31.

Title: PEOPLE vs. TALINGDAN Name of Digester:

G.R. No. L-32126 Date: July 6, 1978 Ponente:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Accessories

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE Respondent: NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO

PHILIPPINES BERRAS. PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA
Doctrine (if applicable): Paragraph 3 of Article 19 Of The Revised Penal Code

Facts:
• Bernardo Bagabag and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, lived together in their house at
Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra. For some time, however, their relationship had been strained and beset with
troubles. On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesio Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house
while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that
illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa. On Thursday night, just two days before
he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several
times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter,
accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo’s house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter
left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
• Between 10:00 and 11:00 o’clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo’s daughter, Corazon, who was
then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-
appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo; as she
approached them, she heard one of them say “Could he elude a bullet”; and when accused Teresa
Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying “You tell your father that
we will kill him”.
• Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old
daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother
go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other
appellants. The child was in the “batalan”, she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she
could not discern what they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them and she knows them
well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them almost everytime. She noted that
the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not last long; after about two minutes
Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an
avocado tree nearby.
• As supper was then ready, the child called her parents to eat; Bernardo who was in the room adjoining
the kitchen did not heed his daughter’s call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as
soon as she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about
the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the
kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that
moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs. The four accused then climbed the stairs
carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him
again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but when Corazon tried to call for
help Bides warned her, saying “You call for help and I will kill you”, so she kept silent.
• The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east. Teresa came out of her “silid” later; she
pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the
killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone,
threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the identities of the
killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the
circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she
thereafter executed on August 5, 1967 finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the
herein five appellants.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether or Not Teresa Domogma is - WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond
an accessory to the murder of Bernardo reasonable, doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Bagabag Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime
of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same
murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other
respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.

Holding:
- Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and
inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her.
- In response to this, the Court states that they are convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that
it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be
able to substantially maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face
of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described.
We reject the possibility of her having been “brainwashed or coached” to testify as she did.
- Furthermore, The Court has carefully reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they
committed the said offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling
of the offended party. In other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim.
- True it is that the proof of Teresa Domogma’s direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond
reasonable doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she
had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the
planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did
not object.
- There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense
committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out
after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father.
When Corazon identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not
only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning
her, “Don’t tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody.” Later, when the peace officers
who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the
information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind.
- In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in
her attitude regarding her co-appellants’ conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after
Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her
constitute “concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime” which makes her liable
as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
32.
Title: People v. Cui Name of Digester: Sabayle
G.R. No 121982 Date: September 10, 1999 Ponente: Puno, J

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Criminally Liable - Accessories

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Leonilo Cui and Beverly Cui

Doctrine (if applicable):

Article 19 of the RPC penalizes as accessories to the crime those who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein by
profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime, without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices.

Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the following elements:

1) that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime
2) that he took part in it subsequent to its commission

Facts:
Armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim in Cebu City, carting away cash and jewelries worth
P20,000. The robbers also forcibly abducted the 17-year old daughter of the Lims, Stephanie Lim, and demanded a
one million-peso ransom which Johnny forced to pay. Later, a house guard of Lim, Eduardo Basingan, identified the
participants of the crime. Thus, an information for kidnapping with ransom was filed against them. Basingan was
also found to be an accomplice by the lower court and so, Basingan and herein appellants were arraigned but
pending trial and before he could testify in court, Basingan was able to escape from prison. After trial, appellants
were found guilty of the crime charged. Hence, they filed their Brief contending that the trial court erred in not
excluding hearsay evidence offered to prove their alleged conspiracy and participation as accomplices of the crime
charged. The OSG then filed a Manifestation recommending the acquittal of the Cuis on the ground that the only
piece of evidence that would link the Cuis directly to the kidnapping incident is the sworn statement by Basingan,
which is however, inadmissible for being hearsay as he was not presented by the prosecution as witness, he having
escaped after arraignment. Thus, his sworn statements cannot be taken as proof of guilt for being hearsay.
Conviction cannot be based on hearsay evidence. The Court then holds that the Cuis are liable as accessories in
accordance with Article 19 of the RPC.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Whether the Cuis are liable as accomplices or accessories The Cuis are liable as accessories.

Holding:
Applying Article 19 of the RPC, the Court held that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and thus,
liable as accessories, not accomplices. As accessories to the consummated crime of kidnapping with ransom, the
penalty imposable upon the Cuis is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. Under Article 267 of the RPC, the
penalty shall be death where the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. However, the
death penalty has already been suspended by the 1987 Constitution and thus, it is commuted to reclusion perpetua.
33.
PEOPLE v. MORALES Name of Digester: Fred Bucu
G.R. No 172873 Date: March 19, Ponente:
2010
Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. D. Persons Criminally Liable c) In Crimes Punished By Special Penal Laws c) In Crimes
Punished by Special Penal Laws
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Roldan Morales y Midarasa

Doctrine (if applicable):

Section 21 of RA No. 9165 “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002” provides:

Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Recit Summary:
Affirming the decision of the RTC, the Court of Appeals finds Roldan Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the possession and selling of illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation by PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera. After appealing
to the Supreme Court, the issue is whether or not Morales is guilty of possession and selling of the dangerous drug.
Records find that he should not be convicted on the grounds that the arresting officers did not follow the proper
procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in sect. 21 of RA 9165
“Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
appellant is ACQUITTED and RELEASED from detention.
Facts:
Quezon City RTC found Roldan Morales guilty of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.

The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy and PO3 Armando Rivera were presented by the prosecution.

They held a buy-bust operation in which Morales was caught having 2 sachets of shabu and the marked money.

Morales, in his statement, said that two male persons in civilian clothing who identified themselves as police (Roy
and Rivera) handcuffed and frisk him. Nothing was found but on their way to the station, Roy produced a sachet of
shabu from his pocket and when once at the station presented it as evidence against Morales.

The trial court found him guilty and when he appealed with the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether Roldan Morales is guilty of a) possession Decision of Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
and b) sale of illegal drugs. Appellant, Morales, is ACQUITTED and RELEASED from
detention.
Holding:

NO. a) Morales claims that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Section 21 of RA No.
9165, the Court holds that the identity of corpus delicti was not proven beyond reasonable doubt due to the ff:

Records hold that: 1) The arresting officers did not place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and
paraphernalia. 2) Arresting officers did not make an inventory and take photos of confiscated items in the presence
of appellant. 3) No representative from media and DOJ, or any elected public official who participated in the
operation. Hence, there was no compliance with the statutory safeguards.

b) The Court points out that to be guilty of sale of illegal drugs, there should be proof that the transaction took
place and the illegal drug is presented in court as evidence. While for possession, it should be established that the
person possesses an illegal drug and is freely aware of it.

The person who Roy and Rivera gave the drugs for delivery of seized items was not present in court nor did they
testify that they properly marked the drugs after appellants arrest. They did not also take photographs and had no
representative from the media and Department of Justice or public official to sign an inventory of the seized items.
Prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.

Section 21 of RA 9165 were not observed. Records failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with the
procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of “shall” in the directives of the law.

Notes: Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the
crime. In this case, it’s the presented shabu in court, which was allegedly from the appellant.
34.
People v. Dalipe Pascual, Dawn
G.R. No. 187154 April 23, 2010 Ponente: Mendoza, J

Criminal Law 1 / Accessories – In Crimes punished by Special Penal Laws

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Edwin Dalipe y Perez

Doctrine: *The case doesn’t mention accessories in crimes punished by special penal laws, I think if there is
accessory in this case it would be FFF because her acts would ultimately conceal the acts by Edwin as she
deliberately ignored AAA’s plea for help and did not immediately report the acts done to AAA. Again, not discussed
in the original, OPINION ONLY.

REYES COMMENTARY on accessories in crimes punished by special penal laws: An accessory may become a
principal if charged under the special law. The accessory must be charged in another information to be held as a
principal.

Recit Summary: Edwin Dalipe, the step-father of AAA (10), would commit rape and lasvicious acts on AAA multiple
times. AAA would report to her mother but would be only scolded at by FFF accusing her of lying. AAA would
eventually tell her classmate, who would report to her teachers, which would eventually accuse and convict Dalipe
of statutory rape (Art. 335) and acts of lasciviousness (RA 7610). Daliped would appeal, claiming that testimonies by
AAA aren’t enough to convict him. The Court denies the appeal; Jurisprudence has established that if a woman of
tender age (Below 12) alleges someone of sexually abusing them, the Court must take their word for it as she would
not go through the burdening and humiliating process of describing the events and filing a case if it were not true.
Facts: Edwin Dalipe is the partner of FFF and the step-father of AAA. Edwin would commit rape and lascivious acts
against AAA (only 10 years old) multiple times within their house. AAA would continue to endure this, because every
time she would tell her mother FFF the latter would only get mad and shout at her accusing her of lying. When AAA
couldn’t take it anymore she confided in her classmate Karen on how she was raped and molested. Karen would
then tell their teachers about AAA’s story, thus leading the action to be taken to the DSWD. The RTC would convict
Dalipe for 3 counts of statutory rape under Art. 335 of the RPC and 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610
or The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The CA would affirm
this as well, but with modifications to remove the sentence of death penalty as amended. Appellant would then
petition to this Court, pleading not guilty.

Issue/s: Whether or not Edwin Dalipe can be convicted of Ruling: YES. WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA
statutory rape under Art. 355 and acts of lasciviousness under finding the accused guilty is affirmed with
RA 7610 based solely on the evidence provided by the modifications. (reclusion perpetua, not death
testimonies of AAA penalty)

Holding: YES. The Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of AAA’s testimony and her version of the events. We
have ruled that a young girl’s revelation that she had been raped, couple with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an
assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.

When a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has indeed been committed. Considering the age of the complainant, who was ten years old when the crime was
committed, the Court finds it improbable for a girl of her age to fabricate a charge o humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse.

It bears emphasis that AAA immediately reported the crimes to her mother and to her grandmother. It is
deplorable that neither of them did not do anything about it.
35.
Title: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan Name of Digester: Pre
G.R. No 148560 Date: November Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
19,2001
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 2: Crimes Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita

Petitioner: Joseph Estrada Respondent: Sandiganbayan

Doctrine (if applicable):

Malum in se – wrong or evil in itself
Malum prohibitum - unlawful act only by virtue of statute /are not wrong or evil in essence, but they are wrong or
evil because they are prohibited.
Mens rea – intent to commit a crime

Facts:
- Petitioner Joseph Estrada claimed that the Anti-Plunder Act is unconstitutional for it is: (a) vague; (b)
requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the right to due
process; (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Is RA 7080 (Plunder Law) unconstitutional? - No. Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Holding:
- Petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law for it contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in
its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that
there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice
- On vagueness: A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein,
or because of the employment of terms without defining them;s much less do we have to define every word
we use. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words. [Combination: two acts under different categories while
series: two acts under the same category]
- On alleged violation of due process for circumventing obligation to prove beyond reasonable doubt and
instead only requiring a proof of pattern of overt or criminal acts that shows unlawful scheme or conspiracy:
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Pattern arises where the prosecution is
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts. Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than a
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth. The prosecution is therefore not
required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts
- Plunder being malum in se: Yes. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the
Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an
element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong,
they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
Separate Dissenitng Opinions:
Kapunan:
- The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special law does not
necessarily make the same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers
generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a marked difference between the two. There is a
distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape,
homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as
illegal possession of firearms. Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for
almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society
Ynares- Santiago J:
- Criminal intent no longer has to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the crime is not required to be
proved. The desire to benefit particular persons does not have to spring from criminal intent under the
special law creating the crime of plunder Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed.
Thus, even if the accused can prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not
exonerate him under the crime mala prohibita. This violates substantive due process and the standards of
fair play because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under the due process clause
Notes:
Plunder Law: Section 1. x x x x
(d)„Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.· Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50.000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (italics supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence.· For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove
each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (italics supplied).
36.
Title: Padilla v. Dizon Name of Digester: Geronilla
Admin Case No. 3086 Date: February 23, 1988 Per Curiam

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Crimes Defined and Penalized by Special Penal Laws

Complainant: Alexander Padilla Respondent: The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of
the Pasay City Regional Trial Court Branch 113
Doctrine (if applicable):
Malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.
Facts:
• The case in which the respondent, Pasay RTC Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, rendered a decision of acquittal
involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. At the time
of his apprehension, he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments
(380 pieces) amounting to US$355,349.57, in various currency denominations without authority as provided
by law.
• At the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit two currency declarations, which he was
supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous trips.
• Information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank
Circular No. 960.
• The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated: “The factual issue for this Court to
determine is whether or not the accused willfully violated Sec. 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the
accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the Philippines did
not by that act alone make him liable for violation of Sec. 6. What is imperative is the purpose for which
the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country was done – the very intention.”
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering
the decision in question.

