G.R. No. 118114. December 7, 1995.

TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and EDY DE LOS REYES, respondents.
Property; Ownership; An asserted right or claim to
ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to
give rise to ownership over the res—that right or title must
be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by
law; While title is the juridical justification, mode is the
actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over
a thing in question.—In the first place, an asserted right
or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising
from a juridical act, however justified, is not per
se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That
right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real
rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or
process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is
the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership
over a thing in question.
Same; Same; Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the
modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified
into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode and the
derivative mode.—Under Article 712 of the Civil Code,
the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified
into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e.,
through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or
intellectual creation) and the derivative mode(i.e.,
through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result
of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation,
assignment or mutuum).
Same; Same; Sales; Succession; “Contract of Sale” and
“Declara-tion of Heirship and Waiver of Rights,”
Distinguished.—In the case at bench, the trial court was
obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating
the same
_____________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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Acap vs. Court
of Appeals
with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a
price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other
hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights
operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate
and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial
settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a marked
difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver
of hereditary rights; A stranger to succession cannot
conclusively claim ownership over a lot on the sole basis
of a waiver document which does not recite the elements
of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative
mode of acquiring ownership.—Hence, there is a marked
difference between a sale of hereditary rights and
a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the
existence of a contract or deed of sale between the
parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or
intentional relinquishment of a known right with
knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish
it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to
the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim
ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the
waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode
of acquiring ownership.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Words and
Phrases; A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice
of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of
which is yet to be established in court at some future
date.—A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not
however prove private respondent’s ownership over the
tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a
notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the
validity of which is yet to be established in court at some
future date, and is no better than a notice of lis
pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in
court.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a person’s right or
interest in a lot in question remains an adverse claim, the
same cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the
land.—It is to be noted that while the existence of said
adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence
whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between
Cosme Pido’s heirs and private respondent transferring
the rights of Pido’s heirs to
32
32 SUPREME
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 the land in favor of private respondent. Private
respondent’s right or interest therefore in the tenanted
lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be
sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same
in private respondent’s name.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Francisco B. Cruz for petitioner.
Cerewarlito V. Quebrarfor private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals, 2nd Division,
1

in CA-G.R. No. 36177, which affirmed the

decision of the Regional Trial Court of
2

Himamaylan, Negros Occidental holding that

private respondent Edy de los Reyes had acquired
ownership of Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey
of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental based on a
document entitled “Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights,” and ordering the dispossession of
petitioner as leasehold tenant of the land for failure
to pay rentals.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey
of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced by
OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq.
meters. The title was issued and is registered in the
name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza
Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son
Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto
executed a duly notarized document entitled
“Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale”
in favor of Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established
that since 1960, petitioner Teodoro Acap had been
the tenant of a portion of
_____________
1 Penned by Purisima, J.,Chairman, with Isnani, J. and Ibay-
Somera, J., concurring.
2 Penned by Executive Judge Jose Aguirre, Jr.

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Acap vs. Court of
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the said land, covering an area of nine thousand five
hundred (9,500) square meters. When ownership
was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme
Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant
thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to
Pido and thereafter, upon Pido’s death, to his widow
Laurenciana.
The controversy began when Pido died intestate
and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs
executed a notarized document denominated as
“Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot
No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre,” wherein they
declared, to quote its pertinent portions, that:
“x x x Cosme Pido died in the Municipality of Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, he died intestate and without any
known debts and obligations which the said parcel of
land is (sic) held liable.
 That Cosme Pido was survived by his/her legitimate
heirs, namely: LAURENCIANA PIDO, wife, ELY,
ERVIN, ELMER, and ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO;
children;
That invoking the provision of Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, the above-mentioned heirs do hereby
declare unto [sic] ourselves the only heirs of the late
Cosme Pido and that we hereby adjudicate unto
ourselves the above-mentioned parcel of land in equal
shares. Now, therefore, We LAURENCIANA, ELY, 3

ELMER, ERVIN and ELECHOR all surnamed PIDO, do

hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and
participation over the said parcel of land in favor of EDY
DE LOS REYES, of legal age, (f)ilipino, married to
VIRGINIA DE LOS REYES, and resident of Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, Philippines. x x x” (Italics supplied)
4

The document was signed by all of Pido’s heirs.

