ANTONIO PAGARIGAN, Petitioner, vs.

ANGELITA Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, DARAB,

YAGUE and SHIRLEY ASUNCION, Respondents. Region III upon failure to reach a settlement before the
barangay and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office.
BRION, J.: Petitioner contended that the respondents’
father consented to his institution as tenant of the land
Principles: and to the construction of his house on the property.
With respect to the ‘house’ being occupied by his son,
Civil Law (Land Titles and Deeds): Occupancy and he claimed that it was built on the property in 1997
cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how long, originally for use as an ‘animal shelter,’ and that his
will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. son’s use was temporary. Also, the petitioner claimed
Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to that the fishponds were constructed in 1995
prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or supposedly to serve as a catch basin for water to
consent of the landowner. irrigate the rice fields without any objection from the
The presence of a tenancy relationship respondents.
cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence The Provincial Adjudicator’s office ruled in the
are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by respondents’ favor after finding that the petitioner’s
mere conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not cultivation and occupation of the subject rice land was
brought about by the mere congruence of facts but, without the respondents’ consent.
being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties On appeal to the DARAB, the DARAB
to that relationship should be primordial. affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision. MR:
denied.
FACTS: CA: affirmed the DARAB’s decision. It held
Anastacio Yague, the previous owner of a that the petitioner’s status as de jure tenant to the
21,459 square meter-parcel of rice land located at subject rice land was not properly established due to
Brgy. San Carlos, Paniqui, Tarlac, had initially the absence of the elements of consent and an agreed
instituted his stepfather Macario Pagarigan as tenant sharing system of harvest between the parties.
of the land. Macario, with the help of his son Alfonso, Petitioner failed to prove that his institution as tenant
cultivated the land and, as agreed upon, shared in 1979 was with the consent of the respondents’
equally the land’s yearly harvest with Anastacio. father; and that the "acquiescence by the landowners
Allegedly with Anastacio’s consent, Alfonso became a of the petitioner’s cultivation of the land does not
tenant of the land in place of his ailing father sometime create an implied tenancy if the former, as in this case,
in 1957. Alfonso continued to cultivate the land after never considered petitioner Antonio Pagarigan as
Macario’s death and religiously delivered to Anastacio tenant of the land." Also, it held that the petitioner
his share in the harvest. failed to provide evidence, such as receipts, that he
In 1993, Anastacio transferred the title of the had been delivering to the respondents their
subject rice land to his daughters, herein respondents. corresponding share in the land’s harvest. MR:
In the succeeding years, the respondents noticed a denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
decline in the number of cavans produced and
delivered to them each year. They claimed that, in ISSUE:
1999, they did not receive any share in the land’s Whether or not an implied tenancy is created
harvest. between petitioner and respondents. -NO
Upon investigation, the respondents were
surprised to find that the petitioner was cultivating the RULING:
land; they thought all along that Alfonso was still the For an implied tenancy to arise, it is necessary
land’s tenant and that Antonio was merely delivering that all the essential requisites of tenancy must first be
to them their share in the harvest upon Alfonso’s present, to wit:
instructions. The respondents confronted the
petitioner and demanded that he vacate the property (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
because they did not consent to his institution as agricultural lessee;
tenant of the land. They also argued that the (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural
petitioner’s house and the two fishponds on the land;
property were constructed without their knowledge (3) there is consent between the parties to the
and consent, and that the petitioner even allowed his relationship;
son to build a house on the property without first (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
seeking their permission. The petitioner refused to agricultural production;
heed the respondents’ demand so the dispute was (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
brought to the barangay for conciliation. tenant or agricultural lessee; and
Respondents filed an ejectment complaint (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and
against the petitioner before the Office of the the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 In this case, the element of consent from the
landowner to the petitioner’s tenancy is absent.
We have consistently held that occupancy
and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how
long, will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant.
Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to
prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or
consent of the landowner. We emphasize that the
presence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit
in law and cannot be done away with by mere
conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought
about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a
legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial.
Petitioner consistently failed to provide
independent and concrete evidence to show that the
respondents and their father, Anastacio, gave their
consent (impliedly and expressly) to his institution as
tenant of the subject rice land. Proof of consent by the
landowner/s is largely a matter of evidence, and not a
proper subject of a Rule 45 petition. Well-settled is the
rule that only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by this Court in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the
absence of exceptional circumstances, we shall rely
and give credence to the factual findings of the
DARAB on the question of whether the landowners
gave their consent to the petitioner's tenancy,
especially when its finding on the matter was affirmed
on appeal to the CA.
 MARO, PARO, RD, CLUPPI) recommended the
approval. In fact, subject land is not a developed
subdivision. There can be no agricultural tenant on a
residential land. With regards the disturbance
compensation, the records are bereft of evidence
CALUZOR VS LLANILLO showing that Caluzor is tenant of Llanillo.
Hence, this recourse to the Supreme Court.
FACTS: ISSUE:
Petitioner Romeo Caluzor alleges that W/N a tenancy relationship exists between
Lorenzo Llanillo took him as a tenant, giving him Caluzor and Llanillo.
(Caluzor) a sketch of the the land he will be cultivating.
Even after the death of Lorenzo, Caluzor continued RULING:
giving Lorenzo’s share to his overseer, Martin There is no tenancy relationship between
Ricardo. Caluzor and Llanillo. Tenancy relationship and
In 1990, Deogracias Llanillo, son of Lorenzo, entitlement to disturbance compensation requires
offered to pay Caluzor P17,000 per hectare of the factual and legal bases. Section 5 provides that a
cultivated land in exchange for turning his (Caluzor’s) “tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with
tillage over to Deogracias. However, no payment was the aid available from his immediate farm
made and instead, Caluzor was ejected from the land. household cultivates the land belonging to, or
Efforts before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council possessed by another, with the latter’s consent
proved futile which gave authority to Caluzor to file the for purposes of production, sharing the produce
instant case. with the landholder under the share tenancy
Before the PARAD Petitioner prayed for the system, or paying to the landholder a price certain
restoration of land to his possession and prayed for or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
the payment of disturbance compensation. On the under the leasehold tenancy system.
other hand, Deogracias denied any tenancy The following elements must concur:
relationship existed between him and Caluzor; he (PACPPH)
presented several documents, among which are the 1. the parties are the landowner and tenant;
master list of tenants and landowners, and a letter for 2. the subject matter is agricultural land;
requesting a change in the classification of the land. 3. there is consent between the parties and the
Meanwhile, DAR granted the application of the land relationship;
from agricultural to residential and commercial use 4. the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
filed by Deogracias through his attorney-in-fact, agricultural production;
Moldex. 5. there is personal cultivation on the part of the
PARAD ultimately dismissed the complaint. It tenant or agricultural lessee;
ruled that petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the 6. the harvest is shared between landowner and
landowner gave his consent for Caluzor to become tenant or agricultural lessee.
tenant of the land. Caluzor failed to present evidence
he has a leasehold contract, and that any receipt of The absence of one will not make an alleged
payment for his alleged leasehold rentals. tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has
“It is a well settled doctrine that mere established that he is a de jure tenant, he is not
cultivation without proof of tenancy conditions entitled to security of tenure or to be covered by the
does not suffice to establish tenancy relations.” land reform program.
Before the DARAB Caluzor appealed to the In establishing tenancy relationship,
DARAB, and the latter ruled in favour of Caluzor. It independent evince should prove the consent of
held that the institution of Caluzor as tenant in the land the landowner to the relationship and the sharing
and sharing of the produce sufficiently established of the harvest. In this case, the third and sixth
tenancy relationship between them. The subsequent elements are not present. Caluzor testified that
conveyance of the land to the heirs does not Lorenzo allowed him to cultivate the land by giving to
extinguish Caluzor’s right to till the land (See Section him (Caluzor) the sketch of the lot in order to delineate
10, Agricultural leasehold relation not extinguished by the portion of his tillage. Yet, the sketch did not
expiration of period, etc.). establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the
Before the Court of Appeals Deogracias and petitioner as his agricultural tenant. This element
Moldex appealed the decision of the DARAB. The CA (consent) demanded that the landowner and tenant
revised the ruling of the DARAB and reinstated the should have agreed to the relationship freely and
decision of PARAB. It held that the application for voluntarily, with neither of them unduly imposing his
conversion of land was granted because the land is no will on the other. In this case, there is no showing of
longer suitable for agricultural production, the property such consent. Even assuming that Lorenzo permitted
has been classified as residential/ commercial, and Caluzor to till the land, there is still no tenancy
relationship established because they had not
discussed any fruit sharing scheme, with Lorenzo
simply telling him that he would just ask his share from
Caluzor.
Petitioner disclosed that he did not see
Lorenzo after he received the sketch and until
Lorenzo’s death. Although he still continued sharing
the fruits through Ricardo evidenced by a list of
produce to support his claim, the list did not indicate
Ricardo’s receiving the fruits listed. It did not also
contain Ricardo’s authority to receive Lorenzo’s share.
The absence of the clear cut sharing agreement
between Caluzor and Lorenzo could only signify that
the latter merely tolerated Caluzor’s cultivation sans
tenancy. It did not make him de jure tenant. There
must be concrete evidence on record adequate to
prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence
must be presented. Tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed.
Leasehold tenancy is not brought about by
mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial. To be entitled to
disturbance compensation, one should be a de
jure tenant. The de jure tenant should allege and
prove:
(1) the cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation,
planting, or harvesting and other expenses
incidental to the improvement of his crop and
(2) necessary and useful improvements made in
cultivationg the land.
OFILADA VS ANDAL
 Office of the Public Respondent for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties.

