Dorado Vs People
Dorado Vs People
Dorado Vs People
216671, 2016-10-03
Facts:
On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his friends
Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group) along A.
Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his
friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at Ronald's
group.Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hid inside to avoid being hit
by the stones and bottles. When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity,
they came out of hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for them. When they
finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group. During the
commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious
for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter, Ronald was brought to the
Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan.
Issues:
Ruling:
Dorado argues that his defenses of alibi and denial should be fully appreciated by the Court as
there was enough evidence to support them; that he was at his home at the time of the incident;
that defense witness Ofelia testified that he was not the one who shot Ronald; and that the
barangay officials did not find the sumpak in his possession.
The Court finds merit in the petition.Dorado was a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at the
time of the commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him
consistently stated his minority.[11] For said reason, he must benefit from the provisions of R.A.
No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, as amended. Even though the said law
was enacted on April 28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of
Dorado pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect).[12]
T... o recapitulate, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those minors above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal
responsibility.
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
x x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial."
After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort
to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of the
commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply stated that a privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be appreciated as it was proven that he was a
minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado
acted with discernment when he committed the crime imputed against him.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment
is different from intent.
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term
"discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil.
580(1939), in this wise:"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct
thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the
desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said
act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in .negligently handling an air rifle. It is
not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but
below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently
shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable
result of his negligence.
Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot
rule with certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there can be no
presumption of discernment on the part of the CICL. In the absence of such determination, it
should be presumed that the CICL acted without discernment.
Principles:
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
x x x who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial."