3rd Cases-Labor-Ft PDF

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 220030. March 18, 2019.]
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. , petitioner, vs.

JOSEFA GUTIERREZ , respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.C., JR. , J : p
This is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated January 22, 2015
and the Resolution 3 dated August 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
130134. 4 The assailed Decision had dismissed petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc.'s motion to quash the writ of execution issued in an illegal dismissal case
that had long been nally decided in favor of respondent Josefa Gutierrez. The assailed
Resolution denied reconsideration.
Undisputed are the facts.
In 2001, petitioner Sameer Overseas Employment Agency, Inc. (Sameer)
deployed respondent Josefa Gutierrez (Gutierrez), a registered Filipino nurse, to Ireland
on a two-year employment in a nursing home. The contract stipulated her salary in the
Irish Pound. After merely two months, however, she was unceremoniously repatriated,
urging her to le for unlawful termination. In its Decision dated February 10, 2003, the
Labor Arbiter found for Gutierrez and declared Sameer 5 liable to pay the money
judgment 6 as follows:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. nding the dismissal of complainant Josefa Docuyanan Gutierrez
to be illegal;
2. ordering respondents Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Rizalina
Lamzon and Irish Nursing Home Organization Limited to pay
complainant jointly and solidarily, the following:
a. Salary (2 1/2 mos.) 2,083.02 Pounds
b. Unexpired Portion (6 mos.) 6,250.02 Pounds (Payable in
Philippine peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time
of payment) caITAC
c. Refund of Placement Fee PHP23,000.00

3. declaring individual respondents Rizalina Lamzon to be properly
impleaded; and to be likewise personally liable for this award; and
4. dismissing all other claims for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED . 7
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor
Arbiter's Decision and denied reconsideration. Then, on certiorari, the Court of Appeals
reinstated the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. Sameer immediately led an appeal 8
before this Court which, however, was denied in a minute resolution 9 and in a
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subsequent resolution 1 0 on motion for reconsideration. Finally, the entry of judgment
issued on October 8, 2010. 1 1
On July 31, 2012, at the instance of Gutierrez, 1 2 the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ
of Execution 1 3 containing a re-computation of the original monetary award and a
conversion thereof into the Euro currency. The writ materially reads:
NOW, THEREFORE , you are hereby directed to proceed to the premises
of respondents Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Rizalina Lamzon and Irish
Nursing Home Organization Limited, located at Rizal Tower, 4474 Singian Street
corner Makati Avenue, Makati City, Metro Manila, or wherever they may be
found in the Philippines, to collect the total amount of TEN THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY THREE & 804/100 EUR (10,453.804 EUR) or its Peso
equivalent prevailing at the time of actual payment representing the
complainant's monetary awards pursuant to the Decision dated 10 February
2003, and to deposit the same to the NLRC Cashier for disposition.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED . 1 4
Sameer moved to recall and/or quash the writ of execution 1 5 believing that the
Labor Arbiter, in converting the award into Euro on execution, had illegally varied the
terms of the nal and executory Decision in the termination case. The writ was
sustained in an Order dated December 12, 2012. 1 6 Then, on January 18, 2013, Sameer
led with the NLRC a petition to annul 1 7 the December 12, 2012 Order and insisted on
the nulli cation of the writ. The NLRC dismissed said petition in a Decision dated
February 25, 2013. 1 8 ICHDca
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, 1 9 Sameer elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals on certiorari. 2 0 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit, 2 1 and likewise denied reconsideration. 2 2
Hence, this petition.
Sameer posits that the Court of Appeals erred (a) in not nding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter when it changed the currency of the
monetary award to Euro; (b) in not nding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when the latter did not grant the petition to annul the December 12, 2012 Order;
and (c) in validating the manner by which the monetary award was converted from Irish
Pound to the Euro. 2 3
For her part, Josefa points out in her Comment 2 4 that the Euro currency had
already replaced the Irish Pound in Ireland at the time the Decision in the illegal
dismissal case became nal and executory. She considers this change in currency as a
supervening fact or event that authorized the Labor Arbiter to make modi cations on
the money judgment even on execution. 2 5
Replying, Sameer advances the notion that a modi cation of the judgment is
indeed allowed in exceptional circumstances but not where the modi cation is made in
a writ of execution. 2 6 It reiterates the elementary rule that a writ of execution must
conform to the dispositive portion of the decision, otherwise the execution is void if it is
in excess of and beyond the original judgment. 2 7
Verily, the focal issue to be addressed in this case is whether or not the original
monetary award in the nal Decision may, by the ensuing writ of execution, be legally re-
computed and translated from Irish Pound to the Euro. As this Court responds in the
affirmative, it hereby finds the subject writ of execution to be fully in order.
We preface the disquisition with the necessary dissection of the nal judgment
rendered in the unlawful termination case between Sameer and Gutierrez.
Fundamental is the rule that the dispositive portion of a judgment, order or
decision is what determines and declares the rights and obligations of the parties to a
dispute as against each other. It is the dispositive portion that must be enforced to
make for a valid execution, and a judgment must be implemented according to its
letter. Except in well-recognized exceptions, a nal judgment, order or decision may not
be validly altered, amended or modi ed even if it is meant to correct a perceptibly
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. This, because any insertion, change or addition to
the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments. 2 8
A case for illegal dismissal or unlawful termination — which is the underlying case
in this petition — is one that relates purely to the status of the parties. Hence, the
decision or ruling therein is essentially declaratory of the rights and obligations of the
parties, and the monetary award that ows from the declared status, such as payment
of separation pay and backwages, is but a necessary and legal consequence of the said
declaration. 2 9 A look at the dispositive portion of a rmative decisions rendered in
illegal dismissal cases tells that it is always comprised of two distinct parts: first is the
de nitive nding of illegal dismissal and the incidental monetary awards sanctioned by
law in such case and, second, is the assessment and computation of what the rst part
of the disposition has already established. The second part, being merely a
computation of what the rst part of the decision has already pronounced, may, by its
nature, be re-computed. 3 0
The Court takes notice that Ireland joined the European Union in January 1, 1973
31 and, in January 1999, became one of the Euro Area member-states that began
replacing their national currencies with the Euro. 3 2 After its gradual adaptation to the
new economic and monetary regime, its national currency, the Irish Pound, nally
departed and ceased to be legal tender on February 9, 2002. 3 3 Inasmuch as the
monetary award in this case has been xed in the Irish Pound but to be paid in its
Philippine Peso equivalent, the Labor Arbiter, in issuing the subject writ of execution on
July 31, 2012, has made a practical, consequential and logical call when she re-
computed and converted the nal Decision's money award into the prevailing currency
that replaced the previous — not to say demonitized and, hence, obsolete and worthless
currency, but still payable to Gutierrez in Philippine Peso equivalent.
The power of the Labor Arbiter to make, at the rst instance, a computation of
monetary award in an illegal dismissal case is sanctioned by the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. 3 4 Implied from this original computation is its currency up to the nality of
the decision. 3 5 Indeed, on one hand, had the case purely involved an employee's claim
for a speci c sum of money, the computation would carry such a continuing currency
that any adjustment or change might only be on the interest that would run from the
nality of the decision until full satisfaction of the judgment obligation. On the other
hand, in a claim that relates to status, such as in illegal dismissal cases, what is
principally implemented is the declaratory nding on the status, rights and obligations
of the parties, and the monetary consequence only follows as a mere incidental
component of said finding. 3 6 ASEcHI
That the Labor Arbiter has been impelled to make an allowance for the
conversion of the money award to happen inspite of the demonitization of the Irish
Pound, is well in accord with Republic Act No. 8183. 3 7 This law authorizes obligations
incurred in foreign currency to be discharged in our local money at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of payment. In other words, because it is just and fair to preserve
the real value of the foreign exchange-incurred obligation to the date of its payment, 3 8
it is just as much legal and logical to take into account the fact that the exchange rate
at the time of execution was already measured in terms of the Euro.
At any rate, Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals 3 9
instructs that a re-computation of the monetary award is indeed part of the law that is
read into the decision. The re-computation of the consequences of an illegal dismissal,
to accommodate the reliefs that continue to add on until full satisfaction of the award,
even upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of
the nal decision being implemented. Indeed, the ruling on the illegality of the dismissal
stands, and only the computation of the monetary consequences must adapt to
changes albeit without running foul to the principle of immutability of a nal judgment.
40
With approval, we quote the observation made by the Court of Appeals on this
matter:
The Writ of Execution did not alter the essential particulars of the
judgment to be executed. The original fallo provides that the money judgment is
payable in Philippine Peso at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of
payment. To be able to convert the said money judgment from Irish Pound to
Philippine Peso, it is necessary to rst convert it to Euro since Irish Pound is no
longer used as currency, and from Euro to Philippine Peso, which is ultimately
the currency that the money judgment was made payable in the judgment
sought to be executed. Hence, the writ of execution did not deviate, but is all the
more in accordance with the final and executory judgment. 4 1
Finally, Sameer likewise questions the validation given by the Court of Appeals to
the manner by which the Labor Arbiter has come by the re-computation of the monetary
award. Yet inasmuch as it thereby would have this Court look into a deeply technical
matter which is best left to the sound judgment of the labor tribunal below, we decline
to address this issue further. Su ce it to say that mathematical computations are
painted in jurisprudence as factual determinations 4 2 and, thus, generally beyond the
province of this Court, especially when supported by substantial evidence and a rmed
by the appellate court. 4 3 Well-recognized exceptions 4 4 to this rule abound, but not one
is applicable in this instant petition.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED .
SO ORDERED . ITAaHc
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Cruz, with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-47.
3. Signed by the same Third Division members, except Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Salvador who retired in the interim and replaced by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-
Fernando; id. at 33-34, rollo, pp. 33-34.
4. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission Sixth
Division and Josefa Gutierrez.
5. Sameer was declared solidarily liable with Rizalina Lamzon and the Irish Nursing Home
Organization Limited. Note that among the issues that had been raised since the
execution stage was the fact that the writ of execution as well as the final decision in the
illegal dismissal case omitted the corporate identifier "Inc." to identify Sameer. It argued
that there had been an erroneous service of the writ as it had been directed to a wrong
party. This issue, however, has already been settled by the appellate court, thus, released
from the main issues in the present petition.
6. Signed by Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma, rollo, pp. 65-66.

7. Id.
8. Via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 188231.
9. Dated March 8, 2010.

10. Dated August 16, 2010.
11. See CA Decision, supra note 2, at 38.

12. Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution; rollo, pp. 67-72.
13. Signed by Labor Arbiter Jenneth Mapiza; id. at 73-78.

14. Id. at 77-78.
15. Urgent Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution dated July 31, 2012; id. at 79-86.
16. Id. at 104-108.