The Regional Director of DAR held that there is

the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.
On appeal by the petitioner, the Secretary of DAR,
reversed the decision of the Regional Director. Upon
motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent,
the New DAR Secretary sets aside the previous decision
and finds the existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is an existence of a tenancy

CABALLES vs. DAR relationship between the parties.

FACTS: RULING:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of an Order issued by public respondent There is none. The Higher Court laid down the essential
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its requisites of a tenancy relationship. All requisites must
then Secretary, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant
petitioner and the private respondent. The landholding of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) thereon, a de jure tenant.
square meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes (petitioner), by virtue of a Deed of The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to
Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea establish a tenancy relationship. This does not
Alicaba Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109- automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof
C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, especially when the area tilled is only 60 square meters and
situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the
spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon primary purpose of agricultural production. The
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, circumstances of this case indicate that the private
paying a monthly rental of ₱2.00 to the owner, Andrea respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed
Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in
on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof the premises and to have a garden of some sort rather than
would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. Abajon a tenant. Agricultural production as the primary purpose
planted corn and bananas on the landholding. For four being absent in the arrangement is a clear proof that the
years, he paid the ₱2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his private respondent was never a tenant.
house, and delivered 50% of the produce to the owner.

As the property was sold, the new owners asked

Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they needed the
property, but Abajon refused.

On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an

Affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded
Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious
and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property
worth about ₱50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief
was filed against Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on
the property, including that of the banana plants, had been
done by Abajon).

Upon motion of the respondent in open court, the

trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional
 Defendant: relationship between the parties is
an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to
section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present
case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond

personally or with the aid of the members of his
GABRIEL VS PANGILINAN immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act
No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the
parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and
FACTS: become of civil lease and therefore the trial court
properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan
claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease
in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy
lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
Defendant was notified that the contract would be defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court
terminated, but upon request was extended for is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
another year. Defendant moved for the dismissal of
Reconsideration by the defendant was
the complaint claiming that the trial court had no
denied. He appealed to this Court.
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural ISSUES:
leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties.
Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. 1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of
The defendant filed his answer that the land was appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease and not
originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as
Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, amended.
subject to the condition that he would convert the
major portion into a fishpond and that which was 2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court
already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being
would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep
heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also Act. No. 1199.
assured him that he could continue leasing as long as
RULING:
he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to
it personally.Parties were ordered to adduce evidence Important differences between a leasehold
for the purpose of determining which Court shall take tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy
cognizance of the case. is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may
be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
It appears that the defendant ceased to work
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such,
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural
personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill
land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
over who said that she helps her father in
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
administering the leased property, conveying his
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose
instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is
may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that
residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children
governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil
are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a
Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by
priest all residing in Manila. None of these has been
special laws.
seen working on the fishpond.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the We are, therefore, constrained to agree with
Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist: the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
1. land worked by the tenant is an Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
agricultural land;
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single
person together with members of his within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
immediate farm household; Court of Agrarian Relations.
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either
personally or with the aid of labor available IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
from members of his immediate farm of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil
household; Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs
4. land belongs to another; and against the appellants.
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural

land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act,
which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration
for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works
an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a
leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of
Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above
enumerated are complied with.

The court doesn’t want to decide on the

second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third
requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956
when he ceased to work the fishpond personally
because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even
did the members of appellant's immediate farm
household work the land. Only the members of the
family of the tenant and such other persons, whether
related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon
him for support and who usually help him to operate
the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household".

Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring

the tenant and his immediate family to work the land.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must
himself and with the aid available from his immediate
farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore,
who do not actually work the land cannot be
considered tenants; and he who hires others whom
he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to
hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land
as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of
Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the
status, rights, and privileges of one.
OARDE VS CA

QUA VS CA
 did not give any consideration for its use, be in rent or
share. Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease
agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her
attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint
before Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of
Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of

possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR
certified that ht e case was not proper for trial before
the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of
Jaime including the leasehold claim of Bejasas.
Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of
leasehold and recovery of damages against
Candelaria and Jaime.

RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA

reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no
tenant relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers
and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw
contract have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not
proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not
proven.
BEJASA VS CA

FACTS:
ISSUE:
This case involves two parcels of land located
WN there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.
in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria.
October 1974, Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease RULING:
agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan
agreed to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to There is no tenancy relationship. There was
purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as
and care for whatever plants thereon exist, to make owner) and the Bejasas, there is no relationship.
the necessary harvest of fruits. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority
of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in
Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such
the land and to clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave presented.
Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983,
Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime
Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of
administration over the land.

October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new

lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife
with a 1-year term. On December 1984, Bejasas
agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an
"pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for

Bejasas to vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and
 present petition for review on certiorari arguing that the
regular court had no jurisdiction over the case and that
Zaldivar had no right to possess the subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MCTC has no jurisdiction over the

subject matter.

