Toll Lawsuit

Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2 Filed 03/11/19 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 75
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
M ELISSA B ARKER , an individual, on behalf

of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:19-cv-987-TWP-MJD
v.
K APSCH T RAFFICCOM USA, INC ., and
G ILA , LLC,
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT NOTICE OF REMOVAL
Defendants Gila, LLC (“Gila”) and Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc. (“Kapsch,” and together
with Gila, “Defendants”) hereby remove this case from the Marion Superior Court for the State of
Indiana (case number 49D13-1902-CT-004569) to this Court. The factual and legal grounds
supporting this Notice of Removal are described below.
1. The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and
1453, provides this Court with original jurisdiction over this case and permits Defendants to
remove the action to this Court. CAFA provides that federal district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over class actions where the number of proposed class members is 100 or greater, any
member of the putative class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from that of any defendant,
and the aggregate amount in controversy for all putative class members exceeds $5,000,000
(exclusive of interest and costs). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). These jurisdictional requirements are
satisfied in this action.1
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Defendants do not agree that Plaintiff’s purported class can or should be certified or that
Plaintiff’s claims are subject to class treatment in any form, and Defendants reserve all objections
Plaintiff’s Putative Class Contains More Than 100 Members
2. Plaintiff Melissa Barker filed her “Class Action Complaint” on February 4, 2019.
Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of people under Indiana Trial Rule 23 (similar to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and defines the putative class as follows:
All individuals who were assessed, charged, invoiced, requested to pay, or did in
fact pay an administrative fee or penalty, relating to tolls assessed to that individual
for use of the RiverLink Toll Bridges, without first being provided notice of any
unpaid toll via a 1st Toll Notice. Excluded from the Class are Defendant(s) and their
officers, directors and employees.
(Compl. ¶ 30.)
3. Defendants deny that Plaintiff has any viable claim, has properly asserted any cause
of action, or that Plaintiff can maintain any claim on behalf of the referenced class. Nevertheless,
Plaintiff has alleged that “the proposed Class contains hundreds or even thousands of motorists.”
(Id. ¶ 31.) Defendants are entitled to rely on this estimate. Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Commercial
Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 582 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus, CAFA’s requirement of at least 100 putative
class members is satisfied.
There Is Minimal Diversity
4. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Indiana. (Compl. ¶ 1.)
5. Gila is a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business in
Texas. (Compl. ¶ 3.) e a9
6. Kapsch is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia.
(Compl. ¶ 2.) For purposes of removal, citizenship of a corporation is based on the state under
whose laws the entity was organized or where its principal place of business is located. See 28
to and arguments against such certification and/or treatment, and will present such objections and
arguments at the appropriate juncture in this matter.
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U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Accordingly, Kapsch is a citizen of Delaware and Virginia, and is diverse
from the named Plaintiff. The requirement of minimal diversity under the CAFA is therefore
satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action [which] is a class action in which . . . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of
a State different from any defendant.”).
The Amount In Controversy Exceeds $5,000,000
7. In order to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the CAFA, “the matter in
controversy” needs to exceed “the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). And, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6), “the claims of the individual
class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”
8. In assessing the amount in controversy, courts consider what the stakes are given
the plaintiff’s demands in the complaint. Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 2008).
9. Here, the Complaint does not precisely specify the amount of purported damages
Plaintiff seeks to recover. And where a complaint does not specify the amount of the alleged
damages, the removing defendant need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 658 F.3d 675, 680
(7th Cir. 2011); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2006).
10. This does not require that the removing defendant concede liability or prove the
amount of damages plaintiff is likely to recover. Rather, the amount in controversy is simply
derived from estimates of the total amount in dispute; it is not a prospective assessment of
defendant’s liability. Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 2008); Sabrina Roppo, 869
F.3d at 579.
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11. This “is a pleading requirement, not a demand for proof.” Blomberg v. Serv. Corp.
Int'l, 639 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir. 2011). Defendants are entitled to rely on “a plausible allegation
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold” under the CAFA. Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014); see also
Viking, Inc. v. NBD Int'l, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-25, 2016 WL 4698240, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 2016).
12. Here, Defendants expressly deny Plaintiff’s allegations and deny that Plaintiff or
any putative class members have any claim against them, or are entitled to any damages or other
forms of the requested relief. Nonetheless, the allegations in the Complaint establish that the
$5,000,0000 CAFA threshold is satisfied.
13. Plaintiff is a driver who crossed bridges over the Ohio River that connect Kentucky
and Southern Indiana. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 20, 21.) Plaintiff alleges that these bridges utilize the all-
electronic tolling system known as RiverLink, which is not equipped with tolling booths. (Id. ¶¶
7-8.)
14. The RiverLink system encourages drivers to install transponders that are read by
sensors, and toll charges are automatically deducted from motorists’ prepaid accounts. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Drivers with transponders and pre-registered RiverLink accounts pay the lowest toll fees. (Id.)
15. For drivers without a transponder and a prepaid RiverLink account, or without
sufficient balances on their accounts, cameras capture license plates for the vehicle and mail an
original toll notice to the registered owner of the vehicle (the “1st Toll Notice”). (Id. ¶ 10.) By law,
the 1st Toll Notice cannot include any administrative fines or penalties. (Id. ¶ 11.)
16. If the 1st Toll Notice is not paid within 30 days, the Complaint describes a series of
escalating fees and penalties. If a motorist does not pay the 1st Toll Notice within 30 days, a second
notice is generated assessing a $5.00 administrative fee/penalty (“2nd Toll Notice”). (Id. ¶ 12.) If
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the 2nd Toll Notice is not paid within 30 days, a third, “Violation Notice” is generated that includes
an additional $25.00 violation penalty/fee. (Id. ¶ 13.) If a Violation Notice is not paid within 30
days, a “Collection Notice” is generated that, in addition to all other fees, includes a $30.00
collection penalty/fee. (Id. ¶ 14.) After that, the account is referred to collections where additional
fees can be assessed. (Id. ¶ 15.)
17. The Complaint alleges that Defendants were responsible for and implemented the
toll invoicing system for RiverLink and that they “began to assess and invoice tolls for motorists
using the Toll Bridges beginning on December 30, 2016 and through the present date.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-
19.) Thus, the alleged timeframe included within the claims spans more than two years.
18. The crux of each of Plaintiff’s causes of action is her claim that she was not mailed
the 1st Toll Notice, and therefore was precluded from avoiding the $5 fee/penalty and the escalating
set of penalties thereafter. (Id. ¶¶ 20-24.)
19. Plaintiff brings her case on behalf of a putative class consisting of all individuals
“who were assessed, charged, invoiced, requested to pay, or did in fact pay an administrative fee
or penalty, relating to tolls assessed to that individual for use of the RiverLink Toll Bridges, without
first being provided notice of any unpaid toll via a 1st Toll Notice.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
20. While the Complaint does not specify the precise number of penalties or crossings
at issue, RiverLink’s website shows that there were 32.3 million crossings in 2018 alone—
including 12.6 million crossings without transponders. There were an additional 30 million
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crossings in 2017, approximately 6% of which (or 1.8 million)2 were without prepaid RiverLink
accounts and transponders. (Id.)3
21. According to the Complaint, such crossings without transponders and a prepaid
RiverLink account—i.e., at least 1.8 million crossings in 2017 alone4—were to have received the
1st Toll Notice. (Compl. ¶ 10.) However, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants routinely did not send
motorists 1st Toll Notices after they crossed the Toll Bridges. Instead, they inappropriately sent 2nd
Toll Notices, Violation Notices, or Collection Notices.” (Id. ¶ 25 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendants’ failure to send 1st Toll Notices is “widespread,” “uniform” and, moreover,
has occurred from the beginning and is ongoing and continuing to the present. (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 28
(seeking, among other things, to “halt” the alleged conduct), 33 and 37 (seeking injunction,
alleging Defendants are continuing “to commit violations alleged” against “members of the Class
2
See extrapolated statistics available relating to low income drivers in 27 zip codes. See
2017 Annual Progress Report, at p. 7, available at: https://riverlink.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/20181022-RiverLink-Annual-Progress-Report-FINAL.pdf (last
accessed Mar. 11, 2019).
3
See https://riverlink.com/2019/02/06/more-growth-and-improvements-in-second-year-
of-tolling/; see also https://riverlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/20181022-RiverLink-
Annual-Progress-Report-FINAL.pdf. The RiverLink Toll project is undertaken jointly by the State
of Indiana and Commonwealth of Kentucky, and is authorized by the Federal Highway
Administration. See https://riverlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/TB-2013-1.pdf. This Court
may take judicial notice of information on government-funded program websites. Denius v.
Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) (taking judicial notice of information from federally-
funded program’s website); Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 926, 931 (S.D. Ill. 2006)
(taking judicial notice of information on www.cyberdriveillinois.com cited in removal notice).
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Moreover, RiverLink reports that in 2018, less than half of those with transponders had
prepaid accounts. See https://riverlink.com/2019/02/06/more-growth-and-improvements-in-
second-year-of-tolling/ (reporting 424,807 transponders and only 193,208 prepaid accounts).
Thus, according to the Complaint’s allegations, a substantial portion of the 19.7 million crossings
with transponders should have triggered the mailing of a 1st Toll Notice. (Compl. ¶ 10.)
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and the general public.”).) Plaintiff’s assertions, “when deciding whether a claim meets the
minimum amount in controversy, . . . must be respected.” Barbers, Hairstyling For Men & Women,
Inc. v. Bishop, 132 F.3d 1203, 1205 (7th Cir. 1997).
22. Applying even the lowest fee/penalty alleged by Plaintiff ($5.00), to the publicly
reported numbers of crossings by motorists without transponders and prepaid RiverLink accounts
(as set forth above, 1.8 million in 2017 alone) plainly reflects that the amount in controversy readily
exceeds CAFA’s $5 million threshold.
23. Moreover, Plaintiff has also requested treble damages as a component of relief for
the putative class claims (in connection with the asserted misrepresentation and Indiana Deceptive
Consumer Sales Act (“IDCSA”) claims). (Compl. ¶¶ 60-61, 70.) Such requests for treble damages
under Sections 24-5-0.5-4 and 34-24-3-1 of the Indiana Code are also counted when estimating
the amount in controversy for purposes of removal. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427
F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (relying on treble damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act in reaching the $5 million CAFA threshold); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Veteran Constr. Co., Inc., No.
113CV00147RLYDML, 2013 WL 12291878, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2013) (relying in part on
treble damages in connection with a fraud claim under the Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1 in calculating
amount in controversy); W. Bend Elevator, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc S.A., 140 F. Supp. 2d 963, 968
(E.D. Wis. 2000) (taking into account statutory treble damages in calculating amount in
controversy); McMullen v. Synchrony Bank, 82 F. Supp. 3d 133, 139 (D.D.C. 2015) (relying on
trebled damage calculation to meet CAFA damage threshold).
24. Plaintiff has also requested punitive damages and attorney’s fees (in connection
with her fraud, negligence and IDCSA claims (Counts III-VII & Prayer for Relief, E-G)), which
likewise are included in estimating the amount in controversy on removal. See Keeling v. Esurance
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Ins. Co., 660 F.3d 273, 2011 WL 4448578 (7th Cir. Sept. 26, 2011) (upholding jurisdiction under
CAFA upon concluding that a 5:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages was
conceivable in a case brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act); ABM Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Davis, 646 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2011) (including attorney’s fees
for work performed prior to filing complaint in calculation).
25. Accordingly, a reasonable reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint here readily reflects that
CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.
26. Therefore, Defendants have properly removed this class action from the Marion
Superior Court to this Court because:
a. Plaintiff is a citizen of a state different from Gila and Kapsch;
b. the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 exclusive of
interest and costs; and
c. the number of members in the putative class in the aggregate is at least 100.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Removal Is Timely And Other Removal Requirements Are Met
27. Finally, Plaintiff served the Complaint on Gila’s registered agent by certified mail
on February 7, 2019, and on Kapsch’s registered agent by certified mail on February 8, 2019. Thus,
this Notice is filed timely within the 30-day period for removing under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b)(1)
and 1453(b).
28. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1454 because this case
was filed in the Marion Superior Court for the State of Indiana.
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29. After filing this Notice, Defendants will promptly serve written notice of this Notice
of Removal on Plaintiff’s counsel and notify the Clerk of the Marion Superior Court, Indiana, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
30. Authentic copies of the state court record are attached to this Notice of Removal as
Exhibit 1.
WHEREFORE, Defendants Gila, LLC and Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc. hereby give
notice that the state court action, under Cause No. 49D13-1902-CT-004569, now pending in the
Marion Superior Court for the State of Indiana, is removed to this Court for all further proceedings.
Date: March 11, 2019
/s/ Jonathan W. Garlough (with

By: permission) By: /s/ Darren A. Craig
Jonathan W. Garlough, #30329-45 Darren A. Craig, #25534-49
F OLEY & LARDNER LLP F ROST B ROWN T ODD LLC
321 North Clark Street, Suite 2800 201 North Illinois Street, Suite 1900
Chicago, IL 60654-5313 P.O. Box 44961
Telephone: (312) 832-5702 Indianapolis, IN 46244-0961
Facsimile: (312) 832-4700 Telephone: (317) 237-3800
Email: jgarlough@foley.com Facsimile: (317) 237-3900
Email: dcraig@fbtlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Gila, LLC
Attorneys for Defendant Kapsch Trafficcom
USA, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 11, 2019, a copy of the foregoing document was served by
electronic mail and by first-class United States Mail, postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
Jacob R. Cox Jonathon B. Noyes

C OX LAW O FFICE William E. Winingham
1606 North Delaware Street W ILSON K EHOE W ININGHAM LLC
Indianapolis, IN 46202 2859 North Meridian Street
jcox@coxlaw.com Indianapolis, IN 46204
jnoyes@wkw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Melissa Barker winingham@wkw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Melissa Barker
Jonathan W. Garlough
Foley & Lardner LLP
321 North Clark Street, Suite 2800
Chicago, IL 60654-5313
jgarlough@foley.com
Attorneys for Defendant Gila, LLC
/s/Darren A. Craig
Darren A. Craig
0134251.0717666 4846-0681-5626v1
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Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2-1 Filed 03/11/19 Page 1 of 17 PageIDFiled:
49D13-1902-CT-004569 2/4/2019 3:36 PM
#: 85 Clerk
Marion Superior Court, Civil Division 13 Marion County, Indiana
STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

) SS:
COUNTY OF MARION ) CAUSE NO:
MELISSA BARKER, an individual, on behalf of )

)
herself and all others similarly situated,
)
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC., and )
GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff, Melissa Barker (“Barker”), by counsel, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, for her Complaint against Defendants, Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc. and GILA,
LLC, alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiff Melissa Barker is an individual who lives in Indiana. Plaintiff was
invoiced by Defendants for use one of the Riverlink toll system bridges.
2. Defendant Kapsch TrafficCom USA, Inc. (herein “Kapsch”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business
located in the State of Virginia.
3. Defendant Gila, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Texas and with its principal place of business in the State of Texas. Gila
LLC also does business using the name “Municipal Services Bureau” or “MSB.”
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Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2-1 Filed 03/11/19 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 86
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff is a
resident of the State of Indiana who was injured in Indiana due to the unlawful actions of
Defendants as set forth below.
5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants do
business in the State of Indiana including specifically via the business activities and conduct at
issue in this Complaint.
6. This Court is a preferred venue for this matter because Defendants each maintain
their registered agents in Marion County, Indiana.
THE RIVERLINK TOLLING SYSTEM
7. RiverLink is the Tolling System for the Louisville-Southern Indiana Ohio River
Bridges Project, a collaborative effort between the States of Indiana and Kentucky to build,
improve, and maintain multiple major bridges over the Ohio River that connect Kentucky and
Southern Indiana (the “Toll Bridges”), including the new Abraham Lincoln Bridge in downtown
Louisville (I-65), the revamping of the existing Kennedy Bridge in downtown Louisville (also I-
65), a new East End Bridge connecting the extension of the Snyder Freeway (I-265) with Southern
Indiana (state road 265) and the rebuilding of the I-65, I-64 and I-71 interchanges.
8. The RiverLink system uses all-electronic tolling, meaning no toll booths. The
RiverLink system is operated and administered by a Toll Services Provider (“TSP”).
9. Drivers and motorists with prepaid accounts and transponders are supposed to pay
the lowest toll rates when using the RiverLink system. For these customers, sensors read the
transponder and deduct the appropriate toll when the motorist crosses one of the Toll Bridges.
10. For drivers without prepaid RiverLink accounts, or with inadequate balances to pay
the toll, cameras capture license plates and an invoice (the “1st Toll Notice”) is then supposed to
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be created and mailed to the registered vehicle owner as identified by the Indiana Bureau of Motor
Vehicles (“IN BMV”) and Kentucky Motor Vehicle Licensing (“KY MVL”).
11. The 1st Toll Notice may not include any administrative fees or penalties, but may
only provide notice of and invoice the motorist for the toll that is due for use of the Tolling Bridge.
12. If a motorist does not pay the toll within thirty (30) days after receipt of the 1st Toll
Notice, the TSP is then authorized to send a “2nd Toll Notice” that includes both the unpaid toll(s)
and the assessment of an additional $5.00 administrative fee/penalty.
13. If the 2nd Toll Notice is not then paid within thirty (30) days, the TSP is then
authorized to send a “Violation Notice” that includes the unpaid toll(s), $5.00 administrative
fee/penalty, and an additional $25.00 violation penalty/fee.
14. If the Violation Notice is not then paid within thirty (30) days, the TSP is then
authorized to send a “Collection Notice” that includes the unpaid toll(s), $5.00 administrative
fee/penalty, $25.00 violation penalty/fee, and an additional $30.00 collections penalty/fee.
15. If the Collection Notice is not paid, additional fees may then be assessed,
collections efforts (including litigation) may be taken, and the TSP can also direct that a hold be
placed on the motorist’s vehicle registration with the IN BMV and/or KY MVL that will not be
lifted until the toll and fees/penalties are paid.
DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT AS TOLL SERVICES PROVIDER
16. After considering various proposals submitted in response to a Request for
Proposals, Defendant Kapsch TrafficCom USA, Inc. was awarded a contract to act as the Toll
Services Provider (“TSP”).
17. Kapsch then hired Defendant GILA, LLC to act as its agent and provide various
services including image review, account and transponder management, payment processing,
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invoicing and video billing, violation processing, and collection and court processing services,
relating to RiverLink.
18. Together, Kapsch and GILA were responsible for and implemented the toll
invoicing system for RiverLink.
19. Defendants began to assess and invoice tolls for motorists using the Toll Bridges
beginning on December 30, 2016 and through the present date.
20. Plaintiff received a 2nd Toll Notice that was dated 08/19/2017 in relation to use of
the Toll Bridges on June 29 and June 30, 2017, and that included an administrative fee of $5.00
that is expressly not allowed for a 1st Toll Notice by law and Defendants’ contract with the States.
21. Thereafter, Plaintiff similarly received a 2nd Toll Notice that was dated 01/16/2018
in relation to use of the Toll Bridges on September 4 and November 26, 2017, and that included
an administrative fee of $5.00 that is expressly not allowed for a 1st Toll Notice by law and
Defendants’ contract to act as the TSP.
22. In both of these instances, Plaintiff did not receive a 1st Toll Notice or otherwise
any invoice or notice that a toll was due and owed for use of the Toll Bridges.
23. Instead, the 2nd Toll Notices received by Plaintiff were the first notices that a toll
was due in relation to the specific uses of the Toll Bridges identified and invoiced in those 2nd Toll
Notices.
24. Plaintiff was thus assessed a fee and/or penalty without any notice of a toll being
due or opportunity to pay that toll within thirty days (of receipt of a 1 st Toll Notice) in order to
avoid assessment of a fee and/or penalty such as those assessed by Defendants in the 2nd Toll
Notices sent to Plaintiff.
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25. Upon information and belief, Defendants routinely did not send motorists 1st Toll
Notices after they crossed the Toll Bridges. Instead, they inappropriately sent 2nd Toll Notices,
Violation Notices, or Collection Notices, which imposed additional fees and/or penalties that were
unlawful due to Defenants failure to provide a 1st Toll Notice that allowed drivers to pay the toll
within thirty days and without imposition of any additional fees or penalties.
26. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ failure to send 1st Toll Notices before
2nd Toll Notices, Violation Notices, and/or Collection Notices is widespread and affects a large
portion of motorists using the RiverLink system.
27. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ have inappropriately charged motorists
penalties as part of a scheme with the intent to defraud and mislead, and/or have otherwise failed
to cure their misconduct despite notice of the same and opportunity.
28. Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
consumers to (i) reimburse them for the damages caused by Defendants’ conduct, (ii) halt the
dissemination of Defendants’ false, misleading and deceptive invoicing system, (iii) correct false
impressions and beliefs that have been created in the minds of consumers by Defendants relating
to the toll payment process and notice requirements, and (iv) otherwise obtain redress for those
who have been inaccurately or wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees without prior
notice.
29. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the Class have
occurred, have been performed, or have been excused or waived.
CLASS DEFINITION AND ALLEGATIONS
30. Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of herself and members of a Class defined as:
All individuals who were assessed, charged, invoiced, requested to