17. Under Section I Rule XII of the 2011 NLRC Rules; id. at 109-130.
18. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard Mabilog, with Commissioner Isabel G.
Panganiban-Ortiguerra and Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro, concurring; id. at
136-139.
19. See Resolution dated April 30, 2013; id. at 151-152.
20. Id. at 153-175.

21. Supra note 2.
22. Rollo, pp. 33-34.
23. Id. at 13-15.

24. Id. at 233-246.
25. Id. at 242-243.

26. Id. at 249-250.
27. Id. at 251.

28. See Lim v. HMR Philippines, Inc., 740 Phil. 353, 367-368 (2014), citing Session Delights Ice
Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals, 625 Phil. 612, 623-624 (2010).
29. Id. at 370, citing Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals, supra.
30. Id. at 371.
31. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-
countries/ireland_en#overview (visited March 11, 2019).
32. https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/what-euro-area_en; (visited

March 11, 2019). https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-
countries/ireland_en#overview (visited March 11, 2019).
33. The Irish Pound Notes and Coins (Cessation of Legal Tender Status) Order, 2001;
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2001/si/313/made/en/print (visited March 11, 2019).
34. Section 13, Rule VII materially states that the Labor Arbiter of origin, in cases involving
monetary awards and at all events, as far as practicable, shall embody in any such
decision or order the detailed and full amount awarded.
35. Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 626.
36. Id. at 627-628.
37. Entitled AN ACT REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE, AS
AMENDED, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO ASSURE THE UNIFORM VALUE OF PHILIPPINE COIN
AND CURRENCY," issued on 11 June 1996.
38. See Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 371 Phil. 745,
753 (1999); and C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 Phil. 11, 20 (2002).
39. Supra note 28.
40. Id. at 629.
41. Rollo, p. 46.
42. Spouses Sy v. China Banking Corp., 792 Phil. 101, 107 (2016), citing National Transmission
Corp. v. Alphaomega Integrated Corp., 740 Phil. 87 (2014).
43. Spouses Sy v. China Banking Corp., supra.
44. Id. at 107-108, citing New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005). The
noted exceptions are: When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; When the findings of fact are conflicting; When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; When the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 222748. April 3, 2019.]
AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC. , petitioner,

vs. ARNULFO M. EGOS , respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA , J : p
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated August 28, 2015 and Resolution 3
dated January 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 130466. The CA
a rmed the Decision 4 dated December 27, 2012 and Resolution dated April 10, 2013
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 07-002187-12
(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-11936-11), which found that respondent was
constructively dismissed.
Facts
The facts, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

On April 9, 1992, petitioners Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services,
Inc. and Francis T. Ching (Airborne), a company engaged in providing
manpower services to various clients, hired the services of private respondent as
Janitor. He was assigned at the Balintawak Branch of Meralco, a client of
Airborne.
Almost twenty years thereafter, or on June 30, 2011, the contract between
Airborne and Meralco-Balintawak Branch expired and a new contract was
awarded to Landbees Corporation, and the latter absorbed all employees of
Airborne except private respondent, who allegedly had a heart ailment. Private
respondent consulted another doctor and, based on the medical result, he was
declared in good health and t to work. He showed the duly issued medical
certificate to Airborne but the same was disregarded.
Private respondent also reported for work but was just ignored by
Airborne and was told that there was no work available for him. Feeling
aggrieved, he led a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal on August 05,
2011.
Airborne, on the other hand, insisted that private respondent was never
dismissed from service. It claimed: 1) that when [its] contract with Meralco-
Balintawak Branch was terminated, it directed all its employees including
private respondent to report to its o ce for reposting; 2) that when private
respondent failed to do so, it sent a letter dated August 12, 2011 at private
respondent's last known address directing him to report to his x x x new
assignment at Meralco Commonwealth Business Center; 3) that said letter,
however, was returned to sender with a notation "RTS unknown"; 4) that another
letter dated September 21, 2011 was sent to private respondent at his last
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known address reiterating the previous directive; and 5) that the same was
again returned with a notation "RTS unknown."
On June 04, 2012, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal, the fallo of which reads:
"WHEREFORE , premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit. CAIHTE
SO ORDERED ."
On appeal to the NLRC, private respondent reiterated that he was
constructively/illegally dismissed by Airborne. He pointed out that he made
several follow-ups since July 1, 2011, but Airborne merely ignored him, and
since then, he was not given a new assignment. Private respondent further
argued that the letters were mere afterthoughts since Airborne was already
aware of the illegal dismissal complaint prior to the sending of the said letters;
that the same could not possibly reach him because his address was
incomplete and such mistake was intentionally done for him not to receive the
letters; and that he left his cellphone number with one Christine Solis, Airborne's
Administrative Officer, but he never received a call from Airborne.
Airborne countered that private respondent introduced for the rst time
on appeal not only new factual allegations but also spurious, fabricated and
self-serving evidence which should not be given credence.
On December 27, 2012, public respondent NLRC rendered a decision
reversing the ndings of the Labor Arbiter and declaring private respondent to
have been constructively/illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE , premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED . The Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE , and a new one issued declaring the respondents guilty of
illegal dismissal.
Accordingly, respondents are ordered to pay complainant
the following:
1. Backwages
2. Separation pay
SO ORDERED ." 5
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the Decision of
the NLRC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Decision dated December 27,
2012 and Resolution dated April 10, 2013 of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Second Division in NLRC NCR LAC No. 07-002187-12 (NLRC NCR
Case No. 08-11936-11) are hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED . 6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.
Hence, this Petition. Respondent led his Comment 7 and, in turn, petitioner led
its Reply. 8
Issues
The issues raised in the Petition are as follows:
I
CONTRARY TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] WITH
DUE RESPECT[,] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE NLRC DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS
CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED AND WORSE BY MAKING AN ASSUMPTION
THAT PETITIONER CLAIMED ABANDONMENT AS A DEFENSE[.]
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI] RELYING SOLELY ON THE
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND LAW MADE BY THE NLRC DESPITE
THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. 9
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is denied.

A review of the submissions of the parties shows that the CA was correct in
a rming the NLRC's ruling that respondent was constructively dismissed. The CA ruled
as follows: HEITAD
In cases of termination of employees, the well-entrenched policy is that

no worker shall be dismissed except for just or authorized cause provided by
law and after due process. Dismissals of employees have two facets: first, the
legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and
second, the legality in the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural
due process.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the failure to observe the twin requisites of notice and hearing not
only makes the dismissal of an employee illegal regardless of his alleged
violation, but is also violative of the employee's right to due process.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, it is beyond cavil that none of the foregoing mandatory
provisions of the labor law were complied with by Airborne.
xxx xxx xxx
To buttress its contention that x x x respondent abandoned his work,
Airborne alleged that it sent letters/notices to private respondent directing him
to report for work. Nonetheless, no iota of evidence was presented by Airborne
su ciently showing that the letters/notices dated August 12, 2011 and dated
September 21, 2011 were actually received by x x x respondent. In fact, said
letters/notices were returned with a notation "RTS unknown" inasmuch as x x x
respondent's address was incomplete and such was intentionally done for the
latter not to receive said letters/notices.
As correctly observed by public respondent NLRC, the letters/notices were
mere afterthoughts since Airborne was already aware of the ling of the illegal
dismissal complaint prior to the sending of the said letters/notices.
Corollary thereto, it must be stressed that x x x respondent made several
follow-ups since July 1, 2011, but Airborne did not give him a new assignment.
Moreover, x x x respondent gave his cellphone number with Christine Solis,
Airborne's Administrative Officer, but to no avail. 1 0
On the other hand, the NLRC found that:
After a careful review of the records of the case, We nd the appeal
impressed with merit.
Complainant [respondent herein] claims that respondents [petitioner
herein] told him that he had a heart ailment, thus, he could not be absorbed for
continued employment. He consulted Dr. Rina Porciuncula of the Our Lady of
the Angels Clinic in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The doctor declared him t to work
(rollo, pp. 25-27).
We nd credence on his allegation that respondents denied him
employment because he had a heart ailment. Nonetheless, despite the
declaration that he was t to work, the respondents still did not give him any
assignment.
The complainant is a mere janitor, and to earn a living, he had to undergo
the medical examination. He exerted effort and spent money to prove to
respondents that he was capable of working.
To give semblance of legality to their act of not giving him an
assignment, after the ling of the complaint for constructive dismissal,
respondents sent him two (2) letters with incomplete address. The sending of
the letters were a mere afterthoughts (sic).
The Supreme Court, in Skippers United Paci c, Inc. vs. NLRC , G.R. No.
148893, July 12, 2006 ruled that "Afterthought cannot be given weight or
credibility."
This Commission is not convinced that they had the sincerity to give him
a new assignment. There is reason to believe that the incomplete address was
intentionally done in order that complainant would not receive it, and
respondents can put up as a defense their intention to have the complainant
reposted by sending the two (2) letters. 1 1
Petitioner, however, argues that there was no dismissal to speak of as it had
placed respondent on oating status when the contract with Meralco was terminated.
12
Although this was not discussed by both the CA and the NLRC, petitioner claims
that it had valid grounds to suspend its business operation or undertaking for a period
of six months and place its employees in a oating status during that period in
accordance with Article 301, formerly Article 286, of the Labor Code. Article 301 states:
ATICcS
ART. 301 [286]. When Employment Not Deemed Terminated. — The

bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period
not exceeding six (6) months, or the ful lment (sic) by the employee of a
military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the
employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of
seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one
(1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief
from the military or civic duty.
The Court nds that petitioner failed to prove that the termination of the contract
with Meralco resulted in a bona de suspension of its business operations so as to
validly place respondent in a floating status.
The suspension of employment under Article 301 of the Labor Code is only
temporary and should not exceed six months, as the Court explained in PT & T Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission: 1 3
x x x Article 286 [now Article 301] may be applied but only by analogy to
set a speci c period that employees may remain temporarily laid-off or in
oating status. Six months is the period set by law that the operation of a
business or undertaking may be suspended thereby suspending the
employment of the employees concerned. The temporary lay-off wherein the
employees likewise cease to work should also not last longer than six months.
After six months, the employees should either be recalled to work or
permanently retrenched following the requirements of the law, and that failing
to comply with this would be tantamount to dismissing the employees and the
employer would thus be liable for such dismissal. 1 4
In implementing this measure, jurisprudence has set that the employer should
notify the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the affected employee, at
least one month prior to the intended date of suspension of business operations. 1 5 An
employer must also prove the existence of a clear and compelling economic reason for
the temporary shutdown of its business or undertaking and that there were no available
posts to which the affected employee could be assigned. The Court explained in Lopez
v. Irvine Construction Corp. 1 6 as follows:
In this case, Irvine failed to prove compliance with the parameters of
Article 286 of the Labor Code. As the records would show, it merely completed
one of its numerous construction projects which does not, by and of itself,
amount to a bona de suspension of business operations or undertaking. In
invoking Article 286 of the Labor Code, the paramount consideration
should be the dire exigency of the business of the employer that
compels it to put some of its employees temporarily out of work . This
means that the employer should be able to prove that it is faced with a clear and
compelling economic reason which reasonably forces it to temporarily shut
down its business operations or a particular undertaking, incidentally resulting
to the temporary lay-off of its employees.
Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee, case law
states that the employer should also bear the burden of proving that
there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of
work can be assigned . Thus, in the case of Mobile Protective & Detective
Agency v. Ompad , the Court found that the security guards therein were
constructively dismissed considering that their employer was not able to show
any dire exigency justifying the latter's failure to give said employees any further
assignment x x x. 1 7 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring in original)
Here, a review of the submissions of the parties shows that petitioner failed to
show compliance with the notice requirement to the DOLE and respondent.
Making matters worse for petitioner, it also failed to prove that after the
termination of its contract with Meralco it was faced with a clear and compelling
economic reason to temporarily shut down its operations or a particular undertaking. It
also failed to show that there were no available posts to which respondent could be
assigned.
Also, not only did petitioner fail to prove it had valid grounds to place respondent
on a floating status, but the NLRC and the CA both correctly found that respondent even
had to ask for a new assignment from petitioner, but this was unheeded. Further, when
respondent led the complaint on August 5, 2011, petitioner, as an afterthought,
subsequently sent notices/letters to respondent directing him to report to work. These,
however, were not received by respondent as the address was incomplete.
I n Morales v. Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. , 1 8 the Court de ned
constructive dismissal as a dismissal in disguise as it is an act amounting to dismissal
but made to appear as if it were not, thus:
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because
"continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an
offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and other bene ts.
Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made
to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of
clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by
him except to forego his continued employment. x x x 1 9 (Citations omitted)
Here, the totality of the foregoing circumstances shows that petitioner's acts of
not informing respondent and the DOLE of the suspension of its operations, failing to
prove the bona de suspension of its business or undertaking, ignoring respondent's
follow-ups on a new assignment, and belated sending of letters/notices which were
returned to it, were done to make it appear as if respondent had not been dismissed.
These acts, however, clearly amounted to a dismissal, for which petitioner is liable.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Petition is DENIED . The Decision dated
August 28, 2015 and Resolution dated January 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 130466 are AFFIRMED . TIADCc
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
J.C. Reyes, Jr., * J., is on wellness leave.
Footnotes
* On wellness leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 11-55, excluding Annexes.
2. Id. at 57-66. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and concurred in by Associate
Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
3. Id. at 68-69.
4. Id. at 122-129. Penned by Commissioner Erlinda T. Agus, with Presiding Commissioner Raul
T. Aquino and Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora concurring.
5. Id. at 58-59.
6. Id. at 65.
7. Id. at 306-317.
8. Id. at 349-355.
9. Id. at 28-29.
10. Id. at 60-64.
11. Id. at 125-126.
12. See id. at 15-16, 30.

13. 496 Phil. 164 (2005).
14. Id. at 177.
15. See Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., 741 Phil. 728, 741 (2014), citing PT & T Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 177-178.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 744-745.
18. 680 Phil. 112 (2012).

19. Id. at 120-121.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231773. March 11, 2019.]
CESAR C. PELAGIO , petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE

CARRIERS, INC., CARLOS SALINAS, and NORWEGIAN CREW
MANAGEMENT A/S , respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 led by petitioner Cesar C.
Pelagio (Pelagio) assailing the Decision 2 dated January 16, 2017 and the Resolution 3
dated May 22, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122771, which
annulled and set aside the Decision 4 dated August 24, 2011 and the Resolution 5 dated
October 4, 2011 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-LAC Case
No. M-05-000458-11, and accordingly, reinstated the Decision 6 dated April 29, 2011 of
the Labor Arbiter (LA) awarding Pelagio the amount of US$13,437.00 representing
permanent partial disability benefits.
The Facts
Respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI) for and on behalf of its
foreign principal, Norwegian Crew Management A/S, hired Pelagio as a Motorman on
board the vessel M/V Drive Mahone for a period of six (6) months, under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved contract of employment 7
dated September 29, 2009 and a collective bargaining agreement 8 (CBA) between
Norwegian Crew Management A/S and Associated Marine O cers' and Seamen's
Union of the Philippines. After being declared t for employment, 9 Pelagio boarded
M/V Drive Mahone on November 3, 2009. 1 0
Sometime in February 2010, Pelagio experienced di culty in breathing and some
pains on his nape, lower back, and joints while at work. Pelagio was then referred to a
port doctor in Said, Egypt where he was diagnosed with "Myositis" 1 1 and declared un t
to work. 1 2 On March 2, 2010, Pelagio was repatriated back to the Philippines for
further medical treatment, and thereafter, promptly sought the medical attention of the
company-designated physician, Dr. Roberto Lim, at Metropolitan Medical Center. 1 3
After a series of medical and laboratory examinations, 1 4 including chest x-ray,
pulmonary function tests, electroencephalogram, and other related physical
examinations, Pelagio was nally diagnosed with Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, Bilateral L5-
S1 Radiculopathy, Mild Degenerative Changes, and Lumbosacral Spine 1 5 with an
interim assessment of a Grade 11 disability rating — "slight loss of lifting power of the
trunk." 1 6
On August 18, 2010, Pelagio sought a second opinion from a private orthopedic
surgery physician, Dr. Manuel Fidel M. Magtira (Dr. Magtira), who assessed him with a
Grade 8 disability — moderate rigidity or two-thirds loss of motion or lifting power of
the trunk — and declared him "permanently UNFIT TO WORK in any capacity at his
previous occupation." 1 7 CAIHTE
Pelagio then sought to avail of permanent total disability bene ts from

respondents PTCI, Carlos Salinas, and Norwegian Crew Management A/S
(respondents), to no avail. Hence, he led a claim 1 8 for permanent total disability
bene ts, reimbursement of medical expenses, illness allowance, damages, and
attorney's fees against petitioners before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, docketed
as NLRC-NCR No. (M) 09-13299-10. Essentially, Pelagio contends that his inability to
work for more than 120 days from repatriation entitles him to permanent total
disability benefits. 1 9
For their part, 2 0 respondents countered that Pelagio is not entitled to permanent
total disability bene ts, considering that the independent physician, Dr. Magtira, merely
assessed him with a Grade 8 impediment. In this relation, respondents likewise claimed
that on August 5, 2010, the company-designated physician assessed Pelagio with a
Grade 11 disability — slight loss of lifting power of the trunk (August 5, 2010 Medical
Report). 2 1 In view of the con icting ndings of the company-designated and the
independent physicians, respondents suggested that they seek a third mutually-
appointed doctor to comply with the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract, but Pelagio refused. Finally, respondents averred that they offered Pelagio the
amount of US$13,437.00, the corresponding bene t to a Grade 11 impediment
pursuant to the CBA, but he rejected such offer. 2 2
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 2 3 dated April 29, 2011, the LA found Pelagio to be suffering from a
permanent partial disability, and accordingly, ordered respondents to jointly and
solidarily pay him the amount of US$13,437.00. 2 4 The LA ruled that Pelagio's mere
inability to work for 120 days from his repatriation did not ipso facto mean that he is
suffering from a permanent total disability, especially in view of the disability
assessments given by both the company-designated and the independent physicians.
On this note, the LA gave weight to the ndings of the company-designated physician
that Pelagio was suffering from a Grade 11 impediment, and thus, must only be
awarded disability benefits corresponding thereto. 2 5
Dissatisfied, Pelagio appealed to the NLRC. 2 6
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision 2 7 dated August 24, 2011, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA
ruling, and accordingly, awarded Pelagio the amounts of US$70,000.00 representing
permanent total disability bene ts and US$7,000.00 as attorney's fees, or a total of
US$77,000.00, at their peso equivalent at the time of actual payment. 2 8
The NLRC found that in the absence of the purported August 5, 2010 Medical
Report in the case records, there is nothing that would support respondents' claim that
the company-designated physician indeed issued Pelagio a nal disability rating of
Grade 11. Thus, the NLRC deemed that there was no nal assessment made on
Pelagio. In view thereof, the NLRC ruled that Pelagio's disability went beyond 240 days
without a declaration that he is t to resume work or an assessment of disability rating,
and as such, he is already entitled to permanent total disability bene ts as stated under
the CBA. 2 9
Respondents led a motion for reconsideration, 3 0 attaching thereto a copy of
the August 5, 2010 Medical Report. However, the same was denied in a Resolution 3 1
dated October 4, 2011. Aggrieved, respondents led a petition for certiorari before the
CA. 3 2
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 3 3 dated January 16, 2017, the CA annulled the NLRC ruling and
reinstated that of the LA. It opined that the company-designated physician indeed gave
Pelagio a disability rating of Grade 11 within 240 days from his repatriation, as evinced
by the July 27, 2010 Medical Report 3 4 which was later on a rmed by the August 5,
2010 Medical Report. Hence, the CA concluded that the company-designated
physician's ndings should prevail considering that he extensively examined and
treated Pelagio's medical condition. 3 5
Dissatis ed, Pelagio moved for reconsideration, 3 6 but was denied in a
Resolution 3 7 dated May 22, 2017; hence, this petition.
The Issue before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
reinstated the LA ruling which only deemed Pelagio to be suffering from a Grade 11
impediment, and must only receive permanent partial disability bene ts corresponding
thereto. HEITAD
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

"Preliminarily, the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing a CA's ruling
in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the correctness of the CA's
Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65. Furthermore,
Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court
views the CA Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari was presented
to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the CA's Decision from the prism of whether
the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in
the NLRC decision." 3 8
"Case law states that grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law." 3 9
"In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its
ndings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, which refers to
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the
applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA
should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition." 4 0
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court nds that the CA erred in
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, as its nding that Pelagio
is entitled to permanent and total disability bene ts is in accord with the evidence on
record, as well as settled legal principles of labor law.
In Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz , 4 1 the Court explained that a seafarer's failure
to obtain any gainful employment for more than 120 days after his medical repatriation
does not ipso facto deem his disability to be permanent and total as the company
designated physician may be given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from
such repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment, and thereafter, make a
declaration as to the nature of the latter's disability. 4 2 It was then clari ed, however,
that for the company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he
must rst perform some signi cant act to justify an extension ( e.g., that the illness still
requires medical attendance beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days);
otherwise, the seafarer's disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent
and total. 4 3 Hence, it reiterated the guidelines that govern seafarers' claims for
permanent and total disability benefits, to wit:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a nal medical
assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days
from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within
the period of 120 days, without any justi able reason, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within
the period of 120 days with a su cient justi cation ( e.g., seafarer required
further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the
burden to prove that the company-designated physician has su cient
justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his
assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification . 4 4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Otherwise stated, the company-designated physician is required to issue a final
and de nite assessment of the seafarer's disability rating within the aforesaid
120/240-day period; 4 5 otherwise, the opinions of the company-designated and the
independent physicians are rendered irrelevant because the seafarer is already
conclusively presumed to be suffering from a permanent and total disability, and thus,
is entitled to the benefits corresponding thereto. 4 6 ATICcS
To recapitulate, the CA's nding that the company-designated physician gave