RULING:

NO. Petition is Denied. CA Decision is

Affirmed. On one hand, the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over agrarian related cases, i.e., rights and
obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and other related agrarian laws,
or those cases involving the ejectment and
dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders.[8] On
the other, Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by Republic Act 7691, provides that
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer is lodged with the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and
MCTCs. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the law,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
SALMORIN VS ZALDIVAR recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.[9]
FACTS:
In his complaint, Zaldivar alleged the
On 15 July 15, respondent entered into an following:
agreement with petitioner designating him as
administrator of the lot but did not comply with the (1) he possessed the subject lot;
terms of the agreement when he failed to till the vacant
areas. Thus, Zaldivar terminated his services and (2) he instituted Salmorin as administrator thereof;
ejected him. When Salmorin refused, Zaldivar filed a
(3) Salmorin failed to administer the subject lot by not
complaint for unlawful detainer in the MCTC (CC: 229-
having the vacant areas thereof planted;
H). In his Answer, Salmorin alleged the existence of a
tenancy relationship thus, the case was an agrarian (4) for Salmorins failure to administer the subject lot,
matter over which the MCTC had no jurisdiction. Salmorins service as administrator was terminated;
MCTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
founding the case to be in the nature of an agrarian (5) he adviced Salmorin through registered mail to
dispute. Upon appeal, the RTC Antique found that leave or vacate the subject lot and
consent of landowner and sharing of harvest
(requisites for the existence of tenancy relationship) (6) Salmorin refused to vacate the subject lot without
did not exist thus, MCTC had jurisdiction and ordered justification. Thus, Zaldivars complaint concerned the
the reinstatement of CC: 229-H. Upon appeal by unlawful detainer by Salmorin of the subject lot. This
Salmorin, the CA upheld the RTC decision. Hence, the matter is properly within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The allegation of tenancy in Salmorins answer
did not automatically deprive the MCTC of its reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and
jurisdiction. In Hilado et al. v. Chavez et al.,[10] we the CA.
ruled:
The fact alone of working on another's
[T]hat the jurisdiction of the court over the landholding does not raise a presumption of the
nature of the action and the subject matter thereof existence of agricultural tenancy.[14] There must be
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up substantial evidence on record adequate to prove the
in the court or upon a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, element of sharing. Moreover, in Rivera v. Santiago,
the question of jurisdiction would depend almost [15] we stressed:
entirely on the defendant.
[T]hat it is not unusual for a landowner to
xxx The [MTCC] does not lose its jurisdiction over an receive the produce of the land from a caretaker who
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party sows thereon. The fact of receipt, without an agreed
raising as defense therein the alleged existence of a system of sharing, does not ipso facto create a
tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the tenancy. Salmorins attempt to persuade us by way of
duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the a certification coming from the Barangay Agrarian
allegations of tenancy. If after hearing, tenancy had in Reform Committee attesting that he was a bona fide
fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should tenant of Zaldivar deserves scant consideration.
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis Certifications issued by municipal agrarian reform
supplied; citations omitted) Contrary to the findings of officers are not binding on the courts. This rule was
the MCTC, both the RTC and the CA found that there articulated in Bautista v. Mag-isa vda. de Villena
was no tenancy relationship between Salmorin and
Zaldivar. A tenancy relationship cannot be In a given locality, merely preliminary or
presumed.[11] In Saul v. Suarez, [12] we held: provisional are the certifications or findings of the
secretary of agrarian reform(or of an authorized
There must be evidence to prove the tenancy representative) concerning the presence or the
relations such that all its indispensable elements must absence of a tenancy relationship between the
be established, to wit: contending parties; hence, such certifications do not
bind the judiciary.
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
We note that agricultural share tenancy was
(2) the subject is agricultural land; declared contrary to public policy and, thus, abolished
by the passage of RA 3844, as amended. Share
(3) there is consent by the landowner;
tenancy exists: [W]henever two persons agree on a
(4) the purpose is agricultural production; joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein
one party furnishes the land and the other his labor,
(5) there is personal cultivation; and with either or both contributing any one or several of
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
(6) there is sharing of the harvests. personally with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the
All these requisites are necessary to create
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder
tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more
and the tenant.[17]
requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto
tenant. All these elements must concur. It is not In alleging that he is a tenant of Zaldivar,
enough that they are alleged. To divest the MCTC of Salmorin (in his affidavit dated April 26, 2000)[18]
jurisdiction, these elements must all be shown to be relates that their arrangement was for him to do all the
present.[13] Tenancy is a legal relationship cultivation and that the expenses therefore will be
established by the existence of particular facts as deducted from the harvest. The rest of the harvest will
required by law. In this case, the RTC and CA correctly be divided equally between himself and Zaldivar. If
found that the third and sixth elements, namely, Salmorins version was to be believed, their
consent of the landowner and sharing of the harvests, arrangement was clearly one of agricultural share
respectively, were absent. We find no compelling tenancy. For being contrary to law, Salmorins
assertion should not be given merit. Since the MCTC Reform Adjudicatory Board(DARAB), by
has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 229-H, we will respondents Leo B. Saul, Roger S. Brillo, Efrain S.
refrain from discussing the right of Zaldivar to possess Brillo, Eleno S. Brillo and Ignacio G. Pelaez.
Respondents alleged that they were
Lot No. 7481-H as it is more correctly the subject of
agricultural tenants in petitioner’s land on a 25-75
the appropriate action in the trial court. sharing agreement; that after two croppings, petitioner
voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government
under a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) that they signed
the documents for the transfer of the land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as
farmer-beneficiaries, and petitioner, as landowner;
and that the sale was approved by the local Land
Valuation Office of the Land Bank of the
Philippines(LBP).
Respondents claimed that while the VOS was
being processed, they were summarily ejected from
the property by TADI after the latter entered into
a Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy with
petitioner thereby depriving them of their
landholdings.
Petitioner filed an Answer contending
that respondents were installed as tenants, not
by him, but by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in South Cotabato. He admitted that he
voluntarily offered his land for sale to the government
under the CARP but denied knowledge of the
certification issued by the LBP. He denied the
existence of a grower’s contract between him and
TADI over the subject land. For its part, TADI claimed
that its grower’s contract with petitioner covered
parcels of land different from those being claimed by
respondents. Regional Adjudicator dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
The adjudicator found that respondents failed
to prove their alleged tenancy over petitioner’s land.
While they were identified as potential farmer-
beneficiaries of the land subject of the VOS, they only
have an “inchoate right” to the land since its coverage
under the CARP has yet to be completed. On appeal,
the DARAB Central Office rendered a Decision
reversing the Regional Adjudicator. It observed that
petitioner admitted that respondents were his
tenants. It further held that: ... it is in fact immaterial
whether the subject landholding is covered by the
alleged grower’s contract or not. What is clear in the
instant case is the fact that herein appellants were
SAUL VS SUAREZ illegally ejected from their respective tenanted
lands. If indeed the subject land is not covered
by the grower’s contract, if there’s any, the act
FACTS:
of defendant-appellee TADI in ejecting the tenants-
Petitioner Domingo C. Suarez owns
appellants was beyond authority, hence, illegal.
hectares agricultural land in South
Assuming arguendo that the subject landholding is
Cotabato. A complaint for reinstatement with
truly covered in the said contract, the contracting
preliminary mandatory injunction, recovery
parties are required under the law to respect the
of possession and damages was filed against
tenurial rights of the tenants therein.
himand T’boli Agro-
[11]
IndustrialDevelopment, Inc. (TADI)
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator,
Appeals which affirmed the DARAB. Upon denial of
Department of Agrarian
the motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the
instant petition. Petitioner contends that there is no cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to
basis in holding that respondents were his tenants. He prove the tenancy relations such that all its
denies having admitted that they were his tenants, and indispensable elements must be established, to wit:
insists that there is no proof to prove the existence of (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
tenancy relations. He asserts that he did not eject (2) the subject is agricultural land;
respondents from their landholdings by entering into a (3) there is consent by the landowner;
grower’s contract over the subject land with TADI. (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
ISSUE: (6) there is sharing of the harvests.
Whether or not, the respondents are bona fide All these requisites are necessary to create
agricultural tenants under the law. tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more
requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. It
RULING: is clear therefore that the subject matter of the
There is nothing in the records to suggest that grower’s contract did not include the
respondents were petitioner’s bona fide tenants prior land subject of the VOS. Thus, petitioner could
to their designation by the DARas potential farmer- not have caused respondents’ ejectment from the
beneficiaries under the CARP. There is no evidence subject property by virtue of his transactions with
to prove tenancy arrangement between petitioner and TADI, since whenever authorized the latter to plant on
respondents before the former’s voluntary offer to the subject land. Respondents’ ejectment from the
convey the land to the government. In holding that land was not pursuant to the contract petitioner had
respondents were bona fide tenants entered into with TADI who appears to have entered
of petitioner, the DARAB and the the land without petitioner’s consent. Thus, it was
appellate court relied solely on the alleged error for the appellate court to affirm DARAB’s
admission in petitioner’s answer to the complaint, to conclusion that it is “immaterial whether the
wit: 3. Defendant admits the averments in paragraph subject landholding is covered by the alleged
IV of the complaint. The fourth paragraph of grower’s contract or not.” It is, in every sense, material
the complaint states: 4. That plaintiffs were to the determination of the case because petitioner is
instituted sometime in 1993 and were sought to be held liable for respondents’ ejectment
given three (3) hectares each respectively, while due allegedly to the contract. If the disputed land is not
for plaintiff Roger Brillo was given 2 hectares; the the subject of the contract, as in fact it is not, then
sharing of the parties involved was 25-75in favor of respondents cannot claim that petitioner illegally
the tenants; after for two croppings defendant ejected them from the land. Consequently, they have
D. Suarez approached and offered the land by no cause of action against petitioner, since the latter
Voluntary Offer to Sale (VOS) last November 1993 in did not commit any act that resulted in their
our favor (plaintiffs-tenants) and the papers for VOS dispossession.
was processed in the office of Department [of] In this case, there is no showing that there
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Koronadal, South Cotabato; exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and
[16] respondents .Likewise, respondents have
We find that the above admission was taken no tenancy relationship with TADI, against
out of context. While petitioner admitted that whom they principally have a cause of
respondents were tenants in the land, he qualified in action. The controversy is civil in nature since
paragraph 2 of his answer that it was the DAR who it involves the issue of material possession,
installed them as such. Clearly, it was the DAR who independent of any question pertaining to agricultural
placed respondents in actual possession of the land tenancy. Hence, the case falls outside the jurisdiction
upon petitioner’s offer to transfer the same to the of DARAB; it is cognizable by the regular courts.
government. Other than this supposed admission, WHEREFORE, t h e i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n i s
there is no evidence on record to prove the tenancy GRANTED.
relations. Respondents did not substantiate their claim The complaint in DARAB Case No.
with evidence to show that they were agricultural X I - 2 4 9 - S C - 9 5 i s hereby DISMISSED
tenants in petitioner’s land. They did not allege actual .
cultivation or specify thecrop produced
thereby. Neither did they mention how much of the
produce was delivered to petitioner or submit receipts
to prove the purported 25-75 sharing of
harvests. They did not state, much less prove, the
circumstances of their agreement with petitioner as to
the alleged tenancy relationship. Thus, there is no
basis to the claim that they are agricultural tenants on
the property.SC held that a tenancy relationship
 FACTS:

The property subject of this case is situated in

Pampanga, with an area of ten (10) hectares, more or
less, previously coveredby Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) and formerly owned by one Dalmacio Sicat
(Dalmacio). Dalmacio offered to sell the
subjectproperty to respondent Pampanga Sugar
Development Company (PASUDECO), a domestic
corporation engaged in sugar milling,to be used as a
housing complex for PASUDECO's laborers and
employees. The land was offered for sale at the price
of P8.00 per square meter. On January 26, 1970,
Dalmacio reduced the price to P5.00 per square
meter. In a meeting held on April 15, 1970,the Board
of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution
No. 057 authorizing the purchase of the subject
property at P4.00per square meter. Dalmacio and his
tenants jointly filed a Petition with the then Court of
Agrarian Relations (CAR) seeking approval of the
voluntary surrender of the subject property with
payment of disturbance compensation.
On the same date, the CAR rendered a
Decision, approving the voluntary surrender of the
subject property by the tenants to Dalmacio, thus,
terminating their tenancy relationship effective May
21, 1970, the date when the parties entered into
the agreement. On May 22, 1970, a Deed of Sale
with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and
PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents needed for
the conversion of the land to residential purposes
were prepared, However, due to financial setbacks
suffered after the imposition of Martial Law in 1972,
PASUDECO deferred the construction of the housing
project. PASUDECO averred that no person was
authorized to occupy and/or cultivate the subject
property.
On the other hand, the petitioners have a
totally different version. Petitioners claimed that,
sometime in November 1970, they started working on
the subject property with a corresponding area of
tillage. A Certification was also issued by the
Samahang Nayon in favor of petitioner Joaquin
Soliman with respect to the remaining area of 1.5
hectares. Likewise, the Barangay Chairperson of
Macabacle, Bacolor, Pampanga, certified that the
eight (8)petitioners had been the actual tenant-tillers
of the subject property from 1970 up to the present,
and that petitioner Baldomero Almario (Baldomero)
was issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT).
The Ocular Inspection and the Investigation
Report issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) on March 13,1990 showed that since
1970, petitioners cultivated the subject property,
allegedly managed by the late respondent Gerry
Rodriguez(Gerry), manager of PASUDECO from
1970-1991. Petitioners alleged that in 1970, Gerry
SOLIMAN VS PASUDECO made one Ciriaco Almario (Ciriaco)
hisoverseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals
from petitioners. In turn, Ciriaco remitted the rentals to that petitioners tilled the subject property for almost
Gerry. twenty (20) years, the same remainedagricultural in
OnMay character.
14,1990,Ciriaco certified that petitioners were the act Moreover, the DARAB held that, contrary to
ual tenant - the findings of the PARAD, the elements of consent
tillers of the subject property. Moreover,petitioners de andsharing were present in this case. The DARAB,
posited their alleged rentals with the Land Bank of the citing Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,
Philippines (LBP), as land amortizations, in varying ratiocinated that petitioners enteredthe subject
amounts,from 1989 to 1993, as shown by the official property in 1970 upon the request of Ciriaco who, with
receipts issued by LBP. Thus, petitioners averred that the consent of Gerry as manager of PASUDECO, was
from 1970 up to 1990 or for aperiod of almost twenty authorizedto look for people to cultivate the subject
(20) years, they had been in actual and peaceful property. Petitioners cultivated the same and shared
possession and cultivation of the subject their harvests with PASUDECO,received by Gerry
property. The real controversy arose when through Ciriaco. Later on, when Gerry refused to
PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of accept their lease rentals, petitioners deposited the
the property into a housing project for itsemployees. money withLBP. The DARAB opined that these pieces
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of of evidence established the fact of consent and
Peaceful Possession with a Prayer for the issuance of sharing. While express consent was notgiven, the fact
a PreliminaryInjunction against Gerry before the that Gerry accepted the lease rentals for a
PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting considerable number of years signified an implied
petitioners in their respective landholdings.Petitioners consent which, in turn,bound PASUDECO.CA
alleged that Gerry, together with armed men, entered reversed the DARAB's ruling and reinstated the
the property and destroyed some of their crops. PARAD's decision.
Traversing thecomplaint, Gerry raised as one of his The CA held that, while the subject property
defenses the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of wasagricultural, there was no tenancy relationship
the subject property. between the parties, express or implied. The CA
Thus, on November 26, 1990, petitioners filed concurred in the findings of thePARAD and found no
their Amended Complaint impleading credible evidence to support the contention that
PASUDECO as a party- petitioners were de jure tenants inasmuch as the
defendant. Meanwhile, PASUDECOasserted that elements of consent and sharing were absent. CA
petitioners were not tenants but merely interlopers, reiterated that tenancy is not merely a factual
usurpers and/or intruders into the subject relationship but also a legal relationship; hence,the
property. Trial on the merits ensued. In the process, fact that PASUDECO, being the owner of the subject
the PARAD conducted an ocular inspection and found property, was uninvolved in and oblivious to
that the subject property was planted with palay . petitioners' cultivation thereof,tenancy relations did
There were also several dikes not exist. Thus, the CA concluded that in the absence
or pilapil dividing the subject property. The PARAD of any tenancy relationship between the parties,
also observed that there wasa big sign installed thecase was outside the jurisdiction of the
therein, reading “Future Site of PASUDECO DARAB. Petitioners filed their Motion for
Employees Housing Project.”The PARAD dismissed Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its
petitioners' complaint and denied their application for Resolution.
the writ of preliminary injunction. ThePARAD held that
petitioners had not shown direct and convincing proof ISSUE:
that they were tenants of the subject property. Whether petitioners are de jure tenants of the subject
Petitionerscould not show any receipt proving property.
payment of lease rentals either to PASUDECO or
Gerry. In addition to the absence of sharing,the RULING:
PARAD ruled that there was no consent given by Tenants are defined as persons who — in
PASUDECO in order to create a tenancy relationship themselves and with the aid available from within their
in favor of thepetitioners. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a immediate farm households— cultivate the land
Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's
DARAB rendered its Decision in favor of the consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
petitioners,reversing the findings and conclusions of producewith the landholder under the share tenancy
the PARAD. The DARAB held that, without the system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
approval of the conversion application ascertainable in produce or money or both under
filedby PASUDECO, it could not be substantiated the leasehold tenancy system.
that the subject property Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant,
was indeed residential property intended entrenched in jurisprudence are the following
for housingpurposes. Because of this, and the fact essential elements of tenancy: 1)the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) Likewise, the alleged sharing and/or payment
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural of lease rentals was not substantiated other than by
