Re-sourcing the Self?

Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor: The Tension between Freedom and Authenticity

Thomas R.V. Nys

ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to compare the theories of Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor with regard to the topic of freedom.
I will argue that Berlin’s famous positive-negative distinction still serves an important purpose by maintaining a crucial
tension within the concept of liberty. This tension allows ethical pluralism to be taken seriously instead of being covered
up by ideological rhetoric. Berlin held that the implementation of positive liberty – defining the boundaries of true
liberty – is always problematic. Taylor, however, tries to bypass the gap between negative and positive liberty by means
of his concept of authenticity. I will argue that this notion is a sound descriptive term for an individual’s entrenchment
in community, but that the normative appeal from authenticity amounts to a project of ‘re-sourcing the self’ which is
ultimately rooted in an optimistic perspective on pluralism and multiculturalism. However, to the extent that there are
indeed different communities with different values and different ways of being authentic, it is worthwhile to repeat the
Berlinian Grundgedanke that human beings should cope with the inexorable and irreducible tragedy in moral life.

KEYWORDS
Authenticity; Autonomy; Isaiah Berlin; Communitarianism; Freedom; Liberty; Liberalism; Pluralism; Charles Taylor

Introduction are forces at hand that try to overcome this tension

and I believe that this would be a considerable loss
Isaiah Berlin’s essay Two Concepts of Liberty to political philosophy. In what follows, I will
started an avalanche of controversy and discussion compare Berlin and Taylor with regard to their
that still echoes through the valley of contem- attitudes towards the concept of negative liberty.
porary philosophical thought. The distinction First, I will try to present a short but accurate
between negative and positive liberty has been an account of the distinction between positive and
ever recurring point of discussion even to the negative liberty – an account both authors can
extent that the debate gives the impression of being agree upon. In a second section, I will discuss
both over-saturated as well as over-analyzed and Taylor’s criticism of the concept of negative liberty
hollow. What could one possibly add to a topic and I will suggest (section 3) that the necessary
that has been constantly chewed over and repeat- valuation of mere opportunity is ultimately in
edly spit out, only to be regurgitated again? need of first-person affirmation (identification),
I will try to demonstrate that the tension within something which tends to be denied by Taylor’s
the concept of liberty is essential, and that the practice of second-guessing. In a fourth section, I
discussion – on a philosophical as well as a will connect the concept of negative liberty to
political level – should be endless. However, there pluralism. According to Berlin, pluralism should

AUTHOR INFORMATION: Thomas R.V. Nys, MPhil, PhD Candidate. Centre for Economics and Ethics, Dekenstraat 2,
B-3000 Leuven. E-mail: Thomas.Nys@econ.kuleuven.ac.be

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 215

be characterized in tragic terms, in terms of loss. lead us to divert from duty. When led by desire
Then I will turn to Taylor’s conception of plural- instead of the law(s) of practical reason, man
ism in which this tragedy is attenuated. Crucial in would be the plaything of alienating forces, with
this respect is the notion of authenticity and I will no control whatsoever; he would be heteronomous.
distinguish this concept from an account of Berlin, however, explicitly avoids the use of the
personal autonomy which is more in line with term negative liberty to refer to this ‘inner
Berlin’s wish for conceptual clarity. The sixth freedom’, and I believe that we should take this
section will show that the prospect of ‘re-sourcing avoidance at face value. Indeed, such usage would
the self’, the normative project to reaffirm com- be the translation of a positive ideal into negative
mon values and to reinforce or establish unity, terms, and Berlin warns us for such conflation. We
hinges on an optimistic account of pluralism. I will could easily reformulate the positive ideal of a
conclude that the to and fro between optimists and ‘higher self’ into the negative demand that the
pessimists gives the debate its perpetual character. individual should be liberated from his ‘lower
self’. Berlin admits that nothing in the concept
of negative liberty prevents such positive transla-
1. Negative and Positive Freedom
tion. Nonetheless, history proves that quasi-nega-
With the perseverance of a high-school teacher, tive theories are less prone to degenerate than their
Berlin repeatedly stressed that the difference positive alternatives. I will come to this process of
between negative and positive freedom is a degeneration, but let me first turn to a misconcep-
difference between two legitimate questions and tion of the difference between the two concepts of
their respective answers. The question related to neg- liberty in order to expose their true nature.
ative liberty inquires into the domain of liberty: “To Gerald MacCallum has argued that the
what extent am I free?”, “What options are available conceptual distinction between positive and nega-
to me?”, “How many doors are open to me?” In tive liberty adds to the confusion because the
other words: it questions the external conditions of dyadic expression of negative freedom (‘X is free
freedom. Hence, negative liberty can indeed be from Y’) is untenable and, as such, it only
characterized as the “absence of external obstacles”1 camouflages a triadic structure underlying a single
as long as these obstacles are imposed by other concept of liberty (‘X is free from Y to do Z’).
human beings, whether deliberately or indirectly, Instead of claiming that philosophers or political
unintentionally or institutionally,2 and only when it thinkers apply different concepts of liberty, the
concerns “alterable human practices”.3 This last con- discussion should focus on the specific contents
dition turns liberty into a political notion4, and pre- that various authors give to the three parameters
vents human limitations like the inability to fly like in this basic structure. The debate should be about
an eagle or swim like a whale from being considered the specific liberties that people want to see
as obstructions to liberty. protected. To argue this, MacCallum uses a
Taylor objects to this mere external character from/to dichotomy to differentiate between
of freedom, and he is absolutely right in saying negative and positive freedom; the first is inter-
that nothing in the idea of negative freedom preted as freedom from something (external
prevents it from also including the possibility of obstacles, barriers, constraints, etc.) and the second
internal obstacles. Kant’s seminal construction of is conceived as the freedom to do something
the positive and negative aspects of freedom bears (actions, conditions of character or circumstance).6
witness to this fact. The negative dimension of But, as Tim Baldwin shows, this is not their true
freedom, according to Kant, was the “indepen- distinguishing mark.
dency of alien causes”5 such as our immediate With Taylor, Baldwin believes that negative
desires and preferences, our Neigungen that would liberty is essentially an opportunity concept, that

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 216

is, it does not imply that the opportunities offered a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-
should also be realized. As Berlin puts it, if a directed and not acted upon by external nature or by
person sits in a chair and he has the opportunity of other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a
standing up, then, if he decides to stay put on his slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of
chair, his liberty is thereby not impaired7. Once we conceiving goals and policies of my own and realis-
understand this, we can see that an easy from/to ing them.”9
distinction between positive and negative freedom
is bound to collapse: negative freedom is always This legitimate desire for autonomy is logically
freedom to do something, but the crucial feature is not very far removed from its negative counter-
that the ‘something’ remains unspecified. This is part:10 if I want to be an agent and not an instru-
what sets negative freedom apart: it is a general ment in the hands of others, then I need a domain
concept whereas positive freedom is specific.8 of freedom in which I am allowed to go my own
Negative liberty is mere opportunity: the more way.11 Agency demands a degree of (external)
doors that are open to a person, the more free she independence. In his introduction to the second
is. The contents of this opportunity set can be very edition of the Four Essays, Berlin stresses the
diverse: it can incorporate the freedom of religion, political implication of this deep-rooted desire
the freedom to read Hegel, the freedom to murder which is mostly translated into a wish for collec-
an adversary, or the freedom to snort rice crispies tive self-government or participatory democracy
through your nose, etc. All these opportunities are (e.g. republicanism). However, this political trans-
instances of negative freedom: some are crucial, lation also provides the necessary soil for the
others highly valued, some immoral and still danger of positive liberty to blossom. The wish to
others just trivial or stupid. Thus, the concept of be self-governed could gradually get perverted into
freedom is independent of its valuation. If we stick its opposite, and this perversion follows the lines
to Berlin’s interpretation, we see that negative of a two-step model.12 First, one makes a distinc-
freedom cannot be equated with self-realization tion between a ‘true’ and a ‘false’ self. This tension
because this would demand an ideal to discrimi- within the subject an sich is not threatening to an
nate between the valuable and the worthless. At individual’s freedom unless he is unable to
most, negative liberty is the precondition for self- overcome his heteronomy. Sometimes, valuable
realization. For now, let us elaborate on the paths in life are being cut off by internal inhibi-
‘specific’ character of positive freedom and try to tions. For example, a person might be unable to
understand why Berlin saw an inherent danger for overcome a certain fear, desire, urge, craving, etc.
perversion. and yet there is no one who prevents him from
Positive liberty stems from a different question, doing anything. Hence, there is no infringement in
namely: “Who or what controls/governs me?” The terms of negative liberty. The person simply
answer to this question, its normative implication, realizes – from the inside – that he is unable to
is that people want to govern themselves. They achieve the goals in life that he holds so dear and
want to be in control of their own lives. he is aware of the frustration.
However, positive and negative freedom only
“I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, fully develop into opposing values when a second
not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be step is also taken: the characteristics of the ‘true
the instrument of my own, not of other men’s acts of self’ become externally assessable and some of the
will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be individual’s desires, commitments and projects get
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are labeled as unimportant or even noxious to the
my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, development and realization of the true self. This
from outside. I wish to be somebody, not anybody; is what Baldwin means when he says that positive