Pelagio a disability rating is largely based on the July 27, 2010 Medical Report 4 7 which
was seconded by the August 5, 2010 Medical Report, 4 8 which respondents claim to
contain the company-designated physician's nal disability grading of Pelagio's
condition. 4 9 However, a more circumspect review of these documents show that these
do not constitute the nal and de nite assessment required by law, considering
that: (a) the July 27, 2010 Medical Report expressly provided that the ndings therein
are only interim; 5 0 whereas (b ) the August 5, 2010 Medical Report only provided for a
"potential disability grading." 5 1
Besides, even assuming arguendo that the August 5, 2010 Medical Report indeed
contains Pelagio's nal disability grading as posited by respondents, it must be noted
that the same was belatedly adduced in evidence when it was attached to respondents'
motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, even if it appears to be readily available.
Case law instructs that "while strict compliance to technical rules is not required in
labor cases, liberal policy should still be pursuant to equitable principles of law. In this
regard, belated submission of evidence may be allowed only if the delay in its
presentation is su ciently justi ed; the evidence adduced is undeniably material to the
cause of a party; and the subject evidence should su ciently prove the allegations
sought to be established." 5 2 Here, respondents did not explain the reasons for their
failure to present the August 5, 2010 Medical Report at the earliest opportunity, and it
was only after the NLRC rendered an unfavorable decision that the same was
presented. Verily, respondents' belated submission thereof without any explanation
casts doubt on its credibility especially since it does not appear to be a newly
discovered evidence. 5 3
In the absence of a nal and de nite disability assessment of the company-
designated physician, Pelagio is conclusively presumed to be suffering from a
permanent and total disability, and thus, is entitled to the bene ts corresponding
thereto. In this light, the Court deems it proper to reverse the CA ruling and reinstate
that of the NLRC, with modi cation imposing on the monetary awards due to Pelagio
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from nality of this Decision until full
payment, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 5 4
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The Decision dated January 16, 2017
and the Resolution dated May 22, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
122771 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Accordingly, the Decision dated August 24,
2011 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2011 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC-LAC Case No. M-05-000458-11, which awarded petitioner Cesar
C. Pelagio the amounts of US$70,000.00 representing permanent total disability
bene ts and US$7,000.00 as attorney's fees, or a total of US$77,000.00, at their peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment, are hereby REINSTATED , with
MODIFICATION imposing on said awards legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Caguioa, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 8-24.
2. Id. at 228-240 & 246-254. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with
Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Renato C. Francisco, concurring.
3. Id. at 262-263.
4. Id. at 140-156. Penned by Commissioner Numeriano D. Villena with Presiding Commissioner

Herminio V. Suelo and Commissioner Angelo Ang Palaña, concurring.
5. Id. at 158-161.

6. Id. at 115-120. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera.
7. Id. at 25.
8. Id. at 26-40.
9. See medical examination records dated September 25, 2009; id. at 42.
10. See id. at 141 and 229.

11. See indorsement letter dated May 18, 2010; CA rollo, p. 203.
12. See rollo, p. 141.

13. See id. at 142.
14. See Pelagio's medical examination reports; id. at 43-50.
15. See the 3rd Medical Report dated March 11, 2010 of Metropolitan Medical Center Assistant
Medical Coordinator Dr. Mylene Cruz-Balbon and Medical Coordinator Dr. Robert D. Lim;
CA rollo, pp. 207-208.
16. See Private and Confidential Medical Report dated July 27, 2010; id. at 375-376.
17. Rollo, p. 142. See also Medical Report dated August 18, 2010 of Dr. Magtira; CA rollo, pp.
274-276.
18. See Complaint dated September 17, 2010 (id. at 54-55) and Position Paper for Complainant
dated January 24, 2011 (id. at 56-75).
19. See id. at 143-144. See also id. at 230-231.
20. See Respondent's Position Paper dated March 2, 2011 (erroneously written as March 2,
2010); id. at 77-113.
21. See id. at 144. See also Private and Confidential Medical Report dated August 5, 2010; id. at
157.
22. See id. at 144-145.
23. Id. at 115-120.

24. Id. at 120.
25. See id. at 118-120.
26. See Memorandum of Appeal dated May 20, 2011; id. at 121-138.
27. Id. at 140-156.
28. See id. at 154-156.

29. See id. at 148-155.
30. Dated September 20, 2011. Records, pp. 399-424.
31. Rollo, pp. 158-161.
32. Dated November 23, 2011. Id. at 164-192.
33. Id. at 228-240 & 246-254.

34. CA rollo, pp. 375-376.
35. See rollo, pp. 236-240, 246-252.

36. See motion for reconsideration dated February 9, 2017; id. at 255-261.
37. Id. at 262-263.
38. University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST , G.R. No. 184262,
April 24, 2017, 824 SCRA 52, 60, citing Quebral v. Angbus Construction, Inc., 798 Phil.
179, 187 (2016).
39. Id. at 60-61; citation omitted.
40. Id. at 61.
41. G.R. No. 218871, January 11, 2017, 814 SCRA 303.
42. See id. at 308-309; citation omitted.

43. See id. at 309-310; citations omitted.
44. Id. at 310; citing Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, 765 Phil. 341, 362-363
(2015).
45. See Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc. v. Mabunay , G.R. No. 206113, November 6, 2017, citing
Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Cruz, 786 Phil. 451, 464 (2016) and Kestrel Shipping Co.,
Inc. v. Munar, 702 Phil. 717, 731 (2013).
46. See Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Cruz, id., citing Alpha Ship Management Corp. v. Calo,
724 Phil. 106, 125-126 (2014).
47. CA rollo, pp. 375-376.
48. Rollo, p. 157.

49. See id. at 116, 144, and 231-232.
50. Pertinent portion of the July 27, 2010 Medical Report reads: "His closest interim assessment
is Grade 11 — slight loss of lifting power of the trunk." (CA rollo, p. 376.)
51. Pertinent portion of the August 5, 2010 Medical Report reads: "Based on his present
condition, the potential disability grading is Grade 11 — slight loss of lifting power of the
trunk." (Rollo, p. 157.)
52. Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Cruz, supra note 45, at 462-463, citing Misamis Oriental II
Electric Service Cooperative v. Cagalawan, 694 Phil. 268, 281 (2012).
53. Id. at 463.
54. See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226722. March 18, 2019.]
FREYSSINET FILIPINAS CORPORATION (now FREY-FIL

CORPORATION), ERIC A. CRUZ, GAUDENCIO S. REYES, AND
CARLOTA R. SATORRE , petitioners, vs. AMADO R. LAPUZ , respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated April
20, 2016 and the Resolution 3 dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 136935, which reversed and set aside the Resolutions dated April 30,
2014 4 and June 25, 2014 5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC LAC No. 04-000894-14 and instead, reinstated the Decision 6 dated January 26,
2014 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC Case No. RAB III-01-18500-12 declaring that
respondent Amado R. Lapuz (respondent) was a regular employee and that his
dismissal was illegal.
The Facts
Respondent Amado R. Lapuz (respondent) worked as warehouse supervisor for

petitioner Freyssinet Filipinas Corporation (FFC), now Frey-Fil Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of general construction, pre-stressed, post-
tensioning, among others. 7 Respondent claimed that he commenced work for FFC
since 1977 under the latter's previous company names, particularly: ( a) FF Interior from
1977 to 1982, (b ) Freyssinet Post Tensioning System Philippines, Inc. (FPTSPI) or
Filsystem from 1982 to 1999, and (c) FFC from 2006 8 to 2012. 9 Except for FPTSPI
which was owned by one Philip Cruz, the remaining rms were allegedly owned and
operated by petitioner Eric A. Cruz (Cruz). 1 0 Respondent was assigned at the different
projects of FFC, the last of which was at the Wharton Parksuite Project in Binondo,
Manila. 1 1
Sometime in December 2011, respondent averred that he was verbally informed
of his termination from work by the project manager, respondent Gaudencio S. Reyes
(Reyes), when he was told "Hoy umalis ka na dyan" and no longer allowed to perform his
work and enter the premises. 1 2 This notwithstanding, respondent continued to report
at the project site until he received a notice 1 3 of termination dated January 5, 2012 and
directed to secure his clearance 1 4 from the HRD Department, which he complied.
Believing to have been dismissed without substantive and procedural due process, 1 5
respondent led a complaint 1 6 for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and
payment of attorney's fees, against FFC, Cruz, Reyes, and one Carlota R. Satorre
(petitioners) before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB III 01-18500-12.
For their part, petitioners asserted that respondent started working as
warehouse supervisor for FFC only on April 11, 2007 under a project employment
contract for its Texas Instruments project located in Pampanga, which lasted until
September 2008. Thereafter, respondent was rehired on a per project basis, for the
following: (a) Robinson's Place project in Dumaguete City from September 12, 2008
until February 26, 2010; (b ) FFC's Calumpit Plant project from March 7, 2010 until April
4, 2011; and (c) Wharton Parksuite project from April 22, 2011 until the termination of
his contract on December 31, 2011. 1 7 In support thereof, FFC submitted copies of
respondent's project employment contracts at his last assignment in Wharton
Parksuite which showed that his services were engaged intermittently for a fixed period
of one (1) or three (3) months only. 1 8 They further contended that respondent's
termination was also reported 1 9 to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
in accordance with Section 2.2 of Department Order No. 19, Series of 1993 (D.O. No.
19-93). 2 0 Thus, they maintained that respondent was not illegally dismissed as his
project employment contract merely expired. 2 1 They further averred that the corporate
o cers should not be held liable in view of the separate personality of the corporation
from its officers and absent showing of bad faith on their part. 2 2
The LA Ruling
In a Decision 2 3 dated January 26, 2014, the LA declared respondent to be a