land; 3)there is consent between the parties to the the deposit-payments withthe LBP, which petitioners
relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to characterized as amortizations. We cannot close
bring about agricultural production; 5)there is personal our eyes to the absence of any proof of payment prior
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural tothe deposit-payments with LBP. Not a single receipt
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between was ever issued by Gerry, duly acknowledging
landowner andtenant or agricultural lessee. The payment of these rentals fromCiriaco who, allegedly,
presence of all these elements must be proved by personally collected the same from the petitioners.
substantial evidence. Unless a person hasestablished Notably, the fact of working on another's
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled landholding,standing alone, does not raise a
to security of tenure and is not covered by the Land presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
Reform Program of the Government under existing Substantial evidence necessary to establishthe fact of
tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot be sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
notautomatically give rise to security of tenure.The adequate to provethe element of sharing. Thus, to
pronouncement of the DARAB that there is, in this prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
case, tenancy by operation of law under Section 5 of credible evidence must be presented, becauseself-
R.A. No. 3844 isnot correct. In serving statements are inadequate.
Reyes v. Reyes SC held: Under R.A. 3844, The certifications attesting to petitioners'
two modes are provided for in the establishment of an alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a
agricultural leasehold relation:(1) by operation of law given locality, the certificationissued by the Secretary
in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative,
oral or written agreement, either express or like the MARO or the BARC, concerning
implied. By operation of law simply means the the presenceor the absence of a tenancy relationship
abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system between the contending parties, is considered merely
andthe conversion of share tenancy relations into preliminary or provisional, hence,such certification
leasehold relations. does not bind the judiciary.
The other method is the agriculturalleasehold The onus rests on the petitioners to prove their
contract, which may either be oral or in writing. Rather, affirmative allegation of tenancy, which they failed to
consistent with the parties' assertions, what we have discharge with substantial evidence. Simply put, he
here is an alleged case of tenancy by implied who makes an affirmative allegation of an issue has
consent. As such,crucial for the creation of tenancy the burden of proving the same, and in the case of the
relations would be the existence of two of the essential plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.
elements, namely, consent and sharingand/or The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact,
payment of lease rentals. if the complainant,upon whom rests the burden
After a meticulous review of the records, we find that of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
the elements of consent and sharing and/or payment satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases
of leaserentals are absent in this case. hisclaim, the respondent is under no obligation to
Tenancy relationship can only be created with prove his exception or defense.
the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed
either the owner, lessee,usufructuary or legal to cultivate the subject property without opposition,
possessor of the property, and not through the acts of does not mean thatPASUDECO impliedly recognized
the supposed landholder who has no right to the the existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and
property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise continued possession of the land willnot ipso facto
would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to the make one a de jure tenant, because the principal
prejudice of the true and lawful landholder . As duly factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship
found by the PARAD and the CA, Gerry was not exists is intent. This much we said in
authorized to enter into a tenancy relationship with VHJ Construction and Development
thepetitioners. In fact, there is no proof that he, Corporation v. Court of Appeals, where we held
indeed, entered into one. Other than their that: Indeed, a tenancy relationship cannot be
bare assertions, petitioners rely on thecertification of presumed. There must be evidence to prove this
Ciriaco who, likewise, failed to substantiate his claim allegation.The principal factor in determining whether
that Gerry authorized him to select individuals and a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not
install themas tenants of the subject property. Absent a purelyfactual relationship dependent on what the
substantial evidence showing Ciriaco's authority from alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
PASUDECO, or even from Gerry, togive consent to relationship .As we ruled in Chico v. Court of Appeals
the creation of a tenancy relationship, his actions [347 SCRA 35 (2000)]:"Each of the elements
could not give rise to an implied tenancy. hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de jure
leasehold or tenancyrelationship between the parties.
This de jure relationship, in turn, is the terra firma for
a security of tenurebetween the landlord and the
tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought
about by a mere congruence of facts but, being a legal
relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial." Thus, the intent of
the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and their writtenagreements, provided these VALENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important. FACTS:
WHEREFORE , the instant Petition is The property in dispute involves two (2)
DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is parcels of land situated in Canlaon City in Negros
AFFIRMED Oriental. On 7 May 1957 Valencia acquired the first
parcel from Bonifacio Supnet, on 22 October 1962
Valencia entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease
agreement over his two (2) parcels of land with
Henson. Before the ten (10)-year lease expired,
without objection from Henson, Valencia leased the
property for five (5) years to Fr. Flores under a civil law
lease concept beginning 21 August 1970 or until 30
June 1975 after which the lease was cancelled .The
lease agreement between Valencia and Fr.
Flores was subject to a prohibition against subleasing
or encumbering the land without Valencia's written
consent.
During the period of lease, Henson instituted
Cresenciano and Marciano Frias to work on the
property, also during the lease of Fr. Flores he
designated 13 persons as overseer and when the
lease agreement between the Petitioner and Fr.
Flores expired, Petitioner demanded to vacate the
property and instead the private respondents
continued cultivating the premises and refused to
comply. On March 20, 1976, Valencia filed a letter to
protest to DAR Regional Office in Cebu City, while the
private respondents without the knowledge of the
Petitioner, applied for the Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLTs) under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program pursuant to PD No. 27 claiming they
were bona fide tenants of the property. Upon issuance
of the Certificate of Land Transfer to the private
respondents, the Petitioner instituted the filing of the
second letter contending the cancellation of CLTs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a contract of civil law lease
prohibits a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on
the land subject matter of the lease agreement?
Otherwise stated, can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr.
Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without
express authority to do so under Art. 1649 of the Civil
Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited
from doing so, as in the instant case?

