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REMEDIAL LAW 2 - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS / page 1
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
Interpleader (R -62)
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE

E. WON and BIENVENIDO A. TAN
G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976
FACTS: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club filed a complaint for
interpleader alleging two causes of action. For the first cause of
action, it alleges both Lee E. Won and Bienvenido Tan claims to
be the owner of membership fee certificate 201.
Won’s claim is by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case

26044 in CFI Manila while Tan’s claim is by virtue of
membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him by
"Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of
membership fee certificate 201. For its second cause of action, it
alleged that the membership fee certificate issued to Won by CFI
of Manila is null and void because issued in violation of its by-
laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the
outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may
be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its
president and secretary. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader suit may prosper when

one of the claimants is a winning litigant in a previous suit
involving the subject matter of the said interpleader.
HELD: The answer is in the negative for three reasons, namely:

(1) action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which
reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay; (2) present
application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the final judgment in the said civil case; and (3)
interpleader suit would compel the winning litigant to establish
his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish

litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit.
Action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late. A stakeholder

should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants
to court. He need not await actual institution of independent
suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should
file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a
dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the
contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or
undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view
of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
In this case, the Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason
why it did not file an application for interpleader in Civil Case
26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between
themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only
after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the
remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By then it was too late,
because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able
to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of
the claimants. Application for interpleader would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case.
A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated

adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his
claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in
effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. Instant
interpleader suit is contrary to the purposes of an interpleader
suit which is to diminish litigation. To now permit the
Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights in Civil Case 26044 to the
membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to
diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an
action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would
lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done
because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil
case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation
must submit to the consequences of defeat.
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK

CORPORATION vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 73794, September 19, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation

and private respondent North Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short)
executed a Land Development Agreement whereby the former
undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and
responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned
by private respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into
and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and price per
lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is
entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the
project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private
respondent through a designated depositary trustee bank.
All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership
over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with such
conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for
interpleader against private respondent MISSION and Maysilo
Estate. Private respondent presented a motion for the placing on
judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner.
Acting on such motion, the trial court denied the motion for
judicial deposit.
Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court

denying the motion for judicial deposit before the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC). IAC issued an order setting aside the
assailed order of the trial court and directed Eternal Gardens to
deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land
Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable
bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the
depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall

be found entitled thereto. Petitioner opposed the IAC decision
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stakeholder or the person who filed a

complaint for interpleader may refuse the order for judicial
deposit of the subject matter of the interpleader.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Under the circumstances,

there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections
to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for
the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for
interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only
required by the nature of the action but is a contractual
obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development
Program.
The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of

interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner,
is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the
court. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff
may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in
litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of
whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto."
SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A.

PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.
G.R. No. 136409, March 14, 2008
FACTS: Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners

executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former, as lessor,
agreed to lease to the latter several units of the San Luis Building.
Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals.
While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis

Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent.
Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista.

Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.
After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners

continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently,
respondent filed a complaint for ejectment was filed by private
respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for

the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but
claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to
receive payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not obligor may refuse payment of an

obligation on the ground that he does not know to whom
payment must be made.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Non-payment of rentals

because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should
be made did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were
the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have
availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on
the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on
interpleader.
Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides: If the creditor to whom

tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to
accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the
consignation of the thing or sum due. Consignation shall be made
by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial
authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in
a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in
other cases.
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever
in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is
not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the
conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate
their several claims among themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the

lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be
made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to
collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners

opted to refrain from making payments.
BANK OF COMMERCE (BOC) vs. PLANTERS

DEVELOPMENT BANK (PDB) and BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS
G.R. Nos. 154470-71, September 24, 2012
FACTS: RCBC owned two sets of Central Bank Bills (CB Bills): (1)
7 CB Bills worth P70 Million; and (2) 2 CB Bills worth P20
Million. The first set was sold to BOC which the latter in turn sold
to PDB. PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70
million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994. The second set of
CB Bills was sold by RCBC to PDB and subsequently acquired by
BOC. All in all, the BOC acquired the first and Second sets of CB
bills.
On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the

CB bills, PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the BSP’s
books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on
account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent
setoff or transfer."
BSP denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28

(Regulations Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization
of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of the
Public Debt) which requires the presentation of the bond before
a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP.
In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of

the CB bills, the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions
for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the
petition. It argued that the PDB has no cause of action against it
since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. On the other
hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10
(d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to
an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB
is neither.
Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed

between and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the
position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB
bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made
to the rightful owner.
PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and
substantiate their respective claims on the subject CB bills.
However, the total face value of the subject CB bills should be
deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only
upon order of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for interpleader may be made

an alternative defense in an answer.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The remedy of

interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the
specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and

secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions.
Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a

complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and
independent from, the answer.
Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the

Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a
claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may
be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This
does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general
procedures.
What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate
the interpleader suit through an original complaint but through
its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is
considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does
not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSP’s
books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered
even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon
maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an alternative position,
made only in the BSP’s Answer.
Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an

affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device of
a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood
this as in the nature of a motion, seeking relief which essentially
consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with
each other so that "payment is made to the rightful or legitimate
owner" of the subject CB bills.
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (R - 63)
EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA vs.

BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 150806, January 28, 2008
FACTS: Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed its

Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda with the following
terms: (1) leased property is 7,348.25 square meters of the
Almeda Compound in Pasong Tamo; (2) for a monthly rental of
P1,107,348.69; (4) term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997.
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter,

respondent dealt with petitioners, Ponciano’s heirs.
On two separate dates, petitioners advised respondent that the
former’s monthly rentals shall be inclusive of VAT and that
monthly rental shall be increased by 73%. Petitioner’s asserted
that the changes in the monthly rental is pursuant to Condition
No. 6 and 7 of the contract of lease.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as

demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
amount set forth in their contract. On February 18, 1998,
respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for
purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition
Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and
prejudice.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because

a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been
commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the
subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same
forum.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief may be

heard despite the existence of a pending action for rescission
involving the same parties and contract terms.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. It is true that in

Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held
that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in
view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer.
However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In

Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been
resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory
relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the
action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for
unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial
court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during
the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial
court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the
suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the
action for declaratory relief.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO

ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Myros M. Villanueva. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United
States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano
learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law: The OSG
contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien.
ISSUE: Whether or not a party may file a petition, not

denominated as petition for declaratory relief.
HELD: Yes. We note that the petition for authority to remarry

filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides: Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. xxxx
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there

must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)
that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
marriage.
CARMEN DANAO MALANA et al. vs. BENIGNO TAPPA

et al.
G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of

land which they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the
lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on
and occupy a portion of the subject property with the agreement
that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that
Anastacio and his heirs might need it. Averring that they already
needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the
same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners’
demand.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and argued that

their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek
complete relief from respondents. Petitioner’s Complaint should
not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for Quieting of Title falls under

the jurisdiction of RTC pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 63.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The second paragraph of

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1)
an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under
Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title,
authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an
action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the
Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three
remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because
they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the

litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR

COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013
FACTS: In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to

determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member
of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two
(2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1)
vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court ruled that the Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one
(1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
On July 31, 2012, respondents’ filed a motion for

reconsideration. Through the subject motion, respondents pray
that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not both the Senate and the House of

Representatives is entitled to only one seat in the Judicial and
Bar Council.
HELD: The language used in the Constitution must be taken to

have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word
employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its
deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification
even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA.

ROSARIO M. SABITSANA vs. JUANITO F.
MUERTEGUI
G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013
FACTS: When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for
registration and coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act or
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana opposed the
application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot.
On April 11, 2000, Juanito filed an action for quieting of title and
preliminary injunction before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naval, Biliran, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his
wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and
are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same,
which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted mainly
that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the marital
consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they
acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that the
Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise
insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran did
not have jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or
interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is merely
P1,230.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over an action for

quieting of title where the subject property is valued below
20,000.00 outside Metro Manila.
HELD: On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules

that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs,
regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute.
Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to
real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the
appropriate RTC.
Review of Judgments and Final Orders of the COMELEC

and COA (R - 64)
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

(ANAD) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
FACTS: In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013, the

COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of
Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from
participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that
while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-
defined political constituencies, its disqualification still subsists
for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its
failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure to
submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Hence, the present petition raising the issues of whether or not

the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the
assailed Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary
hearing mandated by the due process clause, and whether or not
the COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted only
three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007 Elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not a resolution of COMELEC may be

assailed via petition for certiorari on the ground of its failure to
set the case for a second evidentiary hearing.
HELD: The only question that may be raised in a petition for

certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing
of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific

meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down
as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross.
ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion

when it promulgated the assailed Resolution without giving
ANAD the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing, thus
violating its right to due process. It is to be noted, however, that
ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on23 August
2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD’s president,
authenticated documents and answered questions from the
members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD’s qualifications.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (R - 65)
Certiorari
OSCAR R. AMPIL vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 192685, July 31, 2013
FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance

Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project Development
Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower."
wherein the latter shall provide the real property while former
would construct and shoulder the cost of construction and
development of the condominium building. Due to financial
difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO.
Thus, MICO and ASB executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for
the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The

MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net
saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their
investments.
On 11 March 2005, two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title

(CCTs) were issued by Espenesin for 38 units and the allotted
parking spaces in Malayan Tower. The first was in the name of
MICO and the second in the name of ASB. The second set of CCTs
was issued upon the instruction of Serrano an officer of MICO.
Ampil, unsecured creditor of the ASB charged Espenesin with
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack

of probable cause for the alleged commission of falsification.
Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court before the appellate court. And as already stated,
the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to

determine the existence of probable cause may be assailed via
petition for certiorari
HELD: The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy

of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only
be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on
the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a

contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain which units and
parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His actions
would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a

lame claim of bona fide mistake.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. EMMA MONDEJAR

G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the

Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC,
seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71
which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1,
2002 to September 30, 2005.
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of

respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the MTCC in finding that petitioner failed to establish with
certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter
to pay the full amount sought to be collected.
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision dismissing the

petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed
to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as
provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small
Claims Cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not a decision on a complaint falling under

small claims cases may be questioned via petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 when the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases states that decisions rendered in such case is final and non-
appealable.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Considering the final

nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated
rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party
may, thus, immediately move for its execution.
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. PHILIPPINE

AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino which was

operated by respondent PAGCOR. Due to an altercation with a
customer, Petitioner was charged with Discourtesy towards a
casino customer. He was later on found him guilty of Discourtesy
towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day
suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the board’s
decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed
found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is
the appropriate penalty. His Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA.
Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR
in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the
proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing
the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse
to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him
was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s
appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the
performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which
is punishable only by reprimand.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari filed directly

before the CA may be dismissed on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Under the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have

availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE

JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013
FACTS: Private respondents were charged before the CTA for

misdeclaration of goods. Subsequent to the filing by prosecution
of its Formal Offer of Evidence, Private Respondent filed their
Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence which was
granted by the CTA.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia

and Vestidas Jr. in its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for failure of
the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the
prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public
documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact
issued by the legal custodians.
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was

denied by the CTA, stressing, among others, that to grant it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition
for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CTA.
ISSUE: Whether or not a final decision in a criminal complaint

may be assailed by way of petition for certiorari.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. While a judgment of

acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown
that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. In this case, a
perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose
any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial of
due process. The records are replete with indicators that the
petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact,
presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF

REGENTS vs. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN
G.R. No. 110280, October 12, 1993
FACTS: Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the UP College of

Law, applied for Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program
(STFAP).
U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal

(SDT). SDT rendered a decision finding him guilty of "wilfully
and deliberately withholding information in his STFAP
application about the income of his mother, who is living abroad,
in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,
which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his
studies.
As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion

from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP
benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make
reimbursement. The Executive Committee affirmed the decision
of the SDT. Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). BOR
affirmed the decision of the SDT. Nadal forthwith filed a motion
for reconsideration of the BOR decision.
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the BOR found Nadal guilty
and imposed upon him the penalties of suspension for one (1)
year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of

good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as
Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received
with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-
issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his
financial obligations with the university.
Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a

petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer
for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the
BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V.
Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and

prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction and
alleged that RTC judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing a
writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from
implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.
Private respondent opposed the petition and argued that Dr.

