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A Critique of Critical Geopolitics

a
Phil Kelly
a
Department of Political Science , Emporia State University ,
Kansas, USA
Published online: 21 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Phil Kelly (2006) A Critique of Critical Geopolitics, Geopolitics, 11:1, 24-53, DOI:
10.1080/14650040500524053

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 Geopolitics, 11:24–53, 2006
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1465-0045 print
DOI: 10.1080/14650040500524053

A Critique of Critical Geopolitics

Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 01, January 2006: pp. 0–0
0000-0000
1465-0045
FGEO
Geopolitics

PHIL KELLY
A Critique
Phil Kelly of Critical Geopolitics

Department of Political Science, Emporia State University, Kansas, USA

Comparisons between classical and critical geopolitics are made

with the suggestion that both versions, although different in most
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respects, are equally legitimate for study and perhaps may be

brought closer together, at least in ways that may complement
each other, after inspection of their comparative approaches. The
classical version deserves consideration as a contribution to inter-
national relations theory and to foreign policy making. The criti-
cal approach provides a needed and necessary critique of the
classical, exposing its weaknesses and suggesting an emancipatory
alternative. Accordingly, the author has selected a variety of asso-
ciated characteristics that show the primary variations between
the classical and the critical, illustrated by appropriate quotations
and examples, with again the conclusion that both versions of geo-
politics, the classical and the critical, merit credibility, and that
a possibility exists where certain connections may be located
between the two that could mutually clarify and strengthen their
unique contributions to geopolitics as a whole.

Two distinct versions of geopolitics now contend in their academic formats,

the classical and the critical. As a debate in part between the ‘modern’ and
the ‘post-modern’ and in part between political science and political geogra-
phy, the two stances seem irreconcilable – acceptance of one appears to
erase the other, although this author holds that productive linkages between
the two may be located. Both possess value and should be maintained if the
wider field of geopolitics is to be kept vibrant and contributive, and perhaps
the two may be brought into sharper focus with an analysis of the compari-
sons that will appear below. For instance, the critical version offers a fresh
and necessary problematisation to the traditional perhaps giving the latter

Address correspondence to Phil Kelly, Department of Political Science, Emporia State

University, Emporia, Kansas 66801, USA. E-mail: kellyphi@emporia.edu

24
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 25

an important re-vitalisation. Likewise, the classical’s apparent disinterest in

prescribing a better world may reveal the relevance and responsibility of the
critical to do this prescribing. Consequently, the intent of this article is to
outline their unique descriptions, the classical and the critical, and to sug-
gest that both are necessary for a fuller study of geopolitics within political
geography as well as within international affairs.
Despite the continuing usage of geopolitics in foreign policy analysis
and in the popular media, critics of the traditional practice have connected
geopolitics to the taints of various partisans and ideologies, from German
fascism to Cold War ‘power politics’ to great power hegemony, charges that
hold some credibility. When one considers the extensive intellectual attacks
upon geopolitics, the following questions arise. First, is classical geopolitics
indeed capable of being utilised within international relations theory – one
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that can be useful in guiding those interested in foreign affairs and one also
susceptible to academic generalisation? And second, can the newer and rad-
ical version of ‘critical geopolitics’ within political geography likewise be of
utility toward clarifying and strengthening the contribution of geopolitics as
a whole? For these aims, I intend a critique of critical geopolitics, the most
recent opposition to classical geopolitics, by which I will compare the two
as a possible step toward raising the usefulness and legitimacy of geopoli-
tics within international relations and political geography.
Critical geopolitics is a good place to start a general discussion of con-
temporary classical geopolitics, for its advocates make a sophisticated and
systematic critique of the traditional concept. The contrast between the two
versions in fact is so clear, I think, that one approach would be nearly
unrecognisable to the other. I will emphasise in this article, nonetheless,
that the classical variation remains useful to statecraft and to theory but that
its contribution could be strengthened with an awareness of the criticisms
raised against it and with the suggestions for global improvement given by
the advocates of critical theory.
As a whole, geopolitics, similar to other academic models, has lacked a
unified approach for several reasons: the inherently inexact but dynamic
nature of all theory in general and of political geography and international
relations theories specifically; the conflicting visions of the purpose of the-
ory itself, whether descriptive/explanatory or interpretive/expository and
whether problem-solving or critical; the normal inability of scholars to agree
on common assumptions that underlie conceptual frameworks and the lack
of interest or ability of policy makers toward defining their actions precisely;
and the constantly shifting nature of foreign affairs itself that requires fre-
quent adjustment between theory and practice. The rather unsavory history
of geopolitics during the past century adds a further blurring and persistent
controversy to the term, as geopolitics has seemed prone to ‘capture’ by
groups intent on framing it within their foreign affairs approaches, as is
noted above. In addition, classical geopolitics could claim to be the first
 26 Phil Kelly

international relations model utilised by academics and states persons and

hence its early lack of specificity and its simplicity made geopolitics the
most available to capture.
True to form, contemporary geopolitics has evolved in recent decades
into several assortments of assumptions and definitions: the classical or tra-
ditional, the power politics or Cold War, and the critical versions. And
within each of these approaches, of course, lack of agreement among their
advocates pertains also. Below are general characterisations of each of the
broader categories.
A multitude of descriptions and definitions of classical geopolitics exist,
although many focus on the impact upon foreign and strategic policies of
certain geographical features – location, position, resources, topography,
and the like.1 In my approach to the classical term, I prefer sticking to the
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foreign policy and geostrategic designations within political science, geo-

politics being sets of theories and concepts that might be ‘an aid to state-
craft’ and with such statecraft being strongly influenced by physical
geography. To me, the geographical position of a state matters to its policy –
for example, whether it inhabits a central or a peripheral place within a
region and irrespective of mediation by political leaders or of other non-
spatial factors. Such placement would exert policy impact even if statesmen
were not actually aware of this positioning. This ‘geographical-impact-on-
policy’ assumption would label me a classicist. But, an earlier source of the
classical posited an organic feature, too – the state functioning as a ‘living
organism,’ still seen in many South American geopolitical writings. Both pat-
terns pertain to the ‘modernist’ aspect in their ontology and epistemology.
Ultimately, the interest rests with the designing and testing of simple cause-
and-effect probabilities, ignoring a close examination of the context under-
lying the motivations of policy making, as would instead be a post-modernist
emphasis of the critical.
The classical’s modernist ontological perspective finds reality ‘out there’
and distinct from the observer, thus making an objective approach possible,
and its epistemological stance favors the empirical, logical, and intuitive for-
mulation of facts into theory based upon probability. The ‘rational-actor’ or
‘expected utility’ assumption, that leaders naturally will pursue their states’
interests and that in our case such interests will correspond to geographical
realities, is pertinent and essential to the classical. Yet, in making this judg-
ment, those of the traditional bent perhaps open themselves to criticism for
omitting closer scrutiny of the decision-making aspects of foreign relations.
In contrast, advocates of critical geopolitics meet the assumption of ‘ratio-
nality’ head on, not deflecting it as do the traditionalists. Instead, they attack
the assumption more fully by contending that ‘pursuit of a state’s interests’
is subjective and fits the individual ambitions of decision-makers more than
the altruistic needs of the nation. This path too is not free of difficulties, as
will be examined below.
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 27

The classicists’ world is taken as it exists without an immediate concern

toward reforming it, and foreign affairs experts are relied upon to locate
spatial generalisations and apply these to policy. Within the structuralist and
positivist methods, its many common topics include land power and sea
power dichotomies, various core-periphery scenarios, and frontiers and the
rise and decline of states. The most prominent concept and theory of the
classical mode is Halford Mackinder’s controversial yet influential ‘heartland’
pivot of Eurasia,2 one that continues to impact upon Russian and United
States strategic policies.3 Nicholas Spykman’s ‘rimland’ configuration,4 which
enlarges the scope of Mackinder’s heartland thesis,5 is likewise exemplary
of the traditional.
Whereas classical geopolitics stipulates empirical and objective meth-
odologies, other approaches have affixed classical theories to more ideolog-
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ical formats, the most notorious being Karl Haushofer and his German
colleagues who allegedly influenced Nazi aggressiveness before and during
World War Two. This movement erased the legitimacy of geopolitics parti-
cularly in the United States until partial resurrection during the 1970s by
Henry Kissinger’s use of the term. Cold War geopolitics offers another
example of the original concept becoming ideological, one connected to a
hegemony created by the larger countries and the ‘National Security State.’
For instance, James Richardson6 saw geopolitics as “the centuries-old ‘game’
of deadly rivalries among the great powers, but with the Soviet-United
States struggle now ended, so also may end geopolitics.” Similarly, Donald
Snow7 alleged the geopolitics term “had, over time, been expanded to be
nearly synonymous with national security, which was clearly germane to
the Cold War period but not so obviously relevant to the postwar period.”
Snow found geopolitics enlisted against terrorism and also becoming inter-
twined with ‘globalization,’ where international economic matters “may
become the [new] servant of geopolitics.”
A third variety, critical geopolitics, originated from post-modernist and
specifically critical-theory scholars who have criticised the classical and the
German and Cold War versions. Their attempts to re-formulate a ‘new’ geo-
politics toward a revisionist perspective, accordingly, is the topic of this arti-
cle and represents my critique of the contributions of critical geopolitics to
the general field of geopolitics. For source materials on critical geopolitics, I
rely on the many publications of Gearóid Ó Tuathail, a political geographer
at Virginia Tech University, whom I consider to be one of the leading schol-
ars on critical geopolitics, and on other authorities including John Agnew,
Simon Dalby, Klaus Dodds, Leslie Hepple, Timothy Luke, and Paul Rout-
ledge, in particular, all academics in cultural or political geography.
Although my geopolitical preference is the classical, I have gained
immensely from my review of critical geopolitics and have found its arguments
persuasive and productive. Indeed, I have come to realise that study of
both the critical and the classical, although often at wide variance, is truly
 28 Phil Kelly

