SPCMB Law Offices vs. CA

10/1/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 813

CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
____________________
G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016.*

SUBIDO PAGENTE CERTEZA MENDOZA AND BINAY
LAW OFFICES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity
as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and the ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, represented by its
Members, HON. AMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, HON. TERESITA J.
HERBOSA, Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and HON. EMMANUEL F. DOOC, Insurance
Commissioner of the Insurance Commission, respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.

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2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices
vs. Court of Appeals
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d8488f6268beadca2003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/90
Money Laundering; Anti-Money Laundering Act; As presently

worded, Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) has
three (3) elements: (1) ex parte application by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC); (2) determination of probable cause
by the Court of Appeals (CA); and (3) exception of court order in
cases involving unlawful activities defined in Section 3(i)(1), (2),
and (12).—The right to due process has two aspects: (1)
substantive which deals with the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of
the law; and (2) procedural which delves into the rules
government must follow before it deprives a person of its life,
liberty or property. As presently worded, Section 11 of the AMLA
has three elements: (1) ex parte application by the AMLC; (2)
determination of probable cause by the CA; and (3) exception of
court order in cases involving unlawful activities defined in
Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12).
Same; Same; Due Process; Section 11 of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act (AMLA) providing for ex parte application and
inquiry by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) into
certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive
due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at
that stage.—Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex
parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank
deposits and investments does not violate substantive due
process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at
that stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank
deposits or investments in question which brings these within
reach of the judicial process, specifically a determination that the
seizure violated due process. In fact, Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., 545
SCRA 384 (2008), delineates a bank inquiry order under Section
11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies’ effect
on the direct objects, i.e., the bank deposits and investments.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The grant of jurisdiction over cases
involving money laundering offenses is bestowed on the Regional
Trial Courts (RTCs) and the Sandiganbayan as the case may be.
—The grant of jurisdiction over cases involving money laundering
offences is bestowed on the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan as the case may be. In fact, Rule 5 of the IRR is
entitled Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases and
Money Laundering Investigation Procedures: Rule 5.a.
Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases.—The Regional
Trial Courts shall have

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 3


the jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those

committed by public officers and private persons who are in
conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money
Laundering Offenses.— The AMLC shall investigate: (1)
suspicious transactions; (2) covered transactions deemed
suspicious after an investigation conducted by the AMLC; (3)
money laundering activities; and (4) other violations of the AMLA,
as ammended.
Same; Same; Anti-Money Laundering Council; Jurisdiction;
Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) can we glean that the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the
actual preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or
conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Ombudsman.—Nowhere from the text of the law nor its
Implementing Rules and Regulations can we glean that the
AMLC exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the actual
preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or
conducted by the Department of Justice and the Ombudsman.
Again, we hark back to Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA
160 (2000), citing Ruperto v. Torres, where the Court had occasion
to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation: [Such a body] does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating facts and
making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test
of determining whether an administrative body is exercising
judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the
only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted
before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and
if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; That the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) does not exercise quasi-judicial powers and is
simply an investigatory body finds support in the Supreme Court’s
(SC’s) ruling in Shu v. Dee, 723 SCRA 512 (2014).—That the
AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial powers and is simply an
investigatory body finds support in our ruling in Shu v. Dee, 723
SCRA 512 (2014). In that case, petitioner Shu had filed a
complaint before the NBI


charging respondents therein with falsification of two (2)

deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company (Metrobank). After its investigation, the NBI
came up with a Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098
finding that the signatures of petitioner therein which appear on
the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample
signatures he submitted to the NBI. Ruling on the specific issue
raised by respondent therein that they had been denied due
process during the NBI investigation, we stressed that the
functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature.
Same; Same; Due Process; Section 11 of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act (AMLA), authorizing a bank inquiry court order,
cannot be said to violate Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza &
Binay Law Firm’s (SPCMB’s) constitutional right to procedural
due process.—Plainly, the AMLC’s investigation of money
laundering offenses and its determination of possible money
laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank
accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an
investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence,
Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order,
cannot be said to violate SPCMB’s constitutional right to
procedural due process.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) subjected Section 11 of
the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) to heightened scrutiny
and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to undertake an inquiry
into certain bank accounts or deposits.—We thus subjected
Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing
arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to
undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits.
Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank
inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state
policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of
Philippine bank accounts: (1) The AMLC is required to establish
probable cause as basis for its ex parte application for bank
inquiry order; (2) The CA, independent of the AMLC’s
demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an

unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense
under Section 4 of the AMLA; (3) A bank inquiry court order ex
parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court
order ex parte for the principal

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 5

account which court order ex parte for related accounts is

separately based on probable cause that such related account is
materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and (4)
The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal
account and the related accounts shall comply with the
requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.
The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination
into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and solely
based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular,
the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and
determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits
of such governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards
under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA’s denial of
SPCMB’s letter request for information concerning the purported
issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.
Same; Same; Eugenio already declared that Section 11, even
with the allowance of an ex parte application therefor, “is not a
search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct
object but not the seizure of persons or property.”—As regards
SPCMB’s contention that the bank inquiry order is in the nature
of a general warrant, Republic v. Eugenio, 545 SCRA 384 (2008),
already declared that Section 11, even with the allowance of an ex
parte application therefor, “is not a search warrant or warrant of
arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of
persons or property.” It bears repeating that the ‘‘bank inquiry
order” under Section 11 is a provisional remedy to aid the AMLC
in the enforcement of the AMLA.
Same; Same; Bank Inquiry Order; There is nothing in Section
11 nor the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act (AMLA) which prohibits the owner of the
bank account to ascertain from the Court of Appeals (CA), post
issuance of the bank inquiry order ex parte, if his account is indeed
the subject of an examination.—Although the bank inquiry order

ex-parte passes constitutional muster, there is nothing in Section
11 nor the implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA
which prohibits the owner of the bank account, as in his instance
SPCMB, to ascertain from the CA, post issuance of the bank
inquiry order ex parte, if his account is indeed the subject of an
examination. Emphasized by our discussion of the safeguards
under Section 11 preceding the issuance of such an order, we find
that there is nothing therein


which precludes the owner of the account from challenging

the basis for the issuance thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a
court or tribunal can only be considered tainted with grave abuse
of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—An
act of a court or tribunal can only be considered tainted with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be
qualified as “grave” must be so patent or gross as to constitute an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
or to act at all in contemplation of law. In this relation, case law
states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The degree of gravity, as above described, must be met. That the
propriety of the issuance of the bank inquiry order is a justiciable
issue brooks no argument. A justiciable controversy refers to an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
Same; Same; Same; This allowance to the owner of the bank
account to question the bank inquiry order is granted only after
issuance of the freeze order physically seizing the subject bank
account. It cannot be undertaken prior to the issuance of the freeze
order.—In enacting the amendment to Section II of the AMLC,
the legislature saw it fit to place requirements before a bank
inquiry order may be issued. We discussed these requirements as
basis for a valid exception to the general rule on absolute
confidentiality of bank accounts. However, these very safe guards

allow SPCMB, post issuance of the ex parte bank inquiry order,
legal bases to question the propriety of such issued order, if any.
To emphasize, this allowance to the owner of the bank account to
question the bank inquiry order is granted only after issuance of
the freeze order physically seizing the subject bank account. It
cannot be undertaken prior to the issuance of the freeze order.
Same; Same; Same; The owner of bank accounts that could be
potentially affected has the right to challenge whether the
requirements for issuance of the bank inquiry order were indeed
complied

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 7

with given that such has implications on its property rights.—

The law plainly prohibits a mere investigation into the existence
and the amount of the deposit. We relate the principle to
SPCMB’s relationship to the reported principal account under
investigation, one of its clients, former Vice President Binay.
SPCMB as the owner of one of the bank accounts reported to be
investigated by the AMLC for probable money laundering offenses
should be allowed to pursue remedies therefrom where there are
legal implications on the inquiry into its accounts as a law firm.
While we do not lapse into conjecture and cannot take up the
lance for SPCMB on probable violation of the attorney-client
privilege based on pure speculation, the extent of information
obtained by the AMLC concerning the clients of SPCMB has not
been fully drawn and sufficiently demonstrated. At the same
time, the owner of bank accounts that could be potentially
affected has the right to challenge whether the requirements for
issuance of the bank inquiry order were indeed complied with
given that such has implications on its property rights. In this
regard, SPCMB’s obeisance to promulgated rules on the matter
could have afforded it a remedy, even post issuance of the bank
inquiry order.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Rule
10.b. of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) defines
probable cause as “such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an
unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be,
is being or has been committed and that the account or any

monetary instrument or property sought to be frozen is in any way
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering
offense.”—Rule 10.b. of the IRR defines probable cause as “such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet,
prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity
and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has
been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument
or property sought to be frozen is in any way related to said
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.” Evidently,
the provision only refers to probable cause for freeze orders under
Section 10 of the AMLA. From this we note that there is a glaring
lacunae in our procedural rules concerning the bank inquiry order
under Section 11. Despite the advent of RA No. 10167, amending
Section 11 of the AMLA, we have yet to draft additional rules
corresponding to the ex parte bank inquiry order under Section
11. A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC entitled “Rule of Procedure in


Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of

Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing,
Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money
Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended,”
only covers what is already provided in the title. As we have
already noted, the bank inquiry order must likewise be governed
by rules specific to its issuance where the AMLC regularly
invokes this provision and which, expectedly clashes with the
rights of bank account holders.
Same; Same; Same; That there are no specific rules governing
the bank inquiry order does not signify that the Court of Appeals
(CA) cannot confirm to the actual owner of the bank account
reportedly being investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank
inquiry order for covering its accounts, of course after the issuance
of the Freeze Order.—That there are no specific rules governing
the bank inquiry order does not signify that the CA cannot
confirm to the actual owner of the bank account reportedly being
investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank inquiry order for
covering its accounts, of course after the issuance of the Freeze
Order. Even in Ligot v. Republic, 692 SCRA 509 (2013), we held
that by implication, where the law did not specify, the owner of
the “frozen” property may move to lift the freeze order issued
under Section 10 of the AMLA if he can show that no probable
cause exists or the 20-day period of the freeze order has already
lapsed without any extension being requested from and granted
by the CA. Drawing a parallel, such a showing of the absence of
probable cause ought to be afforded SPCMB.
Same; Same; Same; That the bank inquiry order is a separate
from the freeze order does not denote that it cannot be questioned.
The opportunity is still rife for the owner of a bank account to
question the basis for its very inclusion into the investigation and
the corresponding freezing of its account in the process.—We
cannot avoid the requirement-limitation nexus in Section 11. As it
affords the government authority to pursue a legitimate state
interest to investigate money laundering offenses, such likewise
provides the limits for the authority given. Moreover, allowance to
the owner of the bank account, post issuance of the bank inquiry
order and the corresponding freeze order, of remedies to question
the order, will not forestall and waylay the government’s pursuit
of money launderers. That the bank inquiry order is a separate
from the freeze order does not denote that it cannot be questioned.
The opportunity is still rife for the

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 9

owner of a bank account to question the basis for its very

inclusion into the investigation and the corresponding freezing of
its account in the process. As noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr.,
545 SCRA 384 (2008), such an allowance accorded the account
holder who wants to contest the issuance of the order and the
actual investigation by the AMLC, does not cast an unreasonable
burden since the bank inquiry order has already been issued.
Further, allowing for notice to the account holder should not, in
any way, compromise the integrity of the bank records subject of
the inquiry which remain in the possession and control of the
bank. The account holder so notified remains unable to do
anything to conceal or cleanse his bank account records of
suspicious or anomalous transactions, at least not without the
wholehearted cooperation of the bank, which inherently has no
vested interest to aid the account holder in such manner. Rule
10.c of the IRR provides for Duty of the Covered Institution

receiving the Freeze Order. Such can likewise be made applicable
to covered institutions notified of a bank inquiry order.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) affirms the
constitutionality of Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AMLA) allowing the ex parte application by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) for authority to inquire into, and
examine, certain bank deposits and investments.—We affirm the
constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex parte
application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and
examine, certain bank deposits and investments. Section 11 of the
AMLA providing for the ex parte bank deposit inquiry is
constitutionally firm for the reasons already discussed. The ex
parte inquiry shall be upon probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined in
Section 3(i) of the law or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 of the same law. To effect the limit on the ex parte
inquiry, the petition under oath for authority to inquire, must,
akin to the requirement of a petition for freeze order enumerated
in Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, contain the name and
address of the respondent; the grounds relied upon for the
issuance of the order of inquiry; and the supporting evidence that
the subject bank deposit are in any way related to or involved in
an unlawful activity.
Same; Same; Same; Freeze Orders; From the issuance of a
freeze order, the party aggrieved by the ruling of the court may
appeal to the Supreme Court (SC) by petition for review on
certiorari

10

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising all pertinent

questions of law and issues, including the propriety of the issuance
of a bank inquiry order. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement
of the subject decision or final order unless the SC directs
otherwise.—If the CA finds no substantial merit in the petition, it
shall dismiss the petition outright stating the specific reasons for
such denial. If found meritorious and there is a subsequent
petition for freeze order, the proceedings shall be governed by the
existing Rules on Petitions for Freeze Order in the CA. From the
issuance of a freeze order, the party aggrieved by the ruling of the

court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising all pertinent
questions of law and issues, including the propriety of the
issuance of a bank inquiry order. The appeal shall not stay the
enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the
Supreme Court directs otherwise. The CA is directed to draft
rules based on the foregoing discussions to complement the
existing A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary
Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or
Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense
under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended for submission to the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and eventual
approval and promulgation of the Court En Banc.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Money Laundering; Anti-Money Laundering Act; View that

the depositor has no right to demand that it be notified of any
application or issuance of an order to inquire into his or her bank
deposit.—I join the unanimous declaration that, based on the
challenges posed by the present petitions and only within its
ambient facts, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160 or the Anti-
Money Laundering Act is not unconstitutional. Further, that we
are unanimous in declaring that the depositor has no right to
demand that it be notified of any application or issuance of an
order to inquire into his or her bank deposit. The procedure in the
Court of Appeals is ex parte but requires proof of probable cause of
the occurrence of the predicate crime as well as the potential
liability of the owner of the deposit.
Same; Same; View that after the inquiry of the bank deposits
and related accounts within the limitations contained in the court

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 11

order, it is still the option of the law enforcers or the Anti-

Money Laundering Council (AMLC), to proceed to request for a
Freeze Order in accordance with Section 10 of the same law.—
After the inquiry of the bank deposits and related accounts within
the limitations contained in the court order, it is still the option of
the law enforcers or the Anti-Money Laundering Council, to

proceed to request for a Freeze Order in accordance with Section
10 of the same law. The depositor is, thus, entitled to be informed
only after the freeze order has been issued. In questioning the
freeze order, the depositor may then raise defenses relating to the
existence of sufficient evidence to lead the court to believe that
there is probable cause that a covered crime has occurred, that
the depositor is a participant in the crime, and that the stay of all
transactions with respect to the bank account is essential in order
to preserve evidence or to keep the proceeds of the crime intact for
and on behalf of the victims.
Same; Same; View that the majority opinion’s statement that
the “inquiry by the [Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)] into
certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive
due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at
that stage” may have been inadvertent.—The numbers on a bank’s
ledger corresponding to the amounts of money that a depositor
has and its various transactions, especially when digitized, are
definitely not physical. Yet, just because they are not physical
does not necessarily mean that they do not partake of the kinds of
“life, liberty, or property” protected by the due process clause of
the Constitution. Neither should it mean that the numerical
equivalent of the bank’s debt to a depositor or the record of its
various transactions have nothing to do with the “persons . . .
papers, and effects” constitutionally protected against
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” The majority opinion’s
statement that the “inquiry by the [Anti-Money Laundering
Council] into certain bank deposits and investments does not
violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of
property involved at that stage” may have been inadvertent. It
does, however, neglect that the penumbra of rights protected by
the due process clause and the proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures also pertains to protecting the intangibles
essential to human life. Definitely, every liberal democratic
constitutional order has outgrown the archaic concept that life is
only that which can be tangible.

12

Same; Same; View that every regulation therefore that limits

this aspect of individuality may be the subject of inquiry that it
does not “deprive” one of their “life, liberty or property” without
“due process of law.”—The due process clause is crafted as a
proscription. Thus, it states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law[.]” This means
that there is a sphere of individual existence or a penumbra of
individual autonomy that exists prior to every regulation that
should primordially be left untouched. In other words, the
existence of what Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren once
called “the right to be let alone” is now broadly, though at times
awkwardly referred to roughly as the right to privacy, presumed.
Every regulation therefore that limits this aspect of individuality
may be the subject of inquiry that it does not “deprive” one of
their “life, liberty or property” without “due process of law.”
Same; Same; Due Process; View that due process of law simply
means that regulation should both be reasonable and fair.—More
fundamentally, the reservation of a very broad sphere of
individual privacy or individual autonomy is implied in the very
concept of society governed under a constitutional and democratic
order. The aspects of our humanity and the parts of our liberty
surrendered to the government, in order to assure a functioning
society, should only be as much as necessary for a just society and
no more. While the extent of necessary surrender cannot be
determined with precision, our existing doctrine is that any state
interference should neither be arbitrary nor unfair. In many
cases, we have held that due process of law simply means that
regulation should both be reasonable and fair.
Same; Same; Same; View that in the due process clause, there
is the requirement of “deprivation” of one’s right to “life, liberty or
property.” In my view, this means more than the occasional and
temporary discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with the
natural workings of groups of human beings living within a
society.—In the due process clause, there is the requirement of
“deprivation” of one’s right to “life, liberty or property.” In my
view, this means more than the occasional and temporary
discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with the natural
workings of groups of human beings living within a society. De
minimis discomfort is a part of group life, independent of the
workings of the State. The deprivation that may

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trigger a judicial inquiry should be more than momentary. It

must be fundamentally disruptive of a value that we protect
because it is constitutive of our concept of individual autonomy.
For instance, a person who chooses to walk down a public street
cannot complain that a police officer glances or even stares at him
or her. The discomfort of being the subject of the observation by
others, under those circumstances, may be too fleeting and trivial
that it should not cause any constitutional query. That we look at
each other in public spaces is inherently a part of existing within
a society. After all, one of the worst human indignities may be
that we are rendered invisible to everyone for all time within
public spaces.
Same; Same; View that peering into one’s bank accounts and
related transactions is sufficiently disruptive as to be considered a
“deprivation” within the meaning of the due process clause.—
Examining the petitioner’s bank accounts is analogous to the
situation involving the uninvited and unwelcome glance. For
some, their financial worth contained in the bank’s ledgers may
not be physical, but it is constitutive of that part of their identity,
which for their own reasons, they may not want to disclose.
Peering into one’s bank accounts and related transactions is
sufficiently disruptive as to be considered a “deprivation” within
the meaning of the due process clause. It may be short of the
physical seizure of property but it should, in an actual controversy
such as this case at bar, be subject of judicial review.
Same; Same; Bank Inquiry Order; View that a bank inquiry
order is a provisional relief available to the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) in aid of its investigative powers. It
partakes of the character of a search warrant.—A bank inquiry
order is a provisional relief available to the Anti-Money
Laundering Council in aid of its investigative powers. It partakes
of the character of a search warrant. United Laboratories, Inc. v.
Isip, 461 SCRA 574 (2005), discussed the nature of a search
warrant: On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s
contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a
criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The
proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special
and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary
because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with
what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an
application for a

14

search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not

make it such an action. A search warrant is a legal process which
has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to
procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal
process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search
warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A
search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the
People of the Philippines. A search warrant has no relation to a
civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or
maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as
distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of
private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of
public prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; View that considering its implications on
the depositor’s right to privacy, Section 11 of the Anti-Money
Laundering Act (AMLA) explicitly mandates that “[t]he authority
to inquire into or examine the main account and the related
accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections
2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution[.]”—In a search warrant
proceeding, there is already a crime that has been committed and
law enforcers apply for a search warrant to find evidence to
support a case or to retrieve and preserve evidence already known
to them. In the same way, a bank inquiry order is “a means for
the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence
to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for
violation of the [Anti-Money Laundering Act].” It is a preparatory
tool for the discovery and procurement, and preservation —
through the subsequent issuance of a freeze order — of relevant
evidence of a money laundering transaction or activity.
Considering its implications on the depositor’s right to privacy,
Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act explicitly mandates
that “[t]he authority to inquire into or examine the main account
and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of
Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution[.]”
Same; Same; Same; View that the phrase ‘upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce’ allows a determination of probable cause by the
judge [or the Court of Appeals (CA) in Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AMLA) cases] ex parte.—“The phrase ‘upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath

or affirmation of

15
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 15

the complainant and the witnesses he may produce’ allows a

determination of probable cause by the judge [or the Court of
Appeals in Anti-Money Laundering Act cases] ex parte.”
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; View that the absence of
notice to the owner of a bank account that an ex parte application
as well as an order to inquire has been granted by the Court of
Appeals (CA) is not unreasonable nor arbitrary. The lack of notice
does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution.—The
absence of notice to the owner of a bank account that an ex parte
application as well as an order to inquire has been granted by the
Court of Appeals is not unreasonable nor arbitrary. The lack of
notice does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
It is reasonable for the State, through its law enforcers, to inquire
ex parte and without notice because of the nature of a bank
account at present.
Same; Same; View that the inherent constitutionally protected
private rights in bank deposits and other similar instruments are
not absolute.—A bank deposit is an obligation. It is a debt owed by
a bank to its client-depositor. It is understood that the bank will
make use of the value of the money deposited to further create
credit. This means that it may use the value to create loans with
interest to another. Whoever takes out a loan likewise creates a
deposit with another bank creating another obligation and
empowering that other bank to create credit once more through
providing other loans. Bank deposits are not isolated information
similar to personal sets of preferences. Rather, bank deposits exist
as economically essential social constructs. The inherent
constitutionally protected private rights in bank deposits and
other similar instruments are not absolute. These rights should,
in proper cases, be weighed against the need to maintaining the
integrity of our financial system. The integrity of our financial
system on the other hand contributes to the viability of banks and
financial intermediaries, and therefore the viability of keeping
bank deposits.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

16

PEREZ, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari1 and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
constitutionality of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended,
specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council’s authority
to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex
parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and
investments, including related accounts based on probable
cause.
In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections,
reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth
of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his
family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers.
The Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted
investigations2 and inquiries3 thereon ostensibly based on
their respective powers delineated in the Constitution.
From various news reports announcing the inquiry into
then Vice President Binay’s bank accounts, including
accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido
Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB)
was most concerned with the article published in the
Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled “Inspect Binay
Bank Accounts” which read, in pertinent part:
x x x The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the

Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank
accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office
where a family member was once a partner.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-46.
2 Fact-finding as preliminary investigation based on administrative

supervision and powers to investigate government officials, Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution, Ombudsman Act of 1990.
3 In aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.

17
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 17

x x x x
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family,
the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm,
where the Vice President’s daughter Abigail was a former
partner.4

The following day, 26 February 2015, SPCMB wrote
public respondent, Presiding Justice of the CA, Andres B.
Reyes, Jr.:
The law firm of Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay

was surprised to receive a call from Manila Times requesting for a
comment regarding a [supposed petition] filed by the Republic of
the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council before the Court of Appeals seeking to examine the law
office’s bank accounts.
To verify the said matter, the law office is authorizing its
associate Atty. Jose Julius R. Castro to inquire on the veracity of
said report with the Court of Appeals. He is likewise authorized to
secure copies of the relevant documents of the case, such as the
petition and orders issued, if such a case exists.
As this is a matter demanding serious and immediate
attention, the Firm respectfully manifests that if no written
response is received within 24-hours from receipt of this letter, we
shall be at liberty to assume that such a case exists and we shall
act accordingly.
Hoping for your immediate action.
Respectfully yours,
For the Firm
CLARO F. CERTEZA5

Within twenty-four (24) hours, Presiding Justice Reyes
wrote SPCMB denying its request, thus:
_______________
4 Rollo, p. 10.
5 Id., at p. 60.

18

Anent your request for a comment on a supposed petition to

inquire into your law office’s bank accounts, please be informed
that a petition of this nature is strictly confidential in that when
processing the same, not even the handling staff members of the
Office of the Presiding Justice know or have any knowledge who
the subject bank account holders are, as well as the bank accounts
involved.
Please be informed further that clearly under the rules, the
Office of the Presiding Justice is strictly mandated not to disclose,
divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in any
manner or by any means, the fact of the filing of any petition
brought before this Court by the Anti-Money Laundering Council,
its contents and even its entry in the logbook.
Trusting that you find satisfactory the foregoing explanation.6

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another
article entitled, “CA orders probe of Binay’s assets”
reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution
granting the ex parte application of the AMLC to examine
the bank accounts of SPCMB:
The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for

examination of Vice President Jejomar Binay’s bank accounts.
In granting the petition of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC), the CA also ordered the inspection of the bank deposits
of Binay’s wife, children, and a law office connected to him.
x x x x x x x x x
The bank accounts of the law office linked to Binay — the
Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay where Binay’s
daughter, Makati City (Metro Manila)
_______________
6 Id., at p. 51.

19
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 19

Rep. Mar-len Abigail Binay was a partner, are also included in

the probe, the sources said.7

Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no
ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its
rights and interests in the purported ongoing
unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public
respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
SPCMB undertook direct resort to this Court via this
petition for certiorari and prohibition on the following
grounds:
A. THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS IT ALLOWS THE
EXAMINATION OF A BANK ACCOUNT WITHOUT ANY
NOTICE TO THE AFFECTED PARTY:
1. IT VIOLATES THE PERSON’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS; AND
2. IT VIOLATES THE PERSON’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
B. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL, THE
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT:
1. THE REFUSAL OF RESPONDENT PRESIDING
JUSTICE TO PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH A COPY OF
THE EX-PARTE APPLICATION FOR BANK
EXAMINATION FILED BY RESPONDENT AMLC AND
ALL OTHER PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, ORDERS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND PROCESSES ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN RELATION
THERETO VIOLATES PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS;
_______________
7 Id., at p. 11.


20

2. A CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE

ANY AND ALL TRANSACTIONS PERTAINING TO
PETITIONER’S BANK ACCOUNTS VIOLATES THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WHICH IS
SACROSANCT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION;
3. A BLANKET AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE
PETITIONER’S BANK ACCOUNTS, INCLUDING ANY
AND ALL TRANSACTIONS THEREIN FROM ITS
OPENING UP TO THE PRESENT, PARTAKES THE
NATURE OF A GENERAL WARRANT THAT IS
CLEARLY INTENDED TO AID A MERE FISHING
EXPEDITION;
4. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT THAT ALLOWS OR JUSTIFIES THE
WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION AND/OR ANY
COURT RECORDS OR PROCEEDINGS PERTAINING TO
AN EXAMINATION OF A BANK ACCOUNT,
ESPECIALLY IF THE COURT HAS ALREADY GRANTED
THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE EXAMINATION;
5. THE PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT, NOR HAS
THE PETITIONER BEEN IMPLEADED IN ANY
COMPLAINT INVOLVING ANY PREDICATE CRIME
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY AN INQUIRY INTO ITS BANK
ACCOUNTS; AND
7. THE EXAMINATION OF THE PETITIONER’S BANK
ACCOUNTS IS A FORM OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION
OR HARASSMENT.8

In their Comment, the AMLC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), points out a supposed
jurisdictional defect of the instant petition, i.e., SPCMB
failed to implead the House of Representatives which
enacted the AMLA and its amendments. In all, the OSG
argues for the dismissal of the present petition,
highlighting that the AMLC’s inquiry
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 12-13.

21
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 21

into bank deposits does not violate due process nor the
right to privacy:
1. Section 11’s allowance for AMLC’s ex parte
application for an inquiry into particular bank deposits and
investments is investigative, not adjudicatory;
2. The text of Section 11 itself provides safeguards and
limitations on the allowance to the AMLC to inquire into
bank deposits: (a) issued by the CA based on probable
cause; and (b) specific compliance to the requirements of
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution;
3. The ex parte procedure for investigating bank
accounts is necessary to achieve a legitimate state
objective;
4. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy as to
the bank records of a depositor;
5. The examination of, and inquiry, into SPCMB’s
bank accounts does not violate Attorney-Client Privilege;
and
6. A criminal complaint is not a prerequisite to a bank
inquiry order.
In their Reply, SPCMB maintains that the ex parte
proceedings authorizing inquiry of the AMLC into certain
bank deposits and investments is unconstitutional,
violating its rights to due process and privacy.
Before anything else, we here have an original action
turning on three crucial matters: (1) the petition reaches us
from a letter of the Presiding Justice of the CA in response
to a letter written by SPCMB; (2) SPCMB’s bank account
has been reported to be a related account to Vice President
Binay’s investigated by the AMLC for anti-money
laundering activities; and (3) the constitutionality of
Section 11 of the AMLA at its recent amendment has not
been squarely raised and addressed.
To obviate confusion, we act on this petition given that
SPCMB directly assails the constitutionality of Section 11
of the AMLA where it has been widely reported that Vice
Presi-

22

dent Binay’s bank accounts and all related accounts

therewith are subject of an investigation by the AMLC. In
fact, subsequent events from the filing of this petition have
shown that these same bank accounts (including related
accounts) were investigated by the Ombudsman and both
Houses of the Legislature. However, at the time of the
filing of this petition, SPCMB alleged that its accounts
have been inquired into but not subjected to a freeze order
under Section 10 of the AMLA. Thus, as previously noted,
with its preclusion of legal remedies before the CA which
under the AMLA issues the ex parte bank inquiry and
freeze orders, Sections 10 and 11, respectively, SPCMB
establishes that it has no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights
and interests from the purported unconstitutional
intrusion by the AMLC into its bank accounts.
The foregoing shall be addressed specifically and bears
directly on the disposition of the decision herein.
Additionally, we note that the OSG did not question how
this petition reaches us from a letter of the appellate
court’s Presiding Justice, only that, procedurally, SPCMB
should have impleaded Congress.
On the sole procedural issue of whether SPCMB ought
to have impleaded Congress, the contention of the OSG
though novel is untenable. All cases questioning the
constitutionality of a law does not require that Congress be
impleaded for their resolution. The requisites of a judicial
inquiry are elementary:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by
the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and

23
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 23

4. The decision of the constitutional question must be

necessary to the determination of the case itself.9
The complexity of the issues involved herein require us
to examine the assailed provision vis-à-vis the
constitutional proscription against violation of due process.
The statute reads:
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits.—

Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as
amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No.
8791; and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any
particular deposit or investment, including related accounts, with
any banking institution or nonbank financial institution upon
order of any competent court based on an ex parte application in
cases of violations of this Act, when it has been established that
there is probable cause that the deposits or investments,
including related accounts involved, are related to an unlawful
activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 hereof; except that no court order shall be
required in cases involving activities defined in Section 3(i)(1), (2),
and (12) hereof, and felonies or offenses of a nature similar to
those mentioned in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12), which are
punishable under the penal laws of other countries, and terrorism
and conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and penalized
under Republic Act No. 9372.
The Court of Appeals shall act on the application to inquire
into or examine any deposit or investment with any banking
institution or nonbank financial institution within twenty-four
(24) hours from filing of the application.
To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas may, in the course of a periodic or special examination,
check the compliance of a covered
_______________
9 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 376-377; 95 SCRA 392, 400

(1980).

24

institution with the requirements of the AMLA and its

implementing rules and regulations.
For purposes of this section, ‘related accounts’ shall refer to
accounts, the funds and sources of which originated from and/or
are materially linked to the monetary instrument(s) or
property(ies) subject of the freeze order(s).
A court order ex parte must first be obtained before the AMLC
can inquire into these related Accounts: Provided, That the
procedure for the ex parte application of the ex parte court order
for the principal account shall be the same with that of the related
accounts.
The authority to inquire into or examine the main account and
the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article
III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which are hereby
incorporated by reference.10

The due process clause of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.11

The right to due process has two aspects: (1) substantive
which deals with the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the
law; and (2) procedural which delves into the rules
government must follow before it deprives a person of its
life, liberty or property.12
As presently worded, Section 11 of the AMLA has three
elements: (1) ex parte application by the AMLC; (2)
determination of probable cause by the CA; and (3)
exception of court
_______________
10 Republic Act No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10167.

11 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Sec. 1.
12 Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, 602 Phil.
522, 545; 584 SCRA 110, 133 (2009).

25
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 25

order in cases involving unlawful activities defined in

Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12).
As a brief backgrounder to the amendment to Section 11
of the AMLA, the text originally did not specify for an ex
parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into
or examine certain bank accounts or investments. The
extent of this authority was the topic of Rep. of the Phils. v.
Hon. Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al. (Eugenio)13 where the
petitioner therein, Republic of the Philippines, asseverated
that the application for that kind of order under the
questioned section of the AMLA did not require notice and
hearing. Eugenio schooled us on the AMLA, specifically on
the provisional remedies provided therein to aid the AMLC
in enforcing the law:
It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize, as

a general rule, the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order. We
quote the provision in full:
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits.—
Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as
amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No.
8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any
particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or
nonbank financial institution upon order of any competent court
in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established
that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined
in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 hereof, except that no court order shall be
required in cases involving unlawful activities defined in
Section 3(i)(1), (2) and (12).
To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral

ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire into or examine any deposit
of investment with any banking institution or nonbank
financial
_______________
13 569 Phil. 98, 120-124; 545 SCRA 384, 404-409 (2008).

26

institution when the examination is made in the course of a

periodic or special examination, in accordance with the
rules of examination of the BSP. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into

bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial order in cases
where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other
violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder.
Since such special circumstances do not apply in this case, there
is no need for us to pass comment on this proviso. Suffice it to say,
the proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which
presently confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding
discussion, our reference to Section 11 of the AMLA excludes said
proviso.
In the instances where a court order is required for the
issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in Section 11
specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex
parte. It might be argued that this silence does not preclude the ex
parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is not
prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when the
immediately preceding provision, Section 10, is examined.
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or

Property.—The Court of Appeals, upon application ex
parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable
cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in
any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in
Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall
be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a
period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order

under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section 11 are
similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which
the AMLC may avail of to

27
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 27

effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses.

Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex
parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance

absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to
authorize ex parte proceedings for the issuance of the bank
inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such intent in
the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.
Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and
11 of the AMLA was crafted at the same time, through the
passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it was the
AMLC, not the Court of Appeals, which had authority to issue a
freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order always then required,
without exception, an order from a competent court. It was
through the same enactment that ex parte proceedings were
introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in the case of the
freeze order which now can only be issued by the Court of
Appeals. It certainly would have been convenient, through the
same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the
case of a bank inquiry order had Congress been so minded. Yet
nothing in the provision itself, or even the available legislative
record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the
application for a bank inquiry order, unlike in the case of the
freeze order.
That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in
applications for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the present
implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated
upon the passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders
under Section 10, the implementing rules do expressly provide
that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte, but no
similar clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under
Section 11. These implementing rules were promulgated by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and if it was the true belief
of these institutions that inquiry orders could be issued ex parte
similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would have been
in-

28

corporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because the

implementing rules could authorize ex parte applications for
inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but rather
because the framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex

parte applications.
Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No.
05-11-04-SC to enforce the provisions of the AMLA specifically
authorize ex parte applications with respect to freeze orders under
Section 10 but make no similar authorization with respect to bank
inquiry orders under Section 11.
The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte
proceedings under Section 10 and in proscribing the same under
Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is
aimed at preserving monetary instruments or property in any
way deemed related to unlawful activities as defined in Section
3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or
property would thus be inhibited from utilizing the same for the
duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded
by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would
allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the
order could be issued. (Citations omitted)

Quite apparent from the foregoing is that absent a
specific wording in the AMLA allowing for ex parte
proceedings in orders authorizing inquiry and examination
by the AMLC into certain bank deposits or investments,
notice to the affected party is required.
Heeding the Court’s observance in Eugenio that the
remedy of the Republic then lay with the legislative,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10167 amending
Section 11 of the AMLA and specifically inserted the word
ex parte appositive of the nature of this provisional remedy
available to the AMLC thereunder.

29
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 29

It is this current wording of Section 11 which SPCMB

posits as unconstitutional and purportedly actually
proscribed in Eugenio.
We do not subscribe to SPCMB’s position.
Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex
parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain
bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive
due process, there being no physical seizure of property
involved at that stage. It is the preliminary and actual

seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question
which brings these within reach of the judicial process,
specifically a determination that the seizure violated due
process.14 In fact, Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order
under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on
both remedies’ effect on the direct objects, i.e., the bank
deposits and investments:
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does

not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the
account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the
examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking
institutions or nonbank financial institutions. The monetary
instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial
institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined
on particular details such as the account holder’s record of
deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze
order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order
cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said
records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be
destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that
would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the
bank.15
_______________
14 Republic v. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc., 566 Phil.

94, 106-107; 542 SCRA 95, 107 (2008).
15 Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., supra note 13 at pp. 124-125; p. 409.

30

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us,

the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by
the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical
seizure of the targeted corporeal property. From this cite,
we proceed to examine whether Section 11 of the law
violates procedural due process.
As previously stated, the AMLA now specifically
provides for an ex parte application for an order authorizing
inquiry or examination into bank deposits or investments

which continues to pass constitutional muster.
Procedural due process is essentially the opportunity to
be heard.16 In this case, at the investigation stage by the
AMLC into possible money laundering offenses, SPCMB
demands that it have notice and hearing of AMLC’s
investigation into its bank accounts.
We are not unaware of the obiter in Eugenio17 and cited
by SPCMB, voicing misgivings on an interpretation of the
former Section 11 of the AMLA allowing for ex parte
proceedings in bank inquiry orders, to wit:
There certainly is fertile ground to contest the issuance of an ex

parte order. Section 11 itself requires that it be established that
“there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to unlawful activities,” and it obviously is the court which
stands as arbiter whether there is indeed such probable cause.
The process of inquiring into the existence of probable cause
would involve the function of determination reposed on the trial
court. Determination clearly implies a function of adjudication on
the part of the trial court, and not a mechanical application of a
standard predetermination by some other body. The word
“determination” implies deliberation and is, in normal legal
contemplation, equivalent to “the decision of a court of justice.”
_______________
16 Supra notes 11 & 12.

17 Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., supra note 13 at p. 126; pp. 410-411.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 31

The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot

simply take the AMLC’s word that probable cause exists that the
deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. It will
have to exercise its own determinative function in order to be
convinced of such fact. The account holder would be certainly
capable of contesting such probable cause if given the
opportunity to be apprised of the pending application to
inquire into his account; hence a notice requirement
would not be an empty spectacle. It may be so that the
process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more

cumbersome or prolonged because of the notice requirement, yet
we fail to see any unreasonable burden cast by such circumstance.
After all, as earlier stated, requiring notice to the account holder
should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the bank
records subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and
control of the bank. (Emphasis supplied)

On that score, the SPCMB points out that the AMLC’s
bank inquiry is preliminary to the seizure and deprivation
of its property as in a freeze order under Section 10 of the
AMLA which peculiarity lends itself to a sui generis
proceeding akin to the evaluation process in extradition
proceedings pronounced in Secretary of Justice v. Hon.
Lantion.18 Under the extradition law, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs is bound to make a finding that the
extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance before
delivering the same to the Secretary of Justice. We ruled:
[L]ooking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would

appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the
extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours
later, the Department of
_______________
18 379 Phil. 165; 322 SCRA 160 (2000).

32

Justice received the request, apparently without the Department

of Foreign affairs discharging its duty thoroughly evaluating the
same and its accompanying documents. x x x.
x x x x
[T]he record cannot support the presumption of regularity that
the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the
extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived
at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed

documents satisfy the requirements of law. x x x.
The evaluation process, just like the extradition
proceedings, proper belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial
functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the
power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the
completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b)
to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face
of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense
is a military one which is not punishable under
nonmilitary penal legislation. Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process
in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative body’s quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a)
taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved. Inquisitorial power, which
is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better
enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority. This power
allows the administrative body to inspect the re-

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 33

cords and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or

entities coming under its jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of
witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise.
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing,
and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency’s performance of its rule-making or quasi-
judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.19 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The submission of AMLC requires a determination

whether the AMLC is an administrative body with quasi-
judicial powers; corollary thereto, a determination of the
jurisdiction of the AMLC.
Lim v. Gamosa20 is enlightening on jurisdiction and the
requirement of a specific grant thereof in the enabling law.
We declared that the creation of the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) by the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (IPRA) did not confer it exclusive and original,
nor primary jurisdiction, in all claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs and ICCs where no such specific
grant is bestowed.
In this instance, the grant of jurisdiction over cases
involving money laundering offences is bestowed on the
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan as the case
may be. In fact, Rule 5 of the IRR is entitled Jurisdiction
of Money Laundering Cases and Money Laundering
Investigation Procedures:
Rule 5.a. Jurisdiction of Money Laundering

Cases.—The Regional Trial Courts shall have the
jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those
committed by public officers and private persons who are in
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 196-198; p. 182.

20 G.R. No. 193964, December 2, 2015, 775 SCRA 646.

34

conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan.
Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money Laundering Offenses.
—The AMLC shall investigate:
(1) suspicious transactions;
(2) covered transactions deemed suspicious after an
investigation conducted by the AMLC;
(3) money laundering activities; and
(4) other violations of the AMLA, as amended.

The confusion on the scope and parameters of the

AMLC’s investigatory powers and whether such seeps into
and approximates a quasi-judicial agency’s inquisitorial
powers lies in the AMLC’s investigation and consequent
initial determination of whether certain activities are
constitutive of anti-money laundering offenses.
The enabling law itself, the AMLA, specifies the
jurisdiction of the trial courts, RTC and Sandiganbayan,
over money laundering cases, and delineates the
investigative powers of the AMLC.
Textually, the AMLA is the first line of defense against
money laundering in compliance with our international
obligation. There are three (3) stages of determination, two
(2) levels of investigation, falling under three (3)
jurisdictions:
1. The AMLC investigates possible money laundering
offences and initially determines whether there is probable
cause to charge any person with a money laundering
offence under Section 4 of the AMLA, resulting in the filing
of a complaint with the Department of Justice or the Office
of the Ombudsman;21
_______________
21 Rule 6.b. When the AMLC finds, after investigation, that there is
probable cause to charge any person with a money laundering offense
under Section 4 of the AMLA, as amended, it shall cause a complaint to be
filed, pursuant to Section 7(4) of the AMLA, as amended, before the
Department of Justice or the Office of the Om-

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 35

2. The DOJ or the Ombudsman conducts the

preliminary investigation proceeding and if after due notice
and hearing finds probable cause for money laundering
offences, shall file the necessary information before the
Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan;22
3. The RTCs or the Sandiganbayan shall try all cases
on money laundering, as may be applicable.23
Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing

Rules and Regulations can we glean that the AMLC
exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the actual
preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or
conducted by the Department of Justice and the
Ombudsman.
Again, we hark back to Lantion citing Ruperto v.
Torres,23-a where the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of
investigation:
[Such a body] does not exercise judicial functions and its power
is limited to investigating facts and making findings in respect
thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of
power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations
of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for inves-
_______________
budsman, which shall then conduct the preliminary investigation of the

case.
22 Rule 6.c. If after due notice and hearing in the preliminary
investigation proceedings, the Department of Justice, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, as the case may be, finds probable cause for a money
laundering offense, it shall file the necessary information before the
Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan.
23 Rule 5.a. Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases. The
Regional Trial Courts shall have the jurisdiction to try all cases on money
laundering. Those committed by public officers and private persons who
are in conspiracy with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
2 3-a 100 Phil. 1098 (1957).

36

tigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the

facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties,
then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative

body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has
no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of
both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only
power is to determine whether the papers comply with the
requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient
to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus
merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role
of the court. The body’s power is limited to an initial finding of
whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by
certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of
the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the
deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional
arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the
request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of
the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph
[1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be
automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter
period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition
Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a
request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty),
for he will only be discharged if no

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 37

request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is

to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second,
the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6,
Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is
not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent

one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the
evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting
an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or
commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective extraditee, As described by petitioner
himself, this is a “tool” for criminal law enforcement. In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or
investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by
Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights
formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced
to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination.24 (Citations omitted)

In contrast to the disposition in Lantion that the
evaluation process before the Department of Foreign
Affairs is akin to an administrative agency conducting
investigative proceedings with implications on the
consequences of criminal liability, i.e., deprivation of liberty
of a prospective extraditee, the sole investigative functions
of the AMLC finds more reso-
_______________
24 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra note 18 at pp. 198-200; pp.

182-183.

38

nance with the investigative functions of the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
That the AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial powers
and is simply an investigatory body finds support in our
ruling in Shu v. Dee.25 In that case, petitioner Shu had filed
a complaint before the NBI charging respondents therein
with falsification of two (2) deeds of real estate mortgage

submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank). After its investigation, the NBI came up with
a Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 finding that
the signatures of petitioner therein which appear on the
questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample
signatures he submitted to the NBI. Ruling on the specific
issue raised by respondent therein that they had been
denied due process during the NBI investigation, we
stressed that the functions of this agency are merely
investigatory and informational in nature:
[The NBI] has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is

incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency
whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare
may require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders
assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of
crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible.
Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find
that no denial of the respondent’s due process right could have
taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the
prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of
finding the existence of probable cause. We find it significant that
the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were
submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city
prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice during the
preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus,
_______________
25 G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 512, 522-523.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 39

these officers had the opportunity to examine these signatures.

The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due
process when the NBI issued the questioned documents report.
We note that this report merely stated that the signatures
appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioner’s submitted
sample signatures were not written by one and the same person.
Notably, there was no categorical finding in the questioned

documents report that the respondents falsified the documents.
This report, too, was procured during the conduct of the NBI’s
investigation at the petitioner’s request for assistance in the
investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is
inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from securing
a separate documents examination by handwriting experts based
on their own evidence. On its own, the NBI’s questioned
documents report does not directly point to the respondents’
involvement in the crime charged. Its significance is that, taken
together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the
parties during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could
be sufficient for purposes of finding probable cause — the action
that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the present case.

As carved out in Shu, the AMLC functions solely as an
investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26
Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a
Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman
pursuant to Rule 6.b.
_______________
26 Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money Laundering Offenses.— The

AMLC shall investigate:
(1) suspicious transactions;

(2) covered transactions deemed suspicious after an investigation
conducted by the AMLC;
(3) money laundering activities; and
(4) other violations of the AMLA, as amended.

40

Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the

Ombudsman,27 where the conflict arose at the preliminary
investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the
Ombudsman’s denial of Senator Estrada’s Request to be
furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his
corespondents did not violate Estrada’s constitutional right
to due process where the sole issue is the existence of

probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an
information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada
from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his
corespondents during the pretrial or even during trial. We
expounded on the nature of preliminary investigation
proceedings, thus:
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary

investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is
not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or

proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well founded belief” as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s
probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation
_______________
27 G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015, 748 SCRA 1.

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is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s
findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie
evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of
the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence

presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner’s argument that
the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible
as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-
examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a
preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the
witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if
petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine
Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to
testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion
and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-
examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely
because such right was never available to him. The
admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should
be ventilated before the trial court during the

42

trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.

Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very
nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the
accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering
that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the
record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of
the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the
testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted
by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the
prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present
such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and
the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the
petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel

the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of
cross-examination. (Citations and emphasis omitted)

Plainly, the AMLC’s investigation of money laundering
offenses and its determination of possible money
laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain
bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it
into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers.
Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry
court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB’s
constitutional right to procedural due process.
We now come to a determination of whether Section 11
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined
in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is
adamant that the CA’s denial of its request to be furnished
copies of AMLC’s ex parte application for a bank inquiry
order and all

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 43

subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and

issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion where the purported blanket authority under
Section 11: (1) partakes of a general warrant intended to
aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-
client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime
charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense; and (4) is
a form of political harassment [of SPCMB’s] clientele.
We shall discuss these issues jointly since the assailed
Section 11 incorporates by reference that “[t]he authority to
inquire into or examine the main and the related accounts
shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections
2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution.” On this point, SPCMB
asseverates that “there is nothing in the AMLA that allows
or justifies the withholding of information and/or any court
records or proceedings pertaining to an examination of a
bank account, especially if the court has already granted
the authority to conduct the examination.”
The theme of playing off privacy rights and interest
against that of the state’s interest in curbing money
laundering offenses is recurring.28

The invoked constitutional provisions read:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized.
_______________
28 Recommended Citation, Robert S. Pasley, Privacy Rights v. Anti-

Money Laundering Enforcement, 6 N.C. Banking Inst. 147 (2002).

44

SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and

correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public policy or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Once again, Eugenio29 offers guidance:
The Court’s construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is

undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy considerations. If
sustained, petitioner’s argument that a bank account may be
inspected by the government following an ex parte proceeding
about which the depositor would know nothing would have
significant implications on the right to privacy, a right innately
cherished by all notwithstanding the legally recognized exceptions
thereto. The notion that the government could be so empowered is
cause for concern of any individual who values the right to privacy
which, after all, embodies even the right to be “let alone,” the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized people.
One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the

right to privacy, as applied to bank deposits, warrants our present
inquiry. We decline to do so. Admittedly, that question has proved
controversial in American jurisprudence. Notably, the United
States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Miller held that there was
no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the bank records
of a depositor. Moreover, the text of our Constitution has
not bothered with the triviality of allocating specific
rights peculiar to bank deposits.
However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a
right to privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines, and
that such right finds application to the
_______________
29 Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., supra note 13 at pp. 127-132;

pp. 412-417.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 45

case at bar. The source of such right is statutory, expressed as it

is in R.A. No. 1405 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of
1955. The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law, to
wit:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with

banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature
and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases
where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation.
Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank

deposits remains a basic state policy in the Philippines.
Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank

deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within the zones of
privacy recognized by our laws. The framers of the 1987
Constitution likewise recognized that bank accounts are not
covered by either the right to information under Section 7, Article
III or under the requirement of full public disclosure under
Section 28, Article II. Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or
amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely
confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.
Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be
specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself
prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be
examined by “any person, government official, bureau or office”;
namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in
cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a

46

competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public

officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute
confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as
well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act.
Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account
upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the
AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause
that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities
as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there
is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations
under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is
no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could
inquire into such accounts.
It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the
bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a “litigation”
encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act

which is when “the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation.” The orientation of the bank inquiry order
is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier
stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial.
Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later
law has dispensed with the general principle established in the
older law that “[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature.” Indeed, by
force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and
that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions re-

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 47

ferred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these

exceptions in such a manner that would authorize unlimited
discretion on the part of the government or of any party seeking
to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If
there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature
of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into
such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the
former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a law
reversing the general state policy of preserving the absolutely
confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts. (Citations
omitted, emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing disquisition, we extract the following
principles:
1. The Constitution did not allocate specific rights
peculiar to bank deposits;
2. The general rule of absolute confidentiality is simply
statutory,30 i.e., not specified in the Constitution, which has
been affirmed in jurisprudence;31
3. Exceptions to the general rule of absolute
confidentiality have been carved out by the Legislature
which legislation have been sustained, albeit subjected to
heightened scrutiny by the courts;32 and
4. One such legislated exception is Section 11 of the

AMLA.
The warning in Eugenio that an ex parte proceeding
authorizing the government to inspect certain bank
accounts or investments without notice to the depositor
would have significant implications on the right to privacy
still does not preclude such a bank inquiry order to be
allowed by specific legislation as an exception to the
general rule of absolute confidentiality of bank deposits.
_______________
30 BANK SECRECY ACT (BSA) of 1955, RA No. 1405.

31 BSB Group, Inc. v. Go, 626 Phil. 501; 612 SCRA 596 (2010).
32 Id., at p. 513; p. 614; Sec. 2 of the BSA.

48

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened

scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and
authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into
certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it
provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued,
ensuring adherence to the general state policy of
preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine
bank accounts:
(1) The AMLC is required to establish probable cause
as basis for its ex parte application for bank inquiry order;
(2) The CA, independent of the AMLC’s demonstration
of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause
that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense
under Section 4 of the AMLA;
(3) A bank inquiry court order ex parte for related
accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex parte
for the principal account which court order ex parte for
related accounts is separately based on probable cause that
such related account is materially linked to the principal
account inquired into; and
(4) The authority to inquire into or examine the main
or principal account and the related accounts shall comply
with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the

Constitution.
The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and
examination into the bank account are not undertaken
whimsically and solely based on the investigative
discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of
demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA,
of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such
governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards
under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA’s denial
of SPCMB’s letter-request for information concerning the
purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its
accounts.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 49

First. The AMLC and the appellate court are

respectively required to demonstrate and ascertain
probable cause. Ret. Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. v. Republic of the
Philippines,33 which dealt with the adjunct provisional
remedy of freeze order under Section 10 of the AMLA,
defined probable cause, thus:
The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze

order differs from the probable cause required for the
institution of a criminal action, x x x.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for
the issuance of a freeze order refers to “such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet,
prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful
activity and/or money laundering offence is about to be, is
being or has been committed and that the account or any
monetary instrument or property subject thereof
sought to be frozen is in any way related to said
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense.”
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether
probable cause exits, the CA’s statutorily-guided
determination’s focus is not on the probable commissions of
an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the office
of the Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on
whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary
instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related
to any of the illegal activities enumerated under R.A. 9160,

as amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the
sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and
the property or monetary instrument which is the focal
point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second. As regards SPCMB’s contention that the bank

inquiry order is in the nature of a general warrant, Eugenio
already declared that Section 11, even with the allowance
of an ex parte application therefor, “is not a search warrant
or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but
not the
_______________
33 705 Phil. 477, 501-502; 692 SCRA 509, 532-533 (2013).

50

seizure of persons or property.”34 It bears repeating that

the ‘‘bank inquiry order” under Section 11 is a provisional
remedy to aid the AMLC in the enforcement of the AMLA.
Third. Contrary to the stance of SPCMB, the bank
inquiry order does not contemplate that SPCMB be first
impleaded in a money laundering case already filed before
the courts:
We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with

the then Solicitor General who conceded that the use of the
phrase “in cases of” was unfortunate, yet submitted that it should
be interpreted to mean “in the event there are violations” of the
AMLA, and not that there are already cases pending in court
concerning such violations. If the contrary position is adopted,
then the bank inquiry order would be limited in purpose as a tool
in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile as a means for
the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence
to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for
violation of the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all
likelihood the AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character
as a discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect in
filing complaints against suspect account holders. After all, under
such setup the preferred strategy would be to allow or even

encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints under the
AMLA with the hope or expectation that the evidence of money
laundering would somehow surface during the trial. Since the
AMLC could not make use of the bank inquiry order to determine
whether there is evidentiary basis to prosecute the suspected
malefactors, not filing any case at all would not be an alternative.
Such unwholesome setup should not come to pass. Thus Section
11 cannot be interpreted in a way that would emasculate the
remedy it has established and encourage the unfounded initiation
of complaints for money laundering.35 (Citation omitted)
34 Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., supra note 13 at p. 127; p. 412.

35 Id., at p. 120; pp. 403-404.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 51

Guided as we are by prior holdings, and bound as we are

by the requirements for issuance of a bank inquiry order
under Section 11 of the AMLA, we are hard pressed to
declare that it violates SPCMB’s right to privacy.
Nonetheless, although the bank inquiry order ex parte
passes constitutional muster, there is nothing in Section 11
nor the implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA
which prohibits the owner of the bank account, as in his
instance SPCMB, to ascertain from the CA, post issuance
of the bank inquiry order ex parte, if his account is indeed
the subject of an examination. Emphasized by our
discussion of the safeguards under Section 11 preceding the
issuance of such an order, we find that there is nothing
therein which precludes the owner of the account from
challenging the basis for the issuance thereof.
The present controversy revolves around the issue of
whether or not the appellate court, through the Presiding
Justice, gravely abused its discretion when it effectively
denied SPCMB’s letter-request for confirmation that the
AMLC had applied (ex parte) for, and was granted, a bank
inquiry order to examine SPCMB’s bank accounts relative
to the investigation conducted on Vice President Binay’s
accounts.
We recall the Presiding Justice’s letter to SPCMB

categorically stating that “under the rules, the Office of the
Presiding Justice is strictly mandated not to disclose,
divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in
any manner or by any means, the fact of the filing of the
petition brought before [the Court of Appeals] by the
[AMLC], its contents and even its entry in the logbook.”
Note that the letter did not cite the aforementioned rules
that were supposedly crystal clear to foreclose ambiguity.
Note further that Rules 10.c.3 and 10.d of the IRR on
Authority to File Petitions for Freeze Order provides that:
Rule 10.c. Duty of Covered Institutions upon receipt

thereof.—

52

Rule 10.c.1. Upon receipt of the notice of the freeze order,

the covered institution concerned shall immediately freeze the
monetary instrument or property and related accounts subject
thereof.
Rule 10.c.2. The covered institution shall likewise
immediately furnish a copy of the notice of the freeze order upon
the owner or holder of the monetary instrument or property or
related accounts subject thereof.
Rule 10.c.3. Within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
the freeze order, the covered institution concerned shall submit to
the Court of Appeals and the AMLC, by personal delivery, a
detailed written return on the freeze order, specifying all the
pertinent and relevant information which shall include the
following:
(a) the account numbers;

(b) the names of the account owners or holders;
(c) the amount of the monetary instrument, property or
related accounts as of the time they were frozen;
(d) all relevant information as to the nature of the
monetary instrument or property;
(e) any information on the related accounts pertaining
to the monetary instrument or property subject of the freeze
order; and
(f) the time when the freeze thereon took effect.
Rule 10.d. Upon receipt of the freeze order issued by the Court
of Appeals and upon verification by the covered institution that
the related accounts originated from and/or are materially linked
to the monetary instrument or property subject of the freeze
order, the covered institution shall freeze these related accounts
wherever these may be found.
The return of the covered institution as required under Rule
10.c.3 shall include the fact of such freezing and an

53
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 53

explanation as to the grounds for the identification of the related

accounts.
If the related accounts cannot be determined within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt of the freeze order due to the volume
and/or complexity of the transactions or any other justifiable
factor(s), the covered institution shall effect the freezing of the
related accounts, monetary instruments and properties as soon as
practicable and shall submit a supplemental return thereof to the
Court of Appeals and the AMLC within twenty-four (24) hours
from the freezing of said related accounts, monetary instruments
and properties.

The foregoing rule, in relation to what Section 11
already provides, signifies that ex parte bank inquiry
orders on related accounts may be questioned alongside,
albeit subsequent to, the issuance of the initial freeze order
of the subject bank accounts. The requirements and
procedure for the issuance of the order, including the
return to be made thereon lay the grounds for judicial
review thereof. We expound.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the
abuse of discretion to be qualified as “grave” must be so
patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all
in contemplation of law.36 In this relation, case law states
that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of

discretion.37 The degree of gravity, as above described,
must be met.
That the propriety of the issuance of the bank inquiry
order is a justiciable issue brooks no argument. A
justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is ap-
_______________
36 Republic v. Roque, 718 Phil. 294, 303; 706 SCRA 273, 282 (2013).
37 Villanueva v. Ople, 512 Phil. 187; 475 SCRA 539 (2005).

54

propriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is

conjectural or merely anticipatory.38
As previously adverted to in our discussion on the right
to privacy, the clash of privacy rights and interest against
that of the government’s is readily apparent. However, the
statutorily enshrined general rule on absolute
confidentiality of bank accounts remains. Thus, the
safeguards instituted in Section 11 of the AMLA and
heretofore discussed provide for certain well-defined limits,
as in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable
standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion by the appellate court in denying the letter-
request of SPCMB.39 In short, Section 11 itself provides the
basis for the judicial inquiry and which the owner of the
bank accounts subject of the AMLC inquiry may invoke.
Undeniably, there is probable and preliminary
governmental action against SPCMB geared towards
implementation of the AMLA directed at SPCMB’s
property, although there is none, as yet, physical seizure
thereof, as in freezing of bank accounts under Section 10 of
the AMLA.40 Note, however, that the allowance to question
the bank inquiry order we carve herein is tied to the
appellate court’s issuance of a freeze order on the principal
accounts. Even in Eugenio, while declaring that the bank
inquiry order under Section 11 then required prior notice of
such to the account owner, we recognized that the
determination of probable cause by the appellate court to

issue the bank inquiry order can be contested. As presently
worded and how AMLC functions are designed under the
AMLA, the occasion for the issuance of the freeze
_______________
38 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, 472 Phil. 285, 302; 428 SCRA 283,
291 (2004).
39 369 U.S. 186 (1962), cited in Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na
mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 460 Phil. 830,
890-891; 415 SCRA 44, 131 (2003).
40 See Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., supra note 13 at pp. 124-125; pp. 408-
409.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 55

order upon the actual physical seizure of the investigated

and inquired into bank account, calls into motions the
opportunity for the bank account owner to then question,
not just probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order
under Section 10, but, to begin with, the determination of
probable cause for an ex parte bank inquiry order into a
purported related account under Section 11.
In enacting the amendment to Section 11 of the AMLC,
the legislature saw it fit to place requirements before a
bank inquiry order may be issued. We discussed these
requirements as basis for a valid exception to the general
rule on absolute confidentiality of bank accounts. However,
these very safe guards allow SPCMB, post issuance of the
ex parte bank inquiry order, legal bases to question the
propriety of such issued order, if any. To emphasize, this
allowance to the owner of the bank account to question the
bank inquiry order is granted only after issuance of the
freeze order physically seizing the subject bank account. It
cannot be undertaken prior to the issuance of the freeze
order.
While no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on
the part of the appellate court when it explained in its
letter that petitions of such nature “is strictly confidential
in that when processing the same, not even the
handling staff members of the Office of the Presiding

Justice know or have any knowledge who the subject bank
account holders are, as well as the bank accounts involved,”
it was incorrect when it declared that “under the rules, the
Office of the Presiding Justice is strictly mandated not to
disclose, divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or
indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the fact of the
filing of any petition brought before [the Court of Appeals]
by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, its contents and
even its entry in the logbook.” As a result, the appellate
court effectively precluded and prevented SPCMB of any
recourse, amounting to a denial of SPCMB’s letter-request.

56

We cannot overemphasize that SPCMB, as the owner of

the bank account which may be the subject of inquiry of the
AMLC, ought to have a legal remedy to question the
validity and propriety of such an order by the appellate
court under Section 11 of the AMLA even if subsequent to
the issuance of a freeze order. Moreover, given the scope of
inquiry of the AMLC, reaching and including even related
accounts, which inquiry into specifies a proviso that: “[t]hat
the procedure for the ex parte application of the ex parte
court order for the principal account shall be the same with
that of the related accounts,” SPCMB should be allowed to
question the government intrusion. Plainly, by implication,
SPCMB can demonstrate the absence of probable cause,
i.e., that it is not a related account nor are its accounts
materially linked to the principal account being
investigated.41
_______________
41 Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160 as amended by RA

No. 9194 and RA No. 10167;
Rule 3.e.3. “Related Accounts” are those accounts, the funds and
sources of which originated from and/or are materially linked to the
monetary instruments or properties subject of the freeze order.
Rule 3.e.3.a. Materially linked accounts include but are not
limited to the following:
(1) All accounts or monetary instruments belonging to the

same person whose accounts, monetary instruments or
properties are the subject of the freeze order;
(2) All accounts or monetary instruments held, owned or
controlled by the owner or holder of the accounts,
monetary instruments or properties subject of the freeze
order, whether such accounts are held, owned or controlled
singly or jointly with another person;
(3) All accounts or monetary instruments the funds of which
are transferred to the accounts, monetary instruments or
properties subject of the freeze order without any legal or
trade obligation, purpose or economic justification;

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 57

In BSB Group, Inc. v. Go,42 we recounted the objective of

the absolute confidentiality rule which is protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such
inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the
existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit
in any given bank account:
x x x. There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these

primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would
authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or
otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as
_______________
(4) All “In Trust For” (ITF) accounts where the person whose
accounts, monetary instruments or properties are the
subject of the freeze order is either the trustee or the
trustor;
(5) All accounts held for the benefit or in the interest of the
person whose accounts, monetary instruments or
properties are the subject of the freeze order;
(6) All accounts or monetary instruments under the name of
the immediate family or household members of the person
whose accounts, monetary instruments or properties are
the subject of the freeze order if the amount or value
involved is not commensurate with the business or

financial capacity of the said family or household member;
(7) All accounts of corporate and juridical entities that are
substantially owned, controlled or effectively controlled by
the person whose accounts, monetary instruments or
properties are subject of the freeze order;
(8) All shares or units in any investment accounts and/or
pooled funds of the persons whose accounts monetary
instruments or properties are subject of the freeze order;
and
(9) All other accounts, shares, units or monetary instruments
that are similar, analogous or identical to any of the
foregoing.
42 Supra note 31 at pp. 514-515; pp. 610-612.

58

authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then

perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been
explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega. That case
principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against
an examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in
satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative,
the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the
legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that
the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at
protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the
purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine
the existence and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in
any given bank account. Thus:
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development Corporation,
as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to
inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so
that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the

discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No.
351 and House Bill No. 3977 which later became Republic Act No.
1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place
banks deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final
judgment. Thus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I
should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a
tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue [(BIR)] or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability,
and because of this the deposit of this individual [has been]
attached by the [BIR].

