Perfect Competition: A2 Economics - Microeconomics Revision Notes
Perfect Competition: A2 Economics - Microeconomics Revision Notes
Perfect Competition: A2 Economics - Microeconomics Revision Notes
Chapter 2
Perfect competition
Many buyers and sellers neither of which can influence the price there are no price takers
o From seller perspective this is tantamount to saying that there are limited economies of scale in the
industry
o If the minimum efficient scale is small relative to market demand no firm is likely to become so
large that it will gain influence in the market
There are no barriers to entry or exit
o Firms are able to join the market if they perceive it as profitable step and can exit without hindrance
o This assumption is important when it comes to considering the long-run equilibrium towards which
the market will tend
There is perfect knowledge or information
o Buyers always know the prices that firms are charging and thus can buy the good at the cheapest
possible price
All firms aim to maximise profit MR = MC
o Pursuit of self-interest by firms and consumers ensure that the market works effectively
Homogenous product
o Buyers of the good see all products in the market as identical and will not favour one firm’s over
another
o If there were brand loyalty the firm would be able to charge a premium on its price
o By ruling out this possibility, the previous assumption is reinforced no individual seller is able to
influence the selling price of the product
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
Monopoly
Characteristics
Single seller legally it only needs 25% market share to be classed as a monopoly
No close substitutes The firm can sell a product that is unique as a result it can determine price OR
output it cannot dictate both at the same time as it is constrained by the demand curve
High barriers to entry or exit
For government T – Tax Larger firms pay more corporation tax T – Tax avoidance Monopolies can find it
J – Jobs Monopoly power helps keep jobs in easy to avoid paying tax and can employ
country and may improve Balance of Payments expensive tax consultants to help them do so
For workers J - Jobs Monopolies may offer better job B – Bargaining power It might not be easy
security to transfer to a similar company as there is
B – Bonuses Higher profits for monopolies may only one in the industry
mean higher bonuses/more perks J – Job security Monopolies don’t
guarantee jobs security, monopoly profits can
be invested in machinery which replaces
workers
For other firms O – Secure outlet They can offer a secure outlet E – Exploitation Small computer outlets
such as suppliers for suppliers may be exploited as they may have no choice
Q – Quality Firms which buy from monopolies over range and price e.g. with Apple products
might be more likely to have consistent quality P – Predatory pricing Other firms can be
forced out of the market through predatory
pricing because they have not yet established
themselves
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
Price discrimination by a monopoly firm
Three conditions
1. There are different submarkets with different price elasticities of demand
2. Consumers cannot move between the submarkets there is no ‘arbitrage’ creating a secondary market
3. The cost of keeping the markets separate is less than the increased profits gained from so doing
4. The firm must have a high degree of monopoly power
Third degree price discrimination Charging different groups of consumers a different price for the same product
or service
Summary
Monopsony
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
Pure monopsony a firms which is the sole buyer of resources or supplies
Many firms have some degree of monopsony, which means firms have some control over their suppliers
Benefits Costs
Firms and Power in buying means the firm can make more profits as Suppliers can be squeezed out
consumer suppliers cannot overcharge of business
s Lower buying costs might be passed on to the consumer in Choice for consumers could be
retail prices limited, as monopsony acts as
Higher profits of monopsony can be used to invest and a barrier to entry for new firms
innovate Higher profits of monopsony
Monopsony power can give power to buyers in the face of can mean inequality
monopoly supply of resources Firms might be investigated by
o Cosmetic producers e.g. L’Oréal can charge very high the competition authorities
prices for their products but monopolistic
supermarkets can force them to cut their costs
Monopolistic competition
Assumptions
Assumptions
The firms are interdependent action of one firm is dependent on the actions of another a firms
decisions on price, output and other competitive activities can have immediate effects on competitors
Firms face a downward sloping demand curve
Firms aim for profit maximisation MR = MC
A few firms dominate the market & barriers to entry and exit are high
Game theory we can use this to analyse the point above on interdependence
High price Low price Pay-off matrix a simple two-firm, two outcome model
100 0
Non-Collusive behaviour occurs when firms act in a way that
Low price 0 80 does not involve collaboration with other players in the market
the kinked demand curve theory explained below provides
160 80 an example
When they both charge a high price they make a supernormal profit £100 TR>TC
R under cuts now get 160 but Q get 0 this in turn leads to Q cutting prices now only 80-80
Pricing strategies used in Oligopoly Price, predatory, limit, leadership & non-price competition
Price wars Occurs when price cutting leads to retaliation and other firms cut prices leads to further cuts
made by the original firm to increase sales can be destructive for all firms involved
Predatory pricing Firms cut prices below average cost of production (Also may mean prices are below AVC) it is
a short-term measure only and pushes other firms out of the market almost always illegal
Limit pricing cutting prices to the point where possible entrants or higher-cost firms cannot compete the
incumbent firm can sustain this position in the long term because it has lower costs may or
may not be illegal depending on the specific cases looked at by the competition authorities
Price leadership Dominant firm acts to change price and other firm follow if other firms try to make changes
this could set off a price war or other sorts of retaliation the larger firms becomes the
established leader e.g. Barclays price leader when setting inter-bank borrowing rates
Non-price competition firms take action to compete without changing prices maybe through advertising
loyalty cards, free gifts or similar strategies
Non price competition costs money and pushes marginal and average costs up reducing profits
May only maintain market share
Across an industry money spent on non-price competition is often seen as a waste/loss of welfare
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
WHEN TALKING ABOUT NON-COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOUR STATE BRAND LOYALTY REDUCES PED
Overt collusion overt collusion occurs if a firm sends messages to another firm about its prices or other decisions
in order to maximise profits it is illegal and easier to detect than tacit collusion as it is open (Overt) they are
unstable organisations because there is an underlying incentive to cheat on the collusion agreement to get a short-
term agreement Competition commission can fine firms 10% of revenue each year cartel was in existence
Tacit collusion an implicit (Suggested though not directly expressed) understanding might operate between firms
without communication or written agreement this is illegal but very hard to for the competition authorities to
control auction example this may happen through price leadership (Dominant firm sets price) or barometric
price leadership --. Firm tries a higher price to see if others follow, if they do not they drop their price again
The response to cutting or raising prices of one firm to another firm depend on the PED of the goods or
service Necessities are price inelastic therefore if one firm raises prices, others will not if one firm
lowers price, all other firms will
Neither action (Increase or decreasing prices) leads to an increase in total revenue
This model explains why it may look as if firms are colluding even though they are not
The model does not explain why prices are what they are in the first place
It only explains some degree of stability and some markets are far more complex
A pay-off matrix gives a far wider range of possibilities and explains cartels and collusions
The model can provide some game theory analysis when required
In theory the abnormal profits do not get competed away in the long run
because there are barriers to entry preventing new firms entering
A2 Economics – Microeconomics revision notes
Prisoner’s dilemma
Nash equilibrium solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players, in which each player
is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing
only their own strategy (After knowing your rivals decision you would not change yours)
Dominant strategy the player’s best strategy independent of the choices of others e.g. agree to confess in case of
prisoners dilemma
Two large firms in an oligopoly make decisions based on the reactions of their rivals their decisions are
independent
Firm A
Best strategy both firms keep prices the same this maximises joint profits
Dominant strategy lower prices if they both follow dominant strategy they will both lose
Oligopoly game is not a one-off game if one firm lowers price then they can expect the other firm to
respond similarly next time this can lead to a price war price war = both firms continue to lose
First-mover advantage
Second-mover advantage
Contestability
Contestability measure of the ease with which firms can enter or exit an industry