necessary for a more complete understanding of the broader field of geo-

politics. My intent below is to describe the critical’s primary features as
exactly as I can and to compare these to corresponding classical features,
although I admit that my perspective is that of political science and of the
‘modern’ that contrasts to the political geographical and to the ‘post-modern’
of the critical approach. Comparing the two versions frequently resembles
an ‘apples and oranges’ dichotomy in which my more general comparisons
may miss at times the essence and nuances of the critical and thus cause an
unfairness in my evaluation. I can only promise an earnest attempt toward
exactness, tempered and corrected by the very insightful criticisms of the
paper’s referees and by the generous support of Simon Dalby and Gearóid
Ó Tuathail.
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BACKGROUND OF CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

The origins of critical geopolitics arose from the critical theories of philoso-
phers of the Frankfort school, most prominently Max Horkheimer, Theodor
Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas, and later from Michel Foucault, Jacques
Derrida, and Antonio Gramsci, the latter individuals not being part of the
Frankfort school, but all of whom wrote primarily during the second half of
the twentieth century (except Gransci who died in 1937) within the Hege-
lian-Marxist and the earlier Kantian traditions of critical philosophy.8
Broadly, these thinkers have sought, in Richard Jones’s words, to produce a
“process of emancipatory social transformation” with an emphasis on the
“emancipatory potential inherent in communications.”
During the 1980s, an international relations-based critical theory arose
in Great Britain and the United States in reaction to Kenneth Waltz’s neo-
realist Theory of International Politics (1979) for its positivist or scientific-
objectivist methods. But the field of critical international relations since has
broadened to include critiques of international political economy, normative
theory, security studies, and political community. Although much like other
international relations (IR) approaches in political science in being at times
divided, unfocused, and contradictory within its own domain, probably the
dominant theme within IR critical theory has stayed within the problematic
and emancipatory visions. In post-modernist fashion, these theorists reject
the possibility of locating an objective external world and a value-free social
science, and they tend to be constructivists, alleging the importance of dis-
course and context to showing partisan motivations in the ‘scripts’ of deci-
sion-making elites, in addition to being revisionists, desiring replacement of
cultural, economic, and political authority of the capitalist hegemonic powers
with more balanced benefits to marginal populations.
Because it springs largely from the academic studies of political and
cultural geographers, critical geopolitics has not placed itself within the IR
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 29

post-structuralist perspective, and instead the radical French philosopher,

Michel Foucault, is recognised as the philosophical inspiration behind criti-
cal geopolitics. Some in fact place Foucault’s interview with the French
geographer, Yves Lacoste, in the journal Hérodote in 1976 as an origin of
critical geopolitics, in addition to Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) that uti-
lised Foucault’s ideas.9 The ambition of critical geopolitics still remains an
exposure of the excesses contained within classical and Cold War geopoli-
tics and the remolding of the earlier geopolitics into a movement of re-
construction and of global transformation, retaining the ‘geopolitics’ label as
a symbol of revolution and as such emaciating its classical format in hopes
of restructuring international society.
Similar to the organic and geostrategic tracks of classical geopolitics,
critical geopolitics emits diverse internal strains also, and these differ-
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ences tend to complicate an easy comparison between the critical and

classical modes of geopolitics. Perhaps the two most visible critical ver-
sions, both of which overlap, are first the de-constructivist stance of
examining texts, scripts, and discourse contained within foreign policy
and traditional geopolitical statements and theories. Such would be char-
acteristic of much of Ó Tuathail, particularly in his Critical Geopolitics
(1996), and also in The Geopolitics Reader,10 the former evaluated in the
Review Symposium of Susan Roberts,11 although Ó Tuathail departs from
this emphasis elsewhere.12 A good example of a second variant, that
more attuned to Marxist political economy and to critiquing and revising
traditional theory within a more structural yet critical mode, is seen in
Agnew and Corbridge’s Mastering Space,13 where these authors discuss
the ‘changing geographical basis to the international political economy in
different historical periods’ and the ‘impact of increasing economic glo-
balization and political fragmentation in future international relations.’
We see this second variant but also the first in the works of Dalby,
Dodds, and others.
In the comparisons I will make below, I will place more emphasis
upon the discourse, contextual, and representational aspects of the first crit-
ical stream because I believe it to be the more common of the two varia-
tions within the extant writings and the most consistently post-modernist in
orientation. But this emphasis upon the first track should not omit the sec-
ond, for it could indeed provide a somewhat easier accommodation with
classical geopolitics, as will be explored below.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN CRITICAL AND

CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS

Omitting both the German geopolitics of Frederick Ratzell and Karl Haushofer
and the Cold War geopolitics of Robert Strausz-Hupé, James Burnham, and
 30 Phil Kelly

George Kennan, both perspectives of which more widely contrast with the
topic of this article, I will examine nine features as essential to understand-
ing critical geopolitics, comparing these to the classical. Although perhaps
repetitious at times, I have enlisted a series of quotations by advocates of
both geopolitical versions instead of translating these into my words, as a
technique to impose as much accuracy as I possibly can.
I felt it necessary to begin the nine comparisons with ‘levels of analysis’
because this first characteristic set the differences between the two geopolit-
ical versions at their clearest (to me) variance – the classical in its largely
structural or global/regional mode, the critical in its normally decision-
making and emancipatory modes, taking into consideration the variances
within the critical approach briefly touched upon above. The next four com-
parative categories, the post-modern/modern, problematising, and the onto-
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logical and epistemological perspectives, tend I think to connect closely

together, with perhaps the greatest emphasis upon describing the critical and
clarifying the classical – the latter rarely entering into a consideration of these
four domains (which I have come to realise it should). The remaining four
characteristics – great-power hegemony, the focus of study, a timeless-dimen-
sion to geopolitics? and the requirement of emancipation – also originate from
the post-modernist critique of the classical, all seldom considered in the tradi-
tional but to me necessary to an understanding of both streams.
I. Levels of analysis: Various levels or hierarchies of causes and pro-
cesses within the study of international relations, from the individual leader
to the small group and decision-making elites to the national and interna-
tional or structural. Most theories focus on one particular level, although the
ideal but probably not the possible is to combine levels within one compre-
hensive framework.
Perhaps at this point it would be profitable to describe for a moment
the concept of ‘structure.’ From their own perspectives, both the critical
and the classical utilise this concept but in very separate ways. For exam-
ple, the traditional structure tends toward the objective and the enduring,
its internal patterns composed of the more important countries or blocs,
and its functions contributing to types of regional or strategic outcomes,
whether ‘stable,’ ‘cooperative,’ ‘warlike,’ and so forth. In contrast, the crit-
ical structure is much more fluid and immediate, with most emphasis
placed on the dynamics of discourse and de-territorialisation, on effects in
the media and technology, and on various statements toward prescrip-
tion. But, for clarity and consistency, I will not use ‘structure’ in this
second way and instead will equate structural with the objective, the rela-
tively fixed or permanent, and the regional-international groupings of
states.
Critical – The focus here is upon the social or decision-making level,
since geopolitics is a ‘practice’ of states persons rather than an ‘international
reality.’14 According to Ó Tuathail:
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 31

The focus of critical geopolitics is on exposing the plays of power

involved in grand geopolitical schemes. ... Fundamental to this process
is the power of certain national security elites to represent the nature
and defining of dilemmas of international politics in particular ways. ...
These representational practices of national security intellectuals gener-
ate particular ‘scripts’ in international politics concerning places, peoples
and issues. Such ‘scripts’ then become part of the means by which [great
power] hegemony is exercised in the international system.15

Again, the critics of course vary in their approaches, as mentioned

above and below. Agnew, Dalby, and Dodds lean toward the more tradi-
tional structuralist yet problematising approach and the revision of formal
theoretical perspectives, Agnew in political economy, Dalby in security
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questions, and Dodds in foreign policy analysis, whereas Ó Tuathail nor-

mally fits the representational or discourse tendency that places less focus
on generalisation. Nonetheless, because the problem of the classical rests
with exposing likely biases of hegemonic elites and their ‘experts,’ decision-
making becomes a prime object of review and the international dimension
offers less interest, particularly to Ó Tuathail.
Classical – A characteristic of many of the modern IR theories including
realism, systems approaches, and traditional geopolitics, the attention rests
upon objective causes and processes coming from the global or regional
structures themselves and upon locating simple generalisations based upon
probability. In this, it is ‘rational’ to assume that statesmen will perform in
the interests of the state, and therefore, scholars are able to bypass decision-
making and concentrate instead on the international realm, although none-
theless geopolitical experts will give advice to policy makers based upon
spatial theory and associations. As described above, the traditional mode
disregards critiquing leaders’ decisions, that being in contrast a particular
focus and strength of the critical approach. To me, the critical contributes by
critiquing leaders’ decisions, and traditionalists could well strengthen their
contributions to foreign affairs by utilising this technique also. Yet, as a bal-
ance to this observation, de-constructing decision-making could well dis-
tract from composing and evaluating theory, the main focus and value of
the classical.
Indeed, classical writers rarely mention decision-making, emphasising
instead the global level, as this advice by Saul Cohen shows:

The reality that confronts President Reagan’s administration is that the

superpower-dominated global order has disintegrated. ... The new glo-
bal order that eventually emerges will be strongly affected by the behav-
ior of [new] regional forces. There is need for a geopolitical theory that
will take into account structural relations between these first- and sec-
ond-order powers, and the relationships of states in these of the interna-
tional hierarchy to states of lower orders.16
 32 Phil Kelly

Also in similar terms, Mackinder saw a closed structure emerging in

world politics in 1900 that tended to give ‘land powers’ greater strength
over ‘sea powers.’ Specifically, because of the advantages of pivotal conti-
nental location, the possessor of the ‘heartland’ expanse of Eurasia could
extend outwardly at will to absorb resources of outlying regions, safe from
sea power incursions:

The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state,

resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would
permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the
empire of the world would then be in sight.17

Consequently, it would be in Britain’s interest to prevent domination of the

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Heartland by a single power or combination of powers such as Germany

and/or Russia, and he wrote thus to warn British leaders of this threat. The
unique structure of continental position and resources juxtaposed against
the marginal and maritime locations induced this policy suggestion to the
British leadership.
II. Modern vs. post-modern: Post-modernists deny the existence of
any objective truth, supporting instead a wholly subjective world, thus sub-
stantially shifting the epistemological and ontological stances away from the
classical version. Likewise, post-modernists reject the structuralist and posi-
tivist approaches that have been the mainstays of most modern academic
international relations theories including those of realism and classical geo-
politics. A defining aspect of their claim is that knowledge and power
underlie all things,18 as is shown in this statement:

All power requires knowledge and all knowledge relies on and rein-
forces existing power relations. Thus there is no such thing as ‘truth’,
existing outside of power. To paraphrase Foucault, how can history
have a truth if truth has a history? Truth is not something external to
social settings, but is instead part of them. . . . Postmodern interna-
tional theorists have used this insight to examine the ‘truths’ of inter-
national relations to see how the concepts and knowledge-claims that
dominate the discipline in fact are highly contingent on specific power
relations.19

Accordingly, post-modernists advocate transformation of the current world

toward providing more favor to marginal peoples, with an interest in de-
constructing foreign policy scripts and other textural materials, confident
that such a process will reveal the exploitation being done within the exist-
ing international hegemony.
In contrast, modernists take the world ‘as is,’ not being intent upon rad-
ical revision but instead focusing upon simplifying ‘reality’ by examining
facts neutrally and assembling these where possible into theory as their
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 33

method for facilitating reform. In rough comparison, the variance is

between the modernist scholar and the post-modernist scholar/activist.
Here too, we might make a distinction early on between ‘geopolitical
discourse,’ a review of foreign affairs scripts that would be inter-subjective,
discursive, cultural, and ideological in the case of the critical and ‘geopoliti-
cal inheritance,’ a concentration on theorising for the traditional stance that
would correspond to the more objective, factual, material, non-historical,
and permanent.
Critical – Several of the above post-modernist traits will be described in
the other categories below, but certain portrayals can be raised here that
link post-modernism to critical geopolitics. For instance, this statement by
Ó Tuathail:
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In the conventional conceptions that dominated the twentieth century,

[classical] geopolitics was a panoptic form of power/knowledge that
sought to analyze the condition of world power in order to aid the prac-
tice of statecraft by great powers. Embedded within the imperialist
projects of various states throughout the century, geopolitics generated
comprehensive visions of world politics while also proposing particular
strategies for states to pursue against their rivals.20

Ó Tuathail adds that certain recent “processes [have come] together in

a unique way to create a distinctively new [post-modern] geopolitical
environment”:

The first of these processes was the intensified globalization of corpora-

tions and markets in the advanced capitalist world from the 1960s. ...
The second ... was the diffusion of new informational and communica-
tional technologies that intensified the time-space distanciation and
compression historically associated with modernity ... With the Cold
War over, policy makers slowly came to terms with the global ‘risk soci-
ety’ Cold War military-industrial complexes had unleashed.21

One could add ‘de-territorialisation’ of national governments to this list,

where a ‘chronopolitics’ of speed is replacing the importance of space and
the state itself is disappearing, seen also in a ‘glocalisation’ or fusion
between local and global domains. These processes are “provoking the
development of new forms of geopolitical discourse and practice that
require critical investigation.”22 In addition, new threats confront us because
of the fluidity of space and time, a prominent example being the ‘risk soci-
ety.’23 In this latter case, the risk society is a consequence of a second stage
of ruin after the successes and excesses of industrial society, observed in
ecologically-damaging practices, weapons of mass destruction, new tech-
nologies of communication used illegally, and increased marginalisation of
those who cannot compete. But I add that in looking at these new issues,
 34 Phil Kelly

we tend sometimes to stray from the positional-geographical aspects of

traditional geopolitics.
Classical – Inherent to the classical is ‘positivism,’ the premise that
methodologies of natural sciences can be applied to social sciences, that
value-free or objective results will derive from these and other methodolo-
gies, and that humans including our leaders will usually act according to the
‘expected utility’ or reward in selecting the most appropriate policies and
actions. Post-positivists, to the contrary, argue just the opposite – that
because ‘reality’ is tainted and subjective, the techniques of physical
sciences should not be applied to social sciences.
Again, it might clarify to review at this point the different perspectives
of ‘theory,’ for the variations are quite pertinent to differences and similari-
ties among the streams within and between the classical and the critical
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stances. As differentiated by Robert Cox,24 a ‘problem-solving’ theory, more

akin to the classical, is a process that does not judge prevailing institutions
and power relationships and that instead seeks to resolve immediate prob-
lems within them, although not usually investigating the complete difficulty
or its origins. In contrast, a ‘critical’ theory questions existing institutions and
power relationships, raising to problematic status the issue of how the sys-
tem itself and the problems associated within that order originated. Such is
a more systemic, dynamic, and thorough exposing of the problem and the
possible solution. But, Cox maintains the “strength of one is the weakness
of the other”:

Because it deals with a changing reality, critical theory must continually

adjust its concepts to the changing object its seeks to understand and
explain. These concepts and the accompanying methods of inquiry
seem to lack the precision that can be achieved by problem-solving the-
ory, which posits a fixed order as its point of reference. This relative
strength of problem-solving theory, however, rests upon a false premise,
since the social and political order is not fixed but (at least in a long-
range perspective) is changing. Moreover, the assumption of fixity is not
merely a convenience of method, but also an ideological bias.

What I would stress from Cox’s format is that some balancing or blending
between our two geopolitical versions could possess merit within and
among the several theoretical standpoints.
Another point of departure is that critical geopolitics does not focus as
intently on international relations theory as does the classical but instead
draws from epistemological discussions from within political geography. To
the classicist, IR theory seeks to locate simple uniformities within assortments
of data, then attempts to fix probabilities to outcomes. This process is possi-
ble and productive because the world can be seen objectively as distinct
from the viewer and its spatial parameters are fixed. Such generalisations will
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 35

help to predict, explain, and teach, and above all, to provide a problem-solving
format toward advising states persons. To the other extreme, that of
Ó Tuathail’s post-modernist representationalism, theory is always suspect
and usually not relevant because the world is subjective. His mission instead
is to critique this subjectiveness. But, Dodds25 appears to stay more toward
the middle ground by his contention that critical geopolitics seeks to ‘inter-
pret’ rather than accept without review the alleged ‘divine truths’ of traditional
IR theory. Yet, once thoroughly contextualised, certain general propositions
may be useful. Similarly, Dalby26 in his problematising of American security
discourse. And likewise, Agnew and Corbridge’s27 three ‘geopolitical orders’
that reflect the changing “international political economy in different histori-
cal periods” also come somewhere between the opposing poles of either an
uncritical reliance upon or the complete discarding of formal theorising. In
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Dodds, Dalby, and Agnew-Corbridge, all consistent with Cox’s outline, their
desire, I think, is to attain a careful critiquing, exposing, updating, and per-
haps resurrecting of traditional geopolitical theory for its ideological, histori-
cal, and social context before accepting its usefulness. To me, this is a good
platform from which to build a future geopolitical consensus.
A variety of classical theories have lent themselves to successful testing
according to the positivist method. For example, based on studies by
Richardson28 and others, I located a high bi-variate statistical association
between South American countries possessing more international borders
and those nations suffering more war involvements.29 In another study of
mine, I found an equally strong multi-variate correlation between distance
of Latin American states from the United States and their support for United
Nations peacekeeping interventions.30 My ‘shatterbelt’ research31 readily
came from a computerised routine of cluster analysis. Other quantitative
theories of positional natures likewise have shown the possibility of rigor-
ous theory construction with regard to classical geopolitics. And, although
not statistically applicable but yet relevant to historic policies, Mackinder’s
heartland thesis and Spykman’s rimland concept continue influential in stra-
tegic calculations of major powers.
III. The goal of ‘problematising’ classical geopolitics: The allega-
tion that certain presuppositions may disguise correct options and allow
only prejudged solutions. Hence, the aim to unravel and expose such bias
and other weaknesses alleged to be inherent to classical geopolitics by
de-constructing and contextualising these and then by offering solutions for
improving the world.
Critical – The critics do not accept the world of classical theory ‘as is.’
They distrust the motivations of traditionalists and seek to scrutinise their ‘god
tricks’ or supposed detached-observer ‘truths.’ “Critical geopolitics can be
broadly understood as the critical and poststructuralist intellectual practices of
unraveling and deconstructing geographical and related disguises, dissimula-
tions, and rationalisations of power.”32 In the words of Klaus Dodds:
 36 Phil Kelly