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 59

Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the

court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of
such person. But where the primary aim is to determine
whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a
proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed
by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under
the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there
is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain
individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring
out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that
prohibited by. . . the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the
inquiry. . . is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the protection of the right in
favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into
the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x
(Citations omitted)

What is reflected by the foregoing disquisition is that
the law plainly prohibits a mere investigation into the
existence and the amount of the deposit. We relate the
principle to SPCMB’s relationship to the reported principal
account under investigation, one of its clients, former Vice-
President Binay. SPCMB as the owner of one of the bank
accounts reported to be investigated by the AMLC for
probable money laundering offenses should be allowed to
pursue remedies therefrom where there are legal
implications on the inquiry into its

60

accounts as a law firm. While we do not lapse into

conjecture and cannot take up the lance for SPCMB on
probable violation of the attorney-client privilege based on
pure speculation, the extent of information obtained by the
AMLC concerning the clients of SPCMB has not been fully
drawn and sufficiently demonstrated. At the same time,
the owner of bank accounts that could be potentially
affected has the right to challenge whether the
requirements for issuance of the bank inquiry order were
indeed complied with given that such has implications on
its property rights. In this regard, SPCMB’s obeisance to
promulgated rules on the matter could have afforded it a
remedy, even post issuance of the bank inquiry order.
Rule 10.b. of the IRR defines probable cause as “such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an
unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is
about to be, is being or has been committed and that the
account or any monetary instrument or property sought to
be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity
and/or money laundering offense.” Evidently, the provision
only refers to probable cause for freeze orders under
Section 10 of the AMLA. From this we note that there is a
glaring lacunae in our procedural rules concerning the
bank inquiry order under Section 11. Despite the advent of
RA No. 10167, amending Section 11 of the AMLA, we have
yet to draft additional rules corresponding to the ex parte
bank inquiry order under Section 11. A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC
entitled “Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,

Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating
to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense
Under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended,” only covers
what is already provided in the title. As we have already
noted, the bank inquiry order must likewise be governed by
rules specific to its issuance where the AMLC regularly
invokes this provision and which, expectedly clashes with
the rights of bank account holders.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 61

Apart from Section 2, Rule IV of the 2009 Internal Rules

of the CA (IRCA) reads:
SEC. 2. Action by the Presiding Justice or

Executive Justice.—When a petition involves an urgent
matter, such as an application for writ of habeas corpus,
amparo or habeas data or for temporary restraining
order, and there is no way of convening the Raffle
Committee or calling any of its members, the Presiding
Justice or the Executive Justice, as the case may be, or in
his/her absence, the most senior Justice present, may
conduct the raffle or act on the petition, subject to raffle in
the latter case on the next working day in accordance with
Rule III hereof.
(AMLA cases are limited to the first three most senior
Justices as stated in the law and are raffled by the
Chairmen of the First, Second and Third Divisions to
the members of their Divisions only)

Nothing in the IRCA justifies the disallowance to
SPCMB of information and/or court records or proceedings
pertaining to the possible bank inquiry order covering its
bank deposits or investment.
We note that the Presiding Justice’s reply to the request
for comment of SPCMB on the existence of a petition for
bank inquiry order by the AMLC covering the latter’s
account only contemplates the provisions of Section 10 of
the AMLA, its IRR and the promulgated rules thereon.
Such immediate and definitive foreclosure left SPCMB

with no recourse on how to proceed from what it perceived
to be violation of its rights as owner of the bank account
examined. The reply of the Presiding Justice failed to take
into consideration Section 54 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC on
Notice of Freeze Order which reads:
SEC. 54. Notice of freeze order.—The Court shall order

that notice of the freeze order be served personally, in the
same manner provided for the service of the asset
preservation order in Section 14 of this Rule, upon the re-

62

spondent or any person acting in his behalf and such

covered institution or government agency. The court shall
notify also such party-in-interest as may have
appeared before the court. (Emphasis supplied)

We relate this Section 54 to the already cited Rule 10.d
of the IRR
Rule 10.d. Upon receipt of the freeze order issued by

the Court of Appeals and upon verification by the covered
institution that the related accounts originated from and/or
are materially linked to the monetary instrument or
property subject of the freeze order, the covered institution
shall freeze these related accounts wherever these may be
found.
The return of the covered institution as required
under Rule 10.c.3 shall include the fact of such
freezing and an explanation as to the grounds for the
identification of the related accounts.
If the related accounts cannot be determined
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the
freeze order due to the volume and/or complexity of
the transactions or any other justifiable factor(s), the
covered institution shall effect the freezing of the
related accounts, monetary instruments and
properties as soon as practicable and shall submit a
supplemental return thereof to the Court of Appeals
and the AMLC within twenty-four (24) hours from the

freezing of said related accounts, monetary
instruments and properties. (Emphasis supplied)
demonstrating that the return of the Freeze Order must

provide an explanation as to the grounds for the
identification of the related accounts, or the requirement of
notice to a party-in-interest affected thereby whose bank
accounts were examined. This necessarily contemplates the
procedure for a prior bank inquiry order which we ought to
provide for.

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 63

For exact reference, we cite A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, Title

VIII on Petitions for Freeze Order in the CA which certain
pertinent provisions we adopt and apply suppletorily as a
separate Title on Petitions for Bank Inquiry Order:
TITLE VIII
PETITIONS FOR FREEZE ORDER IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
SEC. 43. Applicability.—This Rule shall apply to petitions for
freeze order in the Court of Appeals. The 2002 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals, as amended, shall apply suppletorily in all
other aspects.
x x x x
SEC. 46. Contents of the petition.—The petition shall contain
the following allegations:
(a) The name and address of the respondent;

(b) A specific description with particularity of the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds, their location, the name
of the owner, holder, lienholder or possessor, if known;
(c) The grounds relied upon for the issuance of a freeze order;
and
(d) The supporting evidence showing that the subject monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way related to
or involved in an unlawful activity as defined under Section
3(i) of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9194.
The petition shall be filed in seven clearly legible copies and
shall be accompanied by clearly legible copies of supporting
documents duly subscribed under oath.
x x x x

64

SEC. 49. Confidentiality; prohibited disclosure.—The logbook

and the entries therein shall be kept strictly confidential and
maintained under the responsibility of the Presiding Justice or
the Executive Justices, as the case may be. No person, including
Court personnel, shall disclose, divulge or communicate to anyone
directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the fact of
the filing of the petition for freeze order, its contents and its entry
in the logbook except to those authorized by the Court. Violation
shall constitute contempt of court.
x x x x
SEC. 51. Action by the Court of Appeals.—All members of the
Division of the Court to which the assigned justice belongs shall
act on the petition within twenty-four hours after its filing.
However, if one member of the Division is not available, the
assigned justice and the other justice present shall act on the
petition. If only the assigned justice is present, he shall act alone.
The action of the two justices or of the assigned justice alone, as
the case may be, shall be forthwith promulgated and thereafter
submitted on the next working day to the absent member or
members of the Division for ratification, modification or recall.
If the Court is satisfied from the verified allegations of the
petition that there exists probable cause that the monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way related to or
involved in any unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) of
Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194, it
shall issue ex parte a freeze order as hereinafter provided.
If the Court finds no substantial merit in the petition, it shall
dismiss the petition outright, stating the specific reasons for such
dismissal.
When the unanimous vote of the three justices of the Division
cannot be obtained, the Presiding Justice or the Executive Justice
shall designate two justices by raffle from among the other
justices of the first three divisions to sit temporarily with them
forming a special division of


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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 65

five justices. The concurrence of a majority of such special division

shall be required for the pronouncement of a judgment or
resolution.
SEC. 52. Issuance, form and contents of the freeze order.—The
freeze order shall:
(a) issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council;
(b) describe with particularity the monetary instrument,
property or proceeds frozen, as well as the names of their
owner or owners; and
(c) direct the person or covered institution to immediately
freeze the subject monetary instrument, property or
proceeds or its related web of accounts.
SEC. 53. Freeze order.—
(a) Effectivity; post issuance hearing.—The freeze order shall

be effective immediately for a period of twenty days. Within
the twenty-day period, the court shall conduct a summary
hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or
not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its effectivity
as hereinafter provided.
(b) Extension.—On motion of the petitioner filed before the
expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze order,
the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a
period not exceeding six months.
SEC. 54. Notice of freeze order.—The Court shall order that

notice of the freeze order be served personally, in the same
manner provided for the service of the asset preservation order in
Section 14 of this Rule, upon the respondent or any person acting
in his behalf and such cov-

66

ered institution or government agency. The court shall notify also

such party-in-interest as may have appeared before the court.
SEC. 55. Duty of respondent, covered institution or government
agency upon receipt of freeze order.—Upon receipt of a copy of the
freeze order, the respondent, covered institution or government
agency shall immediately desist from and not allow any
transaction, withdrawal, deposit, transfer, removal, conversion,
other movement or concealment the account representing,
involving or relating to the subject monetary instrument,
property, proceeds or its related web of accounts.
SEC. 56. Consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture
proceedings.—After the post-issuance hearing required in Section
53, the Court shall forthwith remand the case and transmit the
records to the regional trial court for consolidation with the
pending civil forfeiture proceeding.
SEC. 57. Appeal.—Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling
of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the subject decision or
final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise.

A reverse situation affords us a clearer picture of the
arbitrary and total preclusion of SPCMB to question the
bank inquiry order of the appellate court. In particular, in
an occasion where the appellate court denies the AMLC’s
ex parte application for a bank inquiry order under Section
11, the AMLC can question this denial and assail such an
order by the appellate court before us on grave abuse of
discretion. Among others, the AMLC can demonstrate that
it has established probable cause for its issuance, or if the
situation contemplates a denial of an application for a bank
inquiry order into a related account, the AMLC can
establish that the account targeted is indeed a related
account. The resolution on these factual and legal issues
ought to be reviewable, albeit post issuance of the Freeze
Order, akin to the provision of an

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 67

Appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 57 of A.M. No.

05-11-04-SC.
Palpably, the requirement to establish probable cause is

not a useless supposition. To establish and demonstrate the
required probable cause before issuance of the bank inquiry
and the freeze orders is a screw on which the AMLC’s
intrusive functions turns. We are hard pressed to justify a
disallowance to an aggrieved owner of a bank account to
avail of remedies.
That there are no specific rules governing the bank
inquiry order does not signify that the CA cannot confirm
to the actual owner of the bank account reportedly being
investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank inquiry
order for covering its accounts, of course after the issuance
of the Freeze Order. Even in Ligot,43 we held that by
implication, where the law did not specify, the owner of the
“frozen” property may move to lift the freeze order issued
under Section 10 of the AMLA if he can show that no
probable cause exists or the 20-day period of the freeze
order has already lapsed without any extension being
requested from and granted by the CA. Drawing a parallel,
such a showing of the absence of probable cause ought to be
afforded SPCMB.
Ligot clarifies that “probable cause refers to the
sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and
the property or monetary instrument which is the focal
point of Section 10 of the AMLA, as amended.” This same
probable cause is likewise the focal point in a bank inquiry
order to further determine whether the account under
investigation is linked to unlawful activities and/or money
laundering offense. Thus, the specific applicability of
Sections 52, 53, 54 and 57 Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-
SC covering the following: (1) Issuance, Form and Content
of the Freeze Order; (2) Effectivity of the Freeze Order and
Post Issuance Hearing thereon; (3) Notice of the Freeze
Order; and (4) Appeal from the Freeze
_______________
43 Ligot v. Republic, supra note 33 at p. 483; p. 537.

68

Order as separate Rules for Petitions to Question the Bank

Inquiry Order. And as held in Eugenio which now applies
to the present Section 11 of the AMLA:
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order

under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section 11 are
similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which
the AMLC may avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money
laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language
to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief
therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. x x x.44

The cited rules cover and approximate the distinction
made by Eugenio in declaring that the bank inquiry order
is not a search warrant, and yet there are instituted
requirements for the issuance of these orders given that
such is now allowed ex parte:
The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular

requirements attaching to search warrants that are not imposed
by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A
constitutional warrant requires that the judge personally examine
under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, such examination being in the form of searching
questions and answers. Those are impositions which the
legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank inquiry
order under the AMLA and we cannot find sufficient legal basis to
apply them to Section 11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank
inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it
contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or
property.
Even as the Constitution and the Rules of Court impose a high
procedural standard for the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of search warrants which Congress chose not to
prescribe for the bank inquiry order under the AMLA, Congress
nonetheless dis-
_______________

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allowed ex parte applications for the inquiry order. We can discern

that in exchange for these procedural standards normally applied
to search warrants, Congress chose instead to legislate a right to
notice and a right to be heard — characteristics of judicial
proceedings which are not ex parte. Absent any demonstrable
constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute such
legislative policy choices.45

Thus, as an ex parte bank inquiry order which Congress
has now specifically allowed, the owner of a bank account
post issuance of the freeze order has an opportunity under
the Rules to contest the establishment of probable cause.
Again, we cannot avoid the requirement-limitation
nexus in Section 11. As it affords the government authority
to pursue a legitimate state interest to investigate money
laundering offenses, such likewise provides the limits for
the authority given. Moreover, allowance to the owner of
the bank account, post issuance of the bank inquiry order
and the corresponding freeze order, of remedies to question
the order, will not forestall and waylay the government’s
pursuit of money launderers. That the bank inquiry order
is a separate from the freeze order does not denote that it
cannot be questioned. The opportunity is still rife for the
owner of a bank account to question the basis for its very
inclusion into the investigation and the corresponding
freezing of its account in the process.
As noted in Eugenio, such an allowance accorded the
account holder who wants to contest the issuance of the
order and the actual investigation by the AMLC, does not
cast an unreasonable burden since the bank inquiry order
has already been issued. Further, allowing for notice to the
account holder should not, in any way, compromise the
integrity of the bank records subject of the inquiry which
remain in the possession and control of the bank. The
account holder so notified remains unable to do anything to
conceal or cleanse his bank
_______________
45 Id., at p. 127; pp. 411-412.

