Re presumption of regularity in search and seizure operation:

To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a

liberal construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual.
Consistent with this postulate, the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the
search process when an officer undertakes to justify it.1 For, the presumption juris tantum
of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual because zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary
methods that the Constitution itself detests.2

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it
must be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection
with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.3 In search
warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.4

In Microsoft Corporation and Lotus Development Corporation v. Maxicorp,

Inc. (G.R. No. 140946, 13 September 2004), Supreme Court held
Probable cause means “such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper.”5 Thus, probable cause for a search
warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought
in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.6

Adopt: [The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement

under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the
RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of
NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The
1
People v. Benhur Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 [2004] citing Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 [1984].
2
Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184 [[1995].
3
Tambasen v. People, 316 Phil. 237, 243-244 (1995).
4
Del Castillo v. People, 680 Phil. 447, 457 (2012).
5
United States v. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914).
6
Burgos, Sr., et al. v. The Chief of Staff, AFP, et al., 218 Phil. 754 (1984).
offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts.
The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp
commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.] 

SC alarmed by defective arrest, seizure warrants, reminds judges on guidelines

By: Jerome Aning - Reporter / @JeromeAningINQ Philippine Daily
Inquirer / 01:52 AM March 07, 2016

MANILA — The Supreme Court has reminded judges of lower courts to be careful in
issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants so as not to violate constitutional rights
and judicial procedures.

“In view of persistent reports on the pernicious issuance of defective warrants, all judges
are enjoined to strictly observe the constitutional requirements and rules in the issuance
of warrants,” the high court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, said in a
three-page memorandum released last week.

The OCA explained how trial court judges should issue warrants of arrest upon
determining the existence of probable cause based on their personal determination.

“This means that the the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the
counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the
court,” the memo stated.

As long as the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the judge has
sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, according to the OCA.

In such instances, the judge has the option either to issue the warrant if there is
necessity to place the accused under custody, to refuse to issue the warrant if there is
no probable cause, or to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of
doubt.

In the issuance of search and seizure warrants, the OCA said the judge must personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath and affirmation, in the form of
searching questions and answers.

“The personal examination must not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be
probing and exhaustive,” the memo stated.

Judges should require a particular description of the place to be searched, of the

persons to be arrested, or things to be seized, the OCA said.
“A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officer to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness,” the OCA said.

Applications for warrants of search and seizure must be personally endorsed or

authorized by the heads of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine National
Police, the Anti-Crime Task Forces and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and violations related to
illegal drugs, intellectual property, money laundering, customs and tariff, and other laws
enacted by Congress and included by the Supreme Court in its rules.

Judges must also keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and
the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued, the
OCA directed. SFM

G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD, Respondents.

THIRD DIVISION - D E C I S I O N

MARTIRES, J.:

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only
ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall thus be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens; for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision2
dated 22 September 2010, and Resolution3 dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the Omnibus Order4 dated 10
May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified
Search Warrant No. 01-118.

THE FACTS

On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Albert

Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant5 before the
RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office
premises of respondents Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88
Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received
confidential information that respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign
investors. Some of their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they
would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks.
Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment
thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually purchased.
Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana's
personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who threatened
respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special
Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8799 or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).6

In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of
Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia;7 the affidavits of
respondents' former employees who actually called clients abroad;8 the articles of
incorporation of domestic corporations used by respondents in their scheme;9 and the
sketch of the place sought to be searched.10

On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC,
Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No. 01-118
For: Violation of R.A. 8799
-versus-
(The Securities Regulation Code) and Estafa (Art. 315, RPC)

AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD of 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St.,
Makati City

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath the
applicant NBI [Special Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his witnesses
RONNIE AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO, that there is probable cause to believe
that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD have in their possession/control located
in [an] office premises located at 1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City, as
shown in the application for search warrant the following documents, articles and items,
to wit:

Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of brokers and their
personal files; incorporation papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales
agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages
from the clients; copies of credit advise from the banks; clients['] message slips;
company brochures; letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of
Amador Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC.

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day of the
premises above-described and forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring
said documents, articles and items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.

The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within the validity of
the warrant.

This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this date.11 Thus, on 27 March
2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same. The search was witnessed
by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and Building
Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate Center. Pursuant to the Return, 12 dated 2
April 2001, and the Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able
to seize the following:
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:
Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;
List of brokers and 201 files;
Sales agreements;
Official receipts;
Credit advise;
Fax messages;
Clients message slips;
Company brochures;
Letterheads; and
Envelopes.

2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;

3. Offshore incorporation papers;

4. Lease contracts; and

5. Vouchers/ledgers.

On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118
because it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC
and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the basic
tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon
a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Further, Search
Warrant No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.14

On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the search
warrant, respondent Abad moved for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She
contended that the lapse of three (3) months without action on the motion to quash
clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr.'s aversion to passing judgment on his own search
warrant.15

In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily inhibited

himself from the case. Hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch
58.

The Regional Trial Court Ruling

In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search warrant was
null and void because it violated the requirement that a search warrant must be issued
in connection with one specific offense only. It added that the SRC alone punishes
various acts such that one would be left in limbo divining what specific provision
was violated by respondents; and that even estafa under the RPC contemplates
multifarious settings. The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the
application thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter were all wanting in
particularization. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby
QUASHED and NULLIFIED. All documents, articles and items seized are hereby
ordered to be RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any and all items seized, products of
the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in evidence and cannot be used in any
proceeding for whatever purpose. The petition to cite respondent SEC and NBI officers
for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an appeal
before the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It
declared that Search Warrant No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one
specific offense, because the application failed to specify what provision of the SRC
was violated or even what type of estafa was committed by respondents.

The appellate court observed that the application for search warrant never alleged that
respondents or their corporations were not SEC-registered brokers or dealers, contrary
to petitioner's allegation that respondents violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes
unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or broker capacity without the
requisite SEC registration.

The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed to pass the test of
particularity. It reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase "other showing that these
companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" rendered the
warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all records of respondents inside the
office premises to seizure and the implementing officers effectively had unlimited
discretion as to what property should be seized. The CA disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Omnibus
Order dated May 10, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution, dated 11 March 2011. Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE

TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.

READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION

FOR A SEARCH WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 SHOW THAT
SAID WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF VIOLATION
OF SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.

II.

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED

THEREIN WHICH SHOW A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING
AS STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE
IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS
DID NOT INTEND TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS TO
SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE "SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN
VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC."19

Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined
that the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are
necessarily included in the other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers without the
requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC; that these specific acts of defrauding
another by falsely pretending to possess power or qualification of being a stockbroker
similarly constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both Section 28.1 of
the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC penalize the act of misrepresentation, an element
common to both offenses; thus, the issuance of a single search warrant did not violate
the "one specific offense rule."20

Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not a general warrant
because the items listed therein show a reasonable nexus to the offense of acting as
stockbrokers without the required license from the SEC; that the statement "and other
showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the
SEC" did not render the warrant void; and that the words "and other" only intend to
emphasize that no technical description could be given to the items subject of the
search warrant because of the very nature of the offense.21

In their comment,22 respondents counter that the lower court was correct in ruling that
the subject warrant was issued in connection with more than one specific offense; that
estafa and violation of the SRC could not be considered as one crime because the
former is punished under the RPC while the latter is punished under a special law; that
there are many violations cited in the SRC that there can be no offense which is simply
called "violation of R.A. No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa
which could be committed through at least 10 modes, each one of them having
elements distinct from those of the other modes.

Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not expressly indicate that
the documents, articles, and items sought to be seized thereunder are subjects of the
offense, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense; that it is a general warrant
because it enumerates every conceivable document that may be found in an office
setting; that, as a result, it is entirely possible that in the course of the search for the
articles and documents generally listed in the search warrant, those used and intended
for legitimate purposes may be included in the seizure; that the concluding sentence
in the subject warrant "and other showing that these companies acted in violation of
their actual registration with the SEC" is a characteristic of a general warrant; and that it
allows the raiding team unbridled latitude in determining by themselves what items or
documents are evidence of the imputation that respondents and the corporations they
represent are violating their registration with the SEC.23

In its reply,24 petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant may be properly
evaluated by examining both the warrant itself and the application on which it was
based; that the acts alleged in the application clearly constitute a transgression of
Section 28.1 of the SRC; and that the nature of the offense for which a search warrant
is issued is determined based on the factual recital of the elements of the subject crime
therein and not the formal designation of the crime itself in its caption.

THE COURT'S RULING

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of
the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.25

Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),26 the Court stressed two
points which must be considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the
judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.27
Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the search warrants involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to
amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."

The search warrant must be issued for one specific offense.

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must
be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with
one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.28 In search
warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.29
In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were
issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," stated:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the aforementioned
applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said laws; or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted-to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.30

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez,31 the Court further ruled:
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether
an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the
personal properties that may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined
with the "one specific offense" requirement of probable cause. The only way to
determine whether a warrant should issue in connection with one specific offense is to
juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of
the offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.

xxxx

The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a

search warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary
objective of applying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a
subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the search warrant was applied, a
judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence presented by
the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense for
which the warrant is sought and issued. x x x32

In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The
Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33
First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts
under the said law such as manipulation of security prices,34 insider trading,35 acting as
dealer or broker without being registered with the SEC,36 use of unregistered
exchange,37 use of unregistered clearing agency,38 and violation of the restrictions on
borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers39 among others. Even the charge of
"estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing
the said crime: ( 1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of
committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or
(2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search
Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of search warrants
issued for violation of R.A. No. 6425 or the then Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In Olaes
v. People,40 even though the search warrant merely stated that it was issued in
connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not nullify the same for it
was clear in the body that it was issued for the specific offense of possession of illegal
narcotics, viz:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
Violation of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that [t]here is probable cause to believe that Adolfo
Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Cornia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, [have] in their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all
of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of
the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied)

In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No. 6425,
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated. The Court upheld the
validity of the warrant: Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question was
issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that
since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession
of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In
short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the
said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.43 (emphases supplied)

Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of
P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked
that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and
property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within
the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."45

The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its failure to
specify what particular provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search
Warrant No. 01-118 also covered estafa under the RPC. Even the application for the
search warrant merely stated:

Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees scattered throughout their
numerous companies call prospective clients abroad and convince them to buy shares
of stocks in a certain company likewise based abroad. Once the client is convinced to
buy said shares of stocks, he or she is advised to make a telegraphic transfer of the
money supposedly intended for the purchase of the stocks. The transfer is made to the
account of the company which contacted the client. Once the money is received, the
same is immediately withdrawn and brought to the treasury department of the particular
company. The money is then counted and eventually allocated to the following: 42% to
Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for the redeeming clients (those with small
accounts and who already threatened the company with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of
sales and 8% goes to marketing. No allocation is ever made to buy the shares of
stocks.46 Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a
codification of various rules and regulations governing securities. Thus, unlike, the
drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal
drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in
categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was
violated.

Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118, petitioner insists
that the warrant was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No
person shall engage in the business of buying or selling securities in the Philippines as
a broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or
dealer unless registered as such with the Commission." However, despite this belated
attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated, Search
Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The allegations in the application for
search warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers without
prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element to be held liable for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC. It is even worthy to note that Section 28.1 was
specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to Quash,47 dated 5 April 2002.

In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the
application for search warrant, there could have been no finding of probable cause in
connection with that offense. In People v. Hon. Estrada,48 the Court pronounced:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the
negative ingredient of the offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license
required by law, as in the present case - and such evidence is within the knowledge and
control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable
reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring
stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)

Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked
the license to operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view
that at the time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what
offense to charge respondents with.

Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa
are so intertwined with each other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not
violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each
other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. An
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense
may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.50

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused by the offended party or third
person.51 On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes the act of performing
dealer or broker functions without registration with the SEC. For such offense,
defrauding another and causing damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation
are not essential elements. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section
28.1 of the SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same
manner, a person acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held liable
for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
is malum prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas
estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.

Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA (Columbia)52 and Laud v.
People (Laud)53 even militate against petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a
search warrant which covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not
violate the one-specific-offense rule, viz:
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search
warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to
be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued
does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.54 In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407
was adjudged valid as it was issued only for one specific offense - that is, for Murder,
albeit for six (6) counts.

In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific
offense. It included violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several
penal provisions and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.

Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more
than one specific offense.

Reasonable particularity of the description of the things to be seized

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of
reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to
enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be
seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace
officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however, required that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities.55

In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,56 it was pointed out that one of the tests to
determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search
warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued.57

In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be the subject
of a search warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those
used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.58

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the specific
offense alleged committed by respondents. Consequently, it could not have been
possible for the issuing judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to
determine that the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime. Moreover,
even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
as petitioner insists, the documents, articles and items enumerated in the search
warrant failed the test of particularity. The terms used in this warrant were too all-
embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of respondents,
whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other showing that
these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does not
support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No. 01-118 was indeed issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the
corporations' certificate of registration with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of
registration to act as brokers or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than
one offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for
seizure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2010 Decision and

11 March 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

March 8, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on February 21, 2018 a Decision, copy attached
hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case,
the original of which was received by this Office on March 8, 2018 at
1:28 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 November 2007, citing 1987

Constitution, Article III, Section 2 and People v. Aruta, 351 Phil.
868, 895 (1998).

2Rollo, pp. 47-63; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with

Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and Associate Justice Manuel M.
Barrios, concurring.

3 Id. at 64-65.

4 Id. at 123-132; penned by Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

5 Id. at 69-70.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 78-82.

8 Id. at 72-77.

9 Records (Vol. 1), pp. 74-167.

10 Id. at 72-73.

11Rollo, p. 87.

12 Id. at 88.

13 Id. at 89.

14 Id. at 90-106.

15 Id. at 107-120.

16 Id. at 121-122.

17 Id. at 132.

18 Id. at 62-63.

19 Id. at 21-22.

20 Id. at 23-32.

21 Id. at 33-40.

22 Id. at 235-257.

23 Id. at 247-250.

24 Id. at 274-299.

25Nala v. Judge Barroso, Jr., 455 Phil. 999, 1007 (2003).

26 126 Phil. 738 (1967).

27 fon

28Tambasen v. People, 316 Phil. 237, 243-244 (1995).

29Del Castillo v. People, 680 Phil. 447, 457 (2012).

30 Supra note 26 at 747-748.

31 728 Phil. 391 (2014).

32 Id. at 412-413 and 420.

33Rollo, p. 87.

34 Section 24, R.A. No. 8799.

35 Section 27, R.A. No. 8799.

36 Section 28.1, R.A. No. 8799.

37 Section 32, R.A. No. 8799.

38 Section 41, R.A. No. 8799.

39 Section 49, R.A. No. 8799.

40 239 Phil. 468 (1987).

41 Id. at 472.

42 295 Phil. 198 (1993).

43 Id. at 214.

44 259 Phil. 541 (1989).

45 Id. at 554.

46Rollo, pp. 69-70.

47 Records (Vol. IV), pp. 793-807.

48 357 Phil. 377 (1998).

49 Id. at 392.

50Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 382 (2008).

51 Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code (Book Two), 17th Edition, p. 776 (2008).

52 329 Phil. 875 ( 1996).