Caoili, not having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a
collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who
verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents" nor "the
University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in interest
who should file the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not a respondent to a petition for certiorari

may assail the legal standing of the petitioner when the former
had specifically named the latter in a petition for mandamus for
which the injunction was issued and is assailed in the certiorari
petition.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. A real party in interest is

one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere

interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest."
ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON vs.

REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, et al.
G.R. No. 70484, January 29, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Tuasons bought from Carmel Farms,

Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan City. The said land had been
earlier purchased by Carmel from the Government by
installment with the following clause: “in the event of default by
a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and
interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had the
duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit
to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien.”
On September 14, 1973, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.

293 which invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor,
Carmel. Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that
Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. The Tuason
Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which
deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group.
Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his

comment on the petition, he questioned the propriety of the
remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not
appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial
or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not a presidential proclamation annulling a

registered title over a real property may be assailed via petition
for certiorari.
HELD: It is true that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may

properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike
the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either

judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the
same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to
"proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ...
exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will
be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an
unlawful exercise of judicial power.
PROVINCE OF LEYTE vs. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 203124, June 22, 2015
FACTS: Sometime in 2006 and 2007, the Province of Leyte

issued four (4) separate franchise tax assessments against EDC,
which the latter, in turn, protested separately. When the
Province of Leyte effectively denied all protests, EDC appealed
such denials before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City,
Branch 6 (RTC). Upon motion of EDC, the RTC issued an order
directing the consolidation of said appeals.
Notwithstanding the pendency of the cases before the RTC, the
Province of Leyte issued another tax assessment against EDC on
February 27, 2008, with the Assistant Provincial Treasurer
verbally intimating to EDC that he was under strict instruction
from the Governor to enforce the collection of tax through the
available administrative remedies upon the lapse of the sixty
(60)-day period mentioned in the assessment.
This prompted EDC to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of

Preliminary Injunction praying that the RTC enjoin the Province
of Leyte "from assessing to collect franchise taxes from, against
[EDC] until [the pending cases before the RTC] shall have been
resolved with finality.
RTC denied EDC's motion on the ground that its grant would in
effect dispose of the cases before it. However, on EDC's
motion, the RTC issued an Order setting aside its earlier order,
and accordingly, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in its favor. Aggrieved, the Province of Leyte elevated
the matter before the CA by way of a petition for certiorari.
CA dismissed the petition on the ground that, inter alia, "there
was no proper proof of service of the petition to the adverse party.
Certainly, registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient
proper proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail."
The Province of Leyte moved for reconsideration, which was,

however, denied in a Resolution; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Province
of Leyte's certiorari petition before it due to its failure to provide
proof of service of the same on EDC.
RULING: No, the CA erred in dismissing the petition.
A petition for certiorari is, by nature, an original and

independent action, and therefore, not considered as part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. Being an original action, there is a need for the
CA to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the
case before it can resolve the same on the merits. Naturally, the
CA acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner –
which is the Province of Leyte in this case – upon the filing of the
certiorari petition. On the other hand, Section 4, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court (Rules), which covers cases originally filed before
the CA, provides how the CA is able to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent.
Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA , the latter

acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a)
the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial
action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.
Prohibition
ALFEO D. VIVAS vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013
FACTS: On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 27623

placing Eurocredit Bank under receivership. Assailing MB
Resolution No. 276, Vivas (member of Eurocredit Bank new
management team) filed this petition for prohibition before this
Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for
prohibiting Eurocredit Bank from continuing its banking
business and for placing it under receivership.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is the proper

remedy to assail an order of the BSP to place a bank under
receivership.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Vivas Availed of the Wrong

Remedy. To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The
MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the
exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653.
Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under

conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be
restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari.
Pertinent portions of Section 30, R.A. 7653 read: x x x x The
actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under
Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not
be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for
certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may
only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the
majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by
the board of directors of the institution of the order directing

receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.
ROSENDO R. CORALES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186613, August 27, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Corales appointed Dr. Angeles as Municipal

Administrator during his Second and Third term as mayor of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, the Sangguniang Bayan
disapproved petitioner Dr. Angeles’ appointment on the ground
of nepotism, unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. Even so,
petitioner Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions and
duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an
annual salary.
Andal, Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit

Observation Memorandum (AOM) addressed to petitioner
Corales who was asked to comment/reply. The AOM states that:
As Angeles’ appointment was not confirmed by Sangguniang
Bayan, he is considered merely a de facto officer.
As De Facto officer, he may be entitlted to emoluments of the

office for actual services rendered but instead of the municipality
of Nagcarlan, it should be Petitioner Corales who should
shoulder the petitioner Dr. Angeles’ salary according to the Local
Government Code.
Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, petitioners

filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal to
recall its AOM and to eventually desist from collecting
reimbursement from petitioner Corales for the salaries paid to
and received by petitioner Dr. Angeles for the latter’s services as
Municipal Administrator.
OSG, on Andal’s behalf, filed a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court

denied the said Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was
merely a nominal party. Respondent Republic filed a Petition for

Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5
September 2007, as it unjustly denied respondent’s right to
actively prosecute the case through a mere declaration that it was
a nominal party despite a clear showing that the Petition for
Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest.
Court of Appeals granted respondent’s Petition for Certiorari

dismissed petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition may be availed

of to assail an Audit Observation Memorandum of the Provincial
State Auditor stating that according to law the petitioner is liable
to pay and requiring the petitioner to submit a comment thereon.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Settled is the rule that for
the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the following
must be extant: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for
adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the
"standing."
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights,

an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a mere hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question
must be ripe for adjudication. A question is considered ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
A mere issuance stating a possible liability and requiring a

person to comment thereon cannot be considered an actual
controversy over which the power of judicial review may be

exercise by way of petition for prohibition.
Mandamus
NILO HIPOS vs. HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO

A. BAY
G.R. Nos. 174813-15, March 17, 2009
FACTS: Two Information for the crime of rape and one

Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed
against petitioners. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Information had
been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay
granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
On the other hand, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to
Dismiss the Cases before the City Prosecutor on the ground of
lack of probable cause. On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City
Prosecutor affirmed the Information filed against petitioners.
Thereafter, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera,

treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss as an appeal of the
10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10
August 2004. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw

Information in an Order of even date. Without moving for a
reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the trial
court to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by virtue
of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor finding no
probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a
motion to withdraw information.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Mandamus is an

extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to
do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or
when the respondent excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to

compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes
upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment
that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR

A. METEORO vs. ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his
capacity as DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
G.R. No. 161735, September 25, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner were former constable in the Philippine

Constabulary (PC) that were discharged from the service due to
administrative cases filed against them. On appeal, they were
both cleared of all charges and thereafter applied for
reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up
to the integration of the PC into the PNP.
As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the

PNP, the constables in the list requested the assistance of the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG). DILG Secretary sent a memorandum to the Chief of the

PNP.
As petition for absorption is yet to be acted upon, petitioners filed

a petition for mandamus with RTC against the PNP Chief. During
the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution
No. 99-061 on April 19, 1999 recalling the earlier Resolution No.
98-105.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public official who has the power to

appoint/reinstate may be compelled by mandamus to appoint or
reinstate petitioners previously discharged from service.
HELD: No. In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it

is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right
to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand,
respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is
demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or
to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over
which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the
writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the
writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) et al. vs. HON. JOSE

L. ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance

No. 8027 which became effective on December 28, 2001.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators
of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies

Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.
However, implementation of the ordinance was repeatedly

postpone. Thus, petitioners filed this original action for
mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal
duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code
(RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal
of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has
allowed them to stay.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus may be issued in order to

compel the enforcement of an ordinance.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Mandamus is an

extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of
the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.
When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its

object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested
in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as
residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never
questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. MANILA ECONOMIC AND

CULTURAL OFFICE and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner sent a letter to the COA requesting for a "copy

of the latest financial and audit report" of the MECO invoking,
for that purpose, his "constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern." In reply to the said letter, Assistant
Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum referring the
petitioner’s request to COA Assistant Commissioner Emma M.
Espina for "further disposition." In this memorandum, however,
Assistant Commissioner Naranjo revealed that the MECO was
"not among the agencies audited by any of the three Clusters of
the Corporate Government Sector."
Taking the 25 August 2010 memorandum as an admission that

the COA had never audited and examined the accounts of the
MECO, the petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus on
8 September 2010. Petitioner filed the suit in his capacities as
"taxpayer, concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and
law book author." He impleaded both the COA and the MECO.
Petitioner posits that by failing to audit the accounts of the

MECO, the COA is neglecting its duty under Section 2(1), Article
IX-D of the Constitution to audit the accounts of an otherwise
bona fide GOCC or government instrumentality.
It is the adamant claim of the petitioner that the MECO is a

GOCC without an original charter or, at least, a government
instrumentality, the funds of which partake the nature of public
funds.
COA argues that the instant petition already became moot when
COA Chairperson Maria Gracia M. Pulido-Tan (Pulido-Tan)
issued Office Order No. 2011-69850 on 6 October 2011.51 The
COA notes that under Office Order No. 2011-698, Chairperson
Pulido-Tan already directed a team of auditors to proceed to
Taiwan, specifically for the purpose of auditing the accounts of,

among other government agencies based therein, the MECO.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for mandamus may be denied

on the ground of mootness
HELD: No. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical

formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal

duty, coupled with the pressing public interest in the resolution
of all related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive
ruling thereon, if not for the proper guidance of the government
or agency concerned, then for the formulation of controlling
principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in
general. For this purpose, the Court invokes its symbolic
function.
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA vs.

SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE OF 2014 OF
THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the

Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He
was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian,
receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate
and be commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.
Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was

late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also
reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of
Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the
Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia
incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee

(HC) per violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving
statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating
that his 4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the
succeeding class.
Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report.

The HC constituted a team to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be
formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty
verdict and upon the order of the Chairman, the HC reconvened
in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0
guilty verdict. The HC denied Cudia’s appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petition for mandamus is proper

remedy.
HELD: No. The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant

awards, and commission officers in the military service are
discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a

petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a

right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a

ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be
performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a
discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how
or when to perform the duty.
Quo Warranto (R - 66)
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by

SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
FACTS: From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the

faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law. While
being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006,
Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO
cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on
Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO)

certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any
permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover,
out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of
UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth
SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets”
or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of
any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence
of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were
recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On

2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the
JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which
are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the
government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from
the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that
“applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private
practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector
and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time
she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that
“considering that most of her government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider
it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance
issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There
was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this,
on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief
Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty.

Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make
truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of
Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of
probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman
of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of
Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN,
but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998
SALN only in 2003
ISSUE: Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due
course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
HELD: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable

officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to

issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that
the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-
reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a
judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment
is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it.
Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character –

it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This
constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor
of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government
including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a

judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election
or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules
while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the
violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings
referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is
the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may
not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public

wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude
within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the government
policy on the matter at hand.
PEDRO MENDOZA vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO

OLORES
G.R. No. 131977, February 4, 1999
FACTS: Mendoza filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas

as the latter was appointed (by President Ramos) to the former’s
position while the former was temporarily designated in
Cagayan. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered
the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III,
and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to
the same position with payment of full back salaries and other
benefits appurtenant thereto.
Allas appealed to the CA. While the case was pending before said
court, respondent Allas was promoted to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. The
CA dismissed the appeal upon the motion of the Petitioner. The
order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made
on March 19, 1996.
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion

for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied
the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by
respondent Allas was now being occupied by Olores who was not
a party to the quo warranto petition. He alleges that he should
have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment
because the subject position was never vacant to begin with.
Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have
vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the

same.
Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity
allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for quo warranto that was

granted may be executed against the new person occupying the
position vacated by respondent in the said petition.
HELD: No. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to

determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the privilege.
MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA et al. vs. JOSE PIERRE A.

