Narra Nickel V Redmont

8/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 777
G.R. No. 202877. December 9, 2015.*

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, TESORO MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT, INC., and MCARTHUR MINING, INC.,
petitioners, vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
CORPORATION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is a

fundamental rule that the question of jurisdiction may be tackled
motu proprio on appeal even if none of the parties raised the same.
—It is a fundamental rule that the question of jurisdiction may be
tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none of the parties raised
the same. The reason for the rule is that a court without
jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. Cast against this
light, the Court finds that the CA improperly took cognizance of
the case on appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the
reason that the OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA
was not one which could be classified as an exercise of its quasi-
judicial authority, thus negating the CA’s jurisdiction over the
case. The jurisdictional parameter that the appeal be taken
against a judgment, final order, resolution or award of
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* FIRST DIVISION.

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VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 259

Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation
vs.Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation
a “quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-

judicial functions” is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the said
Rule.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016c70dc007c74415fef003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/29
Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial Power; Words and

Phrases; Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is
the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it.—Quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power is the power of the administrative agency
to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially
executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
it.
Adjudicate; Words and Phrases; In the legal sense,
‘adjudicate’ means: [t]o settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
—“‘Adjudicate’ as commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, or
settle. The dictionary defines the term as ‘to settle finally (the
rights and duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: x x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as
judge.’” “In the legal sense, ‘adjudicate’ means: ‘[t]o settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense’; and ‘adjudge’ means: ‘[t]o pass
on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. x x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment.’”
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement; Principle of
Mutuality of Contracts; Being a government or public contract, the
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) is subject to
fundamental contract principles, one (1) of which is the principle
of mutuality of contracts which would definitely be violated if one
were to accept the view that the Office of the President (OP), a
contracting party, can adjudicate on the contract’s own validity.—
With the legal treatment and parameters of an FTAA in mind, it
becomes apparent that the OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of
the FTAA is an exercise of a contractual right that is purely
administrative in nature, and thus, cannot be treated as an
adjudication, again, in the sense above discussed. As one of the
contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have
adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party, as in
a court case where rights and duties of parties

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260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense,

the OP’s cancellation/revocation may be taken as a “decision” but
only to the extent of considering it as its final administrative
action internal to its channels. It is not one for which we should
employ the conventional import of the phrase “final and
executory,” as accorded to proper judicial/quasi-judicial decisions,
and its concomitant effect of barring further recourse of a party.
To reiterate, being a government or public contract, the FTAA is
subject to fundamental contract principles, one of which is the
principle of mutuality of contracts which would definitely be
violated if one were to accept the view that the OP, a contracting
party, can adjudicate on the contract’s own validity. The principle
of mutuality of contracts is expressed in Article 1308 of the Civil
Code.
Mines and Mining; Philippine Mining Act of 1995; Mining
contractor may opt to convert totally or partially his existing
mineral agreement, e.g., Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA) to a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA),
by filing a Letter of Intent with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB), copy furnished the Regional Office where the area covered
by said mineral agreement is located.—Under Section 45 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2010-21, otherwise known as the
“Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942, or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995” (RIRR), mining contractor may opt
to convert totally or partially his existing mineral agreement, e.g.,
an MPSA to an FTAA, by filing a Letter of Intent with the MGB,
copy furnished the Regional Office where the area covered by said
mineral agreement is located. Within sixty (60) days from the
filing of the Letter of Intent, the contractor must comply with the
requirements for the grant of an FTAA laid down in Sections 49 to
69, Chapter VII of the RIRR, as well as pay the conversion fee.
The application for conversion shall be evaluated and eventually,
approved upon compliance. Note that the term of the FTAA
arising from such conversion shall be equivalent to the remaining
period of its predecessor-mineral agreement.
Same; DENR Administrative Order No. 2010-21; Section 55 of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 2010-21 requires a
publication/posting/radio announcement of a Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) application.—Section 55
of the same DENR issuance requires a publication/posting/radio
announcement of an FTAA application. Any

