Succession DIGESTS Cases 1-69

Succession DIGESTS Cases 1-69
Rodelas v Aranza, 27

Azaola v Singson, 27
Alvarez v IAC, 2
Codoy v Calugay, 28
Rabadilla v CA, 3
Unson v Abella, 28
NHA v Almeida, 4
Maloto v CA, 29
Estate of Hemady v Luzon Surety, 5
Lipana v Lipana, 30
Vitug v CA, 6
Gago v Mamuyac, 30
Enriquez v Abadia, 6
Molo v Molo, 31
Jimenez v Fernandez, 7
Heirs of Lasam v Umengan, 32
Miciano v Brimo, 8
Seangio v Reyes, 33
Cayetano v Leonidas, 9
Gallanosa v Arcangel, 34
Abangan v Abangan, 9
De la Cerna v Potot, 35
Suroza v Honrado, 10
Maninang v CA, 36
Mercado vs. Lacuesta, 11
Pastor v CA, 37
Testate Estate of Abada v. Abaja, 12
Nepomuceno v CA, 38
Azuela v CA, 13
Pascual v De la Cruz, 39
Barut v Cabacungan, 14
Reyes v Barreto-Datu, 40
Balonan v Abellana, 14
Austria v Reyes, 41
Nera v Rimando, 15
Nuguid v Nuguid, 42
Taboada v Rosal, 15
Morales v Olondriz, 42
Santos Mitra v Saban-Guevarra, 16
Balanay v Martinez, 43
Cagro v Cagro, 17
Aznar v Duncan, 44
Cruz v Villasor, 17
Solano v CA, 45
Javellana v Ledesma, 17
Escuin v Escuin, 46
Guerrero v Bihis, 18
Lajom v Leuterio, 46
Ortega v Valmonte, 18
JLT Agro v Balansag, 47
Garcia v Vasquez, 19
Rabadilla v CA, 48
Alvarado v Gaviola, 20
Perez v Garchitorena, 49
Gil v Murciano, 21
Crisologo v Singson, 50
Caneda v CA, 21

Calde v CA, 22
Cuevas v Achacoso, 22

Lopez v Lopez, 23

Gonzales v CA, 23

Roxas de Jesus v De Jesus, 24
Kalaw v Relova, 24

Ajero v CA, 25

Labrador v CA, 26

Gan v Yap, 26

Succession CASE DIGESTS, EH402, AY2019-2020

Based on Case Assignments of Atty Gravador by RGL 1 of 51

the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
Alvarez v IAC, through his death to another or others either by his will or
by operation of law.
GR No 68053, 5/7/1990, Fernan, CJ
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights
Doctrinal Rule and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by
his death.
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties,
Facts their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
* Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The
registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.
heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received
* Herein private respondents are grandchildren of Aniceto. from the decedent.
* Teodora, daughter of Aniceto, cultivated only three
hectares of Lot 823.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's
* After liberation, the heirs were informed that Fortunato contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
possession of Lot 773. ‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties.
* Santiago had a TCT over portions of Lot 773 which he sold Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they
to Fuentebella. cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
* After Fuentebella's death, a motion requesting authority to transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
sell Lots 773-A and B was filed and by virtue of the order damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property
granting such motion, said lots were sold to Alvarez. involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction,
the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of
* Two years after such sale, the heirs of Aniceto filed a
their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the
complaint for the "return" of ownership and possession of
hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
lots 773 and 823. During its pendency, Alvarez sold lots
payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be
773-A and B to Dr Siason.
made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of
* CFI ruled in favor of the heirs and ordered Alvarez to the value of their inheritance.
reconvey the lots to them. However, its execution failed in

that the lots have already been sold to Siason.
Disposition
* In another action for recovery of real property, now
impleading Siason, the CFI ruled that Siason who WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above
purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a hereby AFFIRMED.
buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Further,
equity demanded that the Yaneses recover the actual value
of the land because the sale thereof executed between
Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. IAC
affirmed.

Issue/s
WON it was proper to order the heirs of Alvarez to pay the
actual value of the land to the Yaneses.

Held
YES. As to the propriety of the present case, it has long
been established that the sole remedy of the landowner
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages.

Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of


In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No.
Rabadilla v CA, 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the
usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
GR No 113725, 6/29/2000, Purisima, J
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge
Doctrinal Rule Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and
title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of
Facts
the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
* In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the
meters of that parcel of land. trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
* Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint against the heirs of Dr Jorge Rabadilla to enforce
Disposition
the provisions of said Codicil. She alleged the following
violations: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged in disregard of the testatrix's

specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the
near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to
deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar to plaintiff.
* The RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed.

Issue/s
WON the CA erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to
the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of
paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil
Code.

Held
NO. It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the
widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by
operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and
the successional rights were transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,
not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And
since obligations not extinguished by death also form part
of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death.


should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to
NHA v Almeida, properly distribute them later to her heirs–in accordance
with a will or by operation of law.
GR No 162784, 6/22/2007, Puno, CJ
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her
Doctrinal Rule
interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing
Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita
Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified
Facts nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both
parties–Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
* NHA, through its predecessor the LTA, awarded Margarita
transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became
Herrera several portions of land as evidenced by an
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by
Agreement to Sell.
operation of law.
* She had two children: Beatriz, who predeceased
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is
Margarita, and Francisca. Segunda Almeida is the daughter
not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer
and heir of Beatriz.
by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a
* Upon the death of Margarita, Francisca executed a Deed resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make
of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining another contract to sell to other parties of a property
relative and based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay. already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an
* Almeida filed a case to nullify said Deed. A Decision was act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales
reached nullifying such deed. and obligations.
* While the case was pending, Francisca filed an application
with the NHA to purchase the same lots. Almeida protested. Disposition
The NHA granted the application.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing
* RTC rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of Authority is DENIED.
the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President
awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It
declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of
Herrera's heirs null and void. It ruled that the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition
of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held
that the said document must first be submitted to probate
before it can transfer property. CA affirmed.

Issue/s
WON the sale of NHA of the lots to Francisca was proper
noting that there was an existing Contract to Sell between it
and Margarita.

Held
NO. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the
said document commences at the time of death of the
author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y
bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay..." Hence, in such period,
all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and
shall be in the possession of her estate until they are
transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil
Code.
The NHA gave due course to the application made by
Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial
applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and
obligations to the estate including whatever interest she
has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the
extent of the interest that the original owner had over the
property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita
Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest


partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By
Estate of Hemady v Luzon Surety, contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate
guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no
GR No L-8437, 11/28/1956, Reyes, JBL, J
provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death
Doctrinal Rule of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art.
2056, to the effect that "one who is obliged to furnish a
Facts guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity,
capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer
* The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate
for the obligation, which he guarantees. It will be noted,
based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter
however, that the law requires these qualities to be present
bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the
only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty.
deceased K. H. Hemady, as surety solidary guarantor.
It is self-evident that once the contract has become
* Lower court dismissed on the ground that "whatever perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the
losses may occur after Hemady's death are not chargeable guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the
to his estate because upon his death he ceased to be eventual liability he has contracted; and if that be true of his
guarantor." capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his
integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article
alongside the capacity.
Issue/s
Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is incompatible with
WON the obligation of Hemady as guarantor was
the trial court's stand that the requirement of integrity in the
exyingusihed upon his death.
guarantor or surety makes the latter's undertaking strictly
personal, so linked to his individuality that the guaranty
Held automatically terminates upon his death.
NO. While in our successional system the responsibility of The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in
the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered
value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by
rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily
774 and 776 of the New Civil Code expressely so provide. passed upon his death to his heirs.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of
the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant Disposition
the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract.
records are ordered remanded to the court of origin, with
What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H.
instructions to proceed in accordance with law.
Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the
moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse
on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This
reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting
from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it
was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by
Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long
as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility
by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional and
contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not
be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at
the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the
contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon
nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations
under Article 1311 exists when they are "not transmissible by
operation of law". The provision makes reference to those
cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations
are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support
(Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct
(Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726),


WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate
Vitug v CA, court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution, dated
February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
GR No 82027, 3/29/1990, Sarmiento, J

Enriquez v Abadia,
Facts
GR No L-7188, 8/9/1954, Montemayor, J
* Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from
the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his Facts
advances to the estate which he claimed were personal * On Sep 6, 1923, Fr Abadia executed a document
funds. purporting to be his Last Will and Testament marked Exhibit
* Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground "A".
that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal partnership * One Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A",
properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and nephews
allegedly no ground for reimbursement. who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no
* Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property will, filed opposition.
having acquired the same through a survivorship * The CFI found the document to be a holographic will and
agreement executed with his late wife and the bank. that although at the time it was executed and at the time of
* RTC upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by
Vitug's motion. CA reversed holding that the survivorship law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in
"did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic
prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code." wills.

Issue/s Issue/s
WON the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance WON the provisions of the New Civil Code on holographic
mortis causa. wills is to be applied noting that the decedent died prior to
its effectivity.
Held
NO. The conveyance in question is not, first or all, one of Held
mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. The NO. At the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at
monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills
the nature of conjugal funds. were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering
vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and
after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the
between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not
a spouse's own properties to the other. complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the
first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of
even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the
its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that contract
three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being
death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The
having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance
upon her death a vested right over the amounts under of the law in force at the time it is made." The above
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of
Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in authority to the effect that the validity of a will is to be
the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's
court was in error. Being the separate property of death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court
petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but
deceased. at the time the instrument was executed.

Disposition Disposition
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is
reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.


illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any
Jimenez v Fernandez, successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos was
concerned.
GR No L-46364, 4/6/1990, Paras, J
Melecia in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her
Doctrinal Rule
by Carlos or Sulpicia of the litigated portion of the land
could not even legally transfer parcel of land to Cagampan
who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to
Facts herein private respondents.
* The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of

436 sqm of that parcel of residential land with a TCT issued Disposition
in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.
* The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square
meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin
Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos
Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his
father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia.
* After the death of Fermin, the entire parcel of land was
registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos and Sulpicia
(uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso.
* Carlos died, and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia
Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took
possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting
of 436 square meters.
* Melecia sold the lot to Cagampan who in turn transferred
it to Grado.
* Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the
other half of the property appertaining to Carlos, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased
uncle. She then instituted the present action for the
recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of
436 square meters occupied by defendant Grado.
* CFI dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.

Issue/s
WON Melecia had the right to sell the subject lot noting that
her filiation to Carlos was not proven.

