Salazar AAA Decision 1

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (“AAA”)
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
AAA Case No. 01-17-0004-0880
UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING

AGENCY (USADA),
Claimant
and FINAL AWARD
ALBERTO SALAZAR,
Respondent.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1
II. THE PARTIES................................................................................................................. 2
III. JURISDICTION .............................................................................................................. 3
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................................................................. 3
A. Notice Letter ........................................................................................................ 3
B. Charging Letter .................................................................................................... 3
C. Procedural Motions and Hearing ......................................................................... 5
1. Preliminary Hearing and Scheduling Order No. 1 ................................... 5
a. Respondent’s Motion for More Definite Statement of
Claims .......................................................................................... 5
b. USADA’s Motion to Amend Claim ............................................ 6
c. USADA’s Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas and/or to
Move Location of Arbitration to Houston, Texas ........................ 6
2. Scheduling Order No. 2 ........................................................................... 7
3. Procedural Order No. 3 ............................................................................ 8
7. Procedural Order No. 7 .......................................................................... 10
10. Procedural Order No. 10 ........................................................................ 10
15. Pre/Post-Hearing Briefs and In-Person Hearings .................................. 12
V. APPLICABLE RULES .................................................................................................. 13
VI. WITNESS LIST ............................................................................................................. 21
A. For USADA ....................................................................................................... 21
B. For Respondent: ................................................................................................. 22
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................... 24

A. Submissions ....................................................................................................... 24
1. USADA’s Submissions.......................................................................... 24
2. Respondent’s Submissions..................................................................... 24
B. Decision and Reasoning – Statute of Limitations .............................................. 24
VIII. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................... 25
IX. THE L-CARNITINE INFUSIONS/INJECTIONS ........................................................ 25
A. Charges .............................................................................................................. 25
B. Factual Background ........................................................................................... 26
1. L-carnitine Research .............................................................................. 26
2. Magness Involvement ............................................................................ 27
3. Magness Receives L-carnitine Infusion ................................................. 31
4. Magness as Athlete ................................................................................ 33
5. NOP Athletes ......................................................................................... 34
6. Email Exchanges Regarding Infusions and Injections........................... 39
7. Alteration of Medical Records ............................................................... 43
8. Dr. Maguadog and the Compounding Corner Pharmacy ...................... 45
C. Administration and/or Attempted Administration – L-carnitine ....................... 46
1. Magness Infusion - Administration ....................................................... 47
a. USADA Submissions................................................................. 47
b. Respondent’s Submissions......................................................... 51
2. Decision and Reasoning - L-Carnitine – Administration –
Magness Infusion ................................................................................... 54
3. Administration and/or Attempted Administration – L-carnitine -
NOP Athletes ......................................................................................... 57
a. USADA Submissions................................................................. 57
b. Respondent’s Submissions......................................................... 62
4. Decision and Reasoning - Administration and/or Attempted
Administration – L-Carnitine - NOP Athletes ....................................... 68
D. Complicity – L-carnitine – Magness Infusion and NOP Athletes ..................... 72
1. USADA’s Submissions - Complicity .................................................... 72
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
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a. Magness and NOP Athletes Infusion ......................................... 72

b. Intent .......................................................................................... 73
a. Magness and NOP Athletes Infusion ......................................... 74
b. Intent .......................................................................................... 76
3. Decision and Reasoning - Complicity - L-carnitine – Magness
Infusion and NOP Athletes .................................................................... 77
a. Magness Infusion ....................................................................... 78
b. NOP Athletes ............................................................................. 79
E. Tampering and/or Attempted Tampering - L-Carnitine .................................... 80
1. Submissions – Tampering and Attempted Tampering – L-
Carnitine................................................................................................. 81
a. Respondent’s Email Instructions to NOP Athletes
Regarding L-carnitine ................................................................ 81
b. Magness Role ............................................................................. 84
c. Medical Records ........................................................................ 85
2. Decision and Reasoning – Tampering and/or Attempted
Tampering – L-Carnitine ....................................................................... 86
a. Magness Role and Medical Records .......................................... 87
b. Respondent’s Email Instructions to NOP Athletes
Regarding L-carnitine ................................................................ 87
X. RESPONDENT’S PERSONAL USE OF TESTOSTERONE ...................................... 88
A. Charges .............................................................................................................. 88
B. Factual Background ........................................................................................... 89
1. Respondent’s Use of Testosterone ......................................................... 89
2. Respondent’s Role in Medical Treatment of NOP Athletes –
Focus on Increasing Testosterone Levels .............................................. 93
C. Submissions – Possession of Testosterone – Personal Use ............................... 95
1. USADA’s Submissions.......................................................................... 95
a. In Connection with an Athlete, Competition or training ........... 96
b. Acceptable Justification ............................................................. 97
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
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a. In Connection with an Athlete, Competition or training ........... 98

b. Acceptable Justification ........................................................... 100
D. Decision and Reasoning – Possession of Testosterone – Personal Use.......... 102
XI. TESTOSTERONE EXPERIMENT ............................................................................. 103
A. Charges ............................................................................................................ 103
B. Factual Background ......................................................................................... 103
C. Possession of Testosterone – Testosterone Experiment .................................. 109
1. USADA’s Submissions........................................................................ 109
a. In Connection with an Athlete, Competition or training ......... 109
2. Respondent’s Submissions................................................................... 111
a. In Connection with An Athlete, Competition or training ........ 111
3. Decision and Reasoning - Possession of Testosterone –
Testosterone Experiment ..................................................................... 111
D. Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking of Testosterone – Testosterone
Experiment ....................................................................................................... 113
3. Decision and Reasoning – Trafficking and/or Attempted
Trafficking – Testosterone Experiment ............................................... 118
E. Complicity Regarding Testosterone ................................................................ 121
3. Decision and Reasoning – Complicity Regarding Testosterone.......... 122
XII. TAMPERING AND/OR ATTEMPTED TAMPERING – POST-HEARING
CHARGES ................................................................................................................... 123
A. The Charges and Both Parties’ Submissions ................................................... 124
3. Documents ........................................................................................... 126
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
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4. Witnesses and Relevant Evidence ....................................................... 126

5. Coordination of Defense ...................................................................... 127
B. Decision and Reasoning – Tampering and/or Attempted Tampering -
Post-Hearing Charges ...................................................................................... 129
XIII. SANCTION ................................................................................................................. 132
XIV. DECISION AND AWARD ......................................................................................... 134
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WE, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATORS (“Panel”), having been designated by the
above-named parties, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs, arguments,
submissions, evidence, and allegations submitted by the parties, and after an in person evidentiary
hearing held on May 21-25, 2018, in Los Angeles, California, and an in person evidentiary
hearing held on November 26-27, 2018, in Houston, Texas, and an in person Panel deliberation
session held in May 2019 in Phoenix, Arizona, and after numerous Panel deliberation telephone
conferences, do hereby render the Panel’s full award as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
This case involves multiple anti-doping rule violation charges against Respondent
Alberto Salazar (“Respondent” or “Mr. Salazar”) in connection with his work as a coach
at the Nike Oregon Project (“NOP”). Claimant United States Anti-Doping Agency
(“Claimant” or “USADA”) charged Mr. Salazar with the following anti-doping rule
violations under the International Association of Athletics Federation (“IAAF”) Anti-
Doping Rules from 2009 to the present (“IAAF ADR”), the USADA Protocol for
Olympic and Paralympic Movement Testing from 2009 to the present (the “USADA
Protocol”), the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee (“USOPC”) Anti-
Doping Policies from 2009 to the present (“USOPC Anti-Doping Policies”), and the
World Anti-Doping Code from 2009 to the present (the “Code” or “WADA Code”)
(collectively, the “Applicable Rules”).
(1) Possession of prohibited substances and/or methods including

testosterone and prohibited IV infusions and related equipment (such as
needles, IV bags and/or syringes, storage containers and other infusion
equipment and devices).
(2) Trafficking and/or attempted trafficking of testosterone and prohibited

IV infusions.
(3) Administration and/or attempted administration of testosterone and

prohibited IV infusions.
(4) Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up, and other

complicity involving one or more anti-doping rule violations and/or
attempted anti-doping rule violations (“Complicity”).
(5) Tampering and/or attempted tampering.
The Panel finds that USADA has met its burden on the charges of: (i) Administration of
a Prohibited Method (an infusion in excess of the applicable limit), (ii) Tampering and/or
Attempted Tampering with the NOP athletes’ doping control process, and (iii)
Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking of testosterone. These violations collectively
are considered as Mr. Salazar’s first anti-doping rule violation, and a period of
Ineligibility of four years from the date of this Award shall be imposed on him. This is
the most severe sanction imposed among these violations, that of the Administration of a
Prohibited Method (an infusion in excess of the applicable limit), under both the 2009
and the 2015 Code.
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USADA V. SALAZAR AAA CASE NO. 01-17-0004-0880 FINAL AWARD
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The Panel finds that USADA failed to meet its burden on the charges of Possession of
prohibited substances and/or methods relating to prohibited methods and substances and
to testosterone, Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking of prohibited IV infusions,
Administration and/or Attempted Administration of testosterone and prohibited IV
infusions, Complicity regarding the anti-doping violation of Administration and
regarding Dr. Brown’s alleged anti-doping rule violation, Tampering and/or Attempted
Tampering with the doping control process as part of his hearing related conduct. The
Panel’s reasoning for its decision is set forth more fully and specifically below.
II. THE PARTIES
USADA is the independent anti-doping agency for Olympic and Paralympic sports in the
United States and conducts drug testing, investigates anti-doping rule violations, manages
results, and adjudicates anti-doping rule violation disputes. USADA was represented at
the telephonic and in-person hearings by William Bock, Esq., USADA’s General
Counsel, Jeffrey Cook, Esq., Director of Legal Affairs of USADA, Onye Ikwuakor, Esq.,
former Director of Legal Affairs of USADA, and Christopher H. Park, Esq., former
associate at Kroger, Gardis & Regas, LLP.1
Mr. Salazar is the head coach with the NOP in the sport of long-distance running. In 2001,
he helped create the NOP, which desired to make United States distance runners
internationally competitive through delivery of elite coaching and resources. Respondent
has recruited and trained top long-distance runners while at the NOP. Before his time
with the NOP, Respondent was an accomplished long-distance runner. He attended the
University of Oregon where he was a member of the 1977 NCAA cross country
championship team, won the individual NCAA cross country championship in 1978, and
finished second at the 1979 NCAA national cross country championships. Respondent
qualified for the 1980 Olympic team (but did not compete due to the U.S. boycott) and
broke the American indoor 5,000 meter record at the 1981 Millrose Games. He won three
consecutive New York City Marathons from 1980 to 1982. As head coach of the NOP,
Respondent has coached a number of athletes who won Olympic medals, set records, and
won different races around the globe. During the 2012 Olympic Games, Respondent
coached Mo Farah and Galen Rupp. Mr. Farah won gold in both the 10,000 meter and
5,000 meter, and Mr. Rupp won silver in the 10,000 meter. Respondent was represented
at the telephonic and in-person hearings by John P. Collins, Esq., of the Law Offices of
Collins & Collins, and Maurice M. Suh, Esq., Daniel L. Weiss, Esq., Zathrina Zasell G.
Perez, Esq., Harper Gernet-Girard, Esq., and Minae Yu, Esq., of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP.
Claimant and Respondent shall be referred to collectively as “the parties” and

individually as a “party.”
1
Mr. Ikwuakor and Mr. Park are no longer involved in this matter. Mr. Ikwuakor now serves as Associate General
Counsel for the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Mr. Park is an associate with the law firm
Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP.
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III. JURISDICTION
Respondent was a registered member of USA Track and Field (“USATF”), the national
governing body for the sport of Track and Field in the United States during the relevant
period. He actively participated in the IAAF and USATF events and was on the USATF
coaches advisory task force that put together USATF’s Coaches Registry and has been
listed on USATF’s Coaches Registry since its inception in 2010, which requires each
coach to acknowledge the Coaches Code of Conduct and pass a background check. He
is the principal in charge of a group of elite distance athletes subject to IAAF and USATF
rules, known as the NOP. He provided athlete support services to many individuals
associated with the NOP during the relevant period. As such, he is an “Athlete Support
Person” subject to the USADA Protocol, the USOPC Anti-Doping Policies, and the Code.
Pursuant to Paragraph 17(a) of the USADA Protocol, arbitration that arises out of the
USADA Protocol shall use the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)
Supplementary Procedures for the Arbitration of Olympic Sport Doping Disputes (“AAA
Supplementary Procedures”). Under R-4 of the AAA Supplementary Procedures, the
above-captioned arbitration was initiated when USADA sent the June 13, 2017 letter (the
“Notice Letter”) to Respondent outlining certain alleged anti-doping rule violations, as
further detailed below. On July 12, 2017, USADA sent a letter to the AAA requesting the
AAA to begin the process of scheduling the hearing and selecting the arbitration panel,
as provided under R-11 of the AAA Supplementary Procedures, as set forth in Annex D
of the USADA Protocol.
There was no challenge to jurisdiction, no objection to the composition of the Panel, and
all parties participated fully in these proceedings without objection to the jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the jurisdiction is proper here.
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Notice Letter
The Notice Letter informed Respondent through his legal counsel that a formal action
was opened based on evidence that he had engaged in anti-doping rule violations under
the Applicable Rules set forth above.
The Notice Letter advised Respondent of the commencement of this action and further
informed Respondent that USADA would make a written submission to its Anti-Doping
Review Board identifying information relative to the anti-doping rule violations intended
to be charged.
B. Charging Letter
In a letter dated June 30, 2017 (the “Charging Letter”), Respondent through his legal
counsel was informed that the USADA Anti-Doping Review Board had met and
determined that there was sufficient evidence of anti-doping rule violations. The USADA
Anti-Doping Review Board recommended that the adjudication process should proceed.
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The Charging Letter set out the same charges specified in the Notice Letter and outlined
the sanctions being sought, including but not limited to a lifetime period of ineligibility
from participating or coaching in U.S. Olympic, Pan American Games or Paralympic
Trials, being a member of any U.S. Olympic, Pan American Games or Paralympic Team,
and having access to the training facilities of the USOPC training center or other programs
and activities of the USOPC. The Charging Letter also notified Respondent of his right
to an arbitration hearing before the AAA to contest USADA’s charges..
On July 12, 2017, USADA sent a letter to the AAA requesting the AAA to begin the
process of scheduling the hearing and selecting the arbitration panel.
The Charging Letter specified the following anti-doping rule violations under the
Applicable Rules.
(1) Possession of prohibited substances and/or methods

including testosterone and prohibited IV infusions and related
equipment (such as needles, IV bags and/or syringes, storage
containers and other infusion equipment and devices). IAAF ADR
32.2(f)(ii); 2009 Code Article 2.6.2; and 2015 Code Article 2.6.2;
(2) Trafficking of testosterone and prohibited IV infusions.

IAAF ADR 32.2.(g); 2009 Code Article 2.7; and 2015 Code
Article 2.7;
(3) Administration and/or attempted administration of

testosterone and prohibited IV infusions. IAAF ADR 32.2(h);
2009 Code Article 2.8; and 2015 Code Article 2.8;
(4) Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up, and

other complicity involving one or more anti-doping rule violations
and/or attempted anti-doping rule violations. IAAF ADR 32.2(i);
2009 Code Article 2.8; and 2015 Code Article 2.9;
(5) Tampering and/or attempted tampering. IAAF ADR

32.2(e); 2009 Code Article 2.5; and 2015 Code Article 2.5; and
(6) Aggravating circumstances justifying a period of

ineligibility greater than the standard sanction. IAAF ADR 40.6;
2009 Code Article 10.6.2
On August 14, 2017, the AAA sent notice to all parties of the appointment of the Panel,
Maidie E. Oliveau, Esq., of Arent Fox LLP, as chair, Jeffrey G. Benz, Esq., of JAMS and
4 New Square, and Mark Muedeking, Esq., of DLA Piper LLP (US). Following
submission of the Panel’s disclosures and the expiration of time for objections to the
appointments, the Panel appointment process was completed without any objection
2
USADA did not pursue aggravating circumstances justifying a period of ineligibility greater than the standard
sanction, pursuant to 2009 Code Article 10.6.
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and/or dispute relating to the Panel. The Panel appointed Jeffrey B. Weston, Esq., of
Arent Fox LLP, as clerk to the Panel in May 2018, as confirmed by the Parties.
On December 17, 2018, USADA filed its More Definite Statement of Additional
Tampering Claim, to amend the Charging Letter and Notice Letter, pursuant to the
Panel’s Order No. 13 (as set forth below). The following claim was added:
(7) Attempted tampering or tampering in violation of Article

2.5 of the Code, based on the conduct of his counsel for which he
can be held responsible, which includes obstructing, and/or
bringing improper influence to bear, and/or interfering improperly
and/or otherwise subverting Doping Control, including the
investigative and/or hearing process by attempting to obstruct,
prevent and/or delay the receipt of documents, testimony or other
evidence to which USADA was legitimately entitled.
The Applicable Rules that the Panel relied on in reaching its decision are set forth more
fully and specifically in Sections V., below.
C. Procedural Motions and Hearing
1. Preliminary Hearing and Scheduling Order No. 1
A preliminary hearing was conducted via teleconference on October 23, 2017 for
purposes of addressing scheduling and pre-hearing motions. Appearing at the
preliminary hearing before the Panel were William Bock, Jeffrey Cook and Christopher
Park on behalf of Claimant, and John Collins, Maurice Suh, Harper Genet-Girard and
Minae Yu on behalf of Respondent.
The issues presented at the preliminary hearing included: (1) Respondent’s Motion for
More Definite Statement of Claims; (2) USADA’s Motion to Amend Claims; and (3)
USADA’s Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas and/or to Move Location of Arbitration to
Houston, Texas, all presented below. As a result of the preliminary hearing, the Panel
issued its Preliminary Scheduling Order No. 1 setting forth the scheduling and procedures
of the arbitration.
a. Respondent’s Motion for More Definite Statement of Claims
On September 28, 2017, Respondent filed a Motion for More Definite Statement of
Claims, which requested USADA “clearly set forth the alleged anti-doping rule violations
that are subject of the above-captioned arbitration.” Specifically, Respondent asserted
that the Notice Letter and Charging Letter failed to provide a clear and definitive
recitation of (1) the rules that Respondent violated; (2) the conduct that forms the basis
of those rule violations; and (3) the specific sanctions tied to each of those violations.
Respondent urged the Panel to order USADA to prepare and serve a single document that
sets forth the alleged anti-doping rule violations that Respondent violated.
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On October 12, 2017, USADA filed its Response to Respondent’s Motion for More
Definite Statement. In its response, USADA argued, in part, that the Notice Letter and
Charging Letter “more than satisfied Rule R-4 of the [AAA] Supplementary Procedures”
by outlining the violations charged and the sanctions sought. In addition, USADA filed
a “Stipulation Concerning USADA’s Charges”, that identified Respondent’s alleged anti-
doping rule violations and the Prohibited Substance(s) and/or Prohibited Method(s).
After reviewing the parties’ written submissions and hearing arguments during the
October 23, 2017 preliminary hearing, the Panel denied Respondent’s Motion for More
Definite Statement of Claims finding that USADA satisfied its obligation under the AAA
Supplementary Procedures.
b. USADA’s Motion to Amend Claim
On September 29, 2017, USADA filed a Motion to Amend Claim pursuant to Rule R-5
of the AAA Supplementary Procedures to add the claim of attempted trafficking to its list
of anti-doping rule violations found in the Notice Letter and Charging Letter. USADA
argued that attempted trafficking was referenced elsewhere on pages 9 and 12 of
USADA’s Notice Letter and that Respondent would not suffer substantial prejudice by
permitting the requested amendment. In its “Stipulation Concerning USADA’s Charges”
it filed on October 12, 2017, USADA revised its charges against Respondent to include
attempted trafficking.
On October 13, 2017, Respondent filed its Opposition to USADA’s Motion to Amend
Claim. In his Opposition, Respondent argued that USADA’s Motion to Amend Claim
should be denied because USADA failed to provide factual details supporting the addition
of an attempted trafficking charge and failed to provide concision in the Notice Letter and
Charging Letter. Respondent reasoned that USADA had ample time to articulate its
charges prior to sending the Notice Letter and Charging Letter.
During the October 23, 2017 preliminary hearing, the Panel heard arguments at length
from the parties regarding USADA’s Motion to Amend Claim. Upon consideration of
the parties’ written submission and arguments, the Panel granted USADA’s Motion to
Amend Claim, finding that Respondent would not suffer substantial prejudice if the Claim
was amended to include attempted trafficking.
c. USADA’s Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas and/or to Move

Location of Arbitration to Houston, Texas
On September 29, 2017, USADA filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas and/or to
Move Location of Arbitration to Houston, Texas. USADA argued that Rule R-28(e) of
the AAA Supplementary Procedures permits arbitrators authorized by law to subpoena
witnesses or documents and provides that they may do so upon the request of any party
or independently. USADA also contended that Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) authorizes arbitrators to summon witnesses, books, records, documents and
papers believed to be material evidence in an arbitration case. USADA provided an
extensive summary in its Motion of the information it sought to obtain in advance of the
arbitration.
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On October 13, 2017, Respondent filed its Opposition to USADA’s Motion for Issuance
of Subpoenas and/or to Move Location of Arbitration to Houston, Texas. Respondent
challenged the legal basis that USADA relied on in its Motion, and argued that USADA’s
requests were “overbroad, unduly burdensome, and would not be permissible even in a
civil or criminal case.”
After reviewing the parties’ motions and hearing the parties’ arguments during the
preliminary conference, the Panel denied USADA’s request to move the location of the
arbitration to Houston, Texas. The Panel also denied the issuance of subpoenas with
respect to non-parties. However, the Panel included in its decision that “[t]he denial of
this motion is not dispositive of any party’s right to request the issuance of subpoenas for
the hearing . . . .”
The Panel also set forth the pre-hearing procedures and the scheduling of the arbitration,
with the hearing to be held in Los Angeles, California on May 21, 2018, for five
consecutive days, through May 25, 2018.
2. Scheduling Order No. 2
As ordered in the Panel’s Scheduling Order No. 1, the parties were to meet and confer in
good faith on or before November 7, 2017 to adopt a discovery plan and schedule, and
adopt a pre-hearing briefing schedule. The parties tendered their respective proposed
hearing and discovery schedules, but after meeting and conferring were unable to reach
an agreement on (1) setting a reciprocal deadline for further discovery; (2) the timing by
which a protective order should be filed; and (3) the time by which USADA should be
required to file its pre-hearing brief. The parties submitted a side-by-side analysis of their
respective proposals.
After reviewing the submissions of the parties and Scheduling Order No. 1, the Panel
issued Scheduling Order No. 2 on November 22, 2017, setting forth the briefing schedule,
the discovery schedule, and the procedures to file motions to the Panel. The pertinent text
of Schedule Order No. 2 is as follows:
Both parties shall have until February 5, 2018 to tender discovery

requests.
The provisions of Order No. 1 with respect to discovery disputes

as set forth in Para. 2.a. remain in effect, i.e. to the extent there are
any discovery disputes, before any discovery request is brought to
the attention of the Arbitrators, the parties are required to meet and
confer in good faith to narrow the issues in dispute and in any event
submit the dispute to the Arbitrators on a timely basis, so that it
can be resolved in accordance with the Briefing Schedule below.
Discovery responses and any objections or motion for protective

order must be returned within two (2) weeks of service of the
request.
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Any motion to compel a response to discovery must be filed within
seven (7) days from the due date for the discovery response.
Any response to a motion to compel discovery is due within seven

(7) days from the filing of the motion to compel.
Any reply in support of a motion to compel is due within three (3)

business days from the receipt of the response to the motion.
The Arbitrators shall thereafter rule on the motion unless the

Arbitrators determine argument or clarification from the parties
would be helpful.
The last day to respond, object to, or file a motion for protective
order in relation to any discovery served by February 5, shall be
February 19, 2018.
To the extent any extraordinary discovery requests arise after the

closing of discovery, a request shall be made to the Arbitrators
within seven (7) days after the party making the request knew or
should have known about the requested information.
Any other motions may not be filed without permission of the

Arbitrators. Application to file motions shall be filed with the
Arbitrators not to exceed three pages, describing the motion the
party wishes to file, the factual and legal basis for the motion and
the reasons why the motion needs to be filed and how it will
expedite resolution of the case or otherwise benefit the parties. The
submission shall contain a certification that the requesting party
has in good faith conferred with the opposing party about the
proposed motion prior to the party requesting that a motion be
filed. The certification shall state whether the relief sought by the
motion has been agreed to by the parties or will be opposed. If no
conference has occurred, the reason why must be stated. The
opposing party may submit a responsive letter, not to exceed three
pages, within five days of its receipt of a letter requesting a motion.
3. Procedural Order No. 3
Procedural Order No. 3 was issued on December 15, 2017, following the submission of
USADA’s Motion to Compel filed on November 24, 2017, Respondent’s Opposition to
USADA’s Motion to Compel filed on December 1, 2017, and USADA’s Reply in Support
of USADA’s Motion to Compel filed on December 6, 2017. The primary issue involved
USADA’s desire to obtain documents relating to Respondent’s “use of testosterone
and/or the use of testosterone or to efforts to use testosterone or other products or methods
to boost testosterone levels within the Nike Oregon Project.” USADA argued that
Respondent’s objections to the document production were insufficient and/or required a
privilege log. Respondent argued that USADA’s Motion to Compel should be denied on
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procedural grounds and that if documents are produced, the Panel must issue a protective
order.
The Panel determined that Respondent must produce a privilege log with information
regarding the subpoena request, including the documents that may be responsive, a
description of the document withheld, and the basis for withholding such document.
Further, the Panel held that the parties were to meet and confer regarding the drafting and
implementation of a protective order. The Panel provided parameters for motion
submissions if the parties were unable to come to an agreement.
The parties entered into a Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order on or about
January 26, 2018, which the Panel approved on January 31, 2018.
Procedural Order No. 4 was issued on March 16, 2018 following the submission of
Respondent’s Motion to Compel on February 10, 2018, USADA’s Second Motion to
Compel on February 12, 2018, Respondent’s Second Motion to Compel on February 26,
2018, and USADA’s Third Motion to Compel on March 2, 2018.
After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Panel ordered the parties to produce certain
documents without further delay or objection. The Panel ruled that some of USADA’s
documents were protected from production, including documents that would not be used
at the hearing or be related to any witness who would testify at the hearing and documents
that were prepared by and exchanged among USADA and its investigators and/or
USADA’s counsel, or prepared by or exchanged among USADA and WADA, UKAD
and/or IAAF. The Panel also ordered Respondent to produce to the Panel for its in camera
review certain un-redacted emails and documents.
After conducting an in camera review of the un-redacted documents produced by

Respondent, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 5, which ordered Respondent to
produce to USADA, without further delay or objection, additional specific un-redacted
documents.
Procedural Order No. 6 was issued on April 18, 2018 following a status conference with
the parties. The relevant portions of Procedural Order No. 6 include:
• The Panel informing the parties that no testimony would be admitted or

considered, whether by declaration, affidavit or transcript, where a party’s
witness was not available for cross examination by the other party;
• The Panel denying Respondent’s Application of Leave to File a Motion to

Dismiss or to Strike or, in the alternative, Motion in Limine filed on April 9,
2018; and
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• The Panel ordering the parties to supplement their productions of documents
that were to be introduced at the hearing, up to the date the hearing
terminated.
After conducting a pre-hearing conference on May 14, 2018, the Panel issued Procedural
Order No. 7 on May 15, 2018. The purpose of the status conference was to discuss the
twelve topics the parties provided to the Panel for consideration prior to the pre-hearing
conference. The Panel heard lengthy arguments related to the twelve topics.
The Panel’s order included a finding that it was necessary to hear the testimony of Dr.
Jeffrey Brown and Diane Gonzales. The Panel granted USADA’s applications for
subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum, and expressed a willingness to issue the
subpoena(s) and travel to Texas.
On May 17, 2018, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 8 clarifying issues contained in
Procedural Order No. 7, including stating that the Panel will not consolidate USADA v.
Dr. Jeffrey Brown, AAA Case No. 01-17-0003-6197 (“Dr. Brown Arbitration”) with this
hearing. Consistent with Procedural Order No. 7, however, the Panel expressed a
willingness to issue the subpoena(s) to travel to Texas at a time to be determined.
On June 29, 2018, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 9 following several written e-
mails from the parties, regarding the scope of electronically stored information (“ESI”)
evidence to be produced as obtained from the Dr. Brown Arbitration and to set parameters
for the August 7, 2018 hearing in Houston, Texas, including that each party was allocated
a maximum of four hours for the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Brown and Diane Gonzales that
could be allocated to direct examination, cross examination or in whatever manner each
party would determine. The Panel also ordered that no prior testimony from Dr. Jeffrey
Brown and/or Diane Gonzales would be admitted or considered, whether by declaration,
affidavit or transcript. Rather, the Panel said such testimony could only be used for
impeachment and/or rebuttal purposes. The Panel also rejected Respondent’s request to
amend the previously approved Protective Order.
On July 31, 2018, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 10 following the submission of
USADA on July 11, 2018, the submission of Respondent on July 16, 2018, and the
submission by Respondent on behalf of both parties on July 24, 2018 concerning the
production of the ESI documents, including whether USADA was delinquent in
submitting the ESI evidence and whether to exclude USADA’s exhibits based on
relevancy.
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The Panel admitted the ESI documents that USADA submitted late, finding that
USADA’s delay did not prejudice Respondent. The Panel warned USADA that it would
impose sanctions should USADA neglect any other deadlines.
The Panel did not exclude USADA’s exhibits based on relevancy, rather the Panel
determined that it would consider each exhibit as introduced during the hearing and
determine the weight to give to each.
On August 2, 2018, USADA requested the Panel hear the testimony of Mr. Noel Kersh
and Dr. Steven Hoffart, two new witnesses, at the August 7, 2018 hearing in Houston,
Texas. Respondent objected. The Panel heard the parties’ counsels’ oral submissions
during the status conference held on August 3, 2018, and found that the proposed
testimony was not relevant or material to the outcome of this matter and denied the
request.
The Panel also informed the parties’ counsel that the August 7, 2018 hearing would need
to be rescheduled to October 4, 2018 due to an injury suffered by a member of the Panel.
On November 7, 2018, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 13, which addressed
Respondent’s motions concerning USADA’s recent submission of the Joint Defense
Agreement, dated July 30, 2018 (the “Joint Defense Agreement”), between Respondent,
Dr. Brown and Nike, Inc., and USADA’s request to introduce certain emails as evidence
in this matter. Respondent argued that the Panel should preclude these mails from being
introduced based on the common interest/joint defense privilege. After considering the
parties’ arguments, the Panel denied Respondent’s motions, as the Panel found there was
no common interest/joint defense privilege among Nike, Inc. and Respondent.
The Panel further ordered that the “Notice of USADA’s Anticipated Request for Leave
to File Motion to Amend Tampering Claim” and Respondent’s “Response to Notice of
USADA’s Anticipated Request for Leave to File Motion to Amend Claims” be treated as
a motion and opposition. After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Panel granted
USADA’s motion to amend its tampering claim. The Panel set out the schedule for the
parties to address the amended claim, including USADA submitting its Short Statement
of Additional Claim against Respondent and/or his counsel on November 12, 2018.
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The Panel also updated its previous orders to reflect a new post-hearing briefing schedule
due to the delay of the October 4, 2018 hearing.
Pursuant to the Panel’s Procedural Order No. 13, USADA submitted its Short Statement
of Additional Claim on November 12, 2018, and after the parties’ oral submissions at the
close of the hearing in Houston, Texas, the Panel ordered USADA to submit its More
Definite Statement of Additional Tampering Claim, which it did on December 17, 2018.
Respondent was ordered to submit its response to USADA’s More Definite Statement of
Additional Claim related to USADA’s additional tampering claim in his post-hearing
brief.
In its More Definite Statement of Additional Claim, USADA submitted and cited to
Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1015, and 1101 (“Subject Documents”). On December 22, 2018,
Respondent challenged the admissibility of the Subject Documents in its written
submission to the Panel. On January 4, 2019, USADA submitted its response to the Panel
as to why the Subject Documents should be part of the record. On January 11, 2019, the
Panel issued Procedural Order No. 14 excluding the Subject Documents from the record
in this matter because they were submitted past the final deadline for admission of
exhibits.
15. Pre/Post-Hearing Briefs and In-Person Hearings
From May 21-May 25, 2018, the Panel held a hearing in person on the merits in Los
Angeles, California at which it heard opening arguments from the parties and received
live testimony and video conference testimony. Each day’s hearing consisted of ten hours
of testimony and other proceedings. USADA was represented in person by William Bock,
Onye Ikwuakor, Jeffrey Cook and Christopher H. Park. Counsel appearing in person for
Respondent included John P. Collins, Maurice M. Suh, Daniel L. Weiss, Zathrina Zasell
G. Perez and Harper Gernet-Girard.
On November 26-27, 2018, the Panel held a second hearing in person on the merits in
Houston, Texas at which it heard live testimony from Dr. Jeffrey Brown and Diane
Gonzales. USADA was represented in person by William Bock, Jeffrey Cook and
Christopher H. Park. Counsel appearing in person for Respondent included John P.
Collins, Maurice M. Suh, Daniel L. Weiss and Harper Gernet-Girard. Joanie Bain of Bain
& Bain PLLC, counsel for Dr. Jeffrey Brown, also attended in person during Dr. Brown’s
testimony.
At the conclusion of the November 26-27, 2018 hearing, the parties were ordered to
submit post-hearing briefs. On January 17, 2019 and February 14, 2019, USADA and
Respondent respectively submitted 273 and 306 page post-hearing briefs. On February
27, 2019, the Panel granted USADA’s request to extend the time to submit its post-
hearing reply brief from March 7, 2019 to March 14, 2019. On March 14, 2019, the Panel
granted USADA’s request for a one day extension due to severe weather in Colorado
Springs, Colorado. On March 15, 2019, USADA submitted its 183 page post-hearing
reply brief.
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The Panel deliberated extensively on all of the above procedural motions and related
orders and on the final submissions of the Parties.
The Panel closed the hearing effective March 18, 2019. In light of the volume of the
record and briefs, and the complexity of the case, the Panel requested an initial extension
for the delivery of its award until July 19, 2019. Both parties consented to this extension.
Subsequently, and in light of the complexity of this matter and the voluminous record and
briefs presented, on July 3, 2019, the Panel requested and the parties consented to an
extension of time for the Panel to deliver its award until September 30, 2019.
On July 26, 2019, USADA requested that the Panel advise the parties of a date certain by
which the award would be delivered. Respondent did not object to this request. The
Panel denied this request.
The Panel rendered this award within the required time for doing so.
V. APPLICABLE RULES
Respondent argues that the applicable substantive anti-doping rules are those “in effect
at the time the alleged anti-doping rule violation occurred, unless the panel hearing the
case determines the principle of ‘lex mitior’ appropriately applies under the
circumstances of the case.”3 Respondent argues that lex mitior applies to and requires
application of the 2015 Code (with the 2018 amendments). The Panel nevertheless
analyzes the applicability of the 2009 Code where it differs from the 2015 Code with
respect to the conduct alleged here.
Charges 2009 Sanction 2015 Sanction

2009 Code and 2015 Code, Article Two (2) years Ineligibility for first Four (4) years Ineligibility where
2.6.2: Possession time violation. Article 10.2.1 is applicable. If
Article 10.2.1 does not apply, the
period of Ineligibility shall be two
(2) years.
2009 Code and 2015 Code, Article Four (4) years Ineligibility up to a Four (4) years Ineligibility up to a
2.7: Trafficking lifetime Ineligibility. lifetime Ineligibility, depending on
the seriousness of the violation.
2009 Code and 2015 Code, Article Four (4) years Ineligibility up to a Four (4) years Ineligibility up to a
2.8: Administration and/or lifetime Ineligibility. lifetime Ineligibility, depending on
Attempted Administration the seriousness of the violation.
2015 Code, Article 2.9: This is included in the 2009 Code, Two (2) years Ineligibility up to
Complicity Article 2.8: Administration and/or four (4) years Ineligibility,
Attempted Administration. depending on the seriousness of
the violation.
2009 Code and 2015 Code, Article Two (2) years Ineligibility. Four (4) years of Ineligibility.
2.5: Tampering and/or
Attempted Tampering
3
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 45:6.1.
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Based on the parties’ respective submissions, the 2015 Code is referenced as the primary
Code below and differences between the 2009 and 2015 WADA Codes are underlined
and identified by footnote or brackets. The IAAF Anti-Doping Rules are substantially
identical to the Code provisions so for uniformity the Panel refers in this Award not to
the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules, but only to the Code provisions.
Article 2.5 – Tampering and/or Attempted Tampering With Any Part of Doping Control
Conduct which subverts the Doping Control process but which

would not otherwise be included in the definition of Prohibited
Methods. Tampering shall include, without limitation,
intentionally interfering or attempting to interfere with a Doping
Control official, providing fraudulent information to an Anti-
Doping Organization or intimidating or attempting to intimidate a
potential witness.4
Defined Terms
Tampering: Altering for an improper purpose or in an improper

way; bringing improper influence to bear; interfering improperly;
obstructing, misleading or engaging in any fraudulent conduct to
alter results or prevent normal procedures from occurring; or
providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping
Organization.5
Doping Control: All steps and processes from test distribution

planning through to ultimate disposition of any appeal including
all steps and processes in between such as provision of
whereabouts information, Sample collection and handling,
laboratory analysis, TUEs, results management and hearings.
Attempt: Purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a

substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the
commission of an anti-doping rule violation. Provided, however,
there shall be no anti-doping rule violation based solely on an
Attempt to commit a violation if the Person renounces the Attempt
prior it to being discovered by a third party not involved in the
Attempt.
4
The underlined portion of Article 2.5 of the 2015 Code is not contained in Article 2.5 of the 2009 Code.
5
The underlined portion for the Tampering definition in the 2015 Code is not contained in the Tampering
definition in the 2009 Code.
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Article 2.6.2 – Possession
Possession by an Athlete Support Personnel6 In-Competition of

any Prohibited Method or any Prohibited Substance, or
Possession by an Athlete Support Personnel Out-of-Competition
of any Prohibited Method or any Prohibited Substance which is
prohibited Out-of-Competition in connection with an Athlete,
Competition or training, unless the Athlete Support Personnel
establishes that the Possession is pursuant to a therapeutic use
exemption granted to an Athlete in accordance with Article 4.4
[Therapeutic Use] or other acceptable justification.
The comment in Articles 2.6.1-2.6.2 of the Code provides that

“[a]cceptable justification would not include, for example, buying
or Possessing a Prohibited Substance for purposes of giving it to
a friend or relative, except under justifiable medical circumstances
where that Person had a physician’s prescription, e.g., buying
Insulin for a diabetic child.”
Defined Terms
Athlete Support Personnel: Any coach, trainer, manager, agent,

team staff, official, medical, paramedical , parent or any other
Person working with, treating or assisting an Athlete participating
in or preparing for sports Competition.
Possession: The actual, physical Possession, or the constructive

Possession (which shall be found only if the Person has exclusive
control or intends to exercise control over the Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method or the premises in which a
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method exists); provided,
however, that if the Person does not have exclusive control over
the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method or the premises in
which a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method exists,
constructive Possession shall only be found if the Person knew
about the presence of the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited
Method and intended to exercise control over it. Provided,
however, there shall be no anti-doping rule violation based solely
on Possession if, prior to receiving notification of any kind that the
Person has committed an anti-doping rule violation, the Person
has taken concrete action demonstrating that the Person never
intended to have Possession and has renounced Possession by
explicitly declaring it to an Anti-Doping Organization.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this definition, the
purchase (including by any electronic or other means) of a
6
The underlined ending to “Personnel” reflect the 2009 Code wording.
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Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method constitutes Possession
by the Person who makes the purchase.
Prohibited Substance and Prohibited Method are identified in the

Prohibited List. Testosterone is identified as a Prohibited
Substance on the Prohibited List. Prior to 2018, the Prohibited List
included: Intravenous infusions and/or injections of more than a
total of 50 mL per 6 hour period except for those legitimately
received in the course of hospital treatments, surgical procedures
or clinical diagnostic investigations is a Prohibited Method.
Beginning in 2018, the Prohibited List includes: Intravenous
infusions and/or injections of more than a total of 100 mL per 12
hour period except for those legitimately received in the course of
hospital treatments, surgical procedures or clinical diagnostic
investigations is a Prohibited Method.
In-Competition: Unless provided otherwise in the rules of an