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adverse claim, protest, or opposition to the said FTAA should

be filed directly to the Regional Office, Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office, or Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office concerned, within ten (10) days from the
date of publication or from the last date of posting/radio
announcement. The said adverse claim, protest, or opposition
shall then be resolved by the POA of the DENR, whose ruling may
then be appealed to the proper tribunals. To this, it bears pointing
out that Section 55 explicitly exempts “previously published valid
and existing mining claims or FTAA applications originating from
Exploration Permits that have undergone the [publication
requirement]” from the aforesaid publication requirement.
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement; At least with
respect to cases affecting a Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement’s (FTAA’s) validity, the Court holds that the Office of
the President (OP) has no quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the
propriety of its cancellation/revocation.—Thus, at least with
respect to cases affecting an FTAA’s validity, the Court holds that
the OP has no quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of
its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point, the
FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a party, i.e.,
the Republic. It merely exercised a contractual right by
cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative
action which should not be considered quasi-judicial in nature.
Thus, absent the OP’s proper exercise of a quasi-judicial function,
the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its
Decision is, perforce, null and void. With this, it is unnecessary to
delve into the other ancillary issues raised in the course of these
proceedings.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gatmaitan, Yap, Patacsil, Gutierrez & Protacio for
petitioners.
Chan, Robles & Associates for respondent.
Legaspi, Barcelo and Salamera Law Offices
collaborating counsel for respondent.

262

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated February 23, 2012 and the Resolution3
dated July 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 120409, which affirmed the Decision4 dated
April 6, 2011 and the Resolution5 dated July 6, 2011 of the
Office of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 10-E-229 and,
among others, ordered the cancellation and/or revocation of
the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement6 (FTAA)
executed between the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) and herein petitioners Narra Nickel Mining and
Development Corporation, Tesoro Mining and
Development, Inc., and McArthur Mining, Inc.

The Facts

On November 8, 2006, respondent Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corporation (Redmont) filed an
Application for an Exploration Permit7 (EP) over mining
areas located in the Municipalities of Rizal, Bataraza, and
Narra, Palawan. After an inquiry with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Redmont
learned that said areas were already covered by existing
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) and an
EP, which were initially applied for by petitioners’
respective predecessors-in-interest with the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the
DENR.8
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 44-87.

2 Id., at pp. 19-30. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan,
with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 32-34.
4 Id., at pp. 452-469. Penned by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr.
5 CA Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 90-93. See also Rollo, p. 45.
6 Rollo, pp. 271-324.
7 CA Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 252-253.

8 Rollo, pp. 50, 156, 162, and 168.

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In particular, petitioner Narra Nickel Mining and

Development Corporation (Narra Nickel) acquired the
application of MPSA-IV-I-12, covering an area of 3,277
hectares (ha.) in Barangays Calategas and San Isidro,
Narra, Palawan, from Alpha Resources and Development
Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining and Development
Corporation. On March 30, 2006, or prior to Redmont’s EP
application, Narra Nickel had converted its MPSA into an
FTAA application, denominated as AFTA-IVB-07.9
For its part, petitioner Tesoro Mining and Development,
Inc. (Tesoro) acquired the application of MPSA-AMA-IVB-
154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47), covering an area of 3,402 has.
in Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja, Narra,
Palawan, from Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI). Similar to
Narra Nickel, Tesoro sought the conversion of its MPSA
into an FTAA, but its application therefor, denominated as
AFTA-IVB-08, was filed subsequent to Redmont’s EP
application, or sometime in May 2007.10
In the same vein, petitioner McArthur Mining, Inc.
(McArthur) acquired the application of MPSA-AMA-IVB-
153, as well as EPA-IVB-44, covering the areas of 1,782
has. and 3,720 has. in Barangays Sumbiling and
Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan, respectively, from
Madridejos Mining Corporation, an SMMI assignee.
McArthur also filed an application for FTAA conversion in
May 2007, denominated as AFTA-IVB-09.11
Upon the recommendation of then DENR Secretary Jose
L. Atienza, Jr., through a memorandum12 dated November
9, 2009, petitioners’ FTAA applications were all approved
on April 5, 2010. Consequently, on April 12, 2010, the
Republic — represented by then Executive Secretary
Leandro R. Mendoza, acting by authority of then President
Gloria Macapagal-
_______________
9 Id., at p. 452.
10 Id., at pp. 162 and 453, 332.
11 Id., at pp. 332 and 452.
12 CA Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 327-329.

264

Arroyo — and petitioners executed an FTAA13 covering

the subject areas, denominated as FTAA No. 05-2010-IVB
(MIMAROPA).14
Prior to the grant of petitioners’ applications for FTAA
conversion, and the execution of the above stated FTAA,
Redmont filed on January 2, 2007 three (3) separate
petitions15 for the denial of petitioners’ respective MPSA
and/or EP applications before the Panel of Arbitrators
(POA) of the DENR-MGB, docketed as DENR Case Nos.
2007-01,16 2007-02,17 and 2007-03.18 Redmont’s primary
argument was that petitioners were all controlled by their
common majority stockholder, MBMI Resources, Inc.
(MBMI) — a 100% Canadian-owned corporation19 — and,
thus, disqualified from being grantees of MPSAs and/or
EPs. The matter essentially concerning the propriety of
denying petitioners’ MPSAs and/or EPs in view of their
nationality had made it all the way to this Court, and was
docketed as G.R. No. 195580.20 In the Court’s April 21,
2014 Decision,21 petitioners were declared to be foreign
corporations under the application of the “Grandfather
Rule.” Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said
Decision, which was, however, denied in the Court’s
Resolution dated January 28, 2015.
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 271-324.