53 747 Phil. 503 (2014).

54Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, supra note 52 at 928.

55Hon Ne Chan, et ai. v. Honda Motor Co.. Ltd. and Honda Phil., Inc.,
565 Phil. 545, 557 (2007).

56 148 Phil. 794 (1971 ).

57 Id. at 811.

58 Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188526 November 11, 2013

CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., MING SENG CHINESE DRUGSTORE, XIANG

JIAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, TEK SAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, SIM SIM
CHINESE DRUG STORE, BAN SHIONG TAY CHINESE DRUG STORE and/or
WILCENDO TAN MENDEZ, SHUANG YING CHINESE DRUGSTORE, and
BACLARAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 31, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952 and
the Resolution2 dated July 2, 2009, which denied reconsideration thereof. The CA
reversed the Order3 dated September 25, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 143, Makati City, quashing Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-
022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043, and the Order4 dated March 7, 2007 denying
reconsideration thereof.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide
Pharmacy,5 is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap as shown by Certificate of Registration 4-
2000-009881 issued to her by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for a period of ten
years from August 24, 2003.6 On November 7, 2005, her representative, Ping Na
Lau, (Ping) wrote a letter7 addressed to National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, through Atty. Jose Justo Yap and Agent Joseph G. Furing (Agent
Furing), requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which were
selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of their
products.

Agent Furing was assigned to the case and he executed an affidavit8 stating that: he
conducted his own investigation, and on November 9 and 10, 2005, he, together with
Junayd Esmael (Esmael), were able to buy whitening soaps bearing the trademark
"TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" with corresponding receipts from a list of
drugstores which included herein petitioners Century Chinese Medicine Co., Min Seng
Chinese Drugstore, Xiang Jiang Chinese Drug Store, Tek San Chinese Drug Store, Sim
Sim Chinese Drug Store, Ban Shiong Tay Drugstore, Shuang Ying Chinese Drugstore,
and Baclaran Chinese Drug Store; while conducting the investigation and test buys, he
was able to confirm Ping's complaint to be true as he personally saw commercial
quantities of whitening soap bearing the said trademarks being displayed and offered
for sale at the said drugstores; he and Esmael took the purchased items to the NBI, and
Ping, as the authorized representative and expert of Worldwide Pharmacy in
determining counterfeit and unauthorized reproductions of its products, personally
examined the purchased samples, and issued a Certification9 dated November 18, 2005
wherein he confirmed that, indeed, the whitening soaps bearing the trademarks "TOP-
GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" from the subject drugstores were counterfeit.

Esmael also executed an affidavit10 corroborating Agent Furing's statement. Ping's

affidavit11 stated that upon his personal examination of the whitening soaps purchased
from petitioners bearing the subject trademark, he found that the whitening soaps were
different from the genuine quality of their original whitening soaps with the trademarks
"TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" and certified that they were all counterfeit.

On November 21, 2005, Agent Furing applied for the issuance of search warrants
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City, against petitioners and
other establishments for violations of Sections 168 and 155, both in relation to Section
170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines. Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition;
while Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement.

On November 23, 2005, after conducting searching questions upon Agent Furing and
his witnesses, the RTC granted the applications and issued Search Warrants Nos. 05-
030, 05-033, and 05-038 for unfair competition and Search Warrants Nos. 05-022, 05-
023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043 for trademark infringement against petitioners.

On December 5, 2005, Agent Furing filed his Consolidated Return of Search

Warrants.12

On December 8, 2005, petitioners collectively filed their Motion to Quash13 the Search
Warrants contending that their issuances violated the rule against forum shopping; that
Benjamin Yu (Yu) is the sole owner and distributor of the product known as "TOP-GEL";
and there was a prejudicial question posed in Civil Case No. 05-54747 entitled Zenna
Chemical Industry v. Ling Na Lau, et al., pending in Branch 93 of the RTC of Quezon
City, which is a case filed by Yu against respondent for damages due to infringement of
trademark/tradename, unfair competition with prayer for the immediate issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary prohibitory injunction.

On January 9, 2006, respondent filed her Comment/Opposition 14 thereto arguing the

non-existence of forum shopping; that Yu is not a party- respondent in these cases and
the pendency of the civil case filed by him is immaterial and irrelevant; and that Yu
cannot be considered the sole owner and distributor of "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A
LEAF." The motion was then submitted for resolution in an Order dated January 30,
2006. During the pendency of the case, respondent, on April 20, 2006, filed a
Submission15 in relation to the Motion to Quash attaching an Order16 dated March 21,
2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001 filed by respondent against Yu, doing
business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, proprietor
of South Ocean Chinese Drug Stores for trademark infringement and/or unfair
competition and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. The Order approved
therein the parties' Joint Motion To Approve Compromise Agreement filed on March 8,
2006. We quote in its entirety the Order as follows:

The Compromise Agreement between the herein complainant and respondents

provides as follows:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark

TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered
under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on August 24, 2003.

2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of

Complainant as the exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename
and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF
A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M" ISSUED " OVER THE LETTER
"CA") as registered under Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17,
2000, as well as the assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant
of said mark for use on papaya whitening soap.

3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid but after
having realized that Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA
DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now
undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid tradename and
trademark and further undertake not to manufacture, sell, distribute, and otherwise
compete with Complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening
soap using or bearing a mark or name identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting
a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE
and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.

4. Respondents further undertake to withdraw and/or dismiss their counterclaim and

petition to cancel and/or revoke Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued to Complainant.
Respondents also further undertake to pull out within 45 days from approval of the
Compromise Agreement all their products bearing a mark or name identical or
confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and
trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A
LEAF, from the market nationwide.

5. Respondents finally agree and undertake to pay Complainant liquidated damages in

the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php500,000.00) PESOS for every breach
or violation of any of the foregoing undertakings which complainant may enforce by
securing a writ of execution from this Office, under this case.

6. Complainant, on the other hand, agrees to waive all her claim for damages against
Respondents as alleged in her complaint filed in the Intellectual Property Office only.

7. The Parties hereby agree to submit this Compromise Agreement for Approval of this
Office and pray for issuance of a decision on the basis thereof.

Finding the Compromise Agreement to have been duly executed and signed by the
parties and/or their representatives/counsels and the terms and conditions thereof to be
in conformity with the law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy, the
same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is DISMISSED as all
issues raised concerning herein parties have been rendered MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.17

On September 25, 2006, the RTC issued its Order18 sustaining the Motion to Quash the
Search Warrants, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the questioned search warrants were not
supported by probable cause, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED. Search warrants nos.
05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043 are ordered lifted and
recalled.
The NBI Officers who effected the search warrants are hereby ordered to return the
seized items to herein respondents within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

So Ordered.19

In quashing the search warrants, the RTC applied the Rules on Search and Seizure for
Civil Action in Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights.20 It found the existence of a
prejudicial question which was pending before Branch 93 of RTC Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, on the determination as to who between
respondent and Yu is the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the
trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there was also a case for
trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by respondent against Yu before
the IPO which was pending at the time of the application for the search warrants. It is
clear, therefore, that at the time of the filing of the application for the search warrants,
there is yet no determination of the alleged right of respondent over the subject
trademark/tradename. Also, the RTC found that petitioners relied heavily on Yu's
representation that he is the sole owner/distributor of the Top Gel whitening soap, as
the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-109957 from the IPO for a term of 20
years from November 17, 2000 covering the same product. There too was the notarized
certification from Zenna Chemical Industry of Taiwan, owner of Top Gel MCA, with the
caveat that the sale, production or representation of any imitated products under its
trademark and tradename shall be dealt with appropriate legal action.

The RTC further said that in the determination of probable cause, the court must
necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance of a search
warrant or the quashal of the one already issued. In this case, respondent failed to
prove the existence of probable cause, which warranted the quashal of the questioned
search warrants.

On November 13, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Release of Seized Evidence.21

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order22
dated March 7, 2007.

Respondent then filed her appeal with the CA. After respondent filed her appellant's
brief and petitioners their appellee's brief, the case was submitted for decision.

On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

GRANTING the appeal filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Order dated March 7,
2007 issued by Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Makati City in the case involving Search Warrants Nos. 05-030,
05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043.23

In reversing the RTC's quashal of the search warrants, the CA found that the search
warrants were applied for and issued for violations of Sections 155 and 168, in relation
to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code and that the applications for the search
warrants werein anticipation of criminal actions which are to be instituted against
petitioners; thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. It also
ruled that the basis for the applications for issuance of the search warrants on grounds
of trademarks infringement and unfair competition was the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF; that respondent was the registered owner of the said trademark,
which gave her the right to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it by
seeking assistance from the NBI.

The CA did not agree with the RTC that there existed a prejudicial question, since Civil
Case No. 05-54747 was already dismissed on June 10, 2005, i.e., long before the
search warrants subject of this appeal were applied for; and that Yu's motion for
reconsideration was denied on September 15, 2005 with no appeal having been filed
thereon as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued by the said court.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July
2, 2009. Hence, this petition filed by petitioners raising the issue that:

(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND HELD
THAT THE LATTER APPLIED THE RULES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL
ACTIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.24

(B) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT BASED ITS RULING ON THE ARGUMENT WHICH WAS BROUGHT UP
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RESPONDENT LING NA LAU'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF.25

Petitioners contend that the products seized from their respective stores cannot be the
subject of the search warrants and seizure as those Top Gel products are not fruits of
any crime, infringed product nor intended to be used in any crime; that they are
legitimate distributors who are authorized to sell the same, since those genuine top gel
products bore the original trademark/tradename of TOP GEL MCA, owned and
distributed by Yu. Petitioners also claim that despite the RTC's order to release the
seized TOP GEL products, not one had been returned; that one or two samples from
each petitioner’s' drugstore would have sufficed in case there is a need to present them
in a criminal prosecution, and that confiscation of thousands of these products was an
overkill.

Petitioners also argue that the issue that the RTC erred in applying the rules on search
and seizure in anticipation of a civil action was never raised in the RTC.

The issue for resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal
of the assailed search warrants.

We find no merit in the petition.

The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of
Sections 155 and 168, both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Section 155, in
relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement; while Section 168, in relation
to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition, to wit:

Sec 155. Remedies; Infringement. – Any person who shall, without the consent of the
owner of the registered mark:

155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a

registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or

While

Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. –

xxxx

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against
unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the
wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon,
or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer,
other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with
such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade,
or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling
such goods with a like purpose;

And

SEC. 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by
law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of
the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and
Subsection 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or
Representation].

Thus, we agree with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on
the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights, is not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied
based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property
rights under RA 8293. It was established that respondent had asked the NBI for
assistance to conduct investigation and search warrant implementation for possible
apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G.
& DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his
application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the
items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are
likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.

Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs the issuance of the assailed
Search Warrants, provides, to wit:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. - A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the
affidavits submitted.

A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable
cause, meaning "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched."26 And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present.
Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed
not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation,
arbitrary.27 The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules
and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.28
As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man,29 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.30

The RTC quashed the search warrants, saying that (1) there exists a prejudicial
question pending before Branch 93 of the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 05-54747, i.e., the determination as to who between respondent and Yu is the
rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there was also a case for trademark infringement and/or
unfair competition filed by respondent against Yu pending before the IPO, docketed as
IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001; and (2) Yu's representation that he is the sole distributor
of the Top Gel whitening soap, as the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-
109957 issued by the IPO to Zenna Chemical Industry as the registered owner of the
trademark TOP GEL MCA & DEVICE MCA for a term of 20 years from November 17,
2000 covering the same product.

We do not agree. We affirm the CA's reversal of the RTC Order quashing the search
warrants.

The affidavits of NBI Agent Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling, clearly showed
that they are seeking protection for the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A
LEAF" registered to respondent under Certificate of Registration 4-2000-009881 issued
by the IPO on August 24, 2003, and no other. While petitioners claim that the product
they are distributing was owned by Yu with the trademark TOP GEL MCA and MCA
DEVISE under Certificate of Registration 4-1996-109957, it was different from the
trademark TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF subject of the application. We agree
with the CA's finding in this wise:

x x x It bears stressing that the basis for the applications for issuances of the search
warrants on grounds of trademark infringement and unfair competition is the trademark
TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Private complainant-appellant was issued a
Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881 of said trademark on August 24, 2003 by
the Intellectual Property Office, and is thus considered the lawful holder of the said
trademark. Being the registrant and the holder of the same, private complainant-
appellant had the authority to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it.
This prompted her to request for assistance from the agents of the NBI, who thereafter
conducted a series of investigation, test buys and inspection regarding the alleged
trademark infringement by herein respondents-appellees. Subsequently, Ping Na Lau,
private complainant-appellant’s representative, issued a certification with the finding that
the examined goods were counterfeit. This prompted the NBI agents to apply for the
issuances of search warrants against the respondents-appellees. Said applications for
the search warrants were granted after by Judge Laguilles after examining under oath
the applicant Agent Furing of the NBI and his witnesses Ping Na Lau and Junayd R.
Ismael.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search
warrants had been complied with and that there is probable cause to believe that an
offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
were in the places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged violations
committed by respondents-appellees upon the intellectual property rights of herein
private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF
A LEAF under Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on August 24,
2003 by the Intellectual Property Office.31

Notably, at the time the applications for the issuance of the search warrants were filed
on November 21, 2005, as the CA correctly found, Civil Case No. Q-05-54747, which
the RTC found to be where a prejudicial question was raised, was already dismissed on
June 10, 2005,32 because of the pendency of a case involving the same issues and
parties before the IPO. Yu's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order33 dated
September 15, 2005. In fact, a Certificate of Finality34 was issued by the RTC on
January 4, 2007.

Moreover, the IPO case for trademark infringement and unfair competition and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by respondent against Yu and Heidi
Cua, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001, would not also be a basis for quashing
the warrants. In fact, prior to the applications for the issuance of the assailed search
warrants on November 21, 2005, the IPO had issued an Order35 dated October 20,
2005 granting a writ of preliminary injunction against Yu and Cua, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby issued against

Respondent, Benjamin Yu, doing business under the name and style of MCA
Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, Proprietor of South Ocean Chinese Drug Store, and
their agents, representatives, dealers and distributors and all persons acting in their
behalf, to cease and desist using the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF"
or any colorable imitation thereof on Papaya whitening soaps they manufacture, sell,
and/or offer for sale, and otherwise, from packing their Papaya Whitening Soaps in
boxes with the same general appearance as those of complainant's boxes within a
period of NINETY (90) DAYS, effective upon the receipt of respondent of the copy of the
COMPLIANCE filed with this Office by the Complainant stating that it has posted a
CASH BOND in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php100,000.00)
together with the corresponding Official Receipt Number and date thereof.
Consequently, complainant is directed to inform this Office of actual date of receipt by
Respondent of the aforementioned COMPLIANCE.36

To inform the public of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, respondent's
counsel had the dispositive portion of the Order published in The Philippine Star
newspaper on October 30, 2005.37 Thus, it was clearly stated that Yu, doing business
under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing, his agents, representatives, dealers
and distributors and all persons acting in his behalf, were to cease and desist from
using the trademark "TOP GEL & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or any colorable imitation
thereof on Papaya Whitening soaps they manufacture, sell and/or offer for sale.
Petitioners, who admitted having derived their TOP GEL products from Yu, are,
therefore, notified of such injunction and were enjoined from selling the same.

Notwithstanding, at the time of the application of the search warrants on November 21,
2005, and while the injunction was in effect, petitioners were still selling the alleged
counterfeit products bearing the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF.
There exists a probable cause for violation of respondent's intellectual property
rights, which entitles her as the registered owner of the trademark TOP GEL and
DEVICE OF A LEAF to be protected by the issuance of the search warrants.

More importantly, during the pendency of petitioners' motion to quash in the RTC,
respondent submitted the Order dated March 8, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-
2005-00001, where the writ of preliminary injunction was earlier issued, approving the
compromise agreement entered into by respondent with Yu and Cua where it was
stated, among others, that:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark

TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered
under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on August 24, 2003.

2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of

Complainant as the exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename
and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF
A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M" OVER THE LETTER "CA") as
registered under Registration No 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17, 2000, as well
as the assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark
for use on papaya whitening soap.

3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid, but after
having realized that Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA
DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now
undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid tradename and
trademark, and further undertake not to manufacture, sell and distribute and otherwise
compete with complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening
soap using or bearing a mark or name identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting
a colorable imitation of the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE
and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.38

Hence, it appears that there is no more controversy as to who is the rightful holder of
the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Therefore, respondent, as owner
of such registered trademark has the right to the issuance of the search warrants.

Anent petitioners' claim that one or two samples of the Top Gel products from each of
them, instead of confiscating thousands of the products, would have sufficed for the
purpose of an anticipated criminal action, citing our ruling in Summerville General
Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals,39 is not meritorious.

We do not agree.

The factual milieu of the two cases are different. In Summerville, the object of the
violation of Summerville's intellectual property rights, as assignee of Royal playing cards
and Royal brand playing cards case, was limited to the design of Summerville's Royal
plastic container case which encased and wrapped the Crown brand playing cards. In
the application for the search warrant which the RTC subsequently issued, one of the
items to be seized were the Crown brand playing cards using the copyright plastic and
Joker of Royal brand. Thus, numerous boxes containing Crown playing cards were
seized and upon the RTC's instruction were turned over to Summerville, subject to the
condition that the key to the said warehouse be turned over to the court sheriff.
Respondents moved for the quashal of the search warrant and for the return of the
seized properties. The RTC partially granted the motion by ordering the release of the
seized Crown brand playing cards and the printing machines; thus, only the Royal
plastic container cases of the playing cards were left in the custody of Summerville.
The CA sustained the RTC order. On petition with us, we affirmed the CA. We found
therein that the Crown brand playing cards are not the subject of the offense as they are
genuine and the Crown trademark was registered to therein respondents’ names; that it
was the design of the plastic container/case that is alleged to have been utilized by
respondents to deceive the public into believing that the Crown brand playing cards are
the same as those manufactured by Summerville. We then said that assuming that the
Crown playing cards could be considered subject of the offense, a sample or two are
more than enough to retain should there have been a need to examine them along
with the plastic container/case; and that there was no need to hold the hundreds of
articles seized. We said so in the context that since what was in dispute was the design
of the Royal plastic cases/containers of playing cards and not the playing card per se, a
small number of Crown brand playing cards would suffice to examine them with the
Royal plastic cases/containers. And the return of the playing cards would better serve
the purposes of justice and expediency. However, in this case, the object of the violation
of respondent's intellectual property right is the alleged counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. &
DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap being sold by petitioners, so there is a
need to confiscate all these articles to protect respondent's right as the registered owner
of such trademark.

Petitioners next contend that the CA's ruling on the applicability of Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court that the search warrants were issued in anticipation of a criminal action was
only based on respondent's claim which was only brought for the first time in her
appellant's brief.
We are not persuaded.

We find worth quoting respondent's argument addressing this issue in its Comment,
thus:

In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that the Rule correctly applicable to
the subject search warrants was Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners fault the
appellate court for ruling that the Regional Trial Court incorrectly applied the Rules on
Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights on
the basis of an argument that private respondent brought up for the first time in her
Appellant's Brief.

A cursory perusal of the Appellant's Brief shows that the following issues/errors were
raised, that: (1) the Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that the "Rules on Search and
Seizure for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights" apply to the search warrants at
bar; (2)
x x x.

It must be remembered that there was no trial on the merits to speak of in the trial court,
and the matter of the application of the wrong set of Rules only arose in the Order dated
25th September 2006 which sustained the Motion to Quash. A thorough examination of
the Appellee's Brief filed by petitioners (respondents-appellees in the Court of Appeals)
reveals, however, that petitioners NEVER assailed the first issue/error on the ground
that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. It is only now, after the appellate
court rendered a Decision and Resolution unfavorable to them, that petitioners
questioned the alleged procedural error. Petitioners should now be considered in
estoppel to question the same.40

Indeed, perusing the appellee's (herein petitioners) brief filed with the CA, the matter of
the non-applicability of the rules on search and seizure in civil action for infringement of
intellectual property rights was never objected as being raised for the first time. On the
contrary, petitioners had squarely faced respondent's argument in this wise:

Appellant (herein respondent) contends that the rule (SC Adm. Memo 1-06, No. 02-1-
06, Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights) does [not] apply to the search warrants in the [case] at bar, for the reason that
the search warrants themselves reveal that the same were applied for and issued for
violations of "Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293" and violations of
"Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293," and that a perusal of the records
would show that there is no mention of a civil action or anticipation thereof, upon which
the search warrants are applied for.

Appellees (herein petitioners) cannot agree with the contention of the appellant.
Complainant NBI Agent Joseph G. Furing, who applied for the search warrants, violated
the very rule on search and seizure for infringement of Intellectual Property Rights. The
search warrants applied for by the complainants cannot be considered a criminal action.
There was no criminal case yet to speak of when complainants applied for issuance of
the search warrants. There is distinction here because the search applied for is civil in
nature and no criminal case had been filed. The complaint is an afterthought after the
respondents-appellees filed their Motion to Quash Search Warrant before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. The grounds enumerated in the rule must be complied
with in order to protect the constitutional mandate that "no person shall be deprived of
life liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law." Clearly, the application of the search warrants for violation
of unfair competition and infringement is in the nature of a civil action.41

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2009
and the Resolution dated July 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
88952, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican , with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and
Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; rollo, pp. 46-62.

2 Id. at 9-14.

3 Per Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles; rollo, pp. 66-71.

4 Records, Vol. III, pp. 732-736.

5 Records, Vol. II, p. 275.

6 Records, Vol. I, pp. 97-98.

7 Id. at 75.

8 Id. at 73-74.

9 Records, Vol. I, pp. 83-84.

10 Id. at 96.
11 Id. at 88-89.

12 Id. at 172-175.

13 Records, Vol. II, pp. 239-259.

14 Id. at 611-620.

15 Id. at 624-628.

16 Per Bureau of Legal Affairs Director Estrellita Beltran- Abelardo;

id. at 629-632.

17 Id. at 631-632. (Emphasis in the original)

18 Rollo, pp. 66-71

19 Id. at 71.

20 SECTION 6. Grounds for the issuance of the order. - Before the Order can be issued, the evidence proffered by the applicant
and personally evaluated by the judge must show that:

(a) he is the right holder or his duly authorized representative;

(b) there is probable cause to believe that the applicant's right is being infringed or that such infringement is imminent and there is a
prima facie case for final relief against the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party;

(c) damage, potential or actual, likely to be caused to the applicant is irreparable;

(d) there is demonstrable risk of evidence that the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party may destroy, hide or
remove the documents or articles before any application inter partes can be made; and

(e) the documents and articles to be seized constitute evidence of the alleged infringing defendant's or expected adverse party's
infringing activity or that they infringe upon the intellectual property right of the applicant or that they are used or intended to be used
as means of infringing the applicant's intellectual property right.

21 Records, Vol. III, pp. 639-644.

22 Id. at 733-737.

23 Rollo, p. 62. (Emphasis in the original)

24 Id. at 32.

25 Id. at 39.

26 Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Español, 493 Phil. 507, 517 (2005), citing People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 3,
1998, 288 SCRA 626.

27 Id., citing Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 918 (1996), citing 79 CJS, Search and Seizures, Section 74,
862.

28 Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 481 Phil. 550, 566 (2004).

29 Id. at 566-567, citing People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937).

30 Id. at 567.

31 Rollo, pp 60-61.

32 Records, Vol. III, pp. 670-671; per Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.

33 Id. at 672; per pairing Judge Samuel H. Gaerlan.

34 Id. at 731; per Atty. Cecilia L. Cuevas-Torrijos, Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City.

35 Id. at 674-681; per Hearing Officer Adoracion R. Umipig, Bureau of Legal Affairs, concurred in by Director Estrellita Beltran-
Abelardo.
36 Id. at 681.

37 Id. at 682.

38 Records, Vol. II, pp. 631-632.

39 G.R. No. 158767, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 602.

40 Rollo, p. 154.

41 CA rollo, pp. 116-117.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 156804. March 14, 2005]

SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (PHILS.), INC. and IFPI (SOUTHEAST ASIA),

LTD., Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPANOL OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 90, DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, ELENA S. LIM, SUSAN L.
TAN, DAVID S. LIM, JAMES H. UY, WILSON ALEJANDRO, JR., JOSEPH DE LUNA,
MARIA A. VELA CRUZ, DAVID CHUNG, JAMES UY, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
AND SOLID LAGUNA CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be nullified in this petition for certiorari with application for
injunctive relief are the orders issued by the respondent judge on June 25, 20021 and
January 6, 2003,2 the first quashing Search Warrant No. 219-00, and the second,
denying reconsideration of the first.

From the petition, the comment thereon of private respondents, their respective
annexes, and other pleadings filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following
relevant facts:

In a criminal complaint filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Videogram
Regulatory Board (VRB)3 charged herein private respondents James Uy, David Chung,
Elena Lim and another officer of respondent Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) with
violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1987.4 As alleged in the complaint, docketed
as I.S. No. 2000-1576, the four (4) were engaged in the replication, reproduction and
distribution of videograms without license and authority from VRB. On account of this
and petitioners' own complaints for copyright infringement, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), through Agent Ferdinand M. Lavin, applied on September 18, 2000,
with the Regional Trial Court at Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 80, presided by the
respondent judge, for the issuance of search warrants against private respondents
David Chung, James Uy, John and Jane Does, doing business under the name and
style "Media Group" inside the factory and production facility of SLC at Solid corner
Camado Sts., Laguna International Industrial Park, Biñan, Laguna.5
During the proceedings on the application, Agent Lavin presented, as witnesses,
Rodolfo Pedralvez, a deputized agent of VRB, and Rene C. Baltazar, an investigator
retained by the law firm R.V. Domingo & Associates, petitioners' attorney-in-fact. In their
sworn statements, the three stated that petitioners sought their assistance, complaining
about the manufacture, sale and distribution of various titles of compact discs (CDs) in
violation of petitioners' right as copyright owners; that acting on the complaint, Agent
Lavin and the witnesses conducted an investigation, in the course of which unnamed
persons informed them that allegedly infringing or pirated discs were being
manufactured somewhere in an industrial park in Laguna; that in the process of their
operation, they were able to enter, accompanied by another unnamed source, the
premises of SLC and to see various replicating equipment and stacks of CDs; and that
they were told by their anonymous source that the discs were being manufactured in the
same premises. They also testified that private respondents were (1) engaged in the
reproduction or replication of audio and video compacts discs without the requisite
authorization from VRB, in violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987, presenting a VRB
certification to such effect; and (2) per petitioners' certification and a listing of Sony
music titles, infringing on petitioners' copyrights in violation of Section 208 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as Intellectual Property Code.6

On the basis of the foregoing sworn statements, the respondent judge issued Search
Warrant No. 219-007 for violation of Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293 and Search Warrant
No. 220-008 for violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987.

The following day, elements of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, led by PO2 Reggie Comandante, enforced both warrants and brought
the seized items to a private warehouse of Carepak Moving and Storage at 1234
Villonco Road, Sucat, Paranaque City and their custody turned over to VRB.9 An
inventory of seized items,10 as well as a "Return of Search Warrant" were later filed with
the respondent court.

Meanwhile, the respondents in I.S. No. 2000-1576 belabored to prove before the DOJ
Prosecutorial Service that, since 1998 and up to the time of the search, they were
licensed by VRB to operate as replicator and duplicator of videograms.

On the stated finding that "respondents can not . . . be considered an unauthorized

reproducers of videograms", being "licensed to engage in reproduction in videograms
under SLC in which they are the officers and/or or officials", the DOJ, via a resolution
dated January 15, 2001,11 dismissed VRB's complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576.

On February 6, 2001, private respondents, armed with the DOJ resolution adverted to,
moved to quash the search warrants thus issued.12 VRB interposed an opposition for
the reason that the DOJ has yet to resolve the motion for reconsideration it filed in I.S.
No. 2000-1576.

Eventually, the DOJ denied VRB's motion for reconsideration, prompting private
respondents to move anew for the quashal of the search warrants. In its supplement to
motion, private respondents attached copies of SLC's license as videogram duplicator
and replicator.

In an order dated October 30, 2001,13 the respondent judge, citing the January 15, 2001
DOJ resolution in I.S. No. 2000-1576, granted private respondents' motion to quash, as
supplemented, dispositively stating:

"Nonetheless, such being the case, the aforesaid Search Warrants are QUASHED"

Petitioners forthwith sought clarification on whether or not the quashal order referred to
both search warrants or to Search Warrant No. 220-00 alone, since it was the latter that
was based on the charge of violation of PD No. 1987.14 The respondent judge, in a
modificatory order dated January 29, 2002,15 clarified that her previous order quashed
only Search Warrant No. 220-00.

Meanwhile, or on November 22, 2001, petitioners filed with the DOJ an affidavit-
complaint, docketed thereat as I.S. No. 2001-1158, charging individual private
respondents with copyright infringement in violation of Sections 172 and 208 in relation
to other provisions of RA No. 8293.16 Attached to the affidavit-complaint were certain
documents and records seized from SLC's premises, such as production and delivery
records.