Ruling:
The Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with
the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice for the attainment of the objective
of maintaining the people’s faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the
Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits to which he may be entitled
are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstate in any branch of government service, including
government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
Holding:
• The Court finds the respondent guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and
serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this
Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of
maintaining the people‘s faith in the judiciary, it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge be dismissed
from service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby
forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service, including
government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.
• The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to
convict the accused for violation of CB Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused
had criminal intent to violate the law.
• The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in
offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. A judge can not be held to account or
answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
• But these circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to
render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused,
thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision ―in good faith.
Notes:
• Violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, Section 6:
"Sec. 6. Export import of foreign exchange; exceptions. – No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to
take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons,
through the mails or through international carriers except when specifically authorized by the Central
Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations, tourists and non-
resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding
such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them, For purposes of establishing the amount of foreign
exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with
them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines."
• Penal Sanction as provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883
"Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange. – That any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase
and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be
guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal,
(minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos."
• A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous
decision rendered by him in good faith.
37.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals Name of Digester: G. Sison
G.R. No: 121917 Date: March 12, 1997 Ponente: Francisco, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Relation to Special Penal Laws

Petitioner: Robin Cariño Padilla Respondent: Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines
Facts:

1. On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of
petitioner Robin Padilla.
2. Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866
3. During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused, upon advice of counsel, to make any plea. Petitioner waived in writing his right to be present in
any and all stages of the case.
4. After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting
petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum" (skipping
procedural content for brevity)
5. On September 28, 1995 petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with application for bail.

Issue/s: Ruling:
a. Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
error in convicting petitioner of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms? Penalty is modified to ten years and one day as
minimum to eighteen years, eight months and one
day as maximum.

Holding:

1. Petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed
civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Superintendent Rodialo Gumtang, deputy
commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur.

- In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established:

a. the existence of the subject firearm; and
b. the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess.

- The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus:
No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to carry firearms
outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the government agency
involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is
rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which specifically required
the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the PC
Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or
at higher levels of command. Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice
likewise provides as follows:
 If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be
civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the service they are rendering.
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated pieces of evidence is
accentuated all the more by the testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the
firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not
licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner.

2. Lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is
unconstitutional.
- To justify nullification of the penalty based on unconstitutionality, there must be a clear breach of
the constitution. Petitioner’s contention that the penalty of simple illegal possession is cruel and
excessive in contravention of the constitution does not merit consideration. The severity of a
penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

- [RELEVANT TO TOPIC] Although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties
therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by
degrees or determining the proper period should be applied (they are suppletory). Consequently,
the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the
complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
38.
Title: People vs. Simon Name of Digester Barcelon
G.R. No 93028 Date: July 29, 1994 Ponente: REGALADO,J

Subject / Syllabus Topic: CRIM 1/ Relation of RPC to special laws

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA

Doctrine (if applicable): The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10
of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special
law against, such supplementary application.

Recit Summary: Simon was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua for violating the Dangerous
Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a buy-bust
operation which was sold for P40.00. The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about October 22, 1988.

Facts:
• Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-
buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory examination,
were found positive for marijuana.
• Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked up by the
police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from
the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some
papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge
of the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came
from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
• Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
abrasion or contusion on his body.
• Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
and to pay the costs.
• Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Can the court apply the provisions of the RPC to reduce the -Yes
penalty to be imposed on appellant?

Holding:
• In imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines
as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not
taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the
special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is
to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
• The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former,
cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law
against, such supplementary application.
• The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under
a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties
native to said Code.
 • where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for
felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
• the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code,
as well as other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have
suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act No. 1700 and those now provided under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal Code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the
related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special
laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would
be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and
its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of Congress.
Separate Opinions:
DAVIDE, JR.,J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of
penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although
it adopts the Code’s nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the
Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an offense “punished or punishable” by the
Revised Penal Code.
39.
Title: Seguritan v. People Name of Digester: YDP
G.R. No. 172896 Date: April 19, 2010 Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal/Wrongful Act Different from That Intended

Petitioner: Roño Seguritan y Jara Respondent: The People of the Philippines

Doctrine:
When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.

Art. 4. Criminal liability

Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. x x x x

Facts:
• On November 25, 1995, petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor
Panis (Melchor) and Baltazar Panis (Baltazar). Seguritan and Lucrecio were seated beside each other when a heated
argument ensued between them. The argument was about Lucrecio’s carabao entering petitioner’s farm and destroying
his crops. Petitioner punched Lucrecio twice that caused Lucrecio to to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block
which was being used as an improvised stove. Lucrecio was lost consciousness but was then revived. He went to his
house. His wife and daughter noticed that his skin was getting darker and foamy substance was coming out of his mouth.
Lucrecio died the same night.
• NBI Medico-Legal Dr. Vertido concluded that the cause of Lucrecio’s death was traumatic head injury.
• Melchol testified and told the story of what happened that day.
• Seguritan defended himself and alleged that cardiac arrest caused the death of Lucrecio. He further alleged that he did
not punch Lucrecio, and that Lucrecio lost his balance and fell hitting his head on the improvised stove. Petitioner
presented the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio that showed that Lucrecio died of a heart attack. The certificate was
signed by Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Teresita, Cagayan.
• The Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court with modifications on the penalty.
• Seguritan then petitioned for review on Certiorari and assails the decision of the CA.
Issue/s: Ruling:
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused of • The CA did not err in convicting the accused with
the crime of homicide homicide

Holding:

• It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy report showed
that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused by injuries located at the upper right portion of the head, left side of
the center of his head, and a “fracture, linear, right middle fossa, hemorrhage, subdural, right and left cerebral
hemisphere.”
• In reference to the NBI’s medical findings and Melchor’s statements, the Court found no merit in petitioner’s argument
that he could not be held liable for the head fracture suffered by Lucrecio.
• Dr. Vertido also ruled out petitioner’s contention that Lucrecio died of a heart attack. Dr. Vertido opened up the heart
and examined the heart grossly. He found no findings that would lead to a heart attack.
• The Certificate of Death of Lucrecio that he died of a heart attack has no weight in evidence. Dr. Corazon Flor, who
signed said document testified that she did not examine the cadaver of Lucrecio.

• The petitioner’s argued that he should be held liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide due to the
absence of intent to kill Lucrecio.
Ø The Court then answered and said that petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle
who was much older than him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he must be held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
• He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
• In this case, the Court found that the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, attended the commission of the crime. Thus, the appellate court correctly imposed the indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
40. People vs. Sabalones Name of Digester: Pauline Pua Phee

G.R. No. 123485 Date: August 31, 1998 Ponente: Justice Paganiban

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law 1/ Table 3: 1. Wrongful Act Different from That Intended
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Rolusape Sabalones alias “Roling”
et al.
Facts:
• These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision dated September 28, 1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of murder and
frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which
resulted in the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who were all riding in two vehicles
which were allegedly ambushed by appellants. After conducting a preliminary investigation, Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M. Gabiana, Sr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 7, five amended Informations charging four “John Does,” who were later identified as
Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero, with two
counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder.

• Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio Timoteo Beronga were the
first to be arraigned. Upon the arrest of the two, the Informations were amended by the public prosecutor,
with the conformity of the defense counsel, by substituting the names of the two accused for the “John
Does” appearing in the original Informations. When arraigned, said accused, assisted by their respective
lawyers, pleaded not guilty to the five Informations. Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases
against him were dismissed. Accused Cabanero remained at large. Sabalones, on the other hand, was
eventually arrested. Subsequently, he jumped bail but was recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment.

• The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows: WHEREFORE,
premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES and (ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO
BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:

• Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their conviction
but sentenced them to reclusion perpetua for the murders they were found guilty of.

Issue/s: Ruling:
-Did the Court err in holding that the instant case is “one of - No.
aberratio ictus,” which is not a defense, and that the ‘defense of
alibi’ interposed by the accused may not be considered.?”
Holding:

The Court ruled that the appeal is devoid of merit.

Aberratio Ictus
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in “conjecture” in ruling that there was aberratio ictus in this
case. This allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that the trial court relied
on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants
did in fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the appellants,
this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the
discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. In any event, the trial court
was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the
testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were
suspected of having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against
them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims’ vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of
Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their
culpability. The Court has held that “mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the
accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”

Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is better
characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio ictus which
means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.
41.
Title: Urbano v. IAC Name of Digester: Geronilla
G.R. No. L-72864 Date: January 7, 1988 Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Punishable Conduct: Wrongful Act from that Intended

Petitioner: Filomeno Urbano Respondent: Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and

People of the Philippines
Doctrine (if applicable):
• Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended xxx.” Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by
him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.” (People v.
Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
• A person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
• People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987): “While the guilt of the accused in
criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence
is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes
the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)…”
Facts:
• At about 8:00 o’clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his rice field
at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo
Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed.
• Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier
and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal
and Javier admitted that he was the one.
• Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued.
• Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then
unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the
left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and
inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him fro hacking Javier.
• Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay Php 700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement.
• However, at about 1:30 a.m. on November 11, 1980 Javier as rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital Javier lockjaw and was having convulsion Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found the latter’s serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin.
He noticed the presence of a hearing wound in Javier’s palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
• In an information dated April 10, 1981 Filomeno Urbano was charged with crime of homicide before the
then Circuit Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District. Upon agreement, Urbano pleaded “not guilty.”
After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. We was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years., four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of Php 12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal
upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty. The then Intermediate Appellate Court
affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
to Php 30,000.00 with cost against the appellant. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven.
• The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Whether or not there was an efficient cause from the The instant petition is granted, the questioned decision of
time Javier was wounded until his death which would the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier’s death.
 Appeals, is reversed and set aside. The petitioner is
acquitted of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
Holding:
• No. Civil liabilities only. Death was not directly due to the hacking. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.
• The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wound
inflicted upon him by the accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a criminal
conviction). Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding and hacking which was
distinct and foreign to the crime.
• The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus
at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus.
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
• Doubts are present. There is likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tenants may have been the proximate cause of
Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
• The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. But because Urbano & Javier used the
facilities of barangay mediators to affect a compromise agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by
virtue of PD 1508, §2(3) which allows settlement of minor offenses.
Notes:
• Trismus – lockjaw due to infection caused by tetanus
• PMC – Postmortem Care
• “This is one of the causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party…”
42.
Title: UNITED STATES vs. BAUTISTA Name of Digester:
G.R. No. 2189 Date: November Ponente: CARSON, J.
3, 1906
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Proposal and Conspiracy

Petitioner: THE UNITED STATES Respondent: FRANCISCO BAUTISTA ET AL.