14 CA Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 105-159. See also Rollo, p. 20.
15 Filed on January 2, 2007. Rollo, pp. 155-172.
16 In particular, Petition for Denial of MPSA and EP Applications of
McArthur (id., at pp. 167-172).
17 In particular, Petition for Denial of MPSA Application of Tesoro
(id., at pp. 161-166).
18 In particular, Petition for Denial of MPSA Application of Narra

Nickel (id., at pp. 155-160).
19 Id., at p. 453.
20 Entitled “Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation,
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc., and McArthur Mining, Inc. v.
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation.”
21 See Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corporation, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 722
SCRA 382.

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Meanwhile, Redmont separately sought the cancellation

and/or revocation of the executed FTAA through a
Petition22 dated May 7, 2010 (May 7, 2010 Petition) filed
before the Office of the President (OP), docketed as O.P.
Case No. 10-E-229. Redmont asserted, among others, that
the FTAA was highly anomalous and irregular, considering
that petitioners and their mother company, MBMI, have a
long history of violating and circumventing the
Constitution and other laws, due to their questionable
activities in the Philippines and abroad.23
Petitioners opposed Redmont’s petition through a
motion to dismiss, contending that: (a) there is no rule or
law which grants an appeal from a memorandum of a
department secretary; (b) the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; (c) the appeal was not perfected
because copies of the appeal were not properly served on
them; and (d) Redmont is not a real party-in-interest.24

The OP’s Ruling

In a Decision25 dated April 6, 2011, the OP granted
Redmont’s petition. It declared that the OP has the
authority to cancel the FTAA because the grant of exclusive
power to the President of the Philippines to enter into
agreements, including FTAAs under Republic Act No. (RA)
7942,26 or the “Philippine Mining Act of 1995,” carries with
it the authority to cancel the same.27 Thus, finding, inter
alia, that petitioners misrepresented that they were
Filipino corporations qualified to
_______________
22 Rollo, pp. 423-450.

23 See Supplemental Petition with Motion to Admit; CA Rollo, Vol. I,
pp. 338-373.
24 Rollo, p. 459.
25 Id., at pp. 452-469.
26 Entitled “An Act Instituting a New System of Mineral Resources
Exploration, Development, Utilization, and Conservation” (approved on
March 3, 1995).
27 Rollo, pp. 461-462.

266

engage in mining activities,28 the OP cancelled and/or

revoked the said FTAA, and, in turn, gave due course to
Redmont’s EP application.29
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the CA.30

The CA’s Ruling

31
In a Decision dated February 23, 2012, the CA
affirmed the OP Ruling. It found no procedural error in the
OP’s action on the FTAA, holding that it was done in
accordance with the President’s power of control over the
executive departments.32 As to its merits, the CA ruled
that the Republic, as represented by the OP, had the right
to cancel the FTAA, even without judicial permission,
because paragraph a(iii), Section 17.233 thereof provides
that such agreement may be cancelled by either party on
the ground of “any intentional and materially false
statement or omission of facts by a [p]arty.”34 Accordingly,
it sustained the OP’s finding that petitioners committed
misrepresentations which warranted the cancellation
and/or revocation of the FTAA.35
Unperturbed, petitioners filed on March 14, 2012 a
motion for reconsideration,36 which was denied in a
Resolution37 dated July 27, 2012; hence, this petition.
_______________
28 Id., at p. 466.
29 Id., at pp. 468-469.
30 See Petition for Review [with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction]
dated July 26, 2011; id., at pp. 470-518.
31 Id., at pp. 19-30.
32 Id., at pp. 24-25.
33 Id., at pp. 311-312.
34 Id., at p. 25.
35 Id., at p. 27.
36 Id., at pp. 571-603.
37 Id., at pp. 32-34.

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The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or
not the CA correctly affirmed on appeal the OP’s
cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I. On Jurisdiction.

It is a fundamental rule that the question of jurisdiction
may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none of the
parties raised the same.38 The reason for the rule is that a
court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid
judgment.39
Cast against this light, the Court finds that the CA
improperly took cognizance of the case on appeal under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for the reason that the OP’s
cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one
which could be classified as an exercise of its quasi-judicial
authority, thus negating the CA’s jurisdiction over the case.
The jurisdictional parameter that the appeal be taken
against a judgment, final order, resolution or award of a
“quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions” is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the

said Rule:

Rule 43
Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of
Appeals

Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall apply to
appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolu-
_______________
38 Alcala v. Villar, 461 Phil. 617, 624; 416 SCRA 147, 153 (2003).
39 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 262 Phil. 298, 309; 183 SCRA 279, 288
(1990).