International Federation or the ruling body of the Event in
question, ‘In-Competition’ means the period commencing twelve
hours before a Competition in which the Athlete is scheduled to
participate through the end of such Competition and the Sample
collection process related to such Competition.
Out-of-Competition: Any period which is not In-Competition.
Person: A natural Person or an organization or other entity.
Article 2.7 – Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking
Defined Terms
Trafficking: Selling, giving, transporting, sending, delivering or

distributing [or Possessing for any such purpose] a Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method (either physically or by any
electronic or other means) by an Athlete, Athlete Support Person
or any other Person subject to the jurisdiction of an Anti-Doping
Organization to any third party; provided, however, this definition
shall not include the actions of ‘bona fide’ medical personnel
involving a Prohibited Substance used for genuine and legal
therapeutic purposes or other acceptable justification, and shall
not include actions involving Prohibited Substances which are not
prohibited in Out-of-Competition Testing unless the circumstances
as a whole demonstrate such Prohibited Substances are not
intended for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or are
intended to enhance sport performance.
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Attempt.
Article 2.8 – Administration and/or Attempted Administration
Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete In-

Competition of any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method,
or Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete Out-
of-Competition of any Prohibited Substance or any Prohibited
Method that is prohibited Out-of-Competition. [The 2009 Code
also includes “…or assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting,
covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-
doping rule violation or any Attempted anti-doping rule
violation.”]
Defined Terms
Administration: Providing, supplying, supervising, facilitating, or

otherwise participating in the Use or Attempted Use by another
Person of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method. However,
this definition shall not include the actions of bona fide medical
personnel involving a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method
used for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or other
acceptable justification and shall not include actions involving
Prohibited Substances which are not prohibited in Out-of-
Competition Testing unless the circumstances as a whole
demonstrate that such Prohibited Substances are not intended for
genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or are intended to enhance
sport performance. [Administration is undefined in the 2009
Code].
Athlete: Any Person who competes in sport at the international

level (as defined by each International Federation) or the national
level (as defined by each National Anti-Doping Organization). An
Anti-Doping Organization has discretion to apply anti-doping
rules to an Athlete who is neither an International-Level Athlete
nor a National-Level Athlete, and thus to bring them within the
definition of "Athlete." In relation to Athletes who are neither
International-Level nor National-Level Athletes, an Anti-Doping
Organization may elect to: conduct limited Testing or no Testing
at all; analyze Samples for less than the full menu of Prohibited
Substances; require limited or no whereabouts information; or not
require advance TUEs. However, if an Article 2.1, 2.3 or 2.5 anti-
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doping rule violation is committed by any Athlete over whom an
Anti-Doping Organization has authority who competes below the
international or national level, then the Consequences set forth in
the Code (except Article 14.3.2) must be applied. For purposes of
Article 2.8 and Article 2.9 and for purposes of anti-doping
information and education, any Person who participates in sport
under the authority of any Signatory, government, or other sports
organization accepting the Code is an Athlete.
Signatories: Those entities signing the Code and agreeing to

comply with the Code, as provided in Article 23.
Use: The utilization, application, ingestion, injection or

consumption by any means whatsoever of any Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method.
Article 2.9 – Complicity
Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, conspiring, covering up

or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-
doping rule violation, Attempted anti-doping rule violation or
violation of Article 10.12.1 by another Person. [This is set forth in
Article 2.8 of the 2009 Code].
Article 10.2 – Ineligibility for Presence, Use or Attempted Use or Possession of a Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method
The period of Ineligibility for a violation of Article 2.1, 2.2 or 2.6

shall be as follows, subject to potential reduction or suspension
pursuant to Article 10.4, 10.5 or 10.6:
Article 10.2.1: The period of Ineligibility shall be four years7

where:
Article 10.2.1.1: The anti-doping rule violation does not involve a

Specified Substance, unless the Athlete or other Person can
establish that the anti-doping rule violation was not intentional.
Article 10.2.1.2: The anti-doping rule violation involves a

Specified Substance and the Anti-Doping Organization can
establish that the anti-doping rule violation was intentional.
Article 10.2.2: If Article 10.2.1 does not apply, the period of

Ineligibility shall be two years.
Article 10.2.3: As used in Articles 10.2 and 10.3, the term

“intentional” is meant to identify those Athletes who cheat. The
7
The 2009 Code provides a period of two (2) years Ineligibility for a first violation.
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term, therefore, requires that the Athlete or other Person engaged
in conduct which he or she knew constituted an anti-doping rule
violation or knew that there was a significant risk that the conduct
might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule violation and
manifestly disregarded that risk. An anti-doping rule violation
resulting from an Adverse Analytical Finding for a substance
which is only prohibited In-Competition shall be rebuttably
presumed to be not “intentional” if the substance is a Specified
Substance and the Athlete can establish that the Prohibited
Substance was Used Out-of-Competition. An anti-doping rule
violation resulting from an Adverse Analytical Finding for a
substance which is only prohibited In-Competition shall not be
considered “intentional” if the substance is not a Specified
Substance and the Athlete can establish that the Prohibited
Substance was Used Out-of-Competition in a context unrelated to
sport performance.
Article 10.3 – Ineligibility for Other Anti-Doping Rule Violations
The period of Ineligibility for anti-doping rule violations other

than as provided in Article 10.2 shall be as follows, unless Article
10.5 or 10.6 are applicable:
Article 10.3.1: For violations of Article 2.3 or Article 2.5, the

period of Ineligibility shall be four years ...8
Article 10.3.3: For violations of Article 2.7 or 2.8, the period of

Ineligibility shall be a minimum of four years up to lifetime
Ineligibility, depending on the seriousness of the violation… In
addition, significant violations of Article 2.7 or 2.8 which may also
violate non-sporting laws and regulations, shall be reported to the
competent administrative, professional or judicial authorities. For
violations of Article 2.9, the period of Ineligibility imposed shall
be a minimum of two years, up to four years, depending on the
seriousness of the violation.
Article 10.11– Commencement of Ineligibility Period
Except as provided below, the period of Ineligibility shall start on

the date of the final hearing decision providing for Ineligibility or,
if the hearing is waived or there is no hearing, on the date
Ineligibility is accepted or otherwise imposed.
8
The 2009 Code provides a period of two (2) years Ineligibility.
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Article 10.12-Status during Ineligibility
Article 10.12.1. No Athlete or other Person who has been declared

Ineligible may, during the period of Ineligibility, participate in any
capacity in a Competition or activity (other than authorized anti-
doping education or rehabilitation programs) authorized or
organized by any Signatory, Signatory’s member organization, or
a club or other member organization of a Signatory’s member
organization, or in Competitions authorized or organized by any
professional league or any international–or national–level Event
organization or any elite or national-level sporting activity funded
by a governmental organization.
Article 14.3– Public Disclosure
Article 14.3.2. No later than twenty days after it has been

determined in a final appellate decision under Article 13.2.1 or
13.2.2, or such appeal has been waived, or a hearing in
accordance with Article 8 has been waived, or the assertion of an
anti-doping rule violation has not otherwise been timely
challenged, the Anti-Doping Organization responsible for results
management must Publicly Report the disposition of the anti-
doping matter including the sport, the anti-doping rule violated,
the name of the Athlete or other Person committing the violation,
the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method involved and the
Consequences imposed. The same Anti-Doping Organization must
also Publicly Report within twenty days the results of final appeal
decisions concerning anti-doping rule violations, including the
information described above.
Article 14.3.4. Publication shall be accomplished at a minimum by

placing the required information on the Anti-Doping
Organization’s website and leaving the information up for the
longer of one month or the duration of any period of Ineligibility.
Article 14.3.5. No Anti-Doping Organization or WADA-accredited

laboratory, or official of either, shall publicly comment on the
specific facts of any pending case (as opposed to general
description of process and science) except in response to public
comments attributed to the Athlete, other Person or their
representatives.
Article 17 – Statute of Limitations
No anti-doping rule violation proceeding may be commenced

against an Athlete or other Person unless he or she has been
notified of the anti-doping rule violation as provided in Article 7,
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or notification has been reasonably attempted, within ten years
from the date the violation is asserted to have occurred.
Article 21.2.6
Athlete Support Personnel shall not Use or Possess any Prohibited

Substance or Prohibited Method without valid justification.
VI. WITNESS LIST
A. For USADA
Experts:
• Bradley D. Anawalt, M.D., Chief of Medicine at the University of Washington

Medical Center, who serves as a physician on the USADA Therapeutic Use
Exemption Committee.
• Gary Green, M.D., who serves as a medical director for Major League Baseball,
and as its research director on anabolic steroids and performance-enhancing
drugs. He conducts research on intravenous infusions and anabolic agents such as
testosterone and dietary supplements. He also serves as an ad hoc member of the
USADA Therapeutic Use Exemptions Committee and the USADA Adverse
Analytic Committee.
• Margaret Wierman, M.D., Professor in Medicine, Physiology and Biophysics at

the University of Colorado School of Medicine, and Chief of Endocrinology at
the Denver, Colorado Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Dr. Wierman has served on many
Endocrine Society committees, including the Annual Meeting Steering
Committee and Educational Programs Committee.
NOP employees, athletes, related persons and contractors:
• Steve Magness, former assistant coach with the NOP from January 1, 2011 to
May 2012. He was a competitive runner in college and has a graduate degree in
Exercise Science.
• Allan Kupczak, former massage therapist at the NOP, from early 2005 until
September 2005 and again from September 2008 until June 2011.
• Dathan Ritzenhein an athlete with the NOP from 2009 to 2014. He competed on
the U.S. Olympic teams in 2004, 2008 and 2012.
• Alvina Begay an athlete with the NOP from May/June 2011 until the Olympic
trials in January 2012.
• Lindsay Allen-Horn an athlete with the NOP from 2011 until 2013.
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• Kara Goucher, an athlete with the NOP from early 2004 until 2011. She earned a
silver medal in the 10,000 meters at the 2007 World Championships and was a
member of the 2008 and 2012 U. Olympic teams.
.
• Sheldon Andrew Begley, married to Amy Begley, an athlete with the NOP from
December 2006 until 2011.
USADA employees:
• Amy Eichner, Ph.D., a USADA employee working in the Drug Reference

Department since 2009 on the Drug Reference Hotline, Global Drug Reference
Online database, Therapeutic Use Exemptions, and Supplement 411. She is now
the Special Advisor to USADA on Drugs and Supplements.
• Matthew N. Fedoruk, Ph.D., USADA Chief Science Officer responsible for

providing scientific expertise to drive USADA’s science, testing, results
management, and supplement areas.
Former Nike employee:
• Daniel Mackey worked for Nike from August 21, 2007 until October 30, 2010,
He worked with Dr. Myhre (the head of the Nike lab (now deceased)) with blood
draws, blood testing and analyzing blood panels.
Former Nike contractor or employee:
• Jeffrey Brown, M.D., an endocrinology, diabetes & metabolism specialist in

Houston, Texas, who has been practicing for 43 years.
• Diane Gonzales, Dr. Brown’s Medical Assistant from July 1997 to December
2013.
B. For Respondent:
Experts:
• Francis Stephens, Ph.D., head of research at the School of Biomedical Sciences

at the University of Nottingham and author of studies concerning L-carnitine and
its role on metabolism.
• Paul Scott, President and Chief Science Officer of Scott Analytics and Chief
Executive Officer of KorvaLabs, Inc.
• Gerald A. Levine, M.D., endocrinologist in private practice for more than 20

years.
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Respondent’s physicians and personnel:
• Kristina Harp, M.D., physician specializing in internal medicine.
• Blake Cole, former medical assistant to Robert Cook, M.D., an orthopedic

surgeon and who passed away in 2016..
• Jeffrey Brown, M.D.
Pharmacist:
• Shannon Maguadog, Ph.D., pharmacist and owner of Compounding Corner

Pharmacy in Houston.
NOP employees or contractors:
• Darren Treasure, Mental Performance Coach for NOP beginning in 2007.
• Krista Austin, Ph.D., a nutritionist for the NOP from February 2010 until 2013.
• Alejandro (“Alex”) Salazar, Respondent’s son and a business manager at the

NOP.
Athletes at the NOP:
• Galen G. Rupp, has trained with Respondent since 2002. He has five individual
NCAA individual championships, an NCAA relay championship, two NCAA
cross-country team titles, an indoor track NCAA team title, and a silver medal in
the 2012 Olympic Games.
• Ciarán Ó Lionáird, a member of the NOP from the fall of 2011 to sometime in
2012.
Current and former Nike employees:
• Bradley Williams Wilkins, Ph.D. worked for Nike in its Nike Sport Research
Laboratory from 2008 until 2017.
• Tony Salazar, Respondent’s son who currently works for Nike’s Football Sports
Marketing Department.
Counsel to Dr. Brown:
• William B. Mateja, Esq., a partner in the Government Contracts, Investigations &

International Trade Practice Group, of Sheppard Mullin, Richter & Hampton,
LLP, resident in its Dallas, Texas office.
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VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Submissions
1. USADA’s Submissions
Article 17 of the 2015 Code, titled “Statute of Limitations,” provides that “[n]o anti-
doping rule violation proceeding may be commenced against an Athlete or other Person
unless he or she has been notified of the anti-doping rule violation as provided in Article
7, or notification has been reasonably attempted, within ten years from the date the
violation is asserted to have occurred.”
USADA references to both the 2009 and 2015 Code within their briefs. Article 17 of the
2009 Code contains a Statute of Limitations provision, “No action may be commenced
against an Athlete or other Person for an anti-doping rule violation contained in the Code
unless such action is commenced within eight (8) years from the date the violation is
asserted to have occurred.”
USADA submits to the ten-year statute of limitations period provided in the 2015 Code,
and argues that the limitations period is determined from the date it sent the Notice Letter
on June 13, 2017. Therefore, USADA contends that the statute of limitations period
commences on June 13, 2007.
2. Respondent’s Submissions
Respondent argues that the applicable substantive anti-doping rules are those “in effect
at the time the alleged anti-doping rule violation occurred, unless the panel hearing the
case determines the principle of ‘lex mitior’ appropriately applies under the
circumstances of the case.”9 Respondent argues that lex mitior applies to and requires
application of the 2015 Code.
Accordingly, Respondent calculates that USADA is time-barred from bringing an anti-

doping rule violation based on any conduct and events taking place on or before July 11,
2007—which is ten years before USADA’s initiation of this proceeding on July 12, 2017.
B. Decision and Reasoning – Statute of Limitations
The Panel notes that the two parties agree on the applicability of the 2015 Code and the
ten-year statute of limitations period. There is a difference about the date on which
Respondent has been “notified of the anti-doping rule violation” as required by Article
17 of the 2015 Code. Neither party submitted any arguments as to which particular letter
from USADA was the notification as referenced in Article 17, nor did the Panel find the
provisions of the Code referenced in that same Article to be of any assistance. The Panel
finds that the notice requirement was satisfied as of the date of the Charging Letter, i.e.
June 30, 2017, which was the formal letter charging Respondent, after USADA had
concluded its internal Doping Control Review Board process. The letter used by
9
Doc #20977284v5
24
Respondent to measure the notification was the formal letter which began the arbitration
process, but was not a notification letter – that had already occurred. Thus, notification
was provided as of June 30, 2017, the date of the formal Charging Letter.
In any event, there is no substantive effect with respect to the difference of 30 days
between the two asserted notification dates. Background facts occurring before June 13,
2007 were considered by the Panel, but none of them were asserted to be an anti-doping
rule violation. Thus, from a practical standpoint, the difference between the two dates
has no effect.
VIII. BACKGROUND
Below is a summary of the relevant facts and allegations based on the parties’ written
submissions, pleadings and evidence adduced at the hearing. Additional facts and
allegations found in the parties’ written submissions, pleadings and evidence may be set
out, where relevant, in connection with the Panel’s decisions. This hearing and decision
process has been, stated conservatively, extensive: the Panel has reviewed and examined
approximately 1,562 exhibits, heard seven full days of testimony, which are documented
in 2,543 pages of hearing transcript, reviewed and carefully considered the parties’ pre-
hearing and post-hearing briefs, which consist of 1,154 pages, reviewed and ruled on
various motions and issues that arose between the parties, which are articulated in the 14
Procedural Orders issued by the Panel, and the Panel was required to spend thousands of
hours on this matter. While the Panel has considered all facts, allegations, legal arguments
and evidence submitted by the parties in the present proceedings, it refers in this Award
only to the evidence and submissions that it considers appropriate to explain its reasoning
and does not undertake to catalogue all of the evidence and facts presented that support
the Award.
USADA’s charges all relate to the following general alleged sets of facts:
a. The infusions/injections of L-carnitine given to NOP athletes and to Mr. Magness

(the “L-carnitine infusions/injections”).
b. Possession and use of testosterone gel by Mr. Salazar.
c. Tampering premised on the alleged conduct of Mr. Salazar and his attorneys and
representatives after initiation and during the arbitration of this arbitration.
IX. THE L-CARNITINE INFUSIONS/INJECTIONS
A. Charges
USADA charged Respondent with the following Code violations in the Charging Letter
in connection with the L-carnitine infusions/injections:
• Possession of prohibited IV infusions and related equipment.
• Trafficking of prohibited IV infusions.
Doc #20977284v5
25
• Administration and/or attempted administration of prohibited IV infusions.
• Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, cover-up and other complicity involving

prohibited IV Infusions.
• Tampering and/or attempted Tampering regarding USADA’s investigation of

prohibited IV infusions that occurred prior to the initiation of this arbitration.
In its post-hearing submissions, USADA did not pursue the Possession and Trafficking
charges related to L-carnitine infusions/injections. Consequently, the Panel finds that
USADA abandoned those charges and, further concludes that USADA has not proven
facts sufficient to prove Possession or Trafficking with respect to the L-carnitine
infusions/injections and related equipment/methods.
B. Factual Background
Respondent in his coaching role was clearly eager to find ways to enhance the
performance of athletes he coached. He was introduced to a “new sports drink coming
out of the United Kingdom” by Paul Winsper, a Nike employee, as set forth below, after
the below research had been completed.
1. L-carnitine Research
Dr. Francis Stephens, an associate professor at the University of Exeter in the United
Kingdom, in conjunction with his research group at the School of Biomedical Sciences
at the University of Nottingham, published studies concerning L-carnitine and its role on
metabolism. Dr. Stephens testified that L-carnitine can facilitate the transport of fat into
mitochondria and the oxidation of fat to produce energy (i.e., fat metabolism).10 Dr.
Stephens’ studies found that the more L-carnitine present in the muscles, the more fat is
metabolized, saving valuable glycogen stores during competition and increasing
endurance.11
Dr. Stephens and his research group found that ingesting L-carnitine or receiving an
intravenous administration of L-carnitine does not, without more, get absorbed into the
muscle.12 He testified about two tests that he and his research group performed designed
to determine whether increasing the levels of insulin in the blood could increase the
absorption of L-carnitine into muscle.13
The first L-carnitine test involved subjects receiving an intravenous administration of a

solution containing sterile water and 9.67 grams of L-carnitine while also receiving an
intravenous administration from a solution containing saline and insulin.14 This
administration was done through injection into a vein in the subject’s arm.15 Dr. Stephens
10
Tr. (Day 3) at 911:12-20.
11
Tr. (Day 3) at 912:2-10.
12
Tr. (Day 3) at 914:16-915:12.
13
Tr. (Day 3) at 915:13-916:1, 917:2-919:13.
14
Tr. (Day 3) at 917:2-919:13, 920:1-4.
15
Tr. (Day 3) at 919:14-25.
Doc #20977284v5
26
concluded that increasing the insulin level in the blood while also maintaining an elevated
amount of L-carnitine in the blood could increase the absorption of L-carnitine into
muscle.16
The second L-carnitine test involved ingesting carbohydrates over a lengthy time period,
rather than infusing insulin, in order to increase the insulin level. Dr. Stephens testified
that this test indicated a similar impact as the first test, i.e. saving valuable glycogen
stores during competition and increasing endurance.17 The results from this second L-
carnitine test formed the basis of the development in 2010/2011 of a new sports drink by
a company headed by George Clouston (later called NutraMet). In January 2011,
Respondent was introduced to a “new sports drink coming out of the United Kingdom”
by Paul Winsper, a Nike employee working in the “Stark” department, which “had to do
with new training revolutionary methods.”18 Respondent explained that Mr. Winsper told
him that he “might want to think about [the new sports drink] for your athletes that could
really be, you know, a benefit.”19 Thereafter, Mr. Winsper introduced Respondent to Mr.
Clouston.20
2. Magness Involvement
After running at the University of Houston and Rice University, Mr. Magness attended
graduate school at George Mason University and obtained a degree in Exercise Science.21
Following graduation, he was hired by Respondent to serve as the assistant coach at the
NOP in 2011.22
On January 25, 2011, Respondent emailed Mr. Clouston to inquire about a “new
supplement and other supplements you have that might benefit my runners.”23 In his
email to Mr. Clouston, Respondent said that the NOP is known for “our cutting edge
sports science and medicine protocols.”24 Respondent explained that he had two athletes,
Mo Farah and Galen Rupp, who intended to compete at various races in the upcoming
weeks. On January 26, 2011, Mr. Clouston responded to Respondent’s email to inform
him of the time it takes to “load the muscle with carnitine,” advising Respondent that “the
clinical trials demonstrated that the performance benefits were obtained when athletes
consumed 2 doses per day over a 24 week period. It takes this time to load the muscle
with carnitine. Clearly the athletes you mentioned would not gain any performance
benefits in the 6 weeks leading up to their next races.”25
16
Tr. (Day 3) at 917:2-919:13, 921:11-22; Resp. Exs. 371, 316.
17
Tr. (Day 3) at 923:19-926:9; Resp. Ex. 89 at attachment.
18
Tr. (Day 4) at 1480:13-16.
19
Tr. (Day 4) at 1480:17-24.
20
Resp. Ex. 42.
21
Tr. (Day 1) at 189:8-191:3.
22
Tr. (Day 1) at 14-16.
23
Tr. (Day 4) at 1481:9-18; Resp. Ex. 42.
24
Id.
25
Id.
Doc #20977284v5
27
On January 26, 2011, Respondent forwarded the information from Mr. Clouston about
the L-carnitine sports drink to Mr. Magness.26 After conducting his own research into
the L-carnitine studies, Mr. Magness confirmed that Mr. Clouston was correct in that it
takes time to “load the muscle with carnitine.” On February 24, 2011, Mr. Magness sent
an email to Respondent that said, in part, that “it just takes a long time because we can’t
get much more in the muscle than that with ingesting it.” In another email to Respondent
on March 11, 2011, Mr. Magness said Dr. Stephens’ research “looks really promising and
the research behind it is very solid and thorough, unlike a lot of supplements” and “is
getting a lot of recognition.”27 On April 5, 2011, Mr. Magness emailed Respondent again
letting him know that the L-carnitine study was “published in another research journal.”28
On August 5, 2011, Respondent sent an email to his “OP Marathoners” that the “greatest
sports endurance supplement is on the way” and that the “first batch” was “getting tested
at an independent lab to make sure there’s nothing bad in it and then on the plane.”29 In
this same email, Respondent informed his athletes that “You will each start on ot [sic]
immediately as it takes months to build up.”30 Upon receipt of the shipment of the L-
carnitine sports drink on September 28, 2011, Respondent emailed Mr. Ritzenhein, Mr.
Rupp, Ms. Begay, Ms. Allen-Horn and Mr. Magness to inform them of the shipment.
Respondent’s email said:
Hi Everyone, I’m bringing a box of the new sports drink we got

from the UK to Nike tomorrow. I’ve got enough for six months for
each of you. It takes up to four months to take effect, so for the
marathoners you need to start now. It definately [sic] will help a
10k runner. Possibly a steepler and 5k runner. Steve, is it worth
giving to milers? All of you need to get it from me tomorrow. I’ll
be at the track at 9:30? For Jackie, Lindsay and alvinas [sic]
workout. Steve is it ready to go at9:30 ? [sic] – Alberto31
Respondent also forwarded the email he received from George Clouston that attached a
“short document which provides product information on the NutraMet Sport supplement”
to Mr. Magness on September 28, 2011. In his email to Mr. Magness, Respondent said:
Ho [sic] Steve, read thru this. I’m worried that it’s going to take
24 weeks for dathan to get results. In their article it talks about
getting the same results in a few days with infusions. Please check
into those asap with Dt. [sic] Brown to see if he can do it and of
course if it’s Wada legal. For everyone else we have time for the
supplement to work, for dathan we may not. This has to be a top
priority for you this week. Jackie, Ciarán, even Galen and mo take
26
Id.
27
Tr. (Day 4) at 1485:1-8; Resp. Ex. 49 at p.1.
28
Resp. Ex. 53 at p. 1.
29
30
Id.
31
Doc #20977284v5
28
backseat to getting dathan ready. I don’t care if you come to work,
just get this figured out asap. Thx! – Alberto32
Mr. Magness responded that same evening by informing Respondent that it’s “no good”
because “it has to be infused with Insulin to work like [that] in the studies. Insulin IV is
banned by WADA. I’ll see if there’s any other way.” Respondent responded to Mr.
Magness’ email by thanking him for the quick answer and advising that Mr. Ritzenhein
“needs to start on [the] supplement.”33
Respondent testified that the urgency related to the timeline of the L-carnitine infusion
was due to the U.S. Olympic Marathon Trials on January 14, 2012, at which Mr.
Ritzenhein and Ms. Begay would compete.34 Mr. Magness testified that he researched
how to increase the rate of loading the L-carnitine.35
On October 7, 2011, Mr. Magness emailed Dr. Paul Greenhaff, a researcher in Dr.
Stephens’ research group, to inquire whether there was “any way to potentially increase
the rate of loading.”36 Mr. Magness explained the purpose of his email to Dr. Greenhaff
by saying “[w]e have a runner who has about 15 weeks until marathon trials.”37 Following
their phone call on October 11, 2011, Mr. Magness emailed Dr. Greenhaff on October
13, 2011 the following:
Hi Paul,
Thanks for taking the time to answer my questions the other day. I
was wondering if you could send me the protocol for the carnitine
infusion. We are going to look at doing it here first to save on travel
and to see if that is a possibility.38
On October 19, 2011, Dr. Greenhaff emailed Mr. Magness a suggested “infusion
protocol”:
Hi Steve,
If you use the carbohydrate feeding from the “feeding study” [the
second L-carnitine test performed by Dr. Stephens] attached and
the CARNITINE infusion protocol from the attached “titration
study” (not the insulin and glucose infusions obviously) that
should work – having never done it I can’t be sure. One infusion
32
Resp. Ex. 75.
33
Id.
34
Tr. (Day 4) at 1615:3-12.
35
Tr. (Day 1) at 263:22-264:8; 470:7-471:8.
36
37
Id.
38
Resp. 79 at p. 2.
Doc #20977284v5
29
period should work – followed up with the normal daily feeding
protocol.39
On October 19, 2011, Mr. Magness forwarded Dr. Greenhaff’s email and attachment to
Respondent.40 Mr. Magness testified that Respondent encouraged him to communicate
with Dr. Brown in order to develop a process for the L-carnitine infusion.
On November 8, 2011, Mr. Magness emailed Dr. Kristina Harp, Respondent’s physician
in Portland, Oregon, to see if she would administer the L-carnitine infusions to NOP
athletes.41 Mr. Magness testified that he did not know Dr. Harp at this point, but reached
out to her based on Respondent’s instructions.42 For unknown reasons, Dr. Harp did not
administer the infusions.
On November 14, 2011, Mr. Magness emailed Dr. Brown regarding the L-carnitine
infusion:
Hey Dr. Brown,
Alberto wanted me to check with you on the plausibility of doing

this l-carnitine procedure. It’s explained in the procedures of the
attached study, without the glucose and insulin as explained
below. We’re looking at for Dathan, or maybe testing it on myself
to ee [sic] if there are any measureable performance changes.
Steve43
Dr. Brown expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the L-carnitine infusion in two
emails he sent on November 14, 2011.44 Dr. Brown expressed uncertainty in using
“insulin and glucose clamping” for Mr. Ritzenhein because he had a thyroid issue, and
concluded, generally, that the L-carnitine infusions were “not a good idea.” 45
On November 15, 2011, Respondent responded to Dr. Brown’s second email from
November 14, 2011 by saying: “Hi Dr. Brown, what if we just try it with Dathan? We
have nothing to lose, if it works it will get his Lcarnitine levels up quicker. If it doesn’t
there’s no harm. Thx! – Alberto.”46
39
Resp. Ex. 79 at 1; Tr. (Day 4) at 1493:3-1495:13.
40
Resp. Ex. 79 at 1.
41
USADA Ex. USADA-SAL 056133.
42
Tr. (Day 1) at 268:1-22.
43
Resp. Exs. 86 at 2; Resp. Ex. 88 at 3; Tr. (Day 4) at 1497:15-1498:10. This email references the October 19,
2011 email in Paragraph 89 herein.
44
Resp. Ex. 86 at p. 1-2.
45
46
Resp. Ex. 86 at 1.
Doc #20977284v5
30
In response to Respondent’s emails, Dr. Brown reluctantly agreed to administer the L-
carnitine infusions protocol on Mr. Magness, indicating continuing “doubts about how
well it will work.” 47
3. Magness Receives L-carnitine Infusion
On November 15, 2011, Respondent emailed Mr. Magness to see if he wanted to “do the
pre L-carnitine exercise tests prior to Thanksgiving, then you fly there [to see Dr. Brown
in Houston, Texas], get the L-carnitine infusion, come home and retest….”48 On
November 16, 2011, Mr. Magness responded to Respondent’s email by saying “I’m going
to the San Jose race. But had planned on heading home [Houston] for a few days from
there.”49 Respondent sent an email to Mr. Magness later that day that said: OK, so let’s
try and get the infusion done by Dr. Brown, we could even do the insulin infusion since
you’re not competing anymore? This would tell us for sure if the drink with time works
or not. – Alberto.”50
Mr. Magness responded to Respondent’s email that same day and said:
I talked to Dr. Brown.
He’s fine with doing it on me without the insulin. He said with it,
with me being [deleted for privacy], the response could be off. He
said we just have to order medical grade l-carnitine and then we
can get this set up for after thanksgiving.51
Dr. Brown and Mr. Magness exchanged emails on November 18, 2011 regarding where
the L-carnitine for the infusion could be obtained.52 In an email to Mr. Magness, Dr.
Brown said, “I will contact Monday [sic] the people who make our TRH [Thyrotropin-
releasing hormone] and see if they can get it.”53 Dr. Brown testified that the “people”
referenced in his email was Corner Compounding Pharmacy located in Sugar Land,
Texas, owned and operated by Dr. Shannon Maguadog.54 Dr. Brown testified at the
hearing that the L-carnitine infusion given to Mr. Magness came from Corner
Compounding Pharmacy:
Q. And the infusion bag was prepared by the Corner

Compounding Pharmacy, correct?
A. I believe so, yes.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
50
Id.
51
52
USADA Ex. 210.
53
Id.
54
Tr. (Day 6) at 2472:11-22.
Doc #20977284v5
31
Q. Just like all the other infusion materials that - - that
involved L-carnitine.
A. Yes.55
Dr. Maguadog testified that the only two L-carnitine formulations Corner Compounding
Pharmacy prepared for Dr. Brown were the 45 mL formula and 40 mL formula, as
discussed in Paragraph 154. Dr. Maguadog testified: “We have multiple L-carnitine
formulations, but these [referring to the 45 ml formula and the 40 ml formula] are the
only two that we ever did for Dr. Brown,” and “I know these are the only two that we
ever made for Dr. Brown.”56
On November 28, 2011, Mr. Magness received an administration from Dr. Brown of a
solution containing dextrose and “60 millimoles” of L-Carnitine. “60 millimoles” is the
equivalent of 9.67 mg/mL.57
On December 1, 2011, Mr. Magness received the results of his post infusion treadmill
test, and emailed the spreadsheet summarizing the testing to Respondent.58 He reported
“a significant increase in VO2 max” and the result is “very significant performance
enhancement that is almost unbelievable with a supplement.”59 Shortly after Mr. Magness
received the L-carnitine infusion, he went on a “tempo run” with Mr. Rupp, Mr.
Ritzenhein and Mr. Farah. Mr. Rupp, and Mr. Ritzenhein testified that Mr. Magness was
hanging in there during their run.60 Mr. Ritzenhein testified that “it was a little funny at
first, but then it was a little annoying after a while.”61 Mr. Ritzenhein testified that
Respondent was excited about the training.62
On December 1, 2011, Respondent sent an email to Lance Armstrong, a former

professional road racing cyclist sponsored by Nike, saying: “Lance, call me asap! We
have tested it and it’s amazing! You are the only athlete I’m going to tell the actual
numbers to other than Galen Rupp. It’s too incredible. All completely legal and natural.
You will finish the Iron Man in about 16 minutes less while taking this. – Alberto.”63 On
December 12, 2011, Respondent sent an email to Lance Armstrong, Mark Parker,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Nike, and Tom Clarke, President of Advanced
Innovation of Nike, regarding Mr. Magness’ L-carnitine infusion. In his email,
Respondent said, in part: “On my assistant Steve the doctor used a one liter saline bag
with the Lcarnitine and dextrose solution which caused his insulin levels to go up thus
drawing the Lcarnitine into the muscles.”64 (emphasis added)
55
Tr. (Day 6) at 2471:17-21.
56
Tr. (Day 4) at 1743:12-21.
57
Resp. Ex. 270a; Tr. (Day 1) at 289:5-11; Tr. (Day 4) 1507:24-1508:1.
58
Resp. Ex. 95 at 1; Ex. 96.
59
Resp. Ex. 96.
60
Resp. (Day 2) at 638:12-639:20.
61
Tr. (Day 2) at 640:7-9.
62
Tr. (Day 2) at 640:21-641:8.
63
Resp. Ex. 93.
64
USADA Ex. 245.
Doc #20977284v5
32
At the hearing, Dr. Brown testified about the email above regarding the volume of the
infusion:
Q. - - says ‘the doctor used a 1-liter saline bag with the L-

carnitine and dextrose solution.’ Is that the - - is that a fair
indication of the amount of the Magness infusion?
A. It was 500 to a thousand, quite frankly. But it - - probably

was a liter.
Q. Okay. All right.
A. Certainly more than 50 mls.
Q More than 50 mls and - - and it took four to five hours to -

- to - - give it, right?
A. Yes.65 (emphasis added)
4. Magness as Athlete
Mr. Magness testified that while at the NOP he was a competing member of USA Track
& Field because he “didn’t retire”.66 Mr. Magness testified that he registered for and
competed in USATF-sanctioned races during his time at the NOP.67 He registered for and
competed in the USATF Oregon State Cross Country Championship, held on October 22,
2011.68 Mr. Magness registered for but did not compete in the Open Division of the
USATF Club National Cross Country Championship held on December 10, 2011.69
Mr. Magness also testified that he was told by Respondent to “[k]eep [his] fitness levels
incredibly high” because he needed to pace the athletes for their training.70 Respondent
paid Mr. Magness “between $100 to $500 for an athlete to pace that.”71 Mr. Magness
testified that in 2012, Respondent “entered” him into a race to pace Mr. Rupp to assist
him in a “record attempt at a USATF-sanctioned indoor track meet.”72 Mr. Magness
testified that he did not end up competing in this race.73
Mr. Magness did not receive anti-doping information or education during his time at the
NOP, nor was he ever tested by USADA.74 Mr. Magness did not compete in any races
after the administration of the L-carnitine infusion on November 28, 2011.75 Mr. Magness
65
Tr. (Day 6) at 2474:5-14.
66
Tr. (Day 1) at 203:7-14.
67
Tr. (Day 1) at 201:5-11.
68
Tr. (Day 1) at 201:5-11; USADA Ex. 240.
69
Id.
70
Tr. (Day 1) at 197:7-22.
71
Tr. (Day 1) at 196:22-23.
72
Tr. (Day 1) at 197:23-198:3.
73
Tr. (Day 1) at 198:12-16.
74
Tr. (Day 1) at 346:16-347:8, 396:18-24.
75
Resp. Ex. 275 ¶ 11 (signed affidavit); Tr. (Day 1) at 382:18-383:20.
Doc #20977284v5
33
referred to himself as a “coach for the Nike NOP along with Alberto Salazar” in emails
during his time with the NOP.76
Ciarán Ó Lionáird testified that Mr. Magness coached him and said “my time is done” in
response to Mr. Ó Lionáird asking if Mr. Magness would get back into competing.77 Mr.
Ó Lionáird also testified that Mr. Magness appeared to be “happy to have left running
behind and excited to kind of be in this space of learning about sports science or whatever
he was doing.”78
At times during USADA’s investigation, Mr. Magness seemed to be unclear whether he

viewed himself as an Athlete for purposes of the Code. On August 16, 2015, after
USADA initiated its investigation into Respondent and the NOP, Mr. Magness responded
to an email from USADA saying that he had “spent the better part of a decade perfecting
my craft of coaching.”79 On March 22, 2017, USADA sent Mr. Magness a draft affidavit
based on the L-carnitine infusion he received. After reading the affidavit, Mr. Magness
asked Victor Burgos, an investigator for USADA, “If you can point me to the section of
the WADA code that deals with violations by support personnel that would be helpful. I
can only find athletes. I just want to fully understand what it entails, as it is my
livelihood.”80 Mr. Magness also questioned the “competitive runner” language in the
affidavit by asking Mr. Burgos “does it impact things that I did not compete in any race
for a year after the IV.”81 That language was ultimately removed from Mr. Magness’ final
affidavit.82
5. NOP Athletes
On December 1, 2011, Mr. Ritzenhein emailed Dr. Brown saying “I was told I should
come down next week to get the L-Carnitine infusion and have you check me out anyway
for a yearly checkup…”83 Dr. Brown sent a response email on the same day saying that
the infusion process “takes about 4-5 hours”.84 Mr. Ritzenhein booked his trip to visit
Dr. Brown in Houston, Texas for the L-carnitine infusion.85 Mr. Ritzenhein testified that
on approximately December 3, 2011 he expressed concern to Respondent over whether
the infusion was compliant with the Code.86
On December 2, 2011, Respondent emailed Neil Pollock of UK Athletics: “Hi Dr.