The major difference between traditional geopolitics and the more criti-
cal approaches is that the more critical approaches promote an opening
up of political geography to methodological and conceptual re-evalua-
tion. Composed of various strands of social theory, critical geopolitics
has sought to problematize the ways in which geopolitical discourses,
practices and perspectives have measured, described and assessed the
world. The inspiration for critical geopolitics lay in a belief that tradi-
tional political geography had failed to disrupt the widespread ‘depoliti-
cization’ of human geography in the 1950s and 1960. ... Allied with
other developments within the social sciences and humanities, critical
approaches to world politics tend to share the post-modern scepticism
that the world can be rationally perceived and interpreted through par-
ticular techniques.33
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Beyond problematising:

the representation of global political space ... [of] policy-making circles

of national governments and their official advisers, [the critics also seek
to probe] a broader social and cultural phenomenon [for bias], which
permeates through-out societies ... [the] practical [of national govern-
ments, the] formal [of academics, and the] popular [of the media].34

Expanding beyond critiquing the classical, the critical advocates

address a variety of alternatives to the present world condition, such as the
new values of time-space compression, solutions to the problems inherit to
the risk society, and the invention of new and strengthened global institu-
tions that might resolve coming environmental and other crises. Yet, I must
add, they appear rather fuzzy as to the specific characteristics envisioned in
a better society and the appropriate path toward its attainment.
Classical – Such problematising is simply not conceptualised within tra-
ditional geopolitics. Rather, those of the classical see themselves as neutral,
doing a rather fixed, problem-solving, even common sense and natural
application of environmental opportunities and constraints upon foreign
and military policies and actions. Geopolitics as a facility of statecraft is not
self-examined for being ideological or exploitative; it just doesn’t factor into
the approach.
For instance, Frederick Teggert, in praise of Mackinder, asserted the
“migration from the Heartland to the marginal lands of the continent is not a
theory, but a conspicuous fact,” and that:

we are led to see a succession of empires [Greece, Rome, medieval

Europe] based upon sea power, each of which has been overthrown
finally by a land attack. The success of land power, in each case, has
come from a broadening of the field of operations and the seizure of the
seaman’s base of supplies.35
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 37

This description by Ó Tuathail and Dalby, although meant to be critical

I think also pertains well to the traditional:

Classical geopolitics is a form of geopolitical discourse that seeks to

repress its own politics and geography, imagining itself as beyond poli-
tics and above situated geographies in a transcendent Olympian realm
of surveillance and judgement. The response of critical geopolitics is to
insist on the situated, contextual and embodied nature of all forms of
geopolitical reasoning.36

The gaze of states persons toward geographical factors that might impact
upon policy is a good exhibition of the classical, but once done, little con-
cern is applied to the deeper social meaning of what is seen.
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IV. The ontological perspective: The modernist assumption of locat-

ing an objective reality somewhere externally, with observer and observed
separated and the possibility of more than one observer agreeing to what is
actually viewed. A common vision of experts accordingly goes toward
advising foreign policies. But to post-modernists, an entirely subjective
image commands, the latter constructed and often ideologically tainted
through discourse and scripts as composed by partisan elites. Because this
is true, reality exists ‘nowhere.’
Critical – As described by Leslie Hepple,

the texts of [classical] geopolitical discourse are not free-floating, innocent

contributions to an ‘objective’ knowledge, but are rooted in ... ‘power/
knowledge’, serving the interests of particular groups in society and help-
ing to sustain and legitimate certain perspectives and interpretations.37

Hence, the first mission of critical geopolitics is to critique:

the superficial and self-interested ways in which orthodox geopolitics

‘reads the world political map’ by projecting its own cultural and politi-
cal assumptions upon it while concealing these very assumptions. ...
[the critics striving] to expose this power politics to scrutiny and public
debate in the name of deepening democratic politics.38

Since reality is nowhere, traditional theories are not useful, particularly from
Ó Tuathail’s viewpoint, since their reliance must be upon subjectivised facts
and generalisations, making agreement among scholars impossible and the
fixing of probabilities to outcomes irrelevant.
Classical – A world ‘out there’ truly does exist, one relatively fixed that
can be envisioned by humans similarly, although often better by experts,
and that can be demonstrated historically. Geography does influence the
formulation of foreign policy and this connection can be observed, repli-
cated, and made into theory. Elite impact, although a part of any political
 38 Phil Kelly

system, detaches from the geographical since an objective reality within the
international environment is readily present for most to see. Consequently,
it is judged that states’ policies and actions are impacted by geographical
position as well as by other non-spatial motivations, objective and subjec-
tive, no matter the status and awareness of the observer.
Perhaps the leading contemporary exponent of the classical in these
respects is Zbigniew Brzezinski, who would agree with Halford Mackinder,
Nicholas Spykman, George Kennan, Saul Cohen, Colin Gray, and other like
minds in what he writes below:

Ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hun-
dred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power ... American
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foreign policy ... must employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that
creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the
political arbiter ... it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges,
capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America.39

This perspective, often repeated in the discourse of strategic policy, has

found some amount of consensus among traditionalist scholars and security
analysts who visualise a similar objective reality and ignore contexture and
the possibility of bias.
V. The epistemological perspective: The potential for finding reality,
for gaining knowledge about the world. Is it possible scientifically or empir-
ically to explain the world by observing it, gathering facts about it, and then
intuitively or logically formulating facts into theories, as is the classical per-
spective? Or is reality so subjective and personal that generalising is simply
not productive, and consequently one must focus on de-constructing and
contexturalising mind sets and motivations of decision-makers so that later
historicising a radicalised society can bring something better?
Critical – The geopolitical gaze of individuals including states persons
is never objective because viewer and object are inseparable. Writes
Ó Tuathail:

As an unreflexively eurocentric and narrowly rational cultural practice of

‘experts’ in powerful Western institutions (from universities to military
bureaucracies to strategic ‘think-tanks’), [classical] geopolitics is not
about power politics: it is power politics.40

What is important is not the geographical setting of nations and continents

but the discourse and context of the “intellectuals of statecraft ... a whole
community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors
throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct the activ-
ities of state-craft.”41 “In sum,” states Ó Tuathail “modern geopolitics is a
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 39

condensation of Western epistemological and ontological hubris – an imag-

ining of the world from an imperial point of view.”42
Classical – Relationships between geographical position and foreign
policy can be visualised by experts and academic theories devised based on
observations, intuition, and statistical examination. One is able to explain
policy in part by reference to geography. The viewer and the spatial object
are separate, therefore the likelihood of empirical study and neutral results.
Certain generalisations are applicable to all times, locations, and situations.
As a problem-solving technique, geopolitics “takes the existing power struc-
tures for granted and works within these to provide conceptualisation and
advice for foreign policy decision-makers.”43 The classical is not bent
toward emancipation; rather, it functions as a statesman’s tool, with empha-
sis upon country and regional geographical placement and not upon social,
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economic, political, and other calculations of the elite.