PANDAY et al.
G.R. No. 168696, February 28, 2006
FACTS: On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the

Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo
warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents
alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial
court, they had been members of the board of directors and
officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May
2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and
stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of
armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to
Respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for quo warranto is the proper

remedy to assail the persons who usurped the powers of a board
member of a private corporation.
HELD: No. Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office
in a private corporation.
As declared by Justice Jose Y. Feria in Unilongo v. Court of

Appeals, Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp
a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit
their office; and associations which act as corporations without
being legally incorporated”
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo

warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or
franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally
incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the
Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto
filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being
questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the
office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John
Hospital, Incorporated.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of

CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
FACTS: CIBAC, a party-list submitted a list of five nominees

from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the required number of qualifying votes in May 2007
Election. The second nominee in the list is herein petitioner.
However, the president of CIBAC filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Second, Fourth and

Fifth nominees.
After the election, as CIBAC was declared to be entitled to two

seats, it was requested to the Secretary General of the House of
Representative to have the petitioner sworn in as the second
nominee of the party list. The said request was not granted in
view of the pending motion for substitution of nominees.
COMELEC approves the withdrawal and substitution of the
nomination. As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed
Cruz-Gonzales (third nominee) as the official second nominee of
CIBAC.
Hence, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent

COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of
CIBAC and assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
promulgated on January 12, 2007.
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning

party-list organization has been done and its nominee has
assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives
falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the
question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a
special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special
civil action for certiorari in this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not special civil action for quo warranto is the
proper remedy of an alleged winning party-list nominee seeking
to oust proclaimed nominee of the same party list.
HELD: No. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to

questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the
winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner
in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly
speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy

because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent
may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest

nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar
situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second
nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be
available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another
party-list organization to determine which between the defeated
and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a
nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to
unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization.
Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-
Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause
of disqualification for her.
Expropriation (R - 67)
CITY OF MANILA vs. OSCAR SERRANO et al.

G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001
FACTS: City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833,

authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s
First District in Tondo. Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court
issued an order, directing petitioner to deposit the amount of
P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties.
After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court issued
another order, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of petitioner.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of

Appeals held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream
International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the other modes of
acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first
be tried by the city government before it can resort to

expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so,
the Court of Appeals gave judgment for respondents and
enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C.
ISSUE: Whether or not compliance of an LGU in an

expropriation proceeding to the legal requirement that the
government must try other modes of acquisition before resorting
to expropriation is condition sine qua non before the court may
issue a writ of possession.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Upon the filing of the

complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the
defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon
the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with
the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be
held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit
shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the
deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the
Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized
government depositary.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or
other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession
of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to
the court with service of copies to the parties. Thus, a writ of
execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the
government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject
to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this
case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became
the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of
possession.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE
G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004
FACTS: NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and

exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent Pobre
is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land located in Tiwi,
Albay. In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort
subdivision. On 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for
one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.
Subsequently, NPC filed two expropriation case over a portion of
the said property, i.e., first for the 8,311.60 square-meter portion
of the Property and second for the 5,554 square-meter lot (1
September 1979).
On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second

expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an
alternative site. The trial court granted NPC’s motion to dismiss
but the trial court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim
for damages. Thereafter, trial court issued a judgment ordering
the plaintiff to pay the defendant P3,448,450.00 PESOS which is
the fair market value of the subdivision of defendant with an area
of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty nine (68,969) square
meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum from September 6,
1979 and damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. NPC
insists that at the time that it moved for the dismissal of its
complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a motion for
summary judgment on NPC. Thus, NPC as plaintiff had the right
to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. NPC relies
on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then
in effect. NPC argues that the dismissal of the complaint should
have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case including
Pobre’s counterclaim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on dismissal of action as a matter

of right is applicable to a special civil action of expropriation.
HELD: No. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided

the exception to the general rule that the dismissal of the
complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. For
as long as all of the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present
the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiff’s
will. The defending party and even the courts were powerless to
prevent the dismissal. The courts could only accept and record
the dismissal.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DPWH) vs.

ISMAEL ANDAYA
G.R. No. 160656, June 15, 2007
FACTS: Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated with

Andaya to enforce the 60-meter easement of right-of-way. The
easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1,
Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project. The parties,
however, failed to reach an agreement.
On December 13, 1995, the Republic instituted an action to

enforce the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain. The
trial court issued a writ of possession on April 26, 1996. It also
constituted a Board of Commissioners (Board) to determine the
just compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of
Expropriation upon payment of just compensation.
On December 10, 1998, the Board reported that the project

would affect a total of 10,380 square meters of Andaya’s
properties, 4,443 square meters of which will be for the 60-meter
easement. The Board also reported that the easement would
diminish the value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As a
result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages
amounting to P2,820,430 for the remaining area.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic liable for just compensation

if in enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property,
the remaining area would be rendered unusable and
uninhabitable.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. “Taking,” in the exercise

of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the
government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner
of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a
practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his
property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of
the remaining area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden was
imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession
of the property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and
affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the
floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the
remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming
from the Agusan River.
JOCELYN S. LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner, v. LAND

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THROUGH
THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER,
Respondents
G.R. No. 158464, August 2, 2016
FACTS: Petitioner, Limkaichong, was the registered owner of

agricultural lands covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
(OCT) FV-344001, OCT No. 34402, and OCT No. 34403. For
purposes of placing those lands within the coverage of RA 6657,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) sent to her several Notices of Land Valuation and
Acquisition by which the said lands were valued for acquisition
by the DAR.
The petitioner rejected such valuation of her lands, the DARAB

conducted summary administrative proceedings for the
determination of just compensation. On May 28, 1999, the
DARAB issued its order affirming the valuation of the lands upon
finding the valuation consistent with existing administrative
guidelines on land valuation.
On August 19, 1999, the petitioner filed in RTC a complaint for

the fixing of just compensation for her lands, impleading as
defendant the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the DAR.
Limkaichong prayed that the DARAB valuation be set aside and

declared null and void, and that in its stead the price of her lands
be fixed based on the fair market value thereof. The respondents
filed a manifestation and motion to dismiss, stating that the
petitioner’s failure to timely appeal the May 28, 1999 DARAB
order had rendered the order final and executory.
The RTC sitting as SAC granted the respondents’ motion to
dismiss. It held that the petitioner’s complaint should have been
filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed order. It dismissed
her argument that the case was anchored on violations of her
constitutional rights to due process and just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court’s dismissal of her petition

because of her failure to file it before the decision or order of the
DARAb became final and executory pursuant to Section 51 of RA
No. 6657 was fair and proper.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that

