affidavit of th
petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the private complainant.
id) More reprehensible was the action of the judge who issued
a warrant of arrest not only without following the procedure to determine the
existence of probable cause but was so negligent not to notice that there was no
even a prosecutor s certification to rely upon because there was no information
that had yet been filed in court [Talingdan v. Judge Eduarte,
A. M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 02, 2001], However, a judge
was likewise sanctioned for failing to issue a warrant of arrest where there was
clear showing of the existence of probable cause, and as a result of such failur
e,
the accused could no longer be apprehended [Concerned Citizen of Maddela v.
Judge Yadao, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1639, December 12, 2002].
ie) The determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is judicially recognized as an executive function and is made by t
he
prosecutor [Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997].
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent fro
the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his guilt has been
passed
upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated for

that purpose. In Crespo v. Mogul, it was emphasized that the public prosecutor
controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses, and where there is a
clash of views between a judge who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducte
a re-investigation, those of the prosecutor would normally prevail. Accordingly,
in
Gozosv. Tac-An, G.R. No. 123191, December 17, 1998, where the trial judge
conducted an inquiry not only to determine the existence of probable cause, but
also to determine what the charge should be and who should be charged, it was
held that the judge acted beyond his authority. Thus, in Dupasquierv. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112089, January 24, 2001, it was held that courts must respect
the discretion of the prosecutor in his findings and determination of probable c
ause
in preliminary investigation. When the prosecutor is not convinced that he has t
he
quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments, he is under no obligation
to file the criminal information.
if) In the cases when it is the judge who himself conducts the
preliminary investigation, for him to issue a warrant of arrest, the investigati
ng
judge must: (1) have examined, under oath and in writing, the complainant and hi
witnesses; (2) be satisfied that there is probable cause; and (3) that there is
a need
to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the en
ds
of justice [Mantaring v. Judge Roman, 254 SCRA158].

Constitutional Law
ii) Issuance of a Search Warrant. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court requires that the judge must personally examine in the form of searchin
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainants and any
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them, and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. See Silva
v.
Presiding Judge, 203 SCRA 140; Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388.
iia) A search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal
action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against
any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal
property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made neces
sary
because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly
known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search warrant is
entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action [United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163958, June 28, 2005],
iib) Where the judge failed to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the deposition in writing and attaching them to the record,
it
was held that search warrant is invalid, and the fact that the objection thereto
was
raised only during the trial is of no moment, because the absence of such
depositions was discovered only after the arrest and during the trial [People v.
Mamaril, G.R. No. 147607, January 22, 2004], However, the Bill of Rights does no
make it an imperative necessity that the depositions be attached to the records
of
an application for a search warrant. The omission would not be fatal if there is
evidence on record showing that such personal examination was conducted and
what testimony was presented [People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20,
2003].
iic) Where the trial judge not only asked searching questions but
leading questions, as well, the same was not considered improper, because the
complainant and the witnesses were reticent and had to be made to explain [Flore
v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568].
c) After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. The personal examination must not be merely
routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive. The purpose of this
rule is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable caus
e. i)
i) For the procedure in the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, see Soliven v. Makasiar, supra.

ii) The evidence offered by the complainant and his witnesses
should be based on their own personal knowledge and not on mere information or
belief. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the person
al
knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses, because the purpose is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking t
he
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause [Cupcupin v. People,
G.R. No. 132389, November 19, 2002], In Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33, reliable
information was held insufficient; in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800,
evidence gathered and collated by our unit was not sufficient; and in Quintero v.
NBI, 162 SCRA 467, NBI Agent Castro knew nothing of his personal knowledge
that Quintero committed an offense, while Congressman Mate s statement was
characterized by several omissions and replete with conclusions and inferences,
lacking the directness and definiteness which would have been present had the
statement dealt with facts which Congressman Mate actually witnessed. In Sony
Music Entertainment v. Judge Espanol, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005, the
Supreme Court said that absent the element of personal knowledge by the
applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search
warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and
is a nullity, the issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary. In Mata v.
Bayona,
128 SCRA 388, it was held that mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses were not enough to sustain the issuance of a search warrant.
iii) But in People v. Wooicock, 244 SCRA 235, where the police
officers acted not merely on the information given by the Thai Royal Police, but
also conducted thorough surveillance on the accused, it was held that the police
officers had personal knowledge.