Facts:
• Appellants in this case were convicted in the Court of First Instance of 'Manila of the crime of conspiracy
to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands
and the Government of the Philippine Islands
• The appellant Francisco Bautista was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, with hard labor, and $ 3,000
fine, and Aniceto de Guzman and Tomás Puzon, and each of them, to three years' imprisonment, with hard
labor, and a fine of $2,000, and all and each of the said appellants to pay their proportionate share of the
costs of the trial and to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and failure to pay their
respective fines.
• In 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos, resident in the
city of Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands by force of arms, the República Universal Democrática Filipina
• Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military forces, came to Manila from Hongkong in hiding on board the
steamship Yuensang; that after his arrival in the Philippines he held a number of meetings in the city
of Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the above-mentioned conspiracy hatched
in Hongkong
• Francisco Bautista, a resident of the city of Manila, was an intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte
wrote and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that, to aid him in his journey; that after the arrival
of Ricarte, Bautista was present, taking part in several of the abovementioned meetings whereat the
plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected
• Tomás Puzon, united with the conspirators through the agency of one José R. Muñoz, who was proven to
have been a prime leader of the movement, in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him authorized
to distribute bonds and nominate and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the
signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was being brought
to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held several conferences with the said Muñoz whereat plans were
made for the coming insurrection; that at one of these conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission
as brigadier-general of the signal corps of the revolutionary forces and that Puzon accepted the
commission and voluntarily united himself with the conspirators and undertook to do his part in
organizing troops; and that at a later conference he assured the said Muñoz that he had things in readiness,
meaning thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with the terms of his commission.
• Aniceto de Guzman in the finding of his guilt rests substantially upon his acceptance of a number of bonds
from one of the conspirators, such bonds having been prepared by the conspirators for the purpose of
raising funds for carrying out the plans of the conspiracy

Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether Francisco Bautista, Aniceto de - Therefore, that the judgment and sentence before us, in
Guzman and Tomás Puzon are guilty of so far as it affects the said Aniceto de Guzman, should
conspiracy be reversed. Aniceto de Guzman should be acquitted of
the crime with which he is charged and set at liberty
forthwith. Francisco Bautista and Tomas Puzon, should
be, and is hereby, affirmed, except in so far as it imposes
subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency and
failure to pay their respective fines, and, there being no
authority in law for such provision, so much of the
sentence as undertakes to impose subsidiary
imprisonment is hereby reversed.
Holding:
- Puzon, in his defence, did not deny that he made this statement, but he attempted to explain it away by
saying that when he made it he was so excited that he did not know just what he was saying.
- But the case at bar is to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly
discloses that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the appointment in question and in doing
so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of
conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as
evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.
- Where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused
voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly
be taken into consideration as evidence of his relations with the conspirators.
- Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for the crime of
treason should be applied in this case, but this court has always held, In conformance with the decisions
of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate
and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable
in such cases.
- As for Aniceto de Guzman, it does not affirmatively appear that he knew anything of the existence of the
conspiracy or that, when he received the bonds, wrapped in a bundle, he knew what the contents of the
bundle was, nor that he ever, on any occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to these bonds.
43.
People v. Vengco Name of Digester: Jay Daniel T. Morales
G.R. No. L-31657 Date: January 31, Ponente: Relova, J.
1984
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Responsible and Conduct Punished - Punishable Conduct (Proposal and
Conspiracy)
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellant: Eduardo Vengco,
Rogelio Encarnacion, Y De Los Santos alias, Roger Pusa,
Romeo Soliba Y Redobla alias, Romy, Constantino Leneses Y
Marillano alias,
Alexander Remonte y Marillano alias, Alex Remonte, and Leon
David alias, Junior.

Doctrine (if applicable): RPC, Art. 8 – Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in
which the law specially provides a penalty therefor. A conspiracy exists when the person who has decided to
commit a felony purposes its execution to some other person or persons.

Recit Summary: This case talks about five people which conspired to murder an innocent man in a city. These five
men were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila, which held them guilty. But two of
these men were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties provided by the law to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. Anyway, the defendants appealed before the court but to no avail since the CFI of Manila’s
decision was upheld and provided a modification on the penalties that they need to indemnify the heirs of the
victim.

Facts:
● The charge contains the information that on or about August 24, 1967 in Manila, at night time, the
mentioned accused (Vengco, Encarnacion, Soliba, Leneses, David) with the use of superior strength in
which they conspired with an intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked and assaulted with personal violence towards an
innocent man named Charlie Celadena. The defendants stabbed the latter all over his body with bladed and
pointed instruments in which they were armed with such during the scene of the crime. This incident
caused the immediate death of Celadena.
● Moreover, several witnesses gave respective testimonies to support the version of the prosecution. It was
started by Go Hong, a neighbor of the victim, in which he stated Vengco’s act of stabbing and Leneses and
three other persons moving away from the place of the incident, while carrying a dagger, ice pick, and
another pointed weapon. Then Quiane’s testimony includes witnessing the previous incident between
Vengco and Celadena as well as the invitation to Celadena to go to the apartment. Meanwhile, Purita
Delgado, a person inside of Celadena’s sister’s house, corroborates the incident where Celadena was being
held by two men while being stabbed.
● Then, Dr. Mariano de Lara has conducted an autopsy on the body of Celadena to which the doctor found
eleven (11) stab wounds that were mostly located in the chest and abdomen and one in the back of the
deceased. The doctor concluded that five (5) of the stab wounds were fatal.
● Meanwhile, the defendants gave respective testimonies before the court. First, the accused Leneses says
that he was just invited by Vengco, David and the other 2 defendants to go to the house of David and have
a drink where he became unconscious after their session to which he was brought to his house in
Balintawak and stayed the whole evening there. Second, the accused David denied his participation on the
crime for he contends that only Vengco, Encarnacion, and Leneses were the ones who attacked and killed
Celadena.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1.) Whether or not there is conspiracy among the 1.) Yes
accused in the commission of the crime of murder
against Celadena? WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that appellants pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P30,000.00.
Holding:
• The court ruled that the crime committed is murder, which was qualified by abuse of superior strength.
This is because all of the witnesses found that the commission of the crime and the manner of its
perpetration in which there is abuse of superior strength in the part of the defendants, cannot be disputed.
• To support that, appellant David’s witness, which is the taxi driver, confirmed these facts. The conspiracy
among therein appellants and their companions is easily discernible from their conduct. There is also
intent on the part of the defendants to kill Celadena because of the incident that take place before and
during the crime where it was committed. This is because of the assault that the appellants made against
Celadena along with their conduct, which was also testified on by the taxi driver.
• Lastly, the rule that was cited by the court here is that, “if it is proven that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
although apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them is proven.” (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed. by Niblack, pp. 1402-3).
Notes: Minor flaws and inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses. (People vs. Aposaga, 108 SCRA
574). Testimony of witness that the accused perpetrated the crime reinforced by dying declaration of another
witness is credible. (People vs. Capillas, 108 SCRA 173). No improper motive can be attributed to the prosecution
witnesses who positively identified the appellants as perpetrators of the crime. (People vs. Lagtu, 108 SCRA 84.)
Ordinarily, witnesses to a murder boldly committed in a public place, would not volunteer to give information for
fear of becoming the next victims. (People vs. Muñoz, 107 SCRA 313).
44.
People vs Valdez Name of Digester: Fred Bucu
G.R. No L-75390 Date:March 25, 1988 Ponente:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 3: 3. Proposal & Conspiracy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio

Doctrine (if applicable): RPC Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony

Recit Summary: Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are accused of conspiring with one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, shot Eleno Maquiling in his family’s property in La Union, at
8:00 o’clock in the evening. The trial court decided that the accused are guilty. This is an automatic review of the
decision of the RTC. The issue is whether or not the accused are guilty of conspiring with one another. After the
facts are laid out, proving that because of Valdez and Orodio’s prior relationship with Eleno, the Supreme Court
finds them guilty of conspiring with one another in killing Eleno, regardless of who pulled the trigger.

Facts: June 7, 1977, at 8:00 o’ clock in the evening, in the Maquiling’s house in La Union, the victim Eleno was with his
family in their yard and was seated playing the guitar. Suddenly a very loud gun shot rang out from the northern
side of the yard and Eleno fell to the ground, crying out to his father for help. Juanito rushed to his fallen son and
carried him into their house; Eleno, however, died immediately thereafter. The victim's mother Esmenia instinctively
looked toward the direction from whence the gunshot came and saw the two accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio, running down the hill away from the bamboo groves on the northern side of the house. Dionisio Maquiling,
brother of the victim, also testified that he too had seen Danilo with a gun and Simplicio both running away. Facts
state that Danilo Valdez was a neighbor and a relative of the Maquilings, while Simplicio Orodio was their old
acquaintance. Juanito Maquiling, the victim's father, executed a sworn statement saying that 3 days prior to the
shooting of Eleno, Eleno had informed him that in case something untoward happened to him (Eleno), Danilo Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio should be held responsible, since he (Eleno) had quarreled with them concerning their stealing
and robbing. Juanito, further, stated that the accused Danilo has had a personal grudge against Eleno; Danilo had
mortgaged to Eleno's brother a stolen spading fork, a circumstance that Eleno discovered when the real owner of
the spading fork came to talk to him. Esmenia, Eleno's mother, gave no sworn statement on that day. Ten (10) days
later, on 20 June 1977, however, she made a sworn statement to the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando, La
Union. Dionisio identified Danilo Orodio as Eleno's killers. At the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and categorical
in identifying the appellants as the men she saw running from the bamboo groves immediately after the shooting.
This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue/s: Ruling:
-W/N the accused are guilty of conspiring with one -Decision of trial court is AFFIRMED, resulting with the
another for the murder of Eleno. penalty of RECLUSION PENALTY

Holding:
YES. According to Article 8 of the RPC- “Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.” - Conspiracy and proposal to
commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person
or persons.

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery and evident premeditation. The accused had
purposely sought nocturnity and hid themselves behind the bamboo groves located close by the victim’s house and
had fired at Eleno Maquiling suddenly, without any warning, from behind obviously to ensure the success of their
deadly purpose without any risk to themselves and without any possibility of retaliation. Three (3) days before his
assassination, Eleno was already apprehensive for his life when he disclosed to his father, Juanito Maquiling, his
quarrel with Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio over the latter’s thievery and robbery. Clearly, the accused had
planned to kill Eleno some days before the fateful night of 7 June 1977; the shotgun blast at the back of Eleno was
not the result of a spur of the moment decision.
45.
Title: People vs Escober Name of Digester: Padillo
G.R. No. L-69658 Date: January 29, 1988 Ponente: Fernan, J

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Proposal and Conspiracy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario
Punzalan, Jr y Guevarra
Recit Summary:
● Escober was a security guard at Vising Electrical Supply, owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. Also,
one of the alleged co-conspirators is Amadeo Abuyan alias Alorte who was a former security guard at the
said company. On December 3, 1982 Abuyen together with respondent Punzalan went to the company.
Escober recognized Abuyan so he let him get inside the compound. Gun shots were fired and heard.
Thereafter, Abuyen and Punzalan fled, followed by Escober. The two children of Chua spouses were
stabbed which caused their deaths and several items were missing. RTC of QC found Escober and Punzalan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of robber with homicide. SC rules Escober ACQUITTED of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Punzalan is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the
complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Facts:
● Consolidated brief of SG - Abuyen, was a former co-security guard of appellant Escober at Bee Seng
Electrical. At the night of the incident, Rocero left his post and was relieved by Escober. Vicente Chua went
to his office. Abuyen and his three companions went to the company. Escober peeped through the door
and let Abuyen open. Punzalan was left outside as Abuyen proceeded to go in. Gun shots were fired and
heard. Vicente Chua saw his two children mortally wounded, both died.

● Escober voluntarily gave his version of the incident: Escober was not able to talk to Alorte because one of
his companions aimed a gun at Escober and threatened to kill him.

● Punzalan’s defense: he accepted the invitation of Abuyen for a drink. He was requested to join and proceed
to another place, going to the company. Abuyen instructed Punzalan to stay outside, thereafter Abuyen
proceeded to go in.