regular employee of FFC and as such, was dismissed without just or authorized cause.
The LA ruled that petitioners' failure to adduce proof of the ling of termination reports
with the DOLE every time a project or phase was completed is an indication that
respondent was not a project employee. Moreover, the LA noted that respondent has
been employed as warehouse supervisor for FFC since 1977, and that in such capacity,
performed tasks that were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
company. 2 4 Accordingly, the LA ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay
respondent separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service since
1977 up to 2012 in the sum of P610,500.00, with full backwages reckoned from his
dismissal; moral and exemplary damages in the amount P50,000.00 each; and ten
percent (10%) attorney's fees for having been compelled to litigate. 2 5
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed 2 6 to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Resolution 2 7 dated April 30, 2014, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's
decision, holding that respondent was a project employee whose services ended upon
completion of a speci c project. It pointed out that FFC was primarily engaged in the
construction industry whose workers are hired for speci c phases of work in the
project site, and that respondent was made aware of the nature of his employment and
the duration thereof. It held that respondent's engagement as project employee was
further manifested by his identi cation card, clearance, project employment contracts,
and establishment termination report to the DOLE. Since respondent's most recent
project contract had already ended, he cannot be said to have been illegally dismissed
and thus, was not entitled to backwages, separation pay and other bene ts. Finally, it
found no basis to award damages there being no showing that petitioners acted in bad
faith in terminating respondents, as well as attorney's fees. 2 8
Respondent's motion for reconsideration 2 9 was denied in a Resolution 3 0 dated
June 25, 2014. Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari. 3 1
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 3 2 dated April 20, 2016, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC
ruling and instead, reinstated the LA ruling, 3 3 nding respondent to be a regular
employee of FFC as early as 1977. It did not give credence to petitioners' claim that FF
Interior, FPTSPI, and Filsystems were separate and distinct corporations from FFC,
noting that the said corporations were ran by the same people and that the same
merely evolved into different names from its establishment in 1972 until its present
name as FFC. The CA agreed with the ndings of the LA that petitioners' failure to
religiously report the termination of respondent's employment contracts established
that the latter was a regular employee, and that the employment contracts were a mere
after-thought in order to escape from their legal obligation attached to regular
employment. 3 4
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 3 5 was denied in a Resolution 3 6 dated
August 23, 2016; hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
I.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must

satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of law. 3 7 It has also been held that grave abuse of discretion
arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. 3 8
Tested against these considerations, the Court nds that the CA committed no
reversible error in granting respondent's certiorari petition insofar as it ruled that
respondent was a regular — and not a project — employee.
Under Article 295 3 9 of the Labor Code, regular employment exists when the
employee is: (a) engaged to perform activities that are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer; or (b ) a casual employee whose activities
are not usually necessary or desirable in the employer's usual business or trade, and
has rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to
the activity in which he is employed.
On the other hand, an employee is said to be under a project employment when
he is hired under a contract which speci es that the employment will last only for a
speci c project or undertaking the completion or termination of which is
determined at the time of his engagement. 4 0 Thus, for an employee to be considered
project-based, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove that: ( a ) the employee was
assigned to carry out a speci c project or undertaking; and ( b ) the duration and scope
of which were speci ed at the time the employee was engaged for such project. 4 1
When a project employee is assigned to a project or phase thereof which begins and
ends at determined or determinable times, his services may be lawfully terminated at
the completion of such project or a phase thereof. 4 2
Notably, in GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga , 4 3 the Court pointed out that if the
particular job or undertaking is within the regular or usual business of the employer
company and it is not identi ably distinct or separate from the other undertakings of
the company such that there is clearly a constant necessity for the performance of the
task in question, said job or undertaking should not be considered a project. 4 4
In this case, respondent was supposedly engaged by FFC as warehouse
supervisor for its various projects, namely: (a) Texas Instruments project in Pampanga
from April 11, 2007 to September 2008; (b ) Robinson's Place project in Dumaguete
City from September 12, 2008 until February 26, 2010; (c) FFC's Calumpit Plant project
from March 7, 2010 until April 4, 2011; and (d) Wharton Parksuite project from April 22,
2011 until December 31, 2011. However, for the rst three (3) projects , petitioners
failed to show that respondent was hired on a project basis and that he was informed
of the duration and scope of his work. In fact, no employment contracts for the said
projects were presented to substantiate their claim. While the absence of a written
contract does not per se grant regular status to respondent, it is nonetheless evidence
that he was informed of the duration and scope of his work and his status as project
employee. 4 5
In addition, no termination reports for each completed projects were shown to
have been submitted by petitioners to the DOLE as mandated under Section 2 (2.2) (e)
4 6 of Department Order No. 19-93 and, in fact, it was only during respondent's last
assignment at the Wharton Parksuite project that they complied with the directive. It
bears stressing that the failure of an employer to file a termination report with the DOLE
every time a project or a phase thereof is completed indicates that the workers hired
were not project employees. In Tomas Lao Construction v. NLRC, 4 7 the Court ruled that
"[t]he report of termination is one of the indicators of project employment." 4 8
While petitioners did submit respondent's project employment contracts for the
Wharton Parksuite project, which contracts in fact, speci ed the covered project and
duration thereof, the Court nds that the same are still insu cient to prove his status
as a project employee. A perusal of the subject contracts readily reveals that
respondent was repeatedly and successively re-hired as warehouse supervisor for the
Wharton Parksuite project eight (8) times for the following periods, to wit: (a) July 1,
2010 to August 31, 2010, (b ) September 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010, (c) October 1,
2010 to October 31, 2010, (d) January 16, 2011 to February 28, 2011, (e) March 1,
2011 to March 31, 2011, (f) June 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011, (g ) July 1, 2011 to
September 30, 2011, and (h) October 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. These
notwithstanding, petitioners, however, failed to show that respondent's services were
needed only for the period contracted and that the particular phase or undertaking for
which he has been hired has been completed to warrant the termination of his
employment. On the contrary, respondent's successive re-hiring in order to perform the
same kind of work for the same project, contract after contract — most of which were
for a duration of one (1) month only — reasonably shows that respondent's project
employment contracts were merely used by petitioners to circumvent the law on
tenurial security. Settled is the rule that when periods have been imposed to preclude
the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as
contrary to public morals, good customs or public order. 4 9
Even on the assumption that respondent was a project employee, the Court has
held that an employment ceases to be co-terminous with speci c projects when the
employee is continuously rehired due to the demands of employer's business and re-
engaged for many more projects without interruption. 5 0 As aptly pointed out in the
case of Maraguinot, Jr. v NLRC , 5 1 once a project or work pool employee has been:
(1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the
same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary, and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee
must be deemed a regular employee . 5 2 Indeed, while length of time is not the
controlling test for project employment, it is nonetheless vital in determining if the
employee was hired for a speci c undertaking or tasked to perform functions that are
vital, necessary, and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. 5 3
Considering that the function of a warehouse supervisor is no doubt vital,
necessary, and desirable to the construction business of petitioners, and it has been
su ciently shown that respondent's work as such for the latter's various projects
without interruption since 2007 is necessary and desirable to petitioners' construction
business, the CA properly deemed respondent to be a regular employee. To reiterate,
where the employment of project employees is extended long after the supposed
project has been nished, the employees are removed from the scope of project
employees and are considered regular employees. 5 4
As a regular employee, respondent is entitled to security of tenure and may only
be dismissed for just or authorized causes. Thus, not having been dismissed for a valid
and legal cause, the CA was correct in declaring respondent to have been illegally
dismissed.
II.
However, the Court takes exception to the CA's nding that respondent's
employment with petitioners started in 1977 based on its flawed finding that FF Interior
and FFC are one and the same company.
In so ruling, the CA upheld the assertion that FF Interior, FPTSPI/Filsystem, and
FFC merely changed their names and that all companies are managed and owned by
the same people. However, the CA's conclusion is belied by the records which reveal
that FFC originated from then Freyssinet (Davao), Inc., 5 5 that was registered on
February 28, 1994 before the SEC and issued SEC Registration No. AS094-001909, 5 6
and thereafter re-named to FFC 5 7 in 2002, and subsequently, to Frey-Fil Corporation in
2011. 5 8 On the other hand, FPTSPI is shown to have been registered under SEC
Registration No. ASO94-002261, 5 9 while Filsystems Tower 1, Inc. is registered under
SEC Registration No. ASO94-00011538. 6 0 Clearly, having been issued separate
certi cates of registration, the FFC, FPTSPI, and Filsystems Tower 1, Inc., are by law
deemed to be separate and distinct corporate personalities.
Moreover, it is well settled that the mere ownership by a single stockholder or by
another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of
itself su cient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality. 6 1 Neither
is the existence of interlocking directors, corporate o cers, and shareholders enough
justi cation to pierce the veil of corporate ction in the absence of fraud or other public
policy considerations. 6 2 It must be shown that the separate and distinct personalities
of the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or perpetrate a
deception. 6 3 Hence, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established by
substantial evidence; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an injustice that was never
unintended may result from an erroneous application. 6 4 Verily, no such evidence was
submitted by respondent in this respect.
In addition, no less than respondent admitted that his employment with FPTSPI
ceased in 1999 and that he was hired anew by FFC only in 2006. 6 5 While respondent
declared that he was employed by FFC on July 11, 2006 in his complaint, 6 6 no evidence
was presented to substantiate the same. On the other hand, respondent did not deny
FFC's claim that he was hired as warehouse supervisor by the latter in 2007 for its
Texas Instruments project in Pampanga. 6 7 Under the circumstances, the Court is
inclined to believe that respondent was hired by FFC only on April 11, 2007 — and not
on July 11, 2006 as claimed by him.
Thus, since there was no basis for the CA to disregard the separate juridical
personality of FFC under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, and considering
further that respondent was deemed a regular employee of FFC having been
consistently hired as warehouse supervisor since April 11, 2007, and terminated
without a valid cause on January 5, 2012, the awards of backwages and separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement 6 8 are in accord with Article 294 6 9 of the Labor Code.
As to the liability of the impleaded corporate o cers, the Court equally nds
error on the part of the CA in holding them jointly and severally liable to respondent.
Case law states that to hold a director or o cer personally liable for corporate
obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the
director or o cer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or that the
o cer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the
o cer acted in bad faith. 7 0 Here, the twin requirements of allegation and proof of bad
faith necessary to hold the impleaded corporate officers liable for the monetary awards
are clearly lacking.
Finally, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, it is worthy
to point out that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee
was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, while exemplary
damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner. 7 1 Apart from respondent's bare allegations, no evidence was
presented to prove that his dismissal was attended with bad faith or was done
oppressively.
Except for the foregoing modi cations, the CA Decision, which ordered the
reinstatement of the LA ruling, stands.
WHEREFORE , the petition is PARTLY GRANTED . The Decision dated April 20,
2016 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 136935 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS , as follows:
(a) petitioner Freyssinet Filipinas Corporation (now Frey-Fil
Corporation) is ordered to pay respondent Amado R. Lapuz his separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay per year of service reckoned from April 11, 2007
up to the finality of this Decision;
(b) the corporate o cers, petitioners Eric A. Cruz, Gaudencio S.
Reyes, and Carlota R. Satorre, are absolved from liability; and
(c) e award of moral and exemplary damages are ordered deleted for
lack of basis.
The rest of the CA decision stands.
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, * Caguioa, J.C., Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2644 dated March 15, 2019.
1. Rollo, pp. 23-40.
2. Id. at 45-54. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba with Associate Justices
Ramon R. Garcia and Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurring.
3. Id. at 56-57.
4. Id. at 136-143. Penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. with Presiding Commissioner
Alex A. Lopez and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III, concurring.
5. CA rollo, pp. 41-42.
6. Rollo, pp. 103-111. Penned by Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon.