iv) In Columbia Pictures v. Judge Flores, 223 SCRA 761, the
Supreme Court held that the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional a
nd
statutory requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, including the need
to
personally examine the applicant and the witnesses through searching questions.
In People v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 140657, October 25, 2004, the Supreme Court
said that it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive an
not merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. If the Judge fails to
determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, it
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
d) Particularity of description. In People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 14054647, January 20, 2003, it was held that
this requirement is primarily meant to en
able
the law enforcers serving the warrant to (1) readily identify the properties to
be
seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items;

and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to b
seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. Earlier, in Corro v.
Using, 137 SCRA 541, the Court said that the evident purpose of this requirement
is to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles t
hey
should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
made and abuses may not be committed. It is also aimed at preventing violations
of security of persons and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of t
he
home, and giving remedy against such usurpation when attempted [People v.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 457].
i) General warrants are proscribed and unconstitutional [Nolasco
v. Pano, 139 SCRA 152; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800], In Tambasen
v. People, 246 SCRA 184, where the search warrant charged violations of two
special laws, it was considered a scatter-shot warrant , and was declared null and
void. Indeed, as held in People v. Tee, supra., what the Constitution seeks to a
void
are search warrants of broad and general characterization or sweeping
descriptions which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedit
ion
to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an
offense.
ii) Warrant of Arrest. A warrant of arrest is said to particularly
describe the person to be seized if it contains the name/s of the person/s to be
arrested. If the name of the person to be arrested is not known, then a John Doe
warrant may be issued. A John Doe" warrant will satisfy the constitutional
requirement of particularity of description if there is some descriptio persona

which
will enable the officer to identify the accused.
ia) In Pangandaman v. .Casar, 159 SCRA 599, warrants issued
against 50 John Does , none of whom the witnesses could identify, were
Considered as general warrants , and thus, void.
iii) Search Warrant. A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as
the
circumstances will ordinarily allow [People v. Rubio, 57 Phil 384]; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant off
icer
may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is
being issued [Bache & Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823], If the articles desired to be
seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence other than those articles, to prove said offense;
and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence [Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
111267, September 20, 1996].

iiia) However, in Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. No. 94902- OS,
April 21, 1999, it was held that the failure to specify detailed descriptions in
the
warrant does not necessarily make the warrant a general warrant. Citing Justice
Francisco, the Supreme Court said that the description of the property to be
seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise, and its nature
will
necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its chara
cter,
is a matter of concern. The description is required to be specific only in so fa
r as
circumstances will allow. Thus, in People v. Tee, supra., an undetermined
amount of marijuana was held to satisfy the requirement for particularity of
description.
iiib) Furthermore, a search warrant is severable. Thus, in Uy v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000, the Supreme
Court said that the general description of most of the documents in the warrant
if there are others particularly described will not invalidate the entire warran
t.
Those items which are not particularly described may simply be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant. This ruling is reiterated in Microsoft Corporation
v.
Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004.
iiic) Only the articles particularly described in the warrant may
be seized. In People v. Salanguit, supra., where the warrant authorized only the
seizure of shabu, and not marijuana, the seizure of the latter was held unlawful
. In
Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001, the Supreme Court said
that the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the fi
rearm
which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the warrant.
In Veroy v. Layague, 210 SCRA 97, it was held that even while the offense of
illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the
subject firearm is illegal per se. Thus, inasmuch as the consent to the search w
as
limited in scope'to the search for NPA rebels, the confiscation of the firearm w
as
held invalid.
iiid) Place to be searched. The place to be searched should,
likewise be particularly described. In Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253, the search warrant issued to search the
compound of petitioner for unlicensed firearms was held invalid for failing to
describe the place with particularity, considering that the compound is made up
of
200 buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers, 23 warehouses, 6
depots, and 800 miscellaneous structures, spread out over 155 hectares.
iiidl) The place to be searched, as described in the warrant, cannot be amplifie
or modified by the peace officers own personal
C--. NE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