268

tions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial

agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the President, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees’
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and
voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power

is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate
the rights of persons before it. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially executive or
administrative in nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it.40
“‘Adjudicate’ as commonly or popularly understood,
means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, or settle. The dictionary defines the term
as ‘to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x x to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.’”41 “In the
legal sense, ‘adjudicate’ means: ‘[t]o settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with
adjudge in its strictest sense’; and
_______________
40 See Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 621 Phil. 498, 511; 606 SCRA
554, 570 (2009).
41 Republic v. Transunion Corporation, G.R. No. 191590, April 21,
2014, 722 SCRA 273, 283-284, citing Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483, 496.

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‘adjudge’ means: ‘[t]o pass on judicially, to decide, settle,

or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x. Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment.’”42
The OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the
FTAA is obviously not an “adjudication” in the sense
above described. It cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or office. The OP — at the instance of Redmont at that —
was exercising an administrative function pursuant to the
President’s authority43 to invoke the Republic’s right under
paragraph a(iii), Section 17.2 of the FTAA which reads:
17.2 Termination
a. Grounds.—This Agreement may be

terminated, after due process, for any of the
following causes:
x x x x
iii. any intentional and materially false
statement or omission of facts by a Party.44

To contextualize the exercise, a brief discussion on the
nature and legal parameters of an FTAA is apropos.
The basis for the State, through the President, to enter
into an FTAA with another contracting party is found in
the fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution:

Section 2. x x x.
x x x x
The President may enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or

_______________
42 Id.
43 See Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
44 Rollo, p. 311.

270

financial assistance for large-scale

exploration, development, and utilization
of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and

technical resources. (Emphases supplied)

An FTAA is explicitly characterized as a contract in
Section 3(r) of RA 7942:

Section 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in and
for purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether
in singular or plural, shall mean:
x x x x
(r) “Financial or technical assistance
agreement” means a contract involving
financial or technical assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Since an FTAA is entered into by the President on the
State’s behalf, and it involves a matter of public concern in
that it covers the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources, it is properly classified as
a government or public contract, which is, according to
jurisprudence, “generally subject to the same laws and
regulations which govern the validity and sufficiency of
contracts between private individuals.”45 In Sargasso
Construction & Development Corporation v. Philippine
Ports Authority:46

A government or public contract has been defined
as a contract entered into by state officers acting on
behalf of the state, and in which the entire people of
the
_______________
45 Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation v. Philippine

Ports Authority, 637 Phil. 259, 277; 623 SCRA 260, 277 (2010).
46 Id.

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state are directly interested. It relates wholly to

matter of public concern, and affects private rights
only so far as the statute confers such rights when its
provisions are carried out by the officer to whom it is
confided to perform.
A government contract is essentially similar to a
private contract contemplated under the Civil Code.
The legal requisites of consent of the contracting
parties, an object certain which is the subject matter,
and cause or consideration of the obligation must
likewise concur. Otherwise, there is no government
contract to speak of.
x x x x
x x x. Contracts to which the government is a
party are generally subject to the same laws
and regulations which govern the validity and
sufficiency of contracts between private
individuals. A government contract, however, is
perfected only upon approval by a competent
authority, where such approval is required.47
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similar to private contracts, an FTAA involves terms,
conditions, and warranties to be followed by the contracting
parties, which are expressly stated in Section 3548 of RA
7942. Likewise, Section 36 of RA 7942 provides that an
FTAA goes through negotiation:
Section 36. Negotiations.—A financial or

technical assistance agreement shall be negotiated by
the Department and executed and approved by the
President. The President shall notify Congress of all
financial or technical assistance agreements within
thirty (30) days from execution and approval thereof.

In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos49
(La Bugal-B’laan), the Court differentiated an FTAA from
a li-
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 274-277; pp. 274-275.