Following their receipt of DOJ-issued subpoenas to file counter-affidavits, private

respondents moved, in the search warrant case, that they be allowed to examine the
seized items to enable them to intelligently prepare their defense.17 On January 30,
2002, respondent judge issued an order allowing the desired examination, provided it is
made under the supervision of the court's sheriff and in the "presence of the applicant of
Search Warrant No. 219-00".18

On February 8, 2002, the parties, represented by their counsels, repaired to the

Carepak warehouse. An NBI agent representing Agent Lavin appeared. The
examination, however, did not push through on account of petitioners' counsel
insistence on Agent Lavin's physical presence.19 Private respondents were able to
make an examination on the following scheduled setting, February 15, 2002, albeit it
was limited, as the minutes of the inspection discloses, to inspecting only one (1) box
containing 35 assorted CDs, testing stampers, diskettes, a calendar, organizers and
some folders and documents. The minutes also contained an entry stating - "Other
items/machines were not examined because they cannot be identified as they are not
properly segregated from other items/machines in the warehouse. The parties agreed to
schedule another examination on (to be agreed by the parties) after the items/machines
subject of the examination shall have been segregated from the other items/machines
by Carepak Moving and Storage, Inc."20

During the preliminary investigation conducted on February 26, 2002 in I.S. No. 2001-
1158, however, petitioners' counsel objected to any further examination, claiming that
such exercise was a mere subterfuge to delay proceedings.21
On April 11, 2002, individual private respondents, through counsel, filed a "Motion To
Quash Search Warrant (And To Release Seized Properties)" grounded on lack of
probable cause to justify issuance of search warrant, it being inter alia alleged that the
applicant and his witnesses lacked the requisite personal knowledge to justify the valid
issuance of a search warrant; that the warrant did not sufficiently describe the items to
be seized; and that the warrant was improperly enforced.22 To this motion to quash,
petitioners interposed an opposition dated May 7, 2002 predicated on four (4)
grounds.23 On June 26, 2002, respondent SLC filed a Manifestation joining its co-
respondents in, and adopting, their motion to quash.24

On June 25, 2002, the respondent judge issued the herein first assailed order quashing
Search Warrant No. 219-00 principally on the ground that the integrity of the seized
items as evidence had been compromised, commingled as they were with other articles.
Wrote the respondent judge:

Based on the report submitted, it appears that on February 15, 2002, an examination
was actually conducted. Unfortunately, the alleged seized items were commingled with
and not segregated from thousands of other items stored in the warehouse. Only one
box . . . were (sic) examined in the presence of both parties with the sheriff, such that
another date was set . . . . On February 22, 2002, during the hearing before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), [petitioners' counsel] Atty. Arevalo manifested their
objection to the further examination on the alleged ground that all of the items subject of
the DOJ complaint have been examined.

Analyzing the report and the incidents relative thereto, it shows that the items subject of
the questioned Search Warrant were commingled with other items in the warehouse of
Carepak resulting in the failure to identify the machines and other items subject of this
Search Warrant, while the other items enumerated in the said Inventory of Seized Items
and Certification of Legality, Orderliness and Regularity in the Execution and
enforcement of Search Warrants were not examined, hence, the charge imputed
against the respondents could not be established as the evidence to show such
violation fails to determine the culpability of said respondents, thus, violating their
constitutional rights.25

Excepting, petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing on the main that the quashal
order was erroneously based on a ground outside the purview of a motion to quash.26
To this motion, private respondents interposed an opposition, against which petitioners
countered with a reply.

On January 6, 2003, respondent judge issued the second assailed order denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration on the strength of the following premises:

Careful scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the application of the above-
entitled case stemmed from the application for Search Warrant alleging that the
respondent was not licensed to duplicate or replicate CDs and VCDs. The Court was
misled when the applicants declared that Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) is not
licensed to engage in replicating/duplicating CDs and VCDs, when in truth and in fact,
SLC was still a holder of a valid and existing VRB license. Considering the fact that
respondent was duly licensed which facts (sic) was not laid bare to this Court when the
application for writ was filed by the private complainant through the National Bureau
of Investigation, this Court hereby recalls and quashes the above writ.

Lastly, taking into account that respondents were licensed to engage in replicating/
duplicating CDs and VCDs, the issuance of search warrant was of no force and effect
as there was absence of probable cause to justify said issuance. xxx27

Hence, petitioners' present recourse.

In a Resolution dated February 19, 2003,28 the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the respondents from implementing and enforcing the respondent
judge's questioned orders.

Petitioners ascribe on the respondent judge the commission of grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the first assailed order
in that:

1. It was based on a ground that is not a basis for quashal of a search warrant, i.e.,
private respondents' failure to examine the seized items, which ground is extraneous to
the determination of the validity of the issuance of the search warrant.

2. Public respondent, in effect, conducted a "preliminary investigation" that absolved the

private respondents from any liability for copyright infringement.

3. Public respondent recognized the motion to quash search warrant filed by persons
who did not have any standing to question the warrant.

Petitioners also deplore the issuance of the second assailed order which they tag as
predicated on a ground immaterial to Search Warrant No. 219-00.

Private respondents filed their Comment on May 13, 2003, essentially reiterating their
arguments in the "Motion To Quash Search Warrant (And To Release Seized
Properties)". Apart therefrom, they aver that petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of
courts by filing the petition directly with this Court. As to be expected, petitioners' reply
to comment traversed private respondents' position.

Owing to their inability to locate respondent David Chung, petitioners moved and the
Court subsequently approved the dropping, without prejudice, of said respondent from
the case.29

On February 20, 2004, private respondents filed their Rejoinder, therein inviting
attention to petitioner IFPI's failure to execute the certification on non-forum shopping as
required by Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court and questioning the validity of the
Special Powers of Attorney of petitioners' attorney-in-fact to file this case.

In Resolution of March 31, 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and directed
the submission of memoranda which the parties, after each securing an extension, did
submit.

The underlying issue before Us revolves on the propriety of the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 219-00 which, in turn, resolves itself into question of the propriety of the
warrant's issuance in the first place.

It has repeatedly been said that one's house, however, humble is his castle where his
person, papers and effects shall be secured and whence he shall enjoy undisturbed
privacy except, to borrow from Villanueva v. Querubin,30 "in case of overriding social
need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards." The protection against
illegal searches and seizure has found its way into our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
is now embodied in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus -

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, and in
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
viz -

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. 'A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause . . . to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Complementing the aforequoted provisions is Section 5 of the same Rule, reading:

SEC. 5. Examination of the complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.

To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy,

a liberal construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual.
Consistent with this postulate, the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the
search process when an officer undertakes to justify it.31 For, the presumption juris
tantum of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail against the constitutionally protected rights
of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself detests.32

A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable
cause, meaning "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched".33 And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present.
Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed
not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation,
arbitrary, as held by us in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.34 Testimony
based on what is supposedly told to a witness, being patent hearsay and, as rule, of no
evidentiary weight35 or probative value, whether objected to or not,36 would, alone, not
suffice under the law on the existence of probable cause.

In our view, the issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the
requirements of probable cause. The respondent judge did not accordingly err in
quashing the same, let alone gravely abuse her discretion.

Petitioners argue that the instant petition is on all fours with Columbia,37 wherein the en
banc Court upheld the validity of search warrants based on the testimonies of the
applicant and his witnesses who conducted an investigation on the unlawful
reproduction and distribution of video tapes of copyrighted films.

We are not persuaded.

In Columbia, the issuing court probed the applicant's and his witnesses' personal
knowledge of the fact of infringement. It was, however, determined by this Court that
during the application hearing, therein petitioner's attorney-in-fact, a witness of the
applicant, "stated in his affidavit and further expounded in his deposition that he
personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his
clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purposes of selling any of the
copyrighted films."38 Significantly, the Court, in upholding the validity of the writ issued
upon complaint of Columbia Pictures, Inc., et al., stated that "there is no allegation of
misrepresentation, much less finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of
petitioners' witnesses."39

Therein lies the difference with the instant case.

Here, applicant Agent Lavin and his witnesses, Pedralvez and Baltazar, when queried
during the application hearing how they knew that audio and video compact discs were
infringing or pirated, relied for the most part on what alleged unnamed sources told
them and/or on certifications or lists made by persons who were never presented as
witnesses. In net effect, they testified under oath as to the truth of facts they had no
personal knowledge of. The following excerpts of the depositions of applicant Lavin and
his witnesses suggest as much:

A. Deposition of Agent Lavin

28. Question: What happened next?

Answer: We then went to the Laguna Industrial Park, your Honor . . . We then verified
from an informant that David Chung, James Uy . . . under the name and style Media
Group were the ones replicating the infringing CDs.

xxx

36. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs and CDs you purchased or are
indeed infringing?

Answer: I have with me the VRB certification that the VCDs are unauthorized copies. I
also have with me the Complaint-Affidavit of Sony Music and IFPI that certified that
these are infringing copies, as well as the title list of Sony Music wherein some of the
CDs purchased are indicated. (Annex "10", Comment, Rollo, p. 841)

B. Deposition of Baltazar

18. Question: What did you see in that address?

Answer: We saw that they had in stock several infringing, pirated and unauthorized
CDs. They also had videograms without VRB labels, aside from artworks and labels.
John Doe gave us a "Wholesome" CD while Jane Doe gave us "Kenny Rogers Videoke"
and "Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke" which the informant told us were being
reproduced in that facility. The informant further showed us the rooms where the
replicating and/or stamping machine was located.

19. Question: How did you determine that the CDs you purchased are counterfeit,
pirated or unauthorized?

Answer: The Attorney-in-fact of Sony Music and IFPI certified in his Complaint-Affidavit
that they are unauthorized copies. I also have with me a listing of Sony Music titles and
some of the CDs I purchased are in that list.40

C. Deposition of Pedralvez

27. Question: What proof do you have they are producing infringing materials?

Answer: We were given some samples by John Doe and Jane Doe. These are
Kenny Rogers Videoke, Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke, and Andrew E. Wholesome
CD. The informant told us that the said samples were being reproduced in the facility.
28. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs you purchased or got are indeed
unauthorized?

Answer: The VRB has certified that they are unauthorized copies. (Annex "12",
Comment, Rollo, pp. 849-852).

Unlike their counterparts in Columbia who were found to be personally knowledgeable

about their facts, Agent Lavin and his witnesses, judging from their above quoted
answers, had no personal knowledge that the discs they saw, purchased or received
were, in fact, pirated or infringing on petitioners' copyrights. To us, it is not enough that
the applicant and his witnesses testify that they saw stacks of several allegedly
infringing, pirated and unauthorized discs in the subject facility. The more decisive
consideration determinative of whether or not a probable cause obtains to justify the
issuance of a search warrant is that they had personal knowledge that the discs were
actually infringing, pirated or unauthorized copies.41

Moreover, unlike in Columbia, misrepresentation on the part of the applicant and his
witnesses had been established in this case.

This is not to say that the master tapes should have been presented in evidence during
the application hearing, as private respondents, obviously having in mind the holding in
20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals,42 would have this Court believe. It is
true that the Court, in 20th Century Fox, underscored the necessity, in determining
the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases, of presenting the
master tapes of the copyrighted work. But, as emphatically clarified in Columbia "such
auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary
evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence xxx especially where
the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or
expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.43 What this Court is saying is that
any evidence presented in lieu of the master tapes, if not readily available, in similar
application proceedings must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at the very least, be
based on the witness' personal knowledge.

Petitioners argue, citing People v. Chua Uy,44 that Agent Lavin's informants' testimonies
are not indispensable as they would only be corroborative.45 Like Columbia, Chua Uy is
not a winning card for petitioners, for, in the latter case, there was a reliable testimony
to corroborate what the applicant testified to, i.e., the testimony of the police poseur-
buyer in a buy-bust operation involving prohibited drugs. The circumstances are
different in this case wherein the applicant and his witnesses had no personal
knowledge that the discs they purchased were infringing or pirated copies. It cannot be
overemphasized that not one of them testified seeing the pirated discs being
manufactured at SLC's premises. What they stated instead was that they were given
copies of "Kenny Rogers Videoke", "Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke" and "Andrew E.
Wholesome CD" by two anonymous sources, while yet another informant told them that
the discs were manufactured at said premises.
Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and
validated,46 as what transpired in Columbia. Unfortunately, the records show that such
is not the case before us.

On the issue that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in conducting
what petitioners perceived amounted to a "preliminary investigation", this Court has
already ruled in Solid Triangle Sales Corp. v. Sheriff of RTC Quezon City, Branch 93,47
that "in the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether
or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the warrant". In the exercise
of this mandate - which we can allow as being akin to conducting a preliminary
investigation - abuse of discretion cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the issuing
court on account of its prima facie holding that no offense has been committed, even if
consequent to such holding a warrant is recalled and the private complainant is
incidentally deprived of vital evidence to prove his case. Solid Triangle succinctly
explains why:

The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one
hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are
proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other's finding
as regards the existence of a crime. The first is to determine whether a warrant should
issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court.

When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search
warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach
upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the
investigating officer not to file the information for the court's ruling that no crime exists is
only of purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would
like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the executive function. Indeed, to shirk from
this duty would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation.48

While the language of the first questioned Order may be viewed as encroaching on
executive functions, nonetheless, it remains that the order of quashal is entirely
independent of the proceedings in I.S. No. 2001-1158. And needless to stress, the DOJ
is by no means concluded by the respondent judge's findings as regards the existence,
or the non-existence, of a crime.

We can, to a point, accord merit to petitioners' lament that the basis of the first
questioned order, i.e., the mingling of the seized items with other items, is extraneous to
the determination of the validity of the issuance of the search warrant. It is to be pointed
out, though, that public respondent corrected her error when it was raised in petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. There can really be no serious objection to a judge
correcting or altogether altering his case disposition on a motion for reconsideration, it
being the purpose of such recourse to provide the court an opportunity to cleanse itself
of an error unwittingly committed, or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the
chance to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous.49 A motion for reconsideration
before resort to certiorari is required precisely "to afford the public respondent an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case".50

Similarly, as to the matter of the respondent judge's recognizing the April 11, 2002
motion to quash search warrant51 filed by the individual private respondents, instead of
by SLC, as presumptive owner of the seized items, such error was properly addressed
when respondent SLC, represented throughout the proceedings below by the same
counsel of its co-respondents, formally manifested that it was adopting the same motion
as its own.52

It is apropos to point out at this juncture that petitioners have imputed on individual
private respondents criminal liability, utilizing as tools of indictment the very articles and
papers seized from the premises of SLC. Be that as it may, petitioners should be
deemed in estoppel to raise the personality of individual private respondents to
interpose a motion to quash. To be sure, it would be unsporting for petitioners to
prosecute individual private respondents on the basis of seized articles but on the same
breath deny the latter standing to question the legality of the seizure on the postulate
that only the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, meaning SLC, can raise
that challenge. There can be no quibbling that individual private respondents stand to
be prejudiced or at least be inconvenient by any judgment in any case based on the
seized properties. In a very real sense, therefore, they are real parties in interest who
ought not to be prevented from assailing the validity of Search Warrant 219-00, albeit
they cannot plausibly asked for the release and appropriate as their own the seized
articles.

Petitioners' related argument that SLC could not have validly adopted individual private
respondents' motion to quash due to laches is untenable.

The records show that the seizure in question was effected on September 19, 2000.
The complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576 was filed against the officers of SLC, all of whom,
except for one, are also private respondents in the instant petition. I.S. No. 2000-1576
was only resolved on January 15, 2001 when the DOJ dismissed the complaint on the
ground that SLC was, in fact, duly licensed by the VRB. Shortly thereafter, or on
February 6, 2001, less than five (5) months after the seizure, private respondents
moved to quash both search warrants.53 The motion clearly indicates private
respondents' desire for the return of the seized items, and there is nothing in the
records showing that petitioners objected to the motion on the ground that the movants
had no standing to question the warrants.

This bring Us to the second assailed order. As earlier stated, DOJ, in I.S. No. 2000-
1576, found respondent SLC to be licensed by VRB to engage in the business of
replicating or duplicating videograms.

Petitioners would have the Court believe that the second questioned order was based
on a ground immaterial to the charge of infringement. A scrutiny of the text of the said
order, however, shows that the respondent judge denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration because she was misled by the applicant's and his witnesses'
testimony. It may be that a VRB license is no defense to a charge of violating Section
208 of R.A. No. 8293. It must be stressed in this regard, however, that the core issue
here is the validity of the warrant which applicant secured on the basis of, among
others, his representation which turned out to be false.