RULING:
Contrary to the impression of private
respondents, Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended,
does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to
employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner.
The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the
right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a
landowner, except as may be provided by law. But
certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law
lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to
install a tenant thereon. A different interpretation
would create a perverse and absurd situation where a
person who wants to be a tenant, and taking
advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks QUINO VS CA
a third person to become a civil law lessee of the
landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically FACTS:
have a better right over the property than the On 29 October 1974 Bernarda and Rosario
landowner himself. This tenant would then gain Galan sold their agricultural land with an area of
security of tenure, and eventually become owner of 2.3926 hectares situated in Basak, Compostela,
the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to the Cebu, to spouses Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa
hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered Galan for P2,000.00. More than a decade later, or on
into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to 30 October 1986, petitioner Aniceto Quio filed aa
realize later on that he can no longer regain complaint for redemption of the property against the
possession of his property due to the installation of a vendees claiming that he had been instituted as tenant
tenant by the civil law lessee. thereon by the Galans since 1951; consequently, he
On the other hand, under the express had the right to be notified in writing of the owners'
provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee intention to sell the property to enable him to exercise
cannot assign the lease without the consent of the his right of preemption under Sec. 11 of RA No.
lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In 3844[2] but that notwithstanding the Galans had not
the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to informed him of the sale. He claimed that he learned
the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from of the transaction only on 1 September 1986 when he
subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes found out that the Leonardos were already the new
installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the right to owners. He therefore prayed that he be allowed to
do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly stated redeem the property and consigned the purchase
therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit a price with the trial court on the same day he filed his
civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land complaint.
subject matter of the lease agreement. An extensive Meanwhile, on 4 November 1986 the
and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Leonardos sold the property to private respondent
Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by Jose Bitoon for P30,000.00.
the minority view in Bernas v. Court of Appeals. On 12 November 1986 petitioner filed another
When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold complaint against the same spouses for injunction
relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin his
the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, ejectment from the property.
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who During the pendency of the case, Antonio
personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there Leonardo Sr. died. His children, private respondents
is already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, Purificacion L. Canson, Editha G. Leonardo, Carmelita
i.e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the L. Mori, Josefina L. Bais, Aida L. Collyer, Antonio G.
land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are Leonardo, Rudolfo G. Leonardo, Roberto G. Leonardo
"Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations," which and Teresa L. Regner, were substituted in his stead
assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on as co-defendants.
the land; not until then. Sometime thereafter, petitioner received a
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The letter from the counsel of respondent Bitoon dated 24
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. November 1986 notifying him of the transfer of
SP No. 32669 dated 27 July 1995 and its Resolution ownership of the land to his client. As no supporting
dated 22 September 1995 denying the Motion for document was attached to the letter to bolster
Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. counsel’s claim, petitioner went to the Notarial Division
of the Capitol Building and obtained on 2 March 1987
a copy of the pertinent deed of sale between spouses
Leonardo and respondent Bitoon.
On 27 July 1987 petitioner filed an amended
complaint impleading Jose Bitoon as additional
defendant. However, on 8 October 1990 the trial court
dismissed the original as well as the amended
complaint after finding that majority of the essential For a better understanding of the controversy,
requisites of tenancy relationship between the parties it is essential to discuss first the statutory right of
did not exist.[3] redemption and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter.
The Court of Appeals however arrived at an Section 12 of RA No. 3844 as amended by RA No.
entirely different evaluation of the evidence.[4] On 5 6389 provides -
August 1994 it held that all the essential requisites for Sec. 12. Lessee's right of Redemption. - In case the
tenancy relationship were present, and being a tenant landholding is sold to a third person without the
petitioner was entitled to the rights of preemption and knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
redemption under Secs. 11 and 12, respectively, of have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
RA No. 3844. Nevertheless it noted a stumbling block price and consideration x x x x The right of redemption
to petitioner's complete victory thus - under this Section may be exercised within one
Be that as it may, since the land in question hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall
had already pass(ed) on to defendant-appellee Jose be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and
Bitoon, and plaintiff-appellant's quests against the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the
defendant-appellees spouses Antonio Leonardo and registration of the sale x x x x The redemption price
Josefa Galan may be considered moot and academic shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of
under RA 3844, Section 10, defendant-appellee Jose the sale x x x x
Bitoon having been subrogated to the rights and Simply stated, in the event that the
obligations of his predecessors-in-interest, his landholding is sold to a third person without the
obligation under the law to the tenant-plaintiff knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter is
continues and subsists, that if he decides to sell the granted by law the right to redeem it within one
land, then plaintiff-appellant can still exercise his rights hundred eighty (180) days from notice in writing and
under the law (Velasquez v. Nery, 211 SCRA 28, at a reasonable price and consideration. Petitioner
underscoring supplied).[5] was not notified of the first and second instances of
The appellate court decreed thus - sale of the property apparently because all the
1. declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and respondents disputed petitioner's assertion that he
Rosario Galan and thereafter of their successor-in- has been a tenant thereon since 1951. These
interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr. substituted by his instances of sale without notification gave rise to his
(nine?) children and in turn of the present owner, right to redeem the property as lessee although no
respondent Bitoon; longer from the Leonardos but from its present owner,
2. ordering respondent Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as respondent Bitoon.
agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful A letter dated 24 November 1986 from the
possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by counsel of respondent Bitoon was received by
him; petitioner informing him that the ownership of subject
3. ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return property has been transferred to respondent Bitoon.
to petitioner the amount of two thousand pesos However the counsel did not bother to furnish
(P2,000.00) which he consigned with the trial court as petitioner with the supporting documents which is why
redemption price for the land in question, covered by petitioner did not readily believe what was written in
O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986; and, the letter. Petitioner had to proceed to the Notarial
4. no pronouncement as to costs.[6] Division of the Capitol Building on 2 March 1987 to
On 23 November 1994 respondent Court of secure a copy of the deed of sale between spouses
Appeals denied reconsideration.[7] Leonardo and respondent Bitoon.
The purpose of the written notice required by
ISSUE: law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its
WN respondent Court of Appeals was correct in terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the
holding that petitioner could not redeem the property alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe
from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive
sell it on the strength of the ruling in Velasquez v. method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as the
Nery.[8] redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof, the period for redemption will start
RULING: running.[9] The letter received by petitioner, being
Petitioner asserts that Velasquez is bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make
inapplicable because of the difference in factual certain the terms, particulars and validity of the sale.
circumstances. In that case, the sale made by the Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic
landowners to a third party was by virtue of a court form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve
order and not as envisioned under Sec. 11 of RA No. the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the
3844. In other words, the right of the tenants therein to period of redemption from receipt of the authentic
preemptively purchase was not violated. Hence the document on 2 March 1987. The amended complaint
right of redemption was unavailing to them.
filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption the Velasquez spouses, in a nutshell, were agricultural
period of one hundred eighty (180) days. lessees of the property owned by the Nery spouses
The preceding discussion leads us to the and the Lorenzos. Later, the owners filed an action for
requirement concerning reasonable price and partition before the trial court. In a compromise
consideration. An offer to redeem to be properly agreement, they agreed to sell the property to Delta
effected can either be through a formal tender with Motor Corporation. Having received information about
consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled the impending sale, the Velasquez spouses filed an
with consignation of the redemption price within the action for redemption before the then Court of
prescribed period.[10] It must be stressed however Agrarian Relations. Subsequently, the sale
that in making a repurchase it is not sufficient that a materialized. Unfortunately, the redemption case was
person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire dismissed due to lack of interest to redeem the
to repurchase; this statement of intention must be property at its acquisition price. The appeal before
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of respondent court and the petition before this Court
payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of met the same fate. However, we also noted that the
the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was not a party
must be for the full amount of the repurchased price, to the case, had in the meantime extrajudicially
otherwise the offer to redeem will be held foreclosed the property. By way of obiter dictum we
ineffectual.[11] As to what constitutes reasonable stated-
price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Because of the extra-judicial foreclosure of
Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves the mortgage over the subject property by the
as price of the land must be taken to be such Philippine National Bank, the present case has
reasonable price and consideration.[12] become moot and academic with regard to petitioners'
Petitioner consigned the amount of P2000.00 claim against Delta Motor Corporation. It is now the
paid by the Leonardos to the Galans. However when PNB or its subsequent transferees from whom the
he amended his complaint by imp[leading respondent petitioners must redeem, if and when PNB decides to
Bitoon, he did not increase the amount consigned as sell or alienate the subject property in the future x x x
would have made it equivalent to P30,000.00, x
representing payment by the second vendee. In this Respondent appellate court must have taken
regard, petitioner submits that he is not required to out of context our statement therein when the former
consign the latter amount since that would put an ruled that "if respondent Bitoon decides to sell the land
additional burden on a tenant seeking redemption. then petitioner can still exercise his rights under the
After all, he would be paying whatever amount would law." The phrase in the Velasquez case that "if and
be finally determined by the trial court as reasonable when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject
price and consideration. property in the future" logically refers to "its
It is not difficult to discern why the full amount subsequent transferees" only, and not as a condition
of the redemption price should be consigned in court. precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption as
Only by such means can the buyer become certain what respondent court perceived it to be. To further
that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in stress the matter, the ruling of respondent court
good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an overlooks the essence of redemption provided in the
offer of redemption without the attendant evidence amended Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 which, as previously
that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish mentioned, grants to the lessee such right in case the
the repurchase immediately. A different rule would property is sold to a third person without his
leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or knowledge. Since that situation obtained in
crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses had the right to
the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law redeem the property from the PNB as new owner. The
in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti- circumstance that the property was sold to a third
economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing person without the knowledge of the lessee provides
sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all the source from which the right of redemption springs.
controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at Analyzing this right, it may be stated that such right
the proper time.[13] Against such rationale, works only one way - in favor of the redemptioner. For
petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The he can compel the purchaser to sell but he cannot be
amount so consigned by him falls short of the compelled to buy. Supposing the lessee failed to
requirement of the law and leaves the Court with no redeem the property and the purchaser decided to sell
choice but to rule against him. or alienate it without notifying the former, the property
With the foregoing ratiocination, it becomes may be redeemed from the subsequent transferee
unnecessary to dwell on the issue of whether because another essence of the right of redemption is
petitioner may redeem the property from respondent that it attaches to a particular landholding by operation
Bitoon. Nevertheless, we shall pursue the discussion of law.[14] The plain import of the obiter dictum in the
thereon if only to rectify some points. In Velasquez, Velasquez case is that the Velasquez spouses may
redeem the property from the PNB as new owner, or
should PNB decide to sell the property they may
redeem the same from its transferee. Thus, contrary
to the assertion of petitioner, Velasquez is applicable
but not as so applied by respondent court; instead, it
should have based its main ruling on the lack of
interest to redeem the property at the acquisition price
paid by respondent Bitoon.
Hence we reiterate that, for failure of
petitioner to consign the entire redemption price, there
was no valid exercise by him of his legal right to
redeem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals (1) declaring
petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan
and thereafter of their successor-in-interest, Antonio
Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan, and in turn, of the
present owner respondent Bitoon; (2) ordering
respondent Jose Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as SPS. ELIGIO AND MARCELINA MALLARI V.
agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful IGNACIO ARCEGA, ET AL
possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by G.R. No. 106615, January 15, 2004
him; (3) ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to
return to petitioner the amount of P2,000.00 which he FACTS:
consigned as redemption price for the land in question Arcega, et al. are agricultural lessees of
covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October landholdings planted to sugarcane described as Lot
1986, with no pronouncement as to costs, is 3364 of the San Fernando Cadastre. The lot was
AFFIRMED. originally owned by the spouses Wijangco and
mortgaged to PNB to secure a loan. For their failure to
pay their loan, the PNB foreclosed the mortgage. In
the auction sale that followed, PNB was the highest
bidder.
Later, the spouses Mallari purchased the two
lots from PNB without any indication that the same
was tenanted. Upon knowledge of the sale, Arcega, et
al., who were occupying portions of the land, filed with
the Court of Agrarian Relations a Petition for
Redemption against the spouses Wijangco, PNB and
the spouses Mallari. The case reached the RTC and
the latter ordered Arcega, et al. to show cause why the
petition should not be dismissed for the tenants' failure
to make a tender of payment and/or consignation of
the redemption price. Instead of tendering payment,
Arcega, et al. presented a certification entitled
"Certification to Finance Redemption
of Estate under R.A. No. 3844, As Amended". The
RTC dismissed the Petition ruling that the Land Bank
certification does not
constitute a valid tender of payment and/or
consignation of the redemption price. On appeal, the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Aggrieved, the
spouses Mallari filed a Petition for Review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenants have validly
tendered or consigned payment of the redemption
price for the purpose of exercising their right of
redemption under Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844.
RULING:
Paragraph 2 of Land Bank Circular No. 3 has
made it a mandatory requirement that all proposals for
Land Bank financing of land acquisition through pre-
emption or redemption must carry the favorable
indorsement of the Minister (now Secretary) of
Agrarian Reform. It is likewise required that the
prescribed form must indicate that the certification has
been issued pursuant to a letter-request from the
(DAR Secretary) to the Land Bank of the Philippines.
The right of redemption under RA No. 3844,
as amended is an essential mandate of the agrarian
reform legislation to implement the State's policy of
owner-cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified,
selfreliant existence for small farmers. Unfortunately,
such laudable policy could not be effected in favor of
Ignacio Arcega, et al. since they failed to tender or
consign payment of the redemption price. Thus,
spouses Mallari should be allowed to continue
enjoying their right over the subject property as
purchasers thereof, for the State's commendable
agrarian reform policy is never intended to unduly
transgress the rights of innocent purchasers of lands G.R. No. 180476 June 26, 2013
RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M.
CODERIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its
Administrator, DR. RAUL R. CARAG, Respondent.

Case: The Court cannot sanction the use of force to evict

beneficiaries of land reform. Eviction using force is
reversion to the feudal system, where the landed elite have
free rein over their poor vassals. In effect, might is right.

Facts:
The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-
hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the farm). As tiller of
the farm,5 petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.6 In
1980, individuals connected with Chioco – who was a
former Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill
petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops
(corn and vegetables) and house were bulldozed. For fear of
his life, petitioner, together with his family, left the farm.7
In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner and his
family re-established themselves on the farm.8

On March 9, 19959 petitioner filed with the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija a Petition10 against
respondent Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and
cultivation of the farm be respected; that the corresponding
agricultural leasehold contract between them be executed;
that he be awarded actual damages for the destruction of his
house, his standing crops, unrealized harvest from 1980 up
to 1993, attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.11 Respondent moved to dismiss12 the Petition,
contending that petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed
under Section 3813 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844,14 as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. This certificate
amended, since the alleged dispossession took place in 1980 proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily
but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond the devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for
statutory three-year period for filing such claims. Petitioner the tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling."32 Since
filed an opposition15 arguing that his tenure/tillage should the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the
be deemed uninterrupted since his departure was due to coverage of the land reform law,33Chioco had no right to
threats made by Chioco’s henchmen; thus, the three-year evict petitioner and enter the property. More significantly,
prescriptive period should not be applied to his case. Chioco had no right to claim that petitioner’s cause of action
had prescribed.
Ruling of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants,
The PARAD issued a Decision16 dismissing the Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the agricultural
Petition on the ground of prescription. It adopted leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale,
respondent’s argument, adding that although petitioner was alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
forcibly evicted from the farm, he was not without remedy landholding. With unyielding consistency, we have held
under the law to assert his rights. Yet, he filed the Petition that transactions involving the agricultural land over which
only after 14 years, or in 1995. He is thus guilty of laches an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of
and is deemed to have abandoned his rights and privileges ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession,
under the agrarian laws. will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who
is given protection by the law by making such rights
Ruling of the DARAB enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's
Petitioner appealed17The appealed decision is successor in interest.
hereby set aside. A new judgment is entered Ordering the
Respondent-Appellee to respect and maintain the In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the
Petitioner-Appellant in his peaceful possession and principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it
cultivation of the subject landholding; and Ordering the prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can
Respondent-Appellee to reimburse Raymundo Coderias of only be terminated for causes provided by law. Security of
the money equivalent representing the latter’s unrealized tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which
harvest from 1980 to 1993 or if he has not been allowed to they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings
re-enter up to the time this decision is rendered then his is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
share from the harvest should be computed from 1980 to the livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold
present, and ordering the MARO of the municipality to relationship can take place only for causes provided by law.
assist the parties in the computation thereof.
The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris,
Ruling of the Court of Appeals this juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and
The CA SET ASIDE DARAB’s decision. It held Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.
that undoubtedly, a tenancy relation existed between
Chioco and petitioner under RA 3844.24Nevertheless, it Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural
found that petitioner’s action had prescribed, in that the leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of
complained acts occurred in 1980 but petitioner filed only the following three circumstances, to wit: "(1) abandonment
in 1995, or beyond the three-year prescriptive period under of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural
Section 38 of RA 3844. The CA held that this delayed lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
action by petitioner amounts to laches as well. agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served
three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons
Issue: under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x." None of these
Whether or not the CA committed an error in setting aside is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot be
the decision of DARAB, thereby making petitoner’s said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled
contention untenable due to prescription. that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through
threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his
Our Ruling: The Court grants the Petition. crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and
returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has years after, or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition.
been placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is also
undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically
and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favor of provides that "an action to enforce any cause of action under
the petitioner; thus, petitioner already had an expectant right this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three
to the farm.31 A CLT serves as "a provisional title of years after such cause of action accrued." In this case, we
ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is deem it proper to reckon petitioner’s cause of action to have
awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in
1993, and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills which
landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and would certainly not be possible where the former owner is
threats to petitioner’s life and limb existed, petitioner had a allowed to reacquire the land at any time following the
cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of award – in contravention of the government’s objective to
this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.
with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to file a case to
assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian
laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These
rights, as enumerated above, include the right to security of
tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer
of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy the
land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third
person without his knowledge.

Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after

Chioco passed away for his life and the lives of members of
his family are not worth gambling for a piece of land. The
bulldozing of his house – his castle – is only an example of
the fate that could befall them. Under the circumstances, it
is therefore understandable that instead of fighting for the
farm, petitioner opted to leave and keep his family safe. Any
man who cherishes his family more than the most valuable
material thing in his life would have done the same.

Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the

exercise of the will, and so long as they exist, petitioner is
deprived of his free will. He could not occupy his farm,
plant his crops, tend to them, and harvest them. He could
not file an agrarian case against Chioco, for that meant
having to return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case
anywhere else; any other agrarian tribunal or agency would
have declined to exercise jurisdiction.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been

designed to promote economic and social stability. Being a
social legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full
force and effect to its clear intent, which is ‘to achieve a
dignified existence for the small farmers’ and to make them
‘more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens,
and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society’.37

We have ruled time and again that litigants should

have the amplest opportunity for a proper and just
disposition of their cause – free, as much as possible, from
the constraints of procedural technicalities. In the interest of
its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural
lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of
procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice.
Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to
resolve substantial issues raised by the parties.

Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise

to emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the
soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit,
with mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the
antiquated and inequitable feudal system of land ownership.
It aims to ensure the continued possession, cultivation and