Pollock, I know that you are on top of all the WADA rules, but just for my own personal
knowledge, what is the maximum amount of cc’s that an infusion can be to stay within
76
Resp. Ex. 70; see also Resp. Ex. 230.
77
Tr. (Day 4) at 1788:15-1789: 9.
78
Tr. (Day 4) at 1789:6-9.
79
Resp. Ex. 246 at 1.
80
Resp. Ex. 263 at 3.
81
Id.; Tr. (Day 1) at 373:17-374:10.
82
Id.
83
Resp. Ex. 106 at 2.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Tr. (Day2) at 634:14 – 636:13; USADA Ex. 231
Doc #20977284v5
34
the rules? Thx! –Alberto” 87 Noel Pollock responded on the same day: “Hi alberto, 50cc
was the guidance. All the best. Noel” 88
On December 3, 2011, Respondent emailed John Frothingham, USADA’s Chief

Operating Officer, about the L-carnitine infusion. Respondent explained the infusion
received by his “assistant.”89 Respondent also explained the length of time it takes to load
muscle with the “new Sports drink out of the UK.”90 Respondent asked Mr. Frothingham
for permission to perform a “clinical test to evaluate this drink involving about four to
five athletes that would get an infusion of a sugar solution with Lcarnitine; administered
in a Doctor’s clinic.”91 Respondent did not address that Mr. Magness received an over-
the-limit infusion.92 Mr. Frothingham connected Respondent with Dr. Matthew Fedoruk,
who at the time was USADA’s Science Director.93
On December 3, 2011, Respondent forwarded his email of the same date to Mr.
Frothingham to Mr. Ritzenhein. Respondent explained in his email to Mr. Ritzenhein that
“we are cutting edge but we take no chances on a screw up. Everything is above board
and cleared thru USADA. They know me very well because I always get an okay before
doing anything.”94 Respondent’s email statement was supported by testimony at the
hearing where witnesses confirmed that USADA fielded numerous calls from
Respondent about issues that potentially affected Respondent’s athletes.95 Dr. Eichner
testified about USADA’s call log, which listed Respondent’s calls to USADA, and
confirmed that Respondent was known at USADA as a person who frequently calls and
asks questions regarding rule compliance.96 Dr. Fedoruk testified that Respondent’s
contact with USADA was more than any other coach.97
On December 5, 2011, Mr. Frothingham responded to Respondent’s email by informing

him that Dr. Fedoruk would reach out to him the next day.98 On December 6, 2011,
Respondent and Dr. Fedoruk spoke by telephone and Dr. Fedoruk sent an email to
Respondent summarizing their conversation. The email stated that “infusions or
injections are permitted if the infused/injected substance is not on the Prohibited list and
the volume of intravenous fluid administered does not exceed 50 mL per 6-hour period.”99
Dr. Fedoruk’s email also clarified the definition of “clinical investigations” in the context
of IV infusions by saying “these are diagnostic procedures which require IV infusions of
87
USADA Ex. 223.
88
Id.
89
Resp. Ex. 99 at 1.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Respondent confirmed in his December 12, 2011 email to Lance Armstrong and Mark Parker that Mr. Magness
received a “one liter sale bag with the Lcarnitine and dextrose solution…” See Paragraph 101; Resp. Ex. 99 at 1,
Ex. 105 at 2-3; Tr. (Day 4) at 1513:22-1514:13.; USADA Ex. 245.
93
Resp. Ex. 101 at 1.
94
USADA Ex. 231.
95
Resp. Ex. 424.
96
Tr. (Day 3) at 1168:5-1171:11.
97
Tr. (Day 3) at 1309:8-13:11:8.
98
Resp. Ex. 101 at 1.
99
Resp. Ex. 103 at 1, Ex. 104 at 1; Tr. (Day 4) at 1517:15-1518:25.
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35
greater than 50 mL per 6-hour period that would be necessary in a hospital or clinical
setting in order to diagnose a legitimate medical condition.”100
Later on December 6, 2011, Respondent forwarded the email from Dr. Fedoruk to Dr.
Brown, Mr. Ritzenhein and Magness, telling them:
Hi Dr. Brown, I got this from USADA, so we can keep this for our
records. We will have to try the “less than 50 ml L-Carnitine
infusion” after drinking that special medical drink designed to
raise his Insulin levels. Perhaps we should try it on Steve:
1- get a baseline level
2 – take the drink
3 – 20 minutes later draw blood again, and take another

drink
4 – 40 minutes later draw blood again, and take another

drink
5 – 60 minutes later draw blood
Steve said that the drink may only raise insulin levels for 20
minutes, so I was thinking in order to replicate the one hour long
raised insulin levels from the other procedures, Steve would need
to keep taking a drink every 20 minutes? Just a thought on my part,
but I’ll leave it up to you to figure out! Thanks! – Alberto101
Thereafter, plans were made to have each of the following NOP athletes receive an L-
carnitine infusion/injection from Dr. Brown at his office in Houston: Mr. Ritzenhein, Ms.
Begay, Ms. Grunnagle, Mr. Rupp, Ms. Allen-Horn, and Ms. Erdmann (the “NOP
Athletes”).102
Dr. Maguadog testified that he prepared the L-carnitine solution using only syringes, not
infusion bags, and that Compounding Corner Pharmacy never prepared any infusion
materials over 50 mL for Dr. Brown.103 When asked about a fax he received on June 29,
2015 from Dr. Maguadog, Dr. Brown testified the following:
Q. Okay. And how did it come about that - - that Shannon

[Maguadog] sent you this fax?
100
Id.
101
Resp. Ex. 105 at 1.
102
Ms. Erdmann is the only NOP Athlete to receive L-carnitine via a 40 mL injection. See Resp. Ex. 273 at 3.It is
unclear why Ms. Erdmann received her infusion at such a later date as the other NOP Athletes.
103
Tr. (Day 5) at 1722:3-6; 1722:24; 1757:9-10: 1756:23-24; 1758:17-18; 1775:18-25.
Doc #20977284v5
36
A. I believe I was asking him did he have records on all the
stuff - - all the syringes and all the bags that he - - that he
had done for the L-carnitine.
Q. Okay. Because he did both syringes and bags, correct
A. Yes.104
Mr. Ritzenhein received an L-carnitine infusion on December 13, 2011105; Ms. Begay
received an L-carnitine infusion on December 23, 2011106; Ms. Grunnagle received an
L-carnitine infusion on December 29, 2011107; Mr. Rupp received an L-carnitine infusion
on January 5, 2012108; and Ms. Allen-Horn received an L-carnitine infusion on January
11, 2012.109 Ms. Erdmann received an L-carnitine injection on September 19, 2012.110
Mr. Ritzenhein testified that he had a physical examination prior to the L-carnitine
infusion and that infusion bag was “a little tiny bag,” and he is “pretty confident” that the
infusion was less than 50 mL.111 Dr. Brown confirmed the infusion volume in an email
of December 16, 2011 to Respondent in the context of scheduling Ms. Begay’s infusion:
“We will use the same protocol using 45 ml of L-carnitine solution with the oral glucose
loading as we used on Dathan… Jeff” 112
Ms. Begay and Ms. Allen-Horn testified that they also received the L-carnitine infusion
following a physical examination.113 Ms. Begay and Ms. Allen-Horn testified that they
do not recall the size of the bag, and Ms. Begay testified she only remembers “bits and
pieces about that day.”114 Mr. Rupp testified that he did not remember much about the
day he received the L-carnitine infusion.115 He testified that he went to Dr. Brown’s office
in Houston, Texas and he received the infusion through a “needle in my arm.”116
Respondent and Dr. Brown testified that prior to the infusion, Mr. Ritzenhein received a
glucose/sugary drink, which Respondent and Dr. Brown contend was specifically
designed for the under 50 mL infusion protocol.117 According to their testimony, the other
NOP Athletes received the same glucose/sugary drink before their infusions.118
104
Tr. (Day 6) 2455:9-16
105
USADA Ex. USADA-SAL098188-94.
106
USADA Ex. 630.
107
USADA Ex. 631.
108
109
Tr. (Day 3) at 870:23-25; 874:7-10.
110
111
Tr. (Day 2) at 655:14-23.
112
USADA Ex. 113.
113
Tr. (Day 3) at 777:13-20; Tr. (Day 3) at 874:17-23.
114
Tr. (Day 2) at 808:13-18; Tr. (Day 3) at 876:1-3.
115
Tr. (Day 5) at 2126:8-17.
116
Id.
117
Tr. (Day 2) at 653:22-24, 654:19-22; Resp. Exs. 79, 88, and 105.
118
Tr. (Day 2) at 779:8-11, 808:24-25; Tr. (Day 3) at 875:18-22; Tr. (Day 5) at 2126:18-20.
Doc #20977284v5
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Dr. Brown was assisted by Diane Gonzales in the administration of the IV infusion bags
containing the L-carnitine infusion. Dr. Brown testified that the infusions given to these
NOP Athletes were under the 50 mL threshold. Respondent testified that throughout this
period, he was repeatedly and consistently told by Dr. Brown that the L-carnitine
infusions were under the 50 mL threshold.119
On December 19, 2011, Dr. Brown responded to Respondent’s request for the “exact
protocol” by transcribing the following:
The protocol is as follows:
Baseline glucose (fingerstick), give 75 grams of glucola, 10

minutes later give 9.67 grams of L-carnitine in 45 mL of .9% saline
over 1 hour. Give 75 grams of glucola every 20 minutes after the
original (1st glucola) for 1 hour. Check glucose (fingerstick) 20
minutes after infusions stopped. I also check carnitine levels pre
and post infusion, but that was for the benefit to show we achieved
high blood levels and I know we have actually already proven
that.120
Ms. Gonzales initially gave a statement to USADA indicating the L-carnitine infusions
exceeded 50 mL, but later revised her statement and testified that the infusions bags were
“very small, maybe not even full” and that after conducting a test in a Ziploc bag, Ms.
Gonzales believes the infusions were under the 50 mL threshold.121
Mr. Ritzenhein testified that he asked Dr. Brown whether the L-carnitine infusion was
under 50 mL, to which Mr. Ritzenhein testified that Dr. Brown said, “it was compounded
at 45 mL,” below the threshold.122
Ms. Begay, Ms. Allen-Horn and Mr. Rupp testified that they do not recall the volumes of
their saline and L-carnitine infusions.123 Respondent and Dr. Brown contend that these
athletes received the same protocol as Mr. Ritzenhein, and not the protocol used on Mr.
Magness.124
Dr. Brown administered Ms. Erdmann’s L-carnitine via syringe on September 29, 2012.
Prior to Ms. Erdmann’s injection, Dr. Brown asked Respondent on September 5, 2012:
“Do you want me to give the L-Carnitine in a syringe or a bag?”125 Respondent replied
on September 6, 2012 to Dr. Brown’s email by saying: “Hi Dr. Brown, it has to be a
119
Resp. Ex 113, Ex. 120, Ex. 173, Ex. 174, Ex. 208; Tr. (Day 4) at 1522:23-1523:8, 1524:9-22, 1525:3-16,
1528:20-1529:5, 1529:11-23, 1532:20-1533:5.
120
121
Tr. (Day 7) at 165:9-10.
122
Tr. (Day 2) at 651:23-652:3.
123
Tr. (Day 2) at 779:2-782:7, 808:13-809:12; Tr. (Day 3) at 875:17-876:11; Tr. (Day 5) at 2126:11-2127:13.
124
See Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 50:7.5.3.4.4
125
USADA Ex. 392.
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38
syringe because of the WADA rules. Even though it makes no sense and is easier to do it
from a bag, we need to follow the rules exactly. Thx!-Alberto”.126
Based on the totality of the evidence above, the Panel is of the view that Ms. Erdmann is
the only NOP Athlete to receive L-carnitine via an injection, rather than an infusion.
6. Email Exchanges Regarding Infusions and Injections
On December 22, 2010, Respondent emailed Dr. Amy Eichner of USADA asking
whether Ms. Goucher could obtain an iron injection. Dr. Eichner responded: “Intravenous
injections, provided they are under 50 mL in volume, are permitted. Kara can have an
injection of iron without a TUE or a declaration of use.”127 Under the Code as in effect
on that date, it was “acknowledged that some substances included on the List of
Prohibited Substances are used to treat medical conditions frequently encountered in the
athlete population.”128 For monitoring purposes, these substances, for which the route of
administration is not prohibited, required a simple declaration of use, for any:
“Glucocorticosteroids used by non systemic routes, namely intraarticular, periarticular,
peritendinous, epidural, intradermal injections and inhaled route.”129 The declaration of
use was made through the Anti-Doping Administration and Management System
(“ADAMS”) and the Doping Control form “where reasonably feasible and in accordance
with the Code by the Athlete at the same time as the Use starts.”130 The declaration was
to include mention of the diagnosis, the name of the substance, the dose undertaken, and
the name and contact details of the physician. 131
On or about November 2016, WADA removed the requirement to submit a declaration

of use form. Rather, the new rule provides:
Whether it’s an in-competition or out-of-competition test, athletes

are required to complete a doping control form during every
sample collection session. On this form, athletes are required to
declare any and all medications or supplements that they’ve
ingested or used in the past seven days, and to certify that their
declaration is accurate.132
Dr. Eichner testified about an email chain from July of 2009 involving Respondent and
herself, Dr. Richard Hildebrand of USADA, Dr. Jeff Podraza of USADA, and Becky
Renck of USADA, in which they discussed the declaration of use process that needed to
be followed in connection with Mr. Rupp’s use of a [deleted for privacy].133 Dr. Eichner
testified that Respondent was aware of the declaration of use process “[b]ecause a website
declaration of use was required of all athletes for some very, very common medications
126
Id.
127
Resp. Ex. 149 at 2.
128
2009 International Standard - Therapeutic Use Exemptions (“2009 Therapeutic Use Exemptions”) Section 8.1.
129
Id.
130
2009 Therapeutic Use Exemptions, Section 8.2.
131
Id.
132
https://www.usada.org/dcor-declaration-medications/
133
Resp. Ex. 14.
Doc #20977284v5
39
that almost all athletes would have to use at some point in their career, such as beta2
agonists or corticosteroids.”134
On January 5, 2012 at 12:08 p.m., Shelly Rodemer, a USADA TUE & Drug Reference
Specialist, sent an email to Mr. Ritzenhein, copying Respondent where she said:
I just wanted to follow up with you by email in regard to our

telephone conversation. I know that you are working with your
physician to obtain your medical records regarding your hospital
admission in June 2011. When you obtain these medical
documents and notes, can you please provide me with this so that
we may keep them on file. Thank you very much.
I have also attached for your review the WADA guidelines

addressing intravenous infusions. Also please note, as stated on
the Doping Control Official Record, blood transfusions during the
last 6 months should be declared. Thank you very much and please
contact me if you have any questions. Thank you very much for
responding so quickly.135
Later that day at 12:42 p.m., and after a teleconference with Respondent, Ms. Rodemer
sent an email to Respondent entitled “Quick Reference as to Infusion vs. Injection” that
provided Respondent a link to the terms and conditions from the Global DRO website,
which discussed injections and infusions.136 Respondent forwarded Ms. Rodemer’s email
to Dr. Brown seven minutes later with a message asking Dr. Brown to “[c]heck out the
bottom of this regarding “simple syringe” and stating that “I think a butterfly needle is
okayed in another document.”137
Respondent testified that he recalled having another phone call with USADA in which he
believes Ms. Rodemer told him that his athletes should not declare infusions of permitted
substances under 50 mL during sample collection.138 The USADA call log reflects that
Ms. Rodemer spoke with Respondent once on January 5, 2012 in response to his call
about the difference between infusions and injections, and that she had emailed
Respondent the Code’s infusion guidelines, referenced above.139 There is nothing on the
USADA call log that references any discussion about the topic of declaring infusions or
injections during sample collection.140
134
Tr. (Day 3) at 1156:3-1157:18.
135
136
Resp. Ex. 147.
137
Id.
138
Tr. (Day 4) at 1574:15-1576:18.
139
USADA Ex. 321.
140
Id.
Doc #20977284v5
40
At 1:06 p.m. on January 5, 2012, Respondent replied to Ms. Rodemer’s email with the
following email:
Hi Shelly, this Globaldro link and the WADA link regarding

injections and infusions. From reading both of these we will
proceed with the following understanding: As long as an injection
into a vein using a standard needle or butterfly needle is under 50
ml and contains no banned substances, the athlete does not have
to apply for a TUE and should not consider it an infusion, and
should answer “NO”, if asked by drug testers if they’ve had an
infusion in the previous six months.
Is this correct? Thank you! – Alberto Salazar141
At 1:17 p.m. on January 5, 2012, Respondent forwarded his message that he sent to Ms.
Rodemer at 1:06 p.m. to Dr. Brown and told Dr. Brown: “HI Doc, I just sent this. We’ll
see if she responds or does a no commitment move.”142 At 2:44 p.m., Respondent
forwarded to Dr. Brown the December 6, 2011 email from Dr. Fedoruk with the following
message:
HI Dr. Brown, Here it is. I may not get an answer from USADA
but after reading all the documents over several times, it’s clear
that an “injection using a standard or butterfly needle of under
50ml” is clearly not an infusion so it requires no TUE and doesn’t
need to be declared. Thanks. – Alberto.143
At 2:50 p.m. on January 5, 2012, Respondent forwarded Dr. Eichner’s December 22,
2010 email regarding Ms. Goucher’s iron injection to Dr. Brown with the following
message (See Paragraph 127): “Hi Dr. Brown, Eureka!! I have an old email where they
clarified this. No TUE and no declaration needed. – Alberto”.144
At 2:53 p.m. on that date, Respondent forwarded Dr. Eichner’s December 22, 2010 email
to Ms. Rodemer and asked:
Hi Shelly, I just found this old email where Amy Eichner answered
my earlier question to you regarding whether an injection of under
50 ml should be declared when an athlete is asked when drug
tested. She says below that it’s not necessary so unless USADA’s
stance on this has changed, you don’t need to answer me back.
Thanks for all your help and have a great week! — Alberto145
141
Resp. Ex. 144.
142
Id.
143
Resp. Ex. 140.
144
USADA Ex. 323.
145
Resp. Ex. 149.
Doc #20977284v5
41
At 2.54 p.m. on the same date, without waiting for a reply from Ms. Rodemer, Respondent
emailed Dr. Brown and said, “Hi Dr. Brown, Now unless she contradicts the earlier email,
we have our fallback if ever questioned! – Alberto.”146
At 3:27 p.m., Respondent sent an email to Mr. Ritzenhein and Mr. Rupp, copying Ms.
Begay, Darren Treasure, a Nike employee, Mr. Magness, and Alex Salazar, a NOP
employee and son of Respondent:
HI Dathan, Alvina, and Galen, For your interest. When asked

about an infusion, you are to say no. LCarnitine and Iron in the
way we have done it is classified as an injection. So no TUE’s and
no declaration needed, not online and not when asked about
infusions when getting drug tested in or out of competition..Thanks
– Alberto147
At 3:45 p.m., Respondent forwarded his email of 3:27 p.m. to Ms. Allen-Horn and Ms.
Grunnagle.148
At 4:03 p.m., Respondent forwarded the above referenced emails to Bill Kellar and said:
Hi Bill, FYI –I knew it was okay but have just learned that it
doesn’t and shouldn’t be declared as it would just cause them to
have to ask questions. This just occurred with Dathan regarding
an infusion back in June during surgery, and now one week before
the Olympic Marathon Trials they ask us what the infusion was
for! Scared the crap out of us, but I learned from it, don’t put
anything down that you don’t have to.149
Respondent testified he was not trying to be deceptive with USADA and was attempting
to seek their guidance so he could “find out exactly what the rules were so we didn’t break
any.”150 Respondent contends that at any point thereafter, USADA could have told him
that he was incorrect or otherwise told him to inform his athletes that they must declare
all infusions they received.151
Dr. Eichner testified that Respondent’s reliance on her December 22, 2010 email is wrong
and that Respondent misconstrued her email.
Q: Do you believe that your prior email to him regarding Ms.

Goucher receiving an iron injection in December of 2010 is
responsive to the question he posed on January 5, 2012 to Ms.
Rodemer?
146
Id.
147
Res. Ex. 141.
148
Resp. Ex. 142.
149
Resp. Ex. 148.
150
Tr. (Day 4) at 1515:20-22.
151
See Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 173:12:5.6.11.
Doc #20977284v5
42
A: No. Because they’re different questions, and my answer
regarding the iron injection was made very specifically referring
only to that particular circumstance.
Q: Okay. And in that particular circumstance, there was a

requirement – or, sorry – there was a rule in place at that time that
referenced a declaration of use online form?
A: The declaration of use process, which I referred to in my email

regarding the iron injection, yes.
Q: And that, again – just to be clear, that process was separate

from the process by which athletes would make declarations when
they’re being tested?
A. True. That’s correct. It’s a separate process.152
Mr. Ritzenhein testified that the January 5, 2012 email from Respondent was the first
time he had ever heard the L-carnitine administration referred to as an “injection.”153 Mr.
Ritzenhein testified that up to this point, he recalled Respondent referring to the L-carnitine
administration only as “infusions.”154
7. Alteration of Medical Records
On October 3, 2013, Respondent sent an email to Dr. Brown asking him to “write up a
letter” about the volume of the L-carnitine infusions, as follows:
Hi Dr. Brown, before you leave can you have someone write up a
letter saying that the LCarnitine infusion was done with 50 ml or
less and any supporting documents or evidence and have it mailed
to Roy Thompson’s office? I’m just anticipating that USADA may
come back asking for it and I’d rather have it ready to send right
away.
I realize you may not have anything written down about that
volume but whatever you have such as the record of the special
syringes and your statement will have to be enough for them.
Thx!155
Dr. Brown then forwarded Respondent’s email to Ms. Gonzales and requested to
“[p]lease get fr[om] Shannon the documentation of the amount of volume in the syringes
for the l-carnitine [t]hat we injected. Have him fax it to is [sic] so we can send it to Alberto
and the lawyer.”156 Dr. Brown sent a follow-up email a short time later that said, “I don’t
152
Tr (Day 3) at 1166:23 -1167:19
153
Tr. (Day 2) at 663:25-664:10.
154
Id.
155
156
Resp. Ex. 207.
Doc #20977284v5
43
want the infusion bag ones that we didn’t use on the competing athletes, only the syringes
that contain I think it was <40 mL.”157
Dr. Brown sent an email later that day saying “Alberto, I can assure you we were well
below the 50 CC requirement.”158 Respondent replied to Dr. Brown’s email by saying:
“Hi Dr. Brown, I know you did it correctly! It’s just that USADA may ask for some proof
or documentation. I’m just trying to anticipate any of their next moves. Thanks and have
a great weekend! -alberto”159
After Dr. Brown sent the email stating that he was “sure that we will be able to produce,”
Respondent followed up with another email on that date to Dr. Brown that said:
Great, remember it’s whatever you have. If you didn’t write it

down when you did it but just used the 40ml syringes, just state
that and show the receipts that you bought them. We just need to
produce whatever we can. They can’t say that we did something
else. Thanks.- Alberto160
Respondent admitted that he knew at the time of his request to Dr. Brown that USADA
had asked for all of Mr. Rupp’s medical records and that Mr. Rupp’s medical records did
not contain the volume of the January 5, 2012 L-carnitine administration. 161
During its investigation, USADA received copies of medical records from Ms. Begay,
Ms. Grunnagle Mr. Ritzenhein, Mr. Rupp and Ms. Erdmann.162 Other than Ms. Erdmann,
none of those other medical records had a reference to the volume of the L-carnitine
infusion they received.163 Subsequently, Dr. Brown provided copies of the same medical
records directly to USADA, but the copies of the records of Mr. Ritzenhein, Ms.
Grunnagle and Mr. Rupp had been altered to state that the volume of the L-carnitine
injection were “40 mL” or “40 cc”.164
Dr. Brown admitted that he altered those medical records:
Q. You altered Dawn Grunnagle’s record and you put an

improper and inaccurate amount on it, just like the
Ritzenhein record, just like the Rupp record, correct?
A. The important thing, that it was - - it was less than 50 CCs.
Q. - - number on there, correct?
157
Resp. Ex. 209 at 1.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Tr. (Day 4) 1533:25 – 1535:25.
162
See USADA Post-Hearing Brief p. 218-219.
163
See Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 64:7.6.3.6:65.
164
USADA Ex. 632, 712 1004; Tr. (Day 6) 2462:6-2464:4.
Doc #20977284v5
44
A. That was inaccurate, that’s correct.165
USADA’s expert, Dr. Gary Green, testified that these alterations to the patient records
were “outside the scope of generally accepted medical practice.”166 Dr. Green testified
that the “standard of care is to go back and initial and date it when you went back and
changed the medical record.”167 Dr. Green also testified that the volume of the L-carnitine
infusions should have been documented contemporaneously in patient records at the time
of those infusions.168
Dr. Brown’s consulting agreement with Nike terminated on November 15, 2013.169
8. Dr. Maguadog and the Compounding Corner Pharmacy
On June 29, 2015, five days after Respondent’s Open Letter disputing, inter alia, news
reports questioning the propriety of the L-carnitine infusions,170 Dr. Maguadog sent a fax
to Dr. Brown stating:
It is the policy of Compounding Corner Pharmacy, Inc. to purge

electronic patient prescription records and shred hard copies after
two years. However, logs of compounded medications are
available for three years. After performing a search,
Compounding Corner Pharmacy, Inc. can validate that no records
exist for patients receiving L-Carnitine (NS) 9.67 gm/40 mL per
syringe, but logs exist confirming that L-Carnitine (NS) 9.67
gm/40 mL per syringe was made twice in 2012, once on 3/19/2012
(Lot#:03192012@1) and once on 9/10/2012 (Lot#:
09102012@16). Though records for both patient prescriptions
and logs prior to 2012 have been completely purged,
Compounding Corner Pharmacy, Inc. can attest that no more than
40 mL of L-Carnitine (NS) 9.67 gm/40 mL per syringe was ever
made or dispensed.171
On April 7, 2017, Dr. Maguadog notarized an affidavit written by Dr. Brown’s attorneys
that stated:
5. I do have in my computer system two formulas that were

provided by Dr. Jeffrey S. Brown and that I used to prepare
the L-Carnitine injectables for Dr. Brown… Per Dr. Brown’s
instructions, I mixed a solution of 9.67 gm/45 mL of L-
Carnitine… Based on this formula, a batch was made from
165
Tr. (Day 6) 3376:11-19.
166
Tr. (Day 2) at 748:5-25.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Resp. Ex. 436; Tr. (Day 4) at 1426:8-14; Tr. (Day 6) at 2402:4-10.
170
USADA Ex. 514bb, p. 17.
171
USADA Ex. 703.
Doc #20977284v5
45
which two separate syringes containing 45 mL each of
solution were provided to Dr. Brown…
6. The “Logged Formula Worksheet (Exhibit A [attached to the

affidavit]) confirms that all solutions I prepared for Dr.
Brown were less than 50 mL each. Regardless of the batch
size, in this case 100 mL, the formula amount for 9.67gram/45
mL injectable solution dictates the size to be dispensed… The
USADA Statement makes the wrong assumption that the batch
volume (100 mL) is the dispensed volume (45 mL). The
dispensed size was exactly 45 mL each.
7. To my knowledge, my pharmacy is the only pharmacy Dr.

Brown looked to prepare L-Carnitine for infusion.
8. The batch size of 100 mL was needed to dispense the two 45

mL injection solutions. The extra 10 mL allows for errors and
for loss in the filtering process necessary to sterilize the
injection. I have never provided Dr. Brown with a L-carnitine
solution in excess of 45 mL.172
Dr. Maguadog’s testimony is contradicted by Dr. Brown’s testimony that Mr. Magness’
infusion was 1000 mL and Mr. Magness’ confirmation of the same as well as
Respondent’s email to December 12, 2011 email to Lance Armstrong and Mark Parker
as referenced in Paragraph 101, while Dr. Brown testified that he obtained all the L-
carnitine infusions from Dr. Maguadog’s pharmacy.173 And yet, Dr. Maguadog insisted
he had only prepared injections (not infusions) and that they had only been 40 or 45
mL.174 In addition, Dr. Maguadog testified that he altered the records he provided to the
Panel.175 For this and other reasons, the Panel did not consider any of Dr. Maguadog’s
testimony to be credible.
C. Administration and/or Attempted Administration – L-carnitine
An anti-doping rule violation pursuant to Article 2.8 of the 2015 Code, is the
“Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete In-Competition of any
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method, or Administration or Attempted
Administration to any Athlete Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Substance or any
Prohibited Method that is prohibited Out-of-Competition.”176
Administration is undefined in the 2009 Code. Administration in the 2015 Code is defined
172
USADA Ex. 539.
173
USADA Ex. 534, 701; Tr. (Day 6) at 2455:11-16.
174
Tr. (Day 4) at 1585:11-1586:7.
175
Tr. (Day 4) at 1722:3-6; 1732:3-14; 1749:15-1753:24; 1757:5-10; 1758:17-18; 1775:18-25.
176
The 2009 Code includes the following language “… or assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or
any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or any Attempted anti-doping rule violation.
That will be discussed in the Complicity sections contained herein, as the 2015 Code added Article 2.9 dealing
with this anti-doping rule violation.
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as, “Providing, supplying, supervising, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the Use
or Attempted Use by another Person of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method.
However, this definition shall not include the actions of bona fide medical personnel
involving a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method used for genuine and legal
therapeutic purposes or other acceptable justification and shall not include actions
involving Prohibited Substances which are not prohibited in Out-of-Competition Testing
unless the circumstances as a whole demonstrate that such Prohibited Substances are not
intended for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or are intended to enhance sport
performance.”
Attempt is defined as: Purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step
in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-doping rule
violation. Provided, however, there shall be no anti-doping rule violation based solely on
an Attempt to commit a violation if the Person renounces the Attempt prior it to being
discovered by a third party not involved in the Attempt.
Thus, to bear its burden to prove an Attempted Administration, USADA bears the burden
of establishing to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel, bearing in mind the
seriousness of the allegations, that Respondent “[p]urposely engag[ed] in conduct that
constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the
commission of an anti-doping rule violation”, with the Administration definition being,
“Providing, supplying, supervising, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the Use or
Attempted Use by another Person of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method.”177
Should USADA bear its burden, in turn, Respondent bears the burden of establishing by
a balance of probabilities that Respondent renounced the Attempt prior to it being
discovered by a third party not involved in the Attempt.
1. Magness Infusion - Administration
Steve Magness received an L-carnitine infusion on November 28, 2011, at Dr. Brown’s
office in Houston.178 The infusion was administered by Dr. Brown assisted by Ms.
Gonzales and involved infusion of one liter of dextrose and L-carnitine.
There is no dispute the infusion given to Mr. Magness greatly exceeded the 50 mL
threshold and was also well over the current 100 mL infusion volume limit.179
a. USADA Submissions
177
2015 Code, Appx. 1 at p. 136.
178
Resp. Ex. 270a; Tr. (Day 1) at 289:5-11; Tr. (Day 4) 1507:24-1508:1.
179
Tr. (Day 6) 2474:9 (Dr. Brown testifying that “it was probably a liter.”); USADA Ex. 1004; and USADA Ex.
245.
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USADA contends that:
(a) Respondent was responsible for the Administration of the infusion to Mr.
Magness because he initiated, arranged, organized and facilitated the infusion,
and otherwise participated in it by authorizing the procedure.180
(b) The Administration rule has always been interpreted to find that it applied to
acts in addition to physically administering prohibited substances, such as,
providing or supplying prohibited products and/or supervising, facilitating or
otherwise participating in the use of a prohibited substance or method by
another person. This natural interpretation of the Administration rule is
demonstrated in Bruyneel v. USADA, CAS 2014/A/3598 (Oct. 24, 2018)
(hereinafter “CAS Bruyneel”). The panel in the CAS Bruyneel case found an
Administration violation by the team director Mr. Bruyneel who was found,
for instance, to have facilitated and participated in the administrations of
prohibited substances and methods even though the prohibited substances and
methods were physically administered by a team physician, and Mr. Bruyneel
was not always present when the substances and methods were being
administered.181
(c) As the CAS Bruyneel panel found, the Administration rule was modified in
the 2015 Code to break off “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering
up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or
any Attempted anti-doping rule violation” into a new anti-doping rule
violation labeled “Complicity”. At the same time, a definition of
“Administration” was included in the 2015 Code to make clear that the
Administration violation still encompassed a variety of acts beyond physically
administering a prohibited substance or method.
(d) Accordingly, the CAS Bruyneel panel found that providing, supplying,
supervising, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the use or attempted use
by another person of a prohibited substance or method which occurred before
the 2015 Code was adopted should be sanctionable under the prior
Administration rule just as such conduct is sanctioned under the
Administration rule today.182 Therefore, Respondent can be liable under the
Administration rule for supervising, facilitating or otherwise participating in
the use or attempted use of L-carnitine infusions in violation of the anti-doping
rules.183
(e) Respondent was ultimately in charge of the L-carnitine infusions. He decided

when the infusions would occur, who would get them and whether they would
occur. He instructed the NOP Athletes to get the infusions and instructed Dr.
180
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 182.
181
Bruyneel v. USADA, CAS 2014/A/3598 (Oct. 24, 2018), 100 ¶ 647.
182
USADA v. Bruyneel et al., AAA No. 77 190 00225 (Apr. 21, 2014), p. 98-99, ¶¶ 633-37.
183
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Brown to give them. Therefore, Respondent should be found responsible for
supervising, facilitating or otherwise participating in the infusions.184
USADA contends that the only issue concerns whether Mr. Magness was an “Athlete” at
the time of his L-carnitine infusion.
Article 2.8 prohibits Administration to “any Athlete.” The definition of “Athlete” in the
2009 Code is:
Any Person who participates in sport at the international level (as

defined by each International Federation), the national level (as
defined by each National Anti-Doping Organization, including but
not limited to those Persons in its Registered Testing Pool), and
any other competitor in sport who is otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of any Signatory or other sports organization
accepting the Code. All provisions of the Code, including, for
example, Testing and therapeutic use exemptions, must be applied
to international- and national-level competitors. Some National
Anti-Doping Organizations may elect to test and apply anti-doping
rules to recreational-level or masters competitors who are not
current or potential national caliber competitors. National Anti-
Doping Organizations are not required, however, to apply all
aspects of the Code to such Persons. Specific national rules may
be established for Doping Control for non-international-level or
non-national-level competitors without being in conflict with the
Code. Thus, a country could elect to test recreational-level
competitors but not require therapeutic use exemptions or
whereabouts information. In the same manner, a Major Event
Organization holding an Event only for masters-level competitors
could elect to test the competitors but not require advance
therapeutic use exemptions or whereabouts information. For
purposes of Article 2.8 (Administration or Attempted
Administration) and for purposes of anti-doping information
and education, any Person who participates in sport under the
authority of any Signatory, government, or other sports
organization accepting the Code is an Athlete (emphasis added).
The definition of “Athlete” in the 2015 Code is:
Any Person who competes in sport at the international level (as

defined by each International Federation) or the national level (as
defined by each National Anti-Doping Organization). An Anti-
Doping Organization has discretion to apply anti-doping rules to
an Athlete who is neither an International-Level Athlete nor a
National-Level Athlete, and thus to bring them within the definition
of "Athlete." In relation to Athletes who are neither International-
184
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Level nor National-Level Athletes, an Anti-Doping Organization
may elect to: conduct limited Testing or no Testing at all; analyze
Samples for less than the full menu of Prohibited Substances;
require limited or no whereabouts information; or not require
advance TUEs. However, if an Article 2.1, 2.3 or 2.5 anti-doping
rule violation is committed by any Athlete over whom an Anti-
Doping Organization has authority who competes below the
international or national level, then the Consequences set forth in
the Code (except Article 14.3.2) must be applied. For purposes of
Article 2.8 and Article 2.9 and for purposes of anti-doping
information and education, any Person who participates in sport
under the authority of any Signatory, government, or other
sports organization accepting the Code is an Athlete (emphasis
added).
USADA contends that it is not relevant whether or not Mr. Magness was an international
level or national level athlete.185 Rather, USADA contends that while the Code references
international level and national level athletes, those are not the only individuals covered
by the Code definition of “Athlete.”186
Athlete is defined in the 2009 Code to include recreational-level athletes as follows:

“National Anti-Doping Organizations may elect to test and apply anti-doping rules to
recreational-level or masters competitors who are not current or potential national caliber
competitors.” USADA is a National Anti-Doping Organization, and the USADA
Protocol includes the following description of an Athlete subject to USADA testing:
“Any Athlete who is a member or license holder of a NGB.” 187
USADA contends that “there can be no legitimate dispute that Mr. Magness was on
November 28, 2011, at a minimum, a recreational level athlete who had recently
competed in a competition sanctioned by USATF and was at that time registered to
compete in an upcoming USATF event.”188 Therefore, USADA contends that Mr.
Magness was “plainly an athlete covered by the anti-doping rules and it, therefore,
constituted an anti-doping rule violation for Respondent to participate in the
administration of an over-the-limit IV infusion to [Mr. Magness].”189
USADA relies on the following facts to support its contention that Respondent is not
credible when he contends that he did not consider Mr. Magness an Athlete.
• Respondent was aware of Mr. Magness’ training, and even considered entering him
as a “rabbit” or pacer in a race.190
185
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 184-185.
186
Id.
187
USADA Protocol Section 3a.
188
189
Id.
190
Id.
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• Respondent trained with Allan Webb, an athlete at the NOP.191
• In a “close knit running community” it is unlikely that Respondent did not realize Mr.
Magness ran races from time to time. Indeed, USADA argues that Respondent’s
December 12, 2011 email to Mark Parker, Nike, Inc.’s President and Chief Executive
Officer, where he called Respondent a “recreational runner” demonstrates that
“…Respondent has every reason to receive confirmation of Mr. Magness’s
competitive status at the time and, had he received such confirmation, he would have
easily found that Mr. Magness was still actively competiting [sic].”192
USADA’s position is that:
(a) it is not relevant whether or not Respondent thought Mr. Magness was only a
recreational runner. 193
(b) “calling someone a recreational athlete does not exempt them from the anti-
doping rules.”194
(c) “[o]f course, neither, the subjective beliefs of Mr. Magness or Respondent
regarding Mr. Magness’s status within sport are controlling.” Rather, USADA
contends that the key question is whether Mr. Magness was an “Athlete”
within the meaning of the Code and the USADA Protocol.195
(d) based on the provisions of the Code and the USADA Protocol, Mr. Magness
was plainly an Athlete covered by the anti-doping rules and that his over-the-
limit IV infusion violated the Code.196
(e) “Respondent submitted no rationale for concluding the infusion given to

Magness was not a rule violation other than his erroneous claim Mr. Magness
was not an athlete at the time of the infusion.”197
b. Respondent’s Submissions
Respondent argues that the Code does not prohibit all administrations of substances or
methods. Instead, to prove an Administration or Attempted Administration violation,
USADA has the burden of establishing each of the following elements: an “[1]
Administration or Attempted Administration [2] to any Athlete Out-of-Competition [3]
of any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method that is prohibited Out-of-
Competition.”198 According to Respondent, USADA’s charge fails for several reasons:
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
194
Id.
195
196
197
Id.
198
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 46:7.5.1.
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• “USADA Failed to Prove That Respondent Actually Administered or Attempted
to Administer Any Prohibited Method.”199
• “Respondent Did Not Commit an Anti-Doping Rule Violation Involving the
Dextrose and L-Carnitine Administration to Steve Magness.”200
Respondent alleges that in order to establish that Respondent violated the Administration
or Attempted Administration rule, USADA must prove that Respondent actually
Administrated or Attempted to Administer the Prohibited Method. Respondent contends
that USADA has not and cannot make this required showing.201
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Respondent was not present at any of the L-
carnitine infusions or injections, which occurred at Dr. Brown’s office in Houston, Texas.
Because Respondent was not present at the time any of the alleged Prohibited Methods
was administrated, Respondent claims that he cannot, as a matter of law, have violated
the Administration or Attempted Administration rule.202
The Code allows an injection / infusion of a non-Prohibited Substance (like saline,

dextrose, and L-Carnitine) if the volume of the administered fluid does not exceed a
specified volume limit per a specified time period. Only if the volume exceeds the Code
limit does the injection / infusion constitute a Prohibited Method.203
On November 16, 2011, after they had already decided that the first procedure would be
done on Mr. Magness, Respondent mentioned “doing the insulin infusion” only because
he believed that Mr. Magness was “not competing anymore”—i.e., that he was not an
Athlete. Mr. Magness ultimately reported that Dr. Brown advised that “[h]e’s fine doing
it . . . without the insulin” and Dr. Brown and Mr. Magness instead used a solution of
dextrose and L-Carnitine for Mr. Magness’s procedure. Accordingly, Respondent argues
that “the dextrose and L-Carnitine injection / infusion was specifically designed for Mr.
Magness because he was ‘not competing anymore.’”204
Respondent argues that:
(a) Mr. Magness was not an “Athlete,” as defined by the Code, because he was
“not an international or national level runner.” Mr. Magness has never run at
a level that put him in the USATF testing pool and that, both before and while
he was at the NOP, Mr. Magness did not receive any anti-doping information
and education from USADA.205
(b) the definition of “Athlete” in the Code allows National Anti-Doping

Organizations to “elect” to apply some or all of its anti-doping program to
“competitors at lower levels of Competition or to individuals who engage in
199
200
201
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 47:7.5.2.1.
202
203
204
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 60-61:7.6.2.4.
205
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 66-67:7.6.4.2.
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fitness activities but do not compete at all.” However, Respondent argues that
the Panel should not “elect” to apply some or all of USADA’s Protocol, as
requested by USADA, because the definition of Athlete in the USADA
Protocol “…uses essentially the same definition of Athlete as the WADA
Code”, making USADA’s contention that the USADA Protocol applies to
“Any Athlete who is a member or licenseholder of a NGB meaningless.”206
(c) “[t]here is no provision in the USADA Protocol that applies either the entire
WADA Code or the relevant provisions of the WADA Code to individuals
who are not competitors.”207
(d) Mr. Magness did not consider himself to be an Athlete under the Code. In a
May 26, 2017 recorded telephone call with Dr. Brown’s attorneys, Mr.
Magness said, “I did not see myself as a competing athlete.” “Although Mr.
Magness attempted to walk back on his statement during the Hearing, his
emails and documents confirm that Mr. Magness repeatedly told USADA that
he did not see himself as a competition athlete.” On August 16, 2015, Mr.
Magness responded to USADA’s questions during its investigation into
Respondent and the NOP, by saying he had “spent the better part of a decade
perfecting my craft of coaching,” and that, “To my knowledge I haven’t ever”
committed an anti-doping violation.208
(e) USADA “persisted in pressuring” Mr. Magness to confirm that he was an

Athlete. On March 22, 2017, USADA sent Mr. Magness a draft affidavit that
“required him to admit to committing an anti-doping rule violation based on
the dextrose and L-carnitine injection / infusion he received.” After reading
the affidavit, Mr. Magness asked Mr. Burgos of USADA: “If you can point
me to the section of the WADA code that deals with violations by supporting
personnel that would be helpful. I can only find the athletes. I just want to
fully understand what it entails, as it is my livelihood.”
(f) Mr. Magness also asked Mr. Burgos, “does it impact things that I did not
compete in any race for a year after the IV?”209 Respondent contends that these
emails “make clear that, well into 2017, Mr. Magness still did not view
himself as having been a competing athlete when he received the dextrose and
L-carnitine infusion / injection.”210
(g) Mr. Magness referred to himself as “coach for the Nike NOP with Alberto
Salazar” or as otherwise not an active athlete to third parties.211 In Mr.
Magness emails to Dr. Greenhaff, Mr. Magness distinguished himself from
206
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 66:7.6.4.1.2-7.6.4.1.4.
207
Id.
208
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief
209
Resp. Ex. 263 at 3; Tr. (Day 1) at 373:17-374:10; see also Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 68:7.6.4.2.1.4
210
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 68:7.6.4.2.1.4.
211
Resp. Ex. 70.
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the “athletes” and “professional runners.”212 Respondent argues that this
demonstrates that Mr. Magness “did not view himself as an Athlete.”213
Respondent concludes that Respondent at all times insisted that Mr. Magness be
compliant with all applicable WADA rules. To the extent that Mr. Magness violated a
WADA rule, that was done against Respondent’s direction and desire.
2. Decision and Reasoning - L-Carnitine – Administration – Magness

Infusion
Article 2.8 of the 2009 Code provides that the following is an anti-doping rule violation:
“Administration or Attempted administration to any Athlete In-Competition of any
Prohibited Method or Prohibited Substance, or administration or Attempted
administration to any Athlete Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Method or any
Prohibited Substance that is prohibited Out-of-Competition, or assisting, encouraging,
aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping
rule violation or any Attempted anti-doping rule violation.” Article 2.8 of the 2015 Code
provides that the following is an anti-doping rule violation: “Administration or Attempted
Administration to any Athlete In-Competition of any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited
Method, or Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete Out-of-
Competition of any Prohibited Substance or any Prohibited Method that is prohibited
Out-of-Competition”. The 2009 and 2015 Code provisions are identical except that the
2009 Code includes at the end of this provision: “or assisting, encouraging, aiding,
abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule
violation or any Attempted anti-doping rule violation.” The Panel and the parties for
purposes of this charge refer to the 2015 Code provision, with the supplemental
complicity related provision in the 2009 Code addressed separately below under
“Complicity”, starting at Paragraph 260, for the reasons set forth there.
The Panel must therefore determine for this charge of Administration or Attempted
Administration: 1. Was there a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method?; 2. Was there
an Athlete?; and 3. Was there Administration or Attempted Administration by
Respondent? The 2015 Code provides the following definition of Administration:
“[p]roviding, supplying, supervising, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the Use or
Attempted Use by another Person of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method”.
There is no controversy that Steve Magness received a “Prohibited Method” infusion of

L-Carnitine – the infusion was over the limit of 50 mL (or the current limit 100 mL), at
1000 mL as given on November 28, 2011, by Dr. Brown, which the Panel finds to be a
Prohibited Method.
Article 2.8 (of both the 2009 and 2015 Codes) also requires that the Prohibited Method
be administered to an Athlete. Respondent’s argument that Respondent needed to have
specific intent by knowing that Mr. Magness was considered an Athlete and as such
would be committing an anti-doping rule violation (i.e. to have actual knowledge that Mr.
212
Id.
213
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Magness was subject to the provisions of the Code), has no citation to any Code provision
and is inconsistent with the strict liability provisions reflected throughout the Code. If
Mr. Magness was an “Athlete” subject to the provisions of the Code and he received a
Prohibited Method, the Panel finds that is considered an anti-doping rule violation. There
is no requirement that Respondent or Mr. Magness actually intended that Mr. Magness
would be using a Prohibited Method, or that Mr. Magness knew he was subject to the
provisions of the Code as an “Athlete”.
The question for the Panel is whether Mr. Magness falls within the definition of an Athlete
under the 2009 Code which was applicable at the time. Mr. Magness did not consider
himself a professional athlete at the time. He had competed in and entered several
USATF sanctioned events as a member of USATF in good standing. At those
competitions, he was subject to doping control. He had not received any anti-doping
education from USATF. He also considered himself a coach at the same time as he was
entering USATF sanctioned events.
It is unclear from the evidence whether Mr. Magness understood himself to be an

“Athlete” subject to the Code in 2011. The Panel looks to the Code definition of an
Athlete as “Any Person who competes in sport at the international level (as defined by
the International Federation), or the national level (as defined by each National Anti-
Doping Organization). An Anti-Doping Organization has discretion to apply anti-doping
rules to an Athlete who is neither an International-Level Athlete nor a National-Level
Athlete, and thus to bring them within the definition of “Athlete…. For purposes of
Article 2.8 and Article 2.9 and for purposes of anti-doping information and education,
any Person who competes in sport under the authority of any Signatory, government, or
other sports organization accepting the Code is an Athlete.” This charge is under Article
2.8 and as required specifically by the Code, that final sentence is applicable. Mr.
Magness competed and registered for events sanctioned by USATF, i.e. he “competed in
sport under the authority” of a “sports organization accepting the Code”. There is no
requirement that the athlete have knowledge of his status as an Athlete but simply that he
compete in sport under the authority of a sports organization accepting the Code, which
Mr. Magness did in 2011, just prior to receiving the injection of the Prohibited Method
in November 2011.
With respect to the charge of Administration under that same Article 2.8, there is no
requirement that Respondent needs to know that the Administration is to an Athlete, but
rather the determining factor is whether the Administration is to an Athlete, as defined
under the Code.
The Panel finds that Mr. Magness was an “Athlete” within the meaning of the Code in
2011, when he received the Prohibited Method injection.
The Panel must next determine whether there was Administration or Attempted
Administration by Respondent. The charge of Administration requires that Respondent
have “administered” or attempted “administration”, defined as “[p]roviding, supplying,
supervising, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the Use or Attempted Use by
another Person of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method”. Though this definition
was not part of the 2009 Code, which neither party argued was applicable, the Panel still
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must determine whether the principle of lex mitior would change its analysis. Consistent
with the finding by the panel in CAS Bruyneel, the Panel finds that the definition is
applicable here as it provides guidance as to the definition of “Administration”.214 It is
clearly broader that the simple actual administration, i.e. giving or providing.
The Panel found no evidence in this case that Respondent himself provided, supplied,
supervised or participated in the actual use of the Prohibited Method by Mr. Magness.
Respondent did however initiate the research into the L-carnitine by referring Mr.
Magness to the Nottingham Group, by email of January 26, 2011, and on November 14,
2011, Mr. Magness specifically references Respondent’s request to have him have the
infusion, Respondent did suggest that he try the L-carnitine infusion with insulin, he
suggested the use of the Prohibited Method by Mr. Magness in his email of November
15, 2011 that he could “get the L-carnitine infusion”, he directed Mr. Magness to use the
infusion/Prohibited Method by telling him “let’s try and get the infusion done by Dr.
Brown.”215 In other words, without Respondent’s facilitation, Mr. Magness would not
have had the infusion. Mr. Magness worked for Respondent and it was in his interest to
do what he was instructed.
The Panel finds that Respondent’s reliance on Legkov v. IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379 that
“the Panel must be comfortably satisfied that the Athlete personally committed a specific
violation of a specific provision of the WADC” is not helpful. In no way would the Panel
make a finding without USADA’s having met its burden of proof that Respondent did
personally commit a specific violation. Further, USADA must indeed meet its burden to
establish facts without relying on innuendo, rumors or speculation. The Panel has not
considered any of the character evidence introduced by USADA or the “multiple layers”
of hearsay referenced by Respondent.
USADA argues that Respondent by asking Mr. Magness to investigate L-carnitine

infusions and identifying Dr. Brown as the person to administer the infusions was leading
the initiative to administer L-carnitine, i.e. that Respondent fell within the provisions of
the definition of “facilitating, or otherwise participating in the Use or Attempted Use by
another Person of a … Prohibited Method” (The referenced emails can be found at
Paragraphs 80-94).
USADA in order to meet its burden of proof invites the Panel to draw an adverse inference
based on Respondent’s “extensive involvement in a scheme to conceal evidence from
USADA regarding the infusions”, administered by Dr. Brown not just to Mr. Magness
but also to the NOP Athletes, as meeting the comfortable satisfaction standard. The case
cited by USADA, Al Nassr Saudi Club v. Jaimen Javier Ayovi Corozo, CAS 2015/A/3883
to guide the Panel to infer that Respondent has something to hide and thus to draw an
adverse inference against Respondent, is not helpful to the Panel and not necessary. With
respect to Mr. Magness, there was no “extensive involvement in a scheme to conceal
evidence”. The Panel does not draw such an adverse inference against Respondent based
on the facts in this case. The other case cited by USADA, USADA v. Trafeh, AAA 01-
214
Bruyneel v. USADA, CAS 2014/A/3598, 98-99, ¶¶ 633-37.
215
Resp. Ex. 86 at 1.
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14-0000-4694, is not helpful either, as unlike in that case, Respondent did appear, did
respond and did submit evidence on this point.
The Panel finds that USADA has met its burden of proof to show that there was: 1. A
Prohibited Method, an infusion over the applicable limit; 2. Mr. Magness was an Athlete;
and 3. Respondent, specifically and aggressively, facilitated and otherwise participated
in Mr. Magness’ Use of the Prohibited Method. Respondent has committed a violation
of Article 2.8.
The Panel is cognizant of Respondent’s conduct being in “good faith” when he relied on
Magness’ interpretation of his status and the applicability of the Code, and that he was
extremely engaged with USADA and acted with caution and care to comply with the
Code. Unfortunately, in this case, under the applicable standards which this Panel must
apply, Respondent was negligent in his duty and let his enthusiasm about the L-carnitine
performance enhancing potential cloud his judgment. The Panel is not stating that
Respondent set out to violate the Code, but that according to the Code’s provisions and
Respondent’s actions in this case, he did so, seemingly unwittingly.
In accordance with Article 10.3.3, for a violation of Article 2.8, the period of Ineligibility
shall be a minimum of four years up to lifetime Ineligibility, depending on the seriousness
of the violation. The Panel finds that a four year period of Ineligibility, the minimum, is
appropriate considering Respondent’s role in this anti-doping rule violation.
The Panel is mindful that its finding suggests that Mr. Magness committed an anti-doping
rule violation, but that determination is not before this Panel.
3. Administration and/or Attempted Administration – L-carnitine -

NOP Athletes
As stated above (Paragraphs 114 - 124), the NOP Athletes received L-carnitine
infusions/injections from Dr. Brown after Mr. Magness’, with the initial plan to give them
the same protocol as Mr. Magness received, until the plans changed on December 6, 2011
after Mr. Ritzenhein made inquiries as to the risks involved.
a. USADA Submissions
USADA contends:
(a) that once it has established that Respondent purposely engaged in conduct
constituting a substantial step in a course planned to culminate in a rule
violation, the burden shifts to the Respondent to establish that he has
“renounce[d] the Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not
involved in the Attempt.”216 “Where Article 3.1 of the Code places the burden
of proof upon . . . [a] Person alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule
violation to . . . establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of proof
shall be by a balance of probability.” USADA contends “the burden is on
216
2009 Code Def. of “Attempt”.
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57
Respondent to establish renunciation of the Attempt by a balance of
probability.”217
(b) that, in the event the Panel finds that Respondent and Dr. Brown at any point
planned to give NOP Athletes over 50 mL infusions the “key inquiry becomes
not necessarily whether USADA can prove that subsequent infusions were
over 50 mL (i.e., not whether USADA can prove that Dr. Brown administered
over 50 mL to other individuals), but whether Respondent can prove that he
‘renounce[d] the Attempt [i.e., the plan to give over 50 mL infusions] prior to
it [i.e., the Attempt] being discovered by a third party not involved in the
Attempt’.218
(c) that shifting the burden to Respondent to prove that Dr. Brown gave allowable
infusions of 50 mL or less to each of these NOP Athletes is required under the
circumstances of this case by Article 2.8 Administration and Article 3.1
Burdens and Standards of Proof, and the Code definition of “Attempt.”
USADA also argues that it is also just, fair and fully consistent with the core
Code purpose of “protect[ing] . . . Athletes’ fundamental right to participate
in doping-free sport and thus promote, health, fairness and equality for
Athletes worldwide.”219
(d) that when a party should have access to records, “[i]t is not sufficient for [that
party] to simply make a statement for the Panel to accept that it is true. The
Panel, based on objective criteria, must be convinced of the occurrence of
alleged facts.”220 The Mykolayovych case involved a labor conflict about
which the panel observed:
As the employer, the Club has (or at least should have) all the
pertinent evidence in its hand: the contracts, the proof of
payments, the explanations as regards the eventual late payments,
the Player’s eventual failure to carry out his obligations, witness
statements related to the specific circumstances of the case, etc.221
(e) that legal doctrines such as spoliation, equitable estoppel or adverse inferences
are frequently used to address inequitable situations such as when a party
destroys, alters, or fails to produce evidence as Respondent did in this case.
See, e.g., Al Nassr Saudi Club v. Jaimen Javier Ayovi Corozo, CAS
2015/A/3883 at p. 11, ¶ 64 (“if a party after being ordered to do so refuses to
disclose documents without a reasonable excuse, the arbitral tribunal is likely
to infer that the party has something to hide and is likely to treat that party’s
future evidence with a degree of skepticism”); USADA v. Trafeh, AAA 01-
217
218
2009 Code Def. of “Attempt”; USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 188-189.
219
2015 Code, Purpose, Scope and Organization of the World Anti-Doping Program and the Code, p.11
(underlining added).
220
Football Club Goverla v. Gibalyuk Mykola Mykolayovych, CAS 2013/A/3097, p. 16, ¶ 58(e); see also USADA
Post-Hearing Brief at p. 204.
221
See Mykolayovych, p. 14, ¶ 57.
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14-0000-4694, p. 21, ¶ 8.4 (“CAS arbitrators have long recognized the
propriety of imposing an adverse inference against a respondent in an anti-
doping case who failed to appear, failed to respond or failed to cooperate in
the investigation of a case against them.”); see also Taming the Wild West of
Arbitration Ethics, 60 Kan.L.Rev. 925, 951 (2012) (“Nearly every state in the
United States allows for some form of sanctions against the spoliating party
in a civil case. Unlike the tort of spoliation of evidence, some anecdotal
evidence suggests that arbitrators are, in fact, granting this burden-shifting
inference and sanctions in the arbitral forum.”).
(f) that it is not sufficient to meet his burden that Respondent simply professed
that the NOP Athletes received under 50 mL infusions. Rather, Respondent
must prove by a balance of probabilities and with evidence other than his own
statements that the infusions actually given to these NOP Athletes were 50
mL or less. “[T]he currency of a denial is devalued by the fact that it is the
common coin of the guilty as well as the innocent.” Meca-Medina v. FINA,
CAS 99/A/234 ¶10.17.
(g) that Dr. Brown’s “failure to produce reliable, contemporaneous

documentation from sources such as these corroborating the infusion volumes
can and should lead the Panel to treat the physician’s self-serving claims about
infusions with skepticism.”222 USADA argues that Dr. Brown was “directly
accountable to Respondent through his consulting contract with the NOP” and
the infusions were part of the NOP project that required Dr. Brown to keep
records related to the infusions.223
(h) under the circumstances in this case, it is appropriate to hold Respondent

“accountable for an attempt to commit rule violations in relation to the
infusions planned to be given to Mr. Ritzenhein, Ms. Begay, Ms. Grunnagle,
Mr. Rupp and Ms. Allen-Horn and as to which Respondent and those with
whom he conspired have destroyed or hidden all reliable evidence of the
precise volume of the infusions given.”224
(i) that once it has established that Respondent purposely engaged in conduct
constituting a substantial step in a course planned to culminate in a rule
violation, the burden shifts to the Respondent to establish that he has
“renounce[d] the Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not
involved in the Attempt.”225 “Where Article 3.1 of the Code places the burden
of proof upon . . . [a] Person alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule
violation to . . . establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of proof
shall be by a balance of probability.” USADA contends “the burden is on
222
223
Id.
224
225
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Respondent to establish renunciation of the Attempt by a balance of
probability.”226
(j) that, in the event the Panel finds that Respondent and Dr. Brown at any point
planned to give NOP Athletes over 50 mL infusions the “key inquiry becomes
not necessarily whether USADA can prove that subsequent infusions were
over 50 mL (i.e., not whether USADA can prove that Dr. Brown administered
over 50 mL to other individuals), but whether Respondent can prove that he
‘renounce[d] the Attempt [i.e., the plan to give over 50 mL infusions] prior to
it [i.e., the Attempt] being discovered by a third party not involved in the
Attempt’.227
(k) that cases reflect that an “attempt” violation can occur if the actual anti-doping
rule violations contemplated is not established, thereby making one liable for
an “attempt” to use a banned drug merely by ordering a banned drug. See
ASADA v. Wyper, CAS 2007/A/4, p. 10 ¶ 36 (finding that violation of
attempted use was established based on researching, ordering and paying for
prohibited substances, even though the drugs were seized by customs officials
before delivery was made).
(l) that Dr. Brown intentionally failed to record infusion volumes in the NOP
patient records and that Dr. Brown “never provided a cogent explanation why
contemporaneous patient records (before being surreptitiously altered by him)
failed to reflect the volume of infusions given to Dathan Ritzenhein, Alvina
Begay, Dawn Grunnagle, Galen Rupp and Lindsay [Allen]-Horn.”228 Dr.
Green testified that Dr. Brown did not comply with the standard of care when
he failed to record infusion volumes contemporaneously with the infusions.229
(m) that “[a]ny ambiguity created by Dr. Brown’s intentional failure to record
infusion volumes should, therefore, be resolved against Respondent and Dr.
Brown who were actively working together in this scheme.”230 USADA
argues that “[u]nlike the athletes who received the infusions, Respondent,
through Dr. Brown, must have known the exact volumes given. Yet, Dr.
Brown intentionally chose not to record volumes in the patient records.”231
(n) the infusions took place within days to weeks of Respondent reaching out to
USADA and being told that compliance with the 50 mL volume limit was
non-negotiable. If the volume was below the Code threshold, Dr. Brown had
every reason to record it. Respondent and Dr. Brown did not provide any
logical explanation for this omission, which, according to USADA, is highly
suggestive that the volumes were over-limit.
226
227
2009 Code Def. of “Attempt”; USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 188-189.
228
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 193; USADA Ex. 726; Tr. (Day 3) 746:20-747:13.
229
Id.
230
231
Id.
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(o) that “[t]he evidence demonstrates the over-the-limit L-carnitine infusion given
to Magness on November 28, 2011, was part of a broader plan by Respondent
and Dr. Brown to give infusions to other athletes.”232 USADA argues that
“Respondent and Dr. Brown freely acknowledged information from the
Magness infusion was used for planning purposes for subsequent infusions
and the email communications between Respondent and Dr. Brown confirm
the Magness infusion was expressly intended to facilitate these later infusions
to others.”233
(p) that on December 1, 2011, “three days after the infusion given to Magness,
Dathan Ritzenhein was instructed to travel to Houston to receive the same
infusion from Respondent that Steve Magness had received.”234 USADA
contends that despite Respondent’s claim that the original plan was not to give
Mr. Ritzenhein an infusion in excess of 50 mL, Dr. Brown told Mr. Ritzenhein
that the infusion “takes about 4-5 hours,” the same amount of time as Mr.
Magness’ over-the-limit infusion.235
(q) that Respondent’s December 3, 2011 request to USADA to ask for permission
importantly does not identify the volume of the IV infusion that Mr. Magness
received. USADA argues that “the emails of Respondent, Dr. Brown and Mr.
Ritzenhein from December, 2011, are all consistent, pointing unequivocally
to the conclusion that one liter Magness-type L-carnitine infusions were
planned for other NOP athletes, i.e., the 4-5 ‘elite athletes’ for whom
Respondent sought permission to give infusions (after all, Mr. Ritzenhein was
instructed by Respondent to immediately get down to Houston for his infusion
days before the inquiry to USADA was made).”236
(r) that “the only way Respondent could demonstrate that he renounced the plan
to give over-limit infusions was to present sufficient contemporaneous
documentation or other credible evidence to establish by a balance of
probabilities that the infusions Dr. Brown gave were 50 mL or less.”237
USADA argues that because Respondent did not do this, he should be found
responsible for the Attempted violations in relation to the infusions given to
Mr. Ritzenhein (on December 13, 2011), Ms. Begay (on December 23, 2011),
Ms. Grunnagle (on December 29, 2011), Mr. Rupp (on January 5, 2012) and
Ms. Allen-Horn (on January 11, 2012).238
232
233
Id.
234
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 196; USADA Ex. 236.
235
Id.
236
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 199; Tr. (Day 2) at 632:17-24.
237
238
Id.
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(s) USADA argues that Respondent intended to prevent USADA from receiving
information and “[i]t is not necessary for USADA to prove ‘why’ Respondent
sought to prevent USADA from receiving information.”239
b. Respondent’s Submissions
According to Respondent, USADA’s charge fails for several reasons:
• USADA failed to prove that Respondent actually administered or attempted to

administer any prohibited method.
• There was no “prohibited method” because none of the administrations to the
NOP Athletes exceeded 50 mL.
• There was no “prohibited method” because none of the administrations to the
NOP Athletes exceeded 100 mL.
• There was no “attempted” administration exceeding the Code volume limit to an
NOP Athlete.
• USADA’s attempts to shift the burden to prove the volumes to Respondent are
meritless.
Respondent argues that the Code, at the time of the L-carnitine administration, prohibited
“[i]ntravenous infusions and/or injections of more than 50 mL per 6 hour period.”
Respondent contends that “[t]he evidence demonstrates that no NOP Athlete received an
infusion / injection that exceeded 50 ml of fluid per 6-hour period.”240
Respondent relies on the contemporaneous documentary evidence and the testimony of

NOP Athletes to support the conclusion that the L-carnitine administration did not exceed
50 mL.
According to Respondent, Mr. Ritzenhein “made clear that the saline and L-Carnitine
injections / infusions did not exceed the 50 ml threshold necessary to establish a
violation.”241 Mr. Ritzenheim testified that he received his infusion from a “little tiny
bag,” he had watched the drip from the bag, and he was “pretty confident” that the volume
in the bag was “less than 50 milliliters.”242 Mr. Ritzenhein also testified that “[i]t was a
pretty small amount. I know it wasn’t a lot, so — I mean I’ve had a big—a big transfusion
from in the hospital setting before, and I know it didn’t look like that.”243 He explained
that he has a “good sense” of how much 50 mL is because he’s “been living that [issue]
for the last three years” and because he conducted a test by “putting water in a bag [and]
after that looking to see what it looked like.”244
Mr. Ritzenhein testified that he did not receive multiple infusion bags, by saying “I don’t
believe that the bags ever changed” and he has “no recollection of any bags ever being
239
240
241
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 49:7.5.3.4.1.
242
Tr. (Day 2) at 653:3-21, 655:14-23.
243
Tr. (Day 2) at 655:14-23.
244
Tr. (Day 2) at 655:10-22.
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changed.”245 Mr. Ritzenhein testified that he does not believe he committed an anti-
doping rule violation.246
USADA originally argued that Ms. Erdmann’s L-carnitine administration violated the
Code, however, “USADA has now apparently dropped that allegation.”247 Respondent
argues that this was done because her medical records (unlike those of the other NOP
athletes) contain “undisputed evidence [that] shows that she received only 40 ml of saline
and L-Carnitine—specifically, four pushes of “10 cc” (equivalent to 10 ml) each from a
syringe—which is below the 50 ml limit,” set forth in the Code.248USADA argued and
continues to argue that Respondent’s and Dr. Brown’s use of the term “infusion” referred
to an intravenous administration from a bag or to an intravenous administration
containing a large volume. However, Dr. Brown referred to Tara Erdman’s procedure as
an “L-Carnitine infusion” but the procedure undisputedly used a syringe containing 40
mL.
The remaining NOP Athletes do not recall the volumes and other details of their saline
and L-Carnitine injections/infusions. Respondent argues that “[l]ike Mr. Ritzenhein,
however, Ms. Begay, Ms. Allen-Horn and Galen Rupp—all of whom received their
injections / infusions after Mr. Ritzenhein—testified that that they drank multiple glucose
/ sugary drinks as part of their procedures.”249 Respondent argues that this confirms they
received the same procedure as Mr. Ritzenhein because the glucose/sugary drinks were
“specifically designed for the under-50-ml protocol that Mr. Ritzenhein received and was
a substitute for the dextrose (which is also sugar water) in the infusion that Steve Magness
received.”250
Dr. Brown’s contemporaneous notations in Mr. Ritzenhein’s medical records show that
Dr. Brown’s office gave him “75 grams glucose” in intervals of “20 min.”251 Similarly,
the contemporaneous notations in the other NOP Athletes’ medical records show that Dr.
Brown’s office gave them 75 grams of Glucola in intervals of twenty minutes.252 As
discussed above, the use of the glucose / sugary drinks were specifically designed for
under-50-mL protocol that Mr. Ritzenhein received, which was a substitute for the
dextrose in the infusion that Mr. Magness received.
Respondent also argues that Diane Gonzales’ testimony “supports the conclusion that the
L-carnitine administration did not exceed 50 mL.” Ms. Gonzales March 2016 statement
included the following:
245
Tr. (Day 2) at 692:19-693:4, 690:24-691:7.
246
Tr. (Day 2) at 724:16-19.
247
248
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 48:7.5.3.3.1; Resp. Ex. 273 at 3, Ex. 173, Ex. 174.
249
Tr. (Day 2) at 653:22-24, 654:19-22; Tr. (Day 2) at 779:8-11, 808:24-25; Tr. (Day 3) at 875:18-22; Tr. (Day 5)
at 2126:18-20.
250
See Resp. Ex. 79 (“carbohydrate feeding” rather than insulin or glucose infusion), Ex. 83 (“special drink” rather
than insulin infusion), Ex. 88 (“very high concentration glucose drink” rather than insulin or glucose infusion); see
also Ex. 105 (“special drink designed to raise his insulin levels”).
251
Resp. Ex. 271 at 1; see also Tr. (Day 2) at 653:22-24, 654:19-22.
252
Resp. Ex. 127 at 1; Resp. Ex. 131 at 1; Resp. Ex. 137 at 4; see also Tr. (Day 2) at 779:8-11, 808:24-25; Tr.
(Day 3) at 875:18-22; Tr. (Day 5) at 2126:18-20.
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I have been shown a Logged Formula Worksheet from the
Compounding Corner Pharmacy for L-carnitine infusion solution
prepared on January 4, 2012. Having reviewed the Logged
Formula Worksheet and given my recollection of the size of the
infusion bag, I believe the IV infusion bag used in most of the L-
carnitine infusions in which I participated was at least 100 mL.253
At the Hearing, Ms. Gonzales testified that she recently conducted an experiment that
indicated to her that the bags were not 100 mL by filling a sandwich-sized Ziploc bag
with water and folding it in half “to try to make the size of the bag that I remembered.”254
Ms. Gonzales testified that the 100 mL bag “didn’t seem right” and “[i]t seemed too much
fluid.”255 When she filled the Ziploc bag with 50 mL, she said it felt “that seemed more
consistent with the bags that we used” and “all I can say is it just felt right.”256
According to Respondent, the contemporaneous emails support the conclusion that Dr.
Brown planned to and did give each of the NOP Athletes a 45-mL or 40-mL saline and
L-Carnitine injection / infusion, as follows:
(a) Before Mr. Ritzenhein’s procedure, Respondent sent him a copy of his
December 3, 2011 request to USADA for guidance; Mr. Fedoruk’s December
6, 2011 response containing the WADA volume limit of 50-mL per 6-hour
period; and Respondent’s later instruction to Dr. Brown and Mr. Magness to
follow USADA’s guidance.
(b) Then, on December 9, 2011, Mr. Ritzenhein reached out to Dr. Brown
regarding scheduling, expressed his understanding that “we are going to do
the 45ml infusion with the drink,” and proposed visiting Dr. Brown’s office
the following “tuesday,” December 13, 2011.257
(c) Dr. Maguadog entered his formula for a 45-ml injectable (containing saline
and 9.67 grams of L-Carnitine) for Dr. Brown on December 12, 2011—the
day immediately before Mr. Ritzenhein’s scheduled visit to Dr. Brown’s
office. Mr. Ritzenhein in fact received the procedure on December 13, 2011.
(d) Mr. Magness directly communicated with Ms. Grunnagle regarding

scheduling her procedure and, on December 12, 2011, told her that the
procedure consists of essentially “4 drinks [of a sugary drink] and 4 little drips
of infusion.” Mr. Magness’s reference to “4 little drips” demonstrates that he
and Dr. Brown planned to give Ms. Grunnagle only a very small volume of
fluid. This description also is consistent with the four pushes of a syringe that
Ms. Erdmann undisputedly received. Moreover, Mr. Magness’s reference to
253
Resp. Ex. 274 at 2.
254
Tr. (Day 7) at 185:17-186:3, 186:17-187:5.
255
Tr. (Day 7) at 185:17-186:3, 186:17-187:6.
256
Tr. (Day 7) at 185:5-187:18.
257
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taking a “sugary drink” (i.e., glucose drink) in intervals is consistent with the
45 mL protocol and is inconsistent with the Magness protocol.
(e) On December 16, Dr. Brown emailed Respondent, copying his medical
assistant Ms. Gonzales, with respect to Ms. Begay and Ms. Grunnagle and
stated: “We will use the same protocol using 45 ml of L-[]carnitine solution
with the oral glucose loading as we used on Dathan [Ritzenhein].”258 This
demonstrates both that (a) Mr. Ritzenhein received a 45-mL saline and L-
Carnitine administration and (b) that Dr. Brown planned to give Ms.
Grunnagle and Ms. Begay the same procedure.
(f) On December 19, 2011, while Dr. Brown and Respondent were discussing
plans for Mr. Rupp to possibly receive the procedure in Oregon, Respondent
asked Dr. Brown for the protocol for the NOP Athletes. Dr. Brown responded
that he “give[s] 9.67 grams of L-Carnitine in 45 ml of .9% saline over 1
hour.”259 This demonstrates both that (a) Dr. Brown had been using a 45-mL
saline and L-Carnitine injection / infusion for the NOP Athletes up to that
point and (b) that the plan was to give Mr. Rupp the same procedure.
(g) On January 1, 2012, Dr. Brown and Respondent discussed by email

scheduling Mr. Rupp’s procedure for “this coming Thursday”—January 5,
2012—and scheduling Ms. Allen-Horn’s procedure for “Tuesday the 10th [to]
get examined and infusion on the 11th”—January 10 and 11, 2012.260 On
January 4, 2012—the day immediately before Mr. Rupp’s scheduled visit to
Dr. Brown’s office and several days before Ms. Allen-Horn’s scheduled visit
to Dr. Brown’s office—Dr. Maguadog created a log showing his preparation
of two injectables based on his formula for a 45-mL injectable (containing
saline and 9.67 grams of L-Carnitine). Mr. Rupp in fact received the
procedure on January 5, 2012, and Ms. Allen received the procedure on
January 11, 2012.
These documents support the conclusion that Dr. Brown planned to and did give each of
them a 45-mL saline and L-Carnitine injection / infusion.
Moreover, Dr. Brown again confirmed in multiple documents that the volume
administered to the NOP Athletes was “well below” 50 ml—including in an email dated
January 13, 2012, in Tara Erdmann’s medical records, and in an email dated October 3,
2013.
Respondent argues that the purpose of the saline and L-Carnitine injections / infusions
was to mimic the results of the Nottingham Group’s research, which was (1) increasing
and maintaining an elevated level of L-Carnitine in the blood while (2) increasing insulin
in the blood to help drive the L-Carnitine into the muscle. Respondent contends that
258
USADA Ex. 113.
259
Resp. Ex. 120 at 1.
260
Resp. Ex. 133.
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“USADA wrongly assumes that, to achieve these results, the volume of the solution
containing the L-Carnitine had to be greater than 50 ml.”261
Respondent argues that “Dr. Stephens opined that, had his research group used a smaller
volume of sterile water, they could have simply adjusted the rate of infusion and the result
would have been substantially the same.”262 Further, with respect to using 45 mL or 40
mL injectables, “Dr. Stephens opined that the protocol could have sufficiently increased
and maintained a higher level of L-Carnitine in the blood—because the amount of L-
Carnitine was still 9.67 gm—while the Glucola drink helped drive the L-Carnitine from
the blood into the muscle.”263 Dr. Stephens testified that, “although the elevated L-
Carnitine in the blood would not be a steady state four pushes from a syringe containing
45 mL or 40 mL would have elevated and maintained a ‘very high level’ of ‘plasma
carnitine’ and ‘[i]t would have been consistently high, concomitantly with an elevated
insulin concentration above a level that we know will stimulate carnitine uptake into
muscle’.”264 Respondent contends that Dr. Stephens’ testimony was unrebutted, as
USADA presented no expert on L-Carnitine and metabolism. Thus, Respondent argues
there is no evidence that the volume needed to be greater than 50 mL to achieve a
performance-enhancing impact.
Respondent argues that:
(a) there was no “Attempted” Administration exceeding the Code volume limit
to an NOP Athlete.
(b) the evidence shows that after the December 1, 2011 email exchange between
Mr. Ritzenhein and Dr. Brown, Respondent emailed USADA informing it
about the infusion / injection and asking for guidance. Respondent argues that
this shows that he lacked intent to commit an Attempted Administration of an
anti-doping rule violation.
(c) he never intended to use the same procedures on the NOP Athletes that Mr.
Magness received. Respondent argues that “[t]he contemporaneous emails
show that, as of October and November 2011, Respondent and Mr. Magness
had discussed using ‘carbohydrate feeding’ or a ‘very high concentration
glucose drink’ to increase levels of insulin in the blood for the procedure to
the Athletes—and they expressly disclaimed using insulin or glucose
infusions for the Athletes.”265
(d) contrary to USADA’s speculation, neither Mr. Ritzenhein’s reference to the

“L-Carnitine infusion” nor Dr. Brown’s reference to the procedure taking “4-
5 hours” demonstrate that they intended to apply the same infusion that Mr.
Magness received.
261
262
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 57:7.5.3.7.5. Tr. (Day 3) at 932:15-934:8;
263
Id.
264
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 58:7.5.3.7.5. Tr. (Day 3) at 963:21-964:13;
265
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(e) “an intravenous administration of 30 ml can be done and was done in the
Nottingham Group’s research over the course of six hours. It thus certainly
can be done with 45 ml or 40 ml over the course of four to five hours.”266
(f) USADA has not proven and cannot prove a “substantial step.” Rather,
Respondent argues that at most, Mr. Ritzenhein and Dr. Brown scheduled Mr.
Ritzenhein to visit on December 6, 2011, and that appointment was cancelled.
A “cancelled appointment is not a step towards administrating the Magness
Protocol, let alone a ‘substantial step.’”267
(g) the Code expressly provides “there shall be no anti-doping rule violation based
solely on an Attempt to commit a violation if the Person renounces the
Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not involved in the
Attempt.”268 The Code defines “Attempt” as “[p]urposely engaging in conduct
that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate
in the commission of an anti-doping rule violation.”269 The requirement of
“purposeful engagement” (i.e., specific intent) and “substantial step” is
consistent with how California courts and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted
an attempt charge.270 Even assuming for argument’s sake that USADA could
prove “specific intent and a substantial step”, he sufficiently renounced that
effort by reaching out to USADA to obtain guidance and then instructing Dr.
Brown and Mr. Magness to follow the guidance once USADA provided such
guidance.271
(h) to satisfy its burden of proof, USADA must meet the “standard of proof,”
which is “whether [USADA] has established an anti-doping violation to the
comfortable satisfaction of the hearing Panel, bearing in mind the seriousness
of the allegation which is made.” 272 The standard of proof generally requires
proof that is “greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”273
(i) USADA’s burden to establish facts related to anti-doping violations must be

established through “reliable means.” This means that USADA cannot meet
its standard of proof by innuendo, rumors, or speculation.274 USADA also
cannot meet its standard of proof by relying on improper character evidence
and/or multiple layers of hearsay.275
266
267
268
2015 Code, Appx. 1 at p. 136.
269
2015 Code, Appx. 1 at p. 132
270
Cal. Pen. Code § 664; People v. Reed, 53 Cal.App.4th 389, 398 (1996); Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d
1094, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2011).
271
272
2015 Code, Article 3.1.
273
274
See WADA & FIFA v. CFA, et al., CAS 2009/A/1817 (Oct. 26, 2010).
275
Bowen v. Ryan, 163 Cal. App. 4th 916, 923 (2008); see also Cal. Evid. Code § 1101
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(j) in cases like the present where USADA is making “very serious allegations”
of wrongdoing, it is required to adduce “very convincing proof” to
substantiate those allegations. Respondent relies on the CAS panel’s recent
decision Legkov v. IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379. The International Olympic
Committee accused an athlete “of knowingly participating in a corrupt
conspiracy of unprecedented magnitude and sophistication.” In light of these
very serious allegations, the CAS panel held, “it is incumbent on the IOC to
adduce particularly cogent evidence of the Athlete’s deliberate personal
involvement in that wrongdoing.” The CAS panel in Legkov v. IOC, CAS
2017/A/5379 further rejected the “collective responsibility” concept, holding
that, to find a violation, “the Panel must be comfortably satisfied that the
Athlete personally committed a specific violation of a specific provision of
the WADC.”
4. Decision and Reasoning - Administration and/or Attempted