Issue/s: Ruling:
● W/N there exists a conspiracy among the ● No, Court sets aside RTC decision, Juan
accused-appellants in committing the crime of Escober is ACQUITTED of the crime of robbery
robbery with homicide with homicide. Punzalan Jr is found guilty as
principal in the complex crime of robbery with
homicide

Holding:
● The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is an innocent gesture. The act of opening the gate by
Escober would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had prior knowledge of the
crime. The facts of the case do not support theory that the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in
avoidance of suspicion. It is not common experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. The
robbery and homicide was within a span of 5-10 minutes, which is too short to enable Escobar and Abuyen
to contrive such scenario.

● In the case of Punzalan, Court held that he knew of the plan to commit the crime and that it is incredible
that his companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking and just bring him along the scene of the
crime.

● Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those
who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the complex
crime of robbery with homicide
46.
People of the Philippines v Walter Name of Digester: Celina Gonzales
Nacional alias “Ka Dennis,” et.al.

G.R. No. 111294-95 Ponente: PUNO, J.

Date: September 7, 1995
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law 1/Proposal and Conspiracy

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Accused: Walter Nacional alias “Ka Dennis,”et.al

Philippines Accused-Appellant: Javier Mirabete
Doctrine:
1. Conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly, or impliedly to commit the felony and
forthwith to actually pursue it.
2. A Conspiracy, once established, makes each of the conspirators liable for the acts of the others. All
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent of their participation because in
contemplation, the act of one is the act of all.
Facts:
● Walter Nacional alias “Ka Dennis,” Absalon Millamina alias “Ka Alvin,” Efren Musa, Rudy Luces, Javier
Mirabete alias Commander, and Zacararias Militante alias Care were charged with murder in two
separate informations:
o The first information stated that they shot Quirino Lagason and inflicted injuries upon him which
resulted in his death.
o The second information stated that they shot Joel Lagason and inflicted injuries upon him which
resulted in his death.
● Five out of six of the accused, including Nacional were granted conditional pardon. Thus, only Mirabete
pursued his appeal.
● The judgment convicting the five accused is based on the evidence derived from the testimony of two
eyewitnesses, namely Bienvenida Lagason (Quirino’s widow), and Crisanto Miranda (a neighbor of the
Lagasons). The eyewitnesses accused Walter Nacional.
● The six accused were all civilian members of the barangay organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP)-NPA at Daraga, Albay. Their organization held a pulong-pulong (conference) at Barangay
Lacag, Daraga in order to identify suspected military informers and were targeted for liquidation.
However, their team leader disapproved this proposal due to lack of clearance and approval from higher
authorities.
● On February 21, 1985, the six accused were gathered in front of the RCPI building. Wilson Lita informed
them that they had a mission in at Salvancion to talk to two military informers. Some members were
instructed to confront the two about their being informers and if they “resisted,” they would be killed.
The other members were instructed to provide maximum security.
● The group stopped at the sari-sari store and asked for directions. Afterwards, they asked a neighbor
(Miranda) to accompany them to the Lagasons’ house. Wilson Lita, Militante, and Nacional remained at
the waiting shed. Along the way, they saw Quirino and Joel Lagason. \ Nacional approached Quirino and
said something to him. He then pulled a gun from his waist and shot Quirino in the face. Thus, he fell to
the ground and died instantly. Seconds later, Absalon Millamina shot Joel Lagason on the head. The group
then fled towards the direction of the RCPI Relay Station. Joel died a few hours later.
● However, the defense denied these accusations. Nacional claimed that Quirino was killed by Wilson Lita,
while Joel was allegedly shot by Absalon Millamina. Furthermore, he stated that he and the rest of the
group merely provided security to Lita and Millamina. Luce, Militante, Musa, and Mirabete denied being
members of the NPA and their participation in the killings, stating that their presence during the crime
was incidental. Militante claimed that he gave the two directions to the RCPI building. Musa alleged that
he merely gave a glass of water to Lita and Millamina who were passing by his house. Mirabete testified
that he was only watching a volleyball game. Eventually, the trial court rejected their denials and
convicted them.
● In this appeal, Mirabete continued to deny the accusations against him and claimed that he was only a
69-year-old farmer, and it was impossible for him to join the NPA due to his old age. Furthermore,
Miranda purportedly learned of the members’ identities and revealed the same to Bienvenida.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Was Javier Mirabete part of the 1. YES
group that conspired to kill Quirino
and Joel Lagason?
Holding:
● Upon reviewing the facts, the Court found that Mirabete was part of the group that conspired to killed
and actually killed the Lagasons, as identified by several witnesses.
● The evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that Javier Mirabete was a civilian member of the CPP-
NPA and was part of the group of CPP-NPA members that deliberately planned the killing of the
Lagasons.
● The events that led to the victims’ deaths show that this group of CPP-NPA members deliberately
planned, plotted, and premediated their victims’ deaths.
● There was more sufficient time for the group to reflect on their criminal intentions between the decision
to shoot the victims and the actual shooting itself
● Conspiracy arises at the very instance the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly to commit the felony and
fortwith to actually pursue it. Nobody disagreed with the plan to shoot the victims.
● It hardly matters that accused-appellant was not actually present at the specific place of the shooting. He
was at the waiting shed but this was for the purpose of providing security to those who carried out the
shooting
● A conspiracy, once established, makes each of the conspirators liable for the acts of the others. All
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all
47. People vs. Elijorde Name of Digester: BIANCA

G.R. No. 126531 Date: April 21, 1999 Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Proposal & Conspiracy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Gilbert Elijorde and Reynaldo

Punzalan

Doctrine:
1. In order for a person to be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must concur;
a. Community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
b. He cooperates with execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
c. There must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as an accomplice.

Facts:
In the evening of May 21, 1995, at around 6:00 pm, Eric Hierro and Benjamin Visbal went out from Rodel
Contemplados house where they were drinking to buy mango at a nearby sari-sari store. Accused Gilbert Elijorde,
Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes were at the time in front of the store. As Menes approached Hierro, the latter
warned Menes, “Dont touch me, my clothes will get dirty.” Suddenly, Menes punched Hierro on the face, followed
by Elijorde who also boxed Hierro on the face, and Punzalan who kicked Hierro at the back. Hierro and Visbal ran
and sought shelter at the Contemplados house. Some three minutes later, Hierro proceeded home together with
Visbal and the latters wife. As they walked home, they noticed the accused Elijorde, Punzalan and Menes waiting
for them and as they drew near, Punzalan kicked Hierro at the back for the second time. Hierro ran away pursued
by Elijorde and upon overtaking the former, the latter stabbed him at the back. Hierro fell down and Elijorde placed
himself on top of Hierro who was now raising his arms defensively and pleading, “Maawa na kayo, huwag ninyo
akong patayin, wala akong kasalanan sa inyo.” Despite pleas of mercy, Elijorde stabbed Hierro with a knife on the
chest and then fled. Hierro died soon after at the hospital. Charged before the trial court, accused Elijorde and
Punzalan were convicted of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, both accused contended that the court a quo (RTC Bulacan) erred in finding that
treachery qualified the killing to murder. The defense also questioned the finding on Punzalan being guilty of
murder by reason of conspiracy with Elijorde. The defense argued that he did not conspire with Elijorde because
his only participation was his kicking of Hierro twice which were neither in pursuance of the same criminal design
of Elijorde nor done in concert aimed at the attainment of the same objective of killing Hierro.

Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether or not Punzalan is guilty of murder by reason 1. No.
of conspiracy.

Holding:
1. Punzalan is not guilty of murder and neither can Punzalan be considered an accomplice in the crime of
murder. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the
following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice. The cooperation that the law
punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed.
48.
Title: People v Botona Name of Digester: Pre
G.R. No 115693 Date: March 17, 1999. Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 3: 3. Proposal & Conspiracy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: SILVERIANO BOTONA, NICOLAS BOTONA,

JUNICA LINGATONG, alias TIKI (at large) and SOFRONIO
BOTONA
Doctrine (if applicable):
For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It
is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in
its execution. Direct evidence of a previous actual agreement to commit a crime is not necessary.

Facts:
- Bienvenido Botonia was allegedly killed by his brothers-in-law (Silveriano, Nicolas, Junior, and Sofronio)
because of a disagreement over an inherited land.
- On June 27, 1988, after dinner, Julieto Botona fetched his father Bienvenido who was playing bakarat in the
house of his uncle Silveriano. On their way home, a man suddenly emerged from the roadside, who Julieto
later identified as Silveriano.
- Silveriano hugged Bienvenido while holding “sundangay” or small sharp-pointed bolo. Juliano then saw
Silveriano hold the shoulder of his father then pushed him to the ground then called for assistance and
another set of three accused emerged. Julieto did not see what happened next because he ran away and hid
in the ricefield— six arm’s length away from where his father has fallen.
- After a minute, he ran and hid under the house of Batoy Laplana for three hours until he saw the four
accused washing themselves in the pumpwell of the next house.
- At 4:00 am the next day, Julieto went back to the place where he left his father and found him dead in the
same spot where the four accused intercepted his father.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Are Silveriano, along with the three of his - Yes. The Court dismissed Botona’s petition affirming
“associates” Nicolas, Junior, and Sofriano equally guilty lower court’s decision to award the deceased family:
of committing murder? s P50,000 as indeminifaction for the death of the victim,
and P5,000 reimbursement for burial and the accused
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Holding:
- From the treacherous design in accosting the deceased, a land dispute as background motive, a previous
attempt to take the life of the victim, and the other antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned no
conclusion can be drawn other than the guilt of appellants. All told, the circumstantial evidence for the
prosecution surmounted the constitutional presumption of innocence.
- Whether or not Sofronio saw the murder weapon is neither important nor decisive. The belated testimony
of Sofronio who was not in good terms with Silveriano Botona because of the former’s problem on his bond
was never made the basis of the theory of conspiracy. It may have on some points corroborated the
testimony of Julieto Oliver but lapses in the testimony of Sofronio do not in any way affect the untarnished
and straightforward testimony of Julieto that he saw Silveriano holding the weapon when the latter and the
three other accused ganged-up on his father.
- For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition
precedent. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution. Direct evidence of a previous actual agreement to commit a crime
is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
- Silverio suddenly appeared from the roadside, hugging the victim with the murder weapon in his hand, was
complemented by the act of the three other accused ganging-up on the defenseless victim, when Silveriano
called for their reinforcement. Verily, at the precise moment of execution of the crime, the accused acted in
concert to accomplish a common objective·to take the life of Bienvenido Oliver. This court is truly
convinced of the findings by the trial court that conspiracy attended the perpetration of the crime.
 - Consequently, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each. All the
accused in the case are therefore equally liable for the death of Bienvenido Oliver.
- There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means and
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
- In appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the trial court ruled that: The evidence of the
people through Julieto Oliver was clear and unwavering· that the attack was sudden and unexpected where
the victim was unable to de fend himself. They all ganged-up the victim and thereafter pushed said victim to
the ground. Thus, the court a quo properly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as the
attack on the deceased was sudden, catching him unaware and giving him no opportunity to defend himself.

Notes:
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict, if: there is more than one circumstance; the facts from where the
inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering that the conspiracy in the present case is merely implied, evident premeditation must be clearly
established, the elements of which are as follows: the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; an overt
act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; a sufficient lapse of
time between the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect on the
consequences of his act.
49.
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan Pascual, Dawn
G.R. No. 130872 March 25, 1999 Ponente: Bellosillo, J

Criminal Law 1 / Proposal and Conpiracy

Petitioner: Francisco M. Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz Respondent: People of the Philippines
Doctrine: While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together however, the evidence must
reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design.
Recit Summary: Father and son duo Francisco (Mayor) and Lenlie Lecaroz (KB chairman) were both known as elected
public officials in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz. Lenlie would later on step down from his position as he already reached
the age limit. Jowil Red, who would replace Lenlie, would filed before the ombudsman complaints against them. The
action would eventually reach the Sandiganbayan and thus convicting them to be in a conspiracy to commit estafa
through falsification. Petitioners appeal. The Court reversed the Sandiganbayan’s decision as the petitioners weren’t
convicted beyond reasonable doubt, and that proof wasn’t given as to the alleged conspiracy. Evidence on conspiracy
must be strong enough to show unity in criminal design. Conspiracy cannot be presumed just because of a filial
relationship exists. Decision is reversed, petitioners are acquitted.
Facts: The petitioners were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 13 counts of estafa through falsification. Hence, this
petition where they seek for the reversal of the decision insisting on their innocence. Francisco was the Municipal
Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, while his son, Lenlie was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of a
municipality in Sta. Cruz. In the next election for the KB, Jowil Red won, Lenlie didn't run anymore as his age exceeded
the limit required of.

Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie
Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After
preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone.

In convicting both accused on the falsification charges, the Sandiganbayan would state that Francisco entered the name
of his son, the accused Lenlie, in the payroll of the municipality of Sta. Cruz for the payroll period starting January 15,
1986, reinstating accused Lenlie to his position in the Sangguniang Bayan, he was deliberately stating a falsity when he
certified that Lenlie was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The fact is that even accused Lenlie himself no longer
attended the sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, and starting with the payroll for January 16 to 31, 1986, did
not personally pick up his salaries anymore. The information would state that there was conspiracy between Francisco
and Lenlie to commit the 13 counts of estafa through falsification. Petitioners now appeal to this Court for their
acquittal.

Issue/s: Whether or not the 13 counts of estafa through Ruling: NO. WHEREFORE, the petition is
falsification was committed through a conspiracy between GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Francisco and Lenlie Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioners are acquitted of all 13 counts of of
estafa through falsification.
Holding: The Court held that conspiracy was NOT proved in this case, as contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan.
The Court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the payrolls authorizing
payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as a consequence thereof the latter collected his salaries.
These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the very same acts alleged in the informations as constituting the
crime of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent.

While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together however, the evidence must reasonably be
strong enough to show community of criminal design.

Perhaps subliminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it, and if only to buttress its finding of conspiracy, the
Sandiganbayan stressed that the accused are father and son. Granting that this is not even ad hominem, we are unaware
of any presumption in law that a conspiracy exists simply because the conspirators are father and son or related by
blood.
50.
Title: People v. Bello Name of Digester: Sabayle
G.R. No 124871 Date: May 13, 2004 Ponente: Puno, J
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Proposal and Conspiracy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Marife Bello

Doctrine (if applicable):

Ø Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it.
Ø In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Facts:
Ø Marife and Eladio, Jr. checked in at the Queensland Lodge in Pasay City.
Ø When they got into the room, Marife called up the Sunshine Moneychanger and talked with the officer-in-
charge, Eduardo. Identifying herself as “Joann Redillo”, she misrepresented to Eduardo that she came from
Japan and would like to convert her 40 pieces of yen to pesos. She also requested that this be transacted in
their room in the said lodge as she did not want to carry a huge amount of money.
Ø Eduardo agreed since the moneychanger was used to extending such service to the customers of the lodge.
Eduardo then instructed his messenger, Rolando, to proceed to the lodge and give “Joann Redillo” the
amount of P114,000 in exchange of her yen.
Ø Roomboy Mayonito, escorted Rolando to the room until Eladio, Jr. opened the door and let him in.
Ø Seconds later, Marife called up the lodge and informed them that they were already checking out of the
room.
Ø Mayonito inquired from Marife where Rolando (messenger) was but she refused to answer and directed him
to follow-up instead their bill.
Ø As they left, the roomboys discovered the lifeless body of Rolando inside the room, lying beside the bed and
covered by blood-stained bedsheets. He sustained multiple stab wounds and a TV cable wire was tied
around his neck.
Ø The trial court charged both Marife Bello and Eladio Consuelo, Jr. with the maximum penalty of death as
they were found to be part of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62(1)(a) of the RPC.
Ø Both accused then filed their separate Briefs. Marife contends that the lower court erred in finding that she
was in conspiracy with the other accused. On the other hand, Eladio, Jr. asserts that the trial court erred in
convicting him for: (1) his identity as a co-conspirator was not established beyond reasonable doubt and; (2)
the trial court failed to give weight to his alibi.
Ø Marife further avers that her alleged conspiracy with the other accused was not sufficiently established by
circumstantial evidence as there was no showing that she had the same purpose and united with the other
accused in the execution of the crime. She also claims that she was only forced to join the conspirators as
she was threatened that she will be killed if she refused to cooperate.
Ø The court was not persuaded.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Was there a conspiracy between Marife Bello and Eladio Yes.
Consuelo, Jr.?

Holding:
Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it.
Conspiracy is predominantly a state of mind as it involves the meeting of the minds and intent of the
malefactors. Consequently, direct proof is not essential to establish it. The existence of the assent of minds of
the co-conspirators may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that
they are parts of the complete plan to commit the crime. In the case at bar, the records clearly reveal that Marife
was part of the plan to rob the moneychanger. This is because she had close relations with all her co-accused, she
even has a child with Eladio, Jr. and she resided in Cavite with all her co-accused. Indeed, her claim is difficult to
understand as it would be easier to instill fear on a stranger than on a friend or close relation. On the other hand,
the alibi proffered by Eladio, Jr. does not hold as alibi is the weakest defense that can be put up by an accused
especially where there is direct testimony of an eyewitness. In sum, we find both Marife Bello and Eladio, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of robbery with homicide. They were considered conspirators
and thus, equally liable as co-principals for all the planned or unanticipated consequences of their criminal design.
51.

People v. Rom Name of Digester: Khaila Palabrica

G.R. No. 137585 Date: April 28, 2004 Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 3: 3. Proposal & Conspiracy

Petitioner: The People Respondent: Antonio Rom y Sardedo and Joey Corsales aka Antonio Corsanes, accused,
of the Philippines Joey Corsales aka Antonio Corsanes, appellant

Doctrine (if applicable): Conspiracy - Proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime
would be unnecessary to establish conspiracy when by their overt acts it could be deduced that they conducted
themselves in concert with one another in pursuing their unlawful design.

Recit Summary: CORSALES and ROM are found guilty of MURDER. CORSALES, assails that the RTC gravely erred in
ruling that the prosecution had established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The Court finds the
appeal to be bereft of merit. RTC did not err in finding the appellant and ROM guilty of MURDER. Abuse of superiority
is attendant where two accused had cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their combined
superiority in strength and took turns in stabbing the victim who was unarmed. Thus RTC’s imposition of
RECLUSION PERPETUA is CORRECT.

Facts:
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC
- JOEY CORSALES aka ANTONIO CORSANES assails the decision of the RTC finding him and his co-accused
ANTONIO ROM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the CRIME OF MURDER, sentencing each of them to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay damages to the heirs of victim ROY TIOZON.
o August 4, 1996, ROY TIOZON was stabbed and hacked by CORSALES and ROM, with deadly weapons
(bolo and Batangas knife), and was hit by CORSALES and ROM, thereby inflicting serious and mortal
wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
o Wherefore, finding CORSALES and ROM, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the CRIME OF MURDER,
and to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to pay the heirs of TIOZON, jointly and severally,
the amount of P50,000 as indemnity and P1,247,400 as compensatory damages and to pay the costs.
o Only CORSALES appealed. He raises the following Assignment of Errors:
§ Court erred in giving faith and credence to the incredulous testimony of the prosecution
witnesses
§ Court erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
§ Court erred in finding that there was conspiracy in the case at bar.

Sole Issue: Ruling:

- Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that the prosecution had - No.
established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding:
- The trial court principally based its conviction of Rom and appellant on the testimony of prosecution witness
Danilo Ancla; where Eyewitness Danilo testifies that:
o August 4, 1996, Danilo went to the house of CORSALES after he was told by Arturo Tiozon (Roy’s
father) that the latter was fetched by ROM, whom he has known for 2 years, for a DRINKING
SESSION;
o Before reaching the house of CORSALES of about 10-12 meters, he saw a commotion between the
three, where CORSALES was holding a Batangas knife, ROM was holding a bolo and TIOZON pleading
for mercy while CORSALES and ROM were ganging up on him.
o On the same day, ANCLA, told Arturo Tiozon what he saw, and that he volunteered himself to be a
witness.
- Appellant’s appeal is totally bereft of merit
o Tried to impress to us that ANCLA’s testimony was inconsistent; It must be noted that the house of
Rom and appellant were only 1½ to 2 meters away from each other.
 o Insisted that the totality of ANCLA’s testimony points to ROM as the lone assailant of TIOZON; but
through a reproduction of ANCLA’s testimony evidently shows that it does not support appellant’s
claim and as to how the appellant could insist such contention is beyond this Court’s comprehension.
o Appellant claims that there is dearth of evidence proving conspiracy. We are not convinced.
§ ANCLA positively identified him in stabbing TIOZON with a knife together with ROM who
had a bolo.
§ Proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime would be
unnecessary to establish conspiracy when by their overt acts it could be deduced that they
conducted themselves in concert with one another in pursuing their unlawful design.
§ Rom’s and appellant’s acts in helping or assisting each other in simultaneously stabbing or
inflicting wounds on the victim are clear and indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to bring
about the death of the victim, thus they are equally liable for the crime.
- RTC did not err in finding the appellant and ROM guilty of MURDER. The aggravating circumstances of taking
advantage of superior strength qualified the act of TIOZON to MURDER under Art. 14, par. 15 and Art. 248,
par. 1 of the RPC.
- Abuse of superiority is attendant where two accused had cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage
from their combined superiority in strength and took turns in stabbing the victim who was unarmed.
- Thus RTC’s imposition of RECLUSION PERPETUA is CORRECT.

- WHEREFORE, RTC’s decision convicting Joey Corsales a.k.a. Antonio Corsanes together with Antonio Rom y
Sarsedo, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay, jointly and severally with accused Antonio Rom y Sardedo, the heirs of Roy Tiozon,
moral damages in the amount of P50,000, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 and to pay the costs is
AFFIRMED
- with the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Roy Tiozon the amount of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the actual damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
However, appellant together with accused Antonio Rom is ordered to pay jointly and severally, said heirs,
the amount of P75,900 for loss of earning capacity in lieu of the compensatory damages in the amount of
Pl,247,400 awarded by the trial court.