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 217

liberty is specific: it describes a certain way of distinguish between the genuinely important oppor-
self-realization; a description with a strong tunities and those which are far less important. To
normative appeal. As Baldwin puts it: “it is a make his point intuitively clear, Taylor gives the
typical feature of conceptions of positive freedom example of traffic lights. In a strict sense, traffic
that an agent who is free does not merely have the lights restrict a person’s domain of negative liberty;
opportunity for virtue, he must be virtuous.”13 The they deprive him of his opportunities of crossing
ideological conflation of words is then complete the street whenever and wherever he sees fit. Nev-
and, in the extreme case, people can even be forced ertheless, no one in his right mind would consider
to be free. Berlin was very much aware of the traffic lights to be a restriction of liberty. More
historical consequences of this positive perversion importantly, the value of liberty is not even at stake:
as he witnessed the devastating results of the two we simply prefer safety over personal convenience.
great ideologies of his century. Only in a nitpicking philosophical debate could we
call this a restriction of liberty, not in a serious
political discussion. This point is extremely signif-
2. Charles Taylor’s Criticism of Negative Liberty
icant: according to Taylor, negative liberty as a
Of course, Taylor does not deny the sad and unset- mere opportunity concept is a useless notion; it is
tling lessons of history. He is aware of the totali- too thin and elusive to capture what we actually
tarian danger in positive liberty and he is eager to mean when we use the word ‘freedom’. The loss of
avoid such dreadful consequences. Nevertheless, sheer opportunity, when it includes irrelevant,
he remains unconvinced that negative liberty is an worthless, silly or ignorant opportunities, is not
adequate remedy for the ailment. At the outset of necessarily a loss of liberty at all. The example of
his article “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty”, traffic lights could even be developed further: we
Taylor notices a strange paradox. While propo- could defend the view that, instead of restricting
nents of the positive view desperately try to shake our liberty, traffic lights ‘set us free’. By means of
off their reputation as dangerous pseudo-totalitar- them we are able to move about in the city in a
ians who subscribe to a ‘forced to be free’ more coordinated and efficient way. The contra-
doctrine, negative liberalists sincerely seem to diction is now readily apparent: a loss of opportu-
embrace the caricature of freedom as mere oppor- nities can be an increase of liberty.
tunity. In their view, the extreme Hobbesian and This concludes Taylor’s first step but he imme-
Benthamite interpretation of liberty should not be diately recognizes that this line of critique could
attenuated. Taylor says that the reason for this easily be incorporated by the proponents of nega-
embrace is that the opportunity concept is both tive liberty14. The idea of freedom as an opportu-
simple and safe: it just looks at the quantity of nity concept is perfectly able to acknowledge that
opportunities and, in doing so, it cuts out the there are valuable and less valuable opportunities.
danger of positive perversion at the root. However, However, these proponents would maintain that
in the remainder of his article, Taylor tries to show liberty is restricted even if only irrelevant
that this inclination towards conceptual clarity is opportunities are excluded – it is just that the
flawed. The defensive strategy of the negative exclusion would not be so bad (read: the loss
liberals who have withdrawn behind their Maginot might be justified). This is Berlin’s view: the
Line is simply untenable. The argument that liberty of the hangman should rightly be restricted.
should support this conclusion could roughly be This response could backfire on Taylor. His exam-
summarized in three steps. ple of traffic lights primarily serves as an intuition
First, Taylor shows that speaking in terms of pump, but surely our intuition would be pumped
opportunities always needs to be complemented by differently if we were asked to imagine traffic
some sort of valuation. We always need to lights in the desert. To put up such lights in the

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 218

desert would be absurd – for there is no traffic – these desires against a background of understand-
and the local aboriginals would unjustly be ing, they cannot prevent the practice of second-
deprived of their individual (and collective!) guessing. The fact that a person can be right or
liberty. Taylor would agree with this and say that wrong in his desires entails that there is something
the scheme of valuation depends, at least to a to be right or wrong about. There is a larger con-
certain degree, on the given context (the horizon, text, a background, which enables a person to
or background of meaning). But if this is true, then understand what is appropriate and inappropriate.
why should we take a particular context for This background reaches beyond the individual –
granted? Why should we simply affirm that traffic the criteria of right and wrong imply that they are
lights are no impairment of liberty? If we are faced not totally dependent on a private point of view. To
with a multiplicity of horizons and contexts then the extent that these criteria transcend the level of
perhaps a mere opportunity concept of liberty individual judgement there is no reason to exclude
might still prove to have some use. the possibility of second-guessing: the individual
Taylor continues by pointing out that there are is not the final authority concerning his liberty.
also internal obstacles to freedom. But as we have For example, Sue’s fear is inappropriate
seen, it is not impossible to translate a positive because it is utterly irrational: the fear is not in
ideal of the true self into an account of negative proportion to the ‘danger’ of speaking in public.
freedom from internal obstacles. However, one Even if Sue is unaware of her irrational behaviour,
should beware of external usurpation of that ‘true her fear remains an impediment to her freedom.
self’ (the second step in the perversion of positive To that extent, it seems as if she can be ‘forced to
liberty). Taylor wholeheartedly agrees. And yet he be free’:15 people should not take her desire to run
wants to address these inner obstacles because it and hide from her audience very seriously. Charles
seems self-evident that they could impair a Manson, to take Taylor’s more extreme example,
person’s liberty. Taylor gives various examples to was mistaken in his fundamental purposes. What
jog our intuition in this respect. I will paraphrase he identified as his real wants and his truest self
only one of them. Imagine a person, Sue, who was in fact not a legitimate self at all. Manson’s
wants to become a professor but who has an irra- violent urges, rooted in what he held to be his
tional fear of speaking in public. This fear prevents ultimate purpose in life (about him being God and
her from pursuing her deepest ambitions; some his role in the war of helter skelter), were “shot
valuable paths in life are being blocked ‘from the through with confusion and error”.16 Like Sue, he
inside’. Because she is held back by certain was wrong without even knowing he was wrong.
constraints which she considers not to be ‘her The importance of strong evaluation pulls the
own’, her liberty is clearly curbed. But, once individual out of the confines of his own mind, and
again, the negative liberals are able to strike back. allows us to acknowledge boundaries and criteria
As long as we take Sue to be aware of the of authentic freedom which are independent of the
frustration of her deepest desires, we could still individual and which, if necessary, can be used
avoid the danger of external usurpation because against him to overrule his direct and inauthentic
the individual would remain the final judge of her desires. Stated most clearly by Taylor: “the subject
inner liberty. This retort is what Taylor calls the is not the final authority on the question whether
‘halfway’ or ‘middle’ position, and according to he is free; for he cannot be the final authority on
him it is untenable. Once the members of the neg- the question whether his desires are authentic,
ative camp admit that freedom is in need of strong whether they do or do not frustrate his purposes.”17
evaluation, once they agree that people should not To summarize: once the negative liberals are
simply judge the relative force or strength of their lured out of their Maginot Line of defence – because
conflicting desires but also evaluate the worth of they must acknowledge that sheer opportunity is