"private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Under existing law and regulation, respondent LBP is tasked

with the responsibility of initially determining the value of lands
placed under land reform and the just compensation to be paid
the landowners for their taking. By way of notice sent to the

landowner pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA No. 6657, the DAR
makes an offer to acquire the land sought to be placed under
agrarian reform. If the concerned landowner rejects the offer, a
summary administrative proceeding is held, and thereafter the
Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), the Regional Adjudicator
(RARAD) or the Central Adjudicator (DARAB), as the case may
be, fixes the price to be paid for the land, based on the various
factors and criteria as determined by law or regulation. Should
the landowner disagree with the valuation, he/she may bring the
matter to the RTC acting as the SAC. This is the procedure for the
determination of just compensation under RA No. 6657. There
appears to be no question on the respondents' observance of the
proper procedure for acquisition of the petitioner's lands.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain is a

judicial function. However, the more recent jurisprudence
uphold the preeminence of the pronouncement in Philippine
Veterans Bank to the effect that the parties only have 15 days
from their receipt of the decision/order of the DAR within which
to invoke the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC;
otherwise, the decision or order attains finality and
immutability.
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage (R - 68)
JOSE T. RAMIREZ vs. THE MANILA BANKING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198800, December 11, 2013
FACTS: Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land in favor

of respondent The Manila Banking Corporation to secure his
P265,000 loan. The real estate mortgage provides that all
correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications
of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to petitioner Ramirez at his
given address.
Respondent filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real

estate mortgage before Atty. Hipolito Sañez on the ground that
Ramirez failed to pay his loan despite demands. During the
auction sale on September 8, 1994, respondent was the only
bidder for the mortgaged properties. Thereafter, a certificate of
sale was issued in its favor as the highest bidder.
Ramirez sued respondent for annulment of sale and prayed that

the certificate of sale be annulled on the ground, among others,
that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage was violated for he
was not notified of the foreclosure and auction sale. The trial
court ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were
null and void and the certificate of sale is invalid. The CA
reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the breach in the stipulation requiring

personal notice to the mortgagor annuls a concluded
extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
HELD: Yes. A contract is the law between the parties and …

absent any showing that its provisions are wholly or in part
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy, it shall be enforced to the letter by the courts. When
respondent failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure
sale to Ramirez, it committed a contractual breach of said
paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale on September 8, 1994 null and void.
Section 3, Act No. 3135 reads: The Act only requires (1) the
posting of notices of sale in three public places, and (2) the
publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation.
Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary.
Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage contract are not

precluded from exacting additional requirements.
SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J.

MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES CARLITO ALINDOG AND
CARMEN ALINDOG
G.R. No. 184045, January 22, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Anita Marquez extended a loan to Benjamin

Gutierrez secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land
located in Tagaytay. The mortgage was duly annotated on the
dorsal portion of TCT No. T-13443, which Sps. Marquez had
verified as clean prior to the mortgage.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation,

Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject
property. At the public auction sale, Anita emerged as the highest
bidder. Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property
within the prescribed period, title was consolidated under the
name of Sps. Marquez, which, however, bore an annotation of
adverse claim dated March 2, 2000 in the names of respondents-
spouses Alindog. Said annotation was copied from an earlier
annotation on TCT No. T-13443 made only after the subject
property’s mortgage to Sps. Marquez.
Subsequently, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for annulment of real

estate mortgage and certificate of sale against Sps. Marquez.
Meanwhile, Anita filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession before the RTC. RTC granted the same.
Claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury, Sps. Alindog
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. After further proceedings
on the injunction case, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
subject property until after the controversy has been fully
resolved on the merits.
Aggrieved, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration, essentially

pointing out that, as the confirmed and registered owners of the
subject property, they are entitled to its possession as a matter of
right. They argued that pursuant to Sections 728 and 829 of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the RTC was legally bound
to place them in possession of the subject property pending
resolution of the annulment case. Further, it is their position that
the purpose for the issuance of the injunctive writ – i.e., to
restrain the implementation of the writ of possession – had
already been rendered moot and academic by its actual
enforcement in the interim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may issue a writ of

preliminary injunction to enjoin the possession of the winning
bidder in a foreclosure sale after the lapse of the redemption
period.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. It is an established rule that

the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to
the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed
in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the
expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
A writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser should

issue as a matter of right, and thus, merely constitutes a
ministerial duty on the part of the court.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the

purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of
an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged
property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property
by adverse title or right.
The phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property

adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a situation in
which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in
their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the
owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be
possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor." The third person must
therefore claim a right superior to that of the original mortgagor.
In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in

favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already consolidated their title
over the extra-judicially foreclosed property, is merely
ministerial in nature. The general rule as herein stated – and not
the exception found under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules –
should apply since Sps. Alindog hinged their claim over the
subject property on their purported purchase of the same from
its previous owner, i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the
original mortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted
that Sps. Alindog are only the latter’s (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-
in-interest who do not have a right superior to them.
Partition (R - 69)
Figuracion v. Vda. De Figuracion

G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
FACTS: On August 23, 1955, Leandro Figuraciom executed

a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six
children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two
parcels of land. Leandro had inherited both lots from his
deceased parents.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was

a dispute between petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary,
over the eastern half of Lot.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without

any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only
legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the Court of
Appeals that “certain expenses” including those related to her

father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled.
On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale

over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who
in turn immediately caused the cancellation of OCT and the
issuance of TCT in their names.
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and
returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and
relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern
half of Lot No. 707.
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria

and her agents threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who,
in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707
as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705. respondent Emilia instituted
the herein Complaint15 for the partition
ISSUE: The respondent can compel the partition of Lot
HELD: YES. Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the
eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaim executed
by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of
the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. It is well to recall that the
petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the
Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been
rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and
Hilaria―this contention is, of course, flawed.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person

does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or
that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties
may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.36 Stated differently, placing a
parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The

certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.37 In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was
precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully
establish, as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
CARMELA BROBIO MANGAHAS vs. EUFROCINA A.