Private respondent Edy de los Reyes did not sign
said document.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido’s
death, title to the property continued to be
registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses.
Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with
Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent
Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of
Deeds as part of a notice
______________
3 The RTC decision used the name Luzviminda. The CA used the
name Laudenciana.
4 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 14.

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of an adverse claim against the original certificate
of title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for
petitioner (Acap) to personally inform him that he
(Edy) had become the new owner of the land and
that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him
Private respondent further alleged that he and
petitioner entered into an oral lease agreement
wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of
palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, petitioner
allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983,
however, petitioner refused to pay any further lease
rentals on the land, prompting private respondent
to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental. The MAR invited petitioner to a
conference scheduled on 13 October 1983 Petitioner
did not attend the conference but sent his wife
instead to the conference During the meeting, an
officer of the Ministry informed Acap’s wife about
private respondent’s ownership of the said land but
she stated that she and her husband (Teodoro) did
not recognize private respondent’s claim of
ownership over the land.
On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years,
private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner, alleging
in the main that as his leasehold tenant, petitioner
refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental
of ten (10) cavans of palay despite repeated
demands.
During the trial before the court a quo, petitioner
reiterated his refusal to recognize private
respondent’s ownership over the subject land. He
averred that he continues to recognize Cosme Pido
as the owner of the said land, and having been a
registered tenant therein since 1960, he never
reneged on his rental obligations. When Pido died,
he continued to pay rentals to Pido’s widow. When
the latter left for abroad, she instructed him to stay
in the landholding and to pay the accumulated
rentals upon her demand or return from abroad.
Petitioner further claimed before the trial court
that he had no knowledge about any transfer or sale
of the lot to private respondent in 1981 and even the
following year after Laurenciana’s departure for
abroad. He denied having entered into a verbal
lease tenancy contract with private respondent and
that assuming that the said lot was indeed sold to
private respondent
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Acap vs. Court of
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without his knowledge, R.A. 3844, as amended,
grants him the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price. Petitioner also bewailed private
respondent’s ejectment action as a violation of his
right to security of tenure under P.D. 27.
 On 20 August 1991, the lower court rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Edy de los Reyes, and
against the defendant, Teodoro Acap, ordering the
following, to wit:
1. 1.Declaring forfeiture of defendant’s preferred right
to issuance of a Certificate of Land Transfer under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholdings;
2. 2.Ordering the defendant Teodoro Acap to deliver
possession of said farm to plaintiff, and;
3. 3.Ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, the sum of P1,000.00 as expenses of
litigation and the amount of P10,000.00 as actual
damages.” 5

In arriving at the above-mentioned judgment, the

trial court stated that the evidence had established
that the subject land was “sold” by the heirs of
Cosme Pido to private respondent. This is clear from
the following disquisitions contained in the court’s
six (6) page decision:
“There is no doubt that defendant is a registered tenant
of Cosme Pido. However, when the latter died their
tenancy relations changed since ownership of said land
was passed on to his heirs who, by executing a Deed of
Sale,which defendant admitted in his affidavit, likewise
passed on their ownership of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff
(private respondent). As owner hereof, plaintiff has the
right to demand payment of rental and the tenant is
obligated to pay rentals due from the time demand is
made. x x x6

xxx xxx xxx

 Certainly, the sale of the Pido family of Lot 1130 to
herein plaintiff does not of itself extinguish the
relationship. There was only a
_____________
5 Annex “D,” Petition; Rollo, p. 29.
6 Ibid.,p. 27.

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36 SUPREME
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Acap vs. Court of
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change of the personality of the lessor in the person of
herein plaintiff Edy de los Reyes who being the purchaser
or transferee, assumes the rights and obligations of the
former landowner to the tenant Teodoro Acap, herein
defendant.” 7