VI. Great Power Hegemony: Global politics as dominated by the more
powerful countries, such hegemonic preponderance reflected in the ‘power
politics’ and ‘grand chessboard’ natures seen by critics in classical geopolitics.
Critical – Geography is itself exclusively about power, and “the study
of geopolitics is the study of the spatialisation of international politics by
core powers and hegemonic states.”44 Additionally, “struggles over owner-
ship, administration, and mastery of space are an in-escapable part of the
dynamics of contemporary global politics.”45 Or said differently, “The term
‘geopolitics’ is a convenient fiction, an imperfect name for a set of practices
within the civil societies of the Great Powers that sought to explain the
meaning of the new global conditions of space, power, and technology.”46
The critics’ prescription is to unravel, expose, and replace this hegemony
with improved social configurations.
This description by Ó Tuathail of geopolitics as ‘state philosophy’ like-
wise is pertinent to the critical:

Geopolitics is state philosophy, a technology of govern-mentality. It was

conceived and nurtured [centuries ago] in the imperial capitals of the
Great Powers, in their learned academies, in the map and war rooms of
ambitious expansionist states. A parochial imperialist gaze that repre-
sented lands beyond the horizon as spaces of destiny, it helped to colo-
nize the globe with networks of communication, logistic of war, and
ethnocentral models of territorial organization.47

Nonetheless, the picture now fades, showing an ‘end of [traditional] geopoli-

tics’ because the state itself suffers disappearance, and the classical version is
being replaced by a ‘postmodern geopolitics,’ as we will see below.
Such reasoning of classical geopolitics linked to imperialism appears to
be a mainstay to critical geopolitics – the assertion of ubiquitous elitist dom-
ination. Yet, to me this assumption of imperialism figures more as a social
 40 Phil Kelly

‘law’ and not theory, particularly from the representational stream of critical
geopolitics, because once the premise is set, that elitism permeates every
environment; such a preliminary is really all we need to know without fur-
ther generalisation. The rest of our attention must go to further exposing
and remedying the elitist problem. Indeed, Ó Tuathail admits a disinterest in
theory when he describes critical geopolitics as “an approach rather than a
theoretical system ... a project which has three prominent dimensions”,48 all
of which are engaged in de-construction.
Classical – Whether elites and great powers dominate the international
system is simply of no relevance to classical writers, whichever structures
already in place being accepted as they are. But to the traditional advocates,
the smaller countries, similar to larger states, formulate policies appropriate
to their own geographical perspectives. Geopolitics provides a method for
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understanding world and regional affairs based upon spatial comparisons.

National power and development depend upon factors of geographical
placement, such as maritime vs. continental position affected by technology,
central vs. peripheral location, possession of natural/energy resources, and
the like. Certain countries and regions have predominated because they
possess special advantages rendered by geography. Geopolitics advises pol-
icy makers about how to utilise position and resources to the best advan-
tage for all assortments of countries, the powerful and the less influential.
VII. The focus of study: How do we approach the essence of geopol-
itics? What is essential to its meaning and application?
Critical – The deeper meaning of traditional geopolitics, its “materialist
framework,” should be critically interpreted.49 Stated by Klaus Dodds:

Critical geopolitical writers have argued that geopolitics is a discourse

concerned with the relationship between power-knowledge and social
and political relations. ... [They] propose that understanding world poli-
tics has to be understood on a fundamentally interpretative basis rather
than on [accepting without review] a series of divine ‘truths’ such as the
fundamental division of global politics between land and sea powers.
For the critical geopolitician, therefore, the really important task is inter-
preting [the contexture within] theories of world politics rather than
repeating often ill-defined assumptions and understandings of politics
and geography.50

Facts ‘don’t speak for themselves’; rather, one must delve to deeper mean-
ings of discourse and context to locate the prevailing elitist view of the
world, postponing the acceptance of traditionalist theory in their method.
The major focus is consequently placed upon de-constructing and con-
texturalising discourses, scripts, and setting of state leaders and strategists. For
instance, Bosnia scripted as a Vietnam-like ‘quagmire’ and as a genocidal
holocaust, the first but not the second posing good reason for avoiding
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 41

American participation in Balkan conflicts.51 In another study, the Soviet

Union was visualised by policy makers as ‘Oriental,’ ‘a potential rapist,’ and
a ‘Red flood,’ justifications for resisting Russian territorial and ideological
expansion.52 Scripts about South Africa revealed an area of ‘strategic impor-
tance’ yet one also as a ‘morally repugnant place.’53 These sorts of depic-
tions hid and distorted local geography and politics within the machinations
of strategic ideological concerns, simplified complex situations, provided
rationale for armed interventions and high military budgets, and in general
caused an “effacement of place, the erasure of place by official geopolitical
inscriptive strategies.”54
Classical – One studies history and geography, particularly as tied to
diplomacy and strategy, to formulate theories about the impact of geograph-
ical factors upon foreign policies and actions. We can sight (and cite) objec-
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tive reality and can explain what we are observing such that others may
repeat our observations and test our conclusions, whether we are experts,
scholars, or others. Accordingly, geopolitics is a useful theoretical and prac-
tical means to understanding certain dimensions of international affairs and
to formulating international policies.
Studying maps provides insight into geopolitical relationships among
continents and regions of states, a characteristic common to the classic but
opposed by the post-modernists, although both schools disfavor distortions
in propagandistic maps. Mackinder’s reliance on visualising relative posi-
tions, strategic areas, and resources of the globe shows this approach:

Europe, Asia, Africa, and the two Americas are thus included within the vis-
ible hemisphere; but the chief feature even of the land-half of the globe is
the great arm of the Mediterranean ocean, Atlantic and Arctic, winding
north-ward. ... No flat chart can give a correct impression of the form of the
North Atlantic. Only a globe can suggest its vast bulging centre, and the rel-
ative insignificance of its Arctic, Mediterranean, and Caribbean recesses.55

In Ó Tuathail’s words, the classical proponents have composed “a Geopolit-

ical Man, the Mackinder-like figure that eyes the globe and divines the
secrets necessary for mastering it.”56
VII. A timeless dimension to geopolitics? How dynamic is the geo-
politics concept, whether persist ‘timeless truths’ of space and position or a
‘chronopolitics’ of high speeds and cyber-spaces?
Critical – Traditional geopolitics is simply out-moded and old-fashioned:

In a world of perpetual speed and motion, convulsed by globalization, sat-

urated by information, and entranced by ephemeral media spectacles and
hyperbole, [modern] geopolitics seems decidedly old-fashioned and out of
place. Indeed, in the search for a new paradigm of world politics a number
of strategists and politicians have proclaimed the end of geopolitics
 42 Phil Kelly

altogether, its eclipse and supersession by geo-economics, speed or eco-

politics. In many analyses, [such a] geopolitics has been left for dead.57

A ‘geopolitical vertigo’ of ‘mummified’ theory confronts orthodox geopolitics,

in part because the classical has not contended with ‘de-territorialisation’ (the
passing of the territorial nation-state), a ‘glocalisation’ or fusion of local and
strategic, and ‘chronopolitics’ (“the control and distribution of time”).58
Consequently, the world suffers ‘wild’ and ‘tame’ states, new and seri-
ous dangers from a ‘risk society’ fallout of residual problems left by industri-
alisation,59 a concentrated capitalist globalisation of finance and the
associated marginalisation of poorer world regions, and the plight of ‘infor-
mationalisation’ (the accelerating speed and mass of data). In these and
other like respects, Luke and Ó Tuathail argue:
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Entwined intellectually to the apparently frozen blocs of Cold War con-

flict, [classical] geopolitics has been captured by a static territorial imagi-
nation for too long. Unleashed, it now has a critical future tied to
tracking the struggles over accelerating flows in a New World Order
hooked on speed.60

Classical – Most orthodox geopoliticians assert a permanence with respect

to geographical factors impacting upon foreign policies. Perhaps exagger-
ated but much repeated is Spykman’s claim that geographical position
remains an essential guide for statesmen: “Ministers come and go, even dic-
tators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed. ... The nature of the ter-
ritorial base has influenced [policy makers] in the past and will continue to
do so in the future.”61 How such influences transpire will vary, from deter-
minism whereby geography ‘dictates’ or ‘compels’ states’ actions to environ-
mental ‘possibilism’ in which physical or natural spaces ‘influence’ certain
policies as guides from which states may choose.62
IX. The requirement of emancipation: How post-modern geopoli-
tics might facilitate a re-constructing of the international system – the ending
of hegemonic exploitation and the coming of peace among nations and of
justice for marginal peoples according to the facility of a ‘new’ geopolitics
or an ‘anti-geopolitics.’
Critical – Traditional geopolitics exhibits distinctive binary and hierar-
chal characteristics that show an imperial preference, this described by
Simon Dalby:

The modern geopolitical imagination ... is both a Eurocentric world view

and a global vision, the product of an historic process connected to the
expansion of European power over the last half millennium. We see the
world as a whole then divide it into a hierarchy of places, blocs, and
states that have attributes of political importance. In the process we make
a series of conceptual transformations of time into space: modernity is
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 43

here, primitiveness there. [This dichotomy of ‘We’ and ‘They’ translates

into] new geographies of danger, of rogue states, failed states, environ-
mental threats, and related phenomena inscribing the world in terms of
tame zones and wild zones, stable centers and threatening peripheries.63

“This process,” claims John Agnew, “provides the geographical framing

within which political elites and mass publics act in the world in pursuit of
their own identities and interests.”64
An ‘anti-geopolitics’ or a ‘geopolitics from below’ is being utilised by
dominated groups “within society that challenge the military, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural hegemony of the state and its elites,” according to Paul
Routledge:
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Anti-geopolitics represents an assertion of permanent independence

from the state whoever is in power, and articulates two interrelated forms
of counter-hegemonic struggle. First, it challenges the material (eco-
nomic and military) geopolitical power of states and global institutions;
and second, it challenges the representations imposed by political and
economic elites upon the world and its different peoples, that are
deployed to serve their geopolitical interests.65

Similarly, Ó Tuathail and Dalby seek to “radicalize conventional notions of

[classical] geopolitics” and not to resurrect the “traditional themes of geopol-
itics.”66
Yet, I have seen neither a clear characterisation of a better society nor a
specific road map for attaining such an improvement in the critics’ writings.
Classical – Emancipation, like hegemony, is beyond the interest of tra-
ditional writers, who instead accept institutions already in place, whether
democratic or otherwise. Geopolitics as a neutral and objective method for
designing and implementing policy is not bent upon reformulating the inter-
national system.