BROBIO
G.R. No. 183852, October 20, 2010
FACTS: Pacifico died intestate and was survived by his wife,

respondent Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three
illegitimate children. Petitioner Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one
of the illegitimate children. The heirs of the deceased executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Respondent agreed to
pay the petitioner for the latter’s share in the estate. Upon
demand, Respondent failed to pay but subsequently issued a
Promissory Note in favor of the petitioner.
When the promissory note fell due, respondent failed and

refused to pay despite demand. Thus, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against
respondent. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
CA reversed the trial court decision and held that the waiver of
petitioner’s share in the three properties, as expressed in the
deed of extrajudicial settlement, may not be considered as the
consideration of the promissory note, considering that petitioner
signed the Deed way back in 2002 and she had already received
the consideration of P150,000.00 for signing the same. The CA
went on to hold that if petitioner disagreed with the amount she
received, then she should have filed an action for partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for partition is the proper

remedy to contest the terms of the extra-judicial settlement.
HELD: The remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one

under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the
property is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs
had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and
waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no
longer under a state of cownership; there is nothing more to be
partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one
person.
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (R - 70)
CARMENCITA SUAREZ vs. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E.

EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY–DELANTAR
G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014
FACTS: Spouses Padilla owned Lot No. 1907–A which he

partitioned among their heirs among which are Claudia and
Vicente who are the predecessors of herein Respondent and
Petitioner respectively. In 2004, respondents (heirs of Claudia)
were asked by the Heirs of Vicente (predecessor of petitioner), to
vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907–A–5, a
landlocked portion (of the same inherited property) sans a right
of way. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s
inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907–A–2. Thereafter,
respondents received from Petitioner Carmencita a demand
letter requiring them to vacate the subject lot and informing
them that Carmencita had already purchased the subject lot from
the Heirs of Vicente. Respondents ignore the demand and filed a
complaint for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of
new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No.
1907–A.
Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a

complaint for unlawful detainer. She alleged that she bought the
subject lot from Heirs of Vicente, the registered owners thereof
and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same
by mere tolerance. Respondent opposed the said action on the

following grounds: (1) complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate – lack of specific averment as to when
and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began; (2)
the pendency of another action (partition) anchored on the issue
of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit
involving the same real property.
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims and ordered the

respondents to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense
all the improvements they had built thereon.
RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. CA rendered a

decision reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and
dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint for unlawful detainer which

merely alleges prior legal possession by tolerance without
specific averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of
the defendants began is sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction.
HELD: No. In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following

key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established:
1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice
by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s
right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.
CGR CORPORATION vs. ERNESTO L. REYES, JR.

G.R. No. 170916, April 27, 2007
FACTS: Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of

public land even before he notarized separate Fishpond Lease
Agreement in their respective favor were approved in October
2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five
(25) years or until December 31, 2024.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent)

allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties
and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up
a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’
fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and
fingerlings owned by petitioners.
On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed complaints

for Forcible Entry against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.
In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the
Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ complaint for

damages on three grounds – litis pendentia, res judicata and
forum shopping. Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint
on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for
damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on
the forcible entry cases has been made."
ISSUE: Whether, during the pendency of their separate

complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently
institute and maintain an action for damages
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The recoverable

damages in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases thus refer
to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property"
and attorney’s fees and costs.
Settled is the rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that
can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of
rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those
which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but
which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.
SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C.

ERORITA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO
and ANTONIO DUMLAO, Respondents
G.R. No. 195477, January 25, 2016
FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao are the registered

owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-53000. The San
Mariano Academy structures are built on the property.
The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial

foreclosure sale on April 25, 1990 because the former owners,
Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita, failed to redeem it. The
title was consolidated in the buyers' name.
The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue

to operate the school on the property. The Spouses Erorita
appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San Mariano
Academy's administrators.
The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a

monthly rent of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but had
failed to pay rentals since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered
that the Dumlaos allowed them to continue to run the school
without rental out of goodwill and friendship.
On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the

petitioners to vacate the property. Although the Spouses Erorita
wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school
without clearance from the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports to whom they are... accountable.
On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for

recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In their joint answer, the defendants prayed that the complaint

be dismissed because they cannot be forced to vacate and to pay
the rentals under their factual circumstances.
On June 4, 2007, the RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao's

favor.
The defendants Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the

complaint patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction.
HELD: No. The MTC had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is based on

the allegations in the complaint.
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege

that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property,
either by contract or by plaintiffs tolerance; (b) the plaintiff
notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated;
(c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff
of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property.
A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of
real property will not be considered as an action for unlawful
detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.
Contempt (R - 71)
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

CHAIRMAN
PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., et al vs. MANUEL D.
RECTO et al.
G.R. No. 129521, September 7, 1999
FACTS: SEC Chairman Yasay, upon request of certain

stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation, issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport
Resources Corporation from holding the July 9, 1996 scheduled
annual meeting of the stockholders. Notwithstanding the SEC's
TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the meeting on July 9,
1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay.
On July 10, 1996, the SEC declared the stockholders meeting of

Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and
void and directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July
15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in
contempt.
At the hearing on July 15, 1996, respondent Manalaysay

questioned the validity of the TRO as well as the contempt
proceedings in light of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals
restraining the SEC from enforcing its TRO.
After the hearing, the SEC issued an order stating Manalaysay

and Ricalde are GUILTY OF CONTEMPT. After due proceedings,
on April 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing and setting aside the SEC order declaring respondents
guilty of contempt. On May 2, 1997, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on June 11, 1997, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion. Petitioner appealed to the
SC.
On October 7, 1997, respondents filed their comment. In the

main, respondents submit that contempt is criminal in character
and their exoneration from a charge of contempt amounts to an
acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contempt instituted motu proprio

and holding of guilty thereof by a quasi-judicial agency when
reversed on appeal before the CA may again be appealed to the
SC.
HELD: We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt

partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The exoneration of
the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from
which an appeal would not lie.
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil

contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be
done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any
conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court.
Petitioners argue that the contempt committed by respondents
was civil in nature, as the temporary restraining order the SEC
issued was for the benefit of a party to a case.
Hence, there was no willful disobedience to a lawful order of the

SEC. Respondents were not guilty of contempt.
SALVADOR SISON vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR.,

