Middle East Crisis
Middle East Crisis
Middle East Crisis
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PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2018, Volume XXIII, Number 1, pp. 121-148.
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Competing Interests of Major Powers in the Middle East
and societies, which are further the Iranian revolution in 1979, when
inflamed by great power competition.12 the US, along with the Sunni Arab
Home to many ethnic and religious monarchies, viewed Iran as a rising
communities- Sunni and Shia Muslims, threat to its interests in the region. In
Christians, and Jews; Arabs, Turks, and this context, the most notable feature
Persians; Azeris, Kurds, and Druze; regarding US policy is the 1980 Carter
Alawites and Maronits; Nilotic Blacks Doctrine, which will be discussed in
and Sudanese Arabs- the Middle the following section. The Iranian
revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq
East has remained mired in conflicts
war provided a rationale for the extra-
and crises.13 The religious, ethnic and
regional powers to get more actively
racial strife gets intensified by scarce
involved in the affairs of the Middle
arable land and water resources as well Eastern states by exploiting the fears
as conflicting claims over oil and gas of regional states. The extra-regional
resources.14 states’ involvement, though highly
destabilizing, has become a permanent
The Middle East as a shatterbelt feature in the region.
region is characterized by deep This paper discusses the interests and
divisions within and between roles of the major powers; namely the
sovereign states and societies. US, Russia and China, in historical
context. The US and Russia had long
been involved in the affairs of the
Middle East but China, though heavily
The deep internal divisions in the
dependent on energy resources of the
Middle East shatterbelt are enhanced
Middle East, was not an active player
by major powers’ policies to achieve
in Middle East politics. For the first
their objectives. To get more leverage
time in history in January 2016, China
vis-a-vis rival states, the major powers issued a White Paper on its relations
are in direct competition due to the with the Arab States.15 Maintaining
strategic location and huge resources a balance between China’s relations
of the region, which not only increase with Israel and the Arab States as
geopolitical competition among well as between the Sunni Arab States
regional states but contribute to and Iran has been a guiding principle
exacerbating sectarian tensions as well. of China’s Middle East policy. China
has cordial relations with Israel but at
In recent times, the sectarian cleavage the same time it supports a Palestinian
in Middle East politics emerged after state with East Jerusalem as its capital
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Competing Interests of Major Powers in the Middle East
services use their agents and capabilities issue was considered detrimental to
to target and disrupt terrorists at home, the Gulf States’ interests and created
and in some cases, such as Yemen, the fears and doubts in the Gulf capitals
United States secures physical access in about America’s commitment to Gulf
order to launch drone strikes.37 security.39
To meet its interests, the United The Gulf States’ disillusionment with
States maintains a range of security the US, along with their economic
relationships in the Middle East. pragmatism in light of the global power
These include defense cooperation transition to the East, motivated them
agreements, basing and access rights, to diversify their political and security
and the prepositioning of military relations.
assets. The current US force structure in
the Gulf consists of bases in Bahrain, In this regard, since 2005 onwards,
Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE.38 relations with China, Russia and
Western countries were also enhanced.40
The US has been the largest arms
supplier to the regional states. US
military commitments and its security Russian Interests in the
guarantees have been the cornerstone of Middle East
the Middle East security architecture.
The US security umbrella has allowed In the post-Cold War era, Russian
Gulf monarchies to stand up against engagement with the Middle East
their powerful regional rivals – Iraq states can primarily be seen through
and Iran. the prism of countering secessionist
movements in the North Caucasus
as Moscow had been accusing Gulf
The US has been the largest
entities of funding the separatists and
arms supplier to the regional extremists in Russia.41
states.
In the past, Moscow had blamed Gulf-
based charity organizations for
The US invasion of Iraq and later on introducing radicalism in the region
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and financing extremist groups in the
without signing any Status of Forces North Caucasus.42
Agreement has shifted the regional
order in Iran’s favor. Moreover, Russia, while fighting the Chechen
President Obama’s focus on East Asia wars, faced severe criticism from
and its engagement with Iran on nuclear Muslim countries, especially the
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Middle Eastern countries which termed Caucasus have joined high military
the Chechen fight against Russia as ranks in DAESH47 in Iraq and Syria.48
a struggle for achieving right to self- This has been a cause of concern for
determination.43 The War on Terror Russia as these fighters will come
provided Russia with an opportunity to back with more battlefield experience
cooperate with the West and classify its and might try to mobilize a global
military operation in Chechnya as part Jihadist movement against the Russian
of the terrorist strategy.44 government after the end of the Syrian
conflict.49
Russia’s opposition to the Iraq war and
its anti-Western rhetoric helped it to Secondly, Russia is interested in
improve its relations with the Muslim engaging Middle Eastern states
states. In this regard, granting Russia economically but, despite its
an observer status in the Organization continuous efforts, it plays a marginal
of Islamic Countries (OIC) in 2003 role in the economies of the Gulf
was a breakthrough, which led to the States. As per 2013 statistics, out of
improvement of relations between the Gulf Cooperation Council’s $1.47
Russia and Muslim countries and trillion total trade with the world,
subsequently changed the stance of Russia-GCC trade was valued at $3.74
Muslim countries towards Russia’s billion.50 Economic relations remain
actions and policies towards its Muslim focused on three areas: arms sales,
population in the North Caucasus.45 energy, and investment. The region is
the second largest arms export market
for Russia after the Asia Pacific.51
Russia’s opposition to the
Iraq war and its anti-Western Despite having political differences
rhetoric helped it to improve on issues of Iran, Syria and Palestine,
Russia has established strong economic
its relations with the Muslim
relations with Israel, with bilateral
states. trade reaching $3 billion in 2009.52
While making arms deals with Middle
It is reported that Russian Muslims Eastern states, Russia has given due
have been participating in the war in consideration to preserve strategic
Syria as part of the rebel forces and equation vis-à-vis Israel and the
constitute the second largest group of Muslim states of the Middle East.
foreign fighters in Syria after Libyans.46 Apart from Israel, Russia has also
Similarly, militants from the North established strong economic relations
with Turkey. Their trade volume has
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Competing Interests of Major Powers in the Middle East
been constantly increasing and has refusal to sell arms to Egypt in 2013
reached to over $34 billion in 2012.53 following the military takeover, Russia
stepped in and signed arms deals with
As regards Russia’s relations with the
the Egyptian government.58
Gulf countries, energy has remained
the most significant component of Apart from Russia’s economic
economic relations. Energy generates relations with the Middle Eastern
over 40% of Russia’s federal fund and states, the Arab uprisings in 2011
over 75% of foreign hard currency provided Russia with an opportunity
earnings.54 Russia has been continuously to expand its strategic influence in
engaging Iran, Qatar, Algeria and the region. Initially, Russia remained
Libya, the key gas producers of the neutral regarding developments taking
region, to cooperate and coordinate place in Tunisia and Egypt as part of
their policies regarding gas. 55 The the Arab Spring because these two
Russian objective is to contain Europe’s countries were not of much relevance
efforts to diversify its sources of energy to Russia.59 Developments in Libya
(as Europe imports 80% of Russia’s and the subsequent Western military
gas) away from Russia. To achieve intervention for regime change
this end, Russia has adopted a three- alarmed Russia, which abstained from
pronged strategy.56 First, to ensure that Resolution 1973, authorizing NATO’s
Russian controlled pipeline routes – airstrikes against the Qaddafi regime
Nord Stream and South Stream – are and sanctioning military support for
constructed and alternative pipelines opposition forces to topple the Qaddafi
circumventing Russia cannot be government.60
developed. Second, to engage gas
producing Central Asian states such
as Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Apart from Russia’s economic
Uzbekistan to ensure that they sell relations with the Middle
their gas through Russian controlled Eastern states, the Arab
pipelines. Third, to persuade the other uprisings in 2011 provided
gas producing countries (Middle Russia with an opportunity to
Eastern) to collaborate and coordinate expand its strategic influence
with Russia in deciding market share in in the region.
the European gas market.57
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relations with Tehran and acted as a share borders with non-Arab neighbors,
broker between Saudi Arabia and Iran as it shares borders with Turkey and
to set up the November 2016 OPEC Israel. The status of being a frontline
agreement.74 state adjoining Israel gives Syria an
exceptional stature in the Arab world
Apart from the US-Russia stand-off on
and makes it pivotal in international
many issues in the Middle East, China
efforts to resolve the Palestine-Israel
has remained persistent in its stance of
conflict.76 Syria considers Israel as
non-intervention in internal affairs of
a continuous external threat and its
states and opposed Western efforts to
loss of the Golan Heights, its natural
regime change in Libya and later on
defense against Israel, only augmented
in Syria, while emphasizing peaceful
its insecurity and fear.77
resolution of the conflict rather than
overthrowing the Assad regime.75 Apart from external threats, the current
Syrian conflict can be traced back to
the so called Arab Spring of 2011. The
China has remained persistent large-scale protests against President
in its stance of non-intervention Bashar al-Assad and his government
in internal affairs of states. prompted a violent response from the
Assad government. The subsequent
deterioration of the situation paved
the way for external involvement in the
The prolonged Syrian civil war attracted
Syrian conflict.
the regional as well as extra regional
powers to get involved in the conflict Since the outbreak of the current crisis,
to enhance their own interests. A the external powers have sought to
significant reason for the involvement shape the outcomes of the conflict.78
of these states has been Syria’s geo- It is more pertinent to classify external
strategic importance in the Middle actors into three groups: the first group
East. Apart from its own natural comprises those who support the Assad
resources, Syria serves as the centre of regime – Iran, and Russia; the second
thousands of kilometers of oil and gas group consists of those that oppose the
pipelines that run through the Middle Assad regime – Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Eastern states. the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Another reason that signifies its geo- states, the US and its NATO allies; and
strategic importance is the fact that a third group that cannot take sides in
Syria is one of only two Arab states that a decisive way; Jordan, Lebanon and
Israel.79
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In Syria, Russia, Turkey and Iran have The future sectarian challenge may
emerged as the dominant external emerge from the emerging political
players. The apparent disinterest of structure of Syria. Syria not only became
the United States has given Russia a battleground for regional states to
leverage to engage in post-conflict support their sectarian factions, but
settlement talks. As regards the future Syrian refugees’presence in neighboring
of Syria, to maintain the unity of Syria states created fear about demographic
as well as to accommodate the interests change in those states. This is especially
of all the stakeholders will remain a true in Lebanon (on which Lebanon’s
daunting challenge for the foreseeable political structure is based), but support
future. So far, the longevity, gravity and to pro- Syrian government factions
complexity of the Syrian conflict have and anti-Syrian government factions
created serious regional implications can lead to eruption of sectarian and
that are elaborated below. communitarian tensions as was the
case in 1975 and which fuelled the
Harnessing the Sectarian civil war there (1975-1990).97 These
Challenge in the Region fears and concerns can trigger sectarian
strife in respective states. Syrian
The sectarian issue has long been conflict is becoming a defining factor
embedded in the regional politics of in containing or escalating sectarian
the Middle East, but Saudi-Iranian tensions in the region. This sectarian
rivalry for regional hegemony has divide is not limited to Syria alone,
harnessed the sectarian politics. 95 As Yemen is also passing through intense
mentioned earlier, Iran has been the civil war. Bahrain and Lebanon also
main beneficiary of shifting geopolitical have sectarian cleavages that can be
dynamics in the Middle East – the exploited by external players.
post-Saddam Shia regime in Iraq as
well as the Arab uprisings of 2011 have Rising Militancy
immensely contributed to raise the The Assad regime’s renewed initiative
regional influence of Iran. Moreover, to launch attack against rebels in the
the Iranian-P5+1 deal further helped Sunni dominated region of Ghouta
Iran to shift the balance in its favor. 96 has the potential to not only generate
Iran’s increased leverage as well as sectarian violence across the region
the Sunni monarchies’ activism have but it can enhance militancy in youth.
been harnessing the sectarian divide External involvement in internal affairs
in the region and can lead to further of states has already given rise to
instability. militancy. Foreign interference on the
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the region, regional rivalries have been Russia and the US – make the Middle
harnessed by the outside powers by East a shatterbelt region. Much of
directly supporting the states or their the current instability is fueled by the
proxies. In this regard, the Syrian Syrian conflict, but whether resolution
case is the best example to illustrate of the Syrian conflict will address other
the involvement of regional as well as sources of instability is yet to be seen.
extra-regional states and the drastic
consequences of such involvement
for regional peace and stability. The The regional states’ mutual
inherent instability which is caused by distrust and suspicions
ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflicts, and about each other perpetuate
strategic competition between regional instability in the region.
as well as extra-regional powers –
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