G.R. No.

L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA
CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity
as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.

Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for
respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

QUICK SUMMARY: this is about the nomination of the 9-member electoral tribunal (3 from
the majority Nacionalista party, 3 from the minority, Tanadas’, and 3 SC justices)

ACTION: Petition for a writ of preliminary injunction issued directed to respondents Mariano J.
Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public
offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent
Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.

FACTS:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the
Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives
of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the
General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong,
Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso
Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually
assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with
Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William
Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now
pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on
behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano
Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (3 from the party with the largest number of
votes). For the party with the second largest number of votes, supposedly 3, but..Senator Lorenzo
M. Tañada only nominated himself,.

Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and
over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate chose respondents Senators
Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as
supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the
case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and
Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23
Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M.
Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted
absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and
Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused
said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void;
and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of
Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of
the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election
protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators
chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate
and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number
of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista
Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and
his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having
been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".

In short, by allowing 2 more members coming from the Nationalista Party, thereby making it a total
of 5, to be part of the Electoral Tribunal, lokohan mangyayari since majority ang NP. At
mapreprejudice si Diosdado Macapagal dahil kalaban ng LP (party nya) ang NP.

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions
the legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said
respondents Senators.
Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is
without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because
"petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and
refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because
the present action is not the proper remedy. .

To answer the allegation that the Court has no jurisdiction, the ponente cited numerous examples on
the doctrine of political questions to delineate the roles of the legislative and judiciary……

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to
the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall
within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the
judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n.
vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108;
emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution
are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may
be settled by the Courts. 5 .

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered
carefully. The Court said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political,
and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state
canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The
question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view
contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.

xxx xxx x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a
matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50
Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R.
A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the
Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not
merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have
by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated
to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the
power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a
political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his
control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject
him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as
through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and
the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations
which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in
Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not
men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document."
(pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it
refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. To emphasize, pag sinabing WISDOM,
Legislative, but pag legality, Judiciary.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called
upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman
of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the
Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with
"full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise
of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in
nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith.

ISSUE:
Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral
Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
ARTICLE XIII

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

RULING:
In favor of the petitioners, LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus
Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby,
enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from
acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification
stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more
than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who
shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them,
may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado
by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said
Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we
are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although
recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the
majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as
held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling
within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will,
hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned,
conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

.RATIO DECIDENDI:

(1) The Ponente delved on establishing the objective of the framers in providing for the
creation of the Electoral Commission and emphasizing therein the voting rights of the
majority and minority parties;

“It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing
for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for
each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of
election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two
devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party
having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress,
were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that
they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and
thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body
the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the
former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact,
Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations
on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As
Senator Sumulong inquired:.

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of
creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant
majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sabido replied:.

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a
balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the
controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the
ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .

"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become
members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to
protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide
election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were
men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings,
that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be
free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the
majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in
case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the
guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in
the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the
protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and
dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded
by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the
Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either
protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the
Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.

My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is
to insure impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never
allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the
decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest
or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III,
pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals,
that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative of the Citizens
Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party.
Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be
violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making
the nominations. 10.

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or
interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.

STATCON TIME!

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter
thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the
letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the
statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit."
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the
adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to
prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is
founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices
of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power.
The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is
vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence,
compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and
void

Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party
having the second largest of votes, the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the
Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd, would frustrate the
purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against
the possibility of deadlocks. It would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral
Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan
lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices; otherwise membership in the Tribunal
may well be limited to the Justices of the Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives. Upon the other hand, he framers of the Constitution-not
insensitive to some such argument-still had reposed their faith and confidence in the independence,
integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and
thereby expected them, as does everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme Court
election contests exclusively upon their merits.

In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada of the Citizens Party, the party
having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the
Electoral Tribunal, the Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional mandate, to choose-as
it did-said two Members.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.

I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in character
and that this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal
but also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be chosen. Such a holding is in
accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction.

"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given
mandatory effect than is true of any other class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords
with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its character is such as to require
absolute compliance in all cases without exception. And the very principles of our institutions,
involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy, are such as to form reasonable grounds
for a presumption that the framers of a constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it .."
(Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p.84.).

The majority helds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong to
the Nacionalista Party, has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate
the two other members the Senate may not elect said two other members. And the reason given for
this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the
minority. This holding is subject to the following fundamental objections. In the first Place, it renders
nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a
provision which is admittedly a mandatory provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the
power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e., that of electing the members of the
Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or prerogative is lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of
the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority, contrary to the
constitutional provision. In the third place, it would make the supposedly procedural provision, the
process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and paramount over the
power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the ruling of the majority, a procedural
provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory
provision that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the
majority decision has by interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the
Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the
minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership
of the Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is
not justified by any rule of law or reason.

I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other
members must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the
constitutional provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason. The above principle (of waiver)
furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes membership
at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected, can
be reconciled. Well known is the legal principle that provisions which in their application may nullify
each other should be reconciled to make them both effective, if the reconciliation can be effected by
the application of other legal principles. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the
principle of waiver.

While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional
mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other coordinate departments, this
is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the form and
manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.