pay, or did in fact pay an administrative fee or penalty, relating to tolls
5
assessed to that individual for use of the RiverLink Toll Bridges,

without first being provided notice of any unpaid toll via a 1st Toll
Notice. Excluded from the Class are Defendant(s) and their officers,
directors and employees.
31. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members
of the Class is impracticable. Upon information and belief, the proposed Class contains hundreds
or even thousands of motorists who were wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees
without notice and whom have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein.
Individual joinder of each such Class member would be impractical. The precise number of Class
members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time.
32. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. This action
involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting
individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(a) Whether Defendants’ representations discussed above are misleading, or
objectively reasonably likely to deceive;
(b) whether Defendants’ alleged conduct violates public policy;
(c) whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws asserted;
(e) whether Plaintiff and Class members have sustained monetary loss and the
proper measure of that loss; and
(f) whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to other appropriate
remedies, including injunctive relief.
33. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class
because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described
above and were subject to Defendants’ wrongful assessment of administrative penalties and fees
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without notice. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and
all members of the Class. Plaintiff is representative of the Class and has standing to advance these
claims because she was subject to and injured by Defendants’ conduct in a manner such that she
suffered damages that were proximately caused by Defendants’ misrepresentations and unlawful
acts.
34. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff wish to represent the Class because Plaintiff
feel that she has been deceived and wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees without
notice, wishes to obtain redress for the wrongs that have been done to Plaintiff, and also wish to
ensure Defendant is not allowed to perpetrate similar wrongs on other consumers and motorists.
Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and does not
have interests that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interests of the Class member. Plaintiff
has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation and knowledgeable
of applicable law to claims for the Class, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously.
35. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and
efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by
individual Class members is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be
entailed by individual litigation of their claims against Defendant, including the necessity of
extensive discovery and the likely need for and use of expert witnesses in relation to the issues
raised in this litigation. It would be virtually impossible for the Class, on an individual basis, to
obtain effective redress for the wrongs done to them. Furthermore, even if Class members could
afford such individualized litigation, the court system would be overwhelmed by such redundant
litigation of the same factual issues set forth in this Complaint. Individualized litigation would
create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts.
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Individualized litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court
system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the class action device provides the
benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and
comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties
under the circumstances here.
36. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf
of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent
Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full
restitution to Plaintiff and all other Class members.
37. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies received and/or have no
obligation to remedy injuries caused as a result of its conduct and in relation to Plaintiff and Class
members. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant will continue to commit the
violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be
deceived and wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees without notice.
38. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
Class, making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
Count I: Unjust Enrichment
39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth
in paragraphs 1 through 38 above as if fully set forth herein.
40. A measurable benefit was conferred on Defendant by Plaintiff and members of the
putative Class including those amounts paid for penalties and/or administrative fees assessed or
invoiced to Plaintiff and members of the putative Class.
8
41. This benefit was conferred on Defendants at their own behest and was based on
Defendants’ representation that it had provided a 1st Toll Notice and/or other notices that went
unpaid and authorized Defendants to assess additional fees and/or penalties.
42. It would be unjust for Defendants to retain this benefit because Defendants did not
actually provide notice as represented and required to assess the additional fees and/or penalties.
43. Due to the unjust enrichment of Defendants, Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment
for damages in an amount equal to the value of the benefit conferred on Defendant, as will be
determined at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiffs and
the putative Class members for all damages recoverable under the applicable law, for costs, for
pre- and post-judgment interest, and for all other relief just and proper in the premises.
Count II: Money Had and Received
44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set
forth in paragraphs 1 through 43 above as though fully set forth herein.
45. Defendants received money, either from Plaintiff and the putative Class members,
in relation to 2nd Toll Notices and other toll notices to Plaintiffs and the putative Class members
that were sent without sending a 1st Toll Notice and that contained fees and/or penalties may only
be assessed after a 1st Toll Notice is received by a vehicle owner and then not paid within thirty
days.
46. The circumstances are such that Defendants, in equity and good conscience, ought
not to retain that money, as Defendants failed to provide notice that was required to allow
opportunity for payment of any tolls owed without assessment of the additional fees or penalties
that Defendants included in invoices such as the 2nd Toll Notice.
9
47. Further, Defendants misrepresented whether such 1st Toll Notice had been sent by
identifying an invoice that purported to be the “2nd Toll Notice” and deceived Plaintiff and the
other putative Class members as to whether they had been provided notice (when they had not).
48. The money provided to Defendants by Plaintiff and members of the putative Class
was provided by mistake of fact, without consideration, and/or upon consideration that has
failed, and accordingly belongs and should be returned to Plaintiff and the putative Class
members.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants in favor of Plaintiffs and
Count III: Fraud
49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set forth
50. Plaintiff bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.
51. Defendant made numerous material representations of past or existing fact that
were false, including statements regarding whether prior notice of tolls had been provided to
Plaintiff and other Class members as set forth above in greater detail.
52. Defendant made these false material representations of past or existing fact with
knowledge or reckless ignorance of their falsity.
53. Plaintiff and the Class members each relied upon the false material representations
of fact by Defendant, and this reliance proximately caused injury to Plaintiff and the Class
members in the amounts paid for administrative penalties and fees that were unjustified and
wrongfully assessed.
10
54. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to damages in an amount to be
determined at trial as compensation for the injuries they suffered.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff pray for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff and the
Class members for actual, consequential, exemplary, and/or statutory damages, for attorneys fees
and costs, for pre- and post-judgment interest, and for all other relief just and proper in the
premises.
Count IV: Violation of Deceptive Consumer Sales Act
57. As set forth in the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Indiana Code § 24-5-
0.5-2, Plaintiff and the Class members are persons who engaged in consumer transactions with
Defendant, suppliers.
58. Defendants’ conduct, as described more fully above, constitutes a deceptive act.
59. Defendants’ deceptive acts were willfully done by Defendants as part of a scheme,
artifice, or device with intend to defraud and mislead Plaintiff and the Class members, and thus
constitute incurable deceptive acts as set forth under Indiana law.
60. Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged by Defendants’ deceptive acts
and are entitled to a judgment for these damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
61. Plaintiff and the Class members are further entitled to treble damages and attorneys’
fees as set forth in Indiana Code § 24-5-0.5-4.
62. Further, it is believed that discovery in this litigation will reveal that consumers in
other States than Indiana have had their consumer rights violated, as set forth in consumer
protection laws in those other States, by Defendants’ actions. To the extent that those other States’
consumer protection laws require the same legal elements and issues as the Indiana Deceptive
11
Consumer Sales Act such that common questions of law exist amongst the Class, Plaintiff
anticipate amending this Complaint to set forth claims under those Consumer Fraud Acts.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff and the
Class members for actual, consequential, exemplary and/or statutory damages, for attorneys fees
premises.
Count V: Deception or Intentional Misrepresentation
65. Defendants knowingly or intentionally made false or misleading written statements

to Plaintiff and the Class members regarding the notice provided in relation to tolls owed for use
of the toll bridge, including specifically false statements that prior invoices and notice had been
sent and that Defendants were authorized to assess penalties and/or administrative fees under
applicable law.
66. Defendants made these false or misleading written statements with the intent to
obtain property belonging to Plaintiff and the Class members including but not limited to the
money identified as being owed in the invoices sent by Defendants.
67. Defendants further made these deceptive statements along with an assertion that
Plaintiff and the Class members, if they did not pay the amounts invoiced, would be assessed
additional fees or penalties.
68. Defendants’ conduct constitutes deception and/or intentional misrepresentation.
69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deception, Plaintiff and the Class
members have sustained pecuniary loss in an amount to be proven at trial and are entitled to a
judgment for those damages.
70. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1, Plaintiff is also entitled to recover
additional damages in an amount three times Plaintiff’s actual pecuniary loss resulting from
12
Defendants’ deception. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
expenses.
premises.
Count VI: Negligence (Including Negligence Per Se)

73. Defendants had a duty to use care when invoicing Plaintiff and other members of
the putative Class in a manner that was accurate and in accordance with the notice and fee
provisions required of Defendants by applicable law and Defendants’ contracts.
74. Defendants breached these duties of care by negligently making false and
misleading representations regarding whether a 1st Toll Notice had been sent prior to assessing an
administrative penalty/fee and issuing a 2nd Toll Notice, without reasonable grounds for believing
that the false and misleading representations were true.
75. Defendants made these statements for purposes of inducing Plaintiff and the Class
Members to rely on the false and misleading statements and pay the wrongful administrative
fee/penalty due to that reliance and for fear of additional penalties/fees and/or a hold being placed
on their vehicle registrations.
76. Plaintiff and the Class members reviewed and then justifiably believed and relied
upon Defendants’ false and misleading statements, and in doing so suffered damages proximately
caused by Defendants’ breach of duty.
13
77. Defendants further committed negligence per se through violation of state statutes
and regulations including those governing Defendants’ ability to assess fees and/or penalties as a
TSP for the Toll Bridges as well as Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.
78. In relation to the Negligence Per Se, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered
damages proximately caused by violation of these statutes and regulations, are individuals in a
class of persons that were meant to be protected by these various statutes and regulations, and the
injuries Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered were of the type the statutes and regulations
were meant to prevent.
79. Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered damages proximately caused by
Defendants’ negligence and breach of duty in an amount to be determined at trial.
Class members for actual, consequential and exemplary damages, for attorneys fees and costs, for
Count VII: Constructive Fraud
80. Plaintiffs incorporates by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
forth in paragraphs 1 through 79 above as if fully set forth herein.
81. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.
82. Defendants owed Plaintiffs and the putative Class members a duty due to their
relationship as the TSP for the Toll Bridges and as the sole party in control of information about,
and the ability to confirm, whether and when toll notices had been sent to Plaintiff and the
putative Class members.
83. Defendants violated that duty by making deceptive material misrepresentations of
past or existing facts or remaining silent when a duty to speak existed, including specifically by
failing to inform Plaintiff and the putative Class members that Defendants had not sent a 1st Toll
Notice prior to sending later toll notices that included fees and/or penalties for failure to pay the
14
1st Toll Notice (as represented in the later toll notices despite the fact that the 1st Toll Notice had
actually not been sent).
84. Plaintiff and the putative Class members relied on Defendants deceptive material
misrepresentations of past or existing facts and/or silence when a duty to speak existed.
85. Plaintiff and the putative Class members suffered injury as a proximate result
thereof.
86. Defendants gained an advantage at the expense of Plaintiff and the putative Class
members, including but not limited to amounts invoiced and/or paid for fees and/or penalties
arising out of the alleged failure to pay the 1st Toll Notice in a timely manner when the 1st Toll
Notice had, in reality, actually never been sent to or received by Plaintiff and the putative Class
members such that they had an opportunity to pay it in a timely manner and avoid additional fees
and/or penalties.
87. Plaintiffs and the putative Class members are entitled to an award of damages, in
an amount to be determined at trial, to compensate them for their injuries.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff and
the putative Class members for actual, consequential, exemplary and/or statutory damages, for
attorneys fees and costs, for pre- and post-judgment interest, and for all other relief just and
proper in the premises.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for a judgment:

A. Certifying the Class as requested herein;
B. Awarding damages to Plaintiff and the proposed Class members;
C. Awarding restitution and disgorgement of Defendants’ revenues to Plaintiff and

the proposed Class members;
15
D. Awarding injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity, including: enjoining
Defendant from continuing the unlawfill practices as set forth herein, and directing Defendant to
identify, with Court supervision, Victims 0f its conduct and pay them all money it is required t0
Pay;
E Awarding statutory and punitive damages, as appropriate;
F Ordering Defendant t0 engage in a corrective advertising campaign;
G. Awarding attorneys' fees and costs; and
H Providing such further relief as may be just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
COX LAW OFFICE WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM
/s/ Jacob R. Cox Jonathon B. Noyes

/s/
Jacob R. Cox, Attorney N0. 2632 1 -49 Jon Noyes, Attorney No. 3 1444-49
COX LAW OFFICE William E. Winingham, Atty. No. 1309-49
1606 N. Delaware Street Wilson Kehoe Winingham LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202 2859 N. Meridian Street
T: 3 17.884.8550 Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
F: 3 17.660.2453 T: 3 17.920.6400
jw_xw
Attorneyfor Plaintifi‘
F: 3 17.920.6405
jnoyes@wkw.com.com
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Come now the Plaintiffs, by counsel, and demand a trial by jury 0n all issues s0 triable.
/s/ Jacob R. Cox

Jacob R. Cox
16
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing, along with copies of the Appearance and
Summons contemporaneously filed in this matter, has been served upon the following, via U.S.
Mail, Certified, First Class, postage prepaid, this 4th day of February, 2019:
Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.

c/o CT Corporation System (Registered Agent)
150 W. Market Street, Suite 800
Indianapolis, IN 46204
GILA, LLC
c/o Corporation Service Company
135 N. Pennsylvania Street, Suite 1610
/s/ Jacob R. Cox__________________

Jacob R. Cox
17
Summary - MyCase Page 1 of 3
1:19-cv-987-TWP-MJD
This is not the official court record. Official records of court proceedings may only be
obtained directly from the court maintaining a particular record.
Melissa Barker v. Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc., Gila, LLC

Case Number 49D13-1902-CT-004569
Court Marion Superior Court, Civil Division 13
Type CT - Civil Tort
Filed 02/04/2019
Status 02/04/2019 , Pending (active)
Parties to the Case

Defendant Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.
Attorney Darren Andrew Craig
#2553449, Retained
FROST BROWN TODD LLC
201 North Illinois Street - Suite 1900
317-237-3800(W)
Defendant Gila, LLC

Attorney Jonathan William Garlough
#3032945, Retained
321 North Clark Street
Suite 2800
Chicago, IL 60654
(312) 832-5702(W)
Plaintiff Barker, Melissa

Address 15864 Barnard Dr.
Noblesville, IN 46062
Attorney Jacob Ross Cox
#2632149, Lead, Retained
1606 N Delaware ST
317-884-8550(W)
Attorney Jonathon Byron Noyes

#3144449, Retained
2859 N. Meridian Street
317-920-6400(W)
Attorney William E Winingham

#130949, Retained
2859 N Meridian ST
317-920-6400(W)
Chronological Case Summary

02/04/2019 Case Opened as a New Filing
https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/ 3/11/2019
02/05/2019 Complaint/Equivalent Pleading Filed

Class Action Complaint and Demand for Trial by Jury
Filed By: Barker, Melissa

File Stamp: 02/04/2019
02/05/2019 Appearance Filed

Appearance
For Party: Barker, Melissa

02/05/2019 Subpoena/Summons Filed

Summons to Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.

02/05/2019 Subpoena/Summons Filed

Summons to Gila, LLC


E-Filing Appearance by Attorney in Civil Case




For Party: Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.

03/01/2019 Motion for Enlargement of Time Filed

Defendant's Notice of Automatic Initial Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint
Filed By: Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.


Appearance on Behalf of Gila, LLC
For Party: Gila, LLC

03/04/2019 Motion for Enlargement of Time Filed

Gila,LLC's Notice of Automatic Initial Thirty-Day Enlargement of Time to Respond to Complaint
Filed By: Gila, LLC

Financial Information
* Financial Balances reflected are current representations of transactions processed by the Clerk’s Office. Please note that any balance due
does not reflect interest that has accrued – if applicable – since the last payment. For questions/concerns regarding balances shown,
please contact the Clerk’s Office.
Barker, Melissa
Plaintiff
Balance Due (as of 03/11/2019)

0.00
Charge Summary
Description Amount Credit Payment
Court Costs and Filing Fees 157.00 0.00 157.00
Transaction Summary
Date Description Amount
02/05/2019 Transaction Assessment 157.00
02/05/2019 Electronic Payment (157.00)
This is not the official court record. Official records of court proceedings may only be
obtained directly from the court maintaining a particular record.
49D13-1902-CT-004569 #: 1052/4/2019 3:36 PM
Clerk

) SS:

)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
APPEARANCE
This Appearance Form must be filed on behalf of every party in a civil case.
1. The party on whose behalf this form is being filed is:

Initiating _X_ Responding ____ Intervening ____ ; and
the undersigned attorney and all attorneys listed on this form now appear in this case for
the following parties:
Name of party___Melissa Barker, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others

similarly situated. ___________________________________
Address of party (see Question # 6 below if this case involves a protection from abuse
order, a workplace violence restraining order, or a no-contact order)
15864 Barnard Dr., Noblesville, IN 46062-4659 ___________________________.
(List on a continuation page additional parties this attorney represents in this case.)
2. Attorney information for service as required by Trial Rule 5(B)(2)
Name: Jacob R. Cox Atty Number: 26321-49

Address: Cox Law Office
1606 N. Delaware St.
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202
Phone: _317-884-8550________________________________________________
FAX: __317-660-2453________________________________________________
Email Address: _jcox@coxlaw.com__________________________________
(List on continuation page additional attorneys appearing for above party)
3. This is a _CT_________ case type as defined in administrative Rule 8(B)(3).
4. I will accept service by FAX at the above noted number: Yes ____ No _X_
5. This case involves child support issues. Yes ____ No _X_ (If yes, supply social security
numbers for all family members on a separately attached document filed as confidential
information on light green paper. Use Form TCM-TR3.1-4.)
6. This case involves a protection from abuse order, a workplace violence restraining order,
or a no – contact order. Yes ____ No _X_ (If Yes, the initiating party must provide an
address for the purpose of legal service but that address should not be one that exposes
the whereabouts of a petitioner.) The party shall use the following address for purposes
of legal service:
__X__ Attorney’s address

________ The Attorney General Confidentiality program address
(contact the Attorney General at 1-800-321-1907 or e-mail address is
confidential@atg.state.in.us).
________ Another address (provide)
______________________________________________________________
7. This case involves a petition for involuntary commitment. Yes ____ No _X_
8. If Yes above, provide the following regarding the individual subject to the petition for
involuntary commitment:
a. Name of the individual subject to the petition for involuntary commitment if it is not
already provided in #1 above: ____________________________________________
b. State of Residence of person subject to petition: _______________
c. At least one of the following pieces of identifying information:

(i) Date of Birth ___________
(ii) Driver’s License Number ______________________
State where issued _____________ Expiration date __________
(iii) State ID number ____________________________
State where issued _____________ Expiration date ___________
(iv) FBI number __________________________
(v) Indiana Department of Corrections Number _______________________
(vi) Social Security Number is available and is being provided in an attached
confidential document Yes ____ No ____
9. There are related cases: Yes ____ No _X_ (If yes, list on continuation page.)
10. Additional information required by local rule:

_____________________________________________________________________
11. There are other party members: Yes ____ No_X_ (If yes, list on continuation page.)
12. This form has been served on all other parties and Certificate of Service is attached:
Yes_X__ No___
/s/ Jacob R. Cox_______________________

Attorney-at-Law
(Attorney information shown above.)
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon the following via
United States, certified mail, first class, postage prepaid, on the 4th day of February, 2019:

GILA, LLC
/s/ Jacob R. Cox_________________

Jacob R. Cox
Filed: 2/5/2019 10:08 AM
Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2-2 Filed 03/11/19 Page 7 of 46 PageID #: 108 Clerk
Marion County, Indiana

) SS:
COUNTY OF MONROE ) CAUSE NO: 49D13-1902-CT-004569
MELISSA BARKER, an individual, on )

behalf of herself and all other similarly )
situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC. )
and GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
E-FILING APPEARANCE BY ATTORNEY IN CIVIL CASE
Initiating _X__ Responding ____ Intervening ____ ; and
Name of party: Melissa Barker, and individual, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated.
Address of Party: 15864 Barnard Dr., Noblesville, IN 46062
Telephone # of party:
Name: William E. Winingham Atty Number: 1309-49

Address: WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM, LLC
2859 N. Meridian St.
Phone: (317) 920-6400

FAX: (317) 920-6405
Email Address: winingham@wkw.com
IMPORTANT: Each attorney specified on this appearance:
(a) certifies that the contact information listed for him/her on the Indiana Supreme
Court R011 0f Attorneys is current and accurate as of the date of this
Appearance;
(b) acknowledges that all orders, opinions, and notices from the court in this
matter that are served under Trial Rule 86(G) will be sent t0 the attorney at
the email address(es) specified by the attorney 0n the Roll 0f Attorneys
regardless 0f the contact information listed above for the attorney; and
(c) understands that he/she is solely responsible for keeping his/her Roll of
Attorneys contact information current and accurate, see Ind. Admis. Disc. R.
2(A).
Attorneys can review and update their R011 0f Attorneys contact information on the
Courts Portal at http://p0rtal.courts.in.20v.
3. This is a _fl case type as defined in administrative Rule 8(B)(3).
4. This case involves child support issues. Yes N0 X (Ifyes, supply social security
numbersfor allfamz'ly members 0n a separately attached documentfiled as confidential
information 0n light green paper. Use Form TCM-TR3.I-4.)
5.
or a no — contact order. Yes _ L

This case involves a protection from abuse order, a workplace Violence restraining order,
N0 (If Yes, the initiatingparly
addressfor the purpose oflegal service but that address should not be one that exposes
mustprovide an
the whereabouts ofa petitioner.) The party shall use the following address for purposes
of legal service:
Attorney’s address
The Attorney General Confidentiality program address

confidential@atg.in.g0v).
Another address (provide)
This case involves a petition for involuntary commitment. Yes No _X