EVALUATION OF CLASSICAL AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS: THE

POSSIBILITY OF COMPLEMENTARITY?

First, I would like to offer several comments here about classical geopolitics.
The original term I believe has been applied inconsistently in the media and
in scholarship – to me not because this form of geopolitics necessarily lacks
a unified approach but more because its non-classicist enlisters tend not to
understand its more limited intent (“the impact of certain geographical fea-
tures upon foreign policy,” this being my definition, or another close exam-
ple being “geography as an aid to statecraft”) and are not rigorous in
placing their applications. In addition, the traditional concept has been
 44 Phil Kelly

more susceptible to ideological and popular ‘capture’ (that by the critical

theorists, too) because of the inconsistencies of usage, because it has not
attracted the academic interest that might have corrected faulty applications,
and because the term itself is rather ‘catchy,’ simple, and attractive, and this
susceptibility-to-capture liability seems to have had an unfairly attached
hegemonic label to it. And this is not to say that advocates of critical geo-
politics are themselves any more clear about precisely defining their version
of geopolitics as well, or of the desired community they work toward. In
sum, we will probably never have agreement on specific designs for either
the classical or the critical – yet, we can acknowledge nonetheless the exist-
ence of these voids and proceed with our studies.
Another weakness of the traditional, as described above, is its reliance
on ‘rationality,’ the assumption that leaders will act “so as to promote one’s
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[national] interests.”67 Said differently, classicists are forced to accept the

premise that leaders will somehow perform as we would expect them to
perform – in the best interests of the state – and in our case by assuming
that geographical features will impact upon policies and actions to some
degree in their decisions. But it could assuredly be stated that many deci-
sions and actions, whether one is aware of such or not, contain bias, mis-
takes, and faulty reasoning, and to depend upon objectivity most of the
time for us frail humans is a significant ‘leap of faith.’ But frankly, if rational-
ity is rejected, so also is the ability to create legible theoretical frameworks
because decision-making is one of the least predictable and accessible to
generalisation and the international or structural is the most consistent for
model building. “Certainly,” state Ferguson and Mansbach, “if we reject
even modest claims about rationality, it is difficult to imagine constructing a
general theory.” The decision-making realm hence is largely bypassed in
favor of the global. Accordingly, the critics rightly question the traditional
assumptions of rationality. But nonetheless such is a weakness that classical
geopolitics as well as realism and other positivist approaches cannot avoid,
and its advocates simply must accept this and calibrate it within the formu-
lation of their theories.
To me, alternatives to ‘rationality’ are equality untenable, for if we
accept the premise that ‘reality’ is subjective and therefore ‘nowhere,’ then
how do we accurately determine motivations of states persons? For exam-
ple, psycho-biography can be unreliable too, but assuming bias in leaders
could ignore cases of altruism and common sense. As might be followed by
the critics, studies of personality, ideological make-up, roles, group dynam-
ics, perceptions, cognitive psychology, and like approaches may prove
faulty as well. And reliance upon discourse as reality too can be misleading
and misses much of the essence of decision-making.
In sum, since ‘reality’ derives from some combination of both objective
and subjective sources, might not it be more constructive for both the classi-
cal and the critical to admit these common dilemmas and instead utilise this
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 45

‘reality problem’ in rationality as a method for complementing each other?

Could not the traditionalists agree that subjective aspects do factor into deci-
sion-making and these require closer examination and criticism? And might
not the critics concur that some elements of reality indeed are objective and
relatively free of infection and should consequently be generalised? As such,
both sides could partly cover their inherent theoretical weaknesses and per-
haps ‘bridge’ over to more useful collaboration? I see the beginnings of this
nexus forming in the second or structural variant of critical geopolitics.
Finally, I want to defend the classical in these specific areas: 1) The
critics flay against the traditionalists for positing ‘simplistic’ and reductionist
theory, stating the context of politics is too ‘messy’ for reliable generalisa-
tion. Quite so, but to me, the realm of classical theory indeed is to simplify,
to reduce to the obvious, and to work toward probability where it might
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exist. Consequently, I argue the criticism here is not particularly relevant. 2)

Geopolitics is not ‘realist’ theory, at least from the classical perspective.
While parallel in certain areas, the two models differ substantially in others,
the geopolitical in its spatial emphasis, the realist in its endeavor to resolve
the ‘power dilemma,’ that is., how to gain security by manipulating power,
because increasing one’s power often does not bring security, just the
opposite. For example, to realism, certain balance of power structures,
being stable, provide safety, whereas to geopolitics, only positional bal-
ances of power, such as ‘checkerboards’ and core/periphery patterns,
would correspond to its spatial design. 3) Traditionalists tend to be liberal/
conservative reformers, whereas critics tend toward radical revision. Neither
position is the ‘correct’ or the ‘wrong’ one; rather, these rest in personal per-
spective and ideology. 4) Classicists believe that power is natural and ubiq-
uitous to any political system, hence the need to monitor and erase its
excesses. Critics instead tend to decry power as naturally corrupting and
consequently assert the necessity to eliminate it. Again, since neither con-
tention is provable, neither should be shunned. 5) The end-of-the-nation-
state thesis, as claimed within critical geopolitics, to me is premature, with
conflicting evidence as to the staying power of the state.
But I fault the classical track for not doing a better job at second-guess-
ing its premises, as is done so well to the classical by the critics. Indeed,
advocates of the traditional could, I think, gain if they would examine the
extant critical literature, which unfortunately I don’t see them doing. What
are the motivations and contextures behind the traditional theories? Can tra-
ditional theories be accurately evaluated? Has geopolitics contributed to
international conflict and marginalisation? If so, could it also offer remedies?
I further fault the classical in its liking the fixed or permanent too much
and thus in ignoring recent problems, transitions, and technologies that
might correct and update some of the traditional assumptions, for example,
the compression of space and time, the effects of globalisation upon state
sovereignty, the ecological and social fallout from industrial society, the
 46 Phil Kelly

persistence of war and international crisis, the inadequacies of global solu-

tions and institutions, and the like.
Yet, in a more positive direction, I would contend that happily a renais-
sance in the last several decades is happening toward scholarly advance-
ments for both the classical and critical versions of geopolitics, each
clarifying and strengthening its unique perspective – the former in continu-
ing to offer guides to statecraft, the latter in critiquing the traditional and in
visualising more constructive approaches to global affairs. This being the
case, does not this growth in sophistication spell the possibility of construc-
tive linkages between the two alternatives? For one, I am able to visualise
this possibility.
I do not advocate combining the pertinent areas of political geography
with international relations for the sake of furthering geopolitics and thus
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erasing their specific identities, for such is not possible or preferable even if
possible. Each comes from its unique source and its contribution is special
to its assumptions and methodology. To force such a marriage would
weaken spontaneity and depress the recent advances of geopolitics.
But the two can complement each other, for a ‘hybridization’68 for parts
of both disciplines that would be desirable, particularly for international
relations because Ó Tuathail, Dalby, Agnew, and Dodds, among other polit-
ical geographers, have taken geopolitics much further at the moment than
have political scientists.69 I think it is possible in certain areas for the two
tracks to bridge the modernist/post-modernist and the political science/
political geography divides to the advantage of both.
Specifically, I believe the critical has immeasurably strengthened an
understanding (at least in my case) of the classical, prominently in contextu-
alisation and de-construction of the traditional as well as in showing that
prescription may be as vital to the field as theory. Such critiquing is much
needed. But further, perhaps the excesses and biases attributed to or actu-
ally committed by the classical have assisted the critics in shaping their own
visions for an improved society. The bottom line may be that both geopolit-
ical stances require competition against the other for themselves to continue
being vibrant and progressive. In this way, the two versions already are
complementary.
Political science will remain committed largely to the policy and quanti-
tative approaches, whereas political geography will stay mainly with the crit-
ical and spatial aspects, although I would suggest an overlapping of these
approaches could be productive where applicable. Specifically, perhaps a
common conceptual framework could be devised linking the social/
decision-making levels with the global/structural whereby a juxtaposition of
theory and critique could transpire? Along this line, one possibility exists in
replicating and expanding Agnew and Corbridge’s three historic stages
within a political-economy track,70 or something similar to this that could
enlist social aspects within hegemonic cycles or world systems as the
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 47

broader models. Another good example rests in Glassman’s concept of the

‘internationalization of the state’71 where elites of the core and peripheral
states have united to an extent that state lines have dimmed. Also, see Taylor
and his combining of ‘geopolitical codes’ within ‘geopolitical world orders.’72
But unfortunately I feel the present direction of geopolitics as a whole,
from the perspective of both political geography and international relations,
is not particularly promising toward composing some sort of cross-over that
would increase the viability of geopolitics. Both fields, the classical and the
critical, have tended to denigrate each other as well as sometimes geopoli-
tics itself, and the advantages of cross-fertilisation have not approached
their grander potentials. Perhaps this article might be a starting place?.
On this note, I would like briefly to expand upon this last theme in the
pages remaining by raising several points of evaluation, placing my empha-
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sis upon the critical version in my critique.

1) Disparaging the classical. The following descriptors have been
frequently attached to classical geopolitics by its detractors, whereas the
classical version being ‘conflicting, contradictory and confusing’ and based
on ‘fantasies,’ ‘fiction,’ ‘repressed reality,’ and ‘divine’ and ‘timeless’ truths,’
deals with the ‘messy complexity of events in a simple fashion,’ possessing
‘superficial and self-interested ways,’ an ‘arbitrary interpretation of docu-
ments,’ and a ‘free-floating innocen[ce],’ and accordingly is ‘outmoded,’ ‘old
fashioned,’ and should be ‘left for dead.’ Such harsh indictments, to me,
overstate an attack against the classical and leave comparison of the two
versions as an either/or selection when I would again suggest a more con-
structive acceptance and expansion of both yet contrasting approaches as
most productive toward growing the field of geopolitics. To me, the critics
have not been clear as to their stance toward traditional geopolitics,
whether, that is, to destroy it or to resurrect it. This indecision has kept the
gap between the two geopolitical versions wider.
2) The importance of theory. Advocates of critical geopolitics may
be excessively down-grading the importance of traditional theory. My belief
is that one of the strengths of the classical rests in its focus on generalisa-
tion, both in understanding foreign policy as well as in measuring the
impact of geography upon human and governmental behavior. The critics’
intent to unravel and deconstruct “geographical and related disguises, dis-
simulations, and rationalisations of power,” while praiseworthy, construc-
tive, and necessary, may be likewise exaggerated and deny the contribution
of its geopolitical counterpart. Additionally, some classical practitioners of
geopolitics, including leaders of hegemonic states, I would assume, have
sometimes acted altruistically and not intentionally within the bias of domi-
nation. Most critics probably would agree, but such a contention needs
more mention and acceptance by them.
3) The permanence of geography. With critical geopolitics, we have
eliminated the original geographical and positional intent of traditional
 48 Phil Kelly

geopolitics, as geography itself has become suspect as being an imperialist

phenomenon73 and as allegedly having not kept up-to-date with new tech-
nologies and with the supposed ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘glocalisation’ of
states. Yet, in doing so, we discard the many spatial insights that have his-
torically lent themselves so substantially to foreign-policy design and appli-
cation. That placement of states, regions, and natural resources within a
world structure exerts no impact, we are told, is to me quite a ‘stretch’ to
believe, when statistical, historical, logical, and inferential evidence strongly
contends otherwise. Indeed, this essential positional aspect of geographical
permanency represents a core contribution of the classical, and one that
critical geopolitics does not adequately address.
4) Containing the taint of ideology. The critics intend constructing a
different version of geopolitics, one bent upon eradicating in the world of
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the classical its alleged hegemony and upon promising something better.
Such is a laudable undertaking, and one that unfortunately is missing from
the classical. But in this approach, I also see a post-modern elite opposed to
a modern elite, radical against hegemon, for the critics’ geopolitics too
would be ideological, as their post-modern heritage would admit. But how
should one trust the critical approach to be an improvement over the
present, particularly when its advocates have written so sparsely about the
new community and its attainment? From my liberal perspective, I would
rather first attempt correcting any deficiencies of the contemporary practice,
of neutralising the ideological in the classical if such is necessary, than
plunge into a radical unknown. Neither side, critical or classical, to me
deserves sainthood, and again we need a complementarity of and coopera-
tion between both tracks.
5) Problematising discourse. Linking an understanding of foreign
policy to elite scripts and discourse ignores the complexity of decision-
making, because to me a vast assortment of types and levels of groups and
inputs contribute to state actions and goals that are not contained in the
words of leaders. Organisational dynamics should fit into the calculus; like-
wise for domestic and international economic and political factors, person-
ality idiosyncracies, small-group machinations, international and regional
structures, historic and cultural happenings, even luck and chance, and so
on, the list being longer. According to Nicholas Spykman, himself perhaps
labeled wrongly a geographical and classical determinist:

The factors that condition the policy of states are many; they are perma-
nent and temporary, obvious and hidden; they include, apart from the
geographic factor, population density, the economic structure of the
country, the ethnic composition of the people, the form of government,
and the complexes and pet prejudices of foreign ministers; and it is their
simultaneous action and interaction that create the complex phenome-
non know as ‘foreign policy.’74
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 49

In addition, which scripts and discourses are to be examined, how solid are
the links between statesmen’s motivations and their discourse, can such dis-
courses be manipulated by their creators, do we exaggerate a unity of inter-
ests among elites, are elites really in such command of most situations, are
all elites corrupt, could radicals also be tainted, do the critics mistake ‘geo-
political’ scripts for ‘ideological’ scripts? To me, the reliance upon discourse
as a major emphasis of critical review encourages a “so what is next” argu-
ment after we learn that most discourse reveals taint. What indeed follows,
other than repetitious exposure of this rather common-sense truth?.
6) Exploiting great powers. Limiting the discussion of classical geo-
politics to great powers’ domination of world affairs, I think, greatly narrows
and distorts the study of geopolitics, for certainly more transpires than such
a simple assumption. The evidence for such elite exploitation is scanty and
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unprovable, although surely some of it exists albeit within the messiness of

politics. Additionally, and I may be in a minority here, the classical too
involves an interest in peace and international cooperation as well as in
conflict and military strategy, as for example has become a major focus of
South American geopolitical writers concerning economic and political inte-
gration.75 Is it fair and accurate to describe the capture of classical geopoli-
tics within an assumed hegemony, when the new version of geopolitics has
itself been captured by radicals who themselves emit an ideology and may
be as impure as the hegemons they seek to defeat?.
Does not the focus upon the larger countries also negate the utility of
traditional geopolitics for the smaller states? I found Paraguayan foreign
policy76 much impacted by the republic’s position and resources within the
Southern Cone of South America, where such classical labels as ‘buffer
state,’ ‘band wagoning’ allies and balancing larger neighbors, ‘elastic’ fron-
tiers and hydro-electric energy, continental ‘hinge’ or pivotal ‘heartland’ – all
factors that are traditional geopolitical concepts and theories – are quite
helpful to my account and recognised by Paraguayan scholars and policy
makers themselves. All countries, whether large or small, utilise geopolitical
aspects of the traditional mode as one array of many standards for imple-
menting foreign policies and actions.

CONCLUSIONS

I recommend the continued study of traditional geopolitics – the impact of

geography upon foreign policy – and the continued study of critical geo-
politics – the exploration of contexture and emancipation within foreign
policy decision-making. The critical analysis of geopolitics is enlightening
and it makes a significant contribution. But in the case of the much-
maligned classical, might it be better to attempt perfecting the ‘baby’ than to
throw both baby and ‘bath water’ away? For to me it is obvious that spatial
 50 Phil Kelly

position often does influence policy, because too much evidence for this is
available to dispute the basic premise.
In physics the principle of complementarity perhaps is pertinent to this
conclusion, where there may exist two viewpoints about something that are
mutually contradictory, in our case the classical and the critical, and yet both
viewpoints are equally ‘correct.’ What might be productive to the study of
geopolitics in general is to agree that for the fullest understanding we might
accept both types’ unique perspectives as legitimate and productive and
find that each viewpoint by itself tells somewhere about half the truth.
As regards the traditional, that is my domain and passion, but with the
contributions of the critical, my assumption is that a consistent and clear
definition of classical geopolitics already exists that has found common
acceptance by many who write about this tradition. What we in the classical
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realm require at this point is more scholarly interest in constructing a com-

prehensive traditional geopolitical framework, one that would gather and
compose a wide topology of geopolitical assumptions, concepts, and theo-
ries. Once a start in this construction progresses, with insertion too of a crit-
ical inspiration, a fuller testing and comparison of theories could confidently
proceed, followed by grouping similar concepts and theories into more
complex linkages that could be utilised in the analysis of historic and con-
temporary foreign policies and strategies.77 In sum, we already have the
fundamentals. Next, we require expansion, refinement, and application.
Such would bring a new essence of vigor, recognition, resurrection, and
promise to the classical geopolitics field that is its potential, as has been its
historic contribution.