70

account records of suspicious or anomalous transactions, at

least not without the wholehearted cooperation of the bank,
which inherently has no vested interest to aid the account
holder in such manner. Rule 10.c46 of the IRR provides for
Duty of the Covered Institution receiving the Freeze Order.
Such can likewise be made applicable to covered
institutions notified of a bank inquiry order.
On the other hand, a scenario where SPCMB or any
account holder under examination later shows that the
bank inquiry order was without the required probable
cause, the information obtained through the account
reverts to, and maintains, its confidentiality. In short, any
and all informa-
_______________
46 Rule 10.c. Duty of Covered Institutions upon receipt

thereof.—
Rule 10.c.1. Upon receipt of the notice of the freeze order, the
covered institution concerned shall immediately freeze the
monetary instrument or property and related accounts subject
thereof.
Rule 10.c.2. The covered institution shall likewise
immediately furnish a copy of the notice of the freeze order upon
the owner or holder of the monetary instrument or property or
related accounts subject thereof.
Rule 10.c.3. Within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the
freeze order, the covered institution concerned shall submit to the
Court of Appeals and the AMLC, by personal delivery, a detailed
written return on the freeze order, specifying all the pertinent and
relevant information which shall include the following:
(a) the account numbers;
(b) the names of the account owners or holders;
(c) the amount of the monetary instrument, property or
related accounts as of the time they were frozen;
(d) all relevant information as to the nature of the
monetary instrument or property;
(e) any information on the related accounts pertaining to
the monetary instrument or property subject of the freeze
order; and
(f) the time when the freeze thereon took effect.

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tion obtained therein by the AMLC remains confidential, as

if no examination or inquiry on the bank account or
investments was undertaken. The foregoing consequence
can be added as a Section in the Rules entitled “Effect of
absence of probable cause.”
All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of
the AMLA allowing the ex parte application by the AMLC
for authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank
deposits and investments.
Section 11 of the AMLA providing for the ex parte bank
deposit inquiry is constitutionally firm for the reasons
already discussed. The ex parte inquiry shall be upon
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related
to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) of the law
or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the same
law. To effect the limit on the ex parte inquiry, the petition
under oath for authority to inquire, must, akin to the
requirement of a petition for freeze order enumerated in
Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, contain the name and
address of the respondent; the grounds relied upon for the
issuance of the order of inquiry; and the supporting
evidence that the subject bank deposit are in any way
related to or involved in an unlawful activity.
If the CA finds no substantial merit in the petition, it
shall dismiss the petition outright stating the specific
reasons for such denial. If found meritorious and there is a
subsequent petition for freeze order, the proceedings shall
be governed by the existing Rules on Petitions for Freeze
Order in the CA. From the issuance of a freeze order, the
party aggrieved by the ruling of the court may appeal to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising all pertinent
questions of law and issues, including the propriety of the
issuance of a bank inquiry order. The appeal shall not stay
the enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless
the Supreme Court directs otherwise. The CA is directed to
draft rules based on the foregoing discussions to
complement the existing A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC

72

Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset

Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument,
Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating
to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense
under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended for submission
to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and
eventual approval and promulgation of the Court En Banc.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is declared VALID
and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., No part.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Caguioa, J., On Leave.
CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result. It is my honor to do so considering
that the majority opinion is the final ponencia for this
Court En Banc of our esteemed colleague Justice Jose P.
Perez.
I join the unanimous declaration that, based on the
challenges posed by the present petitions and only within
its ambient facts, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160 or
the Anti-Money Laundering Act is not unconstitutional.
Further, that we are unanimous in declaring that the
depositor has no right to demand that it be notified of any
application or issuance of an order to inquire into his or her
bank deposit. The procedure in the Court of Appeals is ex
parte but requires proof of

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 73

probable cause of the occurrence of the predicate crime as

well as the potential liability of the owner of the deposit.
After the inquiry of the bank deposits and related
accounts within the limitations contained in the court
order, it is still the option of the law enforcers or the Anti-
Money Laundering Council, to proceed to request for a
Freeze Order in accordance with Section 10 of the same
law. The depositor is, thus, entitled to be informed only
after the freeze order has been issued. In questioning the
freeze order, the depositor may then raise defenses relating
to the existence of sufficient evidence to lead the court to
believe that there is probable cause that a covered crime
has occurred, that the depositor is a participant in the
crime, and that the stay of all transactions with respect to
the bank account is essential in order to preserve evidence
or to keep the proceeds of the crime intact for and on behalf
of the victims.
I differ with the premises used to arrive at the same
conclusion.

I

The numbers on a bank’s ledger corresponding to the
amounts of money that a depositor has and its various
transactions, especially when digitized, are definitely not
physical. Yet, just because they are not physical does not
necessarily mean that they do not partake of the kinds of
“life, liberty, or property”1 protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Neither should it mean that the
numerical equivalent of the bank’s debt to a depositor or
the record of its various transactions have nothing to do
with the “persons . . . papers,
_______________
1 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1 provides:

ARTICLE III. Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

74

and effects”2 constitutionally protected against

3
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” The majority
opinion’s statement that the “inquiry by the [Anti-Money
Laundering Council] into certain bank deposits and
investments does not violate substantive due process, there
being no physical seizure of property involved at that
stage”4 may have been inadvertent. It does, however,
neglect that the penumbra of rights protected by the due
process clause and the proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures also pertains to protecting the
intangibles essential to human life. Definitely, every liberal
democratic constitutional order has outgrown the archaic
concept that life is only that which can be tangible.
The due process clause is crafted as a proscription. Thus,
it states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law[.]”5 This means that
there is a sphere of individual existence or a penumbra of
individual autonomy that exists prior to every regulation
that should primordially be left untouched. In other words,
the existence of what Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D.
Warren once called “the right to be let alone”6 is now
broadly, though at times
_______________
2 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2 provides:

ARTICLE III. Bill of Rights
. . . .
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
3 Id.
4 Ponencia, p. 29.
5 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1.
6 Warren, Samuel D. and Brandeis, Louis D., The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See also Kramer, Irwin R., The

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VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 75

awkwardly referred to roughly as the right to privacy,

presumed. Every regulation therefore that limits this
aspect of individuality may be the subject of inquiry that it
does not “deprive” one of their “life, liberty or property”
without “due process of law.”
Thus, in the often cited writings of Warren and Brandeis
as early as 1890 on the right to privacy:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in

property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature
and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic
changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law,
in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. Thus,
in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical
interference with life and property, for trespasses vi et armis.
Then the “right to life” served only to protect the subject from
battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual
restraint; and the right to property secured to the individual his
lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of man’s
spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the
scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has
come to mean the right to enjoy life — the right to be let alone;
the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil
privileges; and the term “property” has grown to comprise every
form of possession — intangible, as well as tangible.
Thus, with the recognition of the legal value of sensations, the
protection against actual bodily injury was extended to prohibit
mere attempts to do such injury; that is, the putting another in
fear of such injury. From the action of battery grew that of
assault. Much later there came a qualified protection of the
individual against offensive noises and odors, against dust and
_______________
Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren & Brandeis, 39 CATH. U.L.
REV. 703 (1990).

76

smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of nuisance was

developed. So regard for human emotions soon extended the scope
of personal immunity beyond the body of the individual. His
reputation, the standing among his fellowmen, was considered,
and the law of slander and libel arose. Man’s family relations
became a part of the legal conception of his life, and the alienation
of a wife’s affections was held remediable. Occasionally the law
halted —as in its refusal to recognize the intrusion by seduction
upon the honor of the family. But even here the demands of
society were met. A mean fiction, the action per quod servitium
amisit, was resorted to, and by allowing damages for injury to the
parents’ feelings, an adequate remedy was ordinarily afforded.
Similar to the expansion of the right to life was the growth of the
legal conception of property. From corporeal property arose the
incorporeal rights issuing out of it; and then there opened the
wide realm of intangible property, in the products and processes
of the mind, as works of literature and art, goodwill, trade secrets,
and trademarks.
This development of the law was inevitable.7 (Citations
omitted)
Nothing in the structure of the due process clause limits

the protected sphere of individual existence or autonomy
only to the physical or corporeal aspects of life. After all, as
we have long held, life is not limited only to physical
existence.8
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 193-195.

8 Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 50; 568 SCRA 1,
52 (2008) [Per CJ. Puno, En Banc], explained the concept of right to life:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially
the right to be alive — upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned — the right to security of person is a guarantee of the
secure quality of this life, viz.: “The life to which each person has a right is
not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably
violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance
that the government he established

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Property can be incorporeal.9 Liberty denotes something

more than just freedom from physical restraint.
_______________
and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The
ideal of security in life and property . . . pervades the whole history of
man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence.” In a broad sense, the
right to security of person “emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.” (Citations
omitted)
See also J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015, 776 SCRA 434, 644 [Per
J. Villarama, Jr., En Banc].
9 CIVIL CODE, Arts. 415(10), 417, 519, 520, 521, 613, 721, and 722
provide:
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
. . . .
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real
rights over immovable property
. . . . .
Article 417. The following are also considered as personal property:
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables
or demandable sums; and
(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial
entities, although they may have real estate.
. . . .
Article 519. Mining claims and rights and other matters concerning
minerals and mineral lands are governed by special laws.
Article 520. A trade mark or tradename duly registered in the proper
government bureau or office is owned by and pertains to the person,
corporation, or firm registering the same, subject to the provisions of
special laws.

78

_______________
Article 521. The goodwill of a business is property, and may be

transferred together with the right to use the name under which the
business is conducted.
. . . .
Article 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon
an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner. The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto,
the servient estate.
Article 721. By intellectual creation, the following persons acquire
ownership:
(1) The author with regard to his literary, dramatic, historical,
legal, philosophical, scientific or other work;
(2) The composer, as to his musical composition;
(3) The painter, sculptor, or other artist, with respect to the
product of his art;
(4) The scientist or technologist or any other person with regard to
his discovery or invention.
Article 722. The author and the composer, mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of
the preceding article, shall have the ownership of their creations even
before the publication of the same. Once their works are published, their
rights are governed by the Copyright laws.
The painter, sculptor or other artist shall have dominion over the product
of his art even before it is copyrighted.
The scientist or technologist has the ownership of his discovery or
invention even before it is patented.
INTELLECTUAL PROP. CODE, Secs. 28, 71, 103, 147.1, 165.1, 165.2, and 177
provide:
SECTION 28. Right to a Patent.—The right to a patent belongs to the
inventor, his heirs, or assigns. When two (2) or more persons have jointly
made an invention, the right to a patent shall belong to them jointly.
. . . .
SECTION 71. Rights Conferred by Patent.—
71.1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
a. Where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to restrain,

prohibit and prevent any unauthorized person or

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_______________
entity from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing

that product;
b. Where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to restrain,

prevent or prohibit any unauthorized person or entity from using
the process, and from manufacturing, dealing in, using, selling or
offering for sale, or importing any product obtained directly or
indirectly from such process.
71.2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by
succession the patent, and to conclude licensing contracts for the same.
. . . .
SECTION 103. Transmission of Rights.—
103.1. Patents or applications for patents and invention to which they
relate, shall be protected in the same way as the rights of other property
under the Civil Code.
103.2. Inventions and any right, title or interest in and to patents and
inventions covered thereby, may be assigned or transmitted by
inheritance or bequest or may be the subject of a license contract.
. . . .
SECTION 147. Rights Conferred.—
147.1. The owner of a registered mark shall have the exclusive right to
prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in the
course of trade identical or similar signs or containers for goods or services
which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark
is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In
case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a
likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.
. . . .
SECTION 165. Trade Names or Business Names.—
165.1. A name or designation may not be used as a trade name if by its
nature or the use to which such name or designation may be put, it is
contrary to public order or morals and if, in particular, it is liable to
deceive trade circles or the public as to the nature of the enterprise
identified by that name.
165.2.
a. Notwithstanding any laws or regulations providing for any
obligation to register trade names, such names shall be pro-

80

More fundamentally, the reservation of a very broad

sphere of individual privacy or individual autonomy is
implied in the very concept of society governed under a
constitutional and democratic order. The aspects of our
humanity and the parts of our liberty surrendered to the
government, in order to assure a functioning society,
should only be as much as necessary for a just society and
no more. While the extent of necessary surrender cannot be
determined with precision, our existing doctrine is that any
state interference should neither be arbitrary nor unfair. In
many cases, we have held that due process of law simply
means that regulation should both be reasonable and fair.
_______________
tected, even prior to or without registration, against any unlawful

act committed by third parties.
b. In particular, any subsequent use of the trade name by a third
party, whether as a trade name or a mark or collective mark, or
any such use of a similar trade name or mark, likely to mislead the
public, shall be deemed unlawful.
. . . .
SECTION 177. Copyright or Economic Rights.—Subject to the
provisions of Chapter VIII, copyright or economic rights shall consist of
the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the following acts:
177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work;
177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement
or other transformation of the work;
177.3. The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the
work by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership;
177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or
cinematographic work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a computer
program, a compilation of data and other materials or a musical work in
graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy
which is the subject of the rental;
177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of the work;
177.6. Public performance of the work; and
177.7. Other communication to the public of the work.