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 219

always in need of valuation and that the internal truth about ourselves depends on whether or not
obstacles to freedom are judged by means of strong we can identify with this deeper self – whether or
evaluation – they are bound to take up a middle posi- not we recognize ourselves in the story he tells
tion which cuts off the possibility of returning to about us (De te fabula narratur!). If not, therapy
their warm trenches of conceptual purity. Yet the will fail and we should be glad that the psychoan-
halfway position is untenable from a purely nega- alyst has no further power over us because he
tive perspective because it entails the possibility of could abolish our immediate desires for the sake of
second-guessing. promoting the liberty of an unknown and mysteri-
ous deeper self.
The point is that the ‘being wrong’ — the
3. How To Drown a Fish
mistakes — should eventually be affirmed by the
Taylor, however, believes that the victory on the individual. The subject should realize that he was
positive side should be a mild and merciful one.18 wrong and that he was not ‘himself’ (his normal
The answer should not be sought in the other self). Without this experience of recognition, the
extreme: the caricature of positive liberty. He outside denial of liberty remains horrific. Strong
thinks that the practice of second-guessing does evaluation seems to be in need of personal
not automatically result in a canonical ideology of affirmation or identification. What we object to is
the good life. So, according to Taylor, the positive not strong evaluation as such, but a certain shift
valuation of negative opportunities and the practice in perspective. It is a whispery shift which resem-
of second-guessing are not necessarily a bridge too bles what Berlin calls “the mystical moment”
far. Thus, he proposes his own type of halfway in Rousseau19 where personal judgement is
arrangement: positive liberty without the danger exchanged for third-person authority. So, whereas
envisaged by Isaiah Berlin. negative liberals cannot avoid second-guessing,
But isn’t this combination of the best of both positive liberals cannot avoid the possible danger
worlds equally untenable? Does Taylor really of exteriorizing the self. The discussion between
avoid the danger in positive liberty? What prevents communitarians and liberals circles around the
his theory from allowing the individual to become question which of these positions is preferable and,
entrapped within himself? Taylor starts from situ- as I will try to show, it reflects a difference
ations in which the individual is aware of him between an optimistic and a pessimistic account
being ‘held up’ by his own desires. We all know of pluralism.
that we can be mistaken about our own motives However, Taylor tries to overcome the danger
and true preferences. But Taylor ends up with the of exteriorizing the self with a number of inter-
legitimation of second-guessing where the indi- related concepts such as strong evaluation, authen-
vidual’s authority concerning his liberty can be ticity, community, dialogue, etc. The self is essen-
overruled. Therefore, we should elaborate on this tially shaped within self-transcendent boundaries
matter and ponder the exact character of this of meaning. Likewise, the valuation of opportuni-
‘being mistaken’. ties is a joint achievement. For example, we – as
Imagine a psychoanalyst who tells us that we members of a certain Western community – do not
do not really want to speak to our mother because think of traffic lights in terms of a curtailment of
of childhood trauma, while in fact we call her liberty; we agree that our safety is far more impor-
every day. He confronts us with a deeper identity tant. Actually, we think that it is so much more
of which we were previously unaware: what we important that we have ceased to experience the
thought we wanted is really just superficial loss of individual liberty as a loss. Therefore,
makeup to cover up repressed feelings of hate. Taylor would defend that the true self is not exter-
Nevertheless, whether the psychoanalyst tells the nalized in a top-down fashion which would strike

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 220

the individual as totally ad hoc or ‘out of the blue’ and that different values like beauty, justice,
(like the psychoanalyst who bluntly claims to equality, courage, etc. would fit into a harmonic
know our truest self), but it is shaped and whole similar to the Platonic idea of the Good.
conceived from the bottom up. As members of a Conflict and strife arise from human ignorance or
community and as participants in a perpetual incompetence; the eternal values themselves could
dialogue, we would always remain in touch with not possibly collide. According to these theories
this ideal. The horizon is given, we do not invent all values must be compatible because otherwise
it nor do we choose it, and yet it is not rigid “the universe is not a cosmos, not a harmony”, and
because it is open to our voice. this would be to admit that the notion of “total
But this process of dialogue only works as long human fulfillment is a formal contradiction”.22 The
as the participants are able to recognize themselves Enlightenment reinforced this way of thinking
as contributors to the same dialogue. This becomes about ethical values in claiming that there is such
especially important when we question the idea of a thing as ‘moral truth’ and that within truth there
dialogue as something which connects rather than cannot be contradiction. Berlin vehemently rejects
divides, or when we confront Taylor’s theory with this ideal: according to him, there is irreconcilable
the possibility of multiple communities. However, pluralism and, as a necessary result of pressing
before I come to this I want to present Berlin’s ethical dilemmas, there is deep tragedy within the
account of pluralism and why he believes that it human condition. At times we have to choose, and
supports the value of negative liberty. whatever we choose, we inevitably have to make
concessions to some values. In ethical dilemmas
we simply cannot have it both ways. It is crucial
4. Isaiah Berlin on Pluralism
to see that Berlin connects the value of negative
It is remarkable that many critics of liberalism, liberty to this denial of monist harmony:
even today, are happy to ignore three important
The world that we encounter in ordinary experience
truths about negative liberty that Berlin, however,
is one in which we are faced with choices between
explicitly asserts:20 (1) negative freedom is not the
ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute,
only value, (2) it is not even the supreme value,
the realisation of some of which must inevitably
and consequently (3) it should not be maximized.
involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because
Regarding this last amendment, Berlin indeed
this is their situation that men place such an
sticks to a quantitative account of negative liberty,
immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if
yet he agrees that it is sometimes an “agonizing
they had assurance that in some perfect state,
problem” to determine which alternative would
realisable by men on earth, no ends pursued by them
make an individual more free.21
would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of
The reason for this neglect is that one usually
choice would disappear, and with it the central
focuses on Berlin’s negative argument for nega-
importance of the freedom to choose.23
tive liberty: the importance of negative liberty
grounded in the inherent danger of positive liberty. Man is faced with absolute claims, but he cannot
Since Berlin is eager to avoid this perversion, his possibly reconcile them in a harmonious way. His
recourse to the concept of negative liberty is moral choices are inherently tragic. Negative free-
indeed very strong. But Berlin’s emphasis on the dom allows us to deal with this tragedy. Berlin
importance of negative liberty is also connected does not believe that there is an infinite variety of
with his rejection of monism. Monism postulates incommensurable values, but that, even in holding
that ethical problems have genuine solutions, that the same values, there is no optimal and final solu-
is, whenever a choice is to be made, one particu- tion to our dilemmas. Berlin’s pluralism is not a
lar decision is thought to be better than any other radical or relativist pluralism that would hold

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 221

something like: “I like my coffee with milk and automatically attribute it to some deficiency on our
you like it without; I am in favor of kindness and part which should be eliminated by an increase of
you prefer concentration camps”,24 where the skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still, suppress
differences in preference are on the same, morally one of the competing values altogether by pretend-
neutral level. ing that it is identical with its rival – and so end by
Berlin’s pluralism goes hand in hand with a distorting both.29
form of universalism which enables him to main-
tain that some frameworks or values are demon-
5. Re-sourcing the Self?
strably false. This general tenet of universalism is
quite similar to that of Taylor and they also give Is there such distortion in Taylor? I think there is.
similar examples: the equality of men and The culprit in this regard – the notion which
women,25 and the equality of human beings in absorbs other values – is the idea of authenticity.
general (the perception of Jews as Untermen- In What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty Taylor
schen).26 Berlin thinks that the denial of this equal- already uses the words ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthen-
ity is an empirical falsehood that was wrongly tic’ and we have seen that the individual is not the
proclaimed as being true. Therefore, he wants free- final judge concerning this distinction. Hence, the
dom to be curbed by decent values, but he explic- restriction of inauthentic desires is not an impair-
itly avoids incorporating these other values into ment of liberty. The criteria of authenticity lie
the definition of liberty. This is why he can defend beyond individual judgement. More than a decade
that the hangman’s liberty is curtailed if he is pre- later, the idea of authenticity became central in
vented from executing his acts of torture, and, at Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity. In this work,
the same time, that his liberty is rightly restricted.27 the value of authenticity is described as “being true
Berlin stands out in saying that even within a to your own originality”30. This, however, should
consensus on what constitutes important values, not be interpreted as the wish for idiosyncratic
there is still moral tragedy, and hence, there should individual uniqueness. Authenticity is what
be freedom of choice. Pluralism is therefore what connects us to a community and, as such, the value
justifies the value of negative liberty in a positive of authenticity could serve as a counterweight
way. This is important in order to understand that against different malaises of modernity like
the concept of negative liberty, which is a descrip- individualism, political fragmentation, disenchant-
tive account of what liberty is, is also linked to the ment, instrumental reason, etc.
normative appeal that there should be an area of For example, Taylor convincingly demonstrates
non-interference. The question regarding how that moral discussion is never ex nihilo since
large this area should be, and what amount of neg- human beings are always immersed within a cer-
ative liberty should be rightfully sacrificed, should tain community. Likewise, a person’s identity is
be a matter of ongoing political debate. The sacri- defined and shaped in a continuous dialogue with
fice of negative liberty – sheer opportunity – is a so-called ‘significant others’. Therefore the
token that should remind us of the reasons for this individual cannot single-handedly decide what is
sacrifice. Any loss of liberty should be perceived significant; he always discovers the contours of
as a loss, and therefore it should always be justi- significance.31 Individualism, on the other hand,
fied. Freedom “is what it is” and it should not be pretends that options are rendered worthwhile
equated with any other value (fairness, justice, cul- because they are chosen. This, however, denies the
ture, etc.).28 importance of pre-given, individual-transcending
frameworks of significance. Individualism is the
It is better to face this intellectually uncomfortable degraded offspring of a genuine wish for authen-
fact [the tragedy in moral life] than to ignore it, or ticity and, as such, it is ultimately self-refuting.

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 222

But Taylor admits that this analysis does not get should (re)turn. Indeed, some authors believe that
him very far. If meaning is always embedded in a Taylor has a specific source in mind. David
larger context or horizon, then how could a rugged Baybrook, for example, says that Taylor wants us to
individualist possibly deny this? It just seems that revert to the single God of theism.34 This, however,
his manner of argumentation is wrong-headed, not is a very unfavourable interpretation because it
the values themselves.32 seems to miss the crucial message of a book enti-
Taylor is certainly correct in saying that some- tled ‘Sources…’.35 Therefore, we have to formulate
thing does not become valuable simply because it is the problem more accurately. If we agree that there
chosen, but perhaps we are confronted with an are different horizons and sources then whether or
abundance of values which all ‘make sense’ from not this is a genuine problem depends on how
within different perspectives. The real problem is irreducible the possible schemes of valuation are.
then not individualism – the confrontation between In other words, are there any limits to the project of
self-choosing monads – but the clash between re-sourcing? To what extent can community bonds
different communities.33 The predicament of be forged on an intentional basis? If there are indeed
individualism might be solved by showing that the certain limits to this project then perhaps we should
individual cannot be considered as an island, but the also acknowledge that there are different ways of
conflict between people as part of different com- being authentic. Berlin’s wish for conceptual clarity
munities calls for a more extensive normative in order to avoid the danger of second-guessing
project. Therefore, I think it is important to distin- returns in a different guise. Taylor might have saved
guish two different strands of argumentation in Tay- the individual from being trapped within himself,
lor. On the one hand, there is his analysis but as a member of a certain group striving for
of human beings entrenched within a certain recognition the same fate might still await him.
community, with a certain background, etc. On the Only now he is in danger of being enclosed within
other, there is Taylor’s project of overcoming the confines of his community.
individualism and fragmentation, that is, a project of
reinforcing common values. The first consists in
6. Authenticity vs. Autonomy
making clear that the human identity, the human
self, has moral sources independent of its own To elaborate on this last point we have to return to
choice. The second is what I would call the project the importance of identification. In order for the
of ‘re-sourcing the self’: to bring the individual in reaffirmation and re-sourcing to be successful, the
touch with certain values, goods and narratives individual has to identify with these sources; he
which he holds in common with a certain has to recognize himself as a member of that
community. It is an attempt to restore unity (com- particular community. Therefore, it is one thing to
munality) where unity was lost or to bring unity say that a person’s identity is embedded in a
(communality) where there was none before. The community and construed in dialogue – so far so
methodology of this normative project is that of good – but quite another to say that a community
affirmation and articulation in order to revive the can also second-guess a person’s identity. This
importance of a common background and to give already presupposes that the individual belongs to
new momentum to a moral debate which starts that community. In the context of multiple
from this background and not from untenable communities, the middle position that Taylor holds
individualist premisses. However, the project of re- to be untenable might not be untenable after all.
sourcing the self is faced with the problem of vari- One could allow for strong evaluation in one
ous backgrounds and horizons because once we community (no man is an island), while not allow-
admit that there are different legitimate sources then ing for second-guessing by members of a more
we have to settle the question to which sources we powerful, different community.

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 223

 The possibility of a defensible middle position could just decide. The notion of ‘decisive identifi-
can also be explored in a much more technical cation’ is surely an important element in Frank-
way. In this respect, it is interesting to see that furt’s theory, but throughout the years he has put
Berlin’s fear of second-guessing is also reflected in more emphasis on the passive element within
a contemporary theory of personal autonomy. A personal autonomy as well. Simply put: a person
leading philosopher in this field, Harry Frankfurt, acts autonomously if what he does is in line with
defends an internalist conception of autonomy in ‘the things he cares about’. And these objects of
which the individual is considered to be the final care are beyond the person’s active volitional
judge concerning his autonomy.36 Such a theory is power: a person finds himself caring about certain
anxious to avoid the external, third-person denial things. The horizon of what is important to him is
of personal autonomy (the feeling of unease in the also given and at times, when push comes to
psychoanalyst example). Apparently, Frankfurt shove, he has to deliberate in order to find out
believes that the danger of external assessment – what he cares about most.38 Although it goes
the danger of possible denial – weighs up against beyond the scope of this paper, it would be inter-
the so-called ‘problem of manipulation’. Critics of esting to see to what extent this ‘given horizon’ is
Frankfurt confront his theory with examples of the related to frameworks of importance which are
socially indoctrinated (e.g. the submissive house- held in common. The phrasing ‘the things we care
wife), the brainwashed or even the neurologically about’ suggests (although entirely unintentionally,
reprogrammed: individuals who believe that they I guess) such communality. On the other hand,
are acting on their deepest commitments, their Frankfurt’s recent emphasis on objects of love,
‘truest selves’, but who are, as it turns out, mere which are privately though still passively valued,
puppets on strings. Their volitions did not come suggests the opposite. Nevertheless, Frankfurt’s
about in the right way; their causal history was theory of personal autonomy might allow for
jinxed or otherwise tampered with. Nevertheless, strong evaluation without the possibility of second-
Frankfurt’s willingness to endure this shortcoming guessing.
of his theory shows that he is very reluctant to
accept the alternative, for this would imply that the
7. On Optimism
individual loses his privileged position in judging
his own autonomy. And this seems far more threat- In this paragraph I want to focus on Taylor’s
ening to him. If the essence of the self (its authen- optimism because ultimately the question whether
ticity or autonomy) is ultimately judged in the eyes the project of re-sourcing stands any chance
of others then the self no longer continues to be a depends on whether or not the plurality of
‘self’. Instead it is in danger of becoming a distant horizons should be conceived in tragic terms. Are
stranger with whom we have no binding connec- we dealing with an irreducible multiplicity? Or is
tion. However, Frankfurt’s internalism does not the project of re-sourcing able to attenuate the
prevent him from accepting the dialogical charac- differences? Taylor certainly believes that we can
ter of the self.37 The individual being the final come a long way and I just want to draw attention
judge in no way entails that he is the only one or to three elements in his thinking which bear
that he judges in complete isolation. witness to this optimism. My presentation will be
Taylor once characterized the difference with extremely sketchy: I will just hint at the key
Frankfurt in terms of the distinction between notions and suggest a more pessimistic alternative.
‘radical self-determination’ and ‘strong evalua- First, with regard to the problem we mentioned
tion’. The term ‘radical self-determination’ above – communities within communities and the
suggests that it is only up to the individual in danger of second-guessing beyond boundaries –
which way he wants to be autonomous – as if he Taylor believes in deep diversity. For example, he

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 224

is a well known protagonist in the plea for a we should aim at a fusion of horizons and that we
Canadian state consisting of different communi- should approach different cultures with a pre-
ties which are nevertheless strung together by a sumption of equal worth. But why believe that
sense of Community-with-a-capital-‘c’, an iden- such fusion is possible? Why couldn’t there be
tity malgré toutes les différences. The virtue of genuine, insurmountable conflict?41 And what jus-
deep diversity should enable the overarching iden- tifies this presumption? Taylor agrees that fusion
tity of the Canadian citizen: is not always possible and that we will sometimes
have to reject certain foreign practices (the Aya-
The virtue of deep diversity is that it embraces an
tollah’s fatwa on Salman Rushdie, for example),
openness to the diverse array of collective and
but he maintains that such rejection should take
individual rights demanded by Canada’s various
place in a sphere of understanding. We should at
citizens while promoting allegiance to the national
least properly understand what we reject and why
state. Deep diversity simultaneously promotes
we reject it. This understanding would enable us to
tolerance and cultivates commonality, thereby medi-
communicate our reasons for rejection to those
ating political fragmentation by addressing both of
who disagree. But the main problem is that our
the contrasting normative forces at work within it,
level of understanding exceeds our level of accep-
recognizing particularity and promoting unity.39
tance. We can perfectly understand what’s going
However, political reality proves that such an on (‘how they do things’) and we can compare
identity beyond boundaries is no easy achieve- their practices with practices which are common
ment. According to Mark Redhead, this attempt to within our own horizon. Nevertheless, this ‘same-
overcome political fragmentation fails because ness through otherness’ which connects us, this
Taylor is unable to be ‘open enough’ (and he also increase in knowledge, is insufficient to warrant
blames Taylor’s theism for this). But one could mutual acceptance. Sometimes the reasons for
question if the problem is solved merely by being rejection are simply inexplicable. With regard to
more open. Perhaps the real problem is that the ‘presumption of equal worth’, Taylor acknowl-
people’s particular ways of being authentic prevent edges that it rests on an article of faith. But, of
them from identifying on a higher, more encom- course, critics will point out that such articles are
passing level. essentially unwarranted. To act upon such articles
Secondly and related to this, even if we allow might indeed save us from unbridled arrogance,
for difference and conflict Taylor believes that but perhaps not from plain naïveté.42
moral space does not confront us with irreparable The fact that these optimistic elements can be
tragedy but that it only offers us a “challenge”. questioned from a pessimistic perspective shows
Practical reason is able to resolve conflicts that the project of re-sourcing is not self-evident.
between incommensurable goods.40 The con- And to the extent that it has its limits, the idea
frontation between these goods aims to be “error- of multiple and irreducible forms of authenticity
reducing”. But why? Is there not at least as much becomes more influential and the practice
reason to believe that practical deliberation could of second-guessing becomes more and more
polarize rather than compromise? There is no dangerous.
guarantee that conflict would be resolved if Mon-
tagues and Capulets would just try to sort things
8. Conclusion
out. And what if the contributors to the discussion
have different ideas about what should count as At the outset of this paper I said that the discus-
error-reducing? sion on negative and positive freedom should be
Thirdly, and more specifically with regard to endless. Therefore, it should be clear that I do not
the topic of multiculturalism, Taylor believes that want to refute Taylor’s communitarian project for

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 225

that would be to rule out an important contributor logue. To the extent that they recognize the tragedy
to the debate. Indeed, if the difference between in moral decision-making, they might grant to their
both authors ultimately rests on a difference opponents that their project is not without danger,
between an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook but they will think of it as a token of courage. They
on pluralism then it seems that such a definitive happily forsake the ‘clean hands’ of philosophy in
refutation is impossible. Optimism and pessimism order to fight for the best of all possible worlds.
are different ways of perceiving reality, different However, whenever the optimistic project fails or
ways of looking at things and, as such, they are falters, the pessimists are eager to explain this fail-
not open to falsification. ure in terms of insurmountable differences, incom-
The most appealing feature of Berlin’s two mensurability, intrinsic tragedy, unavoidable strife,
concepts of liberty is that it makes us aware of a etc. They will say that to absorb all human values
danger. This allows for tension and ambiguity into one notion of authenticity is both naïve and
because the fact that something is dangerous does dangerous. In short, the discussion which followed
not necessarily mean that it is not worthwhile. Sav- in the wake of Two Concepts of Liberty is a to and
ing a child from turbulent waters, for example, is fro between pessimistic vigilance and optimistic
surely dangerous and still we believe that we courage.
should take the risk and save the child. Likewise, Therefore, my criticism of Taylor should be
a conception of the good and authentic life is very interpreted as an attempt to give the debate new
much needed. But to define the boundaries of momentum. Michael Walzer once said that the
authenticity is to soften the edges of moral life; it back and forth between liberals and communitar-
is to fit into a harmonious whole something which ians is quite similar to the recurring fashions of
resists such neat boundaries. And this leaves us short skirts and pleated trousers.43 These styles
with a feeling of uneasiness. There is no single might skip a few seasons, but you can expect them
way of being authentic and the different sources of to return. If we take the communitarians to be
moral life can collide. The optimists will focus on pleating the trousers of liberals, then I guess I was
their victories: universally accepted values, grow- pleased to shorten the skirts on the communitarian
ing spheres of communality, inter-cultural dia- side.

Notes

1
Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty,” in The Idea Of Freedom: Essays in Honor of Isaiah Berlin,
ed. A. Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 176.
2
Ramin Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (London: Phoenix Press, 1991), 40.
3
Isaiah Berlin, “Five Essays on Liberty,” in Liberty, ed. H. Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32.
4
Isaiah Berlin, The Power of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 15.
5
Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Kant: Practical Philosophy, ed. & trans. M.J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94.
6
Gerald MacCallum, “Negative and Positive Freedom”, Philosophical Review 76 (1967): 314.
7
For a similar example see Berlin, The Power of Ideas, 15.
8
Tim Baldwin, “MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom,” Ratio 26, no. 2 (1984): 141.
9
Berlin, “Five Essays on Liberty,” 178.
10
Ibid., 35-36.
11
Unless we do not consider the ‘I’ to be different from the ‘we’. In other words, unless we would all (really) want
the same thing as in Rousseau’s proposed volonté générale. Berlin and Taylor had a different appreciation for Rousseau.

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 226

Berlin held him to be “one of the most sinister and most formidable enemies of liberty in the whole history of modern
thought”, whereas Taylor sees him as the originator of his key concept of authenticity. Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and its
Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty, ed. H. Hardy (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002), 49.
12
These two steps are mentioned both by Berlin and Taylor. Berlin, “Five Essays on Liberty,” 178-181; Taylor, “What’s
Wrong With Negative Liberty,” 181.
13
Baldwin, “MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom,” 135.
14
Taylor, “What’s Wrong With Negative Liberty,” 182.
15
Of course, Taylor does not use such crude phrasing because the fact that people can be forced to be free is exactly
what he wants to prevent. However, the idea is certainly lurking in the background.
16
Ibid., 191.
17
Ibid., 180.
18
Mark Redhead has even labeled Taylor’s view as “a communitarian brand of liberalism.” Mark Redhead, Charles
Taylor: Thinking and Living Deep Diversity, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 3.
19
Berlin, “Five Essays on Liberty,” 172.
20
Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), lvi-lvii.
21
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, xlviii-xlvix.
22
Berlin, “Five Essays on Liberty,” 213.
23
Ibid., 213-214.
24
Berlin, The Power of Ideas, 11.
25
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 51.
26
Taylor takes up the example of the irrationality of Nazi ethics. Charles Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,”
in The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 209. Although this paper
concentrates on the differences between Berlin and Taylor, their similarities are equally interesting. Both authors are united
in their fight for a decent society. They are partners in humanism. These similarities cut across a crude communitarian-
liberalist distinction.
27
Berlin says that we should strive towards a “minimally decent society”. The project of Avishai Margalit and his
‘decent society’ at many points seems to elaborate on this precise point; Avishai Margalit, Fatsoen als maatstaf
(Amsterdam: Boom, 2001).
28
Berlin, “Five Essays on Liberty,” 172.
29
Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 1.
30
Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 29.
31
Ibid., 39.
32
See, for instance, the example of homosexuality: Taylor rejects the individualist’s line of argumentation, not homo-
sexuality itself. Ibid., 38.
33
“Multiculturalism is precisely the condition where there is not a single societal culture or a single shared vocabulary,
but many.” See Rudi Visker, “Levinas, Multiculturalism and Us,” Ethical Perspectives 6, no. 2 (1999): 160.
34
David Baybrook, “Inward and Outward with the Modern Self,” Dialogue 13 (1994): 102.
35
Charles Taylor, “Reply to Baybrook and de Sousa,” Dialogue 13 (1994): 125.
36
“What different forms of the internalist view have in common is that they regard agents’ own assessments of their
behaviour as crucial in deciding whether they (the agents) are autonomous or not.” Ian Jennings, “Autonomy and
Hierarchical Compatibilism,” South African Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1997): 44.
37
For a more extensive and thorough discussion of the relation between Taylor’s conception of authenticity and per-
sonal autonomy see Stefaan Cuypers, “Taylors conceptie van persoonlijke autonomie in de morele psychologie,” in
Charles Taylor, eds. S. Cuypers and W. Lemmens (Kapellen: Kok Agora/Pelckmans, 1997), 75.
38
David Shoemaker, “Caring, Identification, and Agency,” Ethics 114, no. 1 (2003): 88-118.
39
Redhead, Charles Taylor: Thinking and Living Deep Diversity, 2 (also 14 and 18).
40
Nicholas Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals, and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 103.
41
Herman De Dijn, “Politiek van de erkenning en multiculturalisme,” in Charles Taylor, eds. S. Cuypers &
W. Lemmens (Kapellen: Pelckmans/Kok Agora, 1997), 156.
42
Ibid., 151.
43
Michael Walzer, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism”, Political Theory 18, no. 1 (1990): 6.

Ethical Perspectives 11 (2004)4, p. 227