6. If Yes above, provide the following regarding the individual subj ect t0 the petition for
a. Name 0f the individual subj ect to the petition for involuntary commitment if it is
not already provided in #1 above:
b. State 0f Residence 0f person subject t0 petition:

(i) Date 0f Birth
(ii) Driver’s License Number
State Where issued Expiration date
(iii) State ID number
State where issued Expiration date
(iv) FBI number
(V) Indiana Department 0f Corrections Number
(Vi) Social Security Number is available and is being provided in an attached

confidential document Yes No
7. There are related cases: Yes No _X_ (Ifyes, list 0n continuation page.)
9. There are other party members: Yes No X (Ifyes, list 0n continuation page.)
10. This form has been served 0n all other parties and Certificate of Service is attached:
Yes_ N0 X
Respectfully Submitted,
WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM LLC
/s/Wi11iam E. Winingham
William E. Winingham, #1309-49
2859 North Meridian Street
Tel (3 17) 920-6400
Fax (3 17) 920-6405
Email: winingham@wkw.com
Ihereby certify that 0n February 5, 20 1 9, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court using the E-Filing system which sent notification of such filing t0 the following E-
Filing participants:
Jacob R. Cox
jcox@coxlaw.com
/s/Wi11iam E. Winingham
William E. Winingham, #1309-49
49D13-1902-CT-004569 2/4/2019 3:36 PM
#: 112 Clerk

) SS:

)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiff, Melissa Barker (“Barker”), by counsel, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, for her Complaint against Defendants, Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc. and GILA,
LLC, alleges as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION
1. Plaintiff Melissa Barker is an individual who lives in Indiana. Plaintiff was
invoiced by Defendants for use one of the Riverlink toll system bridges.
2. Defendant Kapsch TrafficCom USA, Inc. (herein “Kapsch”) is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business
located in the State of Virginia.
3. Defendant Gila, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Texas and with its principal place of business in the State of Texas. Gila
LLC also does business using the name “Municipal Services Bureau” or “MSB.”
1
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff is a
resident of the State of Indiana who was injured in Indiana due to the unlawful actions of
Defendants as set forth below.
5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants do
business in the State of Indiana including specifically via the business activities and conduct at
issue in this Complaint.
6. This Court is a preferred venue for this matter because Defendants each maintain
their registered agents in Marion County, Indiana.
THE RIVERLINK TOLLING SYSTEM
7. RiverLink is the Tolling System for the Louisville-Southern Indiana Ohio River
Bridges Project, a collaborative effort between the States of Indiana and Kentucky to build,
improve, and maintain multiple major bridges over the Ohio River that connect Kentucky and
Southern Indiana (the “Toll Bridges”), including the new Abraham Lincoln Bridge in downtown
Louisville (I-65), the revamping of the existing Kennedy Bridge in downtown Louisville (also I-
65), a new East End Bridge connecting the extension of the Snyder Freeway (I-265) with Southern
Indiana (state road 265) and the rebuilding of the I-65, I-64 and I-71 interchanges.
8. The RiverLink system uses all-electronic tolling, meaning no toll booths. The
RiverLink system is operated and administered by a Toll Services Provider (“TSP”).
9. Drivers and motorists with prepaid accounts and transponders are supposed to pay
the lowest toll rates when using the RiverLink system. For these customers, sensors read the
transponder and deduct the appropriate toll when the motorist crosses one of the Toll Bridges.
10. For drivers without prepaid RiverLink accounts, or with inadequate balances to pay
the toll, cameras capture license plates and an invoice (the “1st Toll Notice”) is then supposed to
2
be created and mailed to the registered vehicle owner as identified by the Indiana Bureau of Motor
Vehicles (“IN BMV”) and Kentucky Motor Vehicle Licensing (“KY MVL”).
11. The 1st Toll Notice may not include any administrative fees or penalties, but may
only provide notice of and invoice the motorist for the toll that is due for use of the Tolling Bridge.
12. If a motorist does not pay the toll within thirty (30) days after receipt of the 1st Toll
Notice, the TSP is then authorized to send a “2nd Toll Notice” that includes both the unpaid toll(s)
and the assessment of an additional $5.00 administrative fee/penalty.
13. If the 2nd Toll Notice is not then paid within thirty (30) days, the TSP is then
authorized to send a “Violation Notice” that includes the unpaid toll(s), $5.00 administrative
fee/penalty, and an additional $25.00 violation penalty/fee.
14. If the Violation Notice is not then paid within thirty (30) days, the TSP is then
authorized to send a “Collection Notice” that includes the unpaid toll(s), $5.00 administrative
fee/penalty, $25.00 violation penalty/fee, and an additional $30.00 collections penalty/fee.
15. If the Collection Notice is not paid, additional fees may then be assessed,
collections efforts (including litigation) may be taken, and the TSP can also direct that a hold be
placed on the motorist’s vehicle registration with the IN BMV and/or KY MVL that will not be
lifted until the toll and fees/penalties are paid.
DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT AS TOLL SERVICES PROVIDER
16. After considering various proposals submitted in response to a Request for
Proposals, Defendant Kapsch TrafficCom USA, Inc. was awarded a contract to act as the Toll
Services Provider (“TSP”).
17. Kapsch then hired Defendant GILA, LLC to act as its agent and provide various
services including image review, account and transponder management, payment processing,
3
invoicing and video billing, violation processing, and collection and court processing services,
relating to RiverLink.
18. Together, Kapsch and GILA were responsible for and implemented the toll
invoicing system for RiverLink.
19. Defendants began to assess and invoice tolls for motorists using the Toll Bridges
beginning on December 30, 2016 and through the present date.
20. Plaintiff received a 2nd Toll Notice that was dated 08/19/2017 in relation to use of
the Toll Bridges on June 29 and June 30, 2017, and that included an administrative fee of $5.00
that is expressly not allowed for a 1st Toll Notice by law and Defendants’ contract with the States.
21. Thereafter, Plaintiff similarly received a 2nd Toll Notice that was dated 01/16/2018
in relation to use of the Toll Bridges on September 4 and November 26, 2017, and that included
an administrative fee of $5.00 that is expressly not allowed for a 1st Toll Notice by law and
Defendants’ contract to act as the TSP.
22. In both of these instances, Plaintiff did not receive a 1st Toll Notice or otherwise
any invoice or notice that a toll was due and owed for use of the Toll Bridges.
23. Instead, the 2nd Toll Notices received by Plaintiff were the first notices that a toll
was due in relation to the specific uses of the Toll Bridges identified and invoiced in those 2nd Toll
Notices.
24. Plaintiff was thus assessed a fee and/or penalty without any notice of a toll being
due or opportunity to pay that toll within thirty days (of receipt of a 1 st Toll Notice) in order to
avoid assessment of a fee and/or penalty such as those assessed by Defendants in the 2nd Toll
Notices sent to Plaintiff.
4
25. Upon information and belief, Defendants routinely did not send motorists 1st Toll
Notices after they crossed the Toll Bridges. Instead, they inappropriately sent 2nd Toll Notices,
Violation Notices, or Collection Notices, which imposed additional fees and/or penalties that were
unlawful due to Defenants failure to provide a 1st Toll Notice that allowed drivers to pay the toll
within thirty days and without imposition of any additional fees or penalties.
26. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ failure to send 1st Toll Notices before
2nd Toll Notices, Violation Notices, and/or Collection Notices is widespread and affects a large
portion of motorists using the RiverLink system.
27. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ have inappropriately charged motorists
penalties as part of a scheme with the intent to defraud and mislead, and/or have otherwise failed
to cure their misconduct despite notice of the same and opportunity.
28. Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
consumers to (i) reimburse them for the damages caused by Defendants’ conduct, (ii) halt the
dissemination of Defendants’ false, misleading and deceptive invoicing system, (iii) correct false
impressions and beliefs that have been created in the minds of consumers by Defendants relating
to the toll payment process and notice requirements, and (iv) otherwise obtain redress for those
who have been inaccurately or wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees without prior
notice.
29. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the Class have
occurred, have been performed, or have been excused or waived.
CLASS DEFINITION AND ALLEGATIONS
30. Plaintiff bring this action on behalf of herself and members of a Class defined as:
All individuals who were assessed, charged, invoiced, requested to

pay, or did in fact pay an administrative fee or penalty, relating to tolls
5
assessed to that individual for use of the RiverLink Toll Bridges,

without first being provided notice of any unpaid toll via a 1st Toll
Notice. Excluded from the Class are Defendant(s) and their officers,
directors and employees.
31. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members
of the Class is impracticable. Upon information and belief, the proposed Class contains hundreds
or even thousands of motorists who were wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees
without notice and whom have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein.
Individual joinder of each such Class member would be impractical. The precise number of Class
members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time.
32. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. This action
involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting
individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(a) Whether Defendants’ representations discussed above are misleading, or
objectively reasonably likely to deceive;
(b) whether Defendants’ alleged conduct violates public policy;
(c) whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws asserted;
(e) whether Plaintiff and Class members have sustained monetary loss and the
proper measure of that loss; and
(f) whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to other appropriate
remedies, including injunctive relief.
33. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class
because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described
above and were subject to Defendants’ wrongful assessment of administrative penalties and fees
6
without notice. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and
all members of the Class. Plaintiff is representative of the Class and has standing to advance these
claims because she was subject to and injured by Defendants’ conduct in a manner such that she
suffered damages that were proximately caused by Defendants’ misrepresentations and unlawful
acts.
34. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff wish to represent the Class because Plaintiff
feel that she has been deceived and wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees without
notice, wishes to obtain redress for the wrongs that have been done to Plaintiff, and also wish to
ensure Defendant is not allowed to perpetrate similar wrongs on other consumers and motorists.
Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and does not
have interests that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interests of the Class member. Plaintiff
has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation and knowledgeable
of applicable law to claims for the Class, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously.
35. Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and
efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by
individual Class members is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be
entailed by individual litigation of their claims against Defendant, including the necessity of
extensive discovery and the likely need for and use of expert witnesses in relation to the issues
raised in this litigation. It would be virtually impossible for the Class, on an individual basis, to
obtain effective redress for the wrongs done to them. Furthermore, even if Class members could
afford such individualized litigation, the court system would be overwhelmed by such redundant
litigation of the same factual issues set forth in this Complaint. Individualized litigation would
create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts.
7
Individualized litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court
system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the class action device provides the
benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and
comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties
under the circumstances here.
36. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf
of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent
Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full
restitution to Plaintiff and all other Class members.
37. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies received and/or have no
obligation to remedy injuries caused as a result of its conduct and in relation to Plaintiff and Class
members. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant will continue to commit the
violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be
deceived and wrongfully assessed administrative penalties and fees without notice.
38. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
Class, making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole.
Count I: Unjust Enrichment
39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth
40. A measurable benefit was conferred on Defendant by Plaintiff and members of the
putative Class including those amounts paid for penalties and/or administrative fees assessed or
invoiced to Plaintiff and members of the putative Class.
8
41. This benefit was conferred on Defendants at their own behest and was based on
Defendants’ representation that it had provided a 1st Toll Notice and/or other notices that went
unpaid and authorized Defendants to assess additional fees and/or penalties.
42. It would be unjust for Defendants to retain this benefit because Defendants did not
actually provide notice as represented and required to assess the additional fees and/or penalties.
43. Due to the unjust enrichment of Defendants, Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment
for damages in an amount equal to the value of the benefit conferred on Defendant, as will be
determined at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiffs and
Count II: Money Had and Received
44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set
forth in paragraphs 1 through 43 above as though fully set forth herein.
45. Defendants received money, either from Plaintiff and the putative Class members,
in relation to 2nd Toll Notices and other toll notices to Plaintiffs and the putative Class members
that were sent without sending a 1st Toll Notice and that contained fees and/or penalties may only
be assessed after a 1st Toll Notice is received by a vehicle owner and then not paid within thirty
days.
46. The circumstances are such that Defendants, in equity and good conscience, ought
not to retain that money, as Defendants failed to provide notice that was required to allow
opportunity for payment of any tolls owed without assessment of the additional fees or penalties
that Defendants included in invoices such as the 2nd Toll Notice.
9
47. Further, Defendants misrepresented whether such 1st Toll Notice had been sent by
identifying an invoice that purported to be the “2nd Toll Notice” and deceived Plaintiff and the
other putative Class members as to whether they had been provided notice (when they had not).
48. The money provided to Defendants by Plaintiff and members of the putative Class
was provided by mistake of fact, without consideration, and/or upon consideration that has
failed, and accordingly belongs and should be returned to Plaintiff and the putative Class
members.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants in favor of Plaintiffs and
Count III: Fraud
51. Defendant made numerous material representations of past or existing fact that
were false, including statements regarding whether prior notice of tolls had been provided to
Plaintiff and other Class members as set forth above in greater detail.
52. Defendant made these false material representations of past or existing fact with
knowledge or reckless ignorance of their falsity.
53. Plaintiff and the Class members each relied upon the false material representations
of fact by Defendant, and this reliance proximately caused injury to Plaintiff and the Class
members in the amounts paid for administrative penalties and fees that were unjustified and
wrongfully assessed.
10
54. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to damages in an amount to be
determined at trial as compensation for the injuries they suffered.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff pray for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff and the
Class members for actual, consequential, exemplary, and/or statutory damages, for attorneys fees
premises.
Count IV: Violation of Deceptive Consumer Sales Act
57. As set forth in the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Indiana Code § 24-5-
0.5-2, Plaintiff and the Class members are persons who engaged in consumer transactions with
Defendant, suppliers.
58. Defendants’ conduct, as described more fully above, constitutes a deceptive act.
59. Defendants’ deceptive acts were willfully done by Defendants as part of a scheme,
artifice, or device with intend to defraud and mislead Plaintiff and the Class members, and thus
constitute incurable deceptive acts as set forth under Indiana law.
60. Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged by Defendants’ deceptive acts
and are entitled to a judgment for these damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
61. Plaintiff and the Class members are further entitled to treble damages and attorneys’
fees as set forth in Indiana Code § 24-5-0.5-4.
62. Further, it is believed that discovery in this litigation will reveal that consumers in
other States than Indiana have had their consumer rights violated, as set forth in consumer
protection laws in those other States, by Defendants’ actions. To the extent that those other States’
consumer protection laws require the same legal elements and issues as the Indiana Deceptive
11
Consumer Sales Act such that common questions of law exist amongst the Class, Plaintiff
anticipate amending this Complaint to set forth claims under those Consumer Fraud Acts.
premises.
Count V: Deception or Intentional Misrepresentation
65. Defendants knowingly or intentionally made false or misleading written statements

to Plaintiff and the Class members regarding the notice provided in relation to tolls owed for use
of the toll bridge, including specifically false statements that prior invoices and notice had been
sent and that Defendants were authorized to assess penalties and/or administrative fees under
applicable law.
66. Defendants made these false or misleading written statements with the intent to
obtain property belonging to Plaintiff and the Class members including but not limited to the
money identified as being owed in the invoices sent by Defendants.
67. Defendants further made these deceptive statements along with an assertion that
Plaintiff and the Class members, if they did not pay the amounts invoiced, would be assessed
additional fees or penalties.
68. Defendants’ conduct constitutes deception and/or intentional misrepresentation.
69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deception, Plaintiff and the Class
members have sustained pecuniary loss in an amount to be proven at trial and are entitled to a
judgment for those damages.
70. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1, Plaintiff is also entitled to recover
additional damages in an amount three times Plaintiff’s actual pecuniary loss resulting from
12
Defendants’ deception. Plaintiff is also entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and
expenses.
premises.
Count VI: Negligence (Including Negligence Per Se)

73. Defendants had a duty to use care when invoicing Plaintiff and other members of
the putative Class in a manner that was accurate and in accordance with the notice and fee
provisions required of Defendants by applicable law and Defendants’ contracts.
74. Defendants breached these duties of care by negligently making false and
misleading representations regarding whether a 1st Toll Notice had been sent prior to assessing an
administrative penalty/fee and issuing a 2nd Toll Notice, without reasonable grounds for believing
that the false and misleading representations were true.
75. Defendants made these statements for purposes of inducing Plaintiff and the Class
Members to rely on the false and misleading statements and pay the wrongful administrative
fee/penalty due to that reliance and for fear of additional penalties/fees and/or a hold being placed
on their vehicle registrations.
76. Plaintiff and the Class members reviewed and then justifiably believed and relied
upon Defendants’ false and misleading statements, and in doing so suffered damages proximately
caused by Defendants’ breach of duty.
13
77. Defendants further committed negligence per se through violation of state statutes
and regulations including those governing Defendants’ ability to assess fees and/or penalties as a
TSP for the Toll Bridges as well as Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.
78. In relation to the Negligence Per Se, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered
damages proximately caused by violation of these statutes and regulations, are individuals in a
class of persons that were meant to be protected by these various statutes and regulations, and the
injuries Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered were of the type the statutes and regulations
were meant to prevent.
79. Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered damages proximately caused by
Defendants’ negligence and breach of duty in an amount to be determined at trial.
Class members for actual, consequential and exemplary damages, for attorneys fees and costs, for
Count VII: Constructive Fraud
80. Plaintiffs incorporates by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
forth in paragraphs 1 through 79 above as if fully set forth herein.
81. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.
82. Defendants owed Plaintiffs and the putative Class members a duty due to their
relationship as the TSP for the Toll Bridges and as the sole party in control of information about,
and the ability to confirm, whether and when toll notices had been sent to Plaintiff and the
putative Class members.
83. Defendants violated that duty by making deceptive material misrepresentations of
past or existing facts or remaining silent when a duty to speak existed, including specifically by
failing to inform Plaintiff and the putative Class members that Defendants had not sent a 1st Toll
Notice prior to sending later toll notices that included fees and/or penalties for failure to pay the
14
1st Toll Notice (as represented in the later toll notices despite the fact that the 1st Toll Notice had
actually not been sent).
84. Plaintiff and the putative Class members relied on Defendants deceptive material
misrepresentations of past or existing facts and/or silence when a duty to speak existed.
85. Plaintiff and the putative Class members suffered injury as a proximate result
thereof.
86. Defendants gained an advantage at the expense of Plaintiff and the putative Class
members, including but not limited to amounts invoiced and/or paid for fees and/or penalties
arising out of the alleged failure to pay the 1st Toll Notice in a timely manner when the 1st Toll
Notice had, in reality, actually never been sent to or received by Plaintiff and the putative Class
members such that they had an opportunity to pay it in a timely manner and avoid additional fees
and/or penalties.
87. Plaintiffs and the putative Class members are entitled to an award of damages, in
an amount to be determined at trial, to compensate them for their injuries.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff and
the putative Class members for actual, consequential, exemplary and/or statutory damages, for
attorneys fees and costs, for pre- and post-judgment interest, and for all other relief just and
proper in the premises.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for a judgment:

A. Certifying the Class as requested herein;
B. Awarding damages to Plaintiff and the proposed Class members;
C. Awarding restitution and disgorgement of Defendants’ revenues to Plaintiff and

the proposed Class members;
15
D. Awarding injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity, including: enjoining
Defendant from continuing the unlawfill practices as set forth herein, and directing Defendant to
identify, with Court supervision, Victims 0f its conduct and pay them all money it is required t0
Pay;
E Awarding statutory and punitive damages, as appropriate;
F Ordering Defendant t0 engage in a corrective advertising campaign;
G. Awarding attorneys' fees and costs; and
H Providing such further relief as may be just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
COX LAW OFFICE WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM
/s/ Jacob R. Cox Jonathon B. Noyes

/s/
Jacob R. Cox, Attorney N0. 2632 1 -49 Jon Noyes, Attorney No. 3 1444-49
COX LAW OFFICE William E. Winingham, Atty. No. 1309-49
1606 N. Delaware Street Wilson Kehoe Winingham LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202 2859 N. Meridian Street
T: 3 17.884.8550 Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
F: 3 17.660.2453 T: 3 17.920.6400
jw_xw
Attorneyfor Plaintifi‘
F: 3 17.920.6405
jnoyes@wkw.com.com
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Come now the Plaintiffs, by counsel, and demand a trial by jury 0n all issues s0 triable.
/s/ Jacob R. Cox

Jacob R. Cox
16
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing, along with copies of the Appearance and
Summons contemporaneously filed in this matter, has been served upon the following, via U.S.
Mail, Certified, First Class, postage prepaid, this 4th day of February, 2019:

GILA, LLC
/s/ Jacob R. Cox__________________

Jacob R. Cox
17
49D13-1902-CT-004569 2/4/2019 3:36 PM
#: 129 Clerk

) SS:

herself and all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
)
GILA, LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
TO DEFENDANT: GILA, LLC

You are hereby notified that you have been sued by the person named as plaintiff and in the
Court indicated above.
The nature of the suit against you is stated in the complaint which is attached to this Summons.
It also states the relief sought or the demand made against you be the plaintiff.
An answer or other appropriate response in writing to the complaint must be filed either by
you or your attorney within twenty (20) days, commencing the day after you receive this
Summons, (or twenty-three (23), days if this Summons was received by mail), or a judgment by
default may be rendered against you for the relief demanded by plaintiff.
If you have a claim for relief against the plaintiff arising from the same transaction or
occurrence, you must assert it in your written answer.
If you need the name of an attorney, you may contact the Indianapolis Bar Association Lawyer
Referral Service (317-269-2222).
2/5/2019
Dated _______________________ _________________________________(Seal)
Clerk, Marion County Courts
(The following manner of service of summons is hereby designated.)