Notes:
- Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances.
o Par. 15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.
- Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
o Par. 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
- Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime.
Title: People vs Comadre Name of Digester: Martin

G.R. No. 153559 Date: June 8, 2004 Ponente:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Crim1/ Proposal and Conspiracy

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Antonio Comadre,
George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano
Doctrine (if applicable):
- Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for
conspiracy transcends companionship.
- Evidence; Witnesses; Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen
rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case,
the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.
Recit Summary: On the 6th of August 1995, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, availing of nighttime to afford impunity, and with the use of an explosive, did there and
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lob a hand grenade that landed and eventually exploded at the
roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly shrapnels that hit and killed Robert Agbanlog and
causing Jerry Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena
Agbanlog to suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies; thus, to the latter victims, the accused commenced
all the acts of execution that would have produced the crime of Multiple Murder as consequences thereof
but nevertheless did not produce them by reason of the timely and able medical and surgical interventions
of physicians, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs and the other victims. Only Antonio
Comadre was convicted because he was the one who threw the grenade without the assistance of George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano.
Facts:
- Around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,
Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were drinking on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father,
Jaime Agbanlog. As they were drinking, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking when they stopped in front of the house.
While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a hand grenade which fell on the roof
of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school. The explosion
ripped a hole on the roof of the house. The companions sustained shrapnel injuries but Robert
died due to the explosion according to Dr. Tirso de los Santos, who conducted the autopsy.
- Antonio Comadre claimed that was whith his family at the house of his father and denied
participation in the incident. George Comadre also denied participation as well as Danilo Lozano
and said that they did not have any misunderstandings with the victims. The family of Antonio
corroborated his claim that he was home and Josie, George’s wife, also testified that her husband
was home that night the incident happened.
- The court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and convicted the respondents the crime
murder with multiple attempted murder. Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn
statements of Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday in identifying the
perpetrators.
Issue/s: Ruling: WHEREFORE, in view
- Whether or not the trial court did not correctly and of all the foregoing, the appealed
judiciously interpret and appreciate the evidence and thus, decision of the Regional Trial
the miscarriage of justice was omnipresent. Court of San Jose City
AFFIRMED insofar as appellant
Antonio Comadre is convicted of
the complex crime of Murder
 with Multiple Attempted Murder
and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death. He is ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P18,000.00 as actual
damages and likewise ordered to
pay the surviving victims, Jaime
Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey
Camat and Gerry Bullanday,
P25,000.00 each as temperate
damages for the injuries they
sustained. Appellants Gregorio
Comadre and Danilo Lozano are
ACQUITTED for lack of
evidence to establish conspiracy,
and they are hereby ordered
immediately RELEASED from
confinement unless they are
lawfully held in custody for
another cause.
Holding:
- On August 7, the victims gave a Sinumpaang Salaysay at the hospital where they named Antonio
Comadre as a suspect. Twenty days later, they gave a more detailed account of the incident
identifying Antonio as the perpetrator together with George Comadre and Danilo Lozano. It was
established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and
Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the house and the moon
was bright.
- The facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement
or performed any act to assist him. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to
establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of
an illegal act is required. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a
conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio
Comadre must answer for the crime.
Title: People v. De Chavez Name of Digester: Parayno
G.R. No 188105 Date: April Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.:
23, 2010
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 3: 3. Proposal & Conspiracy
Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE Accused-appellants: MONICO DE CHAVEZ y PERLAS, JUANITO
PHILIPPINES MIÑON y RODRIGUEZ, and ASUNCION MERCADO y MARCIANO
Facts:
● This is a criminal case charging the accused-appellants Juanito Miñon y Rodriguez (Juanito) and Asuncion
Mercado y Marciano (Asuncion) together with Monico De Chavez y Perlas (Monico) and Joselito Lanip y
Genebraldo (Joselito) with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
● Paolo Earvin C. Alonzo (Paolo), the victim, testified that on August 14, 1998 at around 3pm he was at his
school in Los Banos when he was called to the door of his classroom where Asuncion, claiming to be
someone from Zamboanga, told him that his grandfather had met an accident and wanted to talk to him.
Paolo voluntarily went with the woman who brought him to a Ford Fiera where he saw three men, two of
whom were Monico and Juanito.
● After several hours of travel, he was brought inside a house. According to Corazon Marquez Alonzo
(Corazon), grandmother of the victim, Paolo’ captors demanded a ransom amounting to Php4 million. He
was held captive for 11 days until he was rescued at dawn on August 25, 1998.
● Chf. Insp. Cabula testified as to what happened from August 14, 1998 onwards on how the team
conducted surveillance activities, on how they tailed Joselito to a small house at 114 Brias St., Brgy. 2,
Nasugbu, Batangas where they rescued Paolo. On the other hand, the defense presented testimonies of 13
individuals.
● Both Asuncion and Juanito, corroborating each other, attested that they have been misled and
intimidated into committing the crime by Monico, who they similarly pointed to as the mastermind of the
kidnapping; and that they were merely prevailed upon and compelled to follow Monico under pain of
death Danilo de Mesa Valencia attested that he was together with Joselito and Monico in the afternoon of
August 22, 1998 when they attended a meeting of the Samahang Pantubig in Purok 3 of Brgy. Putho,
Tuntungin, Los Baños, Laguna. Sonny Atole testified playing cards with Monico at the store of Gloria
Penales the whole day of August 22, 1998 except the period when Monico went with Joselito and Danilo
de Mesa for the meeting.
● Gloria Penales, storekeeper, corroborated Sonny Atole, that Monico was playing with Sonny Atole in her
store practically the whole day of August 22, 1998. Defense counsel Atty. Conrado Manicad testified that
it was impossible for Chf. Insp. Cabula to tail Joselito from the latter’s residence to the residence of
Monico using 16 men, eight cars and four motorcycles for the width of the alley they have to traverse can
only accommodate one person at a time.
● RTC rendered a Decision, affirmed by the CA, convicting Monico, Asuncion and Juanito while acquitting
Joselito

Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether or not Juanito and Asuncion -No
conspired with Monico in the perpetration of -No
the crime; WHEREFORE, the appeal of Juanito Miñon y Rodriguez and
-Whether or not an exempting or justifying Asuncion Mercado y Marciano is hereby DENIED, and the
circumstance is present and applicable in assailed November 27, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
their favor. 02212 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Holding:
1. No. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof
required to establish the crime—proof beyond reasonable doubt. The ascertained facts of the kidnapping and the
proven demand for ransom of PhP 4M established beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. Monico’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Evidently, Juanito and
Asuncion acted in concert with Monico on a common plan to kidnap Paolo and hold him for ransom. Asuncion
lured Paolo to accompany her. Juanito blindfolded Paolo when they were transporting him to Nasugbu, Batangas.
Moreover, for 11 days, Juanito and Asuncion guarded Paolo inside the small house at 114 Brias St., Brgy. 2,
Nasugbu, Batangas. Foregoing facts taken together, without a doubt, shows conspiracy between Monico, Juanito
and Asuncion in committing kidnapping for ransom.

2. No. Their testimonies and protestations, they were only compelled by threat of bodily harm by
Monico is not proof of an exempting or justifying circumstance. Firstly, no other corroborative
evidence was shown to prove the existence of either circumstance. Secondly, appellants have not
shown that the house where they kept Paolo was well guarded or that an armed person was
posted therein aside from their mere testimony that the people outside the house with Monico. This belies their
theory of compulsion by an exempting circumstance either of “irresistible force” or “uncontrollable fear” under
Art. 12, par. 5 and 6 of the RPC sufficient to exculpate them. If they indeed labored under such compulsion, there
was nothing keeping them from running to the authorities or escaping with Paolo; but they did not. A review of
the records would indicate that neither Monico nor Joselito was constantly guarding the house. Moreover,
during the PAOCTF rescue operation at dawn of August 25, 1998, only Juanito and Asuncion were guarding Paolo
in the house in Nasugbu, Batangas. The lack of the alleged compulsion is thus clear, and that Asuncion and
Juanito indeed actively participated in the commission of the crime charged.
54.
Title: Ronquillo v. People Name of Digester: ALCARAZ

G.R. No. 181430 Date: March 9, 2010 Ponente: Carpio-Morales, j.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Proposal and Conspiracy

Petitioner: Felipe Ronquillo y Guillermo Respondent: People of the Philippines

and Gilbert Torres y Natalia

Doctrine (if applicable): conspiracy presupposes a community of criminal intent while invocation of justifying
circumstances presupposes lack of criminal intent such that there is no crime and no criminal to speak of.

Recit Summary: Felipe Ronquillo got into a fight with his cousin Edgar Ronquillo. The two were boxing each
other when Edgar fell down, and when Felipe tried to take advantage of this, Edgar stabbed Felipe on the thigh.
Gilbert Torres then joined in the fight and hit Edgar at the back of the head with a shovel. When Edgar was
unconscious, Felipe kept on hitting him on different parts of the body which led to Edgar Ronquillo’s death.

Facts:
· Felipe Ronquillo got into a fight with his cousin Edgar Ronquillo.

· The two were boxing each other when Edgar fell down, and when Felipe tried to take advantage of this,
Edgar stabbed Felipe on the thigh.

· Gilbert Torres then joined in the fight and hit Edgar at the back of the head with a shovel.

· When Edgar was unconscious, Felipe kept on hitting him on different parts of the body which led to Edgar
Ronquillo’s death.

· The witness to the crime mentioned that Felipe was the one who kicked Edgar so hard that he fell down.

· It was established also that Felipe had some ill will towards Edgar for calling the former’s father a witch

· When the accused were questioned they mentioned that they were just acting in self defense.

Issue/s: Ruling:
Whether or not it was established there was conspiracy in No.
the killing of Edgar Ronquillo.

Holding:
· Petitioners contend that there was unlawful aggression towards the victim but based on the witness, it was
the petitioner who kicked the victim so hard that led to the stabbing of the petitioner’s thigh.

· It was also mentioned that when the victim tried to go away from the place, the petitioner followed him and
then Torres hit him at the back of the head with a shovel.

· Unlawful aggression must be established when there is an actual and imminent peril. Therefore the self-
defense is deemed unnecessary as a defense.

· The court stated lastly that no conspiracy was established because the two petitioners inflicted serious
wounds which led to the death of the victim therefore making them co-principals.
55.
Title: Intod v. CA Name of Digester: Nieto
G.R. No 103119 Date: October 21, 1992 Ponente: CAMPOS, Jr. J.:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law I / Table 3: 4. Impossible Crimes

Petitioner: Sulpicio Intod Respondent: Honorable Court of Appeals

Doctrine (if applicable):

An offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by
its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility v. Physical impossibility see Holding.
Facts:
• Sometime in February 1949, Intod and his companions asked Mandaya to accompany him in killing a certain
Bernardina Palangpangan because of a land dispute between them.
• Because of the threat in his life, he accompanied Intod’s group and pointed to them the location of Palangpangan’s
room. At that instant, the group fired several gunshots to Palangpangan’s room.
• However, unknown to the accused, Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-
in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
• The Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
• Petitioner seeks the modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the
facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.

Issue/s: Ruling:
-Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime -Yes.
Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs.
Holding:
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus, legal
impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:

1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of
another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in
reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because of the absence of Palangpangan
was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as
an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies. Hence, accused must
only be liable for the commission of an impossible crime.

In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not
merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.
56.
Title: People vs Lamahang Name of Digester: Padillo
G.R. No. 43540 Date: August 3, 1935 Ponente: Recto, J

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 4: Stage of Execution: 1. Attempt

Petitioner: People of the Philippine Islands Respondent: Aurelio Lamahang
Recit Summary:
● Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of CFI of Iloilo, finding him guilty of
attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years of prision correccional. SC rules the sentence
appealed from is revoked and the accused is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by
means of force.

Facts:
● At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing was patrolling the streets of Ilolo and caught
the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. The
owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded
in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up and
instantly arrested him.

● The Fiscal of Iloilo and trial judge declared Lamahang constituting an attempted robbery

Issue/s: Ruling:
● W/N Petitioner is guilty of attempted robbery ● No. SCrules that the sentence appeal from is
revoked and accused is hereby held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by
means of force

Holding:
● It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that whcih has a
logical relation to the particular, concrete offense. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense is
not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.

● There is no doubt that the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu’s store by means of violence, passing
through the opening, in order to commit an offense, which the timely arrival of the policeman, did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. It is necessary to establish an unavoidable connection.

● It is necessary to prove that the said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, will logically and necesasrily ripen into a concrete offense.

