Spirit and Purpose of the Law

GR202242
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

Facts

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner).By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected
departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of
petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to
determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having
two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the
Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative
in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to
Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral
arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the
arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately
executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within
ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads:
"This disposition is immediately executory."

The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in
the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that
Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not
together, but alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 an eighth
member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

Issues:

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss
the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in
the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the
Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert
the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the
rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should
there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

Ruling:

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are
distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the
body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the
ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon which government and society
were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly
relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be
maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to
interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular
letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been
otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its
other provisions.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the
JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio
Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the
Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them."

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the
Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the
sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become
judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can
convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest
intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional
provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17,
2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby
LIFTED
G.R. No. 200103 April 23, 2014

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

Facts

On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
issued Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V
(IO V) of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent
Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the
respondent's appointment.

In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G.
Lamorena rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on
nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct
and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however,
sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her
appointment is not yet complete.

On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed
Chairperson Quisumbing that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is
covered by the rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari
is considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere
member of the Commission En Banc.

Respondent Cortes appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was denied on
September 30, 2008.

Consequently, respondent Cortes filed a petition for review on November 24, 2008 before the
CSC.

On March 2, 2010 the CSC issued Resolution 10-0370 where it denied the petition and affirmed
the nepotic character of respondent Cortes’ appointment. Respondent Cortes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010.

Consequently, in a letter dated August 10, 2010, CHR Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge Ma.
Victoria V. Cardona terminated respondent’s services effective August 4, 2010.

On August 16, 2010, respondent Cortes filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
(CA).
On August 11, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullified Resolution
10-0370 dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes
be reinstated to her position as IO V in the CHR.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated January 10, 2012.

Issue of the Case

Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in
the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending
authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner
Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner
Mallari.

By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons
employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.2 In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as
IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.

Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not by
the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to
the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition
meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law,
can never have relatives to speak of.

Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body.1âwphi1 What cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts
that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's
abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil
sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for
the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality
and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 11, 2011 and
Resolution dated January 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 115380 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated March 2,
2010 affirming the CSC-NCR Decision dated September 30, 2008 invalidating the appointment
of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for being nepotistic is hereby REINSTATED.

Necessary Implications

G.R. No. 207412 August 7, 2013

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG, PETITIONER,

This case involves the consolidated petitions of petitioner Flord Nicson Calawag in G.R. No.
207412 and petitioners Micah P. Espia, Jose Marie F. Nasalga and Che Che B. Salcepuedes in
G.R. No. 207542 (hereinafter collectively known as petitioners), both assailing the decision1
dated August 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 05079. The CA
annulled the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67, granting a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent Dean Carlos Baylon of the
University of the Philippines Visayas (UP Visayas).

The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a
scholarship from the Department of Science and Technology-Philippine Council for Aquatic and
Marine Research and Development. They finished their first year of study with good grades, and
thus were eligible to start their thesis in the first semester of their second year. The petitioners
then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and obtained the consent
of Dr. Rex Baleña to be their thesis adviser, as well as the other faculty members’ consent to
constitute their respective thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the
petitioners sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of their thesis
committees. The letter contained the thesis committee members and the thesis adviser’s approval
of their titles, as well as the approval of Professor Roman Sanares, the director of the Institute of
Marine Fisheries and Oceanology.

Upon receipt of the petitioners’ letters, Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos addressed to
Professor Sanares, questioning the propriety of the thesis topics with the college’s graduate
degree program. He subsequently disapproved the composition of the petitioners’ thesis
committees and their tentative thesis topics. According to Dean Baylon, the petitioners’ thesis
titles connote a historical and social dimension study which is not appropriate for the petitioners’
chosen master’s degrees. Dean Baylon thereafter ordered the petitioners to submit a two-page
proposal containing an outline of their tentative thesis titles, and informed them that he is
forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the role of the adviser and of the thesis
committees.
The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC, asking it to
order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute the petitioners’ thesis committees and approve their
thesis titles. They also asked that the RTC issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against Dean Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while the suit was pending.

The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon allegedly
refused to follow. UP Visayas eventually assailed this order before the CA through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO).

The CA’s Ruling

In G.R. No. 207412, Calawag argues that the CA’s decision should be set aside for the following
reasons:

First, Calawag was entitled to the injunction prayed for, as he has clear rights under the law
which were violated by Dean Baylon’s actions. These are the right to education, the right to due
process, and the right to equal protection under the law. According to Calawag, Dean Baylon
violated his right to due process when he added to and changed the requirements for the
constitution of his thesis committee, without prior publication of the change in rules. Calawag’s
right to equal protection of the law, on the other hand, was allegedly violated because only
students like him, who chose Dr. Baleña for their thesis adviser, were subjected to the additional
requirements imposed by the dean, while the other students’ thesis committees were formed
without these impositions. Hence, Calawag and the three other petitioners in G.R. No. 207542
were unduly discriminated against

Court’s Ruling

Having reviewed the arguments presented by the petitioners and the records they have attached
to the petitions, we find that the CA did not commit an error in judgment in setting aside the
preliminary mandatory injunction that the RTC issued against Dean Baylon. Thus, there could be
no basis for the Court’s exercise of its discretionary power to review the CA’s decision.

"To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must establish the
following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory
injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus
more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents a fourth requirement: it] is justified only in a clear
case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or disputed, he
does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper."6

By necessary implication,8 the dean’s power to approve includes the power to disapprove the
composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP System’s faculty manual, the dean has
complete discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee.
Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the
Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CA’s interpretation
that the thesis committee’s composition needs the approval of the dean after the students have
complied with the requisites provided in Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual and Section
IX of the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.9

Anent the petitioners’ argument that Dean Baylon acted arbitrarily in imposing additional
requirements for the composition of the thesis committee, which according to Calawag violated
their right to due process, we hold that the dean’s authority to approve or disapprove the
composition of a thesis committee includes this discretion. We also note the CA’s finding that
these additional requirements were meant to assist the petitioners in formulating a thesis title that
is in line with the college’s master of fisheries program. Absent any finding of grave abuse of
discretion, we cannot interfere with the exercise of the dean’s prerogative without encroaching
on the college’s academic freedom.

the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San
Diego,13 we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the
Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements." The thesis
requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable
academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply
with.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY giving due course to the petitions in G.R. No.
207412 and G.R. No. 207542.