As above discussed, the answers of Agent Lavin and his witnesses to the public
respondent's searching questions, particularly those relating to how they knew that the
compact discs they purchased or received were illegal, unauthorized or infringing, were
based on certifications and not personal knowledge. The subject warrant, as well as
Search Warrant No. 220-00, was issued nonetheless. It may well have been that the
issuing judge was, in the end, convinced to issue the warrants by means of the
erroneous VRB certification presented during the joint application hearing, overriding
whatever misgivings she may have had with the applicant's and his witnesses' other
answers. This Court, however, cannot engage in such speculation and sees no need to.

Summing up, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-00 was, at bottom, predicated on
the sworn testimonies of persons without personal knowledge of facts they were
testifying on and who relied on a false certification issued by VRB. Based as it were on
hearsay and false information, its issuance was without probable cause and, therefore,
invalid.

Given the foregoing perspective, the peripheral issues of (a) whether or not petitioner
IFPI (South East Asia), Ltd. failed to comply with the rules requiring the filing of a
certification on non-forum shopping; and (b) whether or not IFPI's board of directors
ratified its conditional authorization for its attorney-in-fact to represent IFPI in this
petition, need not detain us long. In our review of the records, R.V. Domingo &
Associates, whose authority to represent the petitioners in this petition continues, had
duly executed the sworn certification on non - forum shopping.

In the same manner, this Court, having taken cognizance of this petition, need not
belabor the issue of whether or not petitioners have cavalierly breached the rule on
hierarchy of courts. Suffice it to state that, while the Court looks with disfavor on utter
disregard of its rules,54 it is within its power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation whenever the ends of justice so requires, as here.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining
order issued on February 19, 2003 is consequently RECALLED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
Endnotes:

1 Rollo, pp. 60-62.

2 Rollo, pp. 64-65.
3 Now the Optical Media Board.
4 An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board.
5 Petition, pp. 4-5.
6 Petition, p. 37; Annex "V", Petition, Rollo, pp. 669-678.
7 Annex "D", Petition, Rollo, p. 67.
8 Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp. 69-70.
9 Petition, pp. 5-6.

10 Annex "F", Petition, Rollo, pp. 72-77.

11 Annex "1", Comment, Rollo, pp. 746-749.
12 Comment, p. 5; Rollo 712.
13 Annex "G", Petition, Rollo. 79-81.
14 Annex "H", Petition, Rollo, pp. 83-88.
15 Annex "K", Petition, Rollo, p. 160.
16 Annex "I", Petition, Rollo, pp. 92-111.
17 Annex "J", Petition, Rollo, pp. 113-116.
18 Annex "L", Petition, Rollo, p. 162.
19 Comment, p.8, Rollo, p. 715; Reply, p. 33, Rollo, p. 940.
20 Annex "M", Petition, Rollo, pp. 164-166.
21 Reply, pp. 33-34; Rollo, pp. 940-941.
22 Annex "N", Petition, Rollo, pp. 168-183.
23 Annex "O", Petition, Rollo, 223-249.
24 Annex "Q", Petition, Rollo, p. 258.
25 Supra, Note 1, Words in bracket and underlining supplied.
26 Annex "R", Petition, Rollo, p.12.
27 Supra, Note 2.
28 Rollo, p. 675.
29 Rollo, p. 976.
30 48 SCRA 345 [1972].
31 People v. Benhur Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 [2004] citing Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 [1984].
32 Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184 [[1995].
33 People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262 [1998].
34 261 SCRA 144 [1996], citing 79 CJS, Search and Seizures, Sec. 74, 862.
35 AMEX v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 65 [1999].
36 People v. Miclat, 386 SCRA 515 [2002]; People v. Villaviray, 262 SCRA 13 [1996]; People v. Valdez, 347 SCRA 594 [2000].
37 Supra.
38 At p. 173.
39 At p. 74.
40 Annex "11", Comment, Rollo, pp. 846-848.
41 Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 [1999]).
42 164 SCRA 655, [1988].
43 At p. 175.
44 380 SCRA 700 [2002].
45 Petitioners' Memorandum, p.19.
46 Cupcupin v. People, 392 SCRA 203 [2002].
47 370 SCRA 491 [2001]
48 At pp. 504-505.
49 Phil. Advertising Counselors v. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246 [1973].
50 Pure Foods Corp. v. NLRC, 171 SCRA 415 [1989] cited in Sevillana v. I.T.(International) Corp., 356 SCRA 451 [2001]
51 Supra, Note 22.
52 Supra, Note 24.
53 Supra, See Note 12.
54 Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62 [2000].

G.R. No. 174570

ROMER SY TAN vs. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG
SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM, G.R. No.
174570, December 15, 2010
R E S O L U T I O N - PERALTA, J.:

On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision[1] in G.R. No. 174570 entitled
Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and

Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of
Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[2] wherein

respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-
241375. As such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside
and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on
the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case.

In his Comment[3] dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere
reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which
have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he
also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft
against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information
for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject
search warrants will be used as evidence therein.

On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply.

On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[4] wherein respondents were

required to submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14,
2008, which granted their motion to withdraw the information.

On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Court’s directive and submitted a
certified true copy of the Order.[5]

In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated
August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the
Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking with intent to
gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause,
warranting the withdrawal of the Information.[6] The RTC also considered that the said
pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829
in the Resolution[7] dated November 12, 2007.
Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents’ motion to withdraw the information without
prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is
DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.

Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of
the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there
was probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for
respondents’ alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic. Verily,
there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search
warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.[8]

Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the
same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include
the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, he
cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the
subject search warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with
only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicant’s
personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of
Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the
same incident.

Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings
of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict
respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking,
which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which
are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more,
prosper.

Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the

respondents is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for
being MOOT and ACADEMIC. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170425

"x x x.

The Court’s Ruling

The CA held that the proceedings before the Makati RTC and the Muntinlupa RTC are
separate and distinct. The object of the motion to quash search warrant, here filed by
respondents Pastrana and Abad with the Makati RTC, the issuing court, was to test the
validity of its issuance, given that the warrant was made to cover several offenses
rather than just one as the rules provide.[18] On the other hand, the object of the
Muntinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seized
articles in any criminal proceeding against Mendoza, et al. considering the SEC and the
NBI’s failure to immediately turn over the seized articles to the court that issued the
warrant as the rules require.[19]

But Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance of the
search warrant and 2) the suppression of evidence seized under it are matters that can
be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal action has in
the meantime been filed in court. Thus:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. —
A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may
be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court. (Emphasis supplied)

Although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza, et al. filed with
the Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which is to prohibit the three agencies from using the
items seized under the search warrant, is actually an action to suppress their use as
evidence. Consequently, Mendoza, et al. should have filed it with the Makati RTC that
issued such warrant.

It might be pointed out of course that since Mendoza, et al. were not parties to the
issuance of the search warrant, they had no standing to question the same or seek the
suppression of evidence taken under it. Consequently, since they had reasons for
questioning government use of the seized items against them, they had the right to
bring the injunction action before the Muntinlupa RTC where they resided.

But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant
proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not correct to say that
only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek
suppression of evidence seized under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a search
warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of a violation of his right
by another. The Court clearly explained in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,[20] the
nature of a search warrant proceeding.

[A] search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement
of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings.
While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not
make it such an action.

A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery
employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a
criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police
weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the
State, namely, the People of the Philippines.

A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating
civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns the public at large as
distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may
only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.[21]

Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or offices
of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to file with the Makati RTC a motion to suppress
the use of the seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and the NBI
to immediately turn these over to the issuing court. The issuing court is the right forum
for such motion given that no criminal action had as yet been filed against Mendoza, et
al. in some other court.

Parenthetically, it appears from its investigation report that the SEC kept the seized
documents and articles for months rather than immediately turn them over to the Makati
RTC.[22] Justifying its action, the SEC said that it still needed to study the seized
items.[23] Evidently, it wanted to use them to build up a case against the respondents,
unmindful of its duty to first turn them over to the court. Clearly, SEC’s arbitrary action
compromised the integrity of the seized documents and articles.

x x x."

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 199032 November 19, 2014

RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 25, 2011
and the Resolution3 dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.4

The Facts

On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains
of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be
found.5

In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the
RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.6

Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-144077 which was later enforced by the elements of the
PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of
the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.8

On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence9 premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice
Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him
by the Court;10 (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-
14407 which was to be enforced in Davao City;11 (c) the human remains sought to be
seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant;12 (d) the police officers are
mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains;13 (e)
the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause;14 (f) the rule against
forum shopping was violated;15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one
specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be searched and the articles
to be seized.16

The Manila-RTC Ruling

In an Order17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud "after a
careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein]." Aside from this general
statement, the said Order contained no discussion on the particular reasons from which
the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.

Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in an Order19 dated December 8, 2009,
wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its reasons for the warrant’s quashal,
namely: (a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a
search warrant by the Manila RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where
the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court;20 (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable
cause;21 and (c) the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping
as the subject matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the same as
the one contained in a previous application22 before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15
(Davao-RTC) which had been denied.23

Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. No. 113017.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People’s petition and thereby
annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied,
pointing out that an application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and reiterated in A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC,26 provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or
the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF),27 with the endorsement of its
head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently
issued by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as
in this case.28

Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness
Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6)
persons in December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims –
two bodies in each of the three (3) caves.29 Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC
failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get involved
in a criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending
the application of a search warrant.30 Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence
of a protruding human bone in plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola’s first-hand
eye witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that the
crime of Murder had been committed and that the human remains of the victims were
located in the Laud Compound.31

Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the prior application
for a search warrant filed before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and circumstances
different from those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC.32

Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a

Resolution33 dated October 17, 2011,hence, this petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues for the Court’s resolution are as follows: (a) whether the administrative
penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b)
whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-
compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule126 of the
Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular
description were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search
warrant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

A. Effect of Judge Peralta’s Administrative Penalties.

Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that "[t]he
imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position
as such," Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-Executive
Judge and accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s
Resolution in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta34 wherein he was
administratively penalized with fines of ₱15,000.00 and ₱5,000.00.35

While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did
operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be
qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be
considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.

Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de facto officer is and explains that his acts are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons
who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid
on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging
[his] duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes
as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.37

The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that third persons
cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as
such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally
such.38 Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an
office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public – as
distinguished from the officer in question– is concerned.39 Indeed, it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of
the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals
who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.40

In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: (a)
there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general acquiescence
by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith.41

The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there
is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable
right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested
of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality – that is, the operation of
Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said
that there was general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application
was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.42
Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to be
in good faith, as the contrary was not established.43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be
considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-
14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no
administrative impediment.

B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407; Exception to

the Compelling Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance
of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by "the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police(PNP) and
the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and,
whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the
station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and
"shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts."

The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this
case.

As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-
RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,44
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of Murder.45 Finding probable
cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.

Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special criminal case"
excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. —An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)

As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on
search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-
mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being applied for in
connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be
superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12,
Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on
these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.

C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the Issuance of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 and the One-Specific Offense Rule Under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.

In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant
shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No.
09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated
that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims:

Q9-Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and buried in the caves in
December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.?
A9-I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when they were still alive as
Pedro and Mario. I don’t know the names of the other four victims.

Q10-What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims were killed?

A10-Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and bury equally the bodies
in the three caves. We buried Pedro and Mario altogether in the first cave, located more
or less 13 meters from the makeshift house of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the
second cave and the remaining two in the third cave.

Q11-How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of December 2005?

A11-I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran errands [for] him.46

Avasola’s statements in his deposition were confirmed during the hearing on July 10,
2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the following examination:

Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong naghukay, nakatago o

kasama ka?

Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.

Court: Mga ilang katao?

Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.

Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?

Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki. x x x. 47

Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola, who was
personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not the
crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human remains in
connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In Santos v. Pryce
Gases, Inc.,48 the Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor
run counter to the clear dictates of reason.49

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the
existence of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time"
attended the search warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not, by and
of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness
presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s
fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case.50 Ultimately, in
determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of
the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s
mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does not dilute the
probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been
sufficiently met.

The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."

"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality
that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement."51

Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it
particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located
inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City:

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time [of] the day of
the premises above describe[d] particularly the three (3) caves (as sketched) inside the
said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao City and forthwith seize and take
possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the just said
premises. x x x x52 (Emphases supplied)

For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made explicit
reference to the sketch53 contained in the application. These, in the Court’s view, are
sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place to be searched, which they in fact did.

The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the remains of six (6)
victims who were killed and buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that
human remains are not "personal property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a
search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court states:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (Emphases
supplied) "Personal property" in the foregoing context actually refers to the thing’s
mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. Article
416 of the Civil Code,54 which Laud himself cites,55 states that in general, all things
which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property.
Considering that human remains can generally be transported from place to place, and
considering further that they qualify under the phrase "subject of the offense" given that
they prove the crime’s corpus delicti,56 it follows that they may be valid subjects of a
search warrant under the above-cited criminal procedure provision. Neither does the
Court agree with Laud’s contention that the term "human remains" is too all-embracing
so as to subvert the particular description requirement. As the Court sees it, the
description points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the offense
committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived that the description is already specific as
the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies would have
naturally decomposed over time. These observations on the description’s sufficient
particularity square with the Court’s pronouncement in Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc.
v. Judge Ruiz,57 wherein it was held:

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact —
not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued
(Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the articles desired to be seized
have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence. (Emphases supplied)58

Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement – both as to
the place to be searched and the things to be seized – had been complied with.

Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent
the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one
specific offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was discussed in the
case of People v. CA59 as follows: There is no question that the search warrant did not
relate to a specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno
and of Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as follows:

SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.— A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the
search warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to continue
that it was in connection with one specific offense. He could not, of course, for the
warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, "to
robbery, theft, qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the search warrant was
totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by the very judge who had
issued it.60

In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA,61 the Court, however, settled that a search warrant that
covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule, viz.:

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search
warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to
be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued
does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. (Emphasis supplied)62

Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific
offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said that Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.

That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum shopping.

D. Forum Shopping.

There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another.63

Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering the
various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the Manila-
RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each
application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection
with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more
importantly, the places to be searched were different – that in Manila sought the search
of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud
Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the
two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated.

Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the CA Ruling which
upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the
Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1870 dated November 4, 2014.

1 Rollo, pp. 9-53.

2 Id. at 57-70. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with Associate Justices Mario L. Guarifia III and Agnes
Reyes-Carpio, concurring.
3 Id. at 72-74.
4 CA rollo, pp. 207-208.
5 Rollo, p. 58.
6 Id. at 66.
7 CA rollo, pp. 207-208.
8 Rollo, p. 59.
9 Id. at 93-127.
10 See id. at 95-98. Referring to the administrative case entitled "Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta (see 603 Phil. 94
[2009]), wherein the Court administratively penalized Judge Peralta with fines of 15,000.00 and 5,000.00.
11 See id. at 98-106.
12 See id. at 106-108.
13 See id. at 108-112.
14 See id. at 113-118.
15 See id. at 118-121.
16 See id. at 121-124.
17 Id. at 139.
18 Id. at 140-187.
19 Id. at 188-192.
20 Id. at 190.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 79-80.
23 Id. at 191. See Davao-RTC Order dated July 7, 2009 penned by Presiding Judge Ridgway M. Tanjili.
24 Id. at 57-70.
25 Entitled "RESOLUTION CLARIFYING GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION FOR AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SEARCH
WARRANTS" (January 25, 2000).
26 Entitled "GUIDELINES ON THE SELECTION AND DESIGNATION OF EXECUTIVE JUDGES AND DEFINING THEIR
POWERS, PREROGATIVES AND DUTIES" (January 27, 2004).
27 Chapter V, Section 12, of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC omits the PAOC-TF and the REACT-TF, and mentions, instead, the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF).
28 Rollo, pp. 62-64.
29 Id. at 66-67.
30 Id. at 64-65.
31 Id. at 67.
32 Id. at 69.
33 Id. at 72-74.
34 603 Phil. 94 (2009).
35 Id. at 103.
36 G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196.
37 Id. at 224; citations omitted.
38 See Re: Nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile, IBP Ifugao President, as Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon,
Dennis B. Habawel, A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, December 10, 2013.
39 Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7, 29 (1967).
40 See Monroy v. CA, 127 Phil. 1, 7 (1967).
41 Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460, 472 (1995).
42 Rollo, pp. 61-64.
43 "Well-settled is the rule that good faith is always presumed and the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every
person, inter alia, to observe good faith which springs from the fountain of good conscience. Specifically, a public officer is
presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable
absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. ‘Bad faith’ does not simply
connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes." (Collantes v.
Marcelo, 556 Phil. 794, 806 [2007].)
44 Rollo, p. 63. See also CA rollo, p. 22.
45 Republic Act No. 7659, entitled "AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING
FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," states:

xxxx

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,
by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society;

xxxx

Sec. 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or
of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
46 Rollo, pp. 66-67.
47 Id. at 67.
48 563 Phil. 781 (2007).
49 Id. at 793.
50 Rollo, p. 65.
51 Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 907-908 (2000); citations omitted.
52 CA rollo, p. 207.
53 Rollo, p. 81.
54 Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:

xxxx

(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed.
55 Rollo, p. 46.
56 "Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a
murdered man. It refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed." (People v. Quimzon, 471 Phil. 182, 192 [2004].)
57 147 Phil. 794 (1971).
58 Id. at 811.
59 G.R. No. 94396, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 101.
60 Id. at 104-105; citations omitted.
61 329 Phil. 875 (1996).
62 Id. at 928.
63 Atty. Briones v. Henson-Cruz, 585 Phil. 63, 80 (2008).

SECOND DIVISION September 2, 2015 G.R. No. 188794

HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES,

Respondent.

D E C I S I O N - BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated March 31,
2009, and the Resolution3 dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31154. The appealed decision affirmed the joint judgment4 dated September 5,
2007, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao City, Albay, which convicted
petitioner Honesto Ogayon of violating Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.5

The Antecedent Facts

On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed against Ogayon for the crimes
allegedly committed as follows:

I. Criminal Case No. 4738:

That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya,
Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control four (4) pcs. of small
aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. Of disposable lighter in different colors, one (1) blade
trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll aluminum foil, instruments used or intended to be
used for smoking or consuming shabu, without authority of law, to the damage and
prejudice of the public interest and welfare.6

II. Criminal Case No. 4739:

That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at Barangay Iraya,
Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the
law, and without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets containing 0.040 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with full
knowledge that in his possession and control is a dangerous drug, to the damage and
prejudice of the public interest and welfare.7

During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739 on January 21, 2004, and
March 17, 2004, respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and pleaded "not guilty."
The joint pre-trial held on May 5, 2004 yielded only one factual admission on the identity
of the accused.8 A joint trial on the merits ensued.

The Prosecution Version

On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera, together
with the other members of the Albay Provincial Police Office, proceeded to Ogayon’s
house in Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant No. AEK 29-
2003.9 The warrant was for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia allegedly
kept and concealed in the premises of Ogayon’s house. Barangay Tanod Jose Lagana
(Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro Tampocao assisted the police team in conducting
the search.10

Upon reaching Ogayon’s house, the police team noticed several persons inside a nipa
hut located nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held, the police team
restrained two of the five persons and immediately proceeded to Ogayon’s house. After
introducing themselves as police officers, Senior Police Officer Herminigildo Caritos
(SPO4 Caritos) informed Ogayon that they had a warrant to search his place. SPO4
Caritos handed a copy of the warrant to Ogayon, who allowed the police team to
conduct the search.11

Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police team went to the comfort room
located about five meters away from Ogayon’s house. When they searched the area,
they found an object (wrapped in a piece of paper with blue prints) that fell from the
wooden braces of the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos’ inspection, the paper contained two (2)
small, heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that the police team suspected to contain
shabu.

The search of the comfort room also uncovered four (4) disposable lighters, one (1)
knife measuring six inches long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil, and a
"Dorco" blade.12 SPO4 Caritos then placed his initials on the two (2) plastic sachets
before joining the rest of the police officers who were conducting a search in Ogayon’s
house. The police officers who searched Ogayon’s house found live ammunition for an
M-16 rifle.

After conducting the search, the police team prepared a Receipt of Property Seized.13
The receipt was signed by the seizing officers, representatives from the Department of
Justice and the media, and two (2) barangay officials who were present during the
entire operation.14
The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the two (2) other persons who had
earlier been restrained, and brought them to Camp Simeon Ola for booking. The seized
items were likewise brought to the camp for laboratory examination. In his Chemistry
Report,15 Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo (forensic chemist of the Philippine
National Police Regional Crime Laboratory) reported that the two (2) plastic sachets
seized from Ogayon’s place tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.16

The Defense Version

The defense presented a different version of the events.

Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the prohibited drugs and
claimed that he saw the seized items for the first time only when they were being
inventoried. His statements were corroborated by the testimony of his wife, Zenaida
Ogayon.
Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was asleep in his house. His wife Zenaida
woke him up because several policemen and barangay officials came to his house. He
claimed that the police team did not present any search warrant before conducting the
search, and it was only during trial that he saw a copy of the warrant.

He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two groups, conducted a
simultaneous search of his house and the comfort room located nearby. He noticed that
SPO4 Caritos, who was part of the group that searched the comfort room, came out and
went to the Barangay Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos returned, accompanied by
Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went inside the comfort room, leaving Tanod
Lagana waiting outside. SPO4 Caritos thereafter came out from the comfort room and
ran towards Ogayon’s house while shouting "positive, positive."17

The RTC Ruling

On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon of the
two criminal charges against him. Relying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC
rejected Ogayon’s frame-up defense. The dispositive portion of the joint judgment
reads:

WHEREFORE, under the above considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

a. In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 12, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165,
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, namely: four (4) pcs. small aluminum foil, one (1) roll
aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. disposable lighters, and one (1) pc. blade; thereby
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a FINE of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00);

b. In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165,
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful
possession of two (2) pcs. Small heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," with total net weight of 0.0400 gram;
thereby, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and to pay a FINE of
three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00).18

Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity of the search warrant,
claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant was defective for
lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted an examination of the
applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.

The CA Ruling

In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a judge must examine
under oath and in writing an applicant for search warrant and his witnesses. Although
the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this requirement, it
nevertheless upheld the search warrant’s validity due to Ogayon’s failure to make a
timely objection against the warrant during the trial.

That Ogayon objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of exhibits, which included the
search warrant, was not sufficient for the CA. Ogayon merely claimed that the chemistry
report was not executed under oath, the items were not illegal per se, and that he did
not sign the Receipt of Property Seized since he was not present when the seized
items were confiscated. The CA noted that the objections were not based on
constitutional grounds, and for this reason, concluded that Ogayon is deemed to have
waived the right to question the legality of the search warrant.19

Based on the search warrant’s validity, the CA affirmed Ogayon’s conviction for
possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was located
outside Ogayon’s house, the CA declared that he exercised exclusive control over it and
should rightly be held responsible for the prohibited drugs and paraphernalia found
there.

As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of regularity of the police team’s
operation and found Ogayon’s claim of frame-up to be unsupported. The CA thus ruled
that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ogayon was liable for the
crimes charged.

The Issues
In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the
search warrant.

II.

Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question
the legality of the search warrant, the search conducted was still highly irregular,
thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in evidence.

Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be
secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He denies waiving the right through his supposed failure to assail the search
warrant’s validity during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to have objected to the
prosecution’s formal offer of the search warrant.

Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant’s validity only during appeal,
Ogayon contends that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his right. Since an
appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, any objection made on
appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should still be considered.

Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police team on his premises,
pursuant to an already defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and his
spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly discovered the shabu in the
comfort room located outside their house, so they were not able to witness the search.
Moreover, he claimed that there were other persons near the premises of his house
(and the comfort room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it could not indubitably
be concluded that the seized items were under his actual and effective control and
possession.

The Court’s Ruling

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the fundamental
constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[emphasis ours]

This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos
Constitution20 and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing the
Philippines during the American colonization,21 the 1935 Constitution,22 and the 1973
Constitution.23

The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its recognition as a fundamental

human right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 to both of which the Philippines is a
signatory.25 Both the Covenant and the Declaration recognize a person’s right against
arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy and property.26

Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its stealthy
encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put in place for
its protection are observed.

Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the
finding of the judge conducting the examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable
cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that –

Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statement together with
the affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]

Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search warrant
was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required
searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable
cause."28 We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the
complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s examination, though
contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is
merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules of procedure or
statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.29

Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after
which he determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
The examination requirement was originally a procedural rule found in Section 98 of
General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right under the
1935 Constitution.31 The intent was to ensure that a warrant is issued not merely on the
basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after examination
by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As the same examination
requirement was adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable
cause.32 Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his witnesses is
indispensable, and the examination should be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.33

The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and transcript does not
necessarily indicate that no examination was made by the judge who issued the warrant
in compliance with the constitutional requirement.

True, since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that –

[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the

examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does not
make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an
application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as
long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented.35

Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and
the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is
evidence in the records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause
was based thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances
that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of
the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.36

The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of depositions and
transcripts, the records indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a statement in
the search warrant itself attests to this:

Search Warrant

xxxx

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of the
applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that respondent,
without authority of law, has under his possession and control the following articles to
wit:

---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia which are kept and

concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR outside
his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as described in the sketch attached to the
Application for Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay.37 (emphasis
and underscore ours)

Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search

warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.38

"Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched."39

Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of
this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the
applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the
examination was already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the
affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself,40 could not be found in the
records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial revealed that an extensive
examination of the applicant’s witness was made by the judge issuing the warrant, the
testimonies given during Ogayon’s trial made no reference to the application for the
search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the
surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made. However, he was
not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who
applied for it.41

The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite
examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue
the search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the
constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of
substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite examination
of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search Warrant
No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.

The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon’s belated
objections thereto.

The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely objection
against the search warrant’s validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the
procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be made
during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides the
manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence obtained thereby:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. —
A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may
be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court. [emphasis ours]

We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized

compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards for a
constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights;42
their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in
disregard of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable
cause determined after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses
is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice
are better served if the supremacy of the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.

Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.43 In People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that "[w]henever a
protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection,
the presumption is always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional
right has to be laid out convincingly.

In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his
failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the
presentation of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is not a
sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly, and intelligently made
a waiver.45 He cannot reasonably be expected to know the warrant’s defect for lack of
data in the records suggesting that defect existed. It would thus be unfair to construe
Ogayon’s failure to object as a waiver of his constitutional right. In People v. Bodoso,46
the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases where life, liberty and property are all at stake…
The standard of waiver requires that it ‘not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.’"

At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court – a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision was
derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals47 to resolve the main issue of where motions to quash search warrants should
be filed. In other words, the provision was "intended to resolve what is perceived as
conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence seized by virtue thereof…."48 It was certainly not intended to preclude belated
objections against the search warrant’s validity, especially if the grounds therefor are
not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all grounds and objections
then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived,"
and that "a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion
rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress."

A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly brushed aside belated
objections would reveal that the objections were disregarded because they had been
cured or addressed based on the records.

In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted that the search warrant was
never produced in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court, however, noted that
"there were supposed testimonies of its existence."

In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing judge failed to exhaustively
examine the complainant and his witnesses, and that the complainant’s witness (a
National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of the facts
comprising probable cause, but the Court brushed these claims aside. It found that the
witness’ knowledge of the facts supporting probable case was not based on hearsay as
he himself assisted the accused in handling the contraband, and that the issuing judge
extensively questioned this witness. In People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the
validity of the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant as it was supposedly
made without the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise,
citing the testimonies taken during the trial contradicting this claim. A similar objection
was made by the accused in People v. Nuñez,52 but the Court noted the testimony of
the officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in the presence of the
accused himself and two barangay officials.

The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53 People v. Court of Appeals,54 and People
v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case. As mentioned, Malaloan v.
Court of Appeals involved the question of where motions to quash search warrants
should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in People v. Court of
Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle.

We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search warrants during trial
is a procedural rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with
this requirement cannot in any way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a search
warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable cause. Ogayon’s failure to make a
timely objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the
validity of the void warrant would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution.

In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the search conducted on
its authority is likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence obtained in
violation of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.56 With the inadmissibility of the drugs
seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus,
we see no reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the
Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as stated in the
joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Lig ity,
Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against
him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V. F LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes

* Designated as Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per raffle dated July 6, 2015.

1 Rollo, pp. 9-34.

2 Id. at 104-125; penned by Associate Justice Portia Alifio-Hormachuelos, and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose
Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
3 Id. at 143-144.
4 Id. at 59-73A; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Edwin C. Ma-alat.
5 The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of2002.
6 Rollo, p. 60.
7 Id. at 59.
8 Id. at 107.
9 Records II, p. 4.
10 Rollo, p. 109.
11 Id. at 110.
12 Id.
13 Records II, p. 5.
14 Rollo, p. 110.
15 Records II, p. 6.
16 Rollo, p. 111.
17 Id. at 112.
18 Supra note 4, at 73A.
19 Rollo, p. 117.
20 Title IV, Article 10. No one shall enter the dwelling house of any Filipino or a foreigner residing in the Philippines without his
consent except in urgent cases of fire, inundation, earthquake or similar dangers, or by reason of unlawful aggression from within, or
in order to assist a person therein who cries for help. Outside of these cases, the entry into the dwelling house of any Filipino or
foreign resident in the Philippines or the search of his papers and effects can only be decreed by a competent court and executed
only in the daytime. The search of papers and effects shall be made always in the presence of the person searched or of a member
of his family and, in their absence, of two witnesses resident of the same place. However, when a criminal caught in fraganti should
take refuge in his dwelling house, the authorities in pursuit may enter into it, only for the purpose of making an arrest. If a criminal
should take refuge in the dwelling house of a foreigner, the consent of a latter must first be obtained.

21 US President W. McKinley’s Instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Second Philippine Commission, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 or the Jones Law.

22 Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution read: 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

23 Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution read:

Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

24 Section 17(1) of the Covenant states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence." Article 17(2) of the Declaration states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

25 454 Phil. 504, 544-545 (2003).

