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A B RIEF H ISTORY OF


THE IDEA OF P ROGRESS

ALAIN DE BENOIST
_____________________

TRANSLATED BY G REG JOHNSON

The idea of progr e s s se e m s on e of theor eti cal pres u p p o si -


tions of mod er ni ty. One can ev en regar d it, not withou t rea -
son, as the real “religion of West er n civilizatio n.” Historically,
this idea was form ul at e d earlier than it is gen e r ally thoug ht ,
aroun d 1680, during the quarr el of Ancient s and th e Moder n s,
in which Terr as s o n, Charles Perrault, the Abbé of Saint- Pierre,
and Fonte n ell e participat e d . It was then dev elo p e d on the ini-
tiative of a secon d gene r a t ion, including princip ally Turgot,
Condorc et , and Louis Seba s ti e n Mercier.
Progr es s can be defined as a cum ul a tiv e proce s s in which
the most rece nt st ag e is always con sider e d prefer a b l e an d
bet t er, i.e., qualitatively sup erior, to what prec e d e d it. This
definition cont ain s a descrip tive elem e n t (ch an g e takes place
in a given direction) and an axiological elem e n t (this progr e s -
sion is interpr et e d as an improv e m e n t ) . Thus it refer s to
chang e th at is orient e d (towar d th e best), nece s s a r y (one
do es not stop progr e s s) , and irreversible (no overall retur n to
the past is possibl e). Improv e m e n t being inesca p a bl e, it fol-
lows that tom orro w will be always bett er than tod a y.

***
The theorist s of progr es s differ on the directio n of
progr e s s , the rat e and the nat ur e of the chan g e s th at acco m -
pany it, ev en its principal ag e nt s . Never t h el e s s , all adh er e to
thre e key idea s: (1) a linear conce p tion of time an d th e idea
that history has a m e a ni ng, orien t e d towar ds the futur e; (2)


Alain de Benoist, “Un brève histoire de l’idé e de progr è s,” in his Cri-
tique s —Th é ori que s (Laus a n n e , Switzerla n d: L’Age d’Hom m e , 2002), 55–
62. The tran sl a tor wishe s to tha nk Alain de Benoist for per mi ssion to
tran sl at e and publish this ess a y, Micha el O’Meara for checking the trans -
lation, and Arjuna for help with Frenc h idiom s.
8 The Occiden t al Quarterly , vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2008

the idea of the funda m e n t a l unity of hum a ni t y, all called to


evolve in the sam e direction toget h e r; and (3) the idea that
the world can and must be tran sfor m e d , which implies that
the m an affirm s him s elf as sover ei g n ma st e r of nat u r e.
Thes e thr e e ideas originat e d from Christianity. But with th e
rise of scien c e and technolog y in th e sev e n t e e n t h cent ur y,
they were reform ul at e d in secul ar ter m s.
For th e Greeks, et ernit y alone is real. Authen ti c being is im -
mut a bl e: circular motion, which en su r e s the et er n al retur n of
sam e in a series of succe s siv e cycles, is the mo st perfec t ex -
pression of the divine. If ther e ar e rises and falls, progr e s s
and decline, it is within a cycle inevita bly followed by ano th er
(Hesiod’s th eor y of the succe s sio n of the ag es , Virgil’s retur n
of the golden ag e). In ad dition, the m ajor det er m i ning factor
com e s from the past , not the future: the ter m arche refers
abo ve all to an origin (“archaic”) as an aut h ority (“ archon t e ,”
“mon ar c h ”).
With the Bible, history beco m e s an objectiv ely knowabl e
phe no m e n o n , a dyna mi c of pro gr e s s that aims, from the Mes -
sianic point of view, towar d the adv en t of a bet t er world. Gen -
esis assi gn s man the mission of “domi n a tin g the Earth.” Tem -
porality is the vect or in ter m s of which the bet t e r mu st pro -
gressiv ely rev e al itself in the world. As a result, a historical
eve nt can have a savin g role: God ap pe a r s historically. Tem -
porality, mor eo v e r , is direct e d towar d s th e futur e, from Cre -
ation to the Second Coming , the Gard e n of Eden to th e Last
Judgm e n t . The golden age no long er lies in the past, but at
the end of tim es: history will en d, and it will end well, at least
for the choo s e n ones.
This linear tem por ality exclu de s any eter n al retur n , any
cyclic conce p tion of history bas e d on the succe s si o n of age s
and sea s o n s . Since Adam and Eve, the history of salvatio n
proce e d s accor di n g to a nec e s sit y fixed for all et ernity, com -
m en ci ng with the old Covena nt an d, in Christi anity, culmin at -
ing in an Incarna ti on that cann o t be repe a t e d . Saint Augus -
tine was th e first to derive from this conc e pti o n a philoso p hy
of univers al history applicabl e to all hu m a ni t y, which is called
to progr e s s from ag e to age towar ds the bet t e r.
The the ory of prog re s s seculariz es this linear conc e pti o n of
history, from which all mod er n historicism s arise. The m ajor
differenc e is that the her e aft e r is reco n c ei v e d as th e futur e,
and happi n e s s replac e s salvati on . Inde e d, in Christi anity,
Benoist, “A Brief History of the Idea of Progre s s” 9