NOTES

1. G. Parker, Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future (London and Washington: Pinter 1998) p. 5;
P. Kelly, Checkerboards & Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America (Austin: University of Texas
Press 1997), pp. 1–6; C. Gray, ‘Geography and Grand Strategy,’ Comparative Strategy 10/4 (1991),
pp. 311–329; Z. Brzezinski, Game Plan: A GeoStrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Con-
test (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 1986) p. xiv; and H. Sprout and M. Sprout, ‘Environmental Factors
in the Study of International Politics,’ in J. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A
Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press 1969), pp. 41–56.
2. H. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New
York: Henry Holt and Company 1919); H. Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ Geographical
Review 23 (1904) pp. 421–444.
3. I. Berman, ‘Slouching Toward Eurasia?’, Perspectives XII (2001) pp. 1–9; C. Fettweis, ‘Sir Halford
Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century,’ Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly
(May/June 2000) pp. 1–12; C. Clover, ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland,’ Foreign Affairs 78 (1999) pp. 9–13.
4. N. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company 1942).
5. M. Gerace, ‘Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and After,’ Compar-
ative Strategy 10/4 (1991) pp. 347–364.
6. J. Richardson, ‘The End of Geopolitics?’ in R. Leaver and J. Richardson (eds), Charting the Post
Cold War Order (Boulder: Westview Press 1993) p. 39.
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 51

7. D. Snow, National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics (New York: Pearson
Longman 2004) pp. 334–335, 365, 39.
8. R. Jones, Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
2001) pp. 5–10.
9. K. Dodds and J. Sidaway, ‘Locating Critical Geopolitics,’ Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 12 (1994) p. 516.
10. G. Ó Tuathail, S. Dalby, and P. Routledge (eds), The Geopolitics Reader (London and New York:
Routledge 1998).
11. S. Roberts (ed.), “Review Symposium Gearoid O’Tuathail, (1996) Critical Geopolitics: The Pol-
itics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press),’ Political Geography 19/3
(2000), pp. 345–396.
12. See G. Ó Tuathail and J. Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning
in American Foreign Policy,’ Political Geography Quarterly 11 (1992) pp. 155–175.
13. J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political
Economy (London and New York: Routledge 1995) p. 19, Forward.
14. G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics,’
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in G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds), Rethinking Geopolitics (London and New York: Routledge 1998) p. 2.
15. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘The Bush Administration and the ‘End’ of the Cold War: A Critical Geopolitics
of US Foreign Policy in 1989,’ Geoform 23 (1992) p. 439.
16. S. Cohen, ‘A New Map of Global Geopolitical Equilibrium: A Developmental Approach,’ Polit-
ical Geography Quarterly 1/3 (1982) p. 223.
17. H. Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ Geographical Journal 23 (1904) p. 432.
18. See, for example, Dodds and Sidaway (note 9) p. 516.
19. Quotation by S. Smith in R. Jackson and G. Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations:
Theories and Approaches, 2nd ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2003) p. 251.
20. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the
Millennium,’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers on-line version (2000) p. 1.
21. Ibid. pp. 3–4.
22. Ibid. p. 2.
23. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and Beyond,’
in G. Ó Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds), Rethinking Geopolitics (London and New York: Routledge 1998).
24. R. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,’ in
R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press 1986) pp. 207–210.
25. K. Dodds, Geopolitics in a Changing World (Harlow, England and New York: Prentice Hall
2000) p. 33.
26. S. Dalby, ‘Geopolitics, Knowledge and Power at the End of the Century,’ in G. Ó Tuathail,
S. Dalby, and P. Routledge (eds), The Geopolitics Reader (London and New York: Routledge 1998),
pp. 305–312; S. Dalby, ‘American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics,’ Political Geogra-
phy Quarterly 9/2 (1990) pp. 171–188.
27. Agnew and Corbridge (note 13).
28. L. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press 1960).
29. Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts (note 1) pp. 135–138.
30. P. Kelly and T. Boardman, ‘Intervention in the Caribbean: Latin American Responses to United
Nations Peacekeeping,’ Revista/Review Internamericana 6 (1976) pp. 403–411.
31. P. Kelly, ‘Escalation of Regional Conflict: Testing the Shatterbelt Concept,’ Political Geography
Quarterly 5/2 (1986) pp. 161–180.
32. S. Dalby, ‘Gender and Critical Geopolitics: Reading Security Discourse in the New World Dis-
order,’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2 (1994) p. 595.
33. Dodds, Geopolitics in a Changing World (note 25) pp. 32–33.
34. K. Dodds, ‘Cold War Geopolitics,’ in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Ó Tuathail (eds), A Com-
panion to Political Geography (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers 2003) pp.206–207.
35. F. Teggart, ‘Geography as an Aid to Statecraft: An Appreciation of Mackinder’s Democratic
Ideals and Reality,’ Geographical Review 8 (1919) pp. 235–240.
36. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (note 14) p. 6.
37. L. Hepple, ‘Metaphor, Geopolitical Discourse and the Military in South America,’ in T. Barnes
and S. Duncan (eds), Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representations of Language
(London and New York: Routledge 1992) p. 139.
 52 Phil Kelly

38. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society,’ Journal of
Strategic Studies 22 (1999) p. 108.
39. Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
(New York: Basic Books 1997) pp. xiii–xiv.
40. Ó Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics’ (note 38) p. 108.
41. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (note 12) p. 79; Agnew and Corbridge (note 13) p. 48.
42. Ó Tuathail, ‘A Strategic Sign: The Geopolitical Significance of Bosnia in US Foreign Policy,’
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 7 (1997) p. 42. See as well his ‘Cartesian perspectival-
ism’ description of the classical in this regard: Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996) pp. 23–24.
43. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics’ (note 38) p. 107.
44. G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press 1996) p. 60. Also, Ó Tuathail and Agnew (note 12) p. 80.
45. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (note 44) p. 2.
46. Ibid. p. 15.
47. Ó Tuathail, ‘Postmodern Geopolitics?’ (note 23) p. 23.
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48. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘The Critical Reading/Writing of Geopolitics: Re-Reading/Writing Wittfogel,

Bowman and Lacoste,’ Progress in Human Geography (1994, on-line version) p. 1.
49. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘The Language and Nature of the ‘New Geopolitics’ – The Case of US-El Salva-
dor Relations,’ Political Geography Quarterly 5/1 (1986) p. 73.
50. K. Dodds, Geopolitics in a Changing World (note 25) p. 33.
51. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘A Strategic Sign’ (note 42) pp. 1–21.
52. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (note 12) pp. 87–88.
53. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Foreign Policy and the Hyperreal: The Reagan Administration and the Script-
ing of ‘South Africa,’ in T. Barnes and J. Duncan (eds), Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in
the Representation of Landscape (London and New York: Routledge 1992) pp. 155–156.
54. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘The Effacement of Place? US Foreign Policy and the Spatiality of the Gulf Cri-
sis,’ Antipode (1993, on-line version) p. 2.
55. H. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1902) pp. 1–2.
56. Ó Tuathail, ‘Postmodern Geopolitics?’ (note 23) p. 33.
57. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (note 14) p. 1.
58. Dodds (note 25) p. 25.
59. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘De-Territorialized Threats and Global Dangers: Geopolitics, Risk Society and
Reflexive Modernization,’ Geopolitics 3 (1998, on-line version) pp. 5–9.
60. T. Luke and G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Global Flowmations, Local Fundamentalisms and Fast Geopoli-
tics:’America’ in an Accelerating World Order,’ in A. Herod, G. Ó Tuathail, and S. Roberts (eds), Unruly
World? Globalization, Governance and Geography (London and New York: Routledge 1998) p. 91.
61. N. Spykman, ‘Geography and Foreign Policy, I,’ American Political Science Review 21, (1938)
pp. 29–30.
62. Sprout and Sprout (note 1) pp. 44–45.
63. S. Dalby, ‘Green Geopolitics,’ in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Ó Tuathail (eds), A Companion
to Political Geography (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishers 2003) p. 443.
64. J. Agnew, Re-Visioning the World (London and New York: Routledge 1998) p. 2.
65. P. Routledge, ‘Anti-Geopolitics,’ in J. Agnew, K. Mitchell, and G. Ó Tuathail, eds, A Compan-
ion to Political Geography (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishers 2003) pp. 236–237; see also, G. Ó
Tuathail, ‘An Anti-Geopolitical Eye: Maggie O’Kane in Bosnia, 1992–1993,’ Gender, Place and Culture 3/
2 (1996) pp. 171–185.
66. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (note 14) p. 2.
67. Y. Ferguson and R. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest Continues: Theory and Global Politics (Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 2003) pp. 118,139.
68. Y. Lapid, ‘Where Should We Begin? Political Geography and International Relations,’ Political
Geography 18/8 (1999) p. 898.
69. D. Newman, ‘Comments on Daniel Elazar, Political Geography and Political Science,’ Political
Geography 18/8 (1999) pp. 905–911.
70. Agnew and Corbridge (note 13).
71. J. Glassman, “State Power Beyond the ‘Territorial Trap’: The Internationalization of the State,”
Political Geography 18/6 (1999) pp. 669–696.
 A Critique of Critical Geopolitics 53

72. P. Taylor, Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical Transition (London: Pinter Publish-
ers; New York: Guilford Publications, Inc. 1990) pp. 13–21.
73. G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics‘ (note 44); J. Sidaway, ‘The (Re)making of the Western
‘Geographical Tradition’: Some Missing Links,’ Area 29/1 (1997) pp. 72–80.
74. N. Spykman, ‘Geography and Foreign Policy I,’ (note 61) p. 28.
75. See various articles in the leading Uruguayan geopolitics journal, Geosur, and particularly
those of its editor, Bernardo Quagliotti de Bellis.
76. P. Kelly and T. Whigham, ‘Geopolítica del Paraguay: Vulnerabilidades Regionales y Propues-
tas Nacionales,’ Perspectiva Internacional Paraguaya 3 (1990) pp. 41–78.
77. P. Kelly, ‘Geopolitics of Paraguay: Pivotal Position within a Model of Geopolitics,’ Historical
Text Archive (Mississippi State University 2002) pp. 1–45.
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