Presiding Judge, and TEODORO S. ALVAREZ, Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 253
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771, May 27, 2004
FACTS: On September 29, 1999, Sison, an MMDA officer

apprehended Caoibes III for violating a no right turn sign while
the latter was driving along EDSA. Caoibes III introduce himself
to be the son of RTC Judge Caoibes Jr. and plead that he had an
official errand for his father. Notwithstanding such introduction
and plea, Sison confiscated the driver’s license of Caoibies III,
even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody

who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before.
On September 15, 1999, Judge Caoibes Jr. issued an order

requiring Sison to appear before him to explain a traffic incident
involving his son and to show cause why he should not be cited
as in contempt of court. Because of the complainant’s failure to
appear as directed, Judge Caoibes Jr., issued another Order
dated September 22, 1999 for the complainant’s arrest and
commitment, and for the latter to personally appear for hearing
before his sala on September 29, 1999. On the scheduled hearing,
the complainant appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to
the court that he made a mistake and that it was all a
misunderstanding. The respondent judge, thereafter, lifted the
September 22, 1999 Order.
Sison filed an administrative case against Judge Caoibes, Jr., and

alleged the following: (1) that former was charged for indirect
contempt for apprehending the latter’s son for traffic violation;
(2) that former was arrested and was only released upon
admitting his mistakes in relation to the apprehension under
duress; and (3) that the acts of respondents in arresting him
without any warrant of arrest before a charge of indirect
contempt is heard constitute the gravest ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY ever committed by the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of an MMDA officer in

apprehending a person, who while not an official employee of the
judiciary was allegedly performing official function for his father
who is a judge, is contumacious act under Section 3, Rule 71.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The act complained against

must be any of those specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which
requires that the person obstructed should be performing a duty
connected with judicial functions.
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and
remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance towards and
deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and
accommodation due to a court of law and its representative.
The refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause
resentment on the part of the respondent Judge (whom Sison
most likely did not yet know at the time) because he knew, as a
public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of
enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against
swerving into a one-way street from the wrong direction,
regardless of the office or position of the violator’s father.
The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no

legitimate basis by which to consider Sison’s apprehension of his
son as indirect contempt.
JILL M. TORMIS, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ],
February 04, 2015
FACTS: Jill charged Judge Paredes, her professor in Political

Law Review, with grave misconduct. She averred that sometime
in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named
her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis, as one of the judges
involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also
mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her
position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his

discussions not only once but several times. In one session,
Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion
Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis,
stating that he was a "court-noted addict."
To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the... class

under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in
Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica

v. Judge Tormis"[5] (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was
suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly
receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release
of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then
pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who
reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended
that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming

of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language
during class discussions was inappropriate.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his

discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class
was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. Justice Diy
likewise rejected Judge Paredes' position that he could not be
held administratively liable for his comments against Judge
Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the
exercise of his judicial functions. As regards Judge Paredes’
receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioquio case,
Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave
misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct

unbecoming of a judge.
HELD: The court decided in the affirmative.

Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the

Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a
magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct

unbecoming of a judge.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the

judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct

above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer.
BRO. BERNARD OCA, FSC, BRO. DENNIS

MAGBANUA, FSC, MRS. CIRILA MOJICA, MRS.
JOSEFINA PASCUAL and ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF
GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioner, vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174996, December 3, 2014
FACTS: This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari

assailing the May 25, 2011 Decision and the December 19, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31985.
The assailed Decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court
Decision, which found petitioners Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis
Magbanua, Cirila N. Mojica, Alejandro N. Mojica, Josefina
Pascual, Atty. Silvestre Pascual, and St. Francis School of General
Trias, Cavite, Inc. (petitioners) guilty of Indirect
Contempt.1âwphi1 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.
This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate

controversy among the Board of Trustees of petitioner St. Francis
School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).
ISSUE: Whether or not non - litigants to a case may be guilty of

contempt
HELD: This Court rules that the charges against Alejandro and
Atty. Silvestre ought to be dismissed.
"In a proceeding to punish for criminal contempt for willful

disobedience of an injunction, the fact that those disobeying the
injunction were not parties eo nomine to the action in which it
was granted, and were not personally served, is no defense,
where the injunction restrains not only the parties, but those who
act in connection with the party as attorneys, agents, or
employees, and the parties accused, with knowledge of the order
and its terms, acting as the employees of a party, willfully violate
it." (People ex rel. Stearns, et al. vs. Marr, et al., 74 N.E. 431.)
However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The

power to punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously,
sparingly, and judiciously." Without evidence of conspiracy, it
cannot be said that the non-litigants are guilty of contempt.
This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy

to hold both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for contempt.
Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated

cashier who worked in the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. He
neither exercised power over the money nor had the authority to
order how it would be kept or disposed. Moreover, it has been
established that the matriculation fees had already been turned
over to Reynante.
Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees.

However, decisions of the Board of Trustees are not subject to
the control of just one (1) person. While a board member may
protest, the majority of the board may overrule him or her. Thus,
it is not correct to say that a board member is empowered to
cause compliance of the trial court orders.
In the absence of proof of conspiracy, it cannot be said that

Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre are guilty of contempt.

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REMEDIAL LAW 2 - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS / page 1

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE

Won’s claim is by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case

ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader suit may prosper when

HELD: The answer is in the negative for three reasons, namely:

his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish

Action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late. A stakeholder

A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK

FACTS: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation

Private respondent assailed the decision of the trial court

depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall

ISSUE: Whether or not the stakeholder or the person who filed a

HELD: The answer is in the negative. Under the circumstances,

The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A.

FACTS: Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners

While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis

Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista.

After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners

Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for

ISSUE: Whether or not obligor may refuse payment of an

HELD: The answer is in the negative. Non-payment of rentals

Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides: If the creditor to whom

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners

BANK OF COMMERCE (BOC) vs. PLANTERS

On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the

BSP denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28

In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of

Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed

ISSUE: Whether or not a motion for interpleader may be made

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The remedy of

specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and

Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a

Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the

Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an

Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (R - 63)

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA vs.

FACTS: Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed its

During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter,

Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as

Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief may be

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. It is true that in

However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO

FACTS: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

ISSUE: Whether or not a party may file a petition, not

HELD: Yes. We note that the petition for authority to remarry

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

CARMEN DANAO MALANA et al. vs. BENIGNO TAPPA

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and argued that