Administration – L-Carnitine - NOP Athletes
With respect to USADA’s charge that Respondent is in violation of the Attempt Rule
based on a plan to give impermissible infusions to NOP Athletes, the Panel must find that
USADA met its burden to show: 1. Respondent to have at least begun an Attempt which
is “purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-doping rule violation.”. The definition
of Attempt must be read in the context of Article 2.8, which requires attempted
“Administration” as providing, supplying, supervising, facilitating, or otherwise
participating in the Use or Attempted Use by another Person of a Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method. Upon meeting this burden, the Panel must then determine whether 2.
Respondent has “renounce[d] the Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not
involved in the Attempt.”
With respect to determination Number 1, whereas USADA established that the infusion
given to Mr. Magness was a Prohibited Method as it exceeded the maximum allowed
volume of 50 mL, and that there was an original plan for the other NOP Athletes to have
a similar infusion, the evidence was that once Respondent had contacted USADA on
December 3, 2011 to seek approval of his “research” and Dr. Fedoruk responded very
specifically on December 6, 2011 that the limit of any infusion should be 50 mL,
Respondent instructed Dr. Brown and Mr. Magness that the infusions should in the future
be a maximum of 50 mL. All the contemporaneous email exchanges thereafter indicate
that the original plan was altered and the intention was to comply with the Code.
The burden is on USADA to prove that the NOP Athletes’ infusions were intended to be
in excess of the applicable limit and then to show that a substantial step had been made
toward the Use of a Prohibited Method.
The parties have differing positions with respect to the burden of proof on determination
Number 2 above, as USADA argues that where Article 3.1 of the Code places the “burden
of proof upon . . . [a] Person alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to .
. . establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance
of probability.” USADA contends the burden is on Respondent to establish renunciation
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of the Attempt by a balance of probability. Respondent argues that USADA’s attempt to
shift the burden to Respondent is directly contradicted by the Code, which squarely places
the burden on USADA and because this is a non-analytical case, USADA is not entitled
to any presumptions in order to satisfy this burden. Respondent’s argument misses the
point that the facts in question with respect to an Attempt are not such as would assist
USADA in meeting its burden of proof, but rather they are exculpatory facts that would
assist Respondent in his defense against the charges. If Respondent has renounced the
Attempt, it is clearly in his interest and within his purview to prove that. In that event,
the burden to prove that he renounced any Attempt is by a balance of probabilities, a
lower burden than that imposed on USADA to meet its burden that Respondent was
“purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-doping rule violation”. The burden on
USADA is a higher burden, to a comfortable satisfaction of the Panel, considering the
gravity of the charges.
The Panel takes note that Dr. Brown worked for the NOP, was directed by Respondent
and they were in constant communication and that Dr. Brown did not follow the standard
of care and note in the medical records he controlled the volume of the infusions at the
time of the infusions. USADA asks the Panel to draw an inference that the infusions were
thus over 50 mL.
Though Dr. Brown’s medical records on the NOP Athletes did not indicate the volume
of the infusions, there was no evidence in the record of any side conversations between
Dr. Brown and Respondent to concoct a story about 50 mL infusions as reflected in the
email exchanges, while actually having the NOP Athletes receive an infusion over 50
mL. There is no evidence Respondent was even aware of the lack of volume notations in
Dr. Brown’s records until 2013, much later than the time of the infusions. Dr.
Maguadog’s testimony was not credible and did not assist the Panel in evaluating what
the NOP Athletes were given. Nor did Diane Gonzales advance the Panel’s
understanding of the volume of the infusions.
The context of the testimony from the NOP Athletes themselves is ambiguous about the
volume of the infusions. The NOP Athletes’ recollections in their testimony were not
always clear.
There are multiple contemporaneous or near time email exchanges with Dr. Brown where
he listed the protocol for the infusions as under 50 mL, according to the revised plan. In
addition, the email instructions from Respondent, after USADA’s email, were clear that
the plan was to limit the infusions to 50 mL.
USADA cites to various cases where the panel drew adverse inferences based on a refusal
to disclose documents and a failure to appear or failure to cooperate in the investigation
of a case against them.276 The Panel can distinguish those circumstances from USADA’s
276
See USADA’s Post-Hearing Brief pg. 186; Al Nassr Saudi Club v. Jaimen Javier Ayovi Corozo, CAS
2015/A/3883; USADA v. Trafeh, AAA 01-14-0000-4694.
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theory in this case that Respondent conspired with his counsel to hide reliable evidence
or to destroy evidence of the precise volume of the infusions given to the NOP Athletes.
The disturbing pattern of the altered records of Dr. Brown, along with Dr. Maguadog’s
non-credible testimony, were taken into consideration by the Panel. These alterations
occurred much later than the infusions (once USADA started its investigation in 2013)
and would seem to indicate that Dr. Brown and Dr. Maguadog had some later concerns
about their conduct, which could have included a concern about not noting the volume in
the medical records in the first place. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous emails which
are not simply Respondent’s statements, but rather are those of Dr. Brown at the time, are
unambiguous about the change of plan and the volume of the infusions. It is befuddling,
that knowing the concerns about the volume, Dr. Brown did not record in the patients’
medical records the volume of the infusions, but USADA presented no evidence that he
may have, contrary to his statements in several emails, given infusions or planned to give
infusions according to the original plan, i.e. in excess of the applicable limits.
Article 3.2 of the 2015 Code identifies “Methods of Establishing Facts and
Presumptions.” It provides that “The hearing panel in a hearing on an anti-doping rule
violation may draw an inference adverse to the Athlete or other Person who is asserted to
have committed an anti-doping rule violation based on the Athlete’s or other Person’s
refusal, after a request made in a reasonable time in advance of the hearing, to appear at
the hearing … and to answer questions from the hearing panel or the Anti-Doping
Organization asserting the anti-doping rule violation.”277
None of the situations referenced in Article 3.2 apply and a majority of the Panel declines
to draw an adverse inference against Respondent based on Dr. Brown’s failure to follow
the standard of care and Dr. Maguadog’s non-credible testimony.
In accordance with the standard established in Football Club Goverla v. Gibalyuk Mykola
Mykolayovych, CAS 2013/A/3097, that the Panel, based on objective criteria, must be
convinced of the occurrence of alleged facts, when they are available to Respondent, the
Panel notes: the multiple email exchanges with Dr. Brown specifying the new protocol,
the email from Mr. Ritzenhein stating the protocol was for an infusion under 50 mL, and
the emails reflecting the change of plans.
In addition:
(a) There was plenty of credible testimony about Respondent’s intent concerning
athletes at the NOP not having any anti-doping rule violations or taking any
prohibited performance enhancing drugs.
(b) Dr. Maguadog’s records may have been altered prior to the hearing and he
may have provided less than truthful evidence, and Dr. Brown’s records were
altered, but USADA presented no evidence this was done at the direction of
277
2015 Code Article 3.2.
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Respondent, especially in light of Respondent’s emails instructing that the
infusions be under 50 mL.
The Panel must also address USADA’s argument that it has established an “Attempt”,
with the burden then shifting to Respondent to establish that he has “renounce[d] the
Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not involved in the Attempt.”278
USADA claims that there were plans to give the NOP Athletes over limit infusions, but
that Respondent conspired to have the evidence of the precise volume of those infusions
destroyed or hidden and that he could not demonstrate he renounced the plan since he did
not provide sufficient contemporaneous documentation or other credible evidence to
establish the infusion volumes.
To USADA, these all point to a plan by Respondent for NOP Athletes to receive over
limit infusions:
(a) the over-the-limit L-carnitine infusion given to Mr. Magness on November

28, 2011, was part of a broader plan by Respondent and Dr. Brown to give
infusions to NOP Athletes and that this infusion was intended to facilitate
these later infusions to the NOP Athletes;
(b) Dr. Brown’s email to Mr. Ritzenhein where he states that the infusion takes
about 4-5 hours, i.e. the same amount of time as Mr. Magness’ infusion; and
(c) the December 3, 2011 request by Respondent to USADA for permission to

conduct a study which does not identify the volume of the Magness infusion.
In turn, Respondent focuses on Respondent’s lack of intent to commit an Attempted

Administration of an anti-doping rule violation as he never intended to use the same
procedures on the NOP Athletes that Mr. Magness received. The Panel rejects this
characterization, as it is clear that Respondent did originally intend to use the same
procedures on the NOP Athletes as was tested on Mr. Magness,
Respondent also points out that USADA cannot prove a “substantial step” as required by
the Attempted Administration rule, by pointing out that Mr. Ritzenhein’s cancelled
appointment was not such a step but that if it were, he renounced it by reaching out to
USADA for guidance.
As stated above, the Panel must find that USADA has borne its burden of proof that
Respondent was “purposely engaging” (i.e. had intent) in conduct that constitutes a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-
doping rule violation. The Panel finds that Respondent did intend to engage in a course
of conduct planned to culminate (unknowingly) in the commission of an anti-doping rule
violation. Nevertheless, before he purposely engaged in any actual “substantial step” in
that course of conduct with respect to the NOP Athletes, Respondent reached out to
USADA seeking permission or guidance. The majority of the Panel finds that he then
278
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followed that guidance with respect to the revised plans for the volume of the NOP
Athletes’ infusions. Respondent in his testimony to this effect came across as honest and
forthcoming. Dr. Brown’s sloppiness in not maintaining adequate records and then,
worse, altering those records, and his failure to explain those, are regrettable but does not
alter the substantial contemporaneous email record showing the altered plan and accepted
protocol. Any initial intent Respondent may have had for the NOP Athletes to receive
over the limit infusions is irrelevant under the Attempt definition. Rather, purposely
engaging in a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the
commission of an anti-doping rule violation is required. Respondent changed course on
his own in the face of Mr. Ritzenhein’s hesitation and questions and USADA’s guidance.
He had no plans to commit an anti-doping violation.
A majority of the Panel finds that no substantial step was taken by Respondent with
respect to an anti-doping rule violation (i.e. the Use of a Prohibited Method/over volume
infusion) for the NOP Athletes and in fact, Respondent was explicit at the time in taking
whatever steps were necessary to avoid any such conduct.
A majority of the Panel finds that USADA has not met its burden of proof with respect
to the Attempted Administration charge as it relates to the NOP Athletes.
D. Complicity – L-carnitine – Magness Infusion and NOP Athletes
The 2009 Code, Article 2.8, dealing with the Administration rule also prohibited
“assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity
involving an anti-doping rule violation or any attempted anti-doping rule violation.” The
2015 Code continued these provisions as a separate Article 2.9, which included a
requirement that the conduct be “intentional”: “Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting,
conspiring, covering up or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-
doping rule violation, Attempted anti-doping rule violation or violation of Article 10.12.1
by another Person.” (emphasis added).
1. USADA’s Submissions - Complicity
USADA combines Administration and Complicity in its Post-Hearing Briefs, applying

many of the same arguments for both anti-doping rule violations.
a. Magness and NOP Athletes Infusion
As set out above, USADA contends that “there can be no legitimate dispute that Mr.
Magness was on November 28, 2011, at a minimum, a recreational level athlete who had
recently competed in a competition sanctioned by USATF and was at that time registered
to compete in an upcoming USATF event.”279 Therefore, USADA contends that Mr.
Magness was “plainly an athlete covered by the anti-doping rules…” and Respondent
279
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was complicit in the Administration of an over-the-limit infusion to Mr. Magness by
encouraging and assisting with Mr. Magness’ infusion.280
In Legkov, the panel found there was insufficient evidence that the Athlete had engaged
in the use of a Prohibited Substance or had participated in the Tampering of his sample.
The question under consideration by the panel in the cited section of its decision was
whether the Athlete could be found to have violated the complicity portion of the 2009
Code, Article 2.8 by encouraging the rule violations of others. Thus, it was that in ¶ 843
of the CAS decision upon which Respondent relies, the Panel said:
The gravamen of the ADRV under Article 2.8 is the deliberate

facilitation of the commission or concealment of another type of
ADRV, i.e. an ADRV falling under one or more of Articles 2.1 to
2.7, committed by another person, i.e. someone other than the
person charged with an ADRV under Article 2.8.281
USADA argues that in order to be liable for assisting, encouraging or aiding and abetting
or covering up a rule violation you have to know that the rule violation you are charged
with covering up, for instance, has been committed. It, of course, does not mean that you
have to know the sport status of the people involved in the scheme.
Furthermore, USADA argues that Respondent and Dr. Brown were “aware of the 50 mL
volume limitation before Dr. Brown gave the infusion to Mr. Magness on November 28,
2011.”282
USADA argues that Respondent was complicit in the administration of each of the L-
carnitine infusions to NOP Athletes because he was “ultimately in charge of the L-
carnitine infusions.” USADA argues that Respondent “decided when the infusions would
occur, who would get them and whether they would occur.” USADA also argues that
Respondent “instructed the athletes to get the infusions and instructed Dr. Brown to give
them.”283 Therefore, USADA argues that Respondent should be found responsible for
assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity
involving any attempted anti-doping rule violation.
b. Intent
USADA argues that “Respondent’s only citation to authority for the alleged ‘specific
intent’ requirement is Legkov v. IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, p. 148, ¶ 843 (Feb. 1, 2018),
which Respondent has misread and taken entirely out of context.”284
USADA argues that Respondent was Complicit in the prevention of the transmission of
information to USADA because he did not want to “deal with the hassle of a potential
inquiry by an anti-doping organization as it is to seek to prevent detection of an
280
281
Legkov v. IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, p. 148, ¶ 843
282
Tr. (Day 6) 2439:6-2440:3.
283
USADA Post-Hearing Reply Brief at p. 147.
284
USADA Post-Hearing Reply Brief at p. 153.
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underlying rule violation, such as the use of a prohibited method.”285 USADA argues that
“[t]here may have been multiple, not necessarily mutually exclusive, potential
motivations for Respondent’s instruction to his athletes not to tell USADA about the L-
carnitine infusions and/or for his other efforts to interfere with the acquisition of
information by USADA or this Panel.”286 According to USADA, those reasons may
include:
• “A misunderstanding that the infusion rule proscribed infusions from an

infusion bag and a desire to keep USADA from finding out that infusion bags,
rather than syringes, were used in infusions to athletes, (as conceded by Dr.
Brown in his testimony)287;
• Knowledge that the Magness infusion was over the volume limit and a desire
to limit inquiry that could lead to exposing the volume of that infusion288;
• Knowledge that one or more infusions to other NOP Athletes were over the
volume limit289; and/or
• A desire to avoid what Respondent perceived as the potential hassle or

inconvenience of a USADA inquiry into the circumstances of the L-carnitine
infusions.290
To prove a Complicity violation, USADA has the burden of establishing: “Assisting,

encouraging, aiding, abetting, conspiring, covering up or any other type of intentional
complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation…”291 Respondent contends that this
charge requires a showing of specific intent and an underlying anti-doping rule violation.
a. Magness and NOP Athletes Infusion
Respondent argues that USADA did not prove that Respondent “specifically intended to
be complicit in an injection / infusion (or “Attempted” injection / infusion) of more than
the WADA volume limit to any Athlete.”292 Respondent also argues that similar to
Trafficking, complicity requires proof of commercial benefit. Respondent argues that he
received no commercial benefit since Mr. Magness was an Assistant Coach at the NOP,
not an Athlete for the NOP.
Respondent further argues that he went to great lengths to ensure the L-carnitine
administration complied with the Code. He reiterated the importance of being compliant
285
286
Id.
287
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
2015 Code, Art. 2.8.
292
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with the Code to Dr. Brown and Mr. Magness when they were investigating and
developing a method for L-Carnitine supplementation. Respondent claims this is
supported by email correspondence, including on September 28, 2011 where Respondent
instructed Mr. Magness to: “Please check into those asap with D[r.] Brown to see if he
can do it and of course if it’s Wada legal.”293 Respondent also testified that he
emphasized to both Mr. Magness and Dr. Brown that they must ensure everything they
do is compliant with the Code.294
Respondent argues that Mr. Magness and Dr. Brown indicated to Respondent that they
were complying with the Code. Respondent argues that “when he first began to
investigate the Nottingham Group’s research on February 24, 2011,” Mr. Magness
evaluated whether the results could be achieved in a “natural/legal way.”295 In response
to Respondent’s September 28, 2011 email whether they could do “infusions” of L-
carnitine that were “WADA legal,” Mr. Magness indicated that he checked the research
and found that the Nottingham Group had infused insulin in their research, which was
banned by the Code. Mr. Magness explained that they could not do the same procedure
and said, “I’ll see if there’s any other way.”296 These emails all predated the November
28, 2011 dextrose and L-Carnitine injection / infusion to Mr. Magness.
Respondent also argues that after the November 28, 2011 infusion to Mr. Magness, he
directly reached out to USADA in order to ensure that he complied with all of the
requirements in the Code, which is reflected in numerous email correspondence.
Respondent contends that he did this because this was part of his practice, as the head
coach of the NOP. The contemporaneous emails “demonstrate that Respondent
committed no anti-doping rule violations in connection with the saline / dextrose and L-
Carnitine injections / infusions.”297 Respondent contends that the “evidence demonstrates
that Respondent’s conduct was in good faith, and is fully consistent with his long-
standing commitment to complying with the Code and the anti-doping rules and to
requiring the same from his Athletes, his assistant coach, and his consultants.”298
Respondent argues that his caution and care to comply with the Code was established by
testimony from USADA’s own Athlete witnesses. Mr. Ritzenhein testified that
Respondent was “always very adamant” about “adhering to every WADA rule” and
regularly communicated with USADA.299 In fact, Mr. Ritzenhein testified that
Respondent would go “overboard — over the top, for the most part, from what other
coaches would do” to ensure rule compliance.300 When asked whether he ever felt that
any of these efforts were “a ruse or a trick,” Mr. Ritzenhein flatly rejected such a
characterization: “No, I never — I never felt that.”301
293
Resp. Ex. 75 at 1.
294
Tr. (Day 4) at 1490:21-24, 1469:24-25, 1502:25-1503:11, 1520:17-1521:1.
295
296
Resp. Ex. 75; Tr. (Day 4) at 1490:3-24.
297
298
299
Tr. (Day 2) at 695:19-696:18.
300
Tr. (Day 2) at 696:25-697:4.
301
Tr. (Day 2) at 696:25-697:4.
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Likewise, Ms. Begay testified that Respondent was paranoid about complying with the
Code, his efforts to comply were “across the board,” and she believed that “he was doing
his best to follow the rules.”302 Ms. Begay testified that Respondent wanted “to know
what everybody was taking” and “was emailing and calling USADA” and showing the
emails to NOP Athletes.303
Ms. Goucher and Mr. Magness testified that Respondent was concerned about their
compliance with the Code. They also admitted that he was concerned about accidental
contamination and that he had supplements checked.
Mr. Rupp further confirmed Respondent’s caution and care. Mr. Rupp testified that,
when it comes to rule compliance, Respondent “goes above and beyond, I think, almost
to the point of being like annoying to some people because it’s just constantly double-,
triple checking things,” as well as contacting USADA.304
Ciarán Ó Lionáird testified that Respondent “took a strong duty of care” with respect to
complying with the Code.305 Respondent’s actions to ensure rule compliance included
“batch-testing, making sure supplements were approved, having checked out with
USADA,” and his runners’ declarations of use and whereabouts.306
b. Intent
Respondent argues that “USADA’s claim also fails for the independent reason that
USADA has not proven and cannot prove the specific intent necessary to show an anti-
doping rule violation with respect to Mr. Magness.”307 Respondent contends that he
“cannot be expected to have known that Mr. Magness was a competing athlete,”
especially since Mr. Magness himself did not view himself as one.308 Respondent testified
that while Mr. Magness was at the NOP, he had no idea that he was, or training to be, a
competitive athlete. Respondent also testified that he never discussed with Mr. Magness
whether he was registered with the USATF.309
As an assistant coach, Mr. Magness had the duty to read, understand, and comply with
the rules with respect to both himself specifically and the NOP generally, and to advise
Respondent on the advantages and disadvantages of certain actions. Respondent testified
that he had no indications that Mr. Magness was not following the rules or that Mr.
Magness did not understand the rules. Thus, when Respondent emailed Mr. Magness on
November 16, 2011, indicating his understanding that the Code rule on insulin infusions
did not apply to him because he was not competing, Respondent honestly and reasonably
believed that Mr. Magness was not competing. Mr. Magness did not correct Respondent,
302
Tr. (Day 2) at 799:14-25, 801:14-25, 802:1-5.
303
Tr. (Day 2) at 799:17-19, 801:18-22.
304
Tr. (Day 5) at 2108:24-2109:11, 2110:15-17; see also Tr. (Day 5) at 2109:12-2110:7.
305
Tr. (Day 5) at 2110:8-20.
306
Tr. (Day 4) at 1790:22-1791:16.
307
308
309
Tr. (Day 4) at 1467:14-16.
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because he himself believed he was not an Athlete at the time of his dextrose and L-
Carnitine injection / infusion.
“USADA’s contention that Respondent ‘considered entering [Mr. Magness] as a ‘rabbit’

or pacer in a race’ notably lacks any citation.”310 Respondent argues “[t]his is because the
record establishes that, in fact, Mr. Magness never served as a pacer in any race for the
NOP for the very reason that Respondent did not believe that he was in competitive
shape.”311 Mr. Webb left the NOP in March 2011 “and thus long before Mr. Magness’
dextrose and L-carnitine injection / infusion.”312
Respondent contends that Mr. Magness was “hired as an assistant coach and to head the
scientific end of the NOP, effective January 1, 2011.”313 Respondent testified that he
relied on Mr. Magness to investigate questions related to exercise science, to help ensure
that the NOP complied with the Code, and to engage in other coaching duties. Respondent
further contends that “[n]othing Mr. Magness did for the NOP was in the capacity of
anything other than as an assistant coach and sports science expert.”314
Respondent argues that no testimony supports USADA’s speculation as to Respondent’s

intent. The Code treats injections and infusions the same with respect to whether they are
prohibited—both methods are subject to the same volume limit. Both the term “injection”
and the term “infusion” refer to the giving of a fluid into a vein (also called an
“intravenous administration” or “IV”) irrespective of the volume of the fluid. The Code
defines the term “injection” to refer to the giving a fluid into a vein via a needle that is
attached to syringe; it defines the term “infusion” to refer to the giving a fluid into a vein
via the needle that is attached to reservoir (e.g., a bag). However, in practice, researchers
use both terms to refer to the intravenous administration of fluid and the difference
between the two is “semantics.”315
Respondent further argues that neither the term “injection” nor “infusion” indicate
volume. “Injection” does not specifically refer to intravenous administrations of a small
volume. “Infusion” does not specifically refer to intravenous administrations of a large
volume. Respondent also contends that a needle is attached to a syringe instead of a bag,
or is attached to a bag instead of a syringe, does not, without more, indicate a volume.
3. Decision and Reasoning - Complicity - L-carnitine – Magness

Infusion and NOP Athletes
The 2009 Code, Article 2.8 prohibited “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering
up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or any
Attempted anti-doping rule violation”. This complicity language is now part of a separate
standalone “Complicity” rule (Article 2.9 (2015 Code)). The new Article clarifies the
2009 Code by specifying that Complicity is “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting,
310
311
Id.
312
313
Resp. Ex. 38; Tr. (Day 4) at 1461:15-22, 1462:25-1463:5.
314
315
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covering up or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-doping rule
violation, Attempted anti-doping rule violation … by another Person.”
Under the principles of lex mitior, the Panel will refer to the Code version which is most
beneficial to Respondent. The 2015 Code version of this rule is more explicit that any
conduct not already listed is to be “intentional”. Thus, the 2015 Code is clear that if there
is conduct other than “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up”, then such
conduct must be intentional. In addition, the 2009 Code provides for a sanction of a
minimum of 4 years up to lifetime ineligibility for a violation of Article 2.8 (2009 Code,
Article10.3.2). Whereas, the 2015 Code provides for a sanction for a violation of the
Complicity Article 2.9 of a minimum of 2 years up to 4 years (Article 10.3.4). Thus, the
provisions of the 2015 Code will be applied.
The Panel must therefore determine in each instance: 1. Did Respondent assist,
encourage, aid, abet, cover up or otherwise engage in some intentional complicity?; 2. If
so, did that complicity involve an anti-doping rule violation (or attempted anti-doping
rule violation) by another Person?
A “Person” is defined as a natural Person or an organization or other entity.
a. Magness Infusion
As discussed with respect to the Administration charge, the L-carnitine infusion given to
Mr. Magness was a Prohibited Method under the Applicable Rules. Respondent’s
argument that he did not know Magness was considered an Athlete for purposes of the
Code is not sufficient to change Magness’ status. There is no requirement that Respondent
know that Mr. Magness is an Athlete subject to the Code. In any event, Respondent was
aware that Mr. Magness was training, and that he ran USATF races from time to time.
He asked Mr. Magness about his status, but in his enthusiasm about the potential benefits
of the L-carnitine, he did not follow up to determine the answer to that critical question.
Mr. Magness was an Athlete at the time of the 1000 mL infusion, thus this infusion was
an anti-doping rule violation, though unwittingly. The Panel has therefore disposed of
Question 2, as there was an anti-doping rule violation by another Person.
As reflected in the Panel’s finding with respect to the Administration charge, the Panel
finds that with respect to Question 1., Respondent actually was responsible for the
Administration, rather than the lesser threshold required of encouragement and other acts,
as prohibited by the Complicity Article. Specifically, he explicitly asked Magness (i.e.
more than encouraged him since Magness worked for him) to have the infusion by his
email of November 15, 2011. Though USADA asserts that this was with full knowledge
of the limit requirement, there was testimony by Dr. Brown that he was aware of the limit
requirement, but no evidence that Respondent knew the limit, until his email of December
2, 2011 to Noel Pollock asking about the volume limit. The knowledge of the limit was
confirmed in Respondent’s email to Mark Parker of December 12, 2011 which
specifically referred to the Magness infusion being one liter and which email was after
he had been advised by USADA on December 6, 2011 of the infusion volume limit.
Respondent did take the lead on communications with USADA about the infusions and
acted to cover up the volume of the infusions in his description to Mr. Frothingham by
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email of December 3, 2011, wherein he omitted the volume of the infusion. The Panel
can infer from this behavior that Respondent at that point may have known of or suspected
there was a volume limit.
Nevertheless, as argued by Respondent, it is not an element of this Article that

Respondent specifically intended that Magness commit an anti-doping rule violation.
Rather, the Article requires that he engage in one or more intentional acts, such as
“assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of intentional
complicity” which involve an anti-doping rule violation. The evidence shows that
Respondent acted intentionally multiple times as required by the Administration article
to facilitate Magness to have the infusion, he tracked the effect of the infusion and the
test results and was excited about the results as reported to Lance Armstrong and Mark
Parker shortly after the infusion. In addition, he actively covered up the volume of the
infusion in his communications with USADA. All of these steps are part of the act of
Administration, whose elements are different from the intentional acts of
“encouragement, aiding and abetting” within the definition of Complicity.
Respondent’s argument that complicity requires a commercial benefit is not supported by

any citation to a Code provision or case. The Panel declines to find such a requirement.
The Panel finds that USADA has not met its burden of proof with respect to Respondent
committing a Complicity anti-doping rule violation with respect to the Magness infusion.
b. NOP Athletes
USADA relies on the same facts with respect to the Complicity charge as it does with
respect to the Administration charge. Further, USADA argues that Respondent acted in
bad faith by attempting to manufacture a story of compliance through the failure of Dr.
Brown to record contemporaneous infusion volumes, the instruction to the NOP Athletes
not to communicate with USADA about or ever disclose the infusions, the plan to
advance a false narrative related to infusions versus injections for the L-carnitine, the
alteration of patient records by Dr. Brown and the creation of false evidence and
advancing false testimony by Dr. Maguadog. These were steps USADA alleges
Respondent was taking to actively assist and cover up an anti-doping rule violation.
The Panel did not find USADA’s arguments helpful, as it is not at all clear that
Respondent engaged himself in the specific acts of which USADA accuses him. Instead,
the record as it involves Respondent is clear that he was trying not to have the NOP
Athletes commit an anti-doping rule violation. Rather than assisting, encouraging or
covering up, the record is very clear that Respondent was trying to have the L-carnitine
infusions after Mr. Magness’ be done in compliance with the Applicable Rules.
In any event, as discussed with respect to the Administration and/or Attempted

Administration of an anti-doping rule violation charge, there is no anti-doping rule
violation involved with the NOP Athletes, thus question number 2 in this analysis negates
the possibility of Complicity by Respondent with respect to the NOP Athletes.
Respondent appeared to have attempted to cover up what he thought were possible anti-
doping rule violations by insisting that the infusions be referred to as injections, but that
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did not change the fact that a majority of the Panel found the infusions given to the NOP
Athletes were not a Prohibited Method. Respondent was specifically not assisting,
encouraging, aiding or abetting an anti-doping violation, as discussed above.
Nor does USADA’s argument about Respondent being in charge alter the finding by a
majority of the Panel that there was no Prohibited Method and thus no anti-doping rule
violation was involved for the NOP Athletes.
Thus, the Panel finds that USADA has not met its burden of proof with respect to the
Complicity charge as it relates to the NOP Athletes.
E. Tampering and/or Attempted Tampering - L-Carnitine
The 2009 Code, Article 2.5 provides simply: “Tampering or Attempted Tampering with
any part of Doping Control.” The 2015 Code, Article 2.5 provides: “Conduct which
subverts the Doping Control process but which would not otherwise be included in the
definition of Prohibited Methods. Tampering shall include, without limitation,
intentionally interfering or attempting to interfere with a Doping Control official,
providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping Organization or intimidating or
attempting to intimidate a potential witness.”
The attendant definitions are as follows:

alter results or prevent normal procedures from occurring; or
providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping
Organization.316

laboratory analysis, therapeutic use exemptions, results
management and hearings.

Attempt.
316
The underlined portion for the Tampering definition in the 2009 Code is not contained in the Tampering
definition in the 2015 Code.
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USADA has the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred to
the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel, bearing in mind the seriousness of the
allegation which is made.317 Where the Code places the burden on the Athlete or other
Person, such as Respondent, to establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of
proof shall be by a balance of probability.318
USADA charges that the Respondent’s instructions to the NOP Athletes not to reveal the
L-carnitine infusions during doping control constitutes Tampering or Attempted
Tampering with Doping Control.
1. Submissions – Tampering and Attempted Tampering – L-Carnitine
a. Respondent’s Email Instructions to NOP Athletes Regarding

L-carnitine
USADA contends that Respondent “plainly did not want his athletes to discuss their L-
carnitine infusions with USADA” and that Respondent “had a clear concern that infusion
bags not be referenced as having been used to give the L-carnitine infusions.”319 To
support its position, USADA cites to the January 5, 2012 email chain and related emails
(at Paragraphs 127-143) where Respondent instructed NOP Athletes to say “no” when
asked about an infusion because the “LCarnitine . . . the way we have done it is classified
as an injection.”
USADA argues that:
(a) the sequence of communications that Respondent had with Ms. Rodemer was
a charade, intended merely to create a “fallback” to protect himself and give
him a basis to claim he was justified in obstructing the doping control process
by telling the NOP Athletes not to reveal their L-carnitine infusions to
USADA.
(b) from 12:32 pm until 2:53 pm Respondent worked to paper the file to protect
himself and provide a “fallback” for his obstruction plan. Respondent lied
when he falsely testified under oath that either Dr. Eichner, Shelly Rodemer
or Becky Renck had personally spoken with him and told him to tell the NOP
Athletes not to report to USADA any information about injections that were
under 50 mL.
(c) 34 minutes after his last email to Shelly Rodemer, Respondent sent his “do
not communicate email” to the NOP Athletes, attaching his email with Ms.
Rodemer and the 2010 email from Dr. Eichner to make it appear that the
instruction Respondent was giving was accurate, supported by adequate due
diligence and endorsed by USADA.
317
318
Id.
319
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Respondent argues that this January 5, 2012 email cannot be evidence of tampering
because there was never an instance when an NOP Athlete was asked to declare injections
/ infusions and did not so declare because of Respondent’s email. Respondent argues that
“it is important to recognize that Doping Control never asked for this information during
the timeframe (2012) in which this email occurred. In fact, Respondent argues USADA
did not ask about injections / infusions at all in its Doping Control Official Record form
until 2016.320
Respondent also argues that even if USADA’s theory could constitute a violation of the
Code, USADA’s factual characterizations of Respondent’s January 5, 2012, email and
what promoted the email are wrong.
At 12:32 p.m. PST (1:32 p.m. MST) on January 5, 2012, Respondent had a call with
Shelley Rodemer, which USADA’s own call log describes:
coach was calling about difference between infusion and injection-

i have provided coach and athlete with WADA guidelines
regarding IV- i informed coach that injections with a simple
syringe and [sic] are not a prohibited as a method if the injected
substance is not prohibited and the volume does not exceed 50 ml;
an intravenous infusion is defined as a the delivery of fluids
through a vein using a needle or similar device- as stated in the
WADA guidelines and also on Global DRO terms and conditions
(at bottom of terms and conditions)- i emailed alberto the global
dro link and also the first page from Global DRO which states the
terms and conditions stating this information regarding injections
and infusions. shelly321
Respondent argues that he understood Ms. Rodemer to be suggesting that an intravenous

administration that does not exceed 50 mL is referred to as an injection and that this is
treated differently under the WADA rules, from an infusion.
Respondent’s email to Ms. Rodemer later on January 5, 2012, with a proposed instruction
to his NOP Athletes regarding injections / infusions uses Ms. Rodemer’s term “injection”
as she did, to refer to an intravenous administration under 50 mL. (This email is at
Paragraph 133).
Ms. Rodemer did not respond to Respondent’s email. Given this non-response,
Respondent repeatedly expressed concern to Dr. Brown that USADA would not provide
him with a definitive answer. Nevertheless, after all the exchanges of emails referenced
above in Paragraphs 127-143, Respondent sent the January 5, 2012, email to the NOP
Athletes instructing them to say “no” when asked about an infusion because the
“LCarnitine . . . the way we have done it is classified as an injection”.
320
Resp. Exhs. 323-327.
321
Resp. Ex. 424.
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Respondent argues that his conduct described in Paragraphs 131 - 133 was not subversive
to the Doping Control process. He disclosed to USADA precisely what he wanted to tell
the NOP Athletes based on his understanding of USADA’s previous guidance to him. He
invited USADA to let him know if he was incorrect. At any point thereafter, USADA
could have told him that he was incorrect or otherwise told him that they wanted the NOP
Athletes to declare all injections / infusions. USADA always retained the ability to
receive this information, if it wanted.
Respondent argues there is no evidence that Respondent somehow tricked Ms. Rodemer
or that the emails are a sham. Respondent’s 1:06 p.m. PST email to Ms. Rodemer
expressly asked her, “Is this correct?” (referring to his proposed instruction to the NOP
Athletes).322 Further, Respondent’s 2:53 p.m. PST email to Ms. Rodemer expressly
stated, “unless USADA’s stance on this has changed, you don’t need to answer me
back.”323 Nothing interfered with or prevented USADA from answering back.
Indeed, according to Respondent, he did not “hide the ball” from Ms. Rodemer, as
USADA incorrectly asserts.324 Respondent forwarded to her the very December 22, 2010
email from Ms. Eichner to which he referred. Further, Ms. Rodemer had easy access to
Dr. Eichner if she had any questions about her email—as USADA admits, Ms. Rodemer
worked with Dr. Eichner in the same department.
Respondent argues that USADA has no evidence to dispute his recollection that he had
another phone call with USADA in which someone—he believes it was Ms. Rodemer
but it could have been someone else—told him that the NOP Athletes should not declare
injections / infusions of permitted substances under 50 ml. USADA’s reliance on the
call log for the USADA drug reference line is misplaced. Dr. Eichner testified that “there
could be other entries” and in fact, “I would assume that there would be — I mean we get
10 calls, 20 calls per day on the drug reference line.”325 And when asked whether there
could have been other communications between Respondent and USADA that are not
reflected on the call log, she testified, “Yeah. And I don’t know the answer to that.”326
Accordingly, USADA has no basis to dispute Respondent’s testimony.
Respondent asserts that the chronology of his correspondence with USADA makes clear
that his email to the NOP Athletes was correct and that Respondent intended to properly
convey advice. Given that Dr. Eichner’s December 22, 2010 email stated that Ms.
Goucher could receive an iron injection under 50 ml “without a TUE or a declaration of
use,” and Ms. Rodemer’s non-response to his multiple emails inviting correction,
Respondent honestly and reasonably believed that the NOP Athletes did not need to
declare an injection / infusion of a permitted substance under 50 ml.
Respondent argues that no testimony supports USADA’s speculation as to Respondent’s

intent. The Code treats injections and infusions the same with respect to whether they are
322
Resp. Ex. 144.
323
Resp. Ex. 149 at 2.
324
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 173:12.5.6.13; see also USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p. 116-117.
325
Tr. (Day 3) at 1169:15-24.
326
Tr. (Day 3) at 1170:5-9.
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prohibited—both methods are subject to the same volume limit. Both the term “injection”
and the term “infusion” refer to the giving of a fluid into a vein (also called an
“intravenous administration” or “IV”) irrespective of the volume of the fluid. The Code
defines the term “injection” to refer to the giving a fluid into a vein via a needle that is
attached to syringe; it defines the term “infusion” to refer to the giving a fluid into a vein
via the needle that is attached to reservoir (e.g., a bag). However, in practice, researchers
use both terms to refer to the intravenous administration of fluid and the difference
between the two is “semantics.”
b. Magness Role
USADA charges that Respondent sought to create a false narrative concerning the L-
carnitine infusions by falsely framing Mr. Magness as the alleged instigator of the NOP’s
L-carnitine infusion program, thereby subverting the doping control process.
USADA contends that it was Respondent who: (1) asked Mr. Magness to investigate the
L-carnitine infusions; (2) believed the L-carnitine infusions would lead to successful
performance by the NOP Athletes; (3) identified Dr. Brown as the person to administer
the infusions; (4) convinced Dr. Brown to go ahead with the infusions even though he
was, at first, reluctant to do so; (5) asked Mr. Magness to receive an infusion; (6) was
aware of the volume limit for the infusions; (7) took the lead in communicating with
USADA about the L-carnitine infusions; and (8) gave final approval for infusions to be
given to NOP Athletes.
USADA argues that Respondent attempted to “shift blame and to paint Steve Magness as
the alleged driving force behind the infusions received by NOP Athletes.”327 USADA
refers to the evidence concerning Mr. Magness’ actual role as set forth in Paragraphs 80
- 91. USADA cites to excerpts from Respondent’s February 4, 2016 under oath interview
(“Pre-Arbitration Interview”), and Respondent’s Pre-Hearing Brief.
The excerpts at issue during the Pre-Arbitration Interview are the following:
• “I don’t know when the idea for the experiment first came up. I know that I contacted
USADA, and alerted them to the idea that we wanted to do this experiment on L-
carnitine, and I wanted to make sure that it was within the rules.”328
• “Now, I can’t remember when the idea of testing this, and this experiment came up.
It may have come up with Dr. Brown. It may have come up from Professor Greenhaff,
from NutraMet, but once we got to the point of, all right, well, let’s go figure out how
to do this experiment, to my best recollection at that part, that’s where Steve Magness
was primarily in charge.”329
• “So Steve came up with this idea on, we could test it in this manner — and obviously,
the information came from wherever, you know, from Professor Greenhaff, and how
327
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p.127.
328
Pre-Arbitration Interview (Feb. 4. 2106) Tr. (“Tr. Interview”) at 63:14-19.
329
Tr. Interview at 64:5-13.
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the stuff works — and so Steve came up with the idea, these are the athletes that are
willing to partake in this test, and they probably had to do with who is around, who is
willing to do it or who wants to do it.”330
• “I don’t know [whether Tara Erdmann saw Dr. Brown], unless she was in the L-
carnitine experiment. Steve Magness was completely in charge of that. So he could
tell you if she was in that group, but other than that, I don’t remember her ever talking
to or meeting Dr. Brown.”331
• “Steve came up with the idea on who we should test in order to ascertain whether L-
carnitine supplement worked in a way that just taking the drink, you would have to
take it for four months, to supposedly get the benefits.”332
Respondent argues that he did not disavow any role in the L-carnitine infusions in favor
of Mr. Magness, but rather he remained involved in his capacity as head coach and as
such, he obtained guidance from USADA about complying with the Code, kept tabs on
and provided instructions to Mr. Magness and Dr. Brown about complying with the Code,
and was involved in his Athletes’ participation in the L-carnitine administrations.
Respondent contends that USADA is simply deeming Respondent’s testimony during his
Pre-Arbitration Interview and arguments made by his counsel to be false and on this basis
attempting to bring more charges.
Respondent argues that “[n]othing in Article 2.5 or its definition of ‘tampering’ permits
the finding of a tampering violation based on a ‘false narrative.’”333 Respondent contends
that USADA offers no explanation as to how a “false narrative” subverts the Doping
Control process, especially when USADA itself is deemed the arbiter of what is true and
what is false. Moreover, USADA’s “false narrative” theories are premised on
Respondent making arguments, taking positions, and submitting evidence in his defense,
but CAS has made clear that such defensive conduct cannot constitute a Tampering and
Attempted Tampering violation.
c. Medical Records
USADA charges that Respondent’s creation of a false narrative on or before October