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of

Appeals, imputing error to the lower court when it
ruled that private respondent acquired ownership
of Lot No. 1130 and that he, as tenant, should pay
rentals to private respondent and that failing to pay
the same from 1983 to 1987, his right to a certificate
of land transfer under P.D. 27 was deemed forfeited.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioner’s
argument that the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights (Exhibit “D”), the document relied
upon by private respondent to prove his ownership
to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its
order dated 27 August 1990. The order indeed noted
that the document was not identified by Cosme
Pido’s heirs and was not registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Negros Occidental. According
to respondent court, however, since the Declaration
of Heirship and Waiver of Rights appears to have
been duly notarized, no further proof of its due
execution was necessary. Like the trial court,
respondent court was also convinced that the said
document stands as prima facie proof of appellee’s
(private respondent’s) ownership of the land in
dispute.
With respect to its non-registration, respondent
court noted that petitioner had actual knowledge of
the subject sale of the land in dispute to private
respondent because as early as 1983, he (petitioner)
already knew of private respondent’s claim over the
said land but which he thereafter denied, and that
in 1982, he (petitioner) actually paid rent to private
respondent. Otherwise stated, respondent court
considered this fact of rental payment in 1982 as
estoppel on petitioner’s part to thereafter refute
private respondent’s claim of ownership over the
said land. Under these circumstances, respondent
court ruled that indeed there was deliberate refusal
by petitioner to pay rent for a continued period of
five years that merited forfeiture of his otherwise
preferred right to the issuance of a certificate of
land transfer.
______________
7 Ibid.,p. 28.
37
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DECEMBER
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 Acap vs. Court of
Appeals
In the present petition, petitioner impugns the
decision of the Court of Appeals as not in accord
with the law and evidence when it rules that private
respondent acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130
through the aforementioned Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights.
Hence, the issues to be resolved presently are the
following:
1. 1.WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT
DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND WAIVER
OF RIGHTS IS A RECOGNIZED MODE OF
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT OVER THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
2. 2.WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID
DOCUMENT CAN BE CONSIDERED A DEED
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT OF THE LOT IN QUESTION.
Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court, in
its order dated 7 August 1990, explicitly excluded
the document marked as Exhibit “D” (Declaration of
Heirship, etc.) as private respondent’s evidence
because it was not registered with the Registry of
Deeds and was not identified by anyone of the heirs
of Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held
the same to be admissible, it being a notarized
document, hence, a prima facie proof of private
respondents’ ownership of the lot to which it refers.
 Petitioner points out that the Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights is not one of the
recognized modes of acquiring ownership under
Article 712 of the Civil Code. Neither can the same
be considered a deed of sale so as to transfer
ownership of the land to private respondent because
no consideration is stated in the contract (assuming
it is a contract or deed of sale).
Private respondent defends the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as in accord with the
evidence and the law. He posits that while it may
indeed be true that the trial court excluded his
Exhibit “D” which is the Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights as part of his evidence, the
trial court declared him nonetheless owner of the
subject lot based on other evidence adduced during
the trial, namely, the notice of adverse claim
(Exhibit “E”) duly registered by him with the
Registry of Deeds, which contains the questioned
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver
38
38 SUPREME
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Acap vs. Court of
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of Rights as an integral part thereof.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to
ownership or a real right over a thing arising from
a juridical act, however justified, is not per
se sufficient to give rise to ownership over
the res. That right or title must be completed by
fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence,
ownership and real rights are acquired only
pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is
the juridical justification, mode is the actual process
of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing
in question. 8

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of

acquiring ownership are generally classified into
two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e.,
through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or
intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e.,
through succession mortis causa ortradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter,
donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously
confused as to the nature and effect of the
Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights,
equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale.
They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership
of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
party to pay a price certain in money or its
equivalent.9

Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and

waiver of rights operates as a public instrument
when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the
intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left
by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It
is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the
heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 10
_____________
8 Reyes, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. II, p. 20.
9 Article 1458, Civil Code.

10 Paulmitos v. CA, G.R. No. 61584, Nov. 25, 1992, 215 SCRA 867,

868;Uberas v. CFI of Negros, G.R. No. 4248, October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA
145, 147; Abrasia v. Carian, G.R. No. 9510, October 31, 1957.
39
VOL. 251, 39
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Acap vs. Court of
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Hence, there is a marked difference between
a sale of hereditary rights and a waiverof
hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence
of a contract or deed of sale between the
parties. The second is, technically speaking, a
11

mode of extinction of ownership where there is an

abdication or intentional relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons
who are co-heirs in the succession. Private 12

respondent, being then a stranger to the succession

of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership
over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver
document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other
13 14