48 See Section 35, Terms and Conditions, of RA 7942.
49 486 Phil. 754; 445 SCRA 1 (2004).

272

cense. It pronounced that an FTAA involves contract

or property rights, which merit protection by the due
process clause of the Constitution; as such, it may not be
revoked or cancelled in a blink of an eye, in contrast, say
for instance, to a timber license, else the contractor be
unduly deprived of its investments, which are ultimately
intended to contribute to the general welfare of the people:

3. Citing Oposa v. Factoran[,] Jr. [G.R. No.
101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792], Justice
Morales claims that a service contract is not a
contract or property right which merits protection by
the due process clause of the Constitution, but merely
a license or privilege which may be validly revoked,
rescinded or withdrawn by executive action whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare.
Oposa cites Tan v. Director of Forestry and Ysmael
v. Deputy Executive Secretary [210 Phil. 244 (1983)] as
authority. The latter cases dealt specifically with
timber licenses only. Oposa allegedly reiterated
that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation. Thus
this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Should Oposa be deemed applicable to the case at
bar, on the argument that natural resources are also
involved in this situation? We do not think so. A
grantee of a timber license, permit or license
agreement gets to cut the timber already growing on
the surface; it need not dig up tons of earth to get at
the logs. In a logging concession, the investment of
the licensee is not as substantial as the investment of
a large-scale mining contractor. If a timber license
were revoked, the licensee packs up its gear and
moves to a new area applied for, and starts over; what
it leaves behind are mainly the trails leading to the
logging site.

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In contrast, the mining contractor will have sunk a

great deal of money (tens of millions of dollars) into
the ground, so to speak, for exploration activities, for
development of the mine site and infrastructure, and
for the actual excavation and extraction of minerals,
including the extensive tunneling work to reach the
ore body. The cancellation of the mining contract
will utterly deprive the contractor of its
investments (i.e., prevent recovery of
investments), most of which cannot be pulled
out.
To say that an FTAA is just like a mere
timber license or permit and does not involve
contract or property rights which merit
protection by the due process clause of the
Constitution, and may therefore be revoked or
cancelled in the blink of an eye, is to adopt a
well-nigh confiscatory stance; at the very least,
it is downright dismissive of the property rights
of businesspersons and corporate entities that
have investments in the mining industry, whose
investments, operations and expenditures do
contribute to the general welfare of the people,
the coffers of government, and the strength of
the economy. Such a pronouncement will surely
discourage investments (local and foreign) which are
critically needed to fuel the engine of economic growth
and move this country out of the rut of poverty. In
sum, Oposa is not applicable.50 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In La Bugal-B’laan, the financial interest of the
contractor party to an FTAA was recognized by the Court
as follows; hence, the need for its fair protection:

[T]he foreign contractor is in the game precisely to
make money. In order to come anywhere near
profitability, the contractor must first extract and sell
the mineral ore. In order to do that, it must also
develop and construct the mining facilities, set up its
machineries and equipment and dig the tunnels to get

to the deposit. The contractor is
_______________
50 Id., at pp. 894-895; pp. 210-211.

274

thus compelled to expend funds in order to make

profits. If it decides to cut back on investments and
expenditures, it will necessarily sacrifice the pace of
development and utilization; it will necessarily
sacrifice the amount of profits it can make from the
mining operations. In fact, at certain less-than-
optimal levels of operation, the stream of revenues
generated may not even be enough to cover variable
expenses, let alone overhead expenses; this is a
dismal situation anyone would want to avoid. In order
to make money, one has to spend money. This truism
applies to the mining industry as well.51
(Underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration
Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation52 (Celestial), the
Court answered the question on who between the DENR
Secretary, as one of the functionaries of the President
under the Executive Department, and the POA had the
authority to cancel mineral agreements. In Celestial, it was
pronounced that the DENR Secretary, and not the POA,
has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease
contracts or mineral agreements. “The power of the DENR
Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and
control over mineral resources under [Section 2,] Chapter I,
Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987”[:]53
Section 2. Mandate.—(1) The Department of

Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the

foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher
authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State’s constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation
of the country’s natural resources.
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 897-898; p. 213.

52 565 Phil. 466; 541 SCRA 166 (2007).
53 Id., at p. 492; p. 191.

275
VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 275

“[And] [d]erived from the broad and explicit powers of

the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative
Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements
and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said
agreements.”54
In fact, Sections 8 and 29 of RA 7942 confer to the
DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral
agreements:

Section 8. Authority of the Department.—The
Department shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the State’s mineral
resources including those in reservations, watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain. The
Secretary shall have the authority to enter into
mineral agreements on behalf of the
Government upon the recommendation of the
Director, promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to implement the intent and
provisions of this Act.
Section 29. Filing and Approval of Mineral
Agreements.—x x x.
The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement

shall give the proponent the prior right to areas
covered by the same. The proposed mineral
agreement will be approved by the Secretary
and copies thereof shall be submitted to the
President. Thereafter, the President shall provide a
list to Congress of every approved mineral agreement
within thirty (30) days from its approval by the
Secretary. (Emphases supplied)

In this relation, the Court, in Celestial, elaborated that a
petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral
agreement covering an area applied for by an applicant
based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof, is
not a ‘dispute’ involving a mineral agreement under
[Section] 77(b) of RA 7942,55 which lists down the cases
which fall within the jurisdiction of the POA:
_______________
54 Id., at p. 493; p. 193.

55 Id., at pp. 499-502; p. 203.

276

Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators.—x x x. Within

thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide
on the following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or
permits;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners,
occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and
the Department at the date of the effectivity of
this Act.

This is because such matter “does not pertain to a
violation by a party of the right of another. The applicant
[who seeks cancellation] is not a real party-in-interest as he

does not have a material or substantial interest in the
mineral agreement but only a prospective or expectant
right or interest in the mining area. He has no legal right
to such mining claim and hence no dispute can arise
between the applicant and the parties to the mineral
agreement.”56 “[R]A 7942 x x x confers exclusive and
primary jurisdiction on the DENR Secretary to approve
mineral agreements, which is purely an administrative
function within the scope of his powers and
authority.”57
With the legal treatment and parameters of an FTAA in
mind, it becomes apparent that the OP’s cancellation
and/or revocation of the FTAA is an exercise of a
contractual right that is purely administrative in
nature, and thus, cannot be treated as an adjudication,
again, in the sense above discussed. As one of the
contracting parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have
adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested
party, as in a court case where rights
_______________
56 Id., at p. 503; p. 203.

57 Id., at p. 508; p. 209 (emphasis and underscoring supplied).

277
VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 277

and duties of parties are settled before an impartial

tribunal. In a very loose sense, the OP’s
cancellation/revocation may be taken as a “decision” but
only to the extent of considering it as its final
administrative action internal to its channels. It is not one
for which we should employ the conventional import of the
phrase “final and executory,” as accorded to proper
judicial/quasi-judicial decisions, and its concomitant effect
of barring further recourse of a party. To reiterate, being a
government or public contract, the FTAA is subject to
fundamental contract principles, one of which is the
principle of mutuality of contracts which would definitely
be violated if one were to accept the view that the OP, a
contracting party, can adjudicate on the contract’s own

validity. The principle of mutuality of contracts is
expressed in Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1308. The contracts must bind both
contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot
be left to the will of one of them.

At this juncture, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that
Redmont’s participation in these proceedings does not, by
and of itself, make the OP’s cancellation/revocation quasi-
judicial. Strangely enough, Redmont’s May 7, 2010 Petition
was, in fact, taken cognizance by the OP albeit having been
filed outside the existing state of procedure on FTAA
conversion and cancellation. A brief run-through of these
procedures would prove instructive.
A. Conversion.

Under Section 45 of DENR Administrative Order No.
2010-21, otherwise known as the “Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 7942, or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995” (RIRR), mining contractor may opt to
convert totally or partially his existing mineral agreement,
e.g., an MPSA to an FTAA, by filing a Letter of Intent with
the MGB, copy furnished the Regional Office where the
area covered by said

278

mineral agreement is located. Within sixty (60) days

from the filing of the Letter of Intent, the contractor must
comply with the requirements for the grant of an FTAA
laid down in Sections 49 to 69, Chapter VII of the RIRR, as
well as pay the conversion fee. The application for
conversion shall be evaluated and eventually, approved
upon compliance. Note that the term of the FTAA arising
from such conversion shall be equivalent to the remaining
period of its predecessor-mineral agreement.
Section 55 of the same DENR issuance requires a
publication/posting/radio announcement of an FTAA
application. Any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to the
said FTAA should be filed directly to the Regional Office,

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, or
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
concerned, within ten (10) days from the date of publication
or from the last date of posting/radio announcement. The
said adverse claim, protest, or opposition shall then be
resolved by the POA of the DENR, whose ruling may then
be appealed to the proper tribunals.58 To this, it bears
pointing out that Section 55 explicitly exempts “previously
published valid and existing mining claims or FTAA
applications originating from Exploration Permits that
have undergone the [publication requirement]” from the
aforesaid publication requirement.
From the foregoing, it may be inferred that the only time
that third parties, i.e., an entity other than the
contractor/applicant, may pose an objection to an FTAA
application is during the ten (10)-day window period given
by Section 55 of
_______________
58 Under Section 78 of RA 7942 and Section 206 of the RIRR, decisions

rendered by POA may be appealed to the MAB within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice of said decision; otherwise, the POA decision will
become final and executory. In turn, Section 79 of RA 7942 and Section
211 of the RIRR uniformly provide that a decision of the MAB may be
reviewed by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the MAB decision.

279
VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 279

the RIRR. However, this window period is only available

in instances of “fresh” FTAA applications (meaning, that
the same covers an area previously uncovered by any
existing mineral agreements and/or FTAAs). Differently, in
instances of conversion, i.e., of an existing MPSA to an
FTAA, publication is not required as such would have
already been undertaken during the application of the
original mineral agreement, pursuant to the exemption
expressly contained in Section 55 of the RIRR. Absent any
form of protest procedure at least under the prevailing
rules, it appears that the process merely involves the

concerned executive agency directly evaluating, i.e.,
screening and checking, whether the contractor had
complied with the pertinent requisites necessary for it to
enter into a valid FTAA with the Republic. If the requisites
have been met, the agency would then endorse the
conversion application to the topmost executive levels, i.e.,
the DENR Secretary, all culminating in the President’s,
through his/her duly appointed agents/representatives, i.e.,
the Executive Secretary, execution of the FTAA for and in
behalf of the Republic, with the contractor as counter-
party. Following these premises, Redmont’s opposition to
petitioner’s application for FTAA conversion was actually
made beyond the prescribed course of procedure.
B. Cancellation.

Section 68 of the RIRR provides that the
cancellation/revocation/termination of an FTAA may only
be done after due process. In relation, Section 77 of RA
7942, to reiterate, provides that the POA has the exclusive
and original jurisdiction to hear and decide mining
disputes:

Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators.—x x x. Within
thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide
on the following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

280

(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or

permits;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants
and claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the
Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.

In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd. (Gonzales),59 it was
clarified that “a mining dispute is a dispute involving (a)
rights to mining areas, (b) mineral agreements, FTAAs, or

permits, and (c) surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires.”60 Note that “the [POA’s]
jurisdiction is limited only to those mining disputes which
raise questions of fact or matters requiring the application
of technological knowledge and experience.”61 Thus, the
Court, in Gonzales, ruled that the POA is bereft of any
jurisdiction over a complaint for declaration of
nullity and/or termination of the subject contracts
on the ground of fraud, oppression and violation of
the Constitution, viz.:

We now come to the meat of the case which
revolves mainly around the question of jurisdiction by
the Panel of Arbitrators: Does the Panel of
Arbitrators have jurisdiction over the complaint for
declaration of nullity and/or termination of the
subject contracts on the ground of fraud, oppression
and violation of the Constitution? This issue may be
distilled into the more basic question of whether the
Complaint raises a mining dispute or a judicial
question.
A judicial question is a question that is proper for
determination by the courts, as opposed to a moot
question or one properly decided by the executive or
legislative branch. A judicial question is raised when
the determination of the question involves the
exercise of a ju-
_______________
59 492 Phil. 682; 452 SCRA 607 (2005).

60 Id., at p. 692; p. 620; emphasis supplied.
61 Id., at p. 693; p. 620.

281
VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 281

dicial function; that is, the question involves the

determination of what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy.
x x x x
x x x. Whether the case involves void or voidable
contracts is still a judicial question. It may, in some
instances, involve questions of fact especially with
regard to the determination of the circumstances of
the execution of the contracts. But the resolution of
the validity or voidness of the contracts remains a
legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of
judicial function. It requires the ascertainment of
what laws are applicable to the dispute, the
interpretation and application of those laws, and the
rendering of a judgment based thereon. Clearly, the
dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially
judicial. The complaint was not merely for the
determination of rights under the mining contracts
since the very validity of those contracts is put in
issue.62

The Court added that although mining rights may be
raised as corollary issues, the POA still has no
jurisdiction to resolve cases which mainly involve a
determination of a contract’s validity. Neither too
would the mere involvement of an FTAA turn a case into a
mining dispute that would fall under the POA’s
jurisdiction:

The Complaint is not about a dispute involving
rights to mining areas, nor is it a dispute involving
claimholders or concessionaires. The main question
raised was the validity of the Addendum Contract, the
FTAA and the subsequent contracts. The question as
to the rights of petitioner or respondents to the
mining area pursuant to these contracts, as well as
the question of whether or not petitioner had ceded
his mining claims in favor of respondents by way of
execution of the questioned contracts, is merely
corollary to the main issue, and may not be resolved
without first determining the main issue.
_______________
62 Id., at pp. 692 and 695; pp. 619-620 and 623.

282


The Complaint is also not what is contemplated by

[RA] 7942 when it says the dispute should involve
FTAAs. The Complaint is not exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators just because,
or for as long as, the dispute involves an FTAA. The
Complaint raised the issue of the constitutionality of
the FTAA, which is definitely a judicial question. The
question of constitutionality is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the courts to resolve as this would
clearly involve the exercise of judicial power. The
Panel of Arbitrators does not have jurisdiction over
such an issue since it does not involve the application
of technical knowledge and expertise relating to
mining. x x x.63

In this case, the OP cancelled/revoked the subject FTAA
based on its finding that petitioners misrepresented, inter
alia, that they were Filipino corporations qualified to
engage in mining activities. Again, this is obviously an
administrative exercise of a contractual right under
paragraph a(iii), Section 17.2 of the FTAA, which finds
legal basis in Section 99 of RA 7942 that states: “[a]ll
statements made in the exploration permit, mining
agreement and financial or technical assistance shall be
considered as conditions and essential parts thereof x x x.”
A material misrepresentation, if so found by ordinary
courts of law as enunciated in Gonzales upon a case duly
instituted therefor, would then constitute a breach of a
contractual condition that would entitle the aggrieved
party to cancel/revoke the agreement.64
The scenario at hand does not involve a complaint for
cancellation/revocation commenced before the ordinary
courts of law. Hence, Redmont’s recourse to the OP — that,
on the assumption that it even had the legal standing to
oppose an already executed FTAA which it was not a party
to — was, by and of itself, done outside the correct course
procedure. Observe that RA 7942 and its RIRR do not state
that the OP has
_______________
63 Id., at pp. 695-696; pp. 623-624.

64 Id., at p. 694; p. 623.

283
VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 283

the power to take cognizance of a quasi-judicial

proceeding involving a petition for cancellation of an
existing FTAA. In fact, there is even no mention of a
petition for cancellation or revocation to be taken by a third
party before the OP. While it may be said that the OP has
administrative control or supervision over its subordinate
agencies, such as the POA,65 again the jurisdiction of that
body pertains only to mining disputes, and not those which
involve judicial questions cognizable by the ordinary courts
of law.
Thus, at least with respect to cases affecting an FTAA’s
validity, the Court holds that the OP has no quasi-judicial
power to adjudicate the propriety of its
cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point,
the FTAA is a contract to which the OP itself represents a
party, i.e., the Republic. It merely exercised a contractual
right by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely
administrative action which should not be considered
quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP’s proper
exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the CA had no
appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is,
perforce, null and void. With this, it is unnecessary to delve
into the other ancillary issues raised in the course of these
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 23, 2012 and the Resolution dated
July 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
120409 are hereby declared NULL and VOID due to lack
of jurisdiction.
_______________
65 Section 77 of RA 7942 states:

Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators.—There shall be a panel of
arbitrators in the regional office of the Department composed of three (3)
members, two (2) of whom must be members of the Philippine Bar in good
standing and one a licensed mining engineer or a professional in a related
field, and duly designated by the Secretary as recommended by the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau Director. Those designated as members of the
panel shall serve as such in addition to their work in the Department
without receiving any additional compensation. x x x.

284

This pronouncement is without prejudice to any other

appropriate remedy the parties may take against each
other.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,

Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared null

and void.
Notes.—The Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has jurisdiction

to settle disputes over rights to mining areas. (Narra
Nickel Mining and Development Corp. vs. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corp., 722 SCRA 382 [2014])
The term mining claim connotes a parcel of land
containing a precious metal in its soil or rock; A mining
patent pertains to a title granted by the government for the
said mining claim. (Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation vs.
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation, 745
SCRA 154 [2015])

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8/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 777

G.R. No. 202877. December 9, 2015.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is a

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 259

a “quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-

Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial Power; Words and

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation

are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very loose sense,

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 261

adverse claim, protest, or opposition to the said FTAA should

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1 Rollo, pp. 44-87.

7 CA Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 252-253.

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 263

In particular, petitioner Narra Nickel Mining and

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo — and petitioners executed an FTAA13 covering

13 Rollo, pp. 271-324.

18 In particular, Petition for Denial of MPSA Application of Narra

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 265

Meanwhile, Redmont separately sought the cancellation

22 Rollo, pp. 423-450.

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

engage in mining activities,28 the OP cancelled and/or

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 267

The Issue Before the Court

judicial functions” is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 269

‘adjudge’ means: ‘[t]o pass on judicially, to decide, settle,

a. Grounds.—This Agreement may be

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

financial assistance for large-scale

development and use of local scientific and

45 Sargasso Construction & Development Corporation v. Philippine

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 271

state are directly interested. It relates wholly to

Section 36. Negotiations.—A financial or

47 Id., at pp. 274-277; pp. 274-275.

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cense. It pronounced that an FTAA involves contract

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 273

In contrast, the mining contractor will have sunk a

machineries and equipment and dig the tunnels to get

50 Id., at pp. 894-895; pp. 210-211.

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

thus compelled to expend funds in order to make

Section 2. Mandate.—(1) The Department of

primarily responsible for the implementation of the

51 Id., at pp. 897-898; p. 213.

VOL. 777, DECEMBER 9, 2015 275

“[And] [d]erived from the broad and explicit powers of

The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement

54 Id., at p. 493; p. 193.

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED