PASEI vs. Drilon

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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.

DRILON as
Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," challenges the constitutionality of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS." Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel.
In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes
the police power of the Philippine State. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the
nature of a police power measure. The concept of police power has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual
rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of
the greater number.

ISSUE:
WON Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment is
unconstitutional?

RULING:
No, the SC ruled that Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of “guidelines
governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household
workers” is constitutional.

Equal Protection
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown
no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to
existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants,
amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains
the Government's efforts.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind
the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that
in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to
apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. Should the authorities arrive at a means
impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure,
it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
The Court finds the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic
overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for
unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage
to another person or group of persons.

Right to travel
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the
right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety,"
"as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor
Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute.

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