● In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession for the
purpose of gain. In the instant case there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred.
57. People vs Dio Name of Digester: Fred Bucu

G.R. No. L-36461 Date: June 29, 1984 Ponente:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 4: Stage of Execution: 1. Attempt

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Hernando Dio
Doctrine: RPC Art. 297- “When by reason or on occasion of an ATTEMPTED or FRUSTRATED robbery a homicide
is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.”
Recit Summary:
• Hernando Dio, the appellant and his companion who is still at large, is responsible for the killing of Crispulo
Alega, with the original attempt of robbing the victim of his “Seiko” watch but failing to do so. The killing of
Crispulo may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery,
which however was not consummated because of the resistance offered by the deceased. Since there was
no robbery consummated, the Supreme Court then decides that the appellant is guilty of the special
complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide, under the provision of Art. 297 of the RPC, sentencing
him a penalty of prision mayor to reclusion temporal, and NOT death penalty as ordered by the trial court.
Facts:
• At about noontime Crispulo Alega fetch his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti. They proceeded to the Pasay City
Public Market. As they were going up the stairs leading to the Teresa and Sons Restaurant, Remedios, who
was about an arms-length ahead of Crispulo suddenly heard the dropping of her folders and other things,
being carried by Crispulo.
• When she looked back, she saw a man — later Identified as Danilo Tobias but still at large — twisting the
neck of Crispulo, while the appellant, Hernando Dio, was holding his (Crispulo's) two hands. The appellant
and his companion tried to divest Crispulo of his "Seiko" wrist watch, but Crispulo resisted their attempt
and fought the robbers.
• At this juncture, the man who was twisting the neck of Crispulo stabbed the latter on the left side of his
chest. Crispulo ran down the stairs followed by Remedies who shouted for help. When he reached the front
of the Pasay Commercial Bank he fell down and expired. At the time of his death, the "Seiko" watch was
strapped to his wrist.
• The trial court sentenced Hernando Dio, appellant, the penalty of death. The trial court convicted
defendant- appellant of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized
under art. 294, par. 1, of the revised penal code which is now being contested since the watch was never
taken from the deceased.
Issue/s: Ruling:
• Whether or not the crime of robbery was not • Judgement of trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant
consummated. is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of attempted robbery with
homicide. Appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of PRISON MAYOR to
RECLUSION TEMPORAL.
Holding:
• The evidence adduced show that the appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their criminal
venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery.
Indeed, as adverted to earlier, when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his
wrist.
• The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan to carry
out the robbery, which however was not consummated because of the resistance offered by the deceased.
• Consequently, this case would properly come under the provision of Art. 297 of the RPC which reads:
“When by reason or on occasion of an ATTEMPTED or FRUSTRATED robbery a homicide is committed, the
person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.”
58. Name of Digester: Barcelon
Title: People v. Trinidad
G.R. No 79123–25. Date: January 9, 1989. Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: CRIM 1/ Attempt

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: EMELIANO TRINIDAD

Doctrine (if applicable) There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own voluntarily desistance.
Recit Summary: A fish dealer and his two helpers were driving to Davao to sell their fish when accused hitchhiked
with them. Ricardo Tan, one of the helpers, was driving at the time when he heard two gunshots and saw the fish
dealer and the other helper dead.Tan tried to get away but he was shot in the thigh by the accused. Accused is
convicted of 2 counts of murder and frustrated murder.

Facts:
• Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His two helpers are Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa
• The three were on their way to Davao to sell their fish when Trinidad, a member of the integrated national
police, asked if he could ride with them since he was going to Agusan del Norte.
• While driving the vehicle, Tan was told by Trinidad to drive slowly because the place they were driving at
was dangerous territory.
• Tan suddenly heard a gunshot. Laroa was already dead and he saw Trinidad fire another bullet and this
killed Soriano.
• Fearing for his life, Tan got off the vehicle and rode a jeepney. To his horror, Trinidad followed him and
also rode the jeepney. Scared, he got off the jeepney but Trinidad fired two shots at him which hit Tan in
the thigh
• Fortunately, a constabulary saw Tan and helped him
• Aside from the two counts of murder, Trinidad was also convicted by the RTC of frustrated murder
because he shot Tan.

Issue/s: Ruling:
- Was the court correct in convicting Tan of Frustarted - No
Murder?

Holding:
• TRINIDAD can only be convicted of Attempted Murder. TRINIDAD had commenced the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which
TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.
• Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on
the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death
59.
Title: People v. Campuhan Name of Digester: Geronilla
G.R. No. 129433 Date: March 30, 2000 Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Stage of Execution: Giving Rise to Liability – Attempt

Plaintiff-Appelle: People of the Philippines Accused-Appellant: Primo Campuhan y Bello

Doctrine (if applicable):

• Article 6, in relation to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident than
his own spontaneous desistance.
• All the elements of attempted rape – and only of attempted rape – are present in the instant case,
hence the accused should be punished only for it.
Facts:
• Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four-year-old Crysthel Pamintuan.
• Campuhan was caught by the child‘s mother on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house.
• Campuhan, helper of Corazon‘s brother was allegedly kneeling in front of the child with both
their pants down and the child was crying ― “ayoko, ayoko!” while Primo forced his penis into
child‘s vagina.
Issue/s: Disposition:
Whether or not the crime perpetuated was WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo
statutory rape. finding accused PRIMO “SONNY” CAMPUHAN
Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and
sentencing him to death and to pay damages is
MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs
de oficio.
Holding:
• No. Modified to attempted rape
a. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape.
Mere touching of external genitalia considered when it’s an essential part of penetration not
just touching in ordinary sense (People v. Orita). Labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated (People v. Escober)
b. Attempted – no penetration or didn’t reach labia/mere grazing of surface
c. Failed to prove that penetration occurred. Mother‘s testimony questionable with regards to
her position relative to Primo and child. They failed to establish how she could have seen actual
contact in her position
d. Man’s instinct is to run when caught. Primo could not have stayed or to satisfy his lust even
after seeing Corazon
e. Child denied penetration occurred
• People v. Villamor – consummation even when penetration doubted: pains felt, discoloration of
inner lips of vagina or red labia minora or hymenal tags not visible.
• Now seen in case, Medico legal officer, though penetration not needed to prove contact, no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact. Hymen intact.
60.
Title: People of the Philippines v Federico Lopez @ Name of Digester: Celina Gonzales
Amboy Lopez
G.R. No. 119380 Date: August 18, 1999 Ponente: MENDOZA, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law 1/Stage of Execution: Attempt

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellee: Federico Lopez

Facts:
• Federico Lopez, together with John Doe (his identity has not yet been established) shot Rogelio Seldera and
Rodolfo Padapat which caused their death and wound Mario Seldera.
• Mario and Rogelio Seldera together with Rodolfo Padapat worked in a Riceland in Pangasinan. They were
hired to bundle the palay stalks which have been cut. At around 9:00 PM, they started to walk home taking
a trail alongside the Banila River. As they reached a sloping portion in the trail, Federico Lopez appeared
armed with a shotgun together with an unarmed companion. Lopez fireed at the three who slumped forward
faced down. His companion went near the bodies of the victims and rolled them over his foot. Afterwards,
they left. Mario was not killed in the incident, although he was injured in the back. As soon as Lopez and his
companion left, he walked to his uncle’s house and reported the matter. Mario positively identified Lopez as
the assailant, and was able to recognize the type and colors of his clothes since the moon was shining. He
knew Lopez well because the latter frequented their house to play cards with his father.
• Lopez’ claim was alibi. He claimed that he was in his uncle’s house in another barangay of Uminga,
Pangasinan. He had a round of drinks with his friends. At 11:00 PM, he went home. He claimed that it was
dark that night, and that they used a lamp for illumination. He also stated that he did not have a previous
quarrel with any of the victims nor with Mario. He also stated that he has not been to Rogelio’s house.
• The trial court ruled that Lopez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder with Frustrated Murder
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Did Lopez commit frustrated homicide against Mario 1. NO. Lopez only committed attempted murder,
Saldera? not frustrated homicide.

Holding:
• The lower court erred in convicting Lopez of frustrated homicide for the injuries inflicted on Mario. Although
it correctly appreciated the intent to kill, which can be inferred from the weapon used, the proximity of the
assailants, and the location of the injuries, it should have appreciated treachery.
• The injuries sustained by Mario Seldera were life-threatening. His injuries were certified to heal in seven
days, and he was not confined in the hospital. In addition, he no longer needed further medical attention
after his X-Ray examination.
61.
Title: People v. Lizada Name of Digester: YDP
G.R. No. 143468 Date: July 24, 2003 Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal/Stage of Execution: Attempt

Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Freedie Lizada

Doctrine:
Elements of attempted felony:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.

Facts:
• Rose Orillosa has three children (Analia, Jepsy, and Rossel- all minors) and is separated from her husband.
Rose went to Manila, with her children, where she met Freedie Lizada, the accused. Rose and Freddie lived
together with Rose’ children. While Rose was away, Freedie would allegedly finger Analia and proceeded to
forcibly put his penis in Analia’s vagina. In one instance, Rosse, Analia’s brother, saw Freedie touching her
sister’s genitals but didn’t see Freedie inserting his penis. Freedie was not able to continue because he found
out that Rossel was watching then proceeded to scold Rossel.
• During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused private complainant two times a
week. One day, while Analia was tending the video shop that they owned, Freedie ordered Analia to go to her
room. Analia didn’t follow until her Mother arrived. Analia was scolded then said “Ayokono, ayoko na”. Analia
and her Mother went out. Rose asked Analia what she meant. Analia told her Mother what Freedie has been
dong to her.
• The two proceeded to the police district and Analia submitted herself to a genitalia examination. The
conclusions of the genitalia examination showed that there was no sign of extragenital physical injuries, and
that the hymen was intact and its orifice is small as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized
adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury.
• Analia said that she was sexually abused and executed a “Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla” and charged
accused-appellant with rape.
• Accused defended himself and said that he loved the children and took them as his own. According to him,
Rose was just mad at him because his relatives would always visit and because he doesn’t have a job. He said
that Rose just put words in her children’s mouth.
• The Regional Trial Court of Manila, found accuses-appellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of four(4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him the on him the death penalty for each count.
• The accused assailed the decision of the Court a quo.
Ø Accused argued that the trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution and was not able to explain how the Court arrived to its decision. He said that the trial
court failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ø He also argued that there was not enough evidence to convict him. He further averred that the
medical findings were in contradiction to the crimes charged to him.
Issue/s: Ruling:
W/N Freedie Lizada is guilty beyond reasonable • Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is
doubt of four(4) counts of qualified rape. hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple rape
• Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is
hereby found guilty of attempted rape
• Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393,
accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape
Holding:
On the argument that the Trial Court failed to comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
• The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the decision of the
trial court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the
disposition of the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the
records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court.
• According to the Court, by the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any
material element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence, the
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and
hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

On the argument that medical findings were in contradiction to the crimes charged to him:
• The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The barefaced fact that private
complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her having been repeatedly sexually abused by
accused-appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible that the penetration of the
male organ went only as deep as her labia. Even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or
the mere entry of the penis into the aperture constitutes consummated rape.
• It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element
of the crime. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
• The Court agrees with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts (CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-
171392 and 99-171393) of simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The evidence on record shows that accused-
appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of private complainant. Under the given law, the
penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay for civil indemnity and moral
damages.

• As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99- 171391, accused-appellant avers that he is not
criminally liable of rape. The Court agrees with the accused. In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there
was no introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the
vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape.
• But the Court believes that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The accused intended to have carnal knowledge of private complainant. He had commenced the
execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. And his
desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected
arrival of Rossel.
• Accused was meted an indeterminate penalty of from six years of prison correctional in its maximum period,
as minimum to ten years of prison mayor in its medium period, as maximum and was ordered to pay for
moral damages.
62.
People v. Campuhan, Supra Name of Digester: Jay Daniel T. Morales
G.R. No. 129433 Date: March 30, 2000 Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Responsible and Conduct Punished – Stages of Execution Giving Rise to Liability
(Frustration)
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Accused-Appellant: Primo Campuhan Y Bello, accused-
appellant

Doctrine (if applicable): RPC, Art. 6 – “A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpretator.”
Facts:
● On April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the
ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo
Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.
● Then, she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand.
● Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows
and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out
and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within
their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who
detained.
● However, physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel‘s hymen was intact.
● Campuhan testified that Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly
pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
● But the RTC charged Campuhan guilty with statutory rape, which sentenced him to the extreme penalty
of death.
● Thus, this case is subject to automatic review.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1.) Whether or not the crime committed by the 1. No
accused Campuhan was a consummated statutory
rape? WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding
accused PRIMO SONNY CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of
statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay
damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of
ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Holding:
• The court cited People v. De la Peña in which labia majora must be entered first in order for rape to be
consummated.
• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible and that he can easily be seen
given that Crysthel’s younger sister was also there in the room where Primo did his act against her.
• The categorical statement made by Crysthel in denying penetration only shows that her vocabulary is
underdeveloped yet.
• Moreover, Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had
yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
 • Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ," but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the drawbridge."
• The possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that
she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that she did not feel any intense pain
but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko,
aray ko!
• Therefore, under art. 6, in relation to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in
the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it. No medical basis to hold that there was
sexual contact between the accused and the victim.
Notes: In the case of People v. Orita, the court did away with frustrated murder in the stage of execution in the
statutory rape in which only attempted and consummated rape were the ones allowed to remain in the statute
books.
Title: UNITED STATES vs. ADIAO Name of Digester:

G.R. No. 13785 Date: October 8, 1918 Ponente: MALCOLM, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Consummation

Petitioner: THE UNITED STATES Respondent: TOMAS ADIAO

Facts:
• The defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt, from the baggage of a
Japanese named T. Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found
by other customs employees.

Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether or not the crime committed by Tomas Adiao - Judgment is reversed and the defendant and
be classified as frustrated theft or consummated theft? appellant is sentenced to three months and one day of
arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances against
him. The merchandise in question, attached to the
record as Exhibit A, shall be returned to the lawful
owner, T. Murakami. So ordered.
Holding:
- Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime cannot properly be classified as frustrated,
as this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the offender performed all of the acts
of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the felony, he is guilty of the consummated crime of
theft. The fact that the defendant was under observation during the entire transaction and that he was
unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed
crime of theft are present.
64. People vs. Hernandez Name of Digester: BIANCA

G.R. No. 23916 Date: October 14, 1925 Ponente: Ostrand, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Stage of Execution: Consummation

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Domingo Hernandez

Recit Summary:
A 70-year old man had carnal knowledge of a 9-year old but the trial court only convicted him of frustrated rape
because the hymen of the girl was still in tact. Supreme court says that, no, there was consummation of the crime
of rape becuase it has been held in numerous cases that any penetration, whether or not reaching the hymen, is
sufficent to constitute the crime. It is enough if the woman’s body is entered.

Facts:
Defendant Hernandez is accused of raping 12-year old Conrada Jocson, intimidating and forcing her with a knife. He
held the knife so she could not accede to his wish. The accused is the husband of the grandmother of Jocson. Jocson
and Hernandez lives in the same house. Hernandez admits what he did but says that he was intoxicated and did not
know what he was doing. Witnesses, however, stated that he did not show any signs of intoxication during or after
the crime.

The trial court only convicted him of frustrated rape and sentenced him to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor.

Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether or not there was a consummation of the crime 1. Yes.

Holding:
1. Judgment appealed from is modified. The defendant is then guilty of consummated crime of rape and, the
penalty imposed is increased to 17 years, 4 month and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law.
65. People v. Eriñia Name of Digester: Khaila Palabrica

G.R. No. 26298 Date: January 20, 1927 Ponente: Ostrand, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 4: Stage of Execution: 3. Consummation

Petitioner: The People of the Philippine Islands Respondent: Julian Eriñia y Vinolla

Recit Summary: The defendant is found guilty of consummated rape by CFI. Defendant files an appeal, the Court finds
that the defendant is only guilty of frustrated rape, instead of consummated rape, on the ground that there was no
conclusive evidence of the penetration of the child’s genital organ. Thus, Court modifies the penalty imposed to the
defendant of sentencing him to suffer 12 YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR instead of 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND 1 DAY of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL.

Facts:

- Appeal from the judgement of the CFI.

- Defendant is guilty of consummated rape and sentencing him to suffer 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
- The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old, the evidence is conclusive that the defendant
endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded in
penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention of the mother and the sister of the
child.
- The physician who checked the genital organ of the child noted that there was a slight inflammation of the
exterior parts of the organ, indicating that there was an effort in entering the vagina.
- The mother of the child testified that the child’s genital organ was covered with a sticky substance.

Issue/s: Ruling:

- Whether there is conclusive evidence of - No.

penetration of the genital organ of the offended
party, for the defendant to be guilty of
consummated rape.

Holding:

- The Court does not consider the discovery of the sticky substance on the genital organ of the child as conclusive
evidence of penetration.
o Complete penetration is also not an essential requirement to the commission of the crime; it is sufficient
if there is a penetration of the labia
- The Court stated that since the child was of such tender age, penetration would have been impossible, that the
crime of rape was impossible of consummation, and that the offense committed should be treated only as
abusos deshonestos (criminal sexual contact)
- In the case of Kenney v. State, where the offended party was a child (3 years old and 8 months), the physicians’
testimonies state that the labia of the privates of a child of that age can be entered by a man’s male organ to the
hymen and the defendant was found guilty of the CONSUMMATED CRIME OF RAPE.
o In the case at bar, there being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the child,
the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape
o But in view of the fact that he was living in the house of the parents of the child as their guest, the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be imposed in
its max. degree
- The JUDGEMENT appealed is MODIFIED and the defendant-appellant is hereby found GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF FRUSTRATED RAPE and is sentenced to suffer 12 YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances.

Dissenting Opinion: Malcolm, J.

- In my opinion, the accused is guilty of raping a child 3 years and 11 months of age. It is consummated rape
according to the evidence of record, the findings of the trial judge, and our decisions.
- In the Kenney case, the penalty was death, and here for this horrible crime, should be placed in the maximum
degree, or 17 years, 4 months and 1-day imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court.
- Accordingly, my vote is for affirmance of the judgment.
66. Name of Digester: Jul Yann A. Parayno
Title: PEOPLE VS VELASCO
G.R. No L-31922 Date: October 29, 1976 Ponente: CRUZ, J.:
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Table 4: Stage of Execution: 3. Consummation
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: RICARDO VELASCO Y ABENOJAR

Facts:
• As the offended party in this case was only five years of age when the offense of rape for which the
accused was indicted and convicted took place, the only question before this Court on appeal is
whether there was proof sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• 5:30 in the afternoon of the 2nd day of November, 1967, the offended party, Estelita Lopez, a child, five
years old, accompanied by her cousin Nenita Lopez, another child, four years old, were at the North
Cemetery, Manila.
• The defendant, Ricardo Velasco y Abenojar, called them, gave Nenita a five-centavo coin and asked her
to buy cigarettes for him. After she left, the accused held Estelita by the hand and brought her to an
alley.
• Once in a hidden place between the tombs he kissed her on the lips, took off her panties and placed
himself on top of the girl while she was lying down on the ground face up and tried to insert his sexual
organ into that of the victim.
• Arsenio Perez who saw the accused earlier holding the hand of the victim, later saw the accused on top
of the girl making upward and downward movements with his pants and drawers lowered.
• He tried to seek for help and upon seeing Jose Castro on the 24th Street told him, ‘Mang Pepe, Mang
Pepe, the daughter of Mang Pidiong is being raped’
• Once there in the street, Castro suddenly twisted one of his arms. Several people came and gave the
defendant fist blows while Castro was taking him to the office of the North Cemetery and Pedro Zapata
was holding the girl and leading her to the same office.
• Detective Corporal Senen testified that the defendant verbally admitted to him while in the hospital
that he raped the girl, but that the defendant appeared to be drunk at the time.
• Precinct 2 operatives took statements from Estelita, Jose Castro, and Arsenio Perez
• Report by Dr. David S. Cabreira as 8:10 pm
“(1) Fresh laceration of the hymen at six o’clock position; (2) Vaginal opening is painful and sensitive to
touch.”

Issue/s: Ruling:
- Is the accused guilty of the crime consummated rape -WHEREFORE, the decision of February 18, 1970 of
the lower court finding the accused Ricardo
Velasco y Abenojar guilty of the crime of
consummated rape and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua is hereby affirmed. Costs
against appellant.
Decision affirmed.
Holding:
• The medical examination revealed that the offended party was indeed raped.
• The findings showed “fresh laceration on the hymen at six o’clock position,” with „the vaginal opening
painful and sensitive to touch.”
• The fact is latter to an alley, kissed her on the lips, divested her of her intimate garments, and placed
himself on top of her. It could be, as contended by defense counsel, that the actual act of intercourse
was not fully seen by the two eyewitnesses to the occurrence.
• It is, however, equally undisputed that the cries from the horrified onlookers resulted in the accused
being mauled by third parties, who could not repress their sense of indignation and outrage, no doubt
heightened by the sight of the young girl bleeding as a result of what was done to her.
• In the police investigation conducted the same evening, he was identified as the author of the offense
by the young girl. They have been demonstrated beyond doubt.
Notes:
-Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code insofar as relevant reads. “When and how rape committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using
force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the
woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next
preceding paragraphs shall be present.”
-The Supreme Court may resolve actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for
further proceedings, as (a) where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case; or (b)
where public interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c)
when the trial court had already received all the evidence presented by both parties. (Republic vs. Central
Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
-The Supreme Court may make its own findings of fact independently of those made by the lower courts,
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; when the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is a grave abuse of discretion; when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of fact are conflicting and when the
lower court in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of litigants. (Garcia vs.Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 22; Roque vs. Buan, 21 SCRA 642).
67. People vs. Mendoza Pascual, Dawn

G.R. Nos. 152589 and 152758 October 24, 2003 Ponente: PER CURIAM

Criminal Law 1 / Stage of execution - Consummation

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Antonio Mendoza y Butones

Doctrine: To insist on this inference of carnal knowledge on the strength solely of pain in the vagina effectively
emasculates the critical distinction between consummated and attempted rape that we laid down in People v.
Campuhan, i.e., the touching of the female organ to constitute consummated rape should be construed in relation
to the entry by the penis, however slight, into the labia majora.
Recit Summary: Maricar alleges that he was raped by her father, Antonio, while she was unconscious. Her
testimony merely states that she doesn’t remember what exactly happened but she woke up with dried blood in her
thighs and pain in her vagina. Lower court ruled that Antonio is guilty of consummated incestuous rape. Antonio
appeals to change the ruling. The Court ruled that the testimony by Maricar is not enough to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the rape was consummated; the ruling is then modified from consummated to attempted
rape instead.

Facts: Antonio Mendoza has been convicted of consummated incestuous rape of his minor 14 year old daughter,
Maricar Mendoza. Maricar alleged that one night she was raped by her father when he came into her room, already
naked, and proceeded to lie on top of her. She would resist and try her best to fight back, but her father would box
her in the stomach that would make her unconscious. When Maricar woke up, she just saw blood dried up in her
thighs and feeling pain in her vagina.

In school, the principal would notice that Maricar was already showing (pregnant) The mother would be asked to
come in, and where Maricar would finally confess that she has been raped by her father. On the same day they
would have the government doctor examine her where they would find out that she was already 4 months pregnant.
Maricar would continue to explain that she had been repeatedly sexually abused by her father from March 1998 to
September 1999. The mother and daughter would then file a case against Antonio. In the RTC Antonio was
convicted of consummated incestuous rape. He now comes before the court to petition and insist on his innocence,
as he claims that he was convicted not by beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue/s: Whether or not the testimonies of Maricar about her Ruling: NO. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of
being raped while unconscious, can prove beyond reasonable the lower court is MODIFIED. Antonio Mendoza is
doubt that the rape was consummated. found guilty of ATTEMPTED rape.

Holding: The RTC gravely erred with convicting Antonio of consummated incestuous rape without proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Neither could we associate the pain in her vagina with consummated carnal knowledge. Several
alternative explanations for the pain, such as disease or exertion of varied forms of manipulation, can be reasonably
imagined and propounded, besides the essential fact of sexual congress. “Pain” is subjective and so easy to feign
unless the specific cause is pinpointed which, in this case, should be an insertion of the penis into the vagina. To
insist on this inference of carnal knowledge on the strength solely of pain in the vagina effectively emasculates the
critical distinction between consummated and attempted rape that we laid down in People v. Campuhan, i.e., the
touching of the female organ to constitute consummated rape should be construed in relation to the entry by the
penis, however slight, into the labia majora.