derivative mode of acquiring ownership. Quite

surprisingly, both the trial court and public
respondent Court of Appeals concluded that a “sale”
transpired between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private
respondent and that petitioner acquired actual
knowledge of said sale when he was summoned by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to discuss private
respondent’s claim over the lot in question. This
conclusion has no basis both in fact and in law.
On record, Exhibit “D,” which is the “Declaration
of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” was excluded by
the trial court in its order dated 27 August
1990 because the document was neither registered
with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the
heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no showing that
private respondent had the same document
attached to or made part of the record. What the
trial court admitted was Annex “E,” a notice of
adverse claim filed with the Registry of Deeds which
contained the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver
of rights and was annotated at the back of the
Original Certificate of Title to the land in question.
______________
11 See Aguirre v. Atienza, G.R. No. L-10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Mari v.
Bonilla, G.R. No. 852, March 19, 1949; Robles v. CA, G.R. No. L-
47494, 83 SCRA 181, 182, May 15, 1978.
12 See Borromeo Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23,

1987, 152 SCRA 171.

13 See note 10—supra.

14 Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., No. 16544, March

20, 1921.
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Acap vs. Court of
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A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not
however prove private respondent’s ownership over
the tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the
registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be
established in court at some future date, and is no
better than a notice of lis pendenswhich is a notice
of a case already pending in court.”15

It is to be noted that while the existence of said

adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence
whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed
between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private respondent
transferring the rights of Pido’s heirs to the land in
favor of private respondent. Private respondent’s
right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot
remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be
sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the
same in private respondent’s name.
Consequently, while the transaction between
Pido’s heirs and private respondent may be binding
on both parties, the right of petitioner as a
registered tenant to the land cannot be
perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of
private respondent’s ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.
Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the
subject land since 1960 and religiously paid lease
rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to be the
registered tenant of Cosme Pido and his family
(after Pido’s death), even if in 1982, private
respondent allegedly informed petitioner that he
had become the new owner of the land.
Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in
good faith, assumed such statement of private
respondent to be true and may have in fact
delivered 10 cavans of palay as annual rental for
1982 to private respondent. But in 1983, it is clear
that petitioner had misgivings over private
respondent’s claim of ownership over the said land
because in the October 1983 MAR conference, his
wife Laurenciana categorically denied all of private
respondent’s allegations. In fact, petitioner even
secured a certificate from the MAR dated 9 May
1988 to the effect that he
______________
15Somes v. Government of the Philippines, No. 42754, October 30,
1935, 62 Phil. 432.
41
VOL. 251, 41
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Acap vs. Court of
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continued to be the registered tenant of Cosme Pido
and not of private respondent. The reason is that
private respondent never registered the Declaration
of Heirship with Waiver of Rights with the Registry
of Deeds or with the MAR. Instead, he (private
respondent) sought to do indirectly what could not
be done directly, i.e., file a notice of adverse claim on
the said lot to establish ownership thereover.
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there
was no unjustified or deliberate refusal by
petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations
to the landowner/agricultural lessor which, in this
case, private respondent failed to establish in his
favor by clear and convincing evidence. 16
 Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his
preferred right to be issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer under P.D. 27 and to the possession of his
farmholdings should not be applied against
petitioners, since private respondent has not
established a cause of action for recovery of
possession against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby GRANTS the petition and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed
the decision of the RTC of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental dated 20 August 1991 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The private respondent’s complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner Acap is hereby DISMISSED for failure to
properly state a cause of action, without prejudice
to private respondent taking the proper legal steps
to establish the legal mode by which he claims to
have acquired ownership of the land in question.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr., Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted. Judgment set aside, complaint
for recovery of possession dismissed.
_______________
16See Laureto v. CA, G.R. No. 95838, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA
397;Cuno v. CA, G.R. L-62985, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 567.
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Laguna Lake
Development
Authority vs.
Court of Appeals
Notes.—The right to a person’s succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death and do
not vest in his heirs until such time. (Locsin vs.
Court of Appeals,206 SCRA 383 [1992])
In proceeding with the actual partition of the
properties mentioned in the deed of extrajudicial
partition, the parties are duty bound to abide by the
mutual waiver of rights agreed upon in the
document. (Divina vs. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA
597 [1993])
——o0o——