progr e s s rem ain s more esch a t ol ogical tha n historical in the


prope r sens e. Man mus t seek salv atio n here below, but with a
view to th e other world. For he has no control over the divine.
Christia nity also cond e m n s insati abl e desire an d, like Sto -
icism, holds that moral wisdom lies more in the limitation
than the multiplica tion of desire s. Only the millen nialist cur -
ren t in Christianity, inspired by the Apocalyp s e , envis ag e s a
terr es t ri al reign of a thous a n d year s prece di ng the Last Judg -
m en t . Secul arizing Augustin e’s vision, millennialis m inspire d
Joachi m of Flora and his spiritu al desc e n d a n t s . But the theor y
of prog re s s need e d addition al elem e n t s to arriv e at its mo d -
ern form. These elem e n t s first ap pe ar e d in the Renaiss a n c e
and cam e to fruition in the sev e n t e e n t h cent ur y.
The rise of scienc e and techn olo g y, as well as the discov -
ery of the New World, nourish ed opti mis m while ap pe a ri n g to
op en a field for infinite possibl e improv e m e n t . Francis Baco n,
who was the first to use the word “progre ss ” in a te m p o r al
rath er th an a spati al sens e, affirm e d that man’s role is to
control nat ur e by knowing its laws. Ren é Descar t e s , in similar
fashio n, propo s e d that ma n make hims elf mas t e r and poss e s -
sor of nat u r e. Nat ur e, conceive d in the “m at h e m a t i c al lan -
gua g e” of Galileo, the n beco m e s mut e and inani m a t e . The
cos m o s no longer has any m ea nin g in itself. It is nothing
more tha n a machi ne that mu st be disas s e m b l e d to be known
and m anipul at e d . The world beco m e s a pur e object to the hu -
m an subject . Thanks to his reas on , man feels that he can rely
on hims elf alone.
The cos m o s of the Ancient s thu s gives way to a new world:
geo m e t ri cal, hom o g e n e o u s , and (proba b ly) infinite, gover n e d
by laws of caus e and effect . The mod el of this world is the
m achi n e , specifically the clock. Time itself beco m e s ho m o g e -
neo u s, m ea s ur a bl e: “m er ch a n t tim e” replace s “p ea s a n t time”
(Jacq ue s Le Goff). The techn olo gic al m en t ality em er g e s from
this new scientific spirit. The princip al purp os e of tech n olog y
is m axi mizing utility, i.e., helpin g to prod uc e useful thin gs.
There was an obvious conver g e n c e betw e e n this scientific
optimis m and the aspir ation s of a bourgeois class taking com -
man d of natio nal m arket s , which were creat e d in tand e m with
territorial kingdo m s. The bourge oi s men t ality tend s to regar d
only calculabl e quan tities, i.e., com m er ci al values, as valuable,
indeed as real. Georges Sorel later saw the theory of progres s
as a “bourge ois doctrine.”
10 The Occiden t al Quarterly , vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2008

In the eight e e n t h cent ur y, the classical eco no mi s t s (Adam


Smith, Bernar d Mande ville, David Hum e) reh a bilit at e d insa -
tiable desire: According to the m , ma n’s nee d s can alway s be
increa s e d . Thus by his very nat u r e, m an always want s more
and act s accordin gly, con st a n t ly seekin g to m aximize his best
inter es t . Along with the regna n t optimis m , this line of arg u -
m en t ten ds to relativize or effac e the the m e of original sin.
The cum ul ative char ac t e r of scien tific knowledg e was
stre ss e d with particular insist e n c e. Progre s s, it was conclu d -
ed, is nece s s a r y : one will alway s know more, thu s ev eryt hi ng
will always get bett er . Given th at a good mind is “for m e d by
all that prec e d e s it,” the Moder n s are obviou sly sup erio r: “We
are dwarfs perch e d on the should er s of giant s,” said
Font en elle, quoting Bern ar d of Clairvau x. Thus the Ancien t s
are dives t e d of au tho rity. Traditio n, in fact, is see n as inher -
ently an obst a cl e in reaso n’s path. The com p a ri so n of pres e n t
and past—always to th e form er’s adv a n t a g e— al s o allows on e
to glimp s e the cours e of the futur e. Com p a ris o n thu s be -
com e s prediction: progr es s, initially posit e d as the effect of
evolutio n, is hencefort h taken as its cau s e .
A relat e d conce p ti o n, alre ad y form ul at e d by Saint Augu s -
tine, is of hum a ni ty as a unitary org anis m th at grad u ally
leave s the childh oo d of the “first age s” to ent e r “adultho o d .”
Thus according to Turgot, “m ankin d, consider e d from its in -
ception . . . app e a r s to the eyes of the philoso ph e r as an im -
m en s e whole that has, like ever y individu al, a childho od and
a dev el o p m e n t . ” The mech a ni c al met a p h or yields her e to an
orga nic one, but this organici sm is par ad oxical, since it envis -
age s neith er old age nor de at h . This idea of a collectiv e or -
ganis m becom in g perp et u a lly “more adult” gav e rise to the
cont e m p o r a r y idea of “develop m e n t ” under s t o o d as ind efi -
nite growt h. In the eight e e n t h cent ury , a cert ain con t e m p t for
childhoo d took hold, which wen t han d in han d with cont e m p t
for origins and beginni ng s, which are always reg ar d e d as in -
ferior.
The conc ep t of progr e s s implies an idolatry of the novu m :
every innov ation is a priori bet t e r simply beca u s e it is new.
This thirst for novelty—sys t e m a t i c ally eq ua t e d with the bett er
—quickly beca m e one of mod er ni ty’s obse s si o ns . In art, it led
to the conc e pt of the “avan t- garde ” (which also has its coun -
terp ar t s in politics).
From then on, the theory of progr e s s poss e s s e d all its com -
Benoist, “A Brief History of the Idea of Progre s s” 11

pone n t s . Turgot, in 1750, then Cond orce t , form ul at e d it sim -


ply, as th e conviction th at: “Mankind as a whole is always be -
comin g mor e perfect .” Thus the history of hu m a n it y was see n
as definitively unit ary . This pres er v e d the Christian idea of a
futur e perfe ctio n of hum a ni ty an d the certitu d e that hum a n i -
ty is moving toward s a single end . But Provid en c e was aba n -
done d and repl ac e d by hum a n reas o n. From then on, univer -
salis m was bas e d on reaso n conceive d as “on e and entir e in
each individu al,” regar dl e s s of cont ext and particul arity.
Man was likewise conceive d not just as a bein g of unce a s -
ingly ren ew e d desire s and need s , but also as an infinitely per -
fectible being. A new ant hr o p olo gy mak e s ma n a tabula rasa ,
a blank slat e at birth, or allott s him an abs tr a c t “nat u r e” en -
tirely dissociat e d from his concr e t e exist en c e . Hum an diversi -
ty, whet h er individual or collectiv e, is regar d e d as contin ge n t
and com pl et ely m allea bl e by edu c at io n an d “enviro nm e n t .”
The conce p t of artifice beco m e s centr al to and syno ny m o u s
with refine d culture. Man realizes his hum a n it y—“civilizes”
hims elf—only by opposi ng nat ur e and freeing hims elf from it.
Thus hum a nit y has to be free d from every t hi n g that can
block the irresistibl e forwar d march of prog re s s : “prejudic es ,”
“sup er s ti tions, ” the “weight of the past.” This touche s, indi -
rectly, on the justification of the Terror during th e French
Revolutio n : if progre s s is hum a ni t y’s nec e s s a r y aim, who ev er
oppo s e s progr e s s can justifiably be killed; whoev er is op -
pos ed to hu m a ni t y’s progr e s s can justifiably be place d out -
sid e hum a nit y and declar e d an “ene m y of m an ki nd” (hen c e
the difficulty in reconciling the two Kantian ass er tio ns of
equ al dignity and hum a n prog r es s). Modern totalitaria nis m s
(Soviet Com m u ni s m , National Socialism ) gen er alize d this idea
that ther e are “exc es s m en” whos e very exist e n c e preve n t s
the adve n t of a bett e r world.
This rejection of “nat ur e” and the “past ” is freq ue n tl y rep -
res en t e d as syno ny m o u s with liber ati on from all det er mi ni s m .
But in fact, det er mi n a ti on by the pas t is repl ace d by det e r mi -
natio n by the futur e: it is the “point of history.” 1
The opti mis m inher en t in the theo ry of progre s s is prom p t -
ly ext e n d e d to all dom ain s: to society and to m an. The reign
1
I hav e transl a t e d “sens ” here as “point” to pres e rv e wha t appe a r s to
be a felicitous am biguity of the Frenc h: “Sens ” m ay be transla t e d both as
“direc tion” and as “m e a ni ng.” “Point” can have both sens e s as well (e.g.,
“end point,” “the point of the story”).—GJ.
12 The Occiden t al Quarterly , vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2008

of reas o n is supp o s e d to lead to a societ y that is bot h tran s -


par en t and peac ef ul. Suppos e dl y adv a nt a g e o u s for all par -
ties, Mont es q ui eu’s “gen tl e com m e r c e ” is sup po s e d grad u ally
to elimin at e the “irration al” caus e s of conflict and repl ace it
with com m e r ci al exch a n g e . Hence th e abbo t of Saint- Pierre
anno u n c e d , well before Kant, a “projec t of per p e t u al peac e ,”
which Rouss e a u criticized hars hly. Condorc e t propos e d to ra -
tionally improve lang u a g e and spelling. Morality itself was
supp os e d to display th e char a ct eri stics of a scien c e. Educa -
tion aim e d at accus t o mi n g childr en to rid the m s e lv e s of “prej -
udices,” the source of all social evil, an d use their own rea -
son.
Thus hum a ni ty’s march towar d s hap pi n e s s was inter pr e t e d
as th e culmina tion of mor al happi n e s s . The men of the En -
light en m e n t believe d that, since m an in the futur e will act in
an alway s more “enlight e n e d ” m an n er , rea so n will continu al -
ly improv e, and hu m a n i ty will beco m e mor ally bet t e r. Thus
progr e s s , far from affecting only the ext ern al fram ew o rk of
exist e n c e, will transfor m man hims elf. Progr es s in one do -
m ain is nece s s a rily reflect e d in all oth er s. Materi al progr e s s
leads to mor al progr es s.
On the political plan e, the theo ry of progr e s s was very
quickly asso cia t e d with an anti- political ani m us. Nev ert h el es s ,
the th eorist s of progre s s have an am bi g uo us view of th e
stat e . On the one hand , the stat e limits th e auton o m y of th e
econ o m y, regar d e d as the sph er e of “freed o m ” and ration al
action par exc ellenc e : William Godwin say s th at gover n m e n t s
by their nat ur e creat e obst a cl e s to the nat ur al prop e n si t y of
m an to go forwar d. On th e other han d , in the contr act a ri a n
tradition inaugur a t e d by Hobbe s , the stat e allows man to es -
cap e the const r ai nt s sp ecific to th e “stat e of nat ur e .” Thus
the st at e is simult a n e o u sl y an obst acl e and an engin e of
progr e s s .
The mo st com m o n view is that politics itself mu st beco m e
ration al. Political actio n must ceas e being an art, gover n e d by
the principle of pru de n c e, and beco m e a scienc e , gov ern e d
by the principle of rea so n. As with th e univ ers e, soci et y can
be viewed as a machi ne , in which individ uals are th e cogs.
Hence it must be man a g e d ratio n ally, accor di ng to principles
as regul ar as those obse rv e d in physics. The sover eign mu st
be a mech a ni c overs e ei n g the evolution of “social phy sics”
towar d s “the great e s t public utility.” This conce p tion inspired
Benoist, “A Brief History of the Idea of Progre s s” 13

tech no c r a cy an d the administr a tiv e and m an a g e ri al conce p -


tion of politics of a Saint- Simon or a Com t e.
A particularly import a n t ques tio n is whet h e r progr es s is in -
definit e or leads to a final st ag e. This ter mi n u s would either
be an abs olut e innovation or a mor e “perf ec t” restitutio n of
an original or form er stat e: Heg elian synt h e sis , the resto r a -
tion of primitive Com m u nis m by classl es s society (Marx), th e
end of history (Franci s Fukuy a m a ) , etc. One mu st also ask if
the final goal—as su m i n g ther e is only one—ca n be known in
adv a n c e . To what end do es progr e s s lead, insofar as it lead s
to so m e t hi n g other tha n itself?
Liberal s tend to believ e in an indefinit e progr e s s, an un en d -
ing improv e m e n t of the hum a n con dition, wher e a s socialist s
assign man a well- defined happy end . The latter attitud e mix -
es progr e s sivis m and utopi anis m : perp e t u al ch an g e lead s to
a st atio na ry st at e; historical mov e m e n t is posit ed only as a
m e a n s to envisa g e its end. The liberal attitu d e is not, howev -
er, more realistic. For, on th e one han d, if ma n is moving to -
wards perfe ctio n, then, to the ext en t th at he achiev e s it, he
must stop perfecting hims elf. If, on the oth er han d, ther e is
no recog niz abl e goal of pro gr es s, how can one spe ak of
progr e s s at all? Only by recog nizin g a given goal can we say
that a new stat e repr es e n t s an adv an c e over an earlier one.
Another equally import a nt ques tion : Is progr e s s an uncon -
trolled force that acts on its own, or mus t m en interv e n e to
accel er a t e it or rem ov e impedi m e n t s ? Is progr e s s , moreov e r ,
reg ul ar and continu ou s, or does it imply abr up t qualit ativ e
jump s and ruptur e s ? Can one accel er a t e progr e s s while inter -
vening in its cour se , or, in doing so, does on e risk delayin g its
com pl e ti on ? Here agai n liber als, believin g in the “invisible
han d” and “laisse z- faire ,” differ from socialists, who are more
volunt a ris t, if not revolution ar y.

***
In the ninet e e n t h cent ury, th e th eory of progr e s s reach e d
its apo ge e in the West. It was, howev e r, reform ul at e d in a dif -
ferent climat e, m arke d by industri al mod e r niza tion , scien ti s -
tic positivis m, evolutionis m , an d the appe a r a n c e of th e grea t
historicist theori es.
The stres s was hencefor th put more on science than on rea -
son, in the philosophic al sens e of the term. The hope for a
14 The Occiden t al Quarterly , vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2008