X Registered or certified mail.
Attorney for Plaintiff Marion County Courts

Jacob R. Cox 200 East Washington Street
Cox Law Office Indianapolis, IN 46204
1606 N Delaware Street
T: 317.884.8550
1
49D13-1902-CT-004569 2/4/2019 3:36 PM
#: 130 Clerk

) SS:

herself and all others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
)
GILA, LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
TO DEFENDANT: Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.

You are hereby notified that you have been sued by the person named as plaintiff and in the
Court indicated above.
The nature of the suit against you is stated in the complaint which is attached to this Summons.
It also states the relief sought or the demand made against you be the plaintiff.
An answer or other appropriate response in writing to the complaint must be filed either by
you or your attorney within twenty (20) days, commencing the day after you receive this
Summons, (or twenty-three (23), days if this Summons was received by mail), or a judgment by
default may be rendered against you for the relief demanded by plaintiff.
If you have a claim for relief against the plaintiff arising from the same transaction or
occurrence, you must assert it in your written answer.
If you need the name of an attorney, you may contact the Indianapolis Bar Association Lawyer
Referral Service (317-269-2222).
2/5/2019
Dated _______________________ _________________________________(Seal)
Clerk, Marion County Courts
(The following manner of service of summons is hereby designated.)

X Registered or certified mail.
Attorney for Plaintiff Marion County Courts

Jacob R. Cox 200 East Washington Street
Cox Law Office Indianapolis, IN 46204
1606 N Delaware Street
T: 317.884.8550
1
Filed: 2/5/2019 10:10 AM

) SS:
COUNTY OF MONROE ) CAUSE NO: 49D13-1902-CT-004569
MELISSA BARKER, an individual, on )

behalf of herself and all other similarly )
situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC. )
and GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
Initiating _X__ Responding ____ Intervening ____ ; and
Name of party: Melissa Barker, and individual, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated.
Address of Party: 15864 Barnard Dr., Noblesville, IN 46062
Telephone # of party:
Name: Jonathon B. Noyes Atty Number: 31444-49

Address: WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM, LLC
2859 N. Meridian St.
Phone: (317) 920-6400

FAX: (317) 920-6405
Email Address: jnoyes@wkw.com
IMPORTANT: Each attorney specified on this appearance:
(a) certifies that the contact information listed for him/her 0n the Indiana Supreme
Court R011 0f Attorneys is current and accurate as of the date 0f this
Appearance;
matter that are served under Trial Rule 86(G) will be sent t0 the attorney at
the email address(es) specified by the attorney 0n the Roll of Attorneys
regardless 0f the contact information listed above for the attorney; and
(c) understands that he/she is solely responsible for keeping his/her R011 of
2(A).
Attorneys can review and update their R011 0f Attorneys contact information on the
Courts Portal at http://p0rta1.c0urts.in.gov.
3. This is a _fl case type as defined in administrative Rule 8(B)(3).
4. This case involves child support issues. Yes N0 X (Ifyes, supply social security
numbersfor allfamz'ly members 0n a separately attached documentfiled as confidential
information 0n light green paper. Use Form TCM-TR3.I-4.)
5.
or a no — contact order. Yes _ L

This case involves a protection from abuse order, a workplace violence restraining order,
N0 (If Yes, the initiatingparly
addressfor the purpose oflegal service but that address should not be one that exposes
mustprovide an
the whereabouts ofa petitioner.) The party shall use the following address for purposes
of legal service:
Attorney’s address
The Attorney General Confidentiality program address

confidential@atg.in.g0v).
Another address (provide)
This case involves a petition for involuntary commitment. Yes No _X

6. If Yes above, provide the following regarding the individual subj ect t0 the petition for
a. Name 0f the individual subj ect to the petition for involuntary commitment if it is
not already provided in #1 above:
b. State 0f Residence 0f person subject t0 petition:

(i) Date 0f Birth
(ii) Driver’s License Number
State Where issued Expiration date
(iii) State ID number
State where issued Expiration date
(iv) FBI number
(V) Indiana Department 0f Corrections Number
(Vi) Social Security Number is available and is being provided in an attached

confidential document Yes No
7. There are related cases: Yes N0 _X_ (Ifyes, list 0n continuation page.)
9. There are other party members: Yes No X (Ifyes, list 0n continuation page.)
10. This form has been served 0n all other parties and Certificate of Service is attached:
Yes_ N0 X
Respectfully Submitted,
WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM LLC
/s/Jonathon B. Noyes
Jonathon B. Noyes, #3 1444-49
2859 North Meridian Street
Tel (3 17) 920-6400
Fax (3 17) 920-6405
Email: jnoyes@wkw.com
Ihereby certify that 0n February 5, 20 1 9, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court using the E-Filing system which sent notification of such filing t0 the following E-
Filing participants:
Jacob R. Cox
jcox@coxlaw.com
/s/J0nath0n B. Noyes
Jonathon B. Noyes, #3 1444-49
Filed: 3/1/2019 11:43 AM
IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF INDIANA
CIVIL DIVISION 13
M ELISSA B ARKER , an individual, on behalf of Case No. 49D13-1902-CT-004569

Plaintiff,
v.
GILA, LLC,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC.’S NOTICE OF AUTOMATIC

INITIAL EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Defendant Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc., in accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 6(B)(1)
and LR49-TR5-203(D), hereby notifies the Court and opposing counsel that the deadline for
Kapsch to respond to Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint and Demand for Trial By Jury has been
automatically extended by 30 days from March 4, 2019, until and including April 3, 2019. In
support of this Notice, Kapsch states:
1. Plaintiff filed the Complaint on February 4, 2019.
2. On February 8, 2019, Plaintiff served the Summons and Complaint by certified
mail on Kapsch’s registered agent.
3. Accordingly, Kapsch’s initial deadline to respond to the Complaint is March 4,
2019. Ind. Trial Rule 6. That deadline has not expired.
4. Under this Court’s Local Rules, an “[i]nitial written motion for enlargement of
time pursuant to Rule TR 6(B)(1) to respond to a claim shall be automatically allowed for an
additional 30 days from the original due date without a written order of the Court.” LR49-TR5-
203(D).
Accordingly, Kapsch’s deadline to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby
automatically extended by 30 days from March 4, 2019, until and including April 3, 2019.
F ROST B ROWN TODD LLC
By: /s/Darren A. Craig

Darren A. Craig, #25534-49
201 North Illinois Street, Suite 1900
P.O. Box 44961
Indianapolis, IN 46244-0961
Telephone: (317) 237-3800
Facsimile: (317) 237-3900
Email: dcraig@fbtlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Kapsch Trafficcom

USA, Inc.
-2-
I hereby certify that on March 1, 2019, the foregoing document was electronically filed
using the Court’s IEFS system and has been served contemporaneously on the following through
E-service:

jnoyes@wkw.com
/s/Darren A. Craig
Darren A. Craig
0134251.0717666 4830-6175-5785v1
-3-
Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2-2 Filed 03/11/19 Page 37 of 46 PageIDFiled: 3/1/2019 5:04 PM
#: 138 Clerk
STATE OF INDIANA ) MARION SUPERIOR COURT

) SS:
COUNTY OF MARION ) CIVIL DIVISION 13
MELISSA BARKER, an individual, on

)
behalf of herself and all others similarly
)
situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 49D13-1902-CT-004569
)
KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC. and )
GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
DEFENDANT GILA LLC’S NOTICE OF AUTOMATIC INITIAL THIRTY-DAY

ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT
Gila, LLC (“Gila”), by its undersigned counsel and pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 6(B)(1)
and LR49-TR5-203(D), respectfully notifies the Court and all counsel of its initial thirty-day
enlargement of time, up to and including April 3, 2019, to respond to the Complaint. In support
of this notice, Gila states as follows:
1. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on February 4, 2019.
2. On February 7, 2019, Plaintiff served the Summons and Complaint by
certified mail on Gila’s registered agent. Gila’s response to Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore
currently due March 4, 2019, which time has not yet expired.
3. Gila has neither requested nor been granted any prior enlargements of time
to respond to the Complaint.
4. Pursuant to Marion Civil Division LR 49D, an initial written motion for
enlargement of time to respond to a claim shall be automatically allowed for an additional 30 days
from the original due date without a written order of the Court.
4840-7192-0009.1
WHEREFORE, Gila respectfully notifies this Court of an enlargement of the
deadline by which Gila is required to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint from March 4, 2019 to April
3, 2019.
Dated: March 1, 2019 Respectfully submitted,
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
s/ Jonathan W. Garlough
Jonathan W. Garlough INBN 30329-45
Phone: (312) 832-5702
Fax: (312) 832-4700
jgarlough@foley.com
2
4840-7192-0009.1
The undersigned certifies that on March 1, 2019 the foregoing has been electronically
filed with the Clerk of Court using the Indiana E-Filing System (“IEFS”) and has been
contemporaneously been served on the following through E-Service:
Jacob R. Cox
COX LAW OFFICE
jcox@coxlaw.com
William E. Winingham
Jonathon B. Noyes
WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM, LLC
winingham@wkw.com
jnoyes@wkw.com
Phone: (312) 832-5702
Fax: (312) 832-4700
jgarlough@foley.com
3
4840-7192-0009.1
Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2-2 Filed 03/11/19 Page 40 of 46 PageIDFiled: 3/1/2019 5:04 PM
#: 141 Clerk
STATE OF INDIANA ) MARION SUPERIOR COURT

) SS:
COUNTY OF MARION ) CIVIL DIVISION 13
MELISSA BARKER, an individual, on

)
behalf of herself and all others similarly
)
situated, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 49D13-1902-CT-004569
)
KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM USA, INC. and )
GILA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

Initiating ____ Responding X Intervening ____ ; and
Name of party: Gila, LLC
8325 Tuscany Way Building 4