7. Id. at 60.
8. "2000" in some parts of the records. See CA and LA Decisions; id. at 45 and 103, respectively.
9. See id. at 45, 103, and 137.
10. See id. at 78. The CA Decision and the NLRC Resolution stated that FF Interior, FPTSPI, and
FFC were owned by Cruz.
11. Id. at 46 and 137.
12. See id. at 90 and 104.

13. Id. at 94.
14. Id. at 95.
15. See Sinumpaang Salaysay dated April 2, 2012; id. at 89-91. See also id. at 104.
16. See Amended Complaint dated February 29, 2012; id. at 58-59.
17. See id. at 61.
18. Id. at 66-73. The various periods of employment covering respondent's Project Employment
Contract at Wharton Park Suite are as follows:a. July 1, 2010 to August 31, 2010
b. September 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010
c. October 1, 2010 to October 31, 2010
d. January 16, 2011 to February 28, 2011
e. March 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011

f. June 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011
g. July 1, 2011 to September 30, 2011
h. October 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011.
19. See Establishment Employment Report; id. at 74-75.
20. Entitled "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS IN THE

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY" dated April 1, 1993.

22. See id. at 63-64.
23. Id. at 103-111.
24. See id. at 107-110.
25. See id. at 111.
26. See Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal dated March 7, 2014; id. at 114-123.
27. Id. at 136-143.
28. See id. at 140-142.
29. Dated May 30, 2014. Id. at 144-151.
30. CA rollo, pp. 41-42.

31. Rollo, pp. 152-179.
32. Id. at 45-54.
33. See id. at 53.
34. See id. at 47-53.
35. See Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration (to the Decision dated 20 April
2016) dated May 17, 2016; id. at 182-192.
36. Id. at 56-57.

37. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Hipe, Jr., 746 Phil. 955, 965-966 (2014).
38. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 706 Phil. 534, 558 (2013).
39. Formerly Article 280. As renumbered pursuant to Department Advisory No. 01, n series of
2015, entitled "RENUMBERING OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS
AMENDED" dated July 21, 2015.
40. See Article 295 (280) of the Labor Code.
41. Dacles v. Millenium Erectors Corporation, 763 Phil. 550, 558 (2015).

42. See Felipe v. Danilo Divina Tamayo Konstract, Inc. (DDTKI) , 795 Phil. 891, 899 (2016). See
also Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc., 752 Phil. 413, 421 (2015), citing Omni Hauling Services,
Inc. v. Bon, 742 Phil. 335, 343-344 (2014).
43. GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, 722 Phil. 161 (2013).
44. Id. at 173.
45. See Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, supra note 42, at 344.
46. Section 2. EMPLOYMENT STATUS
xxx xxx xxx
2.2 Indicators of project employment. — Either one or more of the following

circumstances, among others, may be considered as indicators that an employee is a
project employee.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The termination of his employment in the particular project/undertaking is

reported to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office
having jurisdiction over the workplace within 30 days following the date of
his separation from work, using the prescribed form on employees'
terminations/dismissals/suspensions.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
47. 344 Phil. 268 (1997).
48. Id. at 282.

49. Id. at 282-283.
50. See id. at 279. See also Liganza v. RBL Shipyard Corporation, 535 Phil. 662, 672 (2006).
51. 348 Phil. 580 (1998).
52. Id. at 606.
53. Integrated Contractor and Plumbing Works, Inc. v. NLRC, 503 Phil. 875, 883 (2005).
54. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 549 Phil.
733, 746 (2007).
55. See rollo, pp. 205-216.
56. See id. at 193-204.
57. See id. at 205-206.
58. See id. at 217.
59. See id. at 229-234.

60. See id. at 235-244.
61. Zambrano v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 224099, June 21, 2017,
828 SCRA 144, 166; citation omitted.
62. Philippine National Bank v. Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation, 706 Phil. 297, 313
(2013).
63. See Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, 646 Phil. 210, 243 (2010).
64. Philippine National Bank v. Andrada Electric & Engineering Company , 430 Phil. 882, 894-
895 (2002).
66. Id. at 58.
67. See respondent's Petition for Certiorari; id. at 166.
68. See LA Decision; id. at 111.
69. Article 294, formerly Article 279, of the Labor Code provides:
Article 294. [279] Security of Tenure . — In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement.
70. Dimson v. Chua, 801 Phil. 778, 791 (2016).
71. Pasos v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, 713 Phil. 416, 437 (2013).
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Department Advisory No. 07" in the original document.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 224854. March 27, 2019.]
LUCITA S. PARDILLO , petitioner, vs. DR. EVELYN DUCAY BANDOJO,

OWNER AND MEDICAL DIRECTOR OF E & R HOSPITAL , respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA , J : p
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, led by Lucita S. Pardillo (Pardillo) against Dr. Evelyn Ducay Bandojo (Dr.
Bandojo), owner of E & R Hospital in Iligan City, assailing the Decision 2 dated
September 17, 2015 and Resolution 3 dated May 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 05365-MIN which had overturned the Decision 4 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
Facts
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are quoted below:

Sometime in November of 1990, x x x Lucita S. Pardillo was hired as
midwife of E & R Hospital and Pharmacy in Iligan City, which is owned and
managed by spouses Prof. Rogelio B. Bandojo and x x x Dr. Evelyn D. Bandojo.
In 1991, [Pardillo] was transferred to a new position as Billing Clerk/Cashier. In
2001, she was promoted and became the Business O ce Manager and held
such position until November 18, 2010 when her employment was terminated
by [Dr. Bandojo].
According to [Pardillo], she was surprised when she received a Notice of
Termination on November 18, 2010 which reads:
To: Ms. Lucita S. Pardillo
From: The Medical Director
Subject: Notice of Termination of Service
You are hereby informed that your services as Business
O ce Manager will be terminated effective thirty (30) days from
receipt of this memorandum.
Due to the following causes:
1. Loss of confidence
2. Habitual Tardiness
3. Texting insulting words to me, your employer
4. Uttering offensive words against me, your employer
5. Texting me, threatening to kill me or any of my family
Your (sic) need not report to work thirty days from today
but you will still received(sic) your salary equivalent to one (1)
month as if you were on regular duty.
You are advised to prepare all clearance as required from
all terminated employees at the end of your tour of duty which is
thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice.
CAIHTE
For your proper guidance.

(SGD) Evelyn D. Bandojo, MD, DFM
Medical Director
On the other hand, x x x Dr. Bandojo alleged that [Pardillo's] termination
was brought about by several infractions she committed and her habitual
tardiness totaling to about 16,000 minutes.
[Dr. Bandojo] avers that E & R Hospital suffered losses due to the
negligence of [Pardillo] in failing to process and send the records of certain
patients to PhilHealth for refund of their paid claims. [Dr. Bandojo] cited the
case of a patient named Jamal Alim, whose claim was not processed or sent to
PhilHealth; Moises Servano whose claim was returned to E & R Hospital due to
the lack of original o cial receipt[;] and Stephen Chiu, a non-PhilHealth patient
who was discharged from the hospital on September 6, 2007 with an unsettled
bill of Php5[,]968.00 and with no promissory note on record.
Moreover, that sometime on August 2010, [Pardillo] allegedly tried to
borrow, for her personal use the hospital's "Pay to Cash" check which was
intended for the payment of the newborn screening kits.
The proverbial last straw that broke the camel's back was the incident on
September 27, 2010 when [Pardillo] reported very late for work; speci cally at
past ten in the morning. [Dr. Bandojo] caught Mrs. Natividad Labadan,
[Pardillo's] subordinate, punching [Pardillo's] time card in the bundy clock
located at the pharmacy area.
Thus, on September 30, 2010, an administrative investigation was
conducted. In the said investigation, [Pardillo] denied [the] accusations against
her.
Due to the alleged incessant breach of trust exhibited by [Pardillo], [Dr.
Bandojo] issued the memorandum dated November 18, 2010 terminating the
employment of [Pardillo] as Business Office Manager of E & R Hospital.
On April 5, 2011, Pardillo led a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with the
Labor Arbiter. x x x 5
Findings of the labor tribunals
In its Decision 6 dated October 24, 2011, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan
(LA) dismissed Pardillo's complaint for lack of merit. The LA held that Pardillo was a
managerial employee whose employment may be terminated on the ground of loss of
trust and con dence. 7 The LA held that Pardillo committed several infractions inimical
to the business of Dr. Bandojo such as failing to process PhilHealth refunds, allowing
the release of a patient with unpaid hospital bills without a promissory note, trying to
take a personal loan on the "pay to cash" check intended for payment of newborn
screening kits, and tardiness. The LA also found that Dr. Bandojo had observed
procedural due process in dismissing Pardillo as an administrative hearing was
conducted.
On appeal the NLRC, reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA in its Decision
dated July 31, 2012. The NLRC held that Pardillo was dismissed without substantive
and procedural due process. Pardillo was able to explain the alleged infractions levelled
against her by Dr. Bandojo. With regard to patient Moises Servano, he had died and his
relatives could no longer nd the original receipt so that upon instruction of Dr.
Bandojo, Pardillo did not re le the claim to PhilHealth. 8 As to patient Jamal Alim, he
had no nancial obligation to the hospital, a fact which was not controverted by Dr.
Bandojo. As regards to patient Adam Stephen Chiu, his grand uncle Victor Chiu, hospital
accountant, executed an a davit alleging that he was responsible for his nephew's
hospitalization and that the balance of his unpaid medical bills were to be offset
against his professional fees. 9 The NLRC concluded that Pardillo caught the ire of Dr.
Bandojo when the latter witnessed Pardillo's subordinate Natividad Ladaban punched
in her superior's time card. The NLRC held that while such act was a violation of the
hospital's policies, it did not amount to the wilful breach of trust that would justify
dismissal from employment. The NLRC also noted that during the time-card incident,
Pardillo was actually present in the hospital premises. This negated the perception that
she had the intention to be absent that day and directed her subordinate to punch in her
time card to make it appear that she was present. 1 0DETACa
On the issue of tardiness, the NLRC found that Pardillo was able to explain the
same. The NLRC noted a memorandum 1 1 dated October 30, 2010 issued by Dr.
Bandojo to Pardillo stating that her usual 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon; 1:00 P.M. to 5:00
P.M. schedule will resume on November 1, 2010 in lieu of other schedules granted or
allowed previously. The NLRC held that the memorandum bolstered Pardillo's claim
that she was allowed to arrive late because she rst attended to outside activities
related to her functions like PhilHealth and bank transactions. The NLRC ordered
Pardillo's reinstatement with full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other bene ts
and attorney's fees.
Dr. Bandojo led a Motion for Reconsideration 1 2 (MR) which was denied by the
NLRC in its Decision 1 3 dated December 12, 2012. The NLRC however, modi ed its
earlier Decision as to the order of reinstatement. Pardillo had manifested that her
relationship with her former employer Dr. Bandojo had become strained and prayed for
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Dr. Bandojo did not controvert this. Thus, the
NLRC granted her prayer for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Aggrieved, Dr. Bandojo elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari 1 4
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA Decision
The CA granted the petition. The CA held that Dr. Bandojo was able to prove with
substantial evidence that Pardillo's termination was for a just cause. The CA ruled that
Dr. Bandojo was able to prove the habitual tardiness of Pardillo which resulted in her
neglect of duties and poor work performance. As a managerial employee, the CA held
that Pardillo should be a sterling example of honesty, trustworthiness, and e ciency in
the workplace. The CA also found that Pardillo's act of ordering her subordinate to
punch in her time card was an act of falsification. 1 5
On the issue of procedural due process, the CA held that Dr. Bandojo was able to
comply with the two-notice rule. Pardillo was given a chance to present her side,
numerous memoranda and warnings were issued to her due to tardiness, as well as a
separate memorandum regarding the time-card incident. Two administrative
conferences were held where Pardillo was given a chance to explain her side. Finally, a
notice of termination 1 6 was sent to Pardillo on November 18, 2010. 1 7 Thus, the CA
overturned the ndings of the NLRC and reinstated the LA Decision. Pardillo's MR was
denied by the CA in the Assailed Resolution.
Pardillo led the instant petition alleging that there were no valid grounds for her
dismissal. 1 8 As well, Pardillo claims that Dr. Bandojo failed to comply with procedural
due process. She did not receive any notice to explain prior to receiving the notice of
termination. 1 9 Dr. Bandojo led her Comment 2 0 praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
Issue
Whether the CA committed reversible error in reversing the NLRC Decision and
reinstating the LA Decision.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that Rule 45 petitions are generally limited to
questions of law, as the Court is not a trier of facts. 2 1 However, an exceptional
circumstance exists when the ndings of the LA, NLRC, and CA are con icting, as in this
case. 2 2
Requirements of substantive
and procedural due process
In determining the legality of an employee's dismissal, the Court must determine
the legality of the act of dismissal which pertains to substantive due process, and the
manner of dismissal which constitutes procedural due process.
Under Article 294 of Presidential Decree No. 442 or the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Labor Code), 2 3 the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just or authorized cause.
The just causes for dismissal are listed under Article 297:
Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any
of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. aDSIHc
Anent the procedural aspect, the employer must comply with the two-notice rule,
as mandated under the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code. 2 4 The
employer must serve the erring employee a rst notice which details the ground/s for
termination, giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side. In
practice, this is commonly referred to as the notice to explain (NTE). The second notice
pertains to the written notice of termination indicating that upon due consideration of
all circumstances, the employer has decided to dismiss the employee.
Loss of trust and confidence as
ground for dismissal
Article 297 (c) allows an employer to terminate the services of an employee on
the ground of loss of trust and con dence. There are two requisites for this ground:
rst, the employee must be holding a position of trust and con dence; and second,
there must be a willful act that would justify the loss of trust and con dence which is
based on clearly established facts. 2 5
Pardillo's status as a managerial employee holding the position of Business
O ce Manager was never disputed in this case. The pivotal issue thus before the Court
is the existence of the second requisite.
I n Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Employee Labor Union v. NLRC , 26 the
Court expounded on loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal:
While the law and this Court recognize the right of an employer to
dismiss an employee based on loss of trust and con dence, the evidence of the
employer must clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which the loss
of trust and confidence in the employee is based.
To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and con dence must be
based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A
breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justi able excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the
employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee
would remain eternally at the mercy of the employer. Further, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-
related and show that the employee concerned is un t to continue working for
the employer. Such ground for dismissal has never been intended to afford an
occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. 2 7
Jurisprudence has also distinguished the treatment of managerial employees
and rank-and- le personnel with regard to the ground of loss and trust and con dence.
In Etcuban Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, 2 8 the Court held:
x x x [W]ith respect to rank-and- le personnel, loss of trust and
con dence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the
alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and
accusations by the employer will not be su cient. But as regards a managerial
employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has
breached the trust of his employer would su ce for his dismissal. Hence, in the
case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it
being su cient that there is some basis for such loss of con dence, such as
when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee
concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and con dence
demanded by his position. 2 9
Thus, there must be some basis or reasonable ground to believe that the
employee is responsible for the misconduct and the breach or act complained of must
be related to the work performed by the employee. Although the employer is given
more leeway in the dismissal of managerial employees on the ground of loss of trust
and con dence, the dismissal must not be based on the mere whims or caprices of the
employer. The dismissal must have reasonable basis.

In illegal dismissal cases, the burden to prove that the termination of
employment was for a just and valid cause is on the employer. 3 0 In this case, the Court
holds that the CA committed reversible error in overturning the ndings of the NLRC.
After a judicious review of the facts as borne by the records, the Court nds that Dr.
Bandojo failed to prove with substantial evidence Pardillo's alleged acts which led to
loss of trust and confidence.
The records show that in a NTE 3 1 dated November 5, 2010, Pardillo was made
to explain her alleged tardiness committed on November 4 and 5, 2010. Pardillo replied
in a letter 3 2 dated November 6, 2010, apologizing for her tardiness. However, in the
notice of termination dated November 18, 2010, Dr. Bandojo indicated the following
grounds for Pardillo's dismissal:
You are hereby informed that your services as Business O ce Manager
will be terminated effective thirty (30) days from receipt of this memorandum.
ETHIDa
Due to the following causes:

1. Loss of trust and confidence
2. Habitual [t]ardiness
3. Texting insulting words to me, your employer
4. Uttering offensive words against me, your employer
5. Texting me, threatening to kill me or any of my family[.] 3 3
The inclusion of the new allegations in the notice of termination was not
su ciently explained by Dr. Bandojo. The notice does not also state the alleged acts
purportedly committed by Pardillo which resulted in loss of trust and con dence.
Pardillo was not served with any NTE so that she could proffer her defense with regard
to the new allegations. Dr. Bandojo also did not expound on the allegations regarding
the insults and threats to her life and her family, in the pleadings that she led before
the labor tribunals and the courts. To the mind of the Court, these circumstances cast
serious doubt on the veracity of Dr. Bandojo's contentions in the notice of termination.
The Court also a rms the ndings of the NLRC regarding the allegation of
habitual tardiness. In order to justify the dismissal of Pardillo, Dr. Bandojo submitted
several notices from as early as 1994 addressed to Pardillo regarding her tardiness
which allegedly amounted to 16,333 minutes. 3 4 However, as correctly held by the
NLRC, Pardillo was able to explain the reason why she could not come to the o ce on
the scheduled time because it was necessary for her to go directly to the bank or to the
PhilHealth o ce to perform o cial business for the hospital. Moreover, the letter
dated October 30, 2010 sent by Dr. Bandojo to Pardillo supports Pardillo's claim that
she had a flexible work schedule. The letter states:
TO: MS. LUCITA S. PARDILLO, B.O. Manager
FROM: THE MEDICAL DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SCHEDULE OF DUTY HOURS
In our latest conversation, we have agreed that your usual 8am-12pm,
1pm-5pm schedule of duty hours will resume effective November 1, 2010.
All other schedules granted or allowed in the past per your various
requests and which have been granted and adjusted to suit your past request in
your schedule of duty hours shall now become moot and academic.
To reiterate what we have agreed, your new schedule of duty hours will
be 8-12 in the morning and 1-5 in the afternoon, Monday to Saturday.
For your guidance.
(Sgd.)
Dr. Evelyn [Ducay] Bandojo, DFM 3 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
The records do not indicate when Pardillo's exible schedule was granted, but
the above letter satisfactorily con rms that Pardillo was allowed some leeway in her
work schedule as her job required her to go to government agencies and banks to
process transactions of the hospital. The tardiness of Pardillo earlier than October 30,
2010 cannot thus be taken against her because prior thereto, she was not strictly
required to be at the o ce from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon and 1:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.
The letter refers to the 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. scheme as Pardillo's "new" schedule.
Pardillo was also sent a document entitled "Warning: This is your nth offense" on
August 10, 2010 regarding her tardiness on several dates. However, the warning itself
contains the following proviso: "Suspension to Termination will be meted out to erring
personnel who incurred tardiness beyond the allowable limit unless you can prove to
management that your tardiness was due to laudable acts bene cial to [the] hospital
business and service." 3 6 This con rms that the hospital policy recognized that there
may be reasonable grounds for an employee's tardiness, which includes performing
tasks bene cial to the hospital outside of its premises. The Court also observes that
the warning did not contain a notice to explain but was merely a notice to Pardillo that
she had been tardy on specific dates.
With regard to the other allegations of Pardillo, the Court quotes with approval
the findings of the NLRC:
x x x The supposed claims of patients Moises Servano and Jamal Alim
have been adequately explained by complainant. x x x [T]he Phil[H]ealth claim
of patient Moises Servano, who is her relative, was returned to the hospital
because only the machine copy of the original receipt of the blood purchased by
the patient was submitted. Servano died and his relatives could no longer nd
the original copy of the o cial receipt so that upon [the] instruction of [Dr.
Bandojo], complainant did not re le the claim to P[hil]H[ealth]. As to patient
Jamal Alim, complainant averred that Mr. Alim has no nancial obligation to
the [h]ospital, which is not being controverted by [Dr. Bandojo] x x x In the case
of patient Adam Stephen Chiu, his grand uncle Victor L. Chiu, who was
responsible for his hospitalization, duly executed a statement under oath
contesting as without bases the charges levelled by [Dr. Bandojo] against
complainant and categorically declared that Mr. Chiu's balance of P4,968.16
with the hospital has been offsetted (sic) with his professional fees as an
accountant of the hospital. 3 7 cSEDTC
The absence of any NTEs on the new allegations (i.e., failure to process
PhilHealth claims, attempting to borrow money for personal use, and allowing the
release of patients with unpaid hospital bills without any promissory note, uttering
offensive words and making death threats) can only be described as bemusing. If the
less serious offense of tardiness merited the sending of several NTEs to Pardillo, why
was it that Dr. Bandojo did not send any NTEs for the more serious allegations? In her
position paper, 3 8 Dr. Bandojo admitted that the derogatory text messages she
received were from an unknown number. She concluded that the sender was Pardillo
merely because the messages stopped after Pardillo stopped reporting for work. 3 9 Dr.
Bandojo likewise did not submit these text messages to the labor tribunals or the
courts. All in all, it is quite apparent that the loss of trust and con dence in this case
was not genuine and was merely used as a convenient means to dismiss Pardillo.
Considering the foregoing, the Court nds that Dr. Bandojo failed to prove with
substantial evidence the acts constituting willful breach of company policy, resulting to
loss of trust and confidence. Thus, Pardillo's dismissal was illegal.
The Court is not unaware of its Decision in Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc, Inc. , 4 0 in
which a supervisory employee was also caught directing his subordinate to punch-in his
time card and the Court upheld the validity of his dismissal. However, in Alvarez, the
incident for which the employee was disciplined was already his second offense and
the Court also considered the totality of circumstances that included several prior
offenses committed by the employee relating to product shortages, negligence, and
tardiness, which were duly proven with substantial evidence. Thus, it is not on all fours
with this case.
Non-compliance with procedural
due process
Dr. Bandojo also failed to comply with the requirements of procedural due
process. As discussed above, Pardillo was served with an NTE that charged her only
with tardiness on two dates. However, the notice of termination charged her with
additional and more serious grounds of loss of trust and con dence, habitual tardiness,
texting insulting words and uttering offensive words to Dr. Bandojo, and threatening to
kill Dr. Bandojo and her family. The additional grounds cited in the notice of termination
which were not mentioned in the NTE violated Pardillo's right to be informed of the
administrative charges against her. The NTE and the notice of termination did not state
the speci c acts that constituted breach of company policies resulting in loss of trust
and confidence and the specific company policies that were violated.
The Court notes that there was an earlier memorandum 4 1 dated September 27,
2010 (memorandum) addressed to Pardillo and other o cers requesting them to
attend a conference on September 28, 2010 to explain the incident in which Pardillo's
subordinate, Mrs. Natividad Ladaban, was caught punching Pardillo's time card in the
bundy clock. However, this cannot be considered the NTE required under the Labor
Code. In King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac , 4 2 the Court elucidated on the required
contents of an NTE:
(1) The rst written notice to be served on the employees should
contain the speci c causes or grounds for termination against them, and a
directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written
explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the
Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord
to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This
should be construed as a period of at least ve (5) calendar days from receipt
of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union o cial or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and
decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order
to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses,
the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances
that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not su ce. Lastly, the notice should speci cally
mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the
grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees. 4 3
The memorandum did not state the grounds for dismissal or disciplinary action,
the speci c acts of Pardillo constituting breach of company policy, and the actual
company policy violated. The memorandum did not also direct Pardillo to submit a
written explanation within a reasonable period of time. In fact, the conference was
scheduled on the very next day. 4 4 Thus, the said memorandum was not a proper NTE.
Moreover, after the conference, Dr. Bandojo did not inform Pardillo of her ndings or
impose any disciplinary action against Pardillo with regard to the allegations about the
time-card incident. It was only on November 18, 2010 that Dr. Bandojo sent the notice
of termination which included new allegations.
In ne, Dr. Bandojo failed to comply with the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process in effecting the termination of Pardillo's employment. There
was no substantial evidence to prove that she committed serious breaches of
company policy resulting in loss of trust and con dence. Moreover, Pardillo was not
afforded procedural due process.
Pardillo is entitled to
backwages and separation pay
The Court a rms the NLRC's award of backwages and separation pay. Article
294 of the Labor Code grants to an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work,
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, other bene ts or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. SDAaTC
In Aliling v. Feliciano, 4 5 citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde , 4 6 the Court awarded
both backwages and separation pay:
The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the
award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no
longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned
but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing
backwages is usually the length of the employee's service while that for
separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully
prevented from working. 4 7
The relationship between the parties in the case are undoubtedly strained and
reinstatement would no longer be viable. Thus, the grant of separation pay is fully
justified.
However, the Court modi es the NLRC award and deletes the award of attorney's
fees. The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule based on
the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 4 8 That a party was
compelled to initiate an action does not automatically entitle them to attorney's fees. In
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 4 9 the Court ruled:
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right
to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power
of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal,
and equitable justi cation. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may
not be awarded where no su cient showing of bad faith could be re ected in a
party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause. 5 0
Thus, in the absence of any factual, legal, or equitable basis for the award of
attorney's fees, the Court denies the same. Finally, the monetary award herein granted
shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum from November 18, 2010, the date of illegal
dismissal, until June 30, 2013 in line with the Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames .
5 1 From July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of the award, the interest rate shall be at 6%.
52
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is GRANTED . The Court further

RESOLVES to:
1. REVERSE and SET ASIDE the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 17, 2015 and Resolution dated May 4, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No.
05365-MIN;
2. AWARD petitioner Lucita S. Pardillo the following:
a. FULL BACKWAGES , inclusive of allowances, and other bene ts or
their monetary equivalent from November 18, 2010 until nality of
this judgment;
b. SEPARATION PAY in lieu of reinstatement at one-month salary for
every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months
considered as one whole year computed from November 1990 (the
date of hiring) until finality of this judgment;
3. The monetary award shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum from
November 18, 2010 until June 30, 2013 and 6% from July 1, 2013 until full
satisfaction of the award; and
4. REMAND the case to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of
backwages and separation pay and for execution of the award. acEHCD
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, J.C. Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-41.
2. Id. at 43-61. Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles.
3. Id. at 110-112. Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Oscar V. Badelles.
4. CA rollo, pp. 348-355. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Bario-Rod M. Talon with the
concurrence of Commissioners Proculo T. Sarmen and Dominador B. Medroso, Jr.
5. Rollo, pp. 43-45.
6. CA rollo, pp. 124-132.
7. Id. at 129.
8. Id. at 351.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 352.
11. Id. at 287.
12. Id. at 357-367.
13. Id. at 387-390.
14. Id. at 2-25.
15. Rollo, p. 58.
16. CA rollo, p. 234.

17. Rollo, pp. 59-60.
18. Id. at 16-27.
19. Id. at 34-37.
20. Id. at 129-146.
21. New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 211-213 (2005).
22. Id. at 212-213, citing The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 472 Phil. 11,
22-23 (2004).
23. As renumbered by Republic Act No. 10151, entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE
EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT WORKERS THEREBY REPEALING ARTICLES 130 AND 131 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-TWO, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," approved on June 21,
2011. See also Department of Labor and Employment, Department Advisory No. 01,
series of 2015, entitled "RENUMBERING OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS
AMENDED," dated July 21, 2015.
24. "For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
Code:
"(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his
side.
"(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance
of counsel if he desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
"(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination. (AMENDING THE RULES IMPLEMENTING BOOKS III AND VI OF THE LABOR
CODE AS AMENDED, Department Order No. 010-97 [1997], Art. III).
25. Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban, 594 Phil. 620, 628-629 (2008).
26. 687 Phil. 351 (2012).

27. Id. at 368-369.
28. 489 Phil. 483 (2005).

29. Id. at 496-497.
30. LABOR CODE, Art. 292 (277).

31. CA rollo, p. 288.
32. Id. at 379.

33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 270-271.
35. Id. at 287.

36. Id. at 509; underscoring supplied.
37. Id. at 351.

38. Id. at 37-55.
39. Id. at 40.
40. 718 Phil. 415 (2013).

41. CA rollo, p. 518.
42. 553 Phil. 108 (2007).

43. Id. at 115-116.
44. The actual meeting was conducted on September 30, 2010 after a postponement, see
Minutes of Meeting dated September 30, 2010, CA rollo, pp. 279-281.
45. 686 Phil. 889 (2012).

46. 634 Phil. 364 (2010).
47. Aliling v. Feliciano, supra note 45, at 916, citing id. at 369.
48. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, 361 Phil. 499, 529 (1999).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 529.

51. 716 Phil. 267, (2013). Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall
apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable (Id. at 281).
52. Id.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220030. March 18, 2019.]

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. , petitioner, vs.

REYES, J.C., JR. , J : p

c. Refund of Placement Fee PHP23,000.00

Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

6. Signed by Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma, rollo, pp. 65-66.

9. Dated March 8, 2010.

11. See CA Decision, supra note 2, at 38.

13. Signed by Labor Arbiter Jenneth Mapiza; id. at 73-78.

16. Id. at 104-108.

20. Id. at 153-175.

23. Id. at 13-15.

25. Id. at 242-243.

27. Id. at 251.

32. https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/what-euro-area_en; (visited

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 222748. April 3, 2019.]

AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC. , petitioner,

The facts, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is denied.

In cases of termination of employees, the well-entrenched policy is that

ART. 301 [286]. When Employment Not Deemed Terminated. — The

12. See id. at 15-16, 30.

18. 680 Phil. 112 (2012).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 231773. March 11, 2019.]

CESAR C. PELAGIO , petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE

Pelagio then sought to avail of permanent total disability bene ts from

The NLRC Ruling

The Issue before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

To recapitulate, the CA's nding that the company-designated physician gave

4. Id. at 140-156. Penned by Commissioner Numeriano D. Villena with Presiding Commissioner

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

10. See id. at 141 and 229.

12. See rollo, p. 141.

23. Id. at 115-120.

28. See id. at 154-156.

33. Id. at 228-240 & 246-254.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

35. See rollo, pp. 236-240, 246-252.

42. See id. at 308-309; citation omitted.

48. Rollo, p. 157.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 226722. March 18, 2019.]

FREYSSINET FILIPINAS CORPORATION (now FREY-FIL

Respondent Amado R. Lapuz (respondent) worked as warehouse supervisor for

In a Decision 2 3 dated January 26, 2014, the LA declared respondent to be a

The NLRC Ruling

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly impressed with merit.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must

6. Rollo, pp. 103-111. Penned by Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon.

12. See id. at 90 and 104.