26 Section 17(1) of the Covenant states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence." Article 17(2) of the Declaration states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

27 135 Phil. 329, 339 (1968).

28 Rollo, p. 113.
29 US v. Berkus, 428 F.2d 1148.

30 The Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the [complainant] and any witnesses [he] may
produce and take their depositions in writing.

31 See Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., A Historical and Juridical Study of the Philippine Bill of Rights, Ateneo University Press (1971), pp.
168-169.

32 213 Phil. 348, 352 (1984).

33 230 Phil. 90, 97 (1986).
34 443 Phil. 521 (2003).
35 Id. at 539; citations omitted, emphasis ours.
36 536 Phil. 672, 699-700 (2006).
37 Records II, p. 4.
38 Supra note 34, at 540, citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 12 L. Ed 2d 723, 726 (1964), 84 S. Ct. 1509.
39 Id.
40 Rollo, p. 27.
41 Id. at 63-64.
42 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(5).
43 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
44 233 Phil. 515, 526 (1987).
45 456 Phil. 507, 518 (2003).
46 446 Phil. 838 (2003).
47 G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249.
48 Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, Rules 110-127 (2007 ed.), p. 1124.
49 G.R. No. 89393, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 373, 382.
50 Supra note 34, at 421.
51 G.R. No. 170837, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 591.
52 G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 394.
53 Supra note 47.
54 G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998, 353 Phil. 604-605.
55 G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 679.
56 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 3(2).

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 204419, November 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO, SR.,
AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI,
CAGAYAN AND JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N - PERALTA,** J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court dated
November 12, 2012 of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented by Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and set aside
the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint Resolution1 dated
May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881
against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.

The facts follow.

On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan
issued Search Warrant No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows:

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath SPO1
RONEL P. SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence Division based at Regional Office 2,
Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the applicant herein, and his witness that there is
probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug, has been and is being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura,
Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control the following items, to wit:

SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS

you are hereby ordered to make an immediate search at any time of the day or night but
preferably at daytime at the afore-stated residential place of JEOFREY JIL RABINO @
JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-
described items to immediately bring him, thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with
in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at Gattaran, Cagayan.2
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was conducted by
elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing residue of suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent Rabino located
in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the
test gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.3

Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent
Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as
follows: That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of
Cagayan, and within, the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any legal authority thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody one (1) big zip-
lock transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, one sachet with traces of said substance gave
POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as Shabu, a dangerous drag, while the other sachet gave negative
results to said tests, the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited
for any person to possess or use any dangerous drug regardless of the quality of the
purity thereof, unless authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6,
Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent Judge Castillo.

Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent
Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally
Acquired Evidence with the following grounds: Search Warrant; Issuing Court must
have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched;

No compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant x x x x

No probable cause to issue Search Warrant x x x x

No searching question elicited from deponent x xx x

No particularity in the places to be searched x x x x

Irregularity in the implementation of the search x x xx

Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper

The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint
Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which partly reads as follows:
It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6) years.
A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to
issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void.
[Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds relied upon by the
accused to buttress his motion and the opposition interposed by the public prosecutor
are deemed mere surplusage.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search Warrant
No. 45 is hereby ordered QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the
execution of Search Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED. There being
no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the above-captioned cases are
hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its
Joint Order7 dated September 24, 2012.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:

With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent
Judge Castillo with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is
patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran,
Cagayan has the authority to issue Search Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned to search
and seize the shabu stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the same
second judicial region in violation of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power
to hear and try the offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated January 25, 2016, claims
that the petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also
argues that the petition should have been filed by the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B,
Sagucio. Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition does not show that the
assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This Court finds merit to the petition.

Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the petition,
certain procedural issues have been pointed out by private respondent that need to be
tackled. According to the private respondent, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck down as it violates the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Private respondent further argues that petitioner did not provide any
compelling reason that would merit the direct filing with this Court of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. It is also averred that the petition should have been filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General and not the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
because the petition is in the nature of an appeal and the former is vested with the
power of representing the people before any court.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. -
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding.9 Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross.10 On the other hand, a remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the judgment the acts of the lower court or agency.11 Its principal office is only
to the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.12

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in
questioning the quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his allegation that
the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts authorized to issue
a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the search warrant was
patently and grossly done. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse to
this Court13 or to the Court of Appeals14 via a special civil action for certiorari from
a trial court's quashal of a search warrant.15 The general rule is that a party is mandated
to follow the hierarchy of courts. Howevever, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue
raised by petitioner involves an application of a rule promulgated by this Court in the
exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution17 regarding the jurisdiction of
courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems it proper to resolve
the present petition.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can
be relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to
proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the
principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.18 It
is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if
not a miscarriage of justice.19 In certain cases, this Court even allowed private
complainants to file petitions for certiorari and considered the said petitions as if filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General. In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 this Court ruled
that an exception exists to the general rule that the proper party to file a petition in the
CA or Supreme Court assailing any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant
proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, thus:

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to
assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of
the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC)
to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The
Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu
of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition
will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor
General. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In
this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature
of the issues raised by the parties.21 Therefore, if this Court had previously considered
the petitions filed by private complainants and deemed them as if filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General, there is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a
search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in
the affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge
must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search
warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.23

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and eventually
dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was issued by the
MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The
Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It is
therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his
motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted
grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all
the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its
elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant.
Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 2. Court where application
for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same
judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the
Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant
to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri,
Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search
warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said
application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for
compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly
complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing
a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be
issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the
resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense
committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to
be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases
when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even
though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the
requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 12, 2012, of petitioner People of the Philippines is GRANTED. Consequently,
the Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri,
Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No.
11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), J., on official leave.

Endnotes:
** Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2395 dated October 19, 2016.

1 Penned by respondent Judge Edmar P. Castillo, Sr., rollo, pp. 27-30.

2Rollo, p. 12.

3Id. at 13.

4Id. at 10.

5Id. at 16-20.

6Id. at 29-30.

7Id. at 35-36.

8Id. at 75-82.

9Ang Biat Huat Sons Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 588, 594 (2007).

10Villanueva v. Porras-Gallardo, G.R. No. 147688, July 10, 2006.

11San Miguel Corporation v. Court Of Appeals, 425 Phil. 951, 956 (2002).

12People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1, 10 (2004).

13 See Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29,
1993, 223 SCRA 761.

14 See Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 650 (1996); 20th Century 3Fox Film Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, Nos. L-76649-51, August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 655.
15Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 563 Phil. 781, 796 (2007).

16United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 500 Phil. 342, 359 (2005).

17 Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution.

18Buscaino v. Commission on Audit, 369 Phil. 886, 900 (1999).

19Aguam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA784 (2000).

20Supra note 16.

21United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, et al., supra, at 359. (Citations omitted).

22People v. Francisco, 436 Phil. 383, 390 (2002).

23Abuan v. People, 536 Phil. 672, 692 (2006), citing Franks v. State of Delaware, 438 US 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978); US v. Leon,
468 US 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984); US v. Mittelman, 999 F.2d 440 (1993); US v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (1976).

24Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Bernabe, etc., et al., 67 Phil. 658 (1939); Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, et al., 75 Phil. 113 (1945).

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004 ]
MICROSOFT CORPORATION AND LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. MAXICORP, INC.,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’
Decision[2] dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order[3] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila (“RTC”), denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.’s
(“Maxicorp”) motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against
Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 (“Section 29 of PD
49”)[4] and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code
(“RPC”).[5]

Antecedent Facts

On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”) Agent Dominador

Samiano, Jr. (“NBI Agent Samiano”) filed several applications for search warrants in
the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article
189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452,
96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.

Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of
Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search
warrants.

On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants

alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants
are in the form of “general warrants.” The RTC denied Maxicorp’s motion on 22
January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorp’s motion for reconsideration.

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI
Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz (“Sacriz”), and computer technician Felixberto
Pante (“Pante”). The three testified on what they discovered during their
respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from
petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed
activities using petitioners’ products.

On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’
motion on 29 November 1999.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI
Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp
was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz.”

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;

2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE

PETITION;

3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH

WARRANTS;
 4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE “GENERAL WARRANTS.”

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law

Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of

law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of
fact, which this Court should not consider in a Rule 45 petition for review.
Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented in this petition involve
questions of law. Petitioners point out that the facts are not in dispute.

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of
law.[6] Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on
appeal,[7] subject to exceptions as when the findings of the appellate court conflict
with the findings of the trial court.[8]

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A

question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a
certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple, determining
the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For
example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute
automatically involve purely questions of law.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without
need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence.[9] The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.[10]If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.[11] Our ruling in Paterno v.
Paterno[12] is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative
value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on
one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of
proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence
submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing;
whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full
faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other
side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such
gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this
situation does not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into
questions of law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.

Of the three main issues raised in this petition – the legal personality of the
petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause –
only the first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was
probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question of fact. At first glance,
this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concern itself with
the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require
this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the
RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[13]

Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments

requiring an examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented
during the search warrant proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us
substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals by
conducting our own evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the situation which
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise
only questions of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this
court to analyze or weigh evidence.[14] When we give due course to such situations,
it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of
extremely meritorious circumstances.[15]

Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the Court
of Appeals conflict with the findings of the RTC.[16] Since petitioners properly raised
the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such
contradiction.

On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition

Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since
the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as
representative of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but
the exception governs this case.[17] We ruled in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[18] that the petitioner-complainant in a
petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the
Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due
process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in
the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy
due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the
application of this doctrine.

On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the
fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners
point out that the Court of Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the
RTC considered in determining the existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters
that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that
the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was defective.

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First,
the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he
bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz.”
Second, the fact that petitioners’ other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that
he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.

We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s findings.

Probable cause means “such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper.”[19] Thus, probable cause for a search
warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought
in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.[20]

The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining
under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to “the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause.”[21] The applicant must have personal knowledge
of the circumstances. “Reliable information” is insufficient.[22] Mere affidavits are not
enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his
witnesses.[23]

The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that
the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to prove
conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of
Appeals ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a connection
between the offense charged and the place searched.

The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of

PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these
charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer
technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged
Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one
of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they
personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.

During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the
witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw
Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw
how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged within Maxicorp’s
premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the products
were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving the
accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of
authenticity.

Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances
when Maxicorp installed petitioners’ software into computers it had
assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners’ software within
Maxicorp’s premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their
software.

The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable
cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp
engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of
petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the
counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As implied by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with probability,
not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this
stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man,[24] not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-
blown trial.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.[25] Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.[26] Thus, it was improper for
the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof
that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant
application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer
unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-
installed petitioners’ software.[27] Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the
computer unit.[28] Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the
presence of petitioners’ software on the same computer unit.[29] There was a
comparison between petitioners’ genuine software and Maxicorp’s software pre-
installed in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.[30] Even if we
disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of “Joel Diaz,” which petitioners
explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still
remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance
of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals’ ruling on Sacriz’s testimony. The fact that
Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not
eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair
competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a
whole range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including
the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies
of petitioners’ witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and
the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine personally and thoroughly
the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The
RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.

Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant
and his witnesses.[31] For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great
weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the
judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason.[32] Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal
any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here
the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a
higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be
placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence at
such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.

On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants

A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to
be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be
seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a
protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no
unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.[33]

In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search
warrant shall issue “in connection with one specific offense.” The articles described
must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued.[34] Thus,
this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the search
and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific offense.

Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack
the specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized. After examining the
wording of the warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and
reversed the RTC’s Order thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioner’s store can be
seized on the ground that it is “used or intended to be used” in the illegal or
unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private respondents’ software and their
manuals.[35]
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e)
of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly
worded warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase “used or intended to be
used,” were previously held void by this Court.[36] The disputed text of the search
warrants in this case states:

a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft software bearing

the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFTCORPORATION
contained in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;

b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft instruction manuals

and/or literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles,

advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and
all other books of accounts and documents used in the recording of the reproduction
and/or assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions in connection with fake
or counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-
ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines
and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and
unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or
which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority
of MICROSOFTCORPORATION, any and all Microsoft trademarks and
copyrights; and

f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all computer hard
drives, data bases and other information storage devices containing
unauthorized Microsoft software.[37] (Emphasis supplied)

It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow.[38] The description of the property to be seized need not be
technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary according
to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of
concern.[39] Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a
general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified
physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the
offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended
for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software. This
language meets the test of specificity.[40]
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court
found the warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not because of
the mere use of the phrase “used or intended to be used.” In Columbia Pictures,
Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of “television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x” were found too broad since the
defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes.[41] The mere presence of
counterfeit video tapes in the defendant’s store does not mean that the machines
were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is
different. Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co.
(Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they
authorized the seizure of records pertaining to “all business transactions” of the
defendant.[42] And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
quashed the warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized,
aggravated by the fact that such appliances are “generally connected with the
legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes.”[43]

However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity.

Paragraph (c) states:

c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers,

receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the
copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for
personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair
competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have
bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c)
simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether
legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in
copyright infringement or unfair competition.

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other
items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as
to the items specifically described in the warrant.[44] A search warrant is severable,
the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.[45] The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the
Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through
unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of
the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned
to Maxicorp.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect
to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-
453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not
falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc.
immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., no part, close relation to counsel.

[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices Jorge S. Imperial and Omar U. Amin concurring.
[3]
Penned by Judge William M. Bayhon.
[4]
Presidential Decree on Intellectual Property. Section 29 punishes copyright infringement.
[5]
Article 189 punishes unfair competition.
[6]
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[7]
Amigo v. Teves, 96 Phil. 252 (1954).
[8]
Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., et al., 125 Phil. 701 (1967).
[9]
Arroyo, et al. v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario De Molo, et al., 132 Phil. 9 (1968).
[10]
Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, 21 January 1991, 193 SCRA 93.
[11]
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, 7 December 1992, 216 SCRA 224.
[12]
G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630.
[13]
Manila Bay Club Corp. v. CA, 315 Phil. 805 (1995).
[14]
Nicolas v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37631, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 635.
[15]
As laid out in Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., et al., 125 Phil. 701 (1967):
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conflicting;
(f) where the findings of fact are contradicted by the evidence of record.
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, 13 January 1992, 205 SCRA 155.
[18]
G.R. No. 111267, 20 September 1996, 262 SCRA 219.
[19]
United States v. Addison, 28 Phil. 566 (1914).
[20]
Burgos, Sr., et al. v. The Chief of Staff, AFP, et al., 218 Phil. 754 (1984).
[21]
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937).
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
Roan v. Hon. Gonzales, 230 Phil. 90 (1986).
[24]
People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667 (1937).
[25]
La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Fernandez, etc., et al., 214 Phil. 332 (1984).
[26]
Central Bank of the Phils. v. Morfe, et al., 126 Phil. 885 (1967).
[27]
TSN of proceedings on application for search warrants, rollo, p. 50.
[28]
Ibid., p. 59.
[29]
Ibid., p. 52.
[30]
Ibid., p. 61.
[31]
Luna v. Hon. Plaza, etc., et al., 135 Phil. 329 (1968).
[32]
Supra note 25.
[33]
Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920).
[34]
BACHE & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., 147 Phil. 794 (1971).
[35]
Rollo, p. 38.
[36]
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, 29 June 1993, 223 SCRA 761; 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, Nos. L-76649-51, 19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 655; BACHE & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., 147 Phil. 794
(1971).
[37]
Rollo, p. 64.
[38]
People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 (1932).
[39]
Kho v. Hon. Makalintal, 365 Phil. 511 (1999).
[40]
Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 18.
[41]
Supra note 36.
[42]
Supra note 34.
[43]
Supra note 36.
[44]
People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, 19 April 2001, 356 SCRA 683.
[45]
Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 129651, 20 October 2000, 344 SCRA 36.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 154491 : November 14, 2008]

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga

Plant,Petitioner, v. QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ
and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY
GALICIA", Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers punishable as
unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code,
Republic Act No. 8293) that would entitle the aggrieved party to a
search warrant against the hoarder? This is the issue we grapple
with in this Petition for Review on Certiorari involving two rival
multinational softdrink giants; petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils.,
Inc. (Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi),
represented by the respondents, of hoarding empty Coke bottles in
bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage its operation in
Bicolandia.