Austin, Texas 78754

Name: Jonathan W. Garlough Atty Number: 30329-45
Address: 321 North Clark Street, Suite 2800
4838-2112-2185.1
Phone: 312-832-5702
FAX: 312-832-4700
Email Address: jgarlough@foley.com
IMPORTANT: Each attorney specified on this appearance:
(a) certifies that the contact information listed for him/her on the Indiana Supreme
Court Roll of Attorneys is current and accurate as of the date of this
Appearance;
matter that are served under Trial Rule 86(G) will be sent to the attorney at
the email address(es) specified by the attorney on the Roll of Attorneys
regardless of the contact information listed above for the attorney; and
2(A).
Attorneys can review and update their Roll of Attorneys contact information on the
Courts Portal at http://portal.courts.in.gov.
3. This is a Civil Tort case type as defined in administrative Rule 8(B)(3).
4. This case involves child support issues. Yes ____ No X (If yes, supply social security
or a no-contact order. Yes ____ No X .
6. This case involves a petition for involuntary commitment. Yes ____ No X .
If Yes above, provide the following regarding the individual subject to the petition for
involuntary commitment.
7. There are related cases: Yes ____ No X (If yes, list on continuation page.)
8. Additional information required by local rule: None.
9. There are other party members: Yes ____ No X (If yes, list on continuation page.)
Yes X No___
4838-2112-2185.1
Phone: (312) 832-5702
Fax: (312) 832-4700
jgarlough@foley.com
4838-2112-2185.1
The undersigned certifies that on March 1, 2019 the foregoing has been electronically
filed with the Clerk of Court using the Indiana E-Filing System (“IEFS”) and has been
contemporaneously been served on the following through E-Service:
Jacob R. Cox
COX LAW OFFICE
jcox@coxlaw.com
William E. Winingham
Jonathon B. Noyes
WILSON KEHOE WININGHAM, LLC
winingham@wkw.com
jnoyes@wkw.com
Phone: (312) 832-5702
Fax: (312) 832-4700
jgarlough@foley.com
4838-2112-2185.1
Filed: 3/1/2019 11:43 AM
IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF INDIANA
CIVIL DIVISION 13
M ELISSA B ARKER , an individual, on behalf of Case No. 49D13-1902-CT-004569

Plaintiff,
v.
GILA, LLC,
Defendants.

Initiating ____ Responding X Intervening ____ ; and
Name of party Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc.
8201 Greensboro Drive, Suite 1002

Mc Lean VA, 22102

Name: Darren A. Craig Atty Number: 25534-49
Address: 201 North Illinois Street, Suite 1900
P.O. Box 44961
Indianapolis, IN 46244-0961
Phone: (317) 237-3800
FAX: (317) 237-3900
Email Address: dcraig@fbtlaw.com
IMPORTANT: Each attorney specified on this appearance:

(a) certifies that the contact information listed for him/her on the Indiana Supreme
Court Roll of Attorneys is current and accurate as of the date of this
Appearance;
matter that are served under Trial Rule 86(G) will be sent to the attorney at
the email address(es) specified by the attorney on the Roll of Attorneys
regardless of the contact information listed above for the attorney; and
2(A).
Attorneys can review and update their Roll of Attorneys contact information on the
Courts Portal at http://portal.courts.in.gov.
3. This is a Civil Tort case type as defined in administrative Rule 8(B)(3).
4. This case involves child support issues. Yes ____ No X (If yes, supply social security
or a no-contact order. Yes ____ No X .
6. This case involves a petition for involuntary commitment. Yes ____ No X .
If Yes above, provide the following regarding the individual subject to the petition for
involuntary commitment.
7. There are related cases: Yes ____ No X (If yes, list on continuation page.)
8. Additional information required by local rule: None.
9. There are other party members: Yes ____ No X (If yes, list on continuation page.)
Yes X No___
/s/Darren A. Craig
Darren A. Craig
(Attorney information shown above.)
2
I hereby certify that on March 1, 2019, the foregoing document was electronically filed
using the Court’s IEFS system and has been served contemporaneously on the following through
E-service:

jnoyes@wkw.com
/s/Darren A. Craig
Darren A. Craig
EN20923.Public-20923 4826-0307-1881v1
3
Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2-3 Filed 03/11/19 Page 1 of1:19-cv-987-TWP-MJD
1 PageID #: 148
JS 44 (Rev. 02/19) CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

Melissa Barker Kapsch Trafficcom USA, Inc. and GILA, LLC
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Marion County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)
Cox Law Office, 1606 N. Delaware St. Indianapolis, IN, (317) 884-8550 Frost Brown Todd LLC, 201 N. Illinois St., Ste. 1900, Indianapolis, IN,
Wilson Kehoe Winingham LLC, 2859 N. Meridian St., Indianapolis, IN, (317) 237-3800; Foley & Lardner LLP, 321 N. Clark St., Ste. 2800,
(317) 920-6400 (312) 832-5702
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
’ 1 U.S. Government ’ 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State ’ 1 ’ 1 Incorporated or Principal Place ’ 4 ’ 4
of Business In This State
’ 2 U.S. Government ’ 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State ’ 2 ’ 2 Incorporated and Principal Place ’ 5 ’ 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State
Citizen or Subject of a ’ 3 ’ 3 Foreign Nation ’ 6 ’ 6

Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only) Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.
CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
’ 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY ’ 625 Drug Related Seizure ’ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ’ 375 False Claims Act
’ 120 Marine ’ 310 Airplane ’ 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 ’ 423 Withdrawal ’ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
’ 130 Miller Act ’ 315 Airplane Product Product Liability ’ 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))
’ 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability ’ 367 Health Care/ ’ 400 State Reapportionment
’ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ’ 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS ’ 410 Antitrust
& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury ’ 820 Copyrights ’ 430 Banks and Banking
’ 151 Medicare Act ’ 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability ’ 830 Patent ’ 450 Commerce
’ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability ’ 368 Asbestos Personal ’ 835 Patent - Abbreviated ’ 460 Deportation
Student Loans ’ 340 Marine Injury Product New Drug Application ’ 470 Racketeer Influenced and
(Excludes Veterans) ’ 345 Marine Product Liability ’ 840 Trademark Corrupt Organizations
’ 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY ’ 480 Consumer Credit
of Veteran’s Benefits ’ 350 Motor Vehicle ’ 370 Other Fraud ’ 710 Fair Labor Standards ’ 861 HIA (1395ff) ’ 485 Telephone Consumer
’ 160 Stockholders’ Suits ’ 355 Motor Vehicle ’ 371 Truth in Lending Act ’ 862 Black Lung (923) Protection Act
’ 190 Other Contract Product Liability ’ 380 Other Personal ’ 720 Labor/Management ’ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ’ 490 Cable/Sat TV
’ 195 Contract Product Liability ’ 360 Other Personal Property Damage Relations ’ 864 SSID Title XVI ’ 850 Securities/Commodities/
’ 196 Franchise Injury ’ 385 Property Damage ’ 740 Railway Labor Act ’ 865 RSI (405(g)) Exchange
’ 362 Personal Injury - Product Liability ’ 751 Family and Medical ’ 890 Other Statutory Actions
Medical Malpractice Leave Act ’ 891 Agricultural Acts
REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS ’ 790 Other Labor Litigation FEDERAL TAX SUITS ’ 893 Environmental Matters
’ 210 Land Condemnation ’ 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: ’ 791 Employee Retirement ’ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff ’ 895 Freedom of Information
’ 220 Foreclosure ’ 441 Voting ’ 463 Alien Detainee Income Security Act or Defendant) Act
’ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment ’ 442 Employment ’ 510 Motions to Vacate ’ 871 IRS—Third Party ’ 896 Arbitration
’ 240 Torts to Land ’ 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 ’ 899 Administrative Procedure
’ 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations ’ 530 General Act/Review or Appeal of
’ 290 All Other Real Property ’ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION Agency Decision
Employment Other: ’ 462 Naturalization Application ’ 950 Constitutionality of
’ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 540 Mandamus & Other ’ 465 Other Immigration State Statutes
Other ’ 550 Civil Rights Actions
’ 448 Education ’ 555 Prison Condition
’ 560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
’ 1 Original ’ 2 Removed from ’ 3 Remanded from ’ 4 Reinstated or ’ 5 Transferred from ’ 6 Multidistrict ’ 8 Multidistrict
Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation - Litigation -
(specify) Transfer Direct File
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
28 U.S.C. 1332
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Plaintiff alleges defendants collected late fees and penalties to which they were not entitled.
VII. REQUESTED IN ’ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. 5,000,000.00 JURY DEMAND: ’ Yes ’ No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
IF ANY JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
03/11/2019 /s/Darren A. Craig
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE
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Case 1:19-cv-00987-TWP-MJD Document 2 Filed 03/11/19 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 75

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

M ELISSA B ARKER , an individual, on behalf

DEFENDANTS’ JOINT NOTICE OF REMOVAL

supporting this Notice of Removal are described below.

satisfied in this action.1

Plaintiff’s Putative Class Contains More Than 100 Members

class members is satisfied.

There Is Minimal Diversity

4. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Indiana. (Compl. ¶ 1.)

Texas. (Compl. ¶ 3.) e a9

6. Kapsch is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia.

a State different from any defendant.”).

The Amount In Controversy Exceeds $5,000,000

or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”

$5,000,0000 CAFA threshold is satisfied.

fees can be assessed. (Id. ¶ 15.)

set of penalties thereafter. (Id. ¶¶ 20-24.)

accounts and transponders. (Id.)3

Inc. v. Bishop, 132 F.3d 1203, 1205 (7th Cir. 1997).

exceeds CAFA’s $5 million threshold.

trebled damage calculation to meet CAFA damage threshold).

for work performed prior to filing complaint in calculation).

CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.

Superior Court to this Court because:

a. Plaintiff is a citizen of a state different from Gila and Kapsch;

b. the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 exclusive of

interest and costs; and

Removal Is Timely And Other Removal Requirements Are Met

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).

Date: March 11, 2019

/s/ Jonathan W. Garlough (with

Jacob R. Cox Jonathon B. Noyes

Attorneys for Plaintiff Melissa Barker

Attorneys for Defendant Gila, LLC

STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

MELISSA BARKER, an individual, on behalf of )

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

LLC, alleges as follows:

1. Plaintiff Melissa Barker is an individual who lives in Indiana. Plaintiff was

2. Defendant Kapsch TrafficCom USA, Inc. (herein “Kapsch”) is a corporation

located in the State of Virginia.

Defendants as set forth below.

5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants do

issue in this Complaint.

their registered agents in Marion County, Indiana.

THE RIVERLINK TOLLING SYSTEM

RiverLink system is operated and administered by a Toll Services Provider (“TSP”).

and the assessment of an additional $5.00 administrative fee/penalty.

fee/penalty, and an additional $25.00 violation penalty/fee.

fee/penalty, $25.00 violation penalty/fee, and an additional $30.00 collections penalty/fee.

lifted until the toll and fees/penalties are paid.

DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT AS TOLL SERVICES PROVIDER

16. After considering various proposals submitted in response to a Request for

Services Provider (“TSP”).

invoicing system for RiverLink.

beginning on December 30, 2016 and through the present date.

Defendants’ contract to act as the TSP.

Notices sent to Plaintiff.

portion of motorists using the RiverLink system.