2013 regarding 40 mL “special syringes” is tampering with the doping control process.
USADA contends that Respondent “hatched a cover-up story to mislead USADA after
Respondent learned USADA was investigating the L-carnitine infusions,” including
preparing an email on October 3, 2013 to Dr. Brown asking him to “write up a letter”
about the volume of the L-carnitine infusions.334 USADA also argues that Respondent
caused or directed Dr. Maguadog and Dr. Brown to fabricate documents and to create a
false narrative about the L-carnitine infusions, and that Mr. Collins, counsel for
330
Tr. Interview at 60:23-61:6.
331
Tr. Interview at 59:24-60:4.
332
Tr. Interview at 60:10-15.
333
334
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Respondent, furthered the false narrative by transmitting the doctored Logged Formula
Worksheet. The factual background relating to these assertions is set forth in Paragraphs
144 - 155.
USADA argues that Respondent’s and Dr. Brown’s use of the term “infusion” referred
to an intravenous administration from a bag or to an intravenous administration
containing a large volume. However, Dr. Brown referred to Tara Erdman’s procedure
as an “L-Carnitine infusion” but the procedure undisputedly used a syringe containing 40
mL. Respondent asserts this shows the two terms were used interchangeably and there is
no actual significance to the distinction.
Respondent argues that “no evidence supports the assertion that Respondent caused or
directed the fabrication of any documents, let alone false ones.”335 The Panel should give
USADA’s speculation and conjecture no credence.336
Respondent contends that his submissions, arguments, and factual and legal positions
taken in this case are not anti-doping rule violations. In IAAF v. Jeptoo, CAS
2015/0/4128, the CAS panel recognized that the right to defend oneself includes the right
“to make any submission that he or she deems appropriate to defend him or himself” and
“to concentrate on or advance in particular arguments that are beneficial to his cause.”
Respondent contends that USADA must prove beyond offensive or improper conduct to
establish a Tampering charge:
the CAS jurisprudence displayed reticence when treating an

athlete’s procedural behavior as an aggravating behavior, since
the sword of Damocles of an increased sanction in a case where a
panel is not prepared to accept the athlete’s submission would
render his or her defense and, thus, access to justice
disproportionately difficult. This is all the more true since
comparable sanction is not foreseen for the sports organization
charging the athlete with an ADRV.337
Respondent argues that tampering also requires that the person charged with an anti-
doping rule violation have specific intent and purpose to subvert the doping control
process and relies on CAS 2016/A/4700 (WADA v. Fedoriva) dated 15 May 2017.
2. Decision and Reasoning – Tampering and/or Attempted Tampering

– L-Carnitine
USADA bears the burden of proving that Respondent engaged in conduct which
“subverted” the Doping Control process, to include “results management and hearings”.
For purposes of this particular charge related to the facts listed, where the allegations
made by USADA relate to the investigation and hearing process, USADA could meet this
burden by proving: 1. that Respondent provided fraudulent information to it, or
335
Respondent Post-Hearing Brief at p. 182:12.7.1.
336
Id.
337
IAAF v. Jeptoo, CAS 2015/0/4128.
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intimidated or attempted to intimidate a potential witness, brought improper influence to
bear; obstructed, mislead or engaged in any fraudulent conduct to alter results or prevent
normal procedures from occurring; 2. That the conduct is not otherwise included in the
definition of Prohibited Methods.
a. Magness Role and Medical Records
With respect to the hearing related and pre-hearing conduct asserted by USADA as
tampering, i.e., Respondent’s Pre-Hearing Interview and his counsel’s arguments relating
to Mr. Magness’ role and the medical records arguments made by Respondent, the Panel
looks to the standard set forth in IAAF v. Jeptoo, CAS 2015/0/4128 allowing the athlete
“to make any submission that he or she deems appropriate to defend him or himself” and
“to concentrate on or advance in particular arguments that are beneficial to his cause.”
Respondent has consistently done so, as allowed in any adversarial proceeding. USADA
has not borne its burden to show that these submissions or arguments “subverted” the
Doping Control process.
The Panel is able to evaluate the veracity of the testimony and give due weight to the
testimony, including the impeachment value of the differing testimony given under oath
by Respondent, and evaluate the evidence and counsel’s arguments, in light of all the
evidence and arguments made by the parties. To prevent Respondent from making such
arguments for fear he could be charged with another anti-doping rule violation,
Tampering, would be unconscionable.
The Panel is loath to discourage persons in the position of Respondent from advancing
the most aggressive positions to defend their cases. It would be a form of preventing due
process if Respondent or others similarly situated were not able to defend their cases in
the way they deem most appropriate under the circumstances, both at the investigation
stage and during the hearing itself. Respondent’s actions with respect to these facts do
not rise to the level required by the Tampering rule, i.e. he did not interfere improperly,
or obstruct, mislead or engage in any fraudulent conduct, to alter results or prevent normal
procedures from occurring, by aggressively asserting his defense and protecting his
rights, seeking to protect information and making legal distinctions.
The Panel evaluates USADA’s post-hearing related Tampering charge separately (See
below Section XII.).
b. Respondent’s Email Instructions to NOP Athletes Regarding

L-carnitine
This charge of Tampering rests on the culmination of the Email Exchanges, i.e. the
January 5, 2012 email that Respondent sent to Mr. Ritzenhein and Mr. Rupp—which was
later forwarded to Ms. Allen-Horn, Ms. Begay, and Ms. Grunnagle—stating that the
injections / infusions under 50 mL that they received should not be declared at doping
control. Respondent’s instruction to the NOP Athletes was that they should not disclose
the “under 50 ml” injections / infusions that they had received, “online” or “when asked
about infusions when getting drug tested in or out of competition.”
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The question the Panel needs to determine is whether this instruction was intentionally
interfering improperly or attempting to interfere with a Doping Control official or
engaging in fraudulent conduct to alter results or prevent normal procedures from
occurring in accordance with the definition of Tampering or Attempted Tampering.
The Panel needs to determine whether Respondent was confused based on his email
exchanges with USADA and the final telephone call he recalled having or whether
Respondent acted deliberately/fraudulently by misrepresenting the information he had in
an effort to prevent USADA from learning about the infusions. It is apparent that at that
time, and for the next year, Respondent was under the incorrect impression that infusions
and injections were categorized differently for doping control purposes and that the
infusions the NOP Athletes had been given were in his mind possibly a violation.
Respondent thus positioned the infusions as injections and forcefully instructed the NOP
Athletes not to disclose them. Respondent’s argument that no doping controls actually
occurred and thus there was no instance where the instructions were followed is of no
relevance to the analysis. The Panel must determine whether Respondent engaged in
what he considered to be intentional or fraudulent conduct to alter results or prevent
normal procedures from occurring.
A majority of the Panel finds that Respondent did deliberately engage in intentional
conduct to alter results or prevent normal procedures from occurring. He was clearly
operating under the impression that the NOP Athletes could be asked about infusions and
a majority finds he tried to prevent the normal procedure from occurring by instructing
the NOP Athletes that no declaration of use of LCarnitine was required and that they
should deny they had the L-carnitine infusion when asked about infusions when getting
drug tested in or out of competition. The full email is at Paragraph 137. At that time, he
knew the NOP Athletes had been given infusions but he deliberately stated they were
“classified as an injection” in his email to them. In addition, in his email to Ms. Rodemer
confirming how he would proceed, he also mischaracterized the infusions as injections
even though he referred to them as “infusions” in his communications with the NOP
Athletes. A majority of the Panel finds that Respondent’s conduct with this instruction
is intentional and fraudulent conduct that was designed to prevent normal procedures
from occurring. His intention is clear from the sequence of events. A majority of the
Panel finds this conduct to be Tampering as it fits squarely in the definition.
The sanction for Tampering, pursuant to Article 10.3.1 of the 2009 Code, is a period of
Ineligibility of two years. The sanction for Tampering, pursuant to Article 10.3.1 of the
2015 Code, is a period of Ineligibility of four years. And though Respondent argued that
the 2015 Code would apply under the principle of lex mitior, the Panel finds that with
respect to this charge, the lesser sanction of a two year period of Ineligibility is imposed,
pursuant to the 2009 Code.
X. RESPONDENT’S PERSONAL USE OF TESTOSTERONE
A. Charges
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USADA charged Respondent with the following Code violations based on Respondent’s
personal use of testosterone:
• Possession
• Trafficking
• Administration and/or Attempted Administration
In its post-hearing submissions, USADA did not pursue the Administration or Attempted
Administration of Testosterone. Consequently, the Panel finds that USADA abandoned
that charge and, further concludes that USADA has not proven facts sufficient to prove
Administration or Attempted Administration of testosterone. The Trafficking charge is
addressed in Section XI.
1. Respondent’s Use of Testosterone
Respondent testified that he first used testosterone for at least “some months” in 1991,
four years prior to retiring from competitive running.338 He applied for a TUE for
testosterone which was denied before he competed in the 1992 Olympic Trials.339
Respondent testified that he was not taking testosterone at the time of the 1992 Olympic
Trials.340 He testified that after competing in and winning the Comrades marathon in
1994, he began thinking of making a comeback, and Respondent had a representative
contact USATF about seeking a TUE to go on testosterone replacement which request
was denied.341
Respondent again retired from competition and resumed testosterone replacement therapy
based on a diagnosis from Dr. Smulovitz in 1994.342 He used testosterone continuously
from 1995 to early 2006. His prescription history for testosterone from January 2003 to
May 2018 (with a break from May 2006 to April 2008) shows prescriptions by four
licensed physicians: Dr. Jan Smulovitz, Dr. Robert Cook, Dr. Jeffrey Brown, and Dr.
Kristina Harp.343
Dr. Smulovitz oversaw Respondent’s testosterone replacement therapy beginning in

1994.344 Upon Dr. Smulovitz’s retirement in 2003, Dr. Robert Cook, an orthopedic
surgeon who had treated Respondent for sports injuries, briefly treated Respondent until
he could find a new primary care doctor.345 In approximately 2005, at the
338
Tr. (Day 4) at 1339:10-25.
339
Tr. (Day 4) at 1343:20-1344:13.
340
Tr. (Day 4) at 1344:11-13.
341
Tr. (Day 4) at 1330: 17-19, 1345:14-18; USADA Ex. 692.
342
Tr. (Day 4) at 1345:19-1346:16.
343
Resp. Ex. 405.
344
Tr. (Day 4) at 1345:19-1346:16.
345
Tr. (Day 4) at 1349:2-1350:5.
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recommendation of Dr. Cook, Respondent’s testosterone replacement therapy was
overseen by Dr. Kristina Harp, a Portland-area internist.346
From 2005 to 2006, and then again from 2013 to the present day, Dr. Harp prescribed
testosterone.347 Dr. Harp testified that she performs regular blood tests on Respondent
and adjusts the dosage of his AndroGel as needed based on his testosterone level and
symptoms of hypogonadism.348
Respondent’s relationship with Dr. Brown began in 2004 or 2005 when Kara and Adam
Goucher, who at the time were athletes with the NOP, introduced the two men.349 They
first met in person in approximately May 2006, when Respondent accompanied Galen
Rupp for his initial visit with Dr. Brown.350 During that visit, Dr. Brown—who was
highly recommended by numerous individuals—asked Respondent about his own health
situation.351 Respondent provided Dr. Brown with his medical background, including
that he was diagnosed with hypogonadism.352 Based on a blood sample Dr. Brown took
at that initial meeting, he informed Respondent that he believed his low testosterone
levels were caused by decreased thyroid function, and explained that if Respondent’s
thyroid was treated, he would not need to be on testosterone replacement therapy.353
Respondent stopped taking testosterone based on Dr. Brown’s advice.354
In June 2007, Respondent had a heart attack.355 He was not taking testosterone at that
time.356 Several months after his heart attack, Respondent felt tired, depressed, and
generally did not feel well.357 Following blood tests, Dr. Brown informed him his
symptoms were caused by low testosterone levels.358
Dr. Brown testified that as a result of Respondent taking statins to control his
cholesterol—in order to prevent another heart attack—he decided to restart Respondent’s
testosterone replacement therapy in April 2008.359 In making this decision, Dr. Brown
reviewed Respondent’s test results, considered his symptoms, and coordinated with his
other physicians.360 Both the medical records from Dr. Caulfield (Respondent’s
346
Tr. (Day 4) at 1349:2-1350:10; Tr. (Day 5) at 2046:24-2047:25; Resp. Ex. 281 at 4
347
Resp. Ex. 405 at 1-24, 58-60.
348
Tr. (Day 5) at 2048:17-2054:18; see, e.g., Resp. Ex. 280 at 36-38, 76.
349
Tr. (Day 3) at 1016:14-1017:22.
350
USADA Exs. 641 and 665.
351
Tr. (Day 4) at 1351:3-1354:17, 1421:10-18.
352
Tr. (Day 4) at 1353:24-1354:17; Resp. Ex. 282 at 9-10.
353
Tr. (Day 4) at 1353:24-1354:17; Tr. (Day 6) at 2410:7-2413:17; Tr. (Day 7) 75:18-77:2.
354
Tr. (Day 4) at 1354:18-22; Tr. (Day 6) at 2404:11-14; Tr. (Day 7) at 75:18-77:21; Resp. Ex. 282 at 2.
355
Tr. (Day 4) at 1354:23-1355:4; Tr. (Day 7) 81:14-25.
356
Tr. (Day 4) at 1355:5-7.
357
Tr. (Day 4) at 1356:10-1357:22, 1656:16-1657:24.
358
Tr. (Day 4) at 1356:10-1357:22; Resp. Ex. 292 at 51.
359
Tr. (Day 7) at 82:4-82:18; Tr. (Day 4) at 1355:8-10; Tr. (Day 6) at 2413:25-2414:17, 2419:4-8, 2417:20-24; Tr.
(Day 7) at 82:19-84:21.
360
Tr. (Day 7) at 86:16-87:22.
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cardiologist) and Dr. Harp establish that Respondent spoke with them about Dr. Brown
potentially restarting him on testosterone.361
Respondent’s natural testosterone production levels were in the normal range by April
2008, according to Dr. Brown’s medical records admitted at the hearing.362
Dr. Kristina Harp and Dr. Brown testified about their medical evaluations in prescribing
testosterone for Respondent.363
Respondent testified that he deferred to and relied on his treating physicians’ medical
judgments over the 25 years he was taking testosterone.364 There was no evidence that
Respondent pressured his physicians to diagnose him with hypogonadism, requested or
otherwise suggested that any physician should prescribe him testosterone or requested or
otherwise suggested the amount of testosterone his physicians should prescribe.365
Both parties presented lengthy, detailed and credible testimony of many experts who had
conflicting, inconsistent, and, frankly, at times for the Panel confusing, opinions
regarding the propriety of Respondent’s diagnosis of hypogonadism and testosterone
treatment. Respondent’s medical expert Dr. Gerald Levine, M.D., testified that
diagnosing a patient with a medical condition requires the exercise of medical judgment
after evaluation of several factors, including the patient’s medical history, symptoms,
physical examination and lab results.366 It was his opinion that there was a rational and
good faith basis for the diagnosis of hypogonadism and prescription of testosterone to
Respondent.367 USADA’s experts were endocrinologist Bradley Anawalt, M.D.,
Margaret Wierman, M.D., and internal medicine and sports medicine doctor, Gary Green,
M.D. Based on their respective reviews of Respondent’s medical records, each of them
was of the opinion that the diagnosis of hypogonadism and levels of prescription of
testosterone for Respondent were inconsistent with best practices for diagnosis and
treatment of hypogonadism.368
The expert and treating physician testimony offered here was of no assistance to the
Panel, often cancelling itself out, and always endeavoring to convince the Panel it should
supplant its view of Respondent’s medical care for that of the Respondent’s treating
physicians, for treating his condition over the course of 25 years, something the Panel
was unwilling to undertake.
Respondent testified that he “used all the testosterone that [he] ever got on [him]self, and
[he] would use it up on [him]self.”369 Respondent’s testosterone levels, as reflected in his
361
Tr. (Day 4) at 1358:4-1359:3; Tr. (Day 7) at 82:19-82:12, 84:22-86:15, 88:17-90:24; Resp. Ex. 285 at 20; Resp.
Ex. 307.
362
USADA Ex. 641.
363
See generally Tr. (Day 5) and Tr. (Day 6 and 7).
364
Resp. Ex. 188, 198; USADA Ex. USADA-SAL_0075599.
365
See Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 99:8.2.2.6.
366
Tr. (Day 5) at 2191:5-2193-13; Tr. (Day 7) at 86:18-87:22.
367
Id.
368
Tr. (Day 2) at 748:5-25.
369
Tr. (Day 4) 1652:13-16; Tr. (Day 5) 2269:22-2273:9, 2295:24-2296:19; USADA Exhs. 598, 617.
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medical records, decreased in April and May 2009 after receiving an increased
prescription of testosterone. From 2016-2018, on several occasions, Dr. Harp
administered an injection of testosterone before travel, so that Respondent did not have
to travel with AndroGel.370 During this same period, the records show that Respondent
was filling testosterone gel prescriptions.371
Respondent testified that he was careful not to cross-contaminate anyone when he applied
the testosterone gel.372 He would apply it to his upper arms and put a shirt on over it, as
well as wash his hands carefully afterwards.373 He also testified that he never gave,
administered or told any athlete to use testosterone.374 He testified that he never brought
his AndroGel testosterone to training sessions or a competition and that he would keep it
with his personal effects wherever he was staying, such as the bedroom or bathroom.375
Kara Goucher and Steve Magness testified that Respondent sometimes gave the athletes
of the NOP, and primarily Galen Rupp, massages even though the NOP had a professional
massage therapist for that purpose.376 Mr. Magness referred to an instance of this at a
2011 high-altitude training camp in Park City, Utah and a hotel room in 2012 for the
Indoor Championships in Albuquerque, New Mexico.377 Respondent testified that he did
not rub testosterone in massages on Galen Rupp or any other athlete.378
Kara Goucher testified that she remembered seeing Respondent with testosterone among
his toiletries at a Park City condo where some of the athletes of the NOP were staying in
2007 for high altitude training camp and again in 2008, at an unknown place and time.379
Dr. Brown and Respondent testified that he was not prescribed testosterone in 2007.380
Mr. Magness saw Respondent with testosterone on the counter in the common area at a
condo where some athletes of the NOP were staying in 2012 in Albuquerque, New
Mexico for altitude training camp.381
Mr. Magness testified that while he was working at the NOP, he came across a Galen
Rupp medical record from 2002 that included the line “Presently on prednisone and
testosterone medication”.382 Mr. Rupp testified that in 2002, he was 15 years old and was
not using testosterone, Dr. Myhre (the head of the Nike lab (now deceased)) was working
on a study relating to the use of altitude tents and would interview Mr. Rupp and take
notes from those interviews.383 Mr. Rupp believed this notation came to be on his chart
370
USADA Ex. 641.
371
Tr. (Day1) at 124:12-22; Tr. (Day 5) at 2274:14-17; USADA Ex. 624 at 5.
372
Tr. (Day 4) at 1456:2-16.
373
Id.
374
Tr. (Day 4) at 1369:25-1370:5.
375
Tr. (Day 4) at 1370:17-22.
376
Tr. (Day 3) at 1066:7-16; Tr. (Day 4) at 1642:24-1646:16
377
Tr. (Day 1) at 233:5-236:18.
378
Tr. (Day 4) at 1371:3-10.
379
Tr. (Day 3) at 1032:21-1033:8, 1035:1-1037:10, 1046:1-5.
380
Tr. (Day 4) at 1355:5-7; Tr. (Day 6) at 2404:11-14; Tr. (Day 7) at 75:18-77:21.
381
Tr. (Day 1) at 231:5-19, 234:15-24.
382
USADA Ex. USADA-SAL097276-277; Tr. (Day 1) at 219:12-225:22
383
Tr. (Day 5) at 2082:4-5, 2083:3-2084:1.
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because he was taking Testo Boost at the time and “I would have told him I was taking
that, and – I’m sure he just made a – you know, he’s like, Okay. Well, is it all right if I
just write testosterone medication down? And that’s how I believe it came down
there.”384
2. Respondent’s Role in Medical Treatment of NOP Athletes – Focus

on Increasing Testosterone Levels.
As a result of the introduction from Kara and Adam Goucher, Dr. Brown started advising
Respondent with respect to other athletes of the NOP in 2005 as an unpaid consultant.385
In 2008 Dr. Brown became a paid NOP consultant and that relationship lasted until 2013,
when his contract expired.386 During this time, Dr. Brown testified that he believed he
was the personal physician of several athletes of the NOP, based on referrals by
Respondent.387 Dr. Brown had a close working relationship with Respondent in his
capacity as the head of the NOP, reflected by the fact that he flew on the Nike corporate
jet to the 2008 Olympic Games.388 He was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article in 2013
saying, “The patients I’ve treated have won 15 Olympic gold medals.”389
Respondent and Dr. Brown communicated repeatedly about the athletes of the NOP’s
performance and medical conditions, exchanging information without any apparent
formal authorization by the athletes at the NOP or distinction between Dr. Brown’s role
as an athlete’s physician and NOP consultant.390 Respondent and Dr. Brown shared
information with the aim of improving the athletes’ performance via medical
intervention, with a particular interest in increasing testosterone levels.391
For example, Athlete A392 testified that Respondent told Athlete A that using thyroid
medication would increase Athlete A’s testosterone levels and help Athlete A to prevent
injury.393 Though Athlete A’s blood levels were in the normal range, Athlete A did follow
Respondent’s advice to go see Dr. Brown in 2010 and the next day, Dr. Brown put Athlete
A on thyroid replacement hormone, which Athlete A has been on ever since.394 According
to Athlete A, Respondent was “really involved, and Dr. Brown and him were in constant
communication.”395 As part of that, Respondent was advising Athlete A about adjusting
Athlete A’s medication based on Respondent’s review of blood test results.396
384
Tr. (Day 5) at 2084:2-12.
385
Tr. (Day 4) at 1422:10-12; Tr. (Day 6) at 2402:17-2403:4; USADA Ex. 982.
386
Tr. (Day 6) at 2402:17-2403:4; USADA Ex. 982.
387
Tr. (Day 6) at 2403:16-2404:3.
388
Tr. (Day 6) 2364:4-7, 2404:9-10; USADA Ex. 728.
389
USADA Ex. 416.
390
USADA Exs. 85, 679-689, 924.
391
USADA Ex. 76; Tr. (Day 2) 549:1-551:2, 592:1-6; Tr. (Day 1) 227:17-228:7; Tr. (Day 3) 1025:20-1026:22.
392
The athletes are identified in a separate key for the parties only, to protect their private medical information.
393
Tr. (Day 2) at 590:21-591:15.
394
Tr. (Day 2) at 601:7-12.
395
Tr. (Day 2) at 604:9-17.
396
USADA Ex. 94.
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Respondent sent several athletes of the NOP to Dr. Brown for thyroid evaluation. During
that period, Dr. Brown diagnosed at least four athletes of the NOP with hypothyroid
conditions and treated at least three of them with thyroid replacement hormones.397
Mr. Magness testified that he was present when Respondent indicated that he thought
Athlete B should increase Athlete B’s thyroid dose. Respondent also told Mr. Magness
to get his thyroid tested by Dr. Brown.398
Kara Goucher recalled Respondent offering her Cytomel, a thyroid medication for which
she did not have a prescription, prior to the Boston marathon in 2011 so she would lose
weight.399 Ms. Goucher added that she “was very concerned [about Dr. Brown’s role with
the NOP] because everybody on the team had hypothyroidism.”400
Lindsay Allen-Horn testified that before she was an athlete at the NOP there were rumors
that “everyone on the Oregon Project had a thyroid issue.”401 When Ms. Allen-Horn went
to see Dr. Brown at Respondent’s request, Dr. Brown recommended that she start thyroid
medication.402
Respondent emailed Dr. Brown asking whether Athlete B’s thyroid medication dose
should be lowered because Athlete B was not going to be training as hard.403
In the midst of the L-carnitine infusions, Respondent wrote to Athlete B, without even
copying Dr. Brown, telling Athlete B to “take a full extra levoxyl [thyroid medication]
tonight and start on Cytomel [thyroid medication] right away”.404Athlete B theorized this
was due to the side effects of L-carnitine.405 Respondent told Athlete B that if Athlete B
did not have the prescription medication, Respondent would drive over and give Athlete
B some.406
Danny Mackey testified that while he was working at the Nike lab, in 2008, and Dr.
Myhre suggested that he go to see Dr. Brown, and that he take thyroid and testosterone
therapy, whereupon Mr. Mackey asked him for more detail.407 He was concerned about
this suggestion because he was a competitive athlete. Dr. Myhre, according to Mr.
Mackey said, “This is what Alberto Salazar’s athletes do, and they haven’t gotten caught.
You’ll be okay.”408
397
One NOP athlete was diagnosed with hypothyroid condition, but declined thyroid replacement hormones.
398
Tr. (Day 1) at 239:24-240:9.
399
Tr. (Day 1) 239:11-17; Tr. (Day 3) at 1022:4-1023:8.
400
Tr. (Day 3) at 1018:3-4.
401
Tr. (Day 3) at 866:22-25.
402
Tr. (Day 3) at 867:17-23.
403
USADA Ex. 111.
404
USADA Ex. 284.
405
Id.
406
Id.
407
Tr. (Day 3) at 1193:17-1194:23.
408
Tr. (Day 3) at 1194:18-19.
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Respondent and USADA presented detailed, lengthy and contradicting expert opinions
regarding the propriety of Dr. Brown’s thyroid diagnosis and treatment of NOP Athletes.
In addition to the thyroid medications widely prescribed by Dr. Brown, Respondent

advised the athletes of the NOP to take specific supplements and medication, including
some which required a prescription. Mr. Magness testified that he witnessed Respondent
recommend and sometimes hand out Celebrex, inhalers, and Ambien to athletes of the
NOP.409 Ms. Allen-Horn testified that Respondent would hand out prescription Celebrex
“a lot of times after workouts” and inhalers to athletes like herself who did not have a
prescription.410 Mr. Ritzenhein testified that Respondent provided Celebrex and vitamin
D in a prescription dosage to him and instructed athletes of the NOP to obtain Calcitonin,
a medication that is available only with a doctor’s prescription.411Respondent admitted
that “I occasionally gave Celebrex to an athlete for a couple days” and further
acknowledged that he gave athletes of the NOP prescription doses of vitamin D.412
There were numerous other examples of this type of “medical” direction in the record of
this case. For example, respondent by email of March 31, 2012, instructed athletes of the
NOP Mo Farah, Galen Rupp, Lindsay Allen-Horn, Dathan Ritzehhein, Dawn Charlier
and Matt Centrowitz to take Calcitonin, a prescription nasal spray to prevent stress
fractures, as well as vitamin D.413
C. Submissions – Possession of Testosterone – Personal Use
Article 2.6.2 of the Code prohibits “Possession by an Athlete Support Person In-
Competition of any Prohibited Method or any Prohibited Substance, or Possession by an
Athlete Support Person Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Method or any Prohibited
Substance which is prohibited Out-of-Competition in connection with an Athlete,
Competition or training, unless the Athlete Support Person establishes that the Possession
is pursuant to a therapeutic use exemption granted to an Athlete in accordance with
Article 4.4 [Therapeutic Use] or other acceptable justification.” USADA must establish
the following three elements: (1) Respondent must be an Athlete Support Person; (2)
Respondent must be in Possession of a Prohibited Substance and/or Prohibited Method;
and (3) the Out-of-Competition Possession must be in connection with an Athlete,
Competition or training.
USADA contends that Respondent is an “Athlete Support Person” as defined in the Code.
Respondent is the head coach of the NOP where he works with, treats or assists Athletes
participating in or preparing for sports Competition. This is undisputed by the parties.
USADA argues that Respondent was in Possession of a Prohibited Substance.

Testosterone is a Prohibited Substance pursuant to the Prohibited List as set forth in the
409
Tr. (Day 2) at 236:23-238:4.
410
Tr. (Day 3) at 868:3-22, 882:14-19.
411
Tr. (Day 2) at 557:21-558:17.
412
Tr. (Day 4) at 1664:12-14.
413
USADA Ex. 367.
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Code. USADA contends that Respondent was in “Possession,” as defined by the Code,
because he had actual, physical Possession of his testosterone.
a. In Connection with an Athlete, Competition or training
USADA argues that:
(a) Respondent’s Possession of testosterone was in connection with an Athlete,

Competition or training. To support its claim, USADA relies on the testimony
from Ms. Goucher and Mr. Magness. Ms. Goucher remembered seeing
Respondent with testosterone at high altitude training camps for athletes of
the NOP. Ms. Goucher recalled the time she saw it in 2011 at high altitude
training in Park City, Utah, among Respondent’s toiletries left on the kitchen
island in a condominium shared by her, Mr. Rupp, and Mr. Adam Goucher,
her husband. Mr. Magness also testified that he observed Respondent’s
testosterone at a 2012 high altitude training camp in Albuquerque, New
Mexico on the kitchen counter.
(b) “[a]lthough Respondent may argue these are innocuous incidents and
insufficient to establish the necessary ‘connection,’ it is important to
remember the full context of Respondent’s behavior.”414 There is
“overwhelming evidence” that Respondent was “obsessed” with the
testosterone levels of athletes at the NOP’ and “peddled the equivalent of
snake oil on how to increase those levels through vitamin D, thyroid and
prolactin prescription medications, which he meticulously monitored and
adjusted.”415 Mr. Ritzenhein indicated that Respondent supplied a lot of
testosterone supplements and frequently checked testosterone levels.416 Mr.
Magness testified that “all the athletes were on vitamin D supplementation”
because Respondent told him that it would cause testosterone levels to rise.417
(c) Respondent “meticulously monitored and adjusted prescription medications

of NOP athletes to enhance their performance and obtained from Dr. Brown
excessive quantities of testosterone, at the same time Respondent was
personally giving Mr. Rupp massages, including the day before races, which
struck Kara Goucher as odd given,the NOP had paid massage therapists for
that purpose.”418
(d) the “obsession with testosterone levels, receipt of excessive testosterone, and
personal massages of star athletes, is especially concerning given Danny
Mackey’s testimony that while working in the Nike Laboratory, the head of
the laboratory Dr. Myhre suggested that he receive testosterone therapy,
despite the fact that he was a competing athlete at the time.”419 USADA argues
414
415
Id.
416
Tr. (Day 2) 549:17-550:5.
417
Tr. (Day 1) 227:17-228-7.
418
Tr. (Day 3) 1066:7-16.
419
Tr. (Day 3) 1193:17-1194:23.
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that Mr. Mackey testified that Dr. Myhre further suggested not to worry
because “Salazar’s athletes do, and they haven’t gotten caught.”420
(e) Respondent dolling out “prescription medications to NOP athletes who did
not have a prescription for performance purposes is of great concern when
thinking about Respondent’s access to testosterone.”421
b. Acceptable Justification
USADA submits that Respondent cannot establish an “acceptable justification” for his
Possession of testosterone “because there was no legitimate basis to prescribe Respondent
testosterone in 2008.” Specifically, USADA contends that the following list supports its
argument that Respondent cannot establish an “acceptable justification:”
• “Respondent’s natural testosterone levels rebounded from 2006 to 2008 when

Respondent was not using testosterone medication. This was reflected in the
numerous tests conducted during that two-year period. There is, therefore, no need
to delve into the murky diagnosis and woefully incomplete records from the 1990s
as Respondent did during his expert’s testimony. When Respondent stopped
taking testosterone in 2006 he reset the clock, giving doctors a clean slate on
which to make a diagnosis.”422
• “All guidelines at the time recommended relying on unequivocally low total
testosterone values from samples collected in the morning when making a
diagnosis. The prevailing standards at the time did not permit a diagnosis based
on a single value, and no guidelines recommended reliance on free testosterone
levels using the assay employed by Dr. Brown. In fact, the relevant guidelines
recommend not using a free testosterone level with the test used by the
laboratories in Respondent’s records because it is unreliable.”423
• “When looking at Respondent’s total testosterone levels from 2006 to 2008, while
Respondent was not using testosterone, they are all within the normal range. Even
his free testosterone levels are within the normal range with the exception of a
single borderline low level in March 2008. Because it is outside the standard of
care and contrary to Dr. Brown’s own PowerPoint slides on the topic to diagnose
someone on a single level, Dr. Brown’s reliance on one free testosterone level
from March 2008 was inappropriate and unsupportable.”424
• “In fact, the day that Dr. Brown prescribed testosterone to Respondent, April 14,
2008, Respondent’s free and total testosterone readings were well within the
normal range, confirming the low-normal reading from the previous month was
not a sign of hypogonadism. Respondent and Dr. Brown simply did not bother to
wait for these results or re-visit the diagnosis after the results came in merely 3
days later, raising questions as to the true motives behind the diagnosis.”425
420
Tr. (Day3) 1194:18-19.
421
422
USADA Post-Hearing Brief at p.92-93.
423
424
Id.
425
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• “The conclusion of Drs. Wierman and Anawalt were resolute and sound:
Respondent was not hypogonadal in 2008, and there was no legitimate basis for
prescribing him testosterone at that time.”426
“Based on the totality of the evidence, USADA submits Respondent has not met his
burden of establishing an acceptable justification for possessing testosterone, and
therefore, he has committed an anti-doping rule violation.”427
USADA’s experts, Drs. Wierman and Anawalt, referred to the Endocrine Society
Guidelines to dispute that Dr. Brown properly diagnosed Respondent with hypogonadism
in 2008, under the prevailing standards of the time. This was based on their review of the
laboratory tests and the medical records provided by Dr. Brown.
USADA argues that the fact that “witness after witness” testified that Respondent doled
out prescription medications to athletes at the NOP when they did not have a prescription
“is of great concern when thinking about Respondent’s access to testosterone.”428
Respondent argues that USADA has “the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule
violation has occurred.”429 USADA carries the burden of proof on each element of the
anti-doping rule violation it asserts unless “the Code places the burden of proof upon the
Athlete or other Person.”430
Respondent argues that USADA’s Post-Hearing brief repeatedly attempts to shift the
burden to Respondent, but this is directly contradicted by the Code, which squarely places
the burden on USADA. Moreover, because this is a non-analytical case, USADA is not
entitled to any presumptions in order to satisfy this burden.
Respondent argues that the “only logical construction of the phrase ‘in connection with
an Athlete, Competition or training’ is that an [Athlete Support Person]’s possession of a
Prohibited Substance must be on behalf of or for use by an Athlete, or for use during
Competition or training”.431 Respondent states that this construction is consistent with the
stated policy of the Code, which is to preserve “the spirit of sport” and that “[d]oping is
fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.”432 Therefore, Respondent argues that
USADA is unable to establish that he Possessed a Prohibited Substance on behalf of or
426
427
Id.
428
429
430
431
432
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for use by an Athlete, or for use during Competition or training, because his Possession
“would have no bearing on the spirit of sport.”433
Respondent sets forth six reasons why the Panel should reject USADA’s interpretation of
“in connection with an Athlete, Competition or Training.”
(a) Defining “in connection with” as “in proximity to” would render that clause a
nullity because Athlete Support Persons, by their definition, are individuals
who are in proximity to an Athlete, Competition or training.434
(b) USADA’s “interpretation would result in a hopelessly vague and ambiguous

rule that does not provide fair notice to an ASP [Athlete Support Person]
regarding what conduct constitutes an anti-doping rule violation.”435
(c) USADA’s interpretation is contrary to case law. In IAAF v. ARAF & Vladimir
Mokhnev, CAS 2016/O/4504, ¶¶ 111, 117 (Dec. 23, 2016), a coach was found
to have possessed peptides where an audio recording revealed that an athlete
asked her coach “[w]hat have you brought?” and the coach responded
“[p]eptides . . . do you know how much I spent on you? . . . peptides are
expensive.” In USADA v. Bruyneel, et al., AAA No. 77 190 00225, 26 & 29,
¶¶ 177, 179 (Apr. 21, 2014) (hereinafter “AAA Bruyneel”), an ASP was found
to have possessed Prohibited Substances and blood transfusion equipment
where multiple witnesses “testified unanimously that [the ASP] administered
various substances and blood transfusions to them for the purposes of doping.”
USADA has cited no case law in which possession was established by an
Athlete Support Person’s possession of a prescription medication in “spatial
proximity” to an Athlete, Competition or training.436
(d) USADA’s interpretation would not “preserve the spirit of sport,” as set forth
in the Code. Respondent uses an example of a coach who must carry an Epi-
Pen with him everywhere (including to competitions) due to severe
allergies.437
(e) Respondent argues that there has been no guidance from the Code or any other
anti-doping organization that supports the assertion of USADA’s
interpretation.438
(f) USADA’s interpretation creates an irreconcilable conflict between Article

2.6.2 and Article 21.2.6. (regarding Athlete Support Personnel use or
Possession without valid justification).439
433
Id.
434
435
436
437
438
439
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Respondent argues that the evidence that USADA relies on is deficient and/or unreliable:
the testimony of Mr. Magness and Ms. Goucher is not credible and, their vague reference
to seeing testosterone in Respondent’s possession does not sufficiently establish that it
was “in connection with any Athlete, Competition or training” as set forth in Article 2.6.2.
Respondent also argues that USADA “appears to be suggesting that Respondent provided
this allegedly extra testosterone to his [NOP] Athletes.”440 However, Respondent points
out that USADA has not charged Respondent with Administering, or being complicit in
the Administration of, testosterone to any Athlete. Nor has USADA charged any of
Respondent’s athletes at the NOP with Administration of testosterone.
Respondent’s expert, Dr. Gerald Levine, testified that there is evidence that demonstrates
the existence of a rational, good faith basis for Respondent’s diagnosis and prescription.
Respondent points out that “multiple licensed physicians prescribed Respondent
testosterone and that the testosterone he possessed was consistent with those
prescriptions.”441
Respondent argues that the Panel should not reevaluate Respondent’s diagnosis and
treatment, as he relied on those diagnosis and treatment from medical professionals.
Respondent relied on Dr. Brown’s medical judgment to remove him from testosterone in
2006 to try an alternative course of treatment. In June 2007, Respondent had a heart
attack. Respondent contends that Dr. Brown’s testimony supports the fact that as a result
of Respondent taking statins to control his cholesterol, he decided to restart Respondent’s
testosterone replacement therapy. Respondent contends that in making this decision, Dr.
Brown reviewed Respondent’s test results, considered his symptoms, and coordinated
with his other physicians.
Respondent contends that the medical records from Dr. Caulfield and Dr. Harp establish
that Respondent spoke with them about Dr. Brown potentially restarting him on
testosterone. Respondent said he then relied on Dr. Brown’s decision to restart him on
testosterone in 2008.
Dr. Brown testified that it was his decision, based on his medical judgment, to restart
Respondent on testosterone in 2008 and to determine the proper dosage. Respondent
argues that his “good-faith reliance on an [Athlete Support Personnel] licensed
physician’s exercise of medical judgment must be an ‘acceptable justification.’”442
Respondent argues that his possession of testosterone was for his own personal use to
treat his hypogonadism. In particular, Respondent relies on the following contentions:
• At no time has Respondent ever given or administered testosterone to an