knowledge of the premises or the evidence which they adduced in support of their
application for a warrant. Thus, where the warrant designated the place to be
searched as Abigail s Variety Store, Apt. 1207, Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave.,
Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan , and the search was made at Apt.
No. I which was immediately adjacent to the store (but an independent unit), it
was
held in People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998, that there
was an infringement of the constitutional guarantee, the clear intention of the
requirement being that the search be confined to the place so described in the
warrant. Similarly, in Yousef Al Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126859,
September 4, 2001, where the search warrant authorized the search of Apartment
No. 2, Obinia Compound, Caloocan City, but the searching party extended the
search and seizure of firearms to Apartment No. 8 in the same compound, the
Supreme Court, while upholding the validity of the search of Apartment No. 2,
invalidated the search done at Apartment No.
8.
iiie) The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly
describe not only the place to be searched, but also the persons to be searched.
In People v. Tiu Won Chua, G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003, the validity of the
search warrant was upheld despite the mistake in the name of the persons to be
searched, because the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy
operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it.
They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be
searched, although they did not specifically know the names of the accused. The
situation in People v. Priscilla del Norte, G.R. No. 149462, March 29, 2004, is
different. The search warrant was issued against one Ising Gutierrez Diwa,
residing at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. Arrested in the house at the address named, and eventually charged, was
Priscilla del Norte, who claimed to be a resident of 376 Dama de Noche, Caloocan
City, as later shown by the certification of the Barangay Chairman, a receipt
evidencing rental payment for the house at Dama de Noche, and the school ID of
her daughter who testified in court. The authorities did not conduct any prior
surveillance. It was only when they implemented the warrant that they coordinate
with barangay officials, and one of the barangay officials informed the police
officers that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla del Norte were one and the same
person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. Thus, the Court h
eld
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 5
5. Properties subject to seizure [Sec. 2, Rule 126, Rules of Court]:
(a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled property and other
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) Property used or intended to be
used as means for the commission of an offense.

a) It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the warrant is issued; it is sufficient that th
property is within his control or possession [Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA
800]..
6. Conduct of the Search. Sec. 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court, requires that no
search of a house, room or any of the premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family, or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of

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REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the

exercise of police power, x x x The ordinary requirements of procedural due

process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests through th

exercise of police power.

b) Lawful Means: The means employed are reasonably necessary for

the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

See: Ynotv. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148SCRA 659; Tablarin v. Gutierrez,

i) Police power concerns government enactments, which precisely

interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare or th

issuance of DOLE Order No. 3 (establishing various procedures and requirements

for screening performing artists as a prerequisite to the processing of any cont

Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power [JMM

Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319].

ii) However, Sec. 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772, which

mandates newspapers of general circulation in every province or city to provide

invalid exercise of the police power in Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 2

SCRA 272,, there being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or

City ordinance which required commercial cemetery owners to reserve 6% of

make the City liable to pay the owners just compensation.

iii) The proper exercise of the police power requires compliance

distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intereference by the

terminals as nuisances per se and ordering their closure or

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

Liner, G.R. NO. 148339, February 23, 2005].

iv) In Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, the

5. Additional Limitations [When exercised by delegate]:

7160, for local government units]

b) Within territorial limits [for local government units, except when

exercised to protect water supply],

c) Must not be contrary to law. [Activity prohibited by law cannot, in the

guise of regulation, be allowed; an activity allowed by law may be regulated, bu

i) In Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No.

102782, December 11,1991, reiterated in Tatelv. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No.

application and consistent with public policy.

of Manila Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited the establishment or operation of

businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and

enactment of the ordinance has no statutory or constitutional

OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due

iii) The authority of a municipality to issue zoning classification is an

is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,

prescribes, defines and apportions a given.political subdivision into specific l

uses as present and future projection of needs [Pasong Bayabas Farmers

C. Power of Eminent Domain

1. Definition/Scope. Also known as the power of expropriation,

b) Distinguished from police power. Police power is the power of the

condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a

power, property rights of individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in

injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a

property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is n

OUTLINE ' REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

restriction constitutes compensable taking [Didipio Earth-Savers MultiPurpose

Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006].

c) It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State

without just compensation , merely imposes a limit on the government s exercise

of this power and provides a measure of protection to the individual s right to

eminent domain [Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2,