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Reasonability and fairness is tentatively captured in the

twin legal concepts of substantive and procedural due
process respectively. Substantive due process is usually,
though not in all cases, a nuanced means-to-end test.
Basically, this means that the regulation which impinges
on individual autonomy is necessary to meet a legitimate
state interest to be protected through means that can
logically relate to achieving that end.10 Procedural due
process is succinctly and most descrip-
_______________
10 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311-312; 455 SCRA 308,
330-331 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], states, “[s]ubstantive due process,
as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient justification
for the government’s action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us
that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level
of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational
basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law
is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental
rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it
can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.”
Further, in Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, 800 SCRA 313, 359
[Per J. Bersamin, En Banc], the Court referred to three levels of scrutiny
in analysing the validity of governmental intrusion: the rational basis test,
which inquires into the reasonable relation between the means and
purpose of the law; the intermediate or heightened review where “the law
must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but . . . the classification . . . must
not depend on broad generalizations”[;] (id.) and the strict scrutiny review,
where the Government must prove the necessity “to achieve a compelling
state interest, and that [the law or ordinance] is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.” (id.) In Mosqueda, The Court declared
unconstitutional Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07 (id., at pp. 320-321)
which imposed a ban in aerial spraying as an agricultural practice, for

82

tively captured in the idea that in the kinds of deprivation

of rights where it would be relevant, there should be an
opportunity to be heard.11
In the due process clause, there is the requirement of
“deprivation” of one’s right to “life, liberty or property.” In
my view, this means more than the occasional and
temporary discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with
the natural workings of groups of human beings living
within a society. De minimis discomfort is a part of group
life, independent of the workings of the State. The
deprivation that may trigger a judicial inquiry should be
more than momentary. It must be
_______________
being “broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance

to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be
conducted”[;] (id., at p. 368) and for being unreasonable and oppressive,
“in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical
alternatives that will not overburden . . . those who stand to be affected.”
(id., at p. 372).
See also Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245; 582
SCRA 254 (2009) [Per J. Austria Martinez, En Banc]; White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461-464; 576 SCRA 416, 436-
438 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712 [Per J.
Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
11 Gutierrez v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 200628, January 13,
2015, 745 SCRA 435, 452-453 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]; Montinola v.
Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 198656, September 8, 2014, 734 SCRA 439,
459-460 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Department of Agrarian Reform
v. Samson, 577 Phil. 370, 380; 554 SCRA 500, 510 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, Third Division]; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 731, 740;
541 SCRA 444, 452 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; Air Philippines
Corporation v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481
Phil. 366, 386; 438 SCRA 51, 66-67 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division]; Macayayong v. Ople, 281 Phil. 419, 423-424; 204 SCRA 372, 376
(1991) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division]; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 641-642 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].


83
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 83

fundamentally disruptive of a value that we protect

because it is constitutive of our concept of individual
autonomy.
For instance, a person who chooses to walk down a
public street cannot complain that a police officer glances
or even stares at him or her. The discomfort of being the
subject of the observation by others, under those
circumstances, may be too fleeting and trivial that it should
not cause any constitutional query. That we look at each
other in public spaces is inherently a part of existing within
a society. After all, one of the worst human indignities may
be that we are rendered invisible to everyone for all time
within public spaces.
On the other hand, the uninvited and unwelcome
peering eyes of the State’s agents as we reside in our most
private spaces presumptively violates our right to life,
liberty, and even our property. In such cases, even the most
fleeting act of voyeurism can cause substantial disruption
of our collective values. Certainly, there is reason to trigger
judicial inquiry. If the intrusion is unreasonable, it violates
the constitutional protection of the due process clause.
Examining the petitioner’s bank accounts is analogous
to the situation involving the uninvited and unwelcome
glance. For some, their financial worth contained in the
bank’s ledgers may not be physical, but it is constitutive of
that part of their identity, which for their own reasons,
they may not want to disclose. Peering into one’s bank
accounts and related transactions is sufficiently disruptive
as to be considered a “deprivation” within the meaning of
the due process clause. It may be short of the physical
seizure of property but it should, in an actual controversy
such as this case at bar, be subject of judicial review.
I disagree with the majority’s opinion that bank
accounts do not have any “legitimate expectation of
privacy[.]”12 I believe that such opinion may be too broad a
reading of Republic
_______________
12 Ponencia, p. 44.

84

v. Hon. Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al.13 It is true that no bank

account or investment can be made without the cooperation
of those who work with financial intermediaries. The
possibility that there are those, who may come across
personal financial information, should not be the measure
of what may be “legitimate expectation” in a constitutional
sense. We should start to distinguish between knowledge of
the content of these accounts, storage of these information,
exchange of data, and making public disclosures.
What we deal with when the Court of Appeals allows
inquiry is simply providing the Anti-Money Laundering
Council or the appropriate law enforcement agency with
access to knowledge of the content of these accounts. The
limits of its storage, how it is exchanged, and making
public disclosures are another matter. Nothing in this
decision should be used to imply the nature of the right to
privacy or the factors to be considered to establish
“legitimate expectation of privacy” as it applies to storage,
exchange, and public disclosures of information.
The truth is that most of today’s digital data is
vulnerable to one who is curious enough, exceedingly
determined, skillful, and willing to deploy the necessary
time and resources to make discovery of our most private
information. Ubiquitous surveillance systems that ensure
the integrity as well as increase confidence in the security
of the data kept in a system are ever present. Copying or
transferring digital data occurs likewise with phenomenal
speed. Data shared in cyberspace also tends to be resilient
and difficult to completely delete. Users of various digital
platforms, including bank accounts, are not necessarily
aware of these vulnerabilities.
Therefore, the concept of “legitimate expectation of
privacy” as the framework for assessing whether personal
information
_______________
13 569 Phil. 98; 545 SCRA 384 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

85
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 85

fall within the constitutionally protected penumbra need to

be carefully reconsidered. In my view, the protected
spheres of privacy will make better sense when our
jurisprudence in the appropriate cases make clear how
specific types of information relate to personal identity and
why this is valuable to assure human dignity and a robust
democracy in the context of a constitutional order.

II

A bank inquiry order is a provisional relief available to
the Anti-Money Laundering Council in aid of its
investigative powers. It partakes of the character of a
search warrant.
United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip14 discussed the nature
of a search warrant:
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s contention

that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action
or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one
against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get
possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public
necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly
known as John Doe proceedings. While an application for a search
warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such
an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a
writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant
evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process,
restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a
police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant
must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the
Philippines.
_______________
14 500 Phil. 342; 461 SCRA 574 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second
Division].

86

A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a

process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private
rights. It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the
ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It
may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.15
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In a search warrant proceeding, there is already a crime
that has been committed and law enforcers apply for a
search warrant to find evidence to support a case or to
retrieve and preserve evidence already known to them.
In the same way, a bank inquiry order is “a means for
the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient
evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the account
holder for violation of the [Anti-Money Laundering Act].”16
It is a preparatory tool for the discovery and procurement,
and preservation — through the subsequent issuance of a
freeze order — of relevant evidence of a money laundering
transaction or activity.
Considering its implications on the depositor’s right to
privacy, Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act
explicitly mandates that “[t]he authority to inquire into or
examine the main account and the related accounts shall
comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and
3 of the 1987 Constitution[.]”
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 357-358; pp. 591-592.


87
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 87

to be determined personally by the judge after examination

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

“The phrase ‘upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce’ allows a determination of probable cause by the
judge [or the Court of Appeals in Anti-Money Laundering
Act cases] ex parte.”17
In People v. Delos Reyes,18 the Court held that due to the
ex parte and non-adversarial nature of the proceedings,
“the [j]udge acting on an application for a search warrant is
not bound to apply strictly the rules of evidence.”19
The ordinary rules of evidence are generally not applied in ex

parte proceedings, partly because there is no opponent to invoke
them, partly because the Judge’s determination is usually
discretionary, partly because it is seldom that, but mainly because
the system of evidence rules was devised for the special control of
trials by jury.20 (Emphasis supplied)

“The existence [of probable cause] depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge [or
magistrate] conducting the examination.”21 “However, the
findings of the
_______________
17 Mendoza v. People, 733 Phil. 603, 613; 722 SCRA 647, 658 (2014)
[Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
18 People v. Delos Reyes, 484 Phil. 271; 441 SCRA 305 (2004) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
19 Id., at p. 285; p. 316.
20 Id., citing Brinegar v. United States, 93 L. ed. 1879 (1949)
21 Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 563 Phil. 781, 793; 538 SCRA 474, 484
(2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

88

judge [or magistrate] should not disregard the facts before

him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.”22
Search warrant proceedings are ex parte because of the
necessities of the investigation. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Hon. Fernandez, etc., et al.,23 states:
. . . an application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is

neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications
must be expedited for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to
be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the
complainant and the witnesses.24 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, it is essential that investigations for Anti-
Money Laundering Act offenses, including the proceedings
for the issuance of bank inquiry orders, be kept ex parte, in
order not to frustrate the State’s effort in building its case
and eventually prosecuting money laundering offenses.

III

The absence of notice to the owner of a bank account
that an ex parte application as well as an order to inquire
has been granted by the Court of Appeals is not
unreasonable nor arbitrary. The lack of notice does not
violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
It is reasonable for the State, through its law enforcers,
to inquire ex parte and without notice because of the nature
of a bank account at present.
A bank deposit is an obligation. It is a debt owed by a
bank to its client-depositor. It is understood that the bank
will make use of the value of the money deposited to
further cre-
_______________
22 Id.
23 214 Phil. 332; 129 SCRA 373 (1984) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First
Division].
24 Id., at p. 350; p. 392.

89
VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 89

ate credit. This means that it may use the value to create
loans with interest to another. Whoever takes out a loan
likewise creates a deposit with another bank creating
another obligation and empowering that other bank to
create credit once more through providing other loans.
Bank deposits are not isolated information similar to
personal sets of preferences. Rather, bank deposits exist as
economically essential social constructs. The inherent
constitutionally protected private rights in bank deposits
and other similar instruments are not absolute. These
rights should, in proper cases, be weighed against the need
to maintaining the integrity of our financial system. The
integrity of our financial system on the other hand
contributes to the viability of banks and financial
intermediaries, and therefore the viability of keeping bank
deposits.
Furthermore, we are at an age of instantaneous
financial transactions. It would be practically impossible to
locate, preserve, and later on present evidence of crimes
covered by the Anti-Money Laundering Act if the theory of
the petitioner is correct. After all, as correctly pointed out
by the majority opinion, the right to information accrues
only after a freeze order is issued. It is then that
limitations on the ability to transact the value of the bank
account will truly affect the depositor.
Accordingly, with these clarifications, I vote to DENY
the Petition.
Petition denied, Section 11 of RA No. 9160 declared valid

and constitutional.
Notes.—Based on Section 10 of R.A. No. 9160, as

amended by R.A. No. 9194, there are only two requisites for
the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte
by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, and (2) the
determination of probable cause by the Court of Appeals.
(Ligot vs. Republic, 692 SCRA 509 [2013])

90

As a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be

extended by the Court of Appeals for a period not exceeding
six months; however, should it become completely
necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of
the freeze order, it should file the necessary motion before
the expiration of the six-month period and explain the
reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case
and justify the period of extension sought. (Id.)

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10/1/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 813

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016.*

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Money Laundering; Anti-Money Laundering Act; As presently

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 3

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices

the jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

charging respondents therein with falsification of two (2)

probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 5

account which court order ex parte for related accounts is

the subject of an examination.—Although the bank inquiry order

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

which precludes the owner of the account from challenging

confidentiality of bank accounts. However, these very safe guards

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 7

with given that such has implications on its property rights.—

is being or has been committed and that the account or any

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 9

owner of a bank account to question the basis for its very

10.c of the IRR provides for Duty of the Covered Institution

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising all pertinent

issuance of a freeze order, the party aggrieved by the ruling of the

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Money Laundering; Anti-Money Laundering Act; View that

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 11

order, it is still the option of the law enforcers or the Anti-

the law enforcers or the Anti-Money Laundering Council, to

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; View that every regulation therefore that limits

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 13

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices

trigger a judicial inquiry should be more than momentary. It

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not

determined personally by the judge after examination under oath

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 15

the complainant and the witnesses he may produce’ allows a

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

x x x The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the

1 Rollo, pp. 3-46.

2 Fact-finding as preliminary investigation based on administrative

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 17

The law firm of Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Anent your request for a comment on a supposed petition to

The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for

VOL. 813, DECEMBER 6, 2016 19

Rep. Mar-len Abigail Binay was a partner, are also included in

A. THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT IS

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. A CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE

8 Id., at pp. 12-13.