Athlete.
440
441
Tr. (Day 4) at 1652:17-24; 1653:7-1654:2.
442
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• Respondent has never told any Athlete to use testosterone, nor has any Athlete
ever asked Respondent to give him or her testosterone.
• Respondent has never brought testosterone to a Competition or to a training
session.
• Respondent has never (1) been asked by an Athlete to hold testosterone for
him or her, (2) possessed testosterone in connection with a Competition, and
(3) possessed testosterone in connection with training an Athlete.
• Respondent took steps to keep his testosterone away from athletes of the NOP
and was careful not to cross-contaminate anyone after applying testosterone
to himself—for example, Respondent would put a shirt on after applying the
testosterone to his bicep area, and would thoroughly wash his hands.
• Dr. Harp, who has treated Respondent for numerous years, believes that
Respondent is using his testosterone prescription for personal use and has no
reason to believe that Respondent has abused his testosterone prescription.
Respondent contends that USADA has not presented any evidence to refute the above
evidence that his testosterone was for his own personal use, rather than “in connection
with an Athlete, Competition or training”.
Respondent argues that to the extent the Panel does reevaluate Respondent’s physicians’
medical judgment, it should be limited to determining whether there was a rational basis
for Respondent’s physicians diagnosis and/or treatment. Regardless of the standard the
Panel applies to evaluate the exercise of medical judgment by Respondent’s physicians,
Respondent argues that his possession of testosterone to treat him for hypogonadism is
consistent with an acceptable justification.
Respondent contends that USADA failed to refute Dr. Levine’s testimony that
Respondent’s medical records in 1994 demonstrated that Dr. Smulovitz correctly
diagnosed Respondent. Respondent claims that USADA’s expert, Dr. Wierman,
“conceded” that “[t]here is evidence in the records of signs and symptoms of low
testosterone, hypogonadism, and several low testosterone levels.”443
Even if the Panel were to consider Respondent’s total testosterone levels, Respondent
argues that the evidence demonstrates that on March 20, 2008, Respondent’s total
testosterone level was 254, which was just above the lower limit of the referenced range
of 241. Respondent contends that “[a]lthough USADA argues that this test result shows
normal testosterone levels and does not warrant Dr. Brown restarting Respondent on
testosterone, Dr. Levine testified that there is no normal testosterone reference range for
people over 40 years old—Respondent was 50 years old at the time—because the
reference range is based on individuals in their 20s or 30s.”444 Dr. Levine further testified
that there are instances when a person over 40 years old needs testosterone when they are
symptomatic of hypogonadism and in the low end of the normal range – it is a matter of
443
Tr. (Day 5) at 2264:7-25.
444
Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 118-119:8.2.5.8.5.Tr. (Day 5) at 2191:9-2193:4.
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clinical judgment.445 Respondent argues that a physician must evaluate the patient’s
medical history and symptoms in combination with the test results.
Respondent contends that USADA’s interpretation of Article 2.6.2 would result in

sanctions imposed by this Panel that violate the Americans with Disabilities Act.
D. Decision and Reasoning – Possession of Testosterone – Personal Use
There is no dispute among the parties as to Respondent being an Athlete Support Person
at the applicable times.
The Panel concludes that the testimony of Ms. Goucher and Mr. Magness establishes that
Respondent had actual, physical possession of testosterone at the two training camps
where the athletes of the NOP and Respondent were living together.
Thus that leaves the Panel to determine whether the Possession of testosterone was “in
connection with an Athlete, Competition or training”. USADA’s showing that the
Prohibited Substance was kept on the counter in the living quarters while the various
athletes of the NOP were there to train is a very tenuous connection to these athletes. The
cases relied upon by USADA (Johannes Eder v. International Olympic Committee, CAS
2007/A/1286; Martin Tauber v. International Olympic Committee, CAS 2007/A/1288;
Jurgen Pinter v. International Olympic Committee, CAS 2007/A/1289, p. 21, ¶ 52, “this
anti-doping violation is proved simply by possession . . . the necessity of proving intent
would render Article 2.6 nugatory”. involved very specific possession by Athlete Support
Personnel for the purpose of using it for the athletes. That is not a finding that can be
made with these facts.
The Prohibited Substance has to be more than in proximity of the athletes of the NOP to
be found to be “in connection with an Athlete…”. USADA has submitted evidence that
shows the Prohibited Substance was simply with Respondent, for his personal use, while
they were all staying together. There is no suggestion from these facts that this meets the
standard of using it for the athletes of the NOP.
While USADA presented extensive evidence about the lack of justification for
Respondent’s being prescribed testosterone, there is no doubt from the evidence that he
was indeed prescribed the testosterone for his personal use, whether or not his doctors
followed appropriate medical guidelines. The further contention by USADA that
Respondent doled out prescriptions to his athletes at the NOP is of no value to USADA
to meet its burden of proof with respect to whether the particular testosterone at issue was
possessed “in connection with…Competition or training” while the athletes of the NOP
and Respondent were at their housing locations while training.
With respect to whether the Possession was “in connection with … Competition or
training”, USADA’s proof is also deficient. The simple presence of the Prohibited
Substance, which the evidence clearly indicated was for Respondent’s personal use, is
not a use “in connection with training”. They were all staying there for purposes of
445
Tr. (Day 5) at 2191:9-2192:4.
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training, but the condo itself was not a training location. The Panel finds there needs to
be a greater nexus between the Possession and the training in order for the Possession to
be “in connection with” training. USADA has not met its burden of proof on the third
prong of this charge.
Thus, it is not necessary for the Panel to examine whether USADA or Respondent had
the burden of proof on the exception reflected in this Article, i.e. establishing “acceptable
justification” for the Possession of the Prohibited Substance.
The Panel does not need to and will not address Respondent’s contention with respect to
the Americans with Disabilities Act.
XI. TESTOSTERONE EXPERIMENT
A. Charges
USADA charged Respondent with the following Code violations based on the
testosterone experiment:
• Article 2.6.2 - Possession
• Article 2.7 – Trafficking
• Article 2.9 – Complicity
Mr. Rupp testified that he was approached after finishing a race at the Oregon Twilight
Track Meet on May 9, 2009, by Chris Whetstine.446 He then felt Chris Whetstine rub
something wet on his back.447 He was concerned about potential sabotage. Respondent
left a message on the USADA voice mail system and sent an email to USADA’s CEO
about this incident that night/early morning the next day to alert him that he was
“suspicious that [Whetstine] could have possibly rubbed something onto Galen”.448
Numerous witnesses (Darren Treasure, Krista Austin, Ciarán Ó Lionáird, Alex Salazar,
Tony Salazar and Galen Rupp) testified that Respondent had a long history of concern
about the potential for sabotage.
Alex Salazar testified about how his father had shared concerns over “somebody spiking
a drink, somebody rubbing something on somebody” and other sabotage-related
scenarios.449 According to Alex Salazar, Respondent was so concerned with sabotage that
he poured out the water bottles of his athletes after they were left unaccompanied and he
446
Tr. (Day 5) at 2101:2-2102:19.
447
Id.
448
Tr. (Day 4) at 1431:18-1432:18; Resp. Ex. 4.
449
Tr. (Day 5) at 1972:8-1973:5.
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asked Galen Rupp and Mo Farah to travel with their medications and supplements locked
in a metal box and keep water in a locked cooler to prevent tampering.450
Respondent also placed and signed a strip of tape on a package that he planned to send to
U.K. Athletics as a way of ensuring that the package was not tampered with, he cautioned
his athletes at the NOP not to give high-fives or allow anyone to touch them after races,
and he told his athletes at the NOP that they could never let water bottles out of their sight
or the sight of someone they “really, really trust.”451
This incident with Mr. Whetstine, who had just been accused of sabotaging another elite
athlete during a massage, prompted Respondent to develop and conduct an experiment to
determine if it would be possible for someone to surreptitiously sabotage a competitor
through topical application of testosterone gel after a race.452
The plan to conduct a testosterone experiment arose from a conversation between

Respondent and Dr. Brown.453 Dr. Brown then designed the protocol for the experiment
to include administering testosterone on subjects who would run 5,000 meters or 10,000
meters.454 As reported by Dr. Brown to Mark Parker by email of July 7, 2009, the protocol
tested only an amount that was likely to “go undetected by an athlete,” starting with one
and two pumps, after a “run on a tread mill [sic] for 20 min. at an ambient temp. of 85
degrees” “[a]ll to simulate conditions post running” and “determine the minimal amount
of gel that would cause a problem.”455 The urine was tested one hour after application of
testosterone gel, but at no other time after the application.456
In addition, there was no performance testing in connection with the testosterone

experiment.457 Tony and Alex Salazar (the subjects of the experiment) testified that
they were never asked to report on how they felt after the application of testosterone or
how the application of testosterone affected their athletic performance.458
Respondent conducted the experiment on June 30, 2009.459 He testified about the details
of the experiment, including taking a pre-run urine sample from each son, and personally
rubbing his sons on the back with testosterone after they had completed their runs on a
treadmill in an environmental chamber at the Nike lab.460
That day, the pre-run urine samples were collected to test Tony’s and Alex’s baseline
testosterone levels and collected again after Respondent had applied “2 squirts” of
testosterone.461 Dr. Brown recalled being at the Nike laboratory that day and said that
450
Tr. (Day 4) at 1436:21-1437:7, Tr. (Day 5) at 1976:5-23, 1977:25-1978:20; see also Resp. Ex. 244.
451
Tr. (Day 4) at 1435:23-1436:8; Tr. (Day 5) at 2105:9-2107:7; Resp. Ex. 177.
452
Tr. (Day 5) at 2101:19-2102:10.
453
Tr. (Day 4) at 1434:9-1435:6.
454
Resp. Ex. 11.
455
Tr. (Day 6) at 2365:5-2367:3; see also Res. Ex. 11.
456
Resp. Ex. 11.
457
Tr. (Day 5) at 2020:17-2021:18, 1987:10-14.
458
Tr. (Day 5) at 1984:18-1985:1, 2020:1-15.
459
USADA Exs. 34-37, 40, 46, 47.
460
Tr. (Day 4) at 1442:17-1444:3; Tr. (Day 7) at 2356:23-2357:1; see also USADA Exs. 34-37, 40, 46, 47.
461
USADA Exs. 34-36.
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Respondent put AndroGel on his son prior to that son exercising on a treadmill, which
was designed to mirror running 5,000 meters.462
Tony Salazar testified that his wife was either pregnant or trying to get pregnant at the
time and that he discussed with his father “about making sure that it was fully showered
off of me before there was any contact with her.”463 Dr. Brown said he “was concerned”
about Tony receiving testosterone because “you have to be careful with AndroGel . . . not
… to get it on somebody else...” though he said, “it would only create risk if she came in
contact with the bare skin without him having washed it off.”464
When the testing came back from Aegis Labs on July 7, 2009, Dr. Brown wrote an email
to Nike CEO Mark Parker, “We have preliminary data back on our experiments with a
topical male hormone called Androgel . . . We found that even though there was a slight
rise in T/E ratios, it was below the level of 4 which would trigger great concern . . . We
are next going to repeat it using 3 pumps . . . We need to determine the minimal amount
of gel that would cause a problem.”465Mr. Parker responded, advising Respondent that
“[i]t will be interesting to determine the minimal amount of topical male hormone
required to create a positive test.”466 Dr. Brown concurred and forwarded the email chain
to Respondent who replied that he would permit Aegis to speak with Dr. Brown directly
about the analysis being done in support of the experiment.467
Respondent’s son Tony was tested again on July 19, 2009 according to the records.
Respondent emailed Dr. Brown that he provided Tony “4 squirts” of AndroGel for this
test. Respondent’s other son Alex underwent the same test on or around July 22, 2009,
based on email from Respondent to Dr. Brown.468
When Respondent on July 31, 2009 provided Dr. Brown the test results for Tony’s second
test with “4 squirts”, they were both happy with the results.469 The results showed a rise
in T/E ratio from .8 before application of the gel to 1.4 after a strenuous basketball game
followed by application.470 He passed on the results to Dr. Brown, stating “[t]his is very
reassuring . . . I don’t think we need to worry about anyone sabotaging us.” Likewise,
Alex’s second round testing resulted in a T/E rise to 2.8, still below the point that would
trigger concern on a drug test.471
Upon seeing these results, Dr. Brown wrote “Want to try 6 squirts?”472 Respondent
responded, “I don’t think it’s worth it. The four squirts was an enormous amount that
462
Tr. (Day 6) at 2356:14-24.
463
Tr. (Day 5) at 2022:10-20.
464
Tr. (Day 6) at 2367:17-20, 2368:1-4.
465
USADA Ex. 38.
466
Id.
467
Id.
468
Tr. (Day 5) 2019:17-19, 2023:5-10; see also USADA Ex. 45.
469
Resp. Ex. 15; Tr. (Day 4) at 1454:2-8.
470
Resp. Exs. 15, 17, 18.
471
Resp. Ex. 15.
472
Resp. Ex. 18.
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was easily noticed.”473 Later that day, Respondent wrote to Dr. Brown: “I’ll sleep better
now after drug tests at big meetings knowing someone didn’t sabotage us.”474
On August 5, 2009, Dr. Brown emailed Nike CEO Parker, and copied Respondent,
explaining that four pumps of AndroGel resulted in a T/E ratio of 2.8, which he indicated
would only be of concern if it was 3 or higher. In this same email, Dr. Brown states:
We know from the medical literature that 8 squirts would definitely

trigger a problem. I suspect that 6 and 7 would also be a problem.
However, this is NOT likely to be a major concern since the amount
of gel of even 4 squirts would be quite apparent to any person it
would put on. Women however are going however to pose to us quite
a problem, since probably as little as 1 or 2 squirts may well trigger
a problem. In order to test this we would need to do a full fledged
research protocol, secure volunteers and get an institutional review
board to sign off on it. I think we need to keep our female athletes
from having any physical contact with anybody until after drug
testing is done after a sporting event.475
Although Dr. Brown suggested that they test additional types of gels and creams and had
concerns that sabotage of women might still be possible, Respondent did not wish to
conduct any additional testing. He did however tell the women to wear long sleeves after
a race and not to have any contact.476
Respondent testified that he used his own supply of testosterone for the testosterone
experiment on his sons.477 At the time of the experiment, Respondent was receiving
testosterone exclusively from Dr. Brown, who testified that he had refused Respondent’s
request to write a prescription for Respondent’s sons to receive testosterone for the
experiment.478 After asking Dr. Brown to prescribe testosterone for his sons Respondent
asked Dr. Brown if he could do anything he wanted to with his testosterone, and Dr.
Brown responded: “It’s up to you. I can’t prevent you from doing anything.”479
Andrew Begley, the husband of NOP athlete Amy Begley, recalled Dr. Brown giving
Amy “a plain envelope that said ‘Alberto’ on it, and she put it in her bag, and she took it
back to Portland” where she delivered the envelope to Respondent.480 Andrew Begley
testified that he and his wife later had a conversation with Respondent during which
Respondent disclosed “that the package that Amy had transported was the [testosterone]
cream that he used on one of his sons to test it.”481 Based on Dr. Brown’s medical records,
Andrew Begley recalled that he and his wife transported the testosterone in August
473
Id.; Tr. (Day 4) at 1453:12-1454:12.
474
Resp. Ex. 18.
475
Id.
476
Resp. Exs. 12, 21, 22; Tr. (Day 4) at 1459:16–1460:18.
477
Tr. (Day 4) at 1671:16-21.
478
Tr. (Day 6) at 2354:11-16.
479
Tr. (Day 6) 2386:3-2387:17, 2352:8-9; USADA Ex. 569 at p. 75-76.
480
Tr. (Day 1) at 174:17-19.
481
Tr. (Day 1) at 174:23-175:14.
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2009,482 which was the same month that Dr. Brown proposed running additional
testosterone experiments. Dr. Brown recalled sending the package with the Begleys prior
to the testosterone experiment commencing, but claimed it was placebo testosterone.483
Respondent stated he had “no recollection” of the Begleys bringing him testosterone to
conduct the experiment.484
Respondent testified that he did not obtain an “independent review board” approval, he
did not have any written protocols and his sons did not provide any written consents.485
Respondent testified that he was assured by Dr. Brown “these few squirts being put on
these young healthy males, that there was nothing to worry about.”486
The testimony of Dr. Brad Wilkins, Alex Salazar, and Tony Salazar—each of whom was
involved in the testosterone experiment—was that no efforts were made to conceal or
hide the testosterone experiment.487 They testified that the testosterone experiment was
conducted in front of numerous scientists and others milling about the Nike Lab, and that
no measures were taken to hide the testosterone experiment or maintain its secrecy.488
Alex Salazar testified that there were “plenty [of people] in the vicinity because it was . .
. just a big, open room. So there might have been you know 30 people working down
there.”489 He also testified that he felt “completely comfortable” with the test because “it
was done in broad daylight in front of everybody else” and “[i]t just didn’t seem like too
much of an event to me.”490
Dr. Wilkins testified that the use of Respondent’s sons “relieved” any potential concerns
“because they were definitely informed . . . they totally understood everything that was
going on and why it was going on.”491 In response to cross-examination suggesting that
Respondent should have obtained approval from an “independent review board” before
conducting the test, Dr. Wilkins testified that “it wasn’t a review board matter” and that
his “potential ethical issues with it were satisfied when I knew that those — that the
subjects were highly informed, close to [Respondent], and family.”492
Respondent and Dr. Brown made no attempt to keep Alex and Tony Salazar from
discussing the testosterone experiment with others before or after it took place.493 Tony
Salazar testified that no one ever told him that the experiment was a “secret” or to refrain
482
Tr. (Day 1) 174:12-19, 183:4-20.
483
Tr. (Day 6) at 2387:18-24, 2388:19-2390:11.
484
Tr. (Day 4) at 1642:19-23.
485
USADA Exs. 34-37, 40, 46, 47.
486
Tr. (Day 4) at 1444:4-12.
487
Tr. (Day 5) at 1984:10-17.
488
Tr. (Day 4) at 1440:14-15; Tr. (Day 5) at 1929:11-1930:12.
489
Tr. (Day 5) at 1984:10-17.
490
Tr. (Day 5) at 1987:2-9.
491
Tr. (Day 5) at 1928:9-15.
492
Tr. (Day 5) at 1952:14-18.
493
Tr. (Day 5) at 1984:18-1985:1, 2020:1-15.
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from telling others about it and that he, in fact, told “multiple people” about the
testosterone experiment because he “thought it was interesting.”494
Alex Salazar’s testimony was the same; no one ever told Alex that the testosterone
experiment was a “secret event” or ever told him not to tell others about the experiment.495
Paul Scott, Respondent’s expert, an analytic chemist with over 10 years of experience
working in drug testing laboratories, testified that the testosterone experiment was
designed to “determin[e] whether a runner could be sabotaged in a post-race scenario”
with “the surreptitious application of testosterone gel” and was fit for that purpose.496 Mr.
Scott’s opinion was based on Respondent and Dr. Brown not increasing the amount of
testosterone gel tested when “the amount becomes too large,” meaning that “they haven’t
tested it to the point of failure on the T/E test;” rather, “[t]hey’ve tested it to the point of
failure as to where it would no longer be reasonable to surreptitiously apply the gel.”497
Mr. Scott also testified that the testosterone experiment was inconsistent with establishing
any kind of doping program because “they are ignoring everything you would need to
pay attention to if you were looking at a scenario where you wanted to dope someone
with testosterone.”498 For example, he testified that the protocol for the testosterone
experiment—as identified by Dr. Brown in an email of July 7, 2009 to Mark Parker is:
“The subjects that were tested Alberto’s sons were run on a tread mill for 20 min. at an
ambient temp. of 85 degrees. The Androgel was rubbed on the skin and urine tested 1
hour later! All to simulate conditions post running.”—would yield no data valuable to
developing a doping program, such as whether the amount of testosterone applied
enhanced performance, since the gel was applied “post-race.”499
He also testified that because topically applied testosterone doesn’t “peak for at least four
to six hours, maybe longer, on the T/E ratio” the one-hour-post-application testing time
did not give valuable data regarding whether the athletes of the NOP were likely to test
positive.500 “[F]or an athlete who’s attempting to develop a doping program, taking a T/E
ratio at a fixed period of time wouldn’t provide much help to them because it’s possible
that they could be tested on a random test at the three or four-hour mark after
administration.”501 Mr. Scott also opined that testing only a couple of times, as
Respondent did, would be insufficient to yield useful data for a doping scheme and that
significantly more regular and numerous tests would be required to determine whether
testosterone was helpful and/or detectable.502
494
Tr. (Day 5) at 2020:1-15.
495
Tr. (Day 5) at 1984:18-1985:1.
496
Tr. (Day 5) at 1861:3-17.
497
Tr. (Day 5) at 1863:25-1864:7.
498
Tr. (Day 5) at 1866:13-1867:16.
499
See Ex. 11; see also Resp. Post-Hearing Brief at p. 137:9.2.2.10.
500
Tr. (Day 5) at 1867:4-16.
501
Tr. (Day 5) at 1874:6-12.
502
Tr. (Day 5) at 1869:5-1871:11.
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C. Possession of Testosterone – Testosterone Experiment
Article 2.6.2 provides that an “Athlete Support Person” may not possess a prohibited
substance “in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training, unless the Athlete
Support Person establishes that the Possession is consistent with a TUE granted to the
Athlete in accordance with Article 4.4 or other acceptable justification.”
USADA argues that Respondent meets the definition of an Athlete Support Person, and
that it is uncontested that Respondent possessed testosterone in furtherance of the
testosterone experiment.
Because testosterone is a Prohibited Substance, banned at all times, USADA argues that
Respondent cannot possess testosterone “in connection with an Athlete, Competition, or
training, unless the Athlete Support Person establishes that the Possession is consistent
with a TUE granted to an Athlete . . . or other acceptable justification.” The comments
to this article of the Code provide that “acceptable justification” “would include, for
example, a team doctor carrying Prohibited Substances for dealing with acute and
emergency situations.” Acceptable justification, however, explicitly does not encompass
“buying or Possessing a Prohibited Substance for purpose of giving it to a friend or
relative, except under justifiable medical circumstances where that Person had a
physician’s prescription, e.g., buying insulin for a diabetic child.”
USADA argues that Respondent possessed testosterone in connection with the

testosterone experiment, as one cannot apply testosterone to his sons as part of the
testosterone experiment without also possessing it. He further acknowledged that the
testosterone used in the testosterone experiment came from his own supply of testosterone
and that the experiment was to help athletes of the NOP at competitions, thereby
inextricably linking the testosterone experiment with both Athletes and Competitions, as
defined by the Code.
USADA also argues that it is undisputed that the testosterone experiment occurred in
Nike Inc.’s laboratory “to ascertain whether low amounts of testosterone rubbed on an
athlete in proximity to competition and before drug testing would be picked up on a urine
drug test.”
Respondent claims that “in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training” requires
USADA to prove that his possession “was on behalf of or for use by an Athlete, or for
use during Competition or training.” USADA argues that this extremely narrow
interpretation of “in connection with” would render the rule entirely superfluous as
possession for use by an athlete (or other person) at any time is already a trafficking
violation.503 USADA further contends that “[i]t is also quite convenient that such a
503
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specific and narrow definition would just so happen to absolve Respondent of liability
since the testosterone excretion experiment involved non-Athletes.”504
Rather, USADA argues that “in connection with” should be interpreted based on the plain
meaning of the words. USADA contends that “[t]he question is simply whether there was
a connection, a link, an association between the testosterone excretion experiment on the
one hand and an athlete, competition or training, on the other hand.” USADA concludes
that the “answer to this question is a resounding, yes.”505
USADA argues that by Respondent’s own admission, the testosterone experiment was to
help athletes of the NOP at competitions not test positive should someone try to sabotage
them by applying testosterone on them after a competition.506 USADA argues that this is
“not an attenuated connection; it is the central reason, according to Respondent, for the
experiment.”507
Accordingly, USADA submits that Respondent “cannot escape liability for possessing
testosterone in violation of the anti-doping rules by redefining possession as trafficking.”
Applying the plain meaning of the words in the rule, there is a clear connection between
the experiment and Athletes and Competitions, as defined by the Code.
Respondent admitted that he used testosterone in his possession and obtained from Dr.
Brown to conduct the testosterone experiment. Therefore, USADA argues that
Respondent’s possession of this testosterone was separate and distinct from his
possession of testosterone for personal use.
As USADA contends that Respondent’s possession of testosterone for use in the

testosterone experiment was connected to Athletes and Competition, Respondent must
provide an acceptable justification for this possession. USADA argues that “[s]imply
having a testosterone prescription clearly does not satisfy this burden because, inter alia,
the prescription was for personal use – not use in a testosterone experiment.”508 USADA
further argues that neither of Respondent’s sons had a prescription for testosterone that
could potentially satisfy his burden to demonstrate an acceptable justification.
Instead, USADA argues that the only “possible justification was the experiment itself”
but that the testosterone experiment provides no such justification.509 To support its
argument, USADA notes that the testosterone experiment was run without Institutional
Review Board (“IRB”) approval, without informed consent, without a medical need for
testosterone, and without a written protocol or analysis. And permitting such
experimentation under the anti-doping rules by categorizing it as an “acceptable
justification” would open the gates for other athlete support personnel to creatively design
504
Id.
505
506
Tr. (Day 4) 1430:1-1437:10.
507
Id.
508
509
Id.
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experiments with potential dual purposes (in the same way Respondent’s experiment may
help Respondent understand the risks of testing positive from sabotage but also reveals
how to avoid a positive test through micro-dosing) without any oversight to skirt anti-
doping prohibitions and risk the health and safety of those involved in the experiment.
USADA argues that “this same experiment can be used to further the nefarious purpose
of evading doping control just as easily as it can be used for the claimed prophylactic
purpose of determining the likely success of attempted sabotage.”510 Therefore, USADA
argues that the unregulated and unapproved testosterone experiment should not be
considered an acceptable justification. USADA argues that “[n]othing in medicine, the
law, or sport rules countenances the reckless and rogue experiment conducted by
Respondent.”511
a. In Connection with An Athlete, Competition or training
Respondent argues that because the testosterone experiment involved only non-Athletes
and was conducted outside of Competition or training, USADA cannot establish that
Respondent’s possession was “in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training.”
Respondent contends that he and Dr. Brown conducted the testosterone experiment on
Alex and Tony Salazar specifically because they were not Athletes, and no Athletes were
present during the testosterone experiment.
Respondent dismisses USADA’s argument that Respondent’s possession of testosterone

during the testosterone experiment was in connection with a Competition because it was
designed to prevent an Athlete from being sabotaged at Competition. Respondent argues
that the purpose of the testosterone experiment was to investigate whether an Athlete
could be sabotaged at a Competition is a far cry from possessing testosterone at a
Competition or for use during a Competition.
Respondent argues that he had an acceptable justification for Possessing testosterone in

connection with the testosterone experiment because it was conducted for the purpose of
preventing sabotage. Respondent argues that “[e]very document, lay witness, and expert
witness supports that the Sabotage Test was conducted for the purpose of preventing
surreptitious sabotage by a competitor and preventing doping violations.”512
3. Decision and Reasoning - Possession of Testosterone – Testosterone

Experiment
USADA bears the burden of proving the same three elements with respect to Possession
related to the testosterone experiment as it did for Personal Use above in Paragraph 348.
510
511
512
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There is no dispute among the parties that Respondent is an Athlete Support Person and
was at the applicable time.
USADA must further prove that Respondent was in Possession of a Prohibited Substance
at the time of the testosterone experiment. This issue is not in dispute among the parties.
Respondent testified that he applied his own prescribed testosterone to his two sons on
the various occasions where the tests were conducted for the testosterone experiment.
Thus, the issue for the Panel is whether the Possession at the time of the testosterone
experiment was “in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training.” It is clear from
the testimony that only non-“Athletes”, Respondent’s two sons, were involved in the
The experiment was conducted at the Nike lab, which is not the actual training site but is
within the area used by the NOP for training, nor is it an actual Competition. USADA
argues that since the experiment was to help the athletes of the NOP at competitions,
thereby inextricably linking the testosterone experiment with both Athletes and
Competitions, it meets the standard of Article 2.6.2. The Panel finds that in order for
Possession to be “in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training” as required by
Article 2.6.2, there would necessarily need to be an Athlete involved. The definition of
“in connection with” according to Merriam-Webster is “in relation to (something)” and
according to lexico.com, it means “with reference to” “concerning”. This is distinct from
the trafficking rule, which does not require a connection to (or a reference to) an Athlete,
Competition or training. A strict reading of the elements required for Possession does
not allow the Panel to stray from its actual wording: there is nothing to suggest that the
term “in connection with” does not require the actual involvement of a specific Athlete
or Athletes either in training or in Competition. The Panel is cognizant that the Code’s
provisions feature other Articles that address conduct such as administration or trafficking
in Prohibited Substances where a coach or other Athlete Support Person might decide to
conduct some type of testing to determine how to “beat” the doping control process. None
of these was involved in the testosterone experiment even if its ultimate purpose was to
help athletes of the NOP in competition avoid sabotage. Having this purpose does not
bring the “Possession” by Respondent within the purview of this Article.
Nevertheless, the Panel is concerned that this experiment was conducted at a reputable
and well known training facility, by a very experienced and well known Athlete Support
Person, with no actual justification and involving the administration of a controlled
substance in potential violation of federal laws. While the Panel accepts Respondent’s
contention that the experiment was designed to protect athletes of the NOP, it could have
also been conducted as part of a nefarious attempt to “beat” the testing system and thus
is susceptible to creating an appearance of cheating that one could argue would bring the
experiment much closer to being “in connection with” an Athlete, Competition or
training.
The Panel thus finds that it is not necessary for the Panel to examine whether USADA or
Respondent had the burden of proof on the exception reflected in this Article, i.e.
establishing “acceptable justification” for the Possession of the Prohibited Substance.
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USADA has not met its burden of proof on the third prong of the charge of Possession,
i.e. that the Possession was “in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training”.
D. Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking of Testosterone – Testosterone

Experiment
Trafficking is defined in Article 2.7 of the Code as: “Selling, giving, transporting,
sending, delivering or distributing [or Possessing for any such purpose] a Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method (either physically or by any electronic or other means)
by an Athlete, Athlete Support Person or any other Person subject to the jurisdiction of
an Anti-Doping Organization to any third party; provided, however, this definition shall
not include the actions of ‘bona fide’ medical personnel involving a Prohibited Substance
used for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or other acceptable justification…”
USADA submits that Respondent committed an anti-doping rule violation under Article
2.7 because he “gave” a Prohibited Substance to another Person, i.e. his two sons during
the testosterone experiment. USADA argues that “[u]nder the trafficking rule the sport
status of the individual (i.e., whether they are considered an Athlete, Athlete Support
Person, or other Person) who received the Prohibited Substance is irrelevant.”513 USADA
argues that Respondent committed a violation by giving testosterone to his sons who
lacked an acceptable justification to receive it.
USADA argues that the panel in AAA Bruyneel determined that “the anti-doping rules do
not provide anti-doping tribunals with a definition of ‘trafficking’” and was thus left to
resort to its best understanding at that time.514
USADA argues that there is no requirement of a commercial requirement for Trafficking.

USADA also points out that the panel in the AAA Bruyneel matter did not decide that
there was a commercial element to trafficking, noting only: “even considering there may
be a commercial aspect to this definition.”515 Furthermore, on appeal the CAS Bruyneel
decision made no such remarks about there being a commercial aspect of trafficking and
found that “all charges against Messrs Bruyneel, Marti and Celaya within the limitations
period have been established to its comfortable satisfaction.”516
USADA contends that Respondent’s “purported reason for the experiment (to protect
athletes of the NOP from sabotage)” was not an acceptable justification.517 The
testosterone experiment was “run without IRB approval, without informed consent,
without a medical need for testosterone, and without a written protocol or analysis.”518
USADA further argues that these are “key components of a valid (i.e., acceptable)
513
514
USADA v. Bruyneel, et al., AAA No. 77 190 00225, 26 & 29, ¶ 120; USADA Post-Hearing Reply Brief at p.
76.
515
Id.
516
Marti v. USADA and WADA v. Bruyneel, et al., CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599, 3618, ¶¶ 628-29.
517
518
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research study conducted by any person or organization, but especially a study involving
the most abused performance enhancing steroid on the planet being conducted by an elite-
level track and field coach backed by the most profitable shoe company in the world.”519
USADA contends that “[w]ithout basic safeguards and controls, Respondent’s sons (or
their wives) may be put at risk unknowingly by participating in a study at the behest of
their father.”520
USADA also warns that the “same experiment can be used to further the nefarious
purpose of evading doping control just as easily as it can be used for the claimed
prophylactic purpose of determining the likely success of attempted sabotage.”521
Therefore, USADA argues that the unregulated, unapproved testosterone experiment
should not be deemed an “acceptable justification.” USADA warns that permitting such
experiments would “open the gates for other [Athlete Support Persons] to creatively
design experiments without any oversight to skirt anti-doping prohibitions and risk the
health and safety of those involved in the experiment as was done in this case.”522
USADA contends that “Respondent and Dr. Brown must have coordinated to arrange for
the Begleys to transport additional testosterone to Respondent for the [testosterone]
experiment because such an act does not happen in a vacuum.”523
USADA further argues that “[e]ven if August 2009 was the correct month that the
Begleys transported testosterone to Respondent, it follows from Dr. Brown’s August 5,
2009 email to CEO Parker recommending further testosterone excretion experiments, that
the testosterone may have been transported for the purpose of conducting these additional
experiments.”524 USADA argues that whether the testosterone was sent before the
testosterone experiment or afterward for “further testosterone experimentation, the
conclusion is the same: Respondent received testosterone from Dr. Brown via
prescription and hand delivery that Respondent used to conduct testosterone
experiments.”525
Respondent argues that USADA failed to satisfy its burden that Respondent engaged in
the “selling, giving, transporting, sending, delivering or distributing” a Prohibited
Substance in connection with the testosterone experiment. Furthermore, Respondent
argues that, in any event, there was an acceptable justification for his conduct.
Respondent contends that Trafficking requires USADA to demonstrate that Respondent

enjoyed a commercial benefit and engaged in more than mere Administration.
Respondent argues that USADA’s definition of Trafficking is “far too expansive; it would
519
Id.
520
521
Id.
522
523
524
525
Id.
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sweep in nearly all conduct concerning a Prohibited Substance.”526 For instance,
Respondent uses the example of an Athlete Support Person “giving” a suitcase containing
an inhaler to a hotel bellhop, “transporting” allergy medication from the pharmacy to a
sick spouse at home, or taking a job at a health food store and “selling” supplements to
non-athlete customers would all constitute Trafficking.527
Respondent contends that USADA’s position is contrary to case law, which outlines that
the alleged trafficker must have enjoyed a commercial benefit from the alleged
Trafficking activity. Respondent relies on AAA Bruyneel, where the panel found that “the
offense of ‘trafficking’ is designed . . . to prevent the distribution or involvement in the
chain of distribution by persons otherwise prohibited by the relevant anti-doping rules
from being so involved.”528 Based on that principle, Respondent contends that the panel
found that the team physician who allegedly extracted and injected blood and
“administered or facilitated the use of doping products for team riders” did not engage in
Trafficking. In particular, the AAA Bruyneel panel held: “[I]t is not clear that, aside from
the actual administration of various prohibited substances and methods, Dr. Celaya was
involved in Trafficking or distribution of prohibited substances or methods” and that “[t]o
read this offense as the same as administration would be inconsistent with a plain reading
of the WADC.”529
Respondent further argues that, in AAA Bruyneel, the panel observed that “there may be
a commercial aspect [to Trafficking],” which was satisfied with respect to the team
director, Mr. Bruyneel, because he stood to benefit financially when his athletes
performed better due to the blood doping scheme in which he participated.530 Rather than
enjoying some type of commercial benefit as set forth in the AAA Bruyneel decision,
Respondent contends that the testosterone experiment only centered around his concern
about the potential for sabotage. Respondent supports his position by citing to testimony
from Darren Treasure, Krista Austin, Ciarán Ó Lionáird, Alex Salazar, Tony Salazar, and
Galen Rupp who each testified that Respondent had a long history of concern about the
potential for sabotage. Alex Salazar, Respondent’s son, testified about how his father had
shared concerns over “somebody spiking a drink, somebody rubbing something on
somebody” and other sabotage-related scenarios.531 At Respondent’s request, NOP staff
were in the habit of reporting any suspicious individuals or conduct to Respondent.
Respondent argues that USADA also cannot establish that Respondent enjoyed a
commercial benefit because he received a salary from the NOP. Respondent contends
that argument ignores the decision in AAA Bruyneel in which, despite receiving a salary
from the team, the team physician was found to not have engaged in Trafficking.
526
527
Id.
528
See USADA v. Bruyneel, et al., AAA No. 77 190 00225, 26 & 29, ¶ 120
529
USADA v. Bruyneel, et al., AAA No. 77 190 00225, 26 & 29, ¶ 178.
530
Id at ¶ 178; see, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006) (“ordinarily ‘trafficking’ means some sort of
commercial dealing”); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 375 (9th Cir. 1996) (“trafficking is a commercial
activity”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1534 (8th ed. 2004) (defining to “traffic” as to “trade or deal in (goods, esp.
illicit drugs or other contraband).”)
531
Tr. (Day 5) at 1972:8-1973:5.
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Respondent contends that USADA has not and cannot explain how Respondent benefited
financially from “ensuring that his athletes could not be victims of sabotage.”
Respondent also contends that contemporaneous emails evidence that the incident leading
to the testosterone experiment was a “potential act of attempted sabotage.” This was
supported by testimony from Respondent and Mr. Rupp that immediately after the
Oregon Twilight Track Meet on May 9, 2009, Mr. Rupp felt Chris Whetstine, who had
already been accused of sabotaging another athlete, rub something wet on his back after
the race. Respondent testified that he emailed Travis Tygart to alert USADA that he was
“suspicious that [Whetstine] could have possibly rubbed something onto Galen.”532
Respondent argues that the contemporaneous emails exchanged while the testosterone
experiment was ongoing support his contention that the purpose of the test was to prevent
sabotage. On July 7, 2009, Dr. Brown wrote, “We need to determine the minimal amount
of gel that would cause a problem” and that “[w]e know that rubbing arms and legs is
more of a potential problem than hand shaking after an event since an athlete is much
more likely to feel a ‘glob’ in a hand shake.”533 On July 31, 2009, after receiving test
results, Respondent wrote: “Here’s the first results back from our last test! It’s very
reassuring . . . I don’t think we need to worry about anyone sabotaging us[.]”534 When
Dr. Brown asked Respondent if they should repeat the test with 6 squirts, Respondent
responded, “I don’t think it’s worth it” because “[t]he four squirts was an enormous
amount that was easily noticed and had to be carefully applied to keep it from falling
off.”535 And later that day, Respondent wrote, “I’ll sleep better now after drug tests at
meetings knowing someone didn’t sabotage us!”536 In describing the results of the
testosterone experiment after its completion, Dr. Brown wrote that six or seven squirts
was not “likely to be a major concern since the amount of gel of even 4 squirts would be
quite apparent to any person it would [sic] put on.”537
Respondent contends that the “protocol” for the testosterone experiment was consistent
with sabotage prevention and inconsistent with a doping scheme. Respondent relies on
testimony and email correspondence that urine was tested one hour after application of
testosterone gel, but at no other time after the application. In addition, there was no
performance testing in connection with the testosterone experiment.
Respondent relies on the testimony of Dr. Wilkins, Alex Salazar and Tony Salazar to
establish that there were no efforts made to conceal or hide the testosterone experiment.
These witnesses testified that the testosterone experiment was conducted in front of
numerous scientists and other individuals in the Nike Lab, and that no measures were
taken to hide the testosterone experiment. Alex Salazar testified that there were “plenty
[of people] in the vicinity because it was . . . just a big, open room. So there might have
been you know 30 people working down there.”538 He also testified that he felt
532
Tr. (Day 4) at 1432:17-18.
533
Resp. Ex. 12.
534
Resp. Ex. 15; see also Tr. (Day 4) at 1454:2-8.
535
Id.
536
Resp. Ex. 18.
537
Resp. Ex. 21.
538
Tr. (Day 5) at 1984:10-17.
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“completely comfortable” with the test because “it was done in broad daylight in front of
everybody else” and “[i]t just didn’t seem like too much of an event to me.”539
Respondent’s expert, Paul Scott, testified that the testosterone experiment was designed
to “determin[e] whether a runner could be sabotaged in a post-race scenario” with “the
surreptitious application of testosterone gel” and was fit for that purpose.540 Mr. Scott
said key to his analysis included the fact that Respondent and Dr. Brown stopped
increasing the amount of testosterone gel , meaning that “they haven’t tested it to the
point of failure on the T/E test,” rather “[t]hey’ve tested it to the point of failure as to
where it would no longer be reasonable to surreptitiously apply the gel.”541 Mr. Scott also
testified that the protocol for the testosterone experiment, i.e. running on a treadmill
followed by an application of the testosterone gel, followed by a urine test one hour later,
would yield no data valuable to developing a doping program.
Respondent also points to his “long history of extensive good-faith attempts to comply
with the WADA Code” to support his conclusion that the testosterone experiment had no
improper purpose.542 Respondent argues that USADA did not refute any of Respondent’s
evidence, rather USADA only called Dr. Fedoruk, who did not opine that the testosterone
experiment was related to the development of a doping program.
Respondent contends that the prevention of unintentional doping violations is an

acceptable justification for his conducting the testosterone experiment, per the Code. The
prevention of sabotage must necessarily be an acceptable justification, because it furthers
the purpose of the Code, which is “to protect athletes’ fundamental rights to participate
in doping-free sport and promote health, fairness, and equality.”543
Respondent argues that other sections of the Code support this conclusion, including
Articles 18.1 and 18.2 which require Athlete Support Persons to “educate and counsel”
Athletes regarding anti-doping rules and “the primary goal of such programs is
prevention” of doping violations including the “intentional or unintentional Use by
Athletes of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods.”544
Respondent contends that the evidence shows that USADA considered potential sabotage
with testosterone a problem worth investigating. Respondent submits that he presented
evidence of Dr. Brown corresponding with journalist David Epstein, who revealed that,
based on his discussions with USADA, it was aware of the “possibility of athletes being
sabotaged with testosterone gel.”545 In correspondence, Mr. Epstein asked Dr. Brown’s
advice on what USADA could do “to be prepared for testosterone gel sabotage.”546 That
USADA was concerned with the same potential sabotage that was the subject of the
539
Tr. (Day 5) at 1987:2-9.
540
Tr. (Day 5) at 1861:3-17.
541
Tr. (Day 5) at 1863:25-1864:7.
542
543
Tr. (Day 1) at 60:14-18.
544
545
Resp. Ex. 438.
546
Resp. Ex. 439.
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testosterone experiment demonstrates that the testosterone experiment qualifies as an
acceptable justification.
Respondent argues that USADA’s reliance on the testosterone experiment being

approved by an IRB is misplaced. Respondent contends that “nothing in the WADA Code
or CAS case law puts athletes and ASPs on notice that only educational efforts with IRB
approval can constitute acceptable justification.”547
Respondent contends he conducted an informal study on two close family members who
were informed, comfortable, and gave full consent. Dr. Wilkins testified that the use of
Respondent’s sons “relieved” any potential concerns “because they were definitely
informed . . . they totally understood everything that was going on and why it was going
on.”548 In response to cross-examination suggesting that Respondent should have
obtained approval from an IRB before conducting the test, Dr. Wilkins testified that “it
wasn’t a review board matter” and that his “potential ethical issues with it were satisfied
when I knew that those — that the subjects were highly informed, close to [Respondent],
and family.”549
Respondent contends that after Mr. Begley was provided medical records documenting
Ms. Begley’s August 2009 visit to Dr. Brown, Mr. Begley testified that the documents
refreshed his memory that the visit with Dr. Brown occurred in August 2009. Respondent
argues that since the testosterone experiment occurred in June and July 2009, USADA is
incorrect in its assertion that the Begleys transported testosterone for the purposes of the
In addition, Respondent testified that he never received any testosterone from Andrew
Begley. Dr. Brown also testified that he never even kept testosterone in his office and
that if he ever sent anything, it would have been a placebo testosterone. Respondent
argues that mere receipt of a Prohibited Substance does not constitute trafficking, nor is
there any evidence that Respondent requested that Dr. Brown sent him testosterone or
asked the Begleys to deliver testosterone to him from Dr. Brown.
3. Decision and Reasoning – Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking

– Testosterone Experiment
USADA bears the burden of proving the following elements of this charge under Article
2.7: 1. That Respondent is an Athlete Support Personnel subject to the Code; 2. That he
was “[S]elling, giving, transporting, sending, delivering or distributing [2009 Code: or
Possession for any such purpose] a Prohibited Substance … to any third party”; and 3.
That his actions were not that “of ‘bona fide’ medical personnel involving a Prohibited
Substance used for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or other acceptable
justification…”.
547
548
Tr. (Day 5) at 1928:9-15.
549
Tr. (Day 5) at 1952:14-18.
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On the first element of this charge, there is no dispute among the parties and the Panel
concludes that Respondent is an Athlete Support Personnel subject to the Code.
USADA contends that Respondent committed an anti-doping rule violation under Article
2.7 because he “gave” a Prohibited Substance (i.e. his personal testosterone) to a third
party, i.e. his two sons, during the testosterone experiment. There is no dispute among
the parties that Respondent’s two sons are not considered “Athletes” under the provisions
of the Code, nor does this Article require that the trafficking involve an Athlete -- rather
it simply requires a “third party”. Each son thus qualifies as a “third party” under the
provisions of this Article.
The first question for the Panel is whether USADA has met its burden of proof that
Respondent, when he applied testosterone gel on his two sons during the experiment, was
“[S]elling, giving, transporting, sending, delivering or distributing a Prohibited
Substance”.
It is not disputed that Respondent did indeed “give” testosterone to his two sons.
Respondent however argues that USADA is required to demonstrate that Respondent
enjoyed a commercial benefit and engaged in more than mere “Administration”.
Respondent’s argument that USADA’s definition is far too expansive, in that “giving” a
suitcase containing an inhaler to a hotel bellhop would fall within USADA’s
interpretation, ignores the circumstances of the testosterone experiment. Respondent
consciously and knowingly gave his personal testosterone, a Prohibited Substance, to
third parties, his sons, for a specific planned use of Respondent’s making, the testosterone
experiment.
The Panel accepts most of the facts and contentions as presented by Respondent, i.e. that
Respondent did not enjoy a commercial benefit from the experiment (as he is salaried),
that the contemporaneous emails evidence that the incident leading to the experiment was
a potential act of sabotage, and that the purpose of the experiment was to prevent
sabotage, that the experiment only centered around Respondent’s concern about the
potential for sabotage, that the protocol for the experiment was consistent with sabotage
prevention and inconsistent with a doping scheme, that no efforts were made to keep the
testosterone experiment a secret or to hide it in any way, and that Respondent has a long
history of extensive good-faith attempts to comply with the Code. Nevertheless, the Panel
finds that Respondent did “give” his sons testosterone, a Prohibited Substance, as
provided in Article 2.7 of the Code. There are no further requirements set forth in the
Code other than this act of “giving” by an Athlete Support Person to a third party.
Respondent’s arguments relying on the AAA Bruyneel case do not assist him here. The
AAA Bruyneel decision was appealed to CAS and though the AAA panel may have found
that Dr. Celaya had administered various Prohibited Substances to Athletes and was
found not to have been trafficking, the CAS Bruyneel panel found otherwise. In addition,
there is no requirement in the Code that a commercial benefit be obtained by Respondent
in order to be found to have violated the Trafficking provision. That said, the Panel is
troubled by the distinction or lack of distinction between administration and trafficking
in these cases-they must have different meanings to have effect, but it appears that every
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administration is trafficking under the current rules, but not vice versa as Trafficking does
not require an Athlete.
USADA warns that permitting such experiments would “open the gates for other [Athlete
Support Persons] to creatively design experiments without any oversight to skirt anti-
doping prohibitions and risk the health and safety of those involved in the experiment as
was done in this case.”550 It is not necessary under Article 2.7 for the Panel to find that
the testosterone experiment was justified by its purpose of sabotage prevention and the
Panel makes no such determination.
Article 2.7 is very limited with respect to the “acceptable justification” that would exclude
Respondent’s giving of a Prohibited Substance from its provisions: the only actions that
are acceptable are those of ‘bona fide’ medical personnel involving a Prohibited
Substance used for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or other acceptable
justification. The Panel disagrees with both parties that the “other acceptable
justification” can be found to exist where there is no ‘bona fide’ medical personnel. The
construction of this sentence requires that ‘bona fide’ medical personnel have the “other
acceptable justification”, not the person doing the giving, selling, etc. Respondent is not
a ‘bona fide’ medical personnel as required by this exclusion from the Article. Thus, the
fact that he was conducting a study or otherwise had what he considered to be an
“acceptable justification” is irrelevant.
In any event, even reading the rule as the parties have done, the Panel does not find
Respondent’s conduct of an experiment using his two sons to be such an “acceptable
justification.” Respondent is an Athlete Support Person bound by the provisions of the
Code, the experiment was conducted at the lab of his employer, where his purpose is to
act in his capacity as an Athlete Support Person. In that capacity, there is no acceptable
justification to give any third parties a Prohibited Substance so he can conduct a test
related to his job. Respondent’s arguments that the prevention of sabotage must be an
acceptable justification, because it furthers the purpose of the Code “to protect athletes’
fundamental rights to participate in doping-free sport and promote health, fairness, and
equality” along with the provision requiring Athlete Support Persons to “educate and
counsel”551 Athletes regarding anti-doping rules and the primary goal of such programs
is prevention” are of no avail. The principles do not alter the specific provisions of this
Article. The testosterone experiment was not conducted to protect athletes’ fundamental
rights or to educate any Athletes regarding anti-doping rules. It was to determine at what
level of exposure to testosterone post-event would one of his Athletes test positive. The
Panel is mindful that Respondent was unable to obtain a prescription for his sons and he
deliberately decided to use his personal testosterone, apply it to his sons to conduct an
experiment, having conceived the experiment out of concern for his athletes and in a
manner that he mistakenly believed was not in violation of the Code. All of this was in
pursuit of protecting his program, but he was clearly misguided in his implementation.
While it does not appear to the Panel that the Respondent was trying to intentionally
circumvent the applicable Code provisions, he is subject to a high standard under the
550
551
2015 Code, Art. 18.
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Code, especially as a coach and an example to his athletes and the Athletics community.
Unfortunately for him, under the plain meaning of the relevant Code provision, as an
Athlete Support Person, Respondent is strictly prohibited from trafficking in testosterone
by giving it to third parties. The Panel therefore must find that he has violated this Article
in the context of the testosterone experiment.
With respect to the charge of Trafficking as it relates to the Begleys transporting

testosterone, the Panel finds that the testimony was unconvincing and lacking in detail
sufficient to meet USADA’s burden of proof. The testosterone experiment was
conducted in June and July 2009 but the Begleys transported the envelope allegedly
containing testosterone thereafter, i.e. in August 2009.
The sanction for a violation of Article 2.7 is identical in both the 2015 and 2009 Codes,
and set forth in Article 10.3.3 of the 2015 Code: the period of Ineligibility shall be a
minimum of four years up to lifetime Ineligibility, depending on the seriousness of the
violation.
The Panel finds that the minimum period of Ineligibility of four years shall be imposed
on Respondent for violation of Article 2.7.
E. Complicity Regarding Testosterone
The 2009 Code, Article 2.8, dealing with the Administration rule also prohibited
“assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity
involving an anti-doping rule violation or any attempted anti-doping rule violation.”
Currently, this language is part of a separate standalone rule violation called “Complicity”
incorporated in the 2015 Code with the addition of “intentional”, as underlined in the
following Article 2.9 “Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, conspiring, covering up
or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation,
Attempted anti-doping rule violation or violation of Article 10.12.1 by another Person.”
Respondent submitted that under the principles of lex mitior, the 2015 Code applies to
this case and the Panel thus refers to the 2015 Code for this charge.
USADA has charged Respondent with a further Complicity violation based on Dr.
Brown’s having committed a violation of the Code trafficking provision, when he
provided testosterone to Respondent, knowing that Respondent was going to provide the
testosterone to his sons for the testosterone experiment in violation of the Code. USADA
contends that Respondent was complicit under the Code by encouraging, aiding and
abetting Dr. Brown to commit an anti-doping rule violation under the Code.
USADA relies on testimony and emails that support its argument that Respondent and
Dr. Brown had conversations in the months leading up to the testosterone experiment, in
which Respondent asked if Dr. Brown would prescribe Respondent’s sons testosterone
for the experiment. When Dr. Brown declined, Respondent made clear that he would use
his own testosterone, and Dr. Brown told him he could do whatever he wanted with his
supply. USADA contends that shortly after those emails with Dr. Brown, Respondent’s
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testosterone prescription almost doubled. According to USADA, “this teamwork is the
definition of complicity.”
USADA also contends that Respondent and Dr. Brown “must have coordinated to arrange
for the Begleys to transport additional testosterone to Respondent for the experiment
because such an act does not happen in a vacuum.”552 USADA argues that Respondent
continued to work in concert with Dr. Brown to plan, execute and report results from the
experiment. Although Respondent carried out the experiment, Dr. Brown was kept
informed of the progress and results, which he helped interpret and report to Nike’s CEO.
USADA argues that by jointly investing time and energy into the success of the
testosterone experiment, Respondent was complicit in Dr. Brown’s trafficking violation.
Respondent argues that USADA’s attempt to connect the testosterone experiment to a

change in the dose of Respondent’s testosterone is wholly unsupported. For USADA’s
assertion to be true, Dr. Brown and Respondent would have had to have known in March
2009, when Dr. Brown increased Respondent’s dosage, that Mr. Rupp would win a track
meet five weeks in the future at which Mr. Whetstine, who had previously been accused
of sabotage, would be in attendance, such that Respondent and Mr. Rupp could allegedly
create a false story that Mr. Rupp was concerned that he might have been sabotaged by
Mr. Whetstine.
And, this particular theory is directly contrary to other theories that USADA has asserted.
That is, if Dr. Brown increased Respondent’s dosage so that the extra testosterone could
be used during the testosterone experiment, there would have been no reason for Dr.
Brown to allegedly provide the Begleys with testosterone to use in connection with the
testosterone experiment or some other additional testing.
More fundamentally, USADA’s theory that Dr. Brown and Respondent conspired to
misuse Respondent’s prescription for testosterone for various purposes, such as the
testosterone experiment, is not supported by the facts. It was Dr. Brown who removed
Respondent from testosterone from May 2006 through April 2008. If, as USADA
suggests, Dr. Brown and Respondent’s goal was to use testosterone to enhance
performance, there would be no reason for Dr. Brown to have directed Respondent to
stop taking testosterone.
Similarly, if increasing Respondent’s dosage from four to seven pumps in March 2009
was for some nefarious purpose, there would have been no reason for Dr. Brown to reduce
that dosage three weeks later.
3. Decision and Reasoning – Complicity Regarding Testosterone
The 2009 Code, Article 2.8 prohibited “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering
up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation or any
Attempted anti-doping rule violation”. This complicity language is now part of a separate
552
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standalone “Complicity” rule (Article 2.9 (2015 Code)). The new Article clarifies the
2009 Code by specifying that Complicity is “assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting,
covering up or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-doping rule
violation, Attempted anti-doping rule violation … by another Person.”
The Panel must therefore determine in each instance: 1. Did Respondent assist,
encourage, aid, abet, cover up or otherwise engage in some intentional complicity?; 2. If
so, did that complicity involve an anti-doping rule violation (or attempted anti-doping
rule violation) by another Person?
A “Person” is defined as a natural Person or an organization or other entity.
USADA’s argument is that Dr. Brown (who is averred to be subject to the Code)
committed a trafficking anti-doping rule violation by providing testosterone to
Respondent knowing that Respondent was going to provide the testosterone to his sons
for the testosterone experiment and Respondent was assisting and encouraging this
alleged violation. So, the Panel must answer the first question about whether Respondent
in fact encouraged Dr. Brown to provide Respondent testosterone for the experiment.
There is insufficient evidence for the Panel to make such a finding. Respondent asked
Dr. Brown to prescribe testosterone for his sons and Dr. Brown declined. This is in no
way “encouraging” Dr. Brown to provide testosterone to him and it happened after Dr.
Brown had already increased his dosage (and reduced it again). The Panel finds that there
was no evidence that the increase in the testosterone prescription three months before the
testosterone experiment was related to the testosterone experiment.
Having answered the first question in the negative, there is no need for the Panel to
address question 2 and the Panel finds that USADA has not met its burden of proof with
respect to this charge.
As referenced in Paragraph 467, with respect to the Trafficking charge, the Panel finds
that the testimony of the Begleys was unconvincing and lacking in detail sufficient to
meet USADA’s burden of proof for the Complicity charge. In addition, the testosterone
experiment was conducted in June and July 2009 but the Begleys transported the envelope
containing testosterone thereafter, i.e. in August 2009.
XII. TAMPERING AND/OR ATTEMPTED TAMPERING – POST-HEARING

CHARGES
On December 17, 2018, USADA filed its More Definite Statement of Additional
Tampering Claim, to amend the Charging Letter and Notice Letter. The following claim
was added:
Attempted tampering or tampering in violation of Article 2.5 of the

Code, based on the conduct of [Respondent’s] counsel for which
he can be held responsible, which includes obstructing, and/or
bringing improper influence to bear, and/or interfering improperly
and/or otherwise subverting Doping Control, including the
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investigative and/or hearing process by attempting to obstruct,
prevent and/or delay the receipt of documents, testimony or other
evidence to which USADA was legitimately entitled.
(“The Post-Hearing Charges”)
The 2015 Code, Article 2.5 provides: “Conduct which subverts the Doping Control
process but which would not otherwise be included in the definition of Prohibited
Methods. Tampering shall include, without limitation, intentionally interfering or
attempting to interfere with a Doping Control official, providing fraudulent information
to an Anti-Doping Organization or intimidating or attempting to intimidate a potential
witness.” The 2009 Code, Article 2.5 provides simply: “Tampering or Attempted
Tampering with any part of Doping Control.”
A. The Charges and Both Parties’ Submissions
The Post-Hearing Charges are that Respondent:
• Intentionally withheld documents from USADA in order to impede its investigation into
Respondent.
• And his counsel interfered with USADA’s efforts to access witnesses and relevant
evidence, to prevent witnesses from testifying and/or to limit or control witness
testimony in this arbitration.
• Failed to disclose to USADA and the Panel that he was coordinating his defense with
Dr. Brown.
USADA alleges that Respondent violated Article 2.5 of the Code, which forbids
“[c]onduct which subverts the Doping Control process”, including bringing improper
influence to bear, obstructing, misleading or engaging in fraudulent conduct that
influenced or otherwise improperly interfered with USADA’s investigation. USADA
contends that the Doping Control process is broadly defined and includes “[a]ll steps and
processes from test distribution planning through to ultimate disposition of any appeal
including all steps and processes in between such as provision of whereabouts
information, Sample collection and handling, laboratory analysis, TUEs, results
management and hearings.”
USADA relies on WADA v. Fedoriva, CAS 2016/A/4700, which found that a coach
committed Tampering by trying to convince a doping control officer that an individual
was the athlete-designated to be tested when that individual was not in fact the correct
athlete and by urging the doping control officer to test that individual rather than the
athlete whom the doping control officer was trying to locate. The panel found that the
coach was responsible for Tampering based on “the underlying intent to subvert the
doping control process” through misleading conduct. Fedoriva, p. 13, ¶ 59.
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Similar to the Fedoriva case, USADA contends that Respondent intended to subvert the
Doping Control process through his improper conduct or the improper conduct of his
lawyers, Dr. Brown, or Dr. Brown’s lawyers, specifically his withholding of documents
from USADA in order to impede its investigation, he and his counsel interfering with
USADA’s efforts to access witnesses and relevant evidence, to prevent witnesses from
testifying and/or to limit or control witness testimony, his failure to disclose to USADA
and the Panel that he was coordinating his defense with Dr. Brown. USADA argues that
Article 2.5 of the Code can be violated regardless of whether another underlying rule
violation (i.e. Possession, Trafficking, etc.) has occurred or been proven.
USADA also contends that it is not required to prove “why” Respondent sought to prevent
USADA from receiving information during its investigation, or whether Respondent was
correct in his understanding that the occurrences he was seeking to cover up would have
constituted a rule violation. USADA contends that “[t]he Court of Arbitration for Sport .
. . has held that the definition of ‘Attempt’ in the [World Anti-Doping Code] can be
satisfied even if the substance which is the subject of the attempt does not ultimately
transpire to have been a Prohibited Substance.”553
Respondent argues that USADA has the burden of establishing “Tampering or Attempted
Tampering with any part of Doping Control”, which is defined as “conduct which
definition of Prohibited Methods.”554
Respondent contends that Article 2.5 of the Code is not intended to be a broad prohibition
on all improper conduct during the course of anti-doping proceedings. In the comment to
Article 2.5 of the Code, it states that “offensive conduct towards a Doping Control official
or other Person involved in Doping Control” alone –without more- must be addressed, if
at all, “in the disciplinary rules of sport organizations.”
Respondent argues that Tampering also requires that the person charged with an anti-
doping rule violation have specific intent and purpose to subvert the Doping Control
process. Respondent contends that there is nothing in Article 2.5 of the Code that permits
the finding of a Tampering violation based on a “false narrative” or based on “agency,
vicarious liability and conspiracy.” Respondent contends that “false narrative” and
“vicarious liability” are not legally cognizable theories or basis for Tampering or
Attempted Tampering, thereby making USADA’s charge fail as a matter of law.
Respondent contends that his submissions, arguments, and factual and legal positions
taken in this case are not anti-doping rule violations. In IAAF v. Jeptoo, CAS
2015/0/4128, the CAS panel recognized that right to defend oneself includes the right “to
make any submission that he or she deems appropriate to defend him or himself” and “to
concentrate on or advance in particular arguments that are beneficial to his cause.”
553
IRB v Luke Troy, CAS 2008/A/1664) at §§84-87.
554
2015 Code, Art. 2.5.
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Respondent contends that USADA must prove beyond offensive or improper conduct to
establish a Tampering charge:
the CAS jurisprudence displayed reticence when treating an

athlete’s procedural behavior as an aggravating behavior, since
the sword of Damocles of an increased sanction in a case where a
panel is not prepared to accept the athlete’s submission would
render his or her defense and, thus, access to justice
disproportionately difficult. This is all the more true since
comparable sanction is not foreseen for the sports organization
charging the athlete with an ADRV.555
3. Documents
USADA charges that Respondent intentionally withheld documents from USADA in

order to impede its investigation into Respondent. USADA argues that some examples of
Respondent improperly withholding documents are: (1) Respondent delivering
approximately 5,000 pages of documents three days prior to his Pre-Arbitration
Interview, despite USADA requesting these documents for several months; and (2)
Respondent providing false testimony at his Pre-Arbitration Interview, which was done
in an “attempt to mislead USADA and to dissuade USADA from continuing its
investigation or from initiating a case against Respondent.”
Respondent argues that his production of documents and participation in the Pre-
Arbitration Interview with USADA in 2016 are clear exercises of his right to defend
himself. Respondent contends that “[a]s a matter of law and logic, an exercise of the right
to defend oneself cannot constitute a Tampering or Attempted Tampering.”556
Respondent contends that his testimony during his Pre-Arbitration Interview was accurate
and consistent with the contemporaneous emails and records. Further, Respondent argues
that USADA is “simply attempting to impeach Respondent in its Post-Hearing Brief
when it failed to confront him about these alleged inaccuracies during its cross-
examination of Respondent at the hearing.”
4. Witnesses and Relevant Evidence
USADA charges that Respondent (and his counsel) interfered with USADA’s efforts to
access witnesses and relevant evidence, to prevent witnesses from testifying and/or to
limit or control witness testimony in this arbitration.
USADA charges that Respondent produced heavily redacted documents without an

acceptable basis to do so and failed to produce all documents requested by USADA and
ordered by the Panel during the arbitration without a justifiable reason. As a consequence
of Respondent’s “failures,” USADA argues that it was required to spend a considerable
555
IAAF v. Jeptoo, CAS 2015/0/4128.
556
See IAAF v. Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128.
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amount of time attempting to retrieve these documents, including filing two additional
motions to compel.
USADA contends that John Collins, Esq., one of Respondent’s lawyers, previously
represented Ms. Begay and Mr. Ritzenhein and his present clients include Mr. Rupp, Ms.
Grunnagle and Matthew Centrowitz, former athlete at the NOP. Through his
representation of these athletes, USADA claims that Mr. Collins prevented USADA from
timely obtaining complete records of the services provided to his clients by Dr. Brown,
failed to afford USADA an opportunity to verify the documents provided for Ms.
Grunnagle and Mr. Rupp were the complete records, and refused to timely clarify whether
his clients, Respondent, Mr. Rupp and Ms. Grunnagle, would voluntarily testify at this
hearing.
USADA also argues that Ms. Allen-Horn testified that she felt pressured not to testify at
the hearing after she received phone calls from Respondent’s lawyers who told her she
did not have to testify.557
Respondent argues that there is nothing in the Code that supports the premise that mere
joint representation constitutes Tampering or Attempted Tampering. Respondent further
argues that USADA did not present any evidence that Respondent controlled Mr. Collins,
or that Mr. Collins did not represent these individuals separately and apart from his
representation of Respondent.
Respondent argues that he did not pressure Ms. Allen-Horn from testifying. At the
hearing, in response to a question about whether Respondent’s counsel told her not to
testify, Ms. Allen-Horn answered: “She didn’t tell me not to testify. She said that I didn’t
have to and that I might not know the full story, there was more to it, and USADA may
not be completely upfront with their approach to this. So she didn’t directly tell me not to
testify, no.”558
5. Coordination of Defense
USADA argues that it repeatedly inquired as to whether Respondent and Dr. Brown were
coordinating their defense, but was informed by Respondent that they were not. In his
opening statement on May 21, 2018, Mr. Maurice Suh, Esq., counsel for Respondent and
Nike, Inc., stated:
Before I close, I think I just - wrap this up, I do want to point out
there are some things that were said that I cannot feel go
unaddressed. So, the first is that somehow we misrepresented --
we, as counsel, misrepresented the existence or tried to hide the
existence of a JDA with Dr. Brown. The emails that we received
and the requests that we had from counsel for USADA were
557
Tr. (Day 3) at 877:6-878:10.
558
Tr. (Day 3) at 894:21-895:2.
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whether or not we were coordinating our defense with their case.
We're not. We're not coordinating our defense.559
USADA argues that it later learned that Respondent and Dr. Brown were coordinating
their defense when on or around September 27, 2018, in the Dr. Brown Arbitration,
USADA received the Joint Defense Agreement executed between Respondent, Dr.
Brown and Nike, Inc. on July 30, 2018. USADA asserts this coordination included Nike,
Inc. paying for lawyers of numerous witnesses, Nike, Inc. paying or agreeing to pay for
certain defenses related to Dr. Brown’s Texas Medical Board proceedings, and lawyers
for Nike, Inc. and Respondent making strategic decisions regarding factual and legal
claims in the Dr. Brown Arbitration to assist himself in this matter.
USADA argues that the coordination between Nike, Inc., Dr. Brown, and Respondent’s
legal teams were “largely hidden from the arbitrators despite the fact that the arbitrators
were entitled to know and understand the degree to which a non-party was seeking to
control and coordinate the defenses, strategies and testimony in the arbitrations and the
degree to which the non-party was able to exercise leverage over witnesses through,
among other things, paying for their legal representation and other expenses.”560
Specifically, USADA points to two provisions in the Joint Defense Agreement:
Confidentiality of this Agreement: It is agreed that the existence of

this Agreement, its terms and conditions and the Parties to this
Agreement shall be considered confidential matters by the Parties,
and no disclosures regarding same shall be made to third parties
without prior consent from all Parties to this Agreement or an
order of an arbitrator or court of competent jurisdiction, except to
enforce the rights under this Agreement. Any such proceedings
would take place under seal, as discussed in Paragraph 25 of this
Agreement.
Notice of Disclosure Demand: If a third party attempts to compel

the disclosure of information obtained pursuant to this Agreement,
the Party who is the target of the subpoena or other form of
compulsory process shall notify counsel for each of the Parties (as
identified below) whose information is affected within five (5)
business days of receiving the subpoena so as to afford such
Parties the opportunity to seek protection from the compelled
disclosure of the information. The Parties agree to take all
reasonable steps to assert and permit the assertion of all
applicable rights and privileges with regard to common interest
materials and shall fully cooperate with all other Parties in any
judicial proceeding relating to disclosure or potential disclosure
of common interest materials.561
559
Tr. (Day 1) at 107:5-16.
560
561
USADA Ex. 816.
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On November 7, 2018, following Respondent’s motions to exclude certain emails based
on the common interest/joint defense privilege, which Respondent asserted in part based
on the Joint Defense Agreement, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 13. The Panel
denied Respondent’s motions, as the Panel found there was no common interest/joint
defense privilege among Nike, Inc. and Respondent. Therefore, those documents that
Respondent was withholding based on the common interest/joint defense privilege were
admitted as evidence in this matter.
Respondent argues that USADA’s “third-party liability theory fails as a matter of law”,
as USADA has not submitted any evidence that Respondent was “intentionally complicit
in anything that Dr. Brown or his attorneys decided to do or not do in connection with
Dr. Brown’s defense against USADA’s proceedings.”562 Respondent argues that
USADA’s attempt to attribute the conduct of Dr. Brown and his attorneys to Respondent
rests on vague assertions of the “principles of agency, vicarious liability and conspiracy”,
which are not recognized by the Code. Respondent argues that he and his lawyers should
not be held responsible for any action(s) done by Dr. Brown or his attorneys, or Nike,
Inc.’s and its attorneys, because Respondent does not have any control over their actions.
B. Decision and Reasoning – Tampering and/or Attempted Tampering - Post-

Hearing Charges
Article 2.5 provides that the following is an anti-doping rule violation: “Conduct which
definition of Prohibited Methods. Tampering shall include, without limitation,
intentionally interfering or attempting to interfere with a Doping Control official,
providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping Organization or intimidating or
attempted to intimidate a potential witness.”
The attendant definitions are as follows:

alter results or prevent normal procedures from occurring; [2009
Code: or providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping
Organization].

laboratory analysis, TUEs, results management and hearings.
USADA bears the burden of proving that: 1. Respondent engaged in conduct which
“subverted” the Doping Control process, to include “results management and hearings”.
For purposes of this case, where the allegations made by USADA relate to the
562
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investigation and hearing process, USADA could meet this burden by proving that
Respondent provided fraudulent information to it, or intimidated or attempted to
intimidate a potential witness; 2. That the conduct is not otherwise included in the
definition of Prohibited Methods.
USADA’s contention with respect to the conduct of Respondent’s lawyers, Dr. Brown
(who in this case is a witness) and Dr. Brown’s lawyers (who are not parties to this case
or otherwise involved) is overly broad and all-encompassing. The Doping Control
process must logically be limited to the particular case before the Panel, not matters
before another panel or otherwise being litigated by USADA. The Panel thus considers
the charges to relate only to Respondent and his lawyers.
The Panel finds that Respondent did not provide fraudulent information to USADA as
required by Article 2.5.
In addition, the Panel finds the burden is on USADA to show conduct that consisted of
“subverting” the Doping Control process, rather than conducting an aggressive defense
of the charges against Respondent.
With respect to the pre-hearing conduct asserted by USADA, which is implied to be that
Respondent deliberately, through his attorney, discouraged potential witnesses, current
or former athletes of the NOP from testifying or providing documents, the Panel finds
this conduct does not qualify as “intimidating” as one of the examples in Article 2.5, but
rather consists of Respondent conducting his defense.
As stated previously, the Panel is loath to discourage persons in the position of

Respondent from advancing the most aggressive positions to defend their cases. It would
be a form of preventing due process if Respondent or others similarly situated were not
able to take the most aggressive positions possible to defend their cases. Simply
discouraging witnesses from testifying is not subverting the Doping Control process.
These witnesses did in fact testify, as they were able to make their own decisions and
were not “intimidated”. USADA did ultimately obtain most of the medical records it
sought, which Respondent and athletes of the NOP may not have voluntarily provided.
There cannot be a standard set such that Respondent is not able to put on his case.
The Panel relies on IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128 to analyze USADA’s post-hearing
Tampering charge based on the conduct of counsel for Respondent in these proceedings
and a common interest and joint defense agreement asserted between various charged
parties related to the NOP. In Jeptoo, the accused athlete engaged in an immediate effort
to mislead the process and the tribunals involved, including by:
• hiding her relationship with the EPO-doctor from her manager and coach
• submitting written statements 2 days after giving oral explanations that

conflicted with those oral statements
• attempting to disrupt the B sample analysis in the laboratory
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• testifying that she did not know how the banned substance got into her
blood in the first instance tribunal
• forging a medical record to establish that the EPO had been given to her
in the context of a treatment for a life-threatening ailment, which
document formed the core of the CAS appeal
• submitting to the CAS proceeding a sworn, and demonstrably false,

witness statement by the athlete
• engaging in disruptive behavior by the athlete and her defense team in the
days prior to the hearing, including the late withdrawal of the athlete’s
counsel, and engaging in disruptive behavior during the telephone hearing
before the CAS, with the “sole purpose of preventing the administration
of justice in this case from occurring”563
The Jeptoo panel, acknowledging other CAS precedent, determined that “the threshold
of legitimate defence is trespassed and, thus, a ‘further element of deception’ is present
where the administration of justice is put fundamentally in danger by the behaviour of the
athlete.”564
The prior CAS precedent, CAS 2013/A/3080, at para. 70 et seq., set forth a clear standard
in this area:
As to the question whether Ms Bekele has been shown to have

engaged in deceptive or obstructing conduct to avoid the detection
or adjudication of an anti-doping rule violation, the view of the
Panel is that for this factor to be brought into play an athlete must
have done more than put the prosecuting authority to proof of its
case. . . . The Sole Arbitrator notes that most, if not all, doping
practices are timed to avoid detection. As a result an aggravating
circumstance is likely to require a further element of deception.
So, the Panel is required to find that the Respondent did more than require USADA to
prove its case.
The Panel also notes that USADA put on a vigorous prosecution, charging Respondent
with five violations relating to multiple sets of facts, and, after putting itself and the
Respondent to great expense and effort over many years, prevailing only on three
violations, each with respect to one set of facts. The Panel notes that there is no similar
principle that would cut the other way to the benefit of an accused facing a boisterous
prosecution that does not meet some boundary of reasonableness. This must also form a
part of the Panel’s consideration of the effort to characterize putting on a legitimate
defense as tampering.
563
Jeptoo, paras. 155-56.
564
Jeptoo, paras. 148 and 151.
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It is true that Respondent, through his counsel, put on a vigorous defense, perhaps greater
than USADA has ever seen in any of its prior cases. But based on USADA’s arguments,
and the evidence observed here, the Panel does not find that the Respondent did anything
more than endeavor to put on his defense to the fullest extent permitted by law and
common practice.
There was no evidence of a fraudulent submission or disruptive activity directed to the

Panel or the proceedings, beyond what was otherwise permitted by accepted law and
common legal practice in the United States.
Simply put, USADA did not meet its burden to establish that the legitimate, even if
uncooperative and aggressive, effort by the Respondent to put USADA to its proof, and
to defend himself, constituted anything more than simply that. The Panel finding
otherwise on these facts would chill, unfairly and inappropriately, an accused’s efforts to
put on the best lawful defense possible, an outcome that would be unfortunate for all
participants.
Accordingly, the Panel declines to find a violation here for Tampering based on
Respondent’s conduct in the investigation and arbitration.
XIII. SANCTION
The Panel must determine the sanction to be imposed based on its finding of multiple
violations by Respondent. In accordance with Article 10.7, “Multiple Violations”, an
anti-doping rule violation will only be considered a second violation if the Anti-doping
Organization can establish that the Athlete Support Person committed the second anti-
doping rule violation after the Athlete Support Person received notice pursuant to Article
7. USADA provided Respondent with one notice which included the several charges
addressed in this case and the Post-Hearing Charges related to Tampering and/or
Attempted Tampering, which USADA did not contend was to be considered a second
violation. Article 10.7 further provides “If the Anti-Doping Organization cannot establish
this, the violations shall be considered together as one single first violation, and the
sanction imposed shall be based on the violation that carries the more severe sanction.”
The charges brought by USADA based on the Charging Letter, as adjudicated in this case,
are all to be considered together as one single first violation. The most severe sanction
for the violations considered as part of this first violation is a period of Ineligibility of
four years to life.
According to Article 10.12, during his period of Ineligibility, Respondent may not
“participate in any capacity in a Competition or activity (other than authorized anti-
doping education or rehabilitation programs) authorized or organized by any Signatory,
Signatory’s member organization, or a club or other member organization of a
Signatory’s member organization, or in Competitions authorized or organized by any
professional league or any international–or national–level Event organization or any elite
or national-level sporting activity funded by a governmental organization.”
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Article 10.11 specifies that the Ineligibility period “shall start on the date of the final
hearing decision providing for Ineligibility.” The date of this decision shall be the start
date of Respondent’s four year period of Ineligibility.
Article 14.3.2 provides that “No later than twenty days after it has been determined in a
final appellate decision … or such appeal has been waived …, the Anti-Doping
Organization responsible for results management must Publicly Report the disposition of
the anti-doping matter…” Thus, subject to Respondent’s right to appeal this award, this
decision shall be publicly reported on a timely basis.
Here, the Panel found the following violations of the Code:
(a) Administration of a Prohibited Method (with respect to an infusion in excess

of the applicable limit),
(b) Tampering and/or attempted tampering with NOP athletes’ doping control
process, and
(c) Trafficking and/or Attempted Trafficking of testosterone.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the period of Ineligibility shall be four years from the
date of this decision.
The Panel notes that the Respondent does not appear to have been motivated by any bad
intention to commit the violations the Panel found. In fact, the Panel was struck by the
amount of care generally taken by Respondent to ensure that whatever new technique or
method or substance he was going to try was lawful under the World Anti-Doping Code,
with USADA’s witness characterizing him as the coach they heard from the most with
respect to trying to ensure that he was complying with his obligations. The Panel has
taken pains to note that Respondent made unintentional mistakes that violated the rules,
apparently motivated by his desire to provide the very best results and training for athletes
under his care. Unfortunately, that desire clouded his judgment in some instances, when
his usual focus on the rules appears to have lapsed. The Panel is required to apply the
relevant law, the World Anti-Doping Code and its positive law enactments in the rules of
international sports federations, in discharging its duty, and here that required the Panel
to find the violations it did.
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XIV. DECISION AND AWARD
On the basis of the foregoing facts and legal aspects, this Panel renders the following decision:
1. Respondent has committed the following anti-doping rule violations: Administration,
Tampering and Trafficking.
2. The following sanction shall be imposed on Respondent: a period of Ineligibility (as

defined in the World Anti-Doping Code) of four years from the date of this Award, with
all attendant consequences.
3. The parties shall bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this
arbitration.
4. The administrative fees and expenses of the American Arbitration Association, and the
compensation and expenses of the Panel, shall be borne entirely by USADA and the
United States Olympic Committee.
5. This award is in full settlement of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this
Arbitration. All claims not expressly granted herein are hereby denied.
6. This award may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be
deemed an original, and all of which shall constitute together one and the same
instrument.
_______________________
Jeffrey G. Benz, Arbitrator
__________________
Maidie E. Oliveau, Chair
September 30, 2019
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (“AAA”)

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

AAA Case No. 01-17-0004-0880

UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING

and FINAL AWARD

VII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................... 24

a. Magness and NOP Athletes Infusion ......................................... 72

a. In Connection with an Athlete, Competition or training ........... 98

4. Witnesses and Relevant Evidence ....................................................... 126

(1) Possession of prohibited substances and/or methods including

(2) Trafficking and/or attempted trafficking of testosterone and prohibited

(3) Administration and/or attempted administration of testosterone and

(4) Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up, and other

(5) Tampering and/or attempted tampering.

II. THE PARTIES

Claimant and Respondent shall be referred to collectively as “the parties” and

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

(1) Possession of prohibited substances and/or methods

(2) Trafficking of testosterone and prohibited IV infusions.

(3) Administration and/or attempted administration of

(4) Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up, and

(5) Tampering and/or attempted tampering. IAAF ADR

(6) Aggravating circumstances justifying a period of

(7) Attempted tampering or tampering in violation of Article

C. Procedural Motions and Hearing

1. Preliminary Hearing and Scheduling Order No. 1

a. Respondent’s Motion for More Definite Statement of Claims

b. USADA’s Motion to Amend Claim

c. USADA’s Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas and/or to Move

2. Scheduling Order No. 2

Both parties shall have until February 5, 2018 to tender discovery

The provisions of Order No. 1 with respect to discovery disputes

Discovery responses and any objections or motion for protective

Any response to a motion to compel discovery is due within seven

Any reply in support of a motion to compel is due within three (3)

The Arbitrators shall thereafter rule on the motion unless the

To the extent any extraordinary discovery requests arise after the

Any other motions may not be filed without permission of the

3. Procedural Order No. 3

4. Procedural Order No. 4

5. Procedural Order No. 5

After conducting an in camera review of the un-redacted documents produced by

6. Procedural Order No. 6

• The Panel informing the parties that no testimony would be admitted or

• The Panel denying Respondent’s Application of Leave to File a Motion to

7. Procedural Order No. 7

8. Procedural Order No. 8

9. Procedural Order No. 9

10. Procedural Order No. 10

11. Procedural Order No. 11

12. Procedural Order No. 12

13. Procedural Order No. 13

14. Procedural Order No. 14

15. Pre/Post-Hearing Briefs and In-Person Hearings

Charges 2009 Sanction 2015 Sanction

Conduct which subverts the Doping Control process but which

Tampering: Altering for an improper purpose or in an improper

Doping Control: All steps and processes from test distribution

Attempt: Purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a