“scientific” organization of hum a ni ty and the scientific control


of all social pheno m e n a bec a m e wides pr e a d. This the m e was
tireles sly revisit ed by Fourier, with his Phalan st er y ; by Saint- Si-
mon, with his technocr atic principles; by August e Comt e, with
his Positivist Catechis m and his “religion of progre ss .”
At the sa m e time, the term s “progr es s” an d “civilization”
tend e d to beco m e synony m o u s . The idea of progr e s s was
used to legitim a t e colonizatio n, sup po s e d ly to spr ea d th e
ben efits of “civilization” everywh er e in the world
The conc e p t of progr e s s was also refor m ul a t e d in light of
Darwinian evolutionis m . The evolution of life itself was rein -
terpr e t e d in term s of progr e s s , particul arly by Herb ert
Spen c er , who defin ed progr e s s as the evolution from simple
to com ple x, hom o g e n e o u s to het er o g e n e o u s . Indee d , th e
char ac t e r of progr es s appr e ci a bly chan g e d . Henc efo rt h, the
Enlight e n m e n t’ s mech a ni c al mo d el was co m bi n e d with a bio -
logical orga nicis m , as its vaunt e d pacifism gav e way to a de -
fens e of the “strug gl e for life.” Progre s s result e d from the se -
lection of the “fittes t ” (“th e best”), in a gen er alized vision of
com p et i tion. This reint er pr e t a t i on reinforce d West er n imperi -
alism: beca u s e it was “mo st evolve d,” the civilizatio n of the
West was also nece s s a rily the best .
Thus West er n civilization was the high point of social evolu -
tion. The history of hum a ni t y was divided into succe s si v e
“sta g e s ,” marking the various ste p s of its “progr e s s .” The dis -
persion of various cultur es in spac e was tran s p o s e d into tim e:
“primitiv e” societie s gave West er n e r s an imag e of their own
past (they were “con t e m p or a r y anc e s t or s”), while the West
would give the m an image of their futur e. Condorce t had al -
ready clai m ed hu m a nit y had pass e d thro u gh ten succe s siv e
stag e s . Hegel, Comt e, Marx, Freud, etc., propos ed analog ou s
sche m e s , going from “supers titiou s faith” to “science,” the
“theological” era to the “scien tific” one, the “primitive” or
“m agic al” men t ality to the “civilized” men t ality and the uni -
versal reign of reason.
Combine d with scientistic positivism , which com pl et ely per -
vad e d ant h ro pology and nourish e d the illusion that one can
m e a s u r e the value of cultur es with precision , this theor y gave
rise to racis m , which perc eive d tradition al civilizations as ei -
ther per m a n e n tl y inferior to or tem p o r a rily behind the West
(th e “civilizing mission ” of the colonial power s consist e d in
m aking the m catch up), and post ul at e d a univers al criterion,
Benoist, “A Brief History of the Idea of Progre s s” 15

an overar chi n g para dig m , th at m ade it possibl e to rank cul -


tures an d peopl es in a hierar ch y. Racis m was thu s directly
linked to the univer s alis m of progr e s s , which alre ad y con -
ceale d an uncon sciou s or mask e d et hn o c e n t ri s m .
I will not deal her e with th e criticis m of the idea of
progr e s s , which, in moder n time s, begins with Rouss e a u , or
with the innum e r a bl e theori es of declin e or deca d e n c e that
on e could oppos e to it. I shall not e only that th e latt er often
(but not always) repr e s e n t the nega tiv e dou bl e, the mirror
imag e, of the theory of progr e s s . The idea of a nec es s a r y
mov e m e n t of history is pres er v e d , but from the rever s e d
point of view: history is inter pr e t e d not as const a n t progr e s -
sion but as inevit a bl e regre s sio n (spe cific or gene r alize d). In
fact, a tend e n c y toward s declin e or deca d e n c e ap pe a r s as
unverifiabl e as one toward s progr e s s .

***
For at leas t twenty year s, books on the disillusions of
progr e s s have proliferat e d . Cert ain aut h or s hav e gon e so far
as to say progr e s s is nothing mor e than a “de ad idea”
(William Pfaff). Reality is undo u b t e dl y more nuan c e d. The the -
ory of progr e s s is seriously que sti o ne d today, but th er e is no
doub t that it lives on in variou s form s.
The tot alit aria nis m s of the twenti e t h cent ury an d the two
World Wars have obviously sapp e d the optimis m of th e two
previous cent u ri e s. The very disillusio ns that das h e d revolu -
tionary hopes have foster e d th e idea that cont e m p o r a r y soci -
ety— spiritually poor and m ea ni n gl e s s thoug h it m ay be—is
none t h el e s s the only one possibl e: social life is incre a si n gly
infus ed with fat alism . The futur e, which now see m s unfor e -
see a b l e, inspire s more fears than hop e s . A dee p e n i n g crisis
see m s mor e likely than a “bett er tom orr ow.”
The idea of unitary progr e s s is bat t e r e d and brok en. No
on e believes any longer that mat e ri al progr e s s make s m an
bet t er, or that progr e s s regist e r e d in one dom ain is au to m a t i -
cally reflect e d in th e rest . In th e “risk societ y” (Ulrich Beck),
m at erial progr es s itself see m s am biv al e nt . It is gran t e d that ,
alon g with its adva n t a g e s , ther e are cost s. It is quite evid e n t
that unplann e d urba niz ation multiplies social pat h ologi es and
that indust ri al mod e r niza tio n res ults in an unpr ec e d e n t e d
degr a d a t io n of the nat u r al fram ew o rk of life. The m as sive de -
16 The Occiden t al Quarterly , vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2008

struction of the environ m e n t gav e rise to ecolo gical move -


m en t s, which were am on g the first to deno un c e the “illusions
of progr e s s .” The develo p m e n t of tech n o s ci en c e also forceful -
ly rais es th e ques tion of purpos e . The devel op m e n t of scien c e
is no longer percei ve d as nece s s a rily contribu tin g to the hap -
pines s of hum a n it y: knowled g e itself, as one sees in th e de -
bat e on biotec hn ol ogie s, is reg ar d e d as pot en ti ally thre a t e n -
ing. Increa singl y large sections of the pop ulation now under -
stan d that “mor e” is not synony m o u s with “bet t e r.” We distin -
guish betw e e n having and being, mat eri al hap pin e s s and
hap pin es s in gen er al.
The the m e of progr e s s never t h el e s s rem ai n s preg n a n t , if
only as a sym bol. The political class contin ue s to mus t e r the
“forces of progre s s” ag ains t the “m en of the past ” an d to
thu nd e r ag ai nst “m edi ev al obscur a n t i s m ” (or the “ma nn e r s
of anot h e r age”). In public discour s e , th e word “progr e s s ” still
ret ains a larg ely positive reson a n c e .
The orient a tion towar ds the futur e also rem ai ns domi na nt .
Even if one ad mit s that the future is filled with me n a ci n g un -
cert ai nti e s, we still exp e ct that, logically, thin gs should im -
prove overall. Swept along by the rise of cutting edg e tech -
nologies and medi a m anipul at e d fashion s, the cult of nov elty
rem ai ns strong e r tha n ever. Peopl e also contin ue to believe
that m an’s “freedo m ” increa s e s to the ext en t that he is up -
root e d fro m organic ties and inherit ed traditions. The reignin g
individualism , alon g with a West e r n et hn o c e n t ri s m— which le -
gitim a t e s itself with th e ideology of hum a n rights—d e s t r u c -
tures the family, dissolve s social bon d s, and discre dit s tradi -
tional Third World societi es, wher e econ o m y is still em b e d d e d
in soci et y and wher e individuals and com m u ni tie s are still in -
terd e p e n d e n t .
But ab ov e all, the theory of progr es s persist s in its produ c -
tivist versio n. It nourish e s the idea that indefinit e growt h is
both norm al and desira bl e, and that a bet t er futur e dep e n d s
upon an ev er- incre a sin g volu m e of produc e d good s , an idea
that favors the globalizatio n of trade . This idea also inspires
the ideology of “dev elop m e n t , ” which still views Third World
societi es as (econ o mi c ally) lagging behind the West and ex -
alts th e Weste r n mod el of pro duc ti o n an d con su m p ti o n th e
desti ny of all hum a nit y. This ideolo gy of dev el o p m e n t was
form ula t e d perfectly in 1960 by Walt Rostow, who enu m e r a t -
ed the “stag e s ” that every society on the planet must travers e
Benoist, “A Brief History of the Idea of Progre s s” 17

to reach the age of consu m e ris m and com m er cial capitalis m.


As Serge Latouch e, Gilbert Rist, and others show, the theory of
dev elop m e n t is ultimat ely just a faith. As long as this faith per -
sists, so too will the ideology of progre s s.

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