Held
NO. From the start the respondent court erred in not
declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as
Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and
therefore, had no right over the property in question.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent. Since Carlos, owner of one-half pro-indiviso
portion of that parcel of land died on July 9, 1936 way
before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
successional rights pertaining to his estate must be
determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Even assuming that Melecia was born out of the
common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria
Cayabyab) and Carlos, she could not even be considered
an acknowledged natural child because Carlos was then
legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified
to marry Maria and consequently Melecia was an


testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Miciano v Brimo, Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
GR No 22595, 11/1/1924, Romualdez, J
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid
Doctrinal Rule and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

Facts Disposition
* The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is
Brimo is in question in this case. directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such
* Andre, one of the brothers of Joseph, opposed it. a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo
* Andre opposed based on the fact that the partition in as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
Turkish nationality.
* The oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines.

Issue/s
(1) WON the opposition on the ground of inapplication of the
national law of decedent in executing his will was proper.
(2) WON the exclusion of the Andre as a legatee was
proper.

Held
(1) NO. It has not been proved in these proceedings what
the Turkish laws are. Andre, himself, acknowledges it when
he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence
on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme
of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed.
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this
respect was not erroneous.

(2) NO. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional,
and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The fact is,
however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to
law, for Article 792 of the Civil Code.
Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to
Article 10 of the Civil Code, such national law of the


Cayetano v Leonidas, Abangan v Abangan,

GR No L-54919, 5/30/1984, Gutierrez, Jr, J GR No 13431, 11/12/1919, Avancena, J

Facts Facts
* CFI admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will * CFI admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July,
and testament of Adoracion C. Campos. 1916.
* As Hermogenes Campos, father of decedent was the only * Said document consists of two sheets, the first of which
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the
entire estate of the deceased Adoracion. direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The
* Nenita C. Paguia, sister of Adoracion, filed a petition for following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly
the reprobate of a will of the deceased which was allegedly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses.
executed in the US. In her petition Nenita alleged that the * Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the
testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters;
and was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA. and these omissions, according to appellants' contention,
are defects whereby the probate of the will should have
been denied.
Issue/s

WON the will of Adoracion executed in the US was valid.
Issue/s

WON the will was duly executed and should be admitted to
Held
probate.
YES. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is

limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and Held
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities YES. Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally consisting two sheets the first of which contains all the
comes only after the court has declared that the will has testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by
been duly authenticated. However, where practical the testator and three witnesses and the second contains
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets
should meet the issue. be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited witnesses, or be paged.
the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty
her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of their "truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Thus, the law which subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. The must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete will. So when an interpretation already given assures such
stranger. ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent disregarded.
must apply.
Disposition
Disposition For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is from is hereby AFFIRMED.
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.


testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that
Suroza v Honrado, the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino
language". That could only mean that the will was written in
AM No 2026-CFI, 12/19/1981, Aquino, J
a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
Doctrinal Rule therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of
article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Facts The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation

clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina
* Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent
Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator"
judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its
instead of "testatrix". Furthermore, after the hearing
face is void because it is written in English, a language not
conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent
known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a
judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented
forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not
as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition,
appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
respondent judge should have personally conducted the
* Mauro Suroza and wife, Marcelina, were childless and hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have
adopted Agapito. ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
* Agapito married Nenita and begot Lilia. He became
disabled and was under guardianship of Nenita.
Disposition
* A woman named Arsenia, delivered a child to Marcelina,
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of
purporting that such child was Agapito's and hers.
Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary for one
* Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on month is imposed on respondent judge.
July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years old. That will, which

is in English, was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. In
that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her
supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
* Judge Honrado ordered Nenita to be ejected from the
testatrix's house that was conveyed to Marilyn.
* Nenita then filed a motion to set aside such order alleging
that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased.
* In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already
apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming
Marcelina' s estate, he issued on April 23 an order
probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the
instituted heiress.
* Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir
is void because of the preterition of Agapito.

Issue/s
WON the purported will of Marcelina should NOT have
been probated.

Held
YES. We hold that disciplinary action should be taken
against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the
testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of
justice because the decedent’s legal heirs and not the
instituted heiress in the void will should have inherited the
decedent's estate.
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and
noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked
by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily
perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that
English was a language "understood and known" to the


Mercado vs. Lacuesta,
G.R. No. L-4067, 11/29/1951, Paras, CJ
Doctrinal Rule

Facts
* This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals
disallowing the will of Antero Mercado dated January 3,
1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect.
* The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino
Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed
below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino
Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross
immediately after his name.
* The CA, reversing the CFI ruled that the attestation clause
failed
(1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of
the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentine
Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence
of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses;
(2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the
testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator
has written & cross at the end of his name and on the left
margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at
the end thereof;
(3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other.

Issue/s
WON the attestation clause failed to state that Mercado
caused Atty Javier to write his name under his express
direction, and thereby defective.

Held
YES. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to
state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to
write the testator's name under his express direction.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will
is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the
ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection
we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a
thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot
and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

Disposition
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.


Testate Estate of Abada v. Abaja, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old
Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the
G. R. No. 147145, 1/31/2005, Carpio, J
intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of
any will. Therefore, Abada’s will does not require
Facts acknowledgment before a notary public.
* The CA sustained the RTC admitting to probate the last
will and testament of Alipio Abada (“Abada”). (3) NO. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will
* Abada and wife Toray died without legitimate children. itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in
* Alipio filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof
will of Abada. The latter allegedly named as his aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada
(“Eulogio”) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of knew or understood the contents of the will and the
Eulogio. Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified
that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their
* Nicanor Caponong (“Caponong”) opposed the petition on
place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
the ground that Abada left no will when he died in 1940.
would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves
* Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really that Abada speaks the Spanish language.
executed it, should be disallowed for the following reasons:

(1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it
was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it (4) YES. A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an
was procured by undue and improper pressure and attestation clause. The pages are numbered correlatively
influence on the part of the beneficiaries. with the letters “ONE” and “TWO”. The attestation clause
clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every page
* Other oppositors are the nephews, nieces and
in the presence of the witnesses.
grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the
* Alipio filed another petition, this time for the probate of the
attestation clause does not indicate the number of
will of Toray.
witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the
* The RTC allowed the probate of the will of Toray and appellate court in applying the rule on substantial
became final and executory. compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While
* The RTC, in another order, designated Belinda the attestation clause does not state the number of
Caponong-Noble (“Caponong-Noble”) Special witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three
Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray. witnesses signed it.
* In a resolution, the RTC also allowed the probate of the An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving,
will of Abada. in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory

of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may
Issue/s still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be rejected
(1) What is the applicable law to the probate of the last will where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law.
of Abada. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of
(2) Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that
before a notary public; of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to
(3) Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The
a language or dialect known to the testator; question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for
(4) Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and
presentation of evidence aliunde.
if so, whether the attestation clause complies with the
requirements of the applicable laws; Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause
does not expressly state the circumstances that the

witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in
Held the presence of the testator and of each other. Precision of
(1) Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in language in the drafting of an attestation clause is
force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like
Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if
governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced
New Civil Code. that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.

(2) NO. Witnesses authenticating a will without the Disposition WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the
attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles 700 Court of Appeals.
and 701, are also required to know the testator. However,


Azuela v CA, fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee
of compliance.
G.R. No. 122880, 4/12/2006, Tinga, J
Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this
Doctrinal Rule
requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and
number of pages on which the will is written is fatally Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by substantial compliance with the requirements under Article
the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or
most importantly, a will which does not contain an anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any comprise the will.
one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial
An examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even
will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its
rejection.
Facts (1) The attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
* The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, witnesses. If an attestation clause not signed by the three
purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it
died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent
* The will, consisted of two (2) pages and written in the occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of
vernacular Pilipino. the witnesses.
* The three named witnesses to the will affixed their (2) The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must
signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
* Oppositor Geralda Castillo argued that the will was not
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
pointed out that decedent's signature did not appear on the
An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. The
second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental
acknowledged.
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they
* The RTC allowed probate but was reversed by the CA. had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free
act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain
of perjury.
Issue/s

WON the attestation clause failed to comply with the
requirements of Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code Disposition
rendering the will void. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Held
YES. As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation
clause fails to state the number of pages of the will. There
was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a
space having been allotted for the insertion of the number
of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never
filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated
in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might
easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would
completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will
and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the
sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following
sheets or pages.
Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since
that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a
failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses
signed in one another's presence should be considered a


Barut v Cabacungan, Balonan v Abellana,
G.R. No. 6285, 2/15/1912, Moreland, J G.R. No. L-15153, 8/31/1960, Labrador, J
Doctrinal Rule Doctrinal Rule

Facts Facts
* This appeal arises out of an application on the part of * The Will sought to be probated is written in the Spanish
Pedro Barut to probate the last will and testament of Maria language and consists of two (2) typewritten pages.
Salomon. By the terms of said will Pedro Barut received the * The first page is signed by Juan Bello and under his name
larger part of decedent's property. appears typewritten 'Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana,
* The original will is in Ilocano. xxxx , Ciudad de Zamboanga', and on the second page
* After disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental
former wills by her made. She also stated in said will that witnesses.
being unable to read or write, the same had been read to
her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that Issue/s
she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as
Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the
testatrix.
typewritten statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana *
* Oppositors alleged that a later will had been executed by * *, Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements
the deceased that was the subject of GR No 6284. of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be
* The probate court found that the will was not entitled to executed?
probate upon the sole ground that the handwriting of the
person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to
Held
the will for and on her behalf looked more like the
handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will. NO. The old law as well as the new require that the testator
himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testator's

name must be written by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction.
Issue/s In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta
WON a will is invalid by the mere dissimilarity in writing. Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said
Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a
failure to comply with the express requirement in the law
Held
that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name
NO. The Court do not believe that the mere dissimilarity in be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence
writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to and by his express direction.
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses
It appearing that the above provision of the law has not
to the will that the signature of the testatrix was written by
been complied with, we are constrained to declare that the
Severo Agayan at her request and in her presence and in
said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be
the presence of all of the witnesses to the will. It is
admitted to probate.
immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it
is written at her request and in her presence and in the
presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will. Disposition
It is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the will, Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside
it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name and the petition for the probate of the will denied.
of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is
that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was

signed at her express direction in the presence of three
witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the
statute requires.

Disposition

The judgment of the probate court must be and is hereby

reversed and that court is directed to enter an order in the
usual form probating the will involved in this litigation and to
proceed with such probate in accordance with law


Nera v Rimando, Taboada v Rosal,
G.R. No. 5971, 2/27/1911, Carson, J G.R. No. L-36033, 11/5/1982, Gutierrez, Jr. J
Doctrinal Rule
The question whether the testator and the subscribing Facts
witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the * The alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea
presence of each other does not depend upon proof of Perez was written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the and
the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper consisted of two pages.
at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but
* The first page contains the entire testamentary
that at that moment existing conditions and their position
dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page
with relation to each other were such that by merely casting
by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the
the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each
three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which
other sign.
contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is
signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3)
Facts attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to testatrix.
the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in * The RTC denied probate.
the court below, is whether one of the subscribing
witnesses was present in the small room where it was
Issue/s
executed at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of
at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three
in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the
doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching
Held
their signatures to the instrument.
NO. Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the

will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
Issue/s himself or by the testator's name written by another person
WON a subscribing witness must be with the testator and in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested
other witnesses when the latter affixed their signatures. and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and
Held
subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
YES. The court is of opinion that this subscribing witness execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally
was in the small room with the testator and the other that those things are done which the statute requires for the
subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their execution of a will and that the signature of the testator
signatures to the instrument. Had this subscribing witness exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the
been proven to have been in the outer room at the time signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for
when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which
attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner was executed by the testator.
room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is
those signatures under such circumstances not being done
our considered view that the will in this case was
"in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of
because the line of vision from this witness to the testator
identification.
and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have
been impeded by the curtain separating the inner room The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left
from the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
signature." genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the
due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation

clause.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met
Disposition and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental
The decree entered by the court below admitting the witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which
instrument propounded therein to probate as the last will contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so
and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is when the will was properly identified by subscribing witness
AFFIRMED. Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the
testatrix.


have signed on the last page of the subject will. When
Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to
subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the
Disposition
logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary
WHEREFORE , the present petition is hereby granted. The disposition ends. As the probate court correctly
orders of the respondent court which denied the probate of appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any
the will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
probate, and the motion for appointment of a special Acknowledgment.
administrator are set aside. The respondent court is

ordered to allow the probate of the will and to conduct
further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No (2) YES. The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the
pronouncement on costs. Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides that:
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
Santos Mitra v Saban-Guevarra,
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language
G.R. No. 213994, 4/18/2018, Reyes, Jr., J used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
Facts compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
* Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of An examination of the will in question reveals that the
the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y Reyes (Legaspi) with attestation clause indeed failed to state the number of
prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. pages comprising the will. However, as was the situation in
Taboada, this omission was supplied in the
* It was alleged that the petitioner is the de facto adopted
Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is
daughter of Legaspi, and that the latter died single.
composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included.
* Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan

(respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs,
opposed the petition.
* They aver that the will was not executed in accordance Disposition
with the formalities required by law; that since the last page WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
of the will, which contained the Acknowledgement, was not GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22,2013 and Resolution
signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will dated August 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
should be declared invalid; that the attestation clause failed CV No. 93671 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
to state the number of pages upon which the will was Decision dated February 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial
written; and that the will was executed under undue and Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in SP. Proc. Case No.
improper pressure. C-3450 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The case is
* RTC approved the probate but was reversed by the CA. remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issue/s
(1) Whether the CA erred in finding that the instrumental
witnesses to the will failed to sign on each and every page
thereof on the left margin, except the last, as required under
Article 805 of the Civil Code

(2) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the failure to state
the number of pages comprising the will on the attestation
clause renders such will defective

Held
(1) YES. There is no doubt that the requirement under the
Article 805 of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of
the testator and of the instrumental witnesses on each and
every page of the will on the left margin, except the last,
was complied with. It should also be mentioned that the
respondents take a skewed stance in insisting that the
testator Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses should


Cagro v Cagro, Issue/s
G.R. No. L-5826, 4/29/1953, Paras, CJ WON the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z.
Cruz was executed in accordance with law, particularly

Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first
Facts requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
The main objection insisted upon by the appellants is that subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator
the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause is and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary
not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question public.
that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the
Held
page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the
left-hand margin. NO. We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the
last will and testament in question was not executed in

accordance with law. The notary public before whom the
Issue/s will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
WON a will is fatally defective if the attestation clause is not instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
signed by the attesting witnesses. himself his having signed the will.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public
Held himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
YES. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one
appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a
will appear before the other to acknowledge his
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
participation in the making of the will. To permit such a
will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses,
situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the American jurisprudence do not serve the purpose of the law
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the in this jurisdiction because the notaries public and
bottom thereof negatives their participation. witnesses referred to in the aforecited cases merely acted
as instrumental, subscribing or attesting witnesses, and not

as acknowledging witnesses. Here the notary public acted
Disposition not only as attesting witness but also as acknowledging
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 806 of the Civil
probate of the will in question denied. Code.

Cruz v Villasor,
G.R. No. L-32213, 11/26/1973, Esguerra, J Disposition
Doctrinal Rule FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

hereby reversed and the probate of the last will and
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
testament of Valente Z. Cruz is declared not valid and
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
hereby set aside.
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will.
Javellana v Ledesma,
Facts G.R. No. L-7179, 6/30/1955, Reyes, JBL, J
* The surviving spouse of deceased Cruz opposed the
allowance of the will, alleging that the will was executed Facts
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
* CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the
influence; that the said instrument was executed without the
Visayan dialect as the testament and codicil of deceased
testator having been fully informed of the contents thereof,
Ledesma Vda de Javellana.
particularly as to what properties he was disposing; and that
the supposed last will and testament was not executed in * Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of
accordance with law. said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that
the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law.
* Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely,
Deogracias T. Jamaoas, Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares, and Atty.
Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the Issue/s
same time the Notary Public before whom the will was (1) WON the testament of 1950 was executed by the testatrix
supposed to have been acknowledged. in the presence of the instrumental witnesses;


(2) WON the acknowledgment clause was signed and the
notarial seal affixed by the notary without the presence of Issue/s
the testatrix and the witnesses;
WON the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting
Held outside the place of his commission satisfied the
(1) YES. Witnesses presented by protestant lacked requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code.
credibility.
Held
(2) NO. Whether or not the notary signed the certification of NO. One of the formalities required by law in connection
acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be
witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. Unlike acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the
require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary indispensable requisites for the validity of a will.
should be accomplished in one single act. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
A comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil deed in going before some competent officer and declaring
Code reveals that while testator and witnesses must sign in it to be his act or deed.
the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his
that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary favor to perform notarial acts. It is issued "within and for" a
public by the testator and the witnesses" particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary
certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the
the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction
itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate only.
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her
witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments
Disposition
should be completed without interruption
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Disposition

The decision admitting the will to probate is affirmed.
Ortega v Valmonte,

G.R. No. 157451, 12/16/2005, Panganiban, J
Guerrero v Bihis,
Doctrinal Rule
G.R. No. 174144, 4/17/2007, Corona, J
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who
Doctrinal Rule
oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be
An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of allowed.
the officer's jurisdiction is void as if the person taking it ware

wholly without official character.
Facts

* Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written
Facts
in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June
* Petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first
A. Bihis are children of deceased Tamio de Buenaventura. page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a
* Guerrero filed a petition for the probate of the will of her part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or
mother. This was opposed by Bihis, alleging it was not bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second
clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and
requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at
procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand
the will through undue and improper pressure and margin.
influence. * The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by
* The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the Leticia on the grounds that:
witnesses at the testatrix's residence in Quezon City before 1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator,
Atty. Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo was a especially those found in the USA;
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
* RTC disallowed the probate and affirmed by the CA.


2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
of the heirs of the testator; or to give them proper notice character of the testamentary act.
pursuant to law; Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind
with; at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
of the alleged execution he being in an advance sate of month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to
senility; be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and According to Article 799, the three things that the testator
pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents must have the ability to know to be considered of sound
and/or assistants; and/or mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator's bounty,
he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
the time of affixing his signature thereto; It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still
* The RTC disallowed the probate but was reversed by the able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned,
CA. the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient

that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have
Issue/s stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will
(1) Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
subject will was procured by fraud or trickery, and that fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should irrelevant.
be his last will and testament.
(2) Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary Disposition
capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
Held AFFIRMED.
(1) NO.
Petitioner alleges that respondent, who is the testator's wife Garcia v Vasquez,
and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and G.R. No. L-26615, 4/30/1970, Reyes, JBL, J
the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Doctrinal Rule
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the
execution and the attestation of the will.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The Facts
burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will * Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried, leaving no
only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. ascendants, descendants nor siblings.
Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving
* Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the
allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
deceased, petitioned the CFI for probate of the alleged last
presented.
will and testament of del Rosario.

* The oppositions invariably charged that the instrument
(2) YES. In determining the capacity of the testator to make executed in 1960 was not intended by the deceased to be
a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines: her true will; that the signature of the deceased appearing
Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the in the will was procured through undue and improper
testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution. pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries
Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or object of her bounty; that the instrument itself reveals
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered irregularities in its execution, and that the formalities
by disease, injury or other cause. required by law for such execution have not been complied
with.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be * The CFI allowed probate of the 1960 will.


* The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the
fact that the testatrix, Gliceria A. del Rosario, during her lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the
lifetime, executed two wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three
of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that she instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four
knew and spoke, witnessed by Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, followed the reading with their own respective copies
Jesus Y. Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and acknowledged previously furnished them.
before notary public Jose Ayala; and another, dated 29 * Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to
December 1960, consisting of 1 page and written in Tagalog, probate.
witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena,
* A codicil was then executed changing some dispositions
and Francisco Lopez and acknowledged before notary
in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye
public Remigio M. Tividad.
operation.
* Testimony from an ophthalmologist revealed that Gliceria
* A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil
del Rosario was incapable of reading, and could not have
was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by
read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her on
private respondent as executor.
29 December 1960.
* Petitioner opposed alleging that the will sought to be

probated was not executed and attested as required by law;
Issue/s that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally
WON the will of 1960 was properly executed noting the incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due
glaring typographical errors and the fact that deceased had to senility and old age; that the will was executed under
poor vision. duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the
Held
testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator
NO. For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, was procured by fraud or trick.
the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was, as appellant
* RTC and CA allowed probate.
oppositors contend, not unlike a blind testator, and the due
execution of her will would have required observance of the
provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code. Issue/s
"ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the
him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so,
again, by the notary public before whom the will is was the double-reading requirement of said article
acknowledged." complied with?
In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing
in the records to show that the above requisites have been Held
complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will
YES. Brigido was blind. Since Brigido Alvarado was
sought to be probated suffers from infirmity' that affects its
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on
due execution.
the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor,"
"defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course
Disposition for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the court the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808.
below allowing to probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it
was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the
eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the
Alvarado v Gaviola, same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not
G.R. No. 74695, 9/14/1993, Bellosillo, J twice as Art. 808 requires.
Doctrinal Rule This Court has held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of
the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the

solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended
Facts to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
* Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will wherein he but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to
disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly destroy the testamentary privilege.
revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will
awaiting probate. and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three
* The notary public and by private respondent who were instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
present at the execution, the testator did not read the final subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being


asked, that the contents read corresponded with his However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except
instructions. Only then did the signing and by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
acknowledgement take place. attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Disposition Facts
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed * Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 executed a last will and testament and later sought for its
is AFFIRMED. probate.
* Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of testator,
filed a petition for intestate proceedings and opposed the
Gil v Murciano,
probate. They alleged that the testator was already in a
G.R. No. L-3362, 3/1/1951, Jugo, J poor state of health such that he could not have possibly
Doctrinal Rule executed the same.
* RTC allowed the probate.
* In the CA, they asserted therein that the will in question is
Facts null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is
fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the
* CFI admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of
instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator
the deceased Carlos Gil. Pilar Gil Vda de Murciano opposed
signing the will in their presence and that they also signed
raising questions of law.
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
* The only copy available is a printed form contained in the testator and of one another.
record appeal.
* CA affirmed RTC on the ground of substantial compliance.
* The attestation clause does not state that the alleged

testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by
the witnesses.
Issue/s
Issue/s WON the attestation cause was proper and that there was
substantial compliance.
WON failure to state in the attestation clause that testator
signed the will is fatal.
Held
Held NO. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause,
the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of
YES. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the
the will, should state
attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the
will, this being the most essential element of the clause. (1) the number of pages used upon which the will is written;
Without it there is no attestation at all. (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to
There is no reason why wills should not be executed by sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
complying substantially with the clear requisites of the law, attesting witnesses; and
leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the
right to dispose of property by will is not natural but testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses
statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied. also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
Disposition
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted
reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and attestation clause, in contravention of the express
declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the
Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state

the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator
Caneda v CA, sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that
G.R. No. 103554, 5/28/1993, Regalado, J they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Doctrinal Rule
We agree.
Omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the
What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is
will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
another.


The rule on substantial compliance must be limited to accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an Code.
examination of the will itself.
Disposition
Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the DENIED. The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals,
impugned decision of respondent court is hereby dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. the Last Will and Testament, and the Codicil thereto, of the
decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
Calde v CA,

G.R. No. 93980, 6/27/1994, Puno, J
Cuevas v Achacoso,

G.R. No. L-3497, 5/18/1951, Bautista Angelo, J
Facts

* Decedent left a Will and Codicil both contained her
thumbmarks. They were also signed by three (3) attesting Facts
witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, * Jose Venzon died leaving a will. His widow, Valentina
then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Cuevas, filed a petition for the probate of said will.
Bauko, Mt. Province. * One Pilar Achacoso filed an alternative petition for the
* Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the probate of a previous will executed by the deceased.
Petition filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the * CFI approved the latter will. The main error assigned
will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that refers to the alleged lack of attestation clause in the will
decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally under consideration (latter will), or to the fact that, if there is
incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by
advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedent's the instrumental witnesses, but by the testator himself, and
thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue it is claimed that this defect has the effect of invalidating the
influence; and that the codicil was not executed in will.
accordance with law.

* RTC approved probate but was reversed by CA.
Issue/s
* CA reversed on the ground that the signatures were of
WON an attestation made by testator himself more than by
different colors.
the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective.

Issue/s
Held
WON both decedent's Last Will and Testament, and its
NO. This apparent anomaly, however, is not in our opinion
Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on
serious nor substantial as to affect the validity of the will, it
separate occasions.
appearing that right under the signature of the testator,
there appear the signatures of the three instrumental
Held witnesses.
YES. As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the An instrumental witness, therefore, does not merely attest
signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedent’s will to the signature of the testator but also to the proper
and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the officers execution of the will. The fact that the three instrumental
were in black. This discrepancy was not explained by witnesses have signed the will immediately under the
petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two signature of the testator, shows that they have in fact
pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but
In fact, two (2) of petitioner's witnesses even testified that also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the
only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two attestation clause.
testamentary documents.
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts Disposition
the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. The will
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court,
show in black and white -- or more accurately, in black and
blue -- that more than one pen was used by the signatories
thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for
respondent court to disbelieve petitioner's claim that both
testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in


Lopez v Lopez, The instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must
be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the
G.R. No. 189984, 11/12/2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J
Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article
821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of
Facts belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that
* Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. evidence be first established on record that the witnesses
Lopez, and their four legitimate children as compulsory have a good standing in the community or that they are
heirs. He left a last will and testament. honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the
* Richard, son and designated executor, filed a petition for
contrary is established otherwise.
probate. Marybeth, one of the daughters, opposed
contending that the purported last will and testament was
not executed and attested as required by law, and that it Facts
was procured by undue and improper pressure and * Private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for
influence on the part of Richard. the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the
* RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply deceased Isabel Gabriel.
with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a * The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is
statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed
used upon which the will is written. barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It
* CA affirmed noting that while the acknowledgment of the consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the
will made mention of “7 pages including the page on which attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary
the ratification and acknowledgment are written,” the will public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel
had actually 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the
thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to left margin of all the pages.
explain the discrepancy. * The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales,
herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be
Issue/s the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
WON the discrepancy number of pages stated in the 1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative 2.
attestation clause vis-a-vis the actual number of pages of that the same was not executed and attested as required by
the will is fatally defective. law; 3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the
purported will, the decedent lacked testamentary capacity

due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative
Held 4. that the purported will was procured through undue and
YES. The law is clear that the attestation must state the improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal
number of pages used upon which the will is written. The beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible * Court a quo disallowed the probate. CA reversed.
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and

prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
Issue/s
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects
in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed WON proof to the credibility of witnesses is required.
in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment
portion of the subject LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT that it Held
“consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
NO. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications
ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be
of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets
deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of
forth the disqualification from being a witness to a will.
8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy
cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the
but through the presentation of evidence aliunde. witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his
good standing in the community, his reputation for

trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and
Disposition uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code
are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can
Gonzales v CA, be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions
G.R. No. L-37453, 5/25/1979, Guerrero, J propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown
Doctrinal Rule from his appearance, testimony, or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
dumb and that he is able to read and write to the


satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the execution nor was there any substitution of Wills and
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a
a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to language known to her. There is also no question as to its
said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the genuineness and due execution. All the children of the
rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will
character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity
applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection
under the Civil Code of the Philippines. interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that
the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date
A 'credible witness' is one who is not disqualified to testify
"FEB. / 61" appearing on the holographic Will is not
by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause.
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment Disposition
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order
appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order
Roxas de Jesus v De Jesus, allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the
G.R. No. L-38338, 1/28/1985, Gutierrez, Jr, J deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
Doctrinal Rule
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should Kalaw v Relova,
include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, G.R. No. L-40207, 9/18/1984, Melencio-Herrera, J
when there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
Doctrinal Rule
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
Facts
Facts * Private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be
* After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, intestate proceeding was filed by a petition for the probate of her holographic Will.
petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased * The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K.
Bibiana. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
* After Letters of Administration had been granted to the * Hence, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate
petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained
purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
Bibiana. authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as
* He found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a * CFI denied probate.
letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and
signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana.
Issue/s
* Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed
WON the original unaltered text after subsequent
an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported
alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for
holographic Will of Bibiana.
lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix,
* CFI disallowed probate. should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.

Issue/s Held
WON the date "FEB. / 61" appearing on the holographic Will It should NOT be probated.
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid
The holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir
with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite
Held of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
YES. We have carefully reviewed the records of this case effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for
and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that
which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first


written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can provided under Article 810.
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in
in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably
handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
Disposition requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
Decision of respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973, is
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
hereby affirmed in toto.
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
Ajero v CA, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of
G.R. No. 106720, 9/15/1994, Puno, J Article 814.
Doctrinal Rule Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or

insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or

on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate
the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
Facts disallowance of such changes.
* Petitioners instituted Special Proceedings for allowance It is also proper to note that the requirements of
of decedent, Annie Sand's holographic will. authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
* Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds
separate from that which provides for the necessary
that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
810).
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
the will was procured by petitioners through improper As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited
pressure and undue influence. to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to
be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are
* RTC allowed probate.
not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to
* The CA found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case
requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her
not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the
name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor
Issue/s Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its
entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she
WON the holographic will should be voided for not
cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she
complying with Articles 813 and 814.
shares with her father's other heirs.

Held
Disposition
NO. In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
only issues to be resolved are:
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840,
(1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except
decedent's last will and testament; with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.
formalities prescribed by law;
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary
capacity at the time the will was executed; and,
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the
voluntary acts of the decedent.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these
formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806
of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what
assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally


Labrador v CA, testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.
G.R. Nos 83843-44, 4/5/1990, Paras, J

Doctrinal Rule
Disposition

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED. The
Facts holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and
* A petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of ALLOWED probate.
the late Melecio Labrador was filed.
* Jesus and Gaudencio Labrador opposed on the ground
Gan v Yap,
that the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, G.R. No. L-12190, 8/30/1958, Bengzon, J
1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Doctrinal Rule
Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying

in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916.
Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of Facts
land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. * Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings with a petition
* The RTC allowed probate and nullified the Deed of for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by
Absolute Sale. CA reversed and denied the probate for the deceased Felicidad Yap.
being undated. * Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso
Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor
executed any testament.
Issue/s
* CFI disallowed probate.
WON the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador
is dated, as provided for in Article 810. * The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to
establish its contents and due execution by the statements

in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro
Held Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez.
YES. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator
himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. The law does
Issue/s
not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that
These requirements are present in the subject will. it was in the handwriting of the testator?

It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the Held
second page of the holographic will, viz: NO. The intention of the law is to give the near relatives the
"And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making choice of either complying with the will if they think it
the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. Such
the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented
day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of for their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not
mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the
this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct
father." disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to
comply with the will, if genuine, a right which they should

not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from them.
The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the
conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or
succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was
will.
executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the
declaration that such partitioning was the testator’s
instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Disposition
Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be
property to be disposed of and of the character of the
sustained.


Rodelas v Aranza, Doctrinal Rule
G.R. No. L-58509, 12/7/1982, Relova, J As to Art 811, where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that
Doctrinal Rule
the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for
expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
witness is available, or none of those produced is
Facts convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort
to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to
* Appellant filed a petition for the probate of the
exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla.
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the
* Appellees opposed on the following grounds: testator be carried into effect.
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the
deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
The rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule
Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not
contain a disposition of property after death and was not Facts
intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not * This case involves the determination of the quantity of
a will; evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.
(3) The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged * Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died leaving a holographic will.
copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would * The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1)
produce no effect, as held in Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and the execution of the will was procured by undue and
(4) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or improper pressure and influence on the part of the
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not
seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that
the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of
Issue/s
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on
WON a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found the will.
can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
* Probate was denied for not having complied with Art 811.

Held
Issue/s
YES. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of
WON proponent must present three witnesses who could
holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of
after its due execution has been proved. The probate may
the testatrix, the probate being contested as compliance to
be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
Art 811.
identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available,
experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
identifying witnesses are required. However, if the Held
holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other NO. We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity
copy is available, the will can not be probated because the of the will was not contested, he was not required to
best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in produce more than one witness; but even if the
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can
the handwritten will. But a photostatic copy or xerox copy of not be interpreted as to require the compulsory
the holographic will may be allowed because comparison presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
can be made with the standard writings of the testator. of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at the execution
Disposition of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810,
new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3,
witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated
beyond the control of the proponent.
August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing
her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness
is hereby SET ASIDE. may be found (or what amounts to the same, thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the

authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
Azaola v Singson, evidence to supply the deficiency.
G.R. No. L-14003, 8/5/1960, Reyes, JBL, J


possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death
Disposition of the deceased.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set A visual examination of the holographic will convince us
aside, and the records ordered remanded to the Court of that the strokes are different when compared with other
origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with documents written by the testator. The signature of the
this opinion. testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There
were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated
Codoy v Calugay,
August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents
G.R. No. 123486, 8/12/1999, Pardo, J such as the application letter for pasture permit dated
Doctrinal Rule December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the
strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous
flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in

writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore,
Facts cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
* Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia handwriting by the deceased.
Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal filed for the
Disposition
probate of the holographic will of deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET
* Oppositors alleged that the holographic will was a forgery
ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of
and that the same is even illegible.
origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce
* Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the
appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de
ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the Ramonal.
will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should

appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. Unson v Abella,
* Petition to probate was denied. CA reversed. G.R. No. 17857, 6/12/1922, Villamor, J
Doctrinal Rule
Issue/s
WON the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
permissive or mandatory. Facts
* Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, executed her last
Held will and testament.
MANDATORY. We are convinced, based on the language * Oppositors alleged that the supposed will of the deceased
used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provisions
word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in
letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the
signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of
respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with
each other.
the handwriting of the testator.
* CFI allowed the probate.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of
Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the
requirement of three witnesses in case of contested Issue/s
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,
WON will should be admitted to probate despite the fact
ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not
that this exhibit has no attestation clause in it, and its
mandatory.
paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in letters.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false

document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which
is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires Held
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the YES. In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to
handwriting of the deceased. the inventory, Exhibit A-1, and at the bottom of said will, the
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the testatrix Josef a Zalamea says:
deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it "In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios
even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of including the page containing the signatures and the
Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise signed the


inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the WON Adriana revoked her will.
presence of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea,
Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna,
Held
Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918."
NO. It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will,
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will
like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
as an integral part of it, we find that the foregoing
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No.
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will,
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the
and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the
testator himself. It may be performed by another person but
end of the inventory.
under the express direction and in the presence of the
testator.
Disposition
We find that the judgment appealed from should be, as is Thus, the necessary elements for the effective revocation of
hereby, AFFIRMED. a last will and testament are:
(1) Animus revocandi;
Maloto v CA, (2) overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating,
GR No 76464; 29 Feb 1988; Sarmiento, J or cancelling the will;
(3) Such act carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express
Doctrinal Rule
direction.

There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these
Facts requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
● Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and Adriana's maid, Guadalope, was not satisfactorily
nephews, the petitioners and the private established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
respondents. Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have
● Believing their aunt did not leave behind a last will, been done under the express direction of Adriana. And
they commence an intestate proceeding for the then, the burning was not in her presence.
settlement of their aunt's estate.
● Pending the case, they executed an agreement of Disposition
extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING
● Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and
Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the respondent
counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the
document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA allowance of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament.
PAGBULUT-AN (Testamento)", dated January 3,
1940, and purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana.
● While Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in
the said will, Aldina and Constancio are
bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares
in the estate of Adriana than what they received by
virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
they had earlier signed.
● Aldina and Constancio thus instituted a special
proceeding to allow probate of the will and annul
the settlement which was denied by the trial court.
● The CA affirmed contending that the will had been
revoked by Adriana based on the facts that the
document was not in the two safes in Adriana's
residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of
Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the
latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of
Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up.

Issue/s


Lipana v Lipana, ● Present action was commenced for the probate of
said new will.
GR No 47174; 28 Jun 1940; Moran, J
● Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana
Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented their
Doctrinal Rule oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy
of the second will and testament executed by the
said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been
Facts
cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel
● Eliodora Lipana filed in the respondent court an Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the last
application for the probate of a will supposedly will.
executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana, a ● Court denied the probation upon the ground that
carbon copy of which was attached to the the same had been cancelled and revoked in the
application. year 1920.
● Court dismissed the application on the ground that ● “ Exhibit A is a mere carbon copy of its original
such copy could not be admitted to probate, it not which remained in the possession of the deceased
having been signed by the testatrix and the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his
attesting witnesses at the end thereof and on the death as per testimony of witnesses Jose Fenoy,
left margin of each page. who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919,
and Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920,

the original of Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually
Issue/s cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who
WON the Court erred in dismissing the probate petition due assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold
to the carbon copy. him a house and the land where the house was
built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919), executing
thereby a new testament.”
Held

YES. Such copy was attached to the application merely to
corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its original Issue/s
and not to establish a full compliance with the requirements WON Miguel Mamuyac revoked his last will.
of the law as to the execution of the will.
It is alleged therein that the original was in the possession Held
of a third person or that it was either lost or destroyed by
YES. The law does not require any evidence of the
some person other than the testatrix. Under section 623 of
revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
Act No. 190, if a will is shown to have been torn by some
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation
other person without the express direction of the testator, it
or cancellation of wills. The fact that, such cancellation or
may be admitted to probate, if its contents, due execution
revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or
and its unauthorized destruction are established by
be inferred from evidence showing that after due search
satisfactory evidence. The applicant, therefore, was entitled
the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot
to hearing to prove the due execution of the original will
be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
and its loss or destruction.
testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence
of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled
Disposition or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
The order of the respondent court of November 29, 1939, shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
issued in its civil case No. 3626, is hereby set aside. cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that
such will has been destroyed by any other person without

the knowledge or authority of the testator.
Gago v Mamuyac, In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be
GR No 26317; 29 Jan 1927; Johnson, J found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in
view of the positive proof that the same had been
Doctrinal Rule cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the
conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the
weight of the evidence.
Facts

● Petition for Probate of a last will and testament of
Miguel Mamuyac by Gago. Disposition
● Court denied probation upon the ground that the Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919,
executed a new will and testament.


Molo v Molo, case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be
admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent
GR No L-2538; 21 Sep 1951; Bautista Angelo, J
relative revocation".

Doctrinal Rule "This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative
revocation, and is usually applied where the testator
The rule is established that where the act of destruction is
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a
raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of
new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old,
the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition
and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
effect for some reason. The doctrine is not limited to the
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
existence of some other document, however, and has been
disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to
applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a
be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation
mistake of law”.
fails and the original will remains in full force.
"The rule is established that where the act of destruction is

connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
Facts raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of
● This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition
Instance of Rizal admitting to probate the last will intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
and testament of the deceased Mariano Molo y conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
Legaspi. disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to
● He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation
petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his fails and the original will remains in full force."
nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants. We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the
● He left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, destruction of the original will by the testator could be
and another executed on June 20, 1939. The latter presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
will contains a clause which expressly revokes the court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating
will executed in 1918. the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on
● His surviving spouse sought probate for the 1939 the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
will. Court rendered decision denying the probate executed and would be given due effect. The theory on
of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not
to prove that the same was executed in accordance intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest
with law. when he executed two wills on two different occasions and
● Due to said denial, Vda de Molo sought probate for instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore
the 1918 will. Again, the same oppositors filed an be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
opposition to the petition, based on three grounds:

(1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the
probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not Disposition
been executed in the manner required by law and Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
(3) that the will has been subsequently revoked.

● CFI approved the probate this time.

Issue/s
WON, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the
revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of nullifying
the prior will of 1918.

Held
NO. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a
previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that
it;-was not executed in conformity with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making
Of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.
Can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was
but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that
the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was
valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the


Heirs of Lasam v Umengan, ● The CA reversed the RTC explaining that the said
last will and testament did not comply with the
GR No 168156; 6 Dec 2006; Callejo, Sr, J
formal requirements of the law on wills. It found that

a. the pages of the purported last will and
Doctrinal Rule
testament were not numbered in
Without having been probated, the last will and testament accordance with the law.
could not be the source of any right. b. Neither did it contain the requisite
attestation clause.
Facts c. Isabel Cuntapay as testator and the
witnesses to the will did not affix their
● The RTC decision affirmed that of the MTCC, which
respective signatures on the second page
had rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of
thereof.
Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of
d. The said instrument was likewise not
respondent Vicenta Umengan from the lot subject
acknowledged before a notary public by
of litigation.
the testator and the witnesses.
● In a Deed of Confirmation, the heirs of spouses
e. While Isabel Cuntapay died in 1947 and the
Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan conveyed the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam claimed that they
ownership of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 in favor of
discovered the same only in 1997, a date –
their two children, Irene Cuntapay and Isabel
May 19, 1956 – appears on the last page.
Cuntapay.
● Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first Issue/s
husband, Domingo Turingan, namely: Abdon, Sado WON the heirs of Rosendo have a better right over the
(deceased), Rufo and Maria. When Domingo subject lot through the purported last will of Isabel
Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Cuntapay.
Mariano Lasam. She had two other children by him,
namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.
Held
● The heirs of Rosendo Lasam filed with the MTCC a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Vicenta NO. As between the respective claims of petitioners and
Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot. respondent, the latter has a better right to possess the
Vicenta Umengan is the daughter of Abdon. subject lot.
● Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the The purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay
deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel could not properly be relied upon to establish petitioners'
Cuntapay. right to possess the subject lot because, without having
● Vicenta countered that when Isabel Cuntapay been probated, the said last will and testament could not
passed away, the subject lot was inherited by her be the source of any right.
six children by her first and second marriages
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
through intestate succession. Each of the six
property unless it is proved and allowed in
children allegedly had a pro indiviso share of 1/6 of
accordance with the Rules of Court.
the subject lot.
● She further alleged that her father, Abdon, Isabel Cuntapay's last will and testament, which has not
purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject been probated, has no effect whatever and petitioners
lot of his siblings Maria and Sado. These cannot claim any right thereunder.
conveyances were allegedly evidenced by a Deed
of Sale. Disposition
● Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
subject lot to Vicenta Umengan and her husband
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
● Abdon also donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot
to her daughter Vicenta as evidenced by a Deed of
Donation.
● Thus, according to Vicenta, the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her second husband own only 2/6
portion of the subject lot. She thus prayed that the
complaint for ejectment be dismissed.
● The MTCC, in judging in favor of Rosendo, gave
credence to the newly discovered last will and
testament purportedly executed by Isabel
Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot
to Rosendo.


Seangio v Reyes, disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
GR No 140371-72; 27 Nov 2006; Azcuna, J
results in the disposition of the property of the testator

Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
Doctrinal Rule
absence of Alfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes
Facts that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
● Private respondents filed a petition for the preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion,
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
Segundo Seangio. compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
● Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not
in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most
Disposition
competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of Segundo because WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
she is a certified public accountant; and, 4)
Segundo left a holographic will, dated September
20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
● A petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Segundo was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
● Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
probate proceedings primarily on the ground that
the document purporting to be the holographic will
of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased. According to them, the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and that there
was preterition.
● RTC denied probate.

Issue/s
WON the will of Segundo was invalid due to preterition as it
only sought to disinherit Alfredo.

Held
NO. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil
Code requires that the same must be effected through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form
of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that
the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance
of a child or descendant under Article 919.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across
as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the


Gallanosa v Arcangel, has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding.
GR No L-29300; 21 Jun 1978; Aquino, j
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to
Doctrinal Rule the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised
anymore.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to
the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised
anymore. Disposition
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 3 and June 17,
Facts 1968 are reversed and set aside and its order of dismissal
dated January 10, 1968 is affirmed.
● The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in
Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis. A childless
widower, he was survived by his brother, Leon. A
petition for the probate of his will was filed.
● In that will, Florentino bequeathed his one-half
share in the conjugal estate to his second wife,
Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him,
as was the case, his one-half share would be
assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and
Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro,
Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the
care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his
foster child, and Pedro had rendered services to
Florentino and Tecla.
● He likewise bequeathed his separate properties
consisting of three parcels of abaca land and a
parcel of riceland to his protegé (sasacuyang
ataman), Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
● Leon opposed. The trial court however allowed
probate.
● Leon then sought to recover the 61 parcels of land
alleging that they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous
possession of those lands en concepto de dueño.
CFI dismissed this case. The plaintiffs filed a motion
for reconsideration. Respondent Judge granted it
and set aside the order of dismissal.

Issue/s
WON private respondents have a cause of action for the
"annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the
recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land adjudicated under
that will to the petitioners.

Held
NO. The lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in reconsidering its order of dismissal and in ignoring the
1939 testamentary case.
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from
defendants' motion to dismiss that plaintiffs' 1967 action is
barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by
prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are
known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as usucapio,
longi temporis possesio and praescriptio.
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the
"annulment" of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it


De la Cerna v Potot,
GR No L-20234; 23 Dec 1964; Reyes, JBL, J

Doctrinal Rule

Facts
● Spouses, Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia
Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in
the local dialect. The bequeathed two parcels of
land to their niece Manuela Rebaca as they were
childless.
● Upon the death of Bernabe in 1939, the will was
duly probated. However, when the will was again
probated upon the death of Gervasia, the CFI
declared the testament null and void, for being
executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills.
● The CA reversed, on the ground that the decree of
probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate
jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of
the testament.

Issue/s
WON the joint will should be invalidated notwithstanding it
has been duly probated by a prior judgment.

Held
NO. The final decree of probate, entered in 1939 has
conclusive effect as to his last will and testament, despite
the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the
invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party.
The error thus committed by the probate court was an error
of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but
which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor
the conclusive effect of its final decision, however
erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world and public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law.
However, the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the
share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It
could not include the disposition of the share of the wife,
Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive.

Disposition
With the foregoing modification, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed.


Maninang v CA, In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private
GR No L-57848; 19 Jun 1982; Melencio-Herrera, J
respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the

latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
Doctrinal Rule
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

Preterition 'consists in the omission in the testator's will of
Facts the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are
● Clemencia Aseneta, who died single, left a not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
holographic will. neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
● She bequeathed all her properties to Dra. Soledad Disinheritance, in turn, 'is a testamentary disposition
L. Maninang with whose famshe has lived depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
continuously for around the last 30 years. for a cause authorized by law.'
● Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for
Disinheritance is always 'voluntary'; preterition, upon the
probate of the Will of the decedent.
other hand, is presumed to be 'involuntary'. Preterition
● Herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the
under Article 854 of the New Civil Code 'shall annul the
adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of
institution of heir.' This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
decedent, instituted intestate proceedings.
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form
● Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate
of devises or legacies. In disinheritance the nullity is limited
Case on the ground that the holographic will was
to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
null and void because he, as the only compulsory
have been illegally deprived.
heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should
ensue. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the
● Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case determination of that controversial issue has not been
for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is thoroughly considered.
limited to an examination of and resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent
Disposition
Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the
decedent. WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the
● The CFI dismissed the testate proceedings. CA Orders of the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated
affirmed. September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified.

Issue/s
WON the CFI erred in dismissing the testate proceeding.

Held
YES. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public
policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic
validity. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with
the requirements of the law.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception
rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in
those cases was passed upon even before probate
because "practical considerations" so demanded.
Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of
the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact,
the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of
whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so
in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is
insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the Will demanded.


When the disputed Probate Order was issued on December
Pastor v CA, 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the community
properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
GR No 56340; 24 Jun 1983; Plana, J

Doctrinal Rule
The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly

owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still being
Facts
litigated in another court.
● Pastor, Sr, a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City,
There was no appropriate determination, much less
survived by his Spanish wife and their two
payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate.
legitimate children, Pastor, Jr and Sofia, and an
The net assets of the estate not having been determined,
illegitimate child, Quemada. Pastor, Jr is Filipino,
the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not
Sofia, Spanish, and Quemada, Filipino.
be ascertained.
● QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not
allowance of an alleged holographic will of
possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA—a
PASTOR, SR.
fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part
● The will contained only one testamentary
of the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce an
disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA
impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in
Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic
the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining.
validity of the will in other respects.
● QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted

against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for
Disposition
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate,
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
which included the properties subject of the legacy
CA-G.R. No SP-11373-R is reversed. The Order of execution
and which were in the names of the spouses
issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as well
PASTOR, JR. and his wife, who claimed to be the
as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged
owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5,
inheritance.
1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11, 1980 and
● PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their
December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is
opposition to the petition for probate.
remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper
● The CFI, CA and SC allowed probate. QUEMADA
proceedings, subject to the judgment to be rendered in
filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of
Civil Case No. 274-R.
his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of

said legacy.

● While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated
in Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu, the PROBATE
COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution
and Garnishment, resolving the question of
ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and
ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was
not inofficious.

Issue/s
Whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved
with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.

Held
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue
by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will,
i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus,
for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title.


probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
Nepomuceno v CA,
The prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
GR No 62952; 9 Oct 1985; Gutierrez, Jr, J making of a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes
Doctrinal Rule void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the
recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will
Facts invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
● Martin Jugo died leaving a last Will and Testament. disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
● Although married and having two legitimate been living in concubinage.
children, Martin named Sofia as his sole and only
executor, having lived with her as husband and wife Disposition
since 1952. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
● He devised his entire estate to his forced heirs,
while the free portion, to Sofia. Rufina Gomez and
her children filed an opposition.
● CFI denied probate on the ground that the Will's
admission to probate will be an idle exercise
because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.
● CA reversed and declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is
null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with
Article 1028.

Issue/s
WON the respondent court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament
of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision
in favor of herein petitioner.

Held
NO. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when
after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the Will.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court,
the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of
this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or later proceedings to
determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the
extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the
Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities
required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she
completely agrees with the respondent court when in
resolving the question of whether or not the probate court
correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and
Testament.
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we
remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a
separate action for that purpose simply because, in the


was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure can
not be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion , as it is
Pascual v De la Cruz,
not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue
GR No L-24819, 5/30/1969, Reyes, JBL, Acting CJ influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised;
Doctrinal Rule that the exercise of improper pressure and undue influence
must be supported by substantial evidence that it was
actually exercised; that the burden is on the person
Facts challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted
* Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving at the time of its execution; that mere general or reasonable
descendant or ascendant, died purporting to have left a will. influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will; nor is
* Andres Pascual sought probate of said will. moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty
* Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other addressed to the testator, or omission of relatives, not
nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz forced heirs, evidence of undue influence. Tested against
contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the
formalities required by law were not complied with; that the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence
testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her or improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the
properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will proponent.
was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the Disposition
signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud. WHEREFORE, the decree of probate appealed from is
* Probate court admitted the will for probate. affirmed, with costs against contestants-appellants.
* Oppositors argued the existence of inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses and
notary public. The Probate court disregarded this stating
that "What is important and essential is that there be
unanimity and certainty in their testimony regarding the
identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting
witnesses, and the Notary Public, and the fact that they
were all present at the time those signatures were affixed."

Issue/s
WON the contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in
the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary adversely
affects the probative value of the will.

Held
NO. The contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in
the testimonies of the witnesses and the notary, pointed out
by the oppositors-appellants, relate to unimportant details
or to impressions of the witnesses about certain details
which could have been affected by the lapse of time and
the treachery of human memory, and which inconsistencies,
by themselves would not alter the probative value of their
testimonies on the due execution of the will.
Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses were
better known to proponent Andres Pascual than to the
testatrix suffices to render their testimony suspect.

Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the
ground that the execution of the will was tainted by fraud
and undue influence exerted by proponent on the testatrix,
and affirm that it was error for the lower court to have
rejected their claim. Before considering the correctness of
these findings, it is worthwhile to recall the basic principles
on undue pressure and influence as laid down by the
jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a
will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own; that the contention that a will


Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's
will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the
Reyes v Barreto-Datu,
institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no
GR No L-17818, 1/20/1967, Reyes, JBL, J preterition, or total omission, of a forced heir.
Doctrinal Rule It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a
decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has
become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of
Facts partition becomes irrelevant.
* This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond In the case before us, however, the agreement of partition
being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution,
deceased Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the
guardian of said minors. name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates
* When Bibiano Barretto died, he left his share of these issued in favor of the heirs, long before the decree was
properties in a will to Salud Barretto. attacked.
* The usufruct of the fishpond, however, was reserved for Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be
his widow, Maria Gerardo. plausible if it were shown that the sole basis for the decree
* After distribution, Salud Barretto took immediate of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even
possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in
original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto,
her own name. against the provisions whereof no objection had been
* Upon the death of Maria Gerardo, it was discovered that made.
she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she The only instance that we can think of in which a party
instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
the later will was allowed and the first rejected. inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
* Salud was held to be not the daughter of the decedent better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same
Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. case by proper motion within the reglementary period,
* The lower court declared the project of partition instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another
estate of Bibiano Barretto to be null and void ab initio (not court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final
merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed
predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a and disposed of.
daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud
Gerardo. and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement
* The Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' of the estate of Bibiano Barretto, duly approved by the
complaint but ordered them to return the properties Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No.
received under the project of partition previously 49629, is not void for being contrary to either articles 1081
mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's or 1814 of the Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's
counterclaim. action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is
barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim
Issue/s that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith
WON the court a quo erred in declaring the project of and should account for the fruits received from the
partition void because Salud was found out to be not a properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is
daughter of Maria and Bibiano. legally untenable. It follows that the plaintiffs' action for
partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should
Held have been given due course.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of
the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case Disposition
by the court below. Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, Bulacan now under appeal is reversed and set aside in so
or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumerated in said
happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his right of said appellee to accounting.
testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the
free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While
the share (1/2) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime
of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.


The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer,
is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The
phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
Austria v Reyes,
mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on
GR No L-23079, 2/27/1970, Castro, J succession and were used, respectively, to describe the
Doctrinal Rule class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the
inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the
decedent would have willed her estate other than the way
Facts she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
* Basilia Austria Vda de Cruz filed a petition for probate, make allowance for legitimes.
ante mortem, of her last will and testament. Petitioners Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side,
opposed. especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of
* CFI dismissed the opposition and allowed probate. the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as
* The bulk of the estate of Basilia was destined to pass on was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the
to respondents which had been assumed and declared by principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
Basilia as her own legally adopted children. the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
* After Basilia died, petitioners filed a petition in intervention language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
for partition alleging that they are the nearest of kin of At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents
Basilia and that the respondents had not been legally by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action
adopted and are thus mere strangers. The petition in brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a
intervention was granted. collateral attack.
* A petition for certiorari was filed in the SC to annul the
orders of the CFI all restricting petitioners' intervention to Disposition
properties that were not included in the decedent's ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied.
testamentary dispositions.

Issue/s
Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in
violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to
properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?

Held
NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under
article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must
concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be
false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.
One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will
does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the
cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the
same on the basis of guess work or uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that
the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et
al. solely because she believed that the law commanded
her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of
these respondents was valid, still such institution must
stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive
injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may
have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after
an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not
have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to
be false.


Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November
8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed.
Nuguid v Nuguid,

GR No L-23445, 6/23/1966, Sanchez, J
Doctrinal Rule
Morales v Olondriz,

GR No 198994, 2/3/2016, Brion, J
Facts Doctrinal Rule
* Rosario Nuguid died single, survived by her parents and 6
siblings.
* Remedios, sister of Rosario, filed a petition for probate of a Facts
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario. * Decedent, Alfonso Olondriz, Sr, was survived by his
* Parents opposed on the ground of preterition since only widow, Ana Maria, and his 5 children, collectively referred
Remedios was instituted as universal heir in the will. as respondent heirs.
* CFI dismissed the petition for probate, nullifying the will. * Believing Alfonso died intestate, the respondents filed a
petition for partition of estate.
Issue/s * Iris Morales filed a separate petition for probate of and
WON there was preterition leading to the nullification of the alleged wiil executed by Alfonso. In said will, Francisco, an
will in question. illegitimate son of Alfonso was omitted.
* RTC suspended the intestate proceedings to give way to
Held the probate of the will. The case was transferred to another
YES. The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 branch that reversed the previous order and ordered to
of the Civil Code. proceed with the intestate proceedings. CA affirmed.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the Issue/s
direct ascending line - her parents, now oppositors Felix WON there was no preterition because Francisco received
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely a house and lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.
omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; Held
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case NO. There was preterition.
of preterition. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir
The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, from the will, either because he is not named or, although
universal heir - nothing more. No specific legacies or he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without
we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of
died intestate. his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total,
Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises,
are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article or advances on his legitime.
854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted
a will - void because of preterition - would give the heir so Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the
instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a in the direct line.
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the
apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received
Preterltlon "consists in the omission in the testator's will of donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime
for a cause authorized by law." Disposition
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in
turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering,
however, that the will before us solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more,
the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Disposition


Disposition
Balanay v Martinez,
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28 and
GR No L-39247, 6/27/1975, Aquino, J June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973,
Doctrinal Rule setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed.

Facts
* Decedent Leodegaria Julian was survived by her husband,
Felix, and by their 6 legitimate children.
* Felix, Jr filed a petition for probate of his mother's notarial
will. In said will, decedent devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the
conjugal assets.
* Felix, Sr and daughter Avelina opposed on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition
of the husband and alleged improper partition of the
conjugal estate.
* CFI allowed probate. CFI later dismissed the petition for
probate and converted the proceedings into one of
intestacy.

Issue/s
(1) WON the probate court erred in passing upon the
intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void.
(2) WON there was preterition that will render the will void.

Held
(1) NO. We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

(2) NO. In the instant case there is no doubt that the
testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal
estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It
is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the
conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband,
after dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented
to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be
probated. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the
surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with
the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled
order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the
will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's
duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will.
Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory.


The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with
the expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as
Aznar v Duncan,
may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will.
GR No L-24365, 6/30/1966, Makalintal, J He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural
Doctrinal Rule daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00.
The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
possess such status is no reason to assume that had the
Facts judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective
* Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile attitude towards her would have undergone any change
in the Philippines, died leaving a will. The will was admitted and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and
to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao. Helen to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by
Garcia was declared a natural child of Edward. him.
* The project of partition was approved wherein the
properties of the estate were divided equally between Lucy
Duncan and Helen Garcia. The said order was based on the Disposition
proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated October 29,
the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, 1964, approving the project of partition as submitted by the
and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is
deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate
favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been anew as indicated in this decision, that is, by giving to
duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no
legatees. more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime,
* Lucy Duncan contends that this is not a case of preterit equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after
ion, but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include
says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by those imposed in the will of the decedent, In accordance
any title less than the legitime belonging to him nay with Article 908 of the Civil Code.
demand that the same be fully satisfied." Appellant also
suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby
the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen
Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless, although less
than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect
defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918.
* Thus, according to Lucy Duncan, under both Articles 906
and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and
not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if
the succession were intestate.

Issue/s
WON the estate, after deducting the legacies, should
pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or
whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir
should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover
the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire
estate.

Held
Helen Garcia is only entitled to the COMPLETION OF HER
LEGITIME.
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a
forced heir may be limited only to the completion of his
legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs)
is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by
any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as
heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he
be recognized or referred to in the will as heir? This
question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an
heir - indeed her status as such is denied - but is given a
legacy of P3,600.00.


holding that the entire Will is void and intestacy ensues, the
preterition of the GARCIAS should annul the institution of
Solano v CA,
ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted
GR No L-41971, 11/29/1983, Melencio-Herrera,J heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that
Doctrinal Rule limitation. It is plain that the intention of the testator was to
favor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which,
under the law, he had a right to dispose of by Will, so that
Facts the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the
* The Garcias, claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. one-half (½) portion of the property that the testator could
Meliton SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. freely dispose of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children
Solano denied paternity. consists of one-half (½) of the hereditary estate, the
* Zonia was the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to participation
Will and Testament probated prior to decedent's death. therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA’s
* In the hearing of May 13, 1970, the Trial Court specified the hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of
legal issues to be treated in the parties' respective the estate, while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled
Memoranda as: 1) the question of recognition of the to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate.
GARCIAS; 2) the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the In the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated that Article 854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies merely
Will. annulling the "institution of heir".
* CFI ruled that all three (3) are illegitimate children and that
the institution of Zonia as sole heir is null and void. Thus, Disposition
the estate of Solano is divided equally among the 3. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby
* CA affirmed. modified in that the hereditary share in the estate of the
decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T. Solano is hereby
Issue/s declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate, while
WON the lower Court, in an action for recognition, was that of private respondents, Bienvenido S. Garcia and
without jurisdiction: 1) to declare ZONIA as an illegitimate Emeteria S. Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the
child of SOLANO; 2) to order the division of the estate in the estate. The usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be
same action despite the pendency of Special Proceedings respected.
No. 842; and 3) to declare null and void the institution of
heir in the Last Will and Testament of SOLANO, which was
duly probated in the same Special Proceedings No. 842,
and concluding that total intestacy resulted.

Held
NO. As raised by the parties in their own pleadings and
pursuant to their respective evidence during the trial, the
litigation was converted into a contest between the
GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct status as
heirs and their respective rights as such. No error was
committed by either the Trial Court or the Appellate Court,
therefore, in resolving the issue of ZONIA’s status.
The Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to
conclude that, upon the facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA
were in the same category as illegitimate children; that
ZONIA’s acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a notarial
document executed by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on
December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time of
her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly Gorand,
his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and,
therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, that being
compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, preterited
from SOLANO's Last Will and Testament; and that as a result
of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by
SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code.
So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the
issue of the hereditary shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA.
However, contrary to the conclusions of the Courts below,


Escuin v Escuin, Lajom v Leuterio,

GR No 4359, 9/24/1908, GR No L-13557, 4/25/1960, Concepcion, J
Doctrinal Rule Doctrinal Rule

Facts Facts
* Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos who had no lawful * Maximo Viola died in 1938. Judicial proceedings of his
descendants executed a will. testate estate were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and
* He stated in clause three of his will, that in case he had a closed in 1937.
duly registered successor, his child would be his sole and * An agreement of partition and distribution was executed in
universal heir; but that if, as would probably be the case, 1935 by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio
there should be no such heir, then in clause four he named Viola, legitimate children of Maximo, whereby the
his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa properties left by their father, Maximo, were divided among
Ponce de Leon his universal heirs, they to divide the estate themselves.
in equal shares between them. * In 1939, Donato Lajom filed a complaint in CFI of Nueva
* The representative of Emilio, the minor natural child of the Ecija praying, among other things, that he be declared a
testator, objected in writing to the partition proposed by the natural child of Maximo; that the agreement of partition and
administrator. distribution executed in 1935 by these three legitimate
children of Maximo be declared null and void and xxxx a
Issue/s new partition be ordered adjudicating one-seventh of the
WON there was preterition on the part of Emilio, the estate left by Maximo to Donato and two-seventh to each of
recognized natural child, as he was omitted in the will of his the three appellants.
father. * The CFI (of Nueva Ecija) ruled in favor of Donato and
affirmed by the SC. Records were remanded to the CFI to
Held execute the Order.
YES. As has been seen, the testator wished to dispose of * When Rafael Viola filed the report required in this order,
his property in his will, designating as heirs his natural Donato Lajom noticed that nothing was said in the
father, Francisco Escuin, and his wife, Maria Teresa Ponce aforementioned report concerning the fruits of a riceland,
de Leon, altogether ignoring his recognized natural child with an area of 215 hectares, allegedly donated by Dr.
who is his general heir. In view thereof, and for the reason Maximo Viola to said Rafael Viola. So, Lajom asked that
that he exceeded his rights, the said designation of heirs Rafael Viola be ordered to include the products of said
became void in so far as it impaired the right of his general riceland in his report, in order that the property may be
heir and deprived him of his legal portion; the will, however, included in the redistribution of the Viola Estate.
is valid with respect to the two-thirds of the property which * Petition of Donato was denied on the ground that "The
the testator could freely dispose of. decision required the defendants to collate the properties in
It is clear and unquestionable that it was the wish of the question. The properties donated to Rafael Viola and which
testator to favor his natural father and his wife with certain are sought to be collated by the plaintiff are not in question
portions of his property which, under the law, he had a right xxxx."
to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the legal
portion of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the Issue/s
two former persons being considered as legatees under the WON the riceland should be included among the properties
will. to be collated in the redistribution of the Viola estate.
The above-mentioned will is neither null, void, nor illegal in
so far as the testator leaves two-thirds of his property to Held
his father and wife; testamentary provisions impairing the NO. The decision affirmed by this Court in G. R. No. L-6457
legal portion of a general heir shall be reduced in so far as ordained the collation of the "properties in question". The
they are illegal or excessive. properties in question were described in an inventory
attached to petitioner's original complaint in case No. 8077
Disposition and did not include the aforementioned riceland.
By virtue of the foregoing considerations it is our opinion It is next alleged that petitioner having been the victim of
that the orders of the court below, of October 30, 1906, and preterition, the institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr.
August 24, 1907, should be reversed, and upon receipt of a Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No.
certified copy of this decision the court below shall take 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate proceedings
action in accordance with the law and the terms herein for the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly
contained with respect to the claims and appeals from the untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were
resolutions of the commissioners pending judicial decision. dealing with a special proceedings for the settlement of the
testate estate of a deceased person, which, in
consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the


character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate children, and not being the owners they could not have sold
estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the it.
deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil * CA reversed emphasizing that nobody in his right
action, and the authority of the court having jurisdiction over judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing
the same is limited to the properties described in the a document like the Supplemental Deed which practically
pleadings, which admittedly do not include the covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor
aforementioned riceland. of his heirs from the second marriage.

Disposition Issue/s
Without prejudice, therefore, to the institution of the WON the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a
corresponding intestate proceedings by the proper party, preterition of his heirs from the second marriage.
the petition herein should, therefore, be, as it is hereby,
DENIED. Held
NO. Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
JLT Agro v Balansag,
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
GR No 141882, 3/11/2005, Tinga, J heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
Doctrinal Rule they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the
omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at
all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
Facts instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly,
* Don Julian contracted 2 marriages, first with Antonia, and nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the
after her death, with Milagros Donio. Don Julian had 2 total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from
children, Emilio and Josefa, with Antonia, and 4 with inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with
Milagros. regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament,
* The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
954 sqm, known as Lot 63. A compromise agreement was anything in the hereditary property but without expressly
reached to settle disputes regarding said parcel of land. disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the
* Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator
of the present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime,
death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs: since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
The properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian (not In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of properties, as evidenced by the court approved
Julian and his four minor children, his two acknowledged Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not
natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don
Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his
Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the
* Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the
of J.L.T. Agro. A supplement to said Deed transferred Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s
ownership of Lot 63 to JLT Agro. desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from
* Don Julian died intestate. inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage,
* Meanwhile, Milagros had taken possession over Lot 63 a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as
after execution of the Compromise Agreement. She entered it is unfounded.
into a lease agreement with Spouses Balansag. Unaware of
the transfer to JLT Agro, Milagros sold the lot to JLT Agro.
* RTC dismissed the complaint of Milagros seeking for
reconveyance of subject lot.
* With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian
and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros
Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto
except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they
could claim only upon the death of the latter.
* The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death
on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his
estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31
July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper
subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her


Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on
this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary
Rabadilla v CA,
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve
GR No 113725, 6/29/2000, Purisima, J the property and to transmit the same later to the second
heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in
Facts fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property
* In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
meters of that parcel of land. property and its transmission to the second heir.
* Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix
complaint against the heirs of Dr Jorge Rabadilla to enforce is not definite. The property will only pass to them should
the provisions of said Codicil. She alleged the following Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
violations: deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged in disregard of the testatrix's Another important element of a fideicommissary
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the
near descendants and sister of the testatrix. second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first
deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar to plaintiff. heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
* The RTC dismissed the complaint. CA reversed. therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree
* Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near
application as there was no modal institution and the descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr.
testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the Jorge Rabadilla.
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article
the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an
deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
complied with. And since the testatrix died single and institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution,
without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect. testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or
Issue/s WON Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix succession. On the other hand, in a conditional
intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
be noncompliance with the obligation. testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and
the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent,
Held it is similar to a resolutory condition.
NO. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under
person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs,
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell,
should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that
leave his/her property to one person with the express the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena
charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of
sued upon contemplates neither of the two. the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near equally apply to the instituted heir and his
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil successors-in-interest.
provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property Disposition
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
near descendants.


her death and in conformity with the express desire of the
testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the
Perez v Garchitorena,
following (above quoted) clauses, which cannot be
GR No 31703, 2/13/1930, Romualdez, J disregarded if we are to give a correct interpretation of the
Doctrinal Rule will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of
Fideicommissary substitution requires three (3) things: substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together,
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate. such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and instituted in the first instance.
transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress
3. A second heir. shall receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with
a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible
Facts with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress
* The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the Carmen's instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the
name with the association known as La Urbana. enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea
* Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at
Carmen, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued the same time he preserves it in order to pass it an to the
in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount second heir.
deposited with La Urbana. It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the
* Carmen, alleging that said deposit belongs to the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of
fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she
secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct
said judgment. Garchitorena contend that the plaintiff is the inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary
the injunction. substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole
* Trial court held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is
plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate,
Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction. without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the
fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another
Issue/s of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution.
WON a trust was created by the will of Dona Ana Maria and The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the
that the amount deposited in La Urbana is the property of requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according to
the children of Carmen as fideicommissary heirs. the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in
the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
Held 1. A first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate.
YES. The will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to
and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the
substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the will.
instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve
case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the
said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
As a matter of fact, however, clause XI provides for the provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the
should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of
are still under age. And it is evident that, considering the leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate,
nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the
testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition
clause X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of 3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
simple substitution. instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her clause X and in clause XI.
sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question
death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff
approval of the report of the committee on claims and herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from
appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria
hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing Alcantara.
explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in
conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The Disposition
fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
heiress does not prevent her children from receiving, upon


Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a
fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is
Crisologo v Singson,
made expressly ("de una manera expresa") either by giving
GR No L-13876, 2/28/1962, Dizon, J it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute
Doctrinal Rule obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver the
inheritance to a substitute or second heir.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under
Facts consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided
* Action for partition commenced by the spouses for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary
Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot. appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary
* Complaint alleged that Singson owned one half rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked
proindiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the
owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon
probated last will of Dona Leona Singson, the original appellee's death—whether this happens before or after that
owner. of the testatrix—her share shall belong to the brothers of
* Spouses had made demands for the partition of said the testatrix.
property, but Singson refused to accede. In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that
* Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was the last will of the deceased Dña. Leon a Singson
a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one half established a mere subtitucion vulgar, the substitution of
proindiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be
she was not entitled to demand partition thereof. effective or to take place upon the death of the former,
* Trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses. whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

Issue/s Disposition
WON the testamentary disposition of the will of Dona Leona In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is affirmed.
provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a
sustitucion fideicomisaria.

Held
In accordance with the legal provision on simple
substitution, the testator may not only designate the heirs
who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for
substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept or are
in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die
ahead of him. The testator may also bequeath his
properties to a particular person with the obligation, on the
part of the latter, to deliver the same to another person,
totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event.
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under
consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named
therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion
Florentino—whether this occurs before or after that of the
testatrix—the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered
("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's
three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their
forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of
Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known
as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that
Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix,
became the owner of one undivided half of the property,
but if it provided for a sustitucion fideicomisaria, she would
have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over
the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly
be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary
substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the
first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or
part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or
upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason


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Rodelas v Aranza, 27

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged in disregard of the testatrix's

* The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of

Cayetano v Leonidas, Abangan v Abangan,

Facts The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation

G.R. No. L-32213, 11/26/1973, Esguerra, J Disposition

Doctrinal Rule FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is

Doctrinal Rule Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or

Escuin v Escuin, Lajom v Leuterio,

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