BACKGROUND

The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.

On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against

Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion
Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition
under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be
confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment
by the respondents.1 In support of the application, Coca-Cola
submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant
representative Arnel John Ponce said he was informed that one of
their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi
compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security
officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi
was hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their
security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was informed by the
security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security
guard Edwin Liriostated that he entered Pepsi's yard on July 2,
2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or
cases.2

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of

Naga City, after taking the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued
Search Warrant No. 2001-013 to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight
and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsi's Naga yard for violation
of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code.4 The local police seized and
brought to the MTC's custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036 eight and 12
ounces empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168 Pepsi
shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces) empty Coke bottles, and
later filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga a complaint
against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in
relation to Section 170 of the IP Code.5 The named respondents,
also the respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales
manager Danilo E. Galicia (Galicia) and its Naga general
manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez).

In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the

bottles came from various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who
included them in their return to make up for shortages of empty
Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the
return of empty Coke bottles as they simply received what had been
delivered; the presence of the bottles in their yard was not
intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and Regaspi's statements are
hearsay as they had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime;
there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of
empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal
nature, must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in
their favor. Pepsi security guards Eduardo E. Miral and Rene
Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook,
Lirio did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July
2, 2001.

The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and
to quash the search warrant. They contended that no probable
cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant; the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and their Naga plant was in
urgent need of the shells.

Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the

evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding
the bottles. It insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on
probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that
the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of
stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and other similar containers.

THE MTC RULINGS

On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed
order6 denying the twin motions. It explained there was an
exhaustive examination of the applicant and its witnesses through
searching questions and that the Pepsi shells are prima
facie evidence that the bottles were placed there by the
respondents.

In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the

quashal of the warrant as the MTC did not conduct a probing and
exhaustive examination; the applicant and its witnesses had no
personal knowledge of facts surrounding the hoarding; the court
failed to order the return of the "borrowed" shells; there was no
crime involved; the warrant was issued based on hearsay evidence;
and the seizure of the shells was illegal because they were not
included in the warrant.

On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for

reconsideration in the second assailed order,7 explaining that the
issue of whether there was unfair competition can only be resolved
during trial.

The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naga City on the ground that the subject search
warrant was issued without probable cause and that the empty
shells were neither mentioned in the warrant nor the objects of the
perceived crime.

THE RTC RULINGS

On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable
cause and the non-commission of the crime of unfair competition,
even as it implied that other laws may have been violated by the
respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the issuing MTC judge.8 Thus,

Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by

the Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on July 2, 2001 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders issued by the Pairing Judge
of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga City dated September 19, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
City Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed
to return to the Petitioner the properties seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs.

SO ORDERED.9

In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12,

2002, the petitioner stressed that the decision of the RTC was
contradictory because it absolved Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the search warrant, but at the same time
nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have dismissed the
petition when it found out that Judge Ocampo did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion.

Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to reverse the decision of the RTC. Essentially, the petition raises
questions against the RTC's nullification of the warrant when it
found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the issuing judge.

THE PETITION and

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed
the respondents' petition for certiorari because it found no grave
abuse of discretion by the MTC in issuing the search warrant. The
petitioner further argues that the IP Code was enacted into law to
remedy various forms of unfair competition accompanying
globalization as well as to replace the inutile provision of unfair
competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section
168.3(c) of the IP Code does not limit the scope of protection on the
particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair
competition to include "other acts contrary to good faith of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another."
The inherent element of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and
that hoarding of large quantities of a competitor's empty bottles is
necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that its Bicol
bottling operation was prejudiced by the respondents' hoarding and
destruction of its empty bottles.
The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant
was improper because it complied with all the essential requisites of
a valid warrant. The empty bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to
prevent discovery while they were systematically being destroyed to
hamper the petitioner's bottling operation and to undermine the
capability of its bottling operations in Bicol.

The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo

conducted his own examination, he gravely erred and abused his
discretion when he ignored the rule on the need of sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause; satisfactory and convincing
evidence is essential to hold them guilty of unfair competition; the
hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not cause actual or probable
deception and confusion on the part of the general public; the
alleged criminal acts do not show conduct aimed at deceiving the
public; there was no attempt to use the empty bottles or pass them
off as the respondents' goods.

The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize
bottle hoarding, as the acts penalized must always involve fraud
and deceit. The hoarding does not make them liable for unfair
competition as there was no deception or fraud on the end-users.

THE ISSUE

Based on the parties' positions, the basic issue submitted to us for

resolution is whether the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search
Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty Coke bottles from
Pepsi's yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP
Code. This basic issue involves two sub-issues, namely, the
substantive issue of whether the application for search warrant
effectively charged an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c)
of the IP Code; and the procedural issue of whether the MTC
observed the procedures required by the Rules of Court in the
issuance of search warrants.

OUR RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision,
our agreement is more in the result than in the reasons that
supported it. The decision is correct in nullifying the search warrant
because it was issued on an invalid substantive basis - the acts
imputed on the respondents do not violate Section 168.3 (c) of the
IP Code. For this reason, we deny the present petition.

The issuance of a search warrant10 against a personal property11 is

governed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court whose relevant
sections state:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant

shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must,

before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with the affidavits submitted.

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. - If the judge is

satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is
based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis supplied]

To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if

there is probable cause in connection with a specific offense alleged
in an application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant
and his or her witnesses. This is the substantive requirement in the
issuance of a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of
probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the
application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine under
oath or affirmation the applicant and his or her witnesses in the
form of "searching questions and answers" in writing and under
oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.

We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have

substantive and procedural aspects. Apparently, the RTC recognized
this dual nature of the requirements and, hence, treated them
separately; it approved of the way the MTC handled the procedural
aspects of the issuance of the search warrant but found its action on
the substantive aspect wanting. It therefore resolved to nullify the
warrant, without however expressly declaring that the MTC gravely
abused its discretion when it issued the warrant applied for. The
RTC's error, however, is in the form rather than the substance of
the decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for the reason
the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave abuse of
discretion was committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions
below will show.

Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the

issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts
and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that
his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense
are in the place to be searched.12 Implicit in this statement is the
recognition that an underlying offense must, in the first place, exist.
In other words, the acts alleged, taken together, must constitute an
offense and that these acts are imputable to an offender in relation
with whom a search warrant is applied for.

In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act
charged - alleged to be hoarding of empty Coke bottles - constitutes
an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. Section 168 in its
entirety states:

SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and

Remedies. -
168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the
goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services from
those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has
a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or
services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner
as other property rights.

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means
contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods
manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or
services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or
who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be
guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action
therefor.

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of

protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed
guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to
the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which
they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other
feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or
dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as
shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade,
or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any
other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is
offering the services of another who has identified such services in
the mind of the public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of
trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of
another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall
apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29,R.A. No. 166a)

The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the
scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands
the meaning of unfair competition to include "other acts contrary to
good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or
services of another." Allegedly, the respondents' hoarding of Coca
Cola empty bottles is one such act.

We do not agree with the petitioner's expansive interpretation of

Section 168.3 (c).

"Unfair competition," previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence

in relation with R.A. No. 166 and Articles 188 and 189 of the
Revised Penal Code, is now covered by Section 168 of the IP Code
as this Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No. 166,
and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and
general rule on the definition of unfair competition. The law does
not thereby cover every unfair act committed in the course of
business; it covers only acts characterized by "deception or any
other means contrary to good faith" in the passing off of goods and
services as those of another who has established goodwill in relation
with these goods or services, or any other act calculated to produce
the same result.

What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section

168.3 when it provides specifics of what unfair competition is
"without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair
competition." Part of these particulars is provided under Section
168.3(c) which provides the general "catch-all" phrase that the
petitioner cites. Under this phrase, a person shall be guilty of unfair
competition "who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith
of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of
another."

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the

passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the
public the goods or business of one person as the goods or business
of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public.
It formulated the "true test" of unfair competition: whether the acts
of defendant are such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary
buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions which
prevail in the particular trade to which the controversy
relates.13 One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain
unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be
shown before the right to recover can exist.14 The advent of the IP
Code has not significantly changed these rulings as they are fully in
accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its entirety
provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still
the key elements that must be present for unfair competition to
exist.

The act alleged to violate the petitioner's rights under Section 168.3
(c) is hoarding which we gather to be the collection of the
petitioner's empty bottles so that they can be withdrawn from
circulation and thus impede the circulation of the petitioner's bottled
products. This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to
good faith - a conclusion that, if true, is indeed an unfair act on the
part of the respondents. The critical question, however, is not the
intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is critical for
purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as
charged, "is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business
or services" of the petitioner.

We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not

even an act within the contemplation of the IP Code.

The petitioner's cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of

rules that refer to a very specific subject - intellectual property.
Aside from the IP Code's actual substantive contents (which relate
specifically to patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names, service
marks, copyrights, and the protection and infringement of the
intellectual properties that these protective measures embody), the
coverage and intent of the Code is expressly reflected in its
"Declaration of State Policy" which states:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The State recognizes that
an effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the
development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of
technology, attracts foreign investments, and ensures market
access for our products. It shall protect and secure the exclusive
rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to
their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial
to the people, for such periods as provided in this Act.

The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end,

the State shall promote the diffusion of knowledge and information
for the promotion of national development and progress and the
common good.

It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative

procedures of registering patents, trademarks and copyright, to
liberalize the registration on the transfer of technology, and to
enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
Philippines. (n)

"Intellectual property rights" have furthermore been defined under

Section 4 of the Code to consist of: a) Copyright and Related
Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; c) Geographic
Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs
(Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g)Protection of
Undisclosed Information.

Given the IP Code's specific focus, a first test that should be made
when a question arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code
is to ask if it refers to an intellectual property as defined in the
Code. If it does not, then coverage by the Code may be negated.

A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an

intellectual property right as defined above, is whether it falls under
the general "unfair competition" concept and definition under
Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The question then is whether
there is "deception" or any other similar act in "passing off" of
goods or services to be those of another who enjoys established
goodwill.
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of
statutory construction giving particular attention, not so much to
the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of Section 168
in particular. Under the principle of "noscitur a sociis," when a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be
made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is found or with which it is associated.15

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section

168.1speaks of a person who has earned goodwill with respect to
his goods and services and who is entitled to protection under the
Code, with or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as
previously discussed, refers to the general definition of unfair
competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand, refers to the
specific instances of unfair competition, with Section
168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the appearance of the
goods of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that
his or her goods or services are that of another who has earned
goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3 being a "catch all"
clause whose coverage the parties now dispute.

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" -

as defined and charged by the petitioner - does not fall within the
coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not
relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that
the respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper
authority from the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be
fraudulently "passing off" their products or services as those of the
petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking
any representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend
to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the
respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an
act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts
it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to
limit the opposition's sales by depriving it of the bottles it can use
for these sales.
In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what
another law - R.A. No. 623 - covers, to wit:

SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the

manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated
waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles,
boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, with
their names or the names of their principals or products, or other
marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with
the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or are used
by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made
applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.

SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written

consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully
registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions
of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs,
barrels, or other similar containers so marked or stamped,
for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic
in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, or to
use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other
purpose than that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or
seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine or
not more than one hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more than
thirty days or both.

As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a

measure that may overlap or be affected by the provisions of Part II
of the IP Code on "The Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and
Trade Names." What is certain is that the IP Code has not expressly
repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to have specific reference to
a special type of registrants - the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers
of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or
other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels,
and other similar containers - who are given special protection with
respect to the containers they use. In this sense, it is in fact a law
of specific coverage and application, compared with the general
terms and application of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it
speaks specifically of unlawful use of containers and even of the
unlawfulness of their wanton destruction - a matter that escapes the
IP Code's generalities unless linked with the concepts of "deception"
and "passing off" as discussed above.

Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and
one that the parties did not consider at all in the search warrant
application. The petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its search
warrant application since the "one specific offense" that the law
allows and which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it
serves any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the
underlying factual situation of the present case is in fact covered by
another law, not by the IP Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in
this light, the lack of probable cause to support the disputed search
warrant at once becomes apparent.

Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited
offense, the ruling of this Court penned by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is
particularly instructive:

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a

finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offenseto
be determined personally by the judge after examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant
does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements
and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant
renders moot and academic the other issues raised in petitioners'
Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed
search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof
should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established
jurisprudence.16

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled

that the petitioner's search warrant should properly be quashed for
the petitioner's failure to show that the acts imputed to the
respondents do not violate the cited offense. There could not have
been any probable cause to support the issuance of a search
warrant because no crime in the first place was effectively charged.
This conclusion renders unnecessary any further discussion on
whether the search warrant application properly alleged that the
imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a "hoarding" in bad
faith aimed to prejudice the petitioner's operations, or whether the
MTC duly complied with the procedural requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.

Accordingly, we confirm that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued
by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City,
is NULL and VOID. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

* Acting Chief Justice.

1 See Paragraph 3 of the Application; records, p. 96.

2 Id., pp. 98-101.

3
Id., pp. 108-109.

4 Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulations and Remedies. -

Sec. 168.3: In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following
shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

xxx

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to
good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or service of another.

5 Sec. 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two years to five years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned
in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.

6 Penned by Pairing Judge Irma Isidora M. Boncodin, MTC, Branch 1, Naga; records, p. 23.

7 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Jose P. Nacional, MTC, Branch 1, Naga; id, p. 22.

8 Decision penned by Judge Ramon A. Cruz, RTC, Branch 21; id., pp. 202-211.

9
Id., p. 210.
10
Rule 126, Section 1. Search warrant defined. - A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court.

11Rule 126, Section 3. Personal property to be seized. - A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

12 La Chemise Lacoste, S. A. v. Judge Fernandez, G.R. NOS. 63796-97, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 373.

13
Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co v. Mojica, 27 Phil. 266 (1914).

14 Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co., 33 Phil. 485 (1916).

15
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd (1995) Ed., at p. 159, citing Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 371,
and Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952, July 1, 1984, among others.

16 Supra note 12, pp. 705-706.