Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC
81 Billion
P116.23 Billion[5]
[ G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019 ]
GIOS-SAMAR, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON The Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve services and
GERARDO M. MALINAO, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF enhance the airside and landside facilities of the key regional airports
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AND CIVIL through concession agreements with the private sector. The Projects
AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. will be awarded through competitive bidding, following the
procurement rules and procedure prescibed under Republic Act (RA)
DECISION No. 6957,[6] as amended by RA No. 7718[7] (BOT Law), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The concession period would
JARDELEZA, J.: be for 30 years.[8]
The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant On March 10, 2015, the DOTC and the CAAP issued the Instructions
to its provisions, granted us original jurisdiction over certain cases. In to Prospective Bidders (ITPB),[9] which provided that prospective
some instances, this jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts bidders are to pre-qualify and bid for the development, operations, and
(RTCs) and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, litigants do not have maintenance of the airports, which are now bundled into two groups
unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. The (collectively, the Bundled Projects), namely:
doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this
Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo
invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action.
This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol (Panglao)[10]
mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of The costs of Bundle 1 and Bundle 2 are P50.66 Billion and P59.66
the land. Billion, respectively. The Puerto Princesa Airport project was not
included in the bundling.[11]
On December 15, 2014, the Department of Transportation and
Communication[1] (DOTC) and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation The general procedure for the bidding of the Bundled Projects stated
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify that "[p]rospective [b]idders may bid for only Bundle 1 or Bundle 2, or
and Bid[2] (Invitation) on the airport development, operations, and bid for both Bundle 1 and Bundle 2. x x x The [Pre-Qualification, Bids
maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New and Awards Commitee (PBAC)] shall announce in a Bid Bulletin prior
Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively, to the Qualifications Submission Date[,] its policy on whether a
Projects).[3] The total cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion, broken [p]rospective [b]idder may be awarded both bundles or whether a
down as follows:[4] [p]rospective [b]idder may only be awarded with one (1) bundle."[12]
Bacolod-Silay P20.26 Billion The submission of the Pre-Qualification Queries was scheduled for
Davao P40.57 Billion April 3, 2015 and the submission of Qualification Documents on May
Iloilo P30.4 Billion 18, 2015.[13]
Laguindingan P14.62 Billion
New Bohol (Panglao) P4.57 Billion
On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Fourth, the PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion
Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it bundled the projects
invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present without legal authority.[22]
petition for prohibition.[14] Petitioner alleges that it is a non-
governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and Fifth, bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the
fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda reasonable bar to a level higher than what it would have been, had the
relying on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry projects been bidded out separately.[23]
and livelihood.[15] It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the
Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from In support of petitioner's prayer, for the issuance of a temporary
proceeding with the bidding of the same. restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, it states that
there is extreme urgency to enjoin the bidding of the Bundled Projects
Petitioner raises the following arguments: so as not to cause irreparable damage and injury to the coffers of the
government.[24]
First, the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional
prohibitions on the anti-dummy and the grant of opportunity to the In its comment,[25] the DOTC counters that: (1) the petition is
general public to invest in public utilities,"[16] citing Section 11, Article premature because there has been no actual bidding yet, hence there
XII of the 1987 Constitution.[17] According to petitioner, bundling would is no Justiciable controversy to speak of; (2) petitioner has no legal
allow companies with questionable or shaky financial background to standing to file the suit whether as a taxpayer or as a private individual;
have direct access to the Projects "by simply joining a consortium (3) petitioner's allegation on the violation of anti-dummy and equal
which under the bundling scheme adopted by the DOTC said opportunity clauses of the Constitution are speculative and
[P]rojects taken altogether would definitely be beyond the financial conjectural; (4) Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is not
capability of any qualified, single Filipino corporation."[18] applicable to the bidding process assailed by petitioner; (5) the
bundling of the Projects does not violate the prohibitions on
Second, bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade; and (6) the DOTC
under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution because it would allow and the CAAP did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airpm1s, thus lack or excess of jurisdiction.[26]
establishing a monopoly. Petitioner asserts that, given the staggering
cost of the Bundled Projects, the same can only be undertaken by a For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic
group, joint venture outfits, and consortiums which are susceptible to fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged
combinations and schemes to control the operation of the service for any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly
profit, enabling a single consortium to control as many as six from the Court. The case should have been filed with the trial court,
airports.[19] because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a
full-blown trial.[27] The CAAP also maintains that petitioner has neither
Third, bundling will "surely perpetrate an undue restraint of legal capacity nor authority to file the suit and that the petition has no
trade."[20] Mid-sized Filipino companies which may have previously cause of action.[28]
considered participating in one of the six (6) distinct Projects will no
longer have a realistic opportunity to participate in the bidding because In its reply,[29] petitioner argues that it need not wait for the conduct of
the separate projects became two (2) gargantuan projects. This the bidding to file the suit because doing so would render useless the
effectively placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-sized very purpose for filing the petition for prohibition.[30] As it is, five groups
Filipino companies.[21] have already been pre-qualified to bid in the Bundled
Projects.[31] Petitioner also submits that direct recourse to this Court is se.[35] With particular respect to the operation of public utilities or
justified as the "matter of prohibiting the bidding process of the x x x services, this Court, in Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v.
illegally bundled projects are matters of public interest and Lazaro,[36] further clarified that "[b]y their very nature, certain public
transcendental importance."[32] It further insists that it has legal services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity,
standing to file the suit through Malinao, its duly authorized transportation, telephone, telegraph, etc. must be given exclusive
representative.[33] franchises if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises
are not violative of the law against monopolies."
The main issue brought to us for resolution is whether the bundling of
the Projects is constitutional. In short, we find that the grant of a concession agreement to an entity,
as a winning bidder, for the exclusive development, operation, and
Petitioner argues that the bundling of the Projects is unconstitutional maintenance of any or all of the Projects, does not by itself create a
because it will: (i) create a monopoly; (ii) allow the creation and monopoly violative of the provisions of the Constitution. Anglo-Fil
operation of a combination in restraint of trade; (iii) violate anti-dummy Trading Corporation teaches that exclusivity is inherent in the grant of
laws and statutes giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public a concession to a private entity to deliver a public service, where
utilities; and (iv) enable companies with shaky financial backgrounds Government chooses not to undertake such service.[37] Otherwise
to participate in the Projects. stated, while the grant may result in a monopoly, it is a type of
monopoly not violative of law. This is the essence of the policy
I decision of the Government to enter into concessions with the private
sector to build, maintain and operate what would have otherwise been
While petitioner asserts that the foregoing arguments involve legal (as government-operated services, such as airports. In any case, the law
opposed to factual) issues, our examination of the petition shows itself provides for built-in protections to safeguard the public interest,
otherwise. As will be demonstrated shortly, petitioner's arguments foremost of which is to require public bidding. Under the BOT Law, for
against the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are example, a private-public pat1nership (PPP) agreement may be
inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the undertaken through public bidding, in cases of solicited proposals, or
determination of which require the reception of evidence. This Court, through "Swiss challenge" (also known as comparative bidding), in
however, is not a trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues cases of unsolicited proposals.
at the first instance. For this reason, we DISMISS the petition.
In any event, the Constitution provides that the State may, by law,
A prohibit or regulate monopolies when the public interest so
requires.[38] Petitioner has failed to point to any provision in the law,
Petitioner claims that the bundling of the Projects violates the which specifically prohibits the bundling of bids, a detail supplied by
constitutional provisions on monopolies and combinations in restraint the respondent DOTC as implementing agency for the PPP program
of trade under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads: for airpm1s. Our examination of the petition and the relevant statute,
m fact, provides further support for the dismissal of the present action.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies while the
public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or Originally, monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade were
unfair competition shall be allowed. governed by, and penalized under, Article 186[39] of the Revised Penal
Code. This provision has since been repealed by RA No. 10667, or
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,[34] we clarified that the Philippine Competition Act, which defines and penalizes "all forms
the Constitution does not prohibit the operation of monopolies per
of anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and anti- action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of
competitive mergers and acquisitions."[40] fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid
or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law.
RA No. 10667 does not define what constitutes a "monopoly." Instead, Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid,
it prohibits one or more entities which has/have acquired or achieved illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
a "dominant position" in a "relevant market" from "abusing" its showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law."[45] The present
dominant position. In other words, an entity is not prohibited from, or action should thus be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause
held liable for prosecution and punishment for, simply securing a of action.[46]
dominant position in the relevant market in which it operates. It is only
when that entity engages in conduct in abuse of its dominant position Similarly, RA No. 10667 does not define what a "combination in
that it will be exposed to prosecution and possible punishment. restraint of trade" is. What it does is penalize anti-
competitive agreements. Agreement refers to "any type of form or
Under RA No. 10667, "dominant position" is defined as follows: contract, arrangement, understanding, collective recommendation, or
concerted action, whether formal or informal."[47] The following
Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act: agreements are considered anti competitive:
(g) Dominant position refers to a position of economic strength that an (a) The following agreements, between or among competitors, are per
entity or entities hold which makes it capable of controlling the relevant se prohibited:
market independently from any or a combination of the following:
competitors, customers, suppliers, or consumers[.] (1) Restricting competition as to price, or components thereof, or other
terms of trade;
"Relevant market," on the other hand, refers to the market in which a
particular good or service is sold and which is a combination of the (2) Fixing price at an auction or in any form of bidding including cover
relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.[41] The bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation and market allocation and other
determination of a particular relevant market depends on the analogous practices of bid manipulation;
consideration of factors which affect the substitutability among goods
or services constituting such market, and the geographic area (b) The following agreements, between or among competitors which
delineating the boundaries of the market.[42] An entity with a dominant have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or
position in a relevant market is deemed to have abused its dominant lessening competition shall be prohibited:
position if it engages in a conduct that would substantially prevent,
restrict, or lessen competition.[43] (1) Setting, limiting, or controlling production, markets, technical
development, or investment;
Here, petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that
bundling will create a monopoly, in violation of the Constitution. By (2) Dividing or sharing the market, whether by volume of sales or
merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any purchases, territory, type of goods or services, buyers or sellers or any
sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief other means;
petitioner prayed for. In Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran,[44] we held that
"[a] pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
(c) Agreements other than those specified in (a) and (b) of this section account of past behavior of the parties involved and prevailing market
which have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting conditions;
or lessening competition shall also be prohibited: Provided, Those
which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods (d) Balance the need to ensure that competition is not prevented or
and services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while substantially restricted and the risk that competition efficiency,
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, may not productivity, innovation, or development of priority areas or industries
necessarily be deemed a violation of this Act. in the general interest of the country may be deterred by overzealous
or undue intervention; and
An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
with another entity or entities, have common economic interests, and (e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it is more likely than not
are not otherwise able to decide or act independently of each other, that the entity has engaged in anti-competitive agreement or conduct
shall not be considered competitors for purposes of this section. including whether the entity's conduct was done with a reasonable
commercial purpose such as but not limited to phasing out of a product
The bundling of the Projects is an an arrangement made by the DOTC or closure of a business, or as a reasonable commercial response to
and the CAAP in the conduct of public bidding. The question that the market entry or conduct of a competitor. (Emphasis supplied.)
arises is whether the same constitutes an anti-competitive agreement
prohibited by RA No. 10667. However, to resolve this, we refer to the Similar to its assertion that bundling will create a monopoly prohibited
factors enumerated in Section 26 of RA No. 10667 on the by law, we find that petitioner, again, utterly failed to sufficiently state
determination of anti-competitive agreements or conduct: a cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts to support its
conclusion that bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade or
Sec. 26. Determination of Anti-Competitive Agreement or Conduct. - results in unfair competition under the provisions of RA No. 10667.
In determining whether anti-competitive agreement or conduct has
been committed, the Commission shall: Even granting that the petition sufficiently pleads a cause of action for
the foregoing violations, there is a need to receive evidence to test the
(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected by the anti- premises of petitioner's conclusions.
competitive agreement or conduct, following the principles laid out
in Section 24 of this Chapter; To illustrate, applying the facts and claims relative to the violation of
the proscription against monopolies, what RA No. 10667, in fact,
(b) Determine if there is actual or potential adverse impact on prohibits and punishes is the situation where: (1) an entity, having
competition in the relevant market caused by the alleged been granted an exclusive franchise to maintain and operate one or
agreement or conduct, and if such impact is substantial and more airports, attains a dominant position in that market; and (2)
outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that result from abuses such dominant position by engaging in prohibited conduct, i.e.,
the agreement or conduct; acts that substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition in market
of airport development, operations and maintenance. Thus, for
(c) Adopt a broad and forward-looking perspective, recognizing future petitioner to succeed in asserting that such a prohibited situation
developments, any overriding need to make the goods or services legally obtains, it must first establish, by evidence, that indeed: (1)
available to consumers, the requirements of large investments in the relevant market is that of airport development, maintenance, and
infrastructure, the requirements of law, and the need of our operation (under the facts-based criteria enumerated in Section 24 of
economy to respond to international competition, but also taking RA No. 10667); (2) the entity has achieved a dominant position (under
the facts-based criteria enumerated in Section 27 of RA No. 10667) in
that relevant market; and (3) the entity commits acts said provision. The president or managers and directors or trustees of
constituting abuse of dominant position (under the facts based criteria corporations or associations convicted of a violation of this section
enumerated in Section 27 of RA No. 10667). shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than five nor more than
fifteen years, and by a fine not less than the value of the right,
In addition, to support the legal conclusion that bundling is an anti- franchise or privilege, enjoyed or acquired in violation of the provisions
competitive agreement, there must be evidence that: (1) the relevant hereof but in no case less than five thousand pesos.
market is that of airport development, maintenance, and operation
(under the facts-based criterion enumerated in Section 24 of RA No. For liability for violation of Section 2 to attach, it must first be
10667); (2) bundling causes, or will cause, actual or potential adverse established that there is a law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or
impact on the competition in that relevant market; (3) said impact is exercise of a right, franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of the
substantial and outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least a certain
results from bundling; and (4) the totality of evidence shows that the percentage of which is owned by such citizens. [50] Moreover, it must
winning bidder, more likely than not engaged, in anti-competitive be shown by evidence that a corporation or association falsely
conduct. simulated the existence of the minimum required Filipino stock or
capital ownership to enjoy or exercise the right, franchise, privilege, or
The Court, however, is still not a trier of facts. Petitioner should have business.
brought the challenge before a tribunal, specially equipped to resolve
the factual and legal issues presented.[48] In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the
bundling of the Projects violated the Anti-Dummy Law. It did not
B identify what corporation or association falsely simulated the
composition of its stock ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that
We now jointly discuss petitioner's remaining allegations, namely, that there is a law limiting, reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or
bundling of the Projects: (i) violates the anti-dummy law and the development projects must be awarded only to corporations, a certain
constitutional provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to percentage of the capital of which is exclusively owned by Filipinos.
invest in public utilities; (ii) is in grave abuse of discretion; and (iii) Executive Order (EO) No. 65,[51] even exempts contracts for
enables companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate in infrastructure/development projects covered by the BOT Law from the
the Projects. 40% foreign ownership limitation.
Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, otherwise known as the For the same reasons above, petitioner's allegation that bundling
Anti-Dummy Law, was enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain violated Section 11,[52] Article XII of the Constitution - which prescribes
economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations.[49] Section 2 of a 60% Filipino ownership requirement for franchises, certificate, or for
said law states: the operation of public utilities - must be rejected.
Sec. 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock. - In all cases in which a Petitioner's argument that, bundling of the Projects gave shady
constitutional or legal provision requires that, in order that a companies direct access to the Projects, also raises questions of fact.
corporation or association may exercise or enjoy a right, franchise or Foremost, petitioner does not identify these "shady companies." Even
privilege, not less than a certain per centum of its capital must be assuming that petitioner is referring to any or all of the five companies
owned by citizens of the Philippines or of any other specific country, it who have been pre-qualified to bid in the projects,[53] its assertion that
shall be unlawful to falsely simulate the existence of such minimum these companies are not financially able to undertake the project
stock or capital as owned by such citizens, for the purpose of evading raises a question of fact, financial ability being a pre-qualification
requirement. As already stated earlier, such question is one which this (b) Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara[58] model;
Court is ill-equipped to resolve.[54]
(c) The transcendental importance doctrine;
Finally, the allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a
conclusion of law. As shown, no facts were even alleged to show (d) The Court is not a trier of facts;
which specific law was violated by the decision to bundle the Projects.
(e) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
In short, these three above arguments of petitioner must be dismissed
for failure to. sufficiently plead a cause of action. Even assuming that (f) The Court's expanded jurisdiction, social rights, and the Court's
petitioner's causes of action were properly alleged, the resolution of constitutional rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution;
said issues would still require the determination of factual issues which
this Court simply cannot undertake. (g) Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts: The case of The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections;[59]
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, (h) Hierarchy of courts as a constitutional imperative; and
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus[55] (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper (i) Hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism.
only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific
instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article A
VII,[56] cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of
questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because The Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction
we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or
rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over petitions for
the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory extraordinary writs predates the 1935 Constitution.
agencies.[57] This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed On June 11, 1901, the Second Philippine Commission, popularly
to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned known as the Taft Commission, enacted Act No. 136, or An Act
to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed Providing For the Organization of Courts in the Philippine
aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or Islands.[60] Act No. 136 vested the judicial power of the Government of
constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised. the Philippine Islands unto the Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance
(CFI), courts of justices of the peace, together with such special
II jurisdiction of municipal courts, and other special tribunals as may be
authorized by law.[61] Under Act No. 136, the Supreme Court had
For a better understanding of our ruling today, we review below, in original jurisdiction over the following cases:
light of the Court's fundamental constitutional tasks, the constitutional
and statutory evolution of the Court's original and concurrent Sec. 17. Its Original Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall have
jurisdiction, and its interplay with related doctrines, pronouncements, original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
and even the Court's own rules, as follows: prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the
manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and
(a) The Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction;
determine controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases occupation.[66] The Philippine Bill retained original jurisdiction of the
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.) Supreme Court conferred under Act No. 136, with the caveat that the
legislative department might add to such jurisdiction.[67] Thus,
The Code of Civil Procedure[62] (1901 Rules) referred to in Section 17 in Weigall v. Shuster,[68] one of the earliest cases of the Court, we held
of Act No. 136, in turn, provided that the Supreme Court shall have that the Philippine Commission could increase, but not decrease, our
concurrent jurisdiction with the CFIs in certiorari, prohibition, original jurisdiction under Act No. 136.
and mandamus proceedings over any inferior tribunal, board, or
officer and in quo warranto and habeas On December 31, 1916, Act No. 2657 or the Administrative Code was
corpus proceedings.[63] Likewise, the 1901 Rules stated that the Court enacted, which included the "Judiciary Law" under Title IV, Chapter
shall have original jurisdiction by certiorari and mandamus over the 10. It was revised on March 10, 1917 through the Revised
proceedings of CFIs wherever said courts have acted without, or in Administrative Code,[69] which increased the original jurisdiction of the
excess of, jurisdiction, or in case of a mandamus proceeding, hen the Supreme Court by adding those cases affecting ambassadors, other
CFIs and judges thereof unlawfully neglect the performance of a duty public ministers, and consuls.[70]
imposed by law.[64]
On May 14, 1935, 33 years after the enactment of the Philippine Bill,
Notably, Sections 496 and 497 of the 1901 Rules proscribed the Court the Philippines ratified the 1935 Constitution. Like its predecessor, the
not only from reviewing the evidence taken in the court below but also 1935 Constitution adopted the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
from retrying questions of fact, viz.: Court as provided in existing laws, i.e., Act No. 136, the 1901 Rules,
and the Revised Administrative Code. Section 3, Article VIII of the
Sec. 496. General Procedure in the Supreme Court. - The Supreme 1935 Constitution states that, "[u]ntil the [Congress] shall provide
Court may. in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirm, reverse, otherwise the Supreme Cow1shall have such original and appellate
or modify any final judgment, order, or decree of a Court of First jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court
Instance, regularly entered in the Supreme Court by bill of exceptions, of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
or appeal, and may direct the proper judgment, order, or decree to be x x x"[71] The 1935 Constitution further stated that the Congress may
entered, or direct a new trial, or further proceedings to be had, and if not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases
a new trial shall be granted, the court shall pass upon and affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.[72]
determine all the questions of law involved in the case presented
by such bill of exceptions and necessary for the final On December 31, 1935, Commonwealth Act No. 3,[73] amending the
determination of the action. Revised Administrative Code, created the Court of Appeals (CA) and
granted it "original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
Sec. 497. Hearings Confined to Matters of Law, With Certain injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and
Exceptions. - In hearings upon bills of exception, in civil actions and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."[74]
special proceedings, the Supreme Court shall not review the
evidence taken in the court below, nor retry the questions of fact, On June 17, 1948, the Congress enacted RA No. 296, otherwise
except as in this section hereafter provided; but shall determine known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948. Section 17 of RA
only questions of law raised by the bill of exceptions. x x x No. 296 vested the Supreme Court with "original and exclusive
(Emphasis supplied.) jurisdiction in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Court of Appeals." It also
On July 1, 1902, the Congress enacted the Philippine Bill[65] or the first provided that the Supreme Court shall exercise original and
"Constitution" of the Philippines under the American concurrent jurisdiction with CFIs :
xxxx Where the 1935 Constitution only referred to the original jurisdiction
which the Supreme Court possessed at the time of its adoption, the
1. In petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, 1973 Constitution expressly provided for the Supreme Court's original
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus; jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs.
2. In actions between the Roman Catholic Church and the In 1981, this Court's original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs
municipalities or towns, or the Filipino Independent Church for became concurrent with the CA, pursuant to Batas Pambansa
controversy as to title to, or ownership, administration or possession Bilang 129 (BP 129) or The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. BP
of hospitals, convents, cemeteries or other properties used in 129 repealed RA No. 296[76] and granted the CA with "[o]riginal
connection therewith; jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
3. In actions brought by the Government of the Philippines against the or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."[77] In addition, Section 21(2)
Roman Catholic Church or vice versa for the title to, or ownership of, of BP 129 bestowed the RTCs (formerly the CFIs) with original (and
hospitals, asylums, charitable institutions, or any other kind of consequently, concurrent with the Supreme Court) jurisdiction over
property; and actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
4. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law Seven years after the enactment of BP 129, the Philippines ratified the
concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. 1987 Constitution; Article VII, Section 5(1) of which provides the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which is an exact
RA No. 5440 amended RA No. 296 on September 9, 1968, deleting reproduction of Section 5(1), A1ticle X of the 1973 Constitution.
numbers 3 and 4 mentioned above.[75]
B
Several years later, on January 17, 1973, the Philippines ratified the
1973 Constitution. Article X of the same is dedicated to the Judiciary. Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara model
Section 5(1) of the said article provides for the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction, viz.: Direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction over the issuance
of extraordinary writs started in 1936 with Angara v. Electoral
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Commission.[78] Angara is the first case directly filed before the Court
after the 1935 Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935. It is the
quintessential example of a valid direct recourse to this Court on
constitutional questions.
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, Angara was an original petition for prohibition seeking to restrain the
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of an election
contest led against an elected (and confirmed) member of the National
Assembly. The main issue before the Court involved the question of
whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the Electoral
xxxx Commission and the subject matter of the controversy.[79]
We took cognizance of the petition, ruling foremost that the Court has Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.[84] Province of
jurisdiction over the case by virtue of its "power of judicial review North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Constitution:" Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),[85] Macalintal v. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal,[86] Belgica v. Ochoa,[87] Imbong v. Ochoa,
x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional Jr.,[88] Araullo v. Aquino III,[89] Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr.,[90] Padilla v.
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other Congress of the Philippines,[91] to name a few. To stress, the
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the common denominator of all these cases is that the threshold
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation questions presented before us are ones of law.
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an C
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. x x x[80] The transcendental importance doctrine
In Angara, there was no dispute as to the facts. Petitioner was allowed In 1949, the Court introduced a legal concept that will later underpin
to file the petition for prohibition directly before us because what was most of the cases filed directly before us - the doctrine of
considered was the nature of the issue involved in the case: a transcendental importance. Although this doctrine was originally used
legal controversy between two agencies of the government that to relax the rules on locus standi or legal standing, its application
called for the exercise of the power of judicial review by the final would later be loosely extended as an independent justification for
arbiter of the Constitution, the Supreme Court. direct recourse to this Court.
Several years later, another original action for prohibition was filed We first used the term "transcendental importance" in Araneta v.
directly before the Court, this time seeking to enjoin certain members Dinglasan.[92] Araneta involved five consolidated petitions before the
of the rival political party from "continuing to usurp, intrude into and/or Court assailing the validity of the President's orders issued pursuant
hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by to Commonwealth Act No. 671, or "An Act Declaring a State of Total
them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Emergency as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and
Cuenco, et al.[81] we were confronted with the issue of whether the Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members Meet such Emergency."[93] Petitioners rested their case on the theory
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator that Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to have any force
Primicias - a member and spokesman of the party having the and effect.[94] The main issues for resolution in Araneta were: (1)
largest number of votes in the Senate - on behalf of its Committee on whether Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force; and relatedly,
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of (2) whether the executive orders issued pursuant thereto were valid.
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination x x x Specifically, the Court had to resolve the issue of whether
of the party having the second largest number of votes. x x x Commonwealth Act No. 671 (and the President's Emergency Powers)
x."[82] There, this Court proceeded to resolve the constitutional issue continued to be effective after the opening of the regular session of
raised without inquiring into the propriety of direct recourse to us. Congress.
Similar with Angara, the question before us, then, was purely legal.
In overruling the objection to the personality or sufficiency of the
The Angara model of direct recourse would be followed and allowed interest of petitioners in bringing the actions as taxpayers,[95] this Court
by the Court in Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon declared that "[a]bove all, the transcendental importance to the public
Committee,[83] Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."[96] Thus, and decision dismissing the petition, Chief Justice Querube Makalintal
similar with Angara, direct recourse to the Court in Araneta is wrote:
justified because the issue to be resolved there was one of law;
there was no dispute as to any underlying fact. Araneta has since Judge Pamatian issued the order now assailed herein after he
then been followed by a myriad of cases [97] where transcendental heard the parties and received relevant evidence bearing on the
importance was cited as basis for setting aside objections on legal incident before him, namely, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
standing. injunction as prayed for by the defendants. He issued the writ on
the basis of the facts as found by him, subject of course, as he himself
It was in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority[98] when, for the first time, admitted, considering the interlocutory nature of the injunction, to
it appeared that the transcendental importance doctrine could, apart further consideration of the case on the merits after trial. I do not see
from its original purpose to overcome objections to standing, stand as that his factual findings are arbitrary or unsupported by the
a justification for disregarding the proscription against direct recourse evidence. If anything, they are circumspect, reasoned out and
to the Court. Chavez is an original action for mandamus filed before arrived at after serious judicial inquiry.
the Court against the Public Estates Authority (PEA). There, the
petition sought, among others, to compel the PEA to disclose all facts This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond its function to
on the PEA's then on-going renegotiations to reclaim portions of make its own findings of certain vital facts different from those of
Manila Bay.[99] On the issue of whether the non-observance of the the trial court, especially on the basis of the conflicting claims of
hierarchy of courts merits the dismissal of the petition, we ruled that: the parties and without the evidence being properly before it. For
this Court to make such factual conclusions is entirely
x x x The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to unjustified - first, because if material facts are controverted, as in this
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the case, and they are issues being litigated before the lower court, the
Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The petition for certiorari would not be in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of
instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of this Court; and, secondly, because it preempts the primary
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve function of the lower court, namely, to try the case on the merits,
this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. receive all the evidence to be presented by the parties, and only
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under then come to a definite decision, including either the maintenance
the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the or the discharge of the preliminary injunction it has issued.
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the
instant case.[100] (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.) The thousands of pages of pleadings, memoranda, and annexes
already before this Court and the countless hours spent in
D discussing the bare allegations of the parties - as to the factual
aspects of which the members are in sharp disagreement -
The Court is not a trier of facts merely to r solve whether or not to give due course to the petition,
demonstrate clearly why this Court, in a case like this, should
In 1973, the dictum that the Supreme Court is not trier of facts first consider only one question, and no other, namely, did the court
appeared in jurisprudence through the concurring opinion of then below commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal in Chemplex (Philippines) Inc. v. complained of, and should answer that question without searching
Pamatian.[101] Chemplex involved a petition for certiorari against an the pleadings for supposed facts still in dispute and not those set forth
order recognizing the validity and legitimacy of the election of directors in the order itself, and in effect deciding the main case on the merits
on the board of a private corporation. In his concurrence to the majority
although it is yet in its preliminary stages and has not entered the resolved mainly in the light of their peddling contracts. A different
period of trial.[102] (Emphasis and italics supplied.) approach would lead this Court astray into the field of factual
controversy where its legal pronouncements would not rest on solid
The maxim that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts will later find grounds.[104] (Emphasis supplied.)
its way in the Court's majority opinion in Mafinco Trading Corporation
v. Ople.[103] The Rules of Court referred to above is the 1964 Rules of Court. Up
to this date, the requirement of alleging facts with certainty remains in
Mafinco involved a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
annul a Decision of the Secretary of Labor, finding that the old National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had jurisdiction over the Meanwhile, the Court, aware of its own limitations, decreed in Section
complaint filed against Mafinco Trading Corporation for having 2, Rule 3 of its Internal Rules[105] that it is "not a trier of facts," viz.:
dismissed two union members. The crucial issue brought before the
Court was whether an employer-employee relationship existed Sec. 2. The Court Not a Trier of Facts. - The Court is not a trier of
between petitioner and the private respondents. Before resolving the facts; its role is to decide cases based on the findings of fact before it.
issue on the basis of the parties' contracts, the Court made the Where the Constitution, the law or the Court itself, in the exercise of
following pronouncements: its discretion, decides to receive evidence, the reception of evidence
may be delegated to a member of the Court, to either the Clerk of
The parties in their pleadings and memoranda injected conflicting Court or one of the Division Clerks of Court, or to one of the appellate
factual allegations to support their diametrically opposite contentions. courts or its justices who shall submit to the Court a report and
From the factual angle, the case has become highly controversial. recommendation on the basis of the evidence presented.
In Agan, we stated that "[t]he facts necessary to resolve these legal To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe
questions are well established and, hence, need not be determined by us with the power to tackle factual questions and play the role of a trial
a trial court,"[148] In Jaworski, the issue is whether Presidential Decree court. The only circumstance when we may take cognizance of a
No. 1869 authorized the Philippine Amusement and Gaming case in the first instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in
Corporation to contract any part of its franchise by authorizing a the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the
concessionaire to operate internet gambling.[149] In Romulo, we sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's proclamation of
declared that the facts necessary to resolve the legal question are not martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
disputed.[150] In Aquino III, the lone issue is whether RA No. 9716, Constitution.[160] The case before us does not fall under this exception.
H ordinarily might escape detection. The Court has thus been freed
to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most
Hierarchy of courts is a constitutional imperative important work, which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, "is
less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the
Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should not be transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more
a matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional imperative given (1) the intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous
structure of our judicial system and (2) the requirements of due economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental
process. authority and its impact upon fundamental rights." [170] (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.)
First. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the various levels
of courts in the country as they are established under the Constitution Accordingly, when litigants seek relief directly from the Court, they
and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one bypass the judicial structure and open themselves to the risk of
another, and how these different levels of court interact with one presenting incomplete or disputed facts. This consequently hampers
another.[161] It determines the venues of appeals and the appropriate the resolution of controversies before the Court. Without the
forum for the Issuance of extraordinary writs.[162] necessary facts, the Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights
and obligations of the parties. The case would then become another
Since the creation of the Court in 1901,[163] and save for certain addition to the Court's already congested dockets. Thus, as we
exceptions, it does not, as a rule, retry questions of facts. [164] Trial explained in Alonso:
courts such as the MTCs and the RTCs, on the other hand, routinely
decide questions of fact and law at the first instance, in accordance x x x Their non-observance of the hierarchy of courts has forthwith
with the jurisdiction granted to them by law.[165] While the CA and other enlarged the docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it
intermediate courts can rule on both questions of fact and law, the may not seem burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to the
Supreme Court, in stark contrast, generally decides only questions of Court, which has to devote time and effort in poring over the papers
law. This is because the Court, whether in the exercise of its original submitted herein, only to discover in the end that a review should have
or appellate jurisdiction, is not equipped to receive and evaluate first been made by the CA. The time and effort could have been
evidence in the first instance. Our sole role is to apply the law based dedicated to other cases of importance and impact on the lives and
on the findings of facts brought before us. [166] Notably, from the 1901 rights of others.[171]
Rules[167] until the present 1997 Revised Rules of Court,[168] the power
to ascertain facts and receive and evaluate evidence in relation thereto Second. Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts also
is lodged with the trial courts. proceeds from considerations of due process. While the term "due
process of law" evades exact and concrete definition, this Court, in
In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Alonso),[169] this Court had one of its earliest decisions, referred to it as a law which hears before
occasion to articulate the role of the CA in the judicial hierarchy, viz.: it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial. It means that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
CA stands between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment society.[172] Under the present Rules of Court, which governs our
has been precisely to take over much of the work that used to be judicial proceedings, warring factual allegations of parties are settled
done by the Court. Historically, the CA has been of the greatest through presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of
help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in ascertaining, in a judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of
an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors that fact:[173] As earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in
the first instance. By directly filing a case before the Court, litigants proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as the court better
necessarily deprive themselves of the oportunity to completely pursue equipped to resolve factual questions.[178]
or defend their causes of actions. Their right to due process is
effectively undermined by their own doing. Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is an effective
mechanism to filter the cases which reach the Court. As of December
Objective justice also requires the ascertainment of all relevant facts 31, 2016, 6,526 new cases were filed to the Court. Together with the
before the Court can rule on the issue brought before it. Our reinstated/revived/reopened cases, the Court has a total of 14,491
pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan[174] is enlightening: cases in its docket. Of the new cases, 300 are raffled to the Court En
Banc and 6,226 to the three Divisions of the Court. The Court En
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison Banc disposed of 105 cases by decision or signed resolution, while
d'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the Divisions of the Court disposed of a total of 923 by decision or
the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the signed resolution.[179]
pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties,
and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, These, clearly, are staggering numbers. The Constitution provides that
by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy the Court has original jurisdiction over five extraordinary writs and by
may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally. our rule-making power, we created four more writs which can be filed
directly before us. There is also the matter of appeals brought to us
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in from the decisions of lower courts. Considering the immense backlog
this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts are facing the court, this begs the question: What is really the Court's
indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that work? What sort of cases deserves the Court's attention and time?
adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that
extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective We restate the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Angara that the
justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. Hence, direct
see that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no recourse to us should be allowed only when the issue involved is one
suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; of law. However, and as former Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
and that no party be unaware of any fact material and relevant to the reminds, the Court may still choose to avoid passing upon
action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his constitutional questions which are confessedly within its jurisdiction if
attention during the trial.[175] (Emphasis supplied.) there is some other ground on which its decision may be
based.[180] The so-called "seven pillars of limitations of judicial
I review"[181] or the "rules of avoidance" enunciated by US Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism Tennessee Valley Authority[182] teaches that:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction;[176] (2) prevent further questions "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in
overcrowding of the Court's docket;[177] and (3) prevent the inevitable the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit,
which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act."
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in Meanwhile, in Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga
advance of the necessity of deciding it." "It is not the habit of the Court Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,[184] the Court
to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely summarized the foregoing "pillars" into six categories and adopted
necessary to a decision of the case." "parallel guidelines" in the exercise of its power of judicial review, to
wit:
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority from different decisions
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other following categories:
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of 1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a case
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging 2. that rules of constitutional law shall be
its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently formulated only as required by the facts of the
dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent case
state ground.
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint other ground
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of 4. that there be actual injury sustained by the
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. party by reason of the operation of the statute
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained. In Fairchild v. 5. that the parties are not in estoppel
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen
who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the constitutionality.
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this
Court in the exercise of judicial review:
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. 1. actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal 2. the person challenging the act must have
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of "standing" to challenge; he must have a
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be personal and substantial interest in the case
avoided."[183] (Citations omitted.) such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. the question of constitutionality must be Carpio, J., I concur to J. Leonen. We do not abandon here the doctrine
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; of transcendental importance.
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
very lis mota of the case.[185] (Citations
omitted.)
Thus, the exercise of our power of judicial review is subject to these NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
four requisites and the further requirement that we can only resolve
pure questions of law. These limitations, when properly and strictly Sirs/Mesdames:
observed, should aid in the decongestion of the Court's workload.
Please take notice that on March 12, 2019 a Decision, copy attached
To end, while reflective deliberation is necessary in the judicial herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled
process, there is simply no ample time for it given this Court's massive case, the original of which was received by this Office on March 25,
caseload.[185] In fact, we are not unaware of the proposals to radically 2019 at 11:30 a.m.
reform the judicial structure in an attempt to relieve the Court of its
backlog of cases.[186] Such proposals are, perhaps, borne out of the
public's frustration over the slow pace of decision-making. With
respect, however, no overhaul would be necessary if this Court Very truly yours,
commits to be more judicious with the exercise of its original
jurisdiction by strictly implementing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Accordingly, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, we (SGD) EDGAR
reiterate that when a question before the Court involves O. ARICHETA
determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution
of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question Clerk of Court
regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons,
such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case.
Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts
or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve
factual questions.
[1]
Renamed as Department of Transportation under Section 15 of
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition Republic Act No. 10844 or the Department of Information and
is DISMISSED. Communications Technology Act of 2015.
SO ORDERED. [2] Rollo, p. 17.
Bersamin, C. J., Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, A. [3] Id. at 4.
Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang,
and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur. [4] See Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid. Id.
[5] Rollo, p. 17. body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing
[6]
An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and officers of such corporation or association must citizens of the
Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for Philippines.
Other Purposes.
[18] Rollo, p. 10.
[7]
An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957,
entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation [19] Id. at 10-11.
and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and
for Other Purposes." [20] Id. at 12.
[17]Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization [30] Id. at 271.
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under [31] Id. at 274.
the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, cet1ificate, or [32] Id. at 284. Emphasis omitted.
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except [33] Id. at 285.
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The [34] G.R. Nos. 124360 & 127867, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330.
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing
[35] Id. at 357. which such manufactured, produced, or imported merchandise or
object of commerce is used.
[36]
G.R. Nos. L-54958 & L-54966, September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 494,
522. If the offense mentioned in this article affects any food substance,
motor fuel or lubricants, or other articles of prime necessity, the
[37]
G.R. Nos. L-54958 & L-54966, September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 494. penalty shall be that of prision mayor in its maximum and medium
Se also Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic periods it being sufficient for the imposition thereof that the initial steps
Act No. 7718, and Section 2.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and have been taken toward carrying out the purposes of the combination.
Regulations of the BOT Law, as amended.
Any property possessed under any contract or by any combination
[38]
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, supra note 33 at mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, and being the subject thereof,
355. shall be forfeited to the Government of the Philippines.
[39]
Art. 186. Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade. - The Whenever any of the offenses described above is committed by a
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging corporation or association, the president and each one of its agents or
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon: representatives in the Philippines in case of a foreign corporation or
association, who shall have knowingly permitted or to prevent the
1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement or shall commission of such offense, shall be held liable as principals thereof.
take part in any conspiracy or combination in the form of a trust or
[40] See Sections 2(t) and 55(a) of Republic Act No. 10667.
otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial
means free competition in the market;
[41] Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
2. Any person who shall monopolize any merchandise or object of
trade or commerce, or shall combine with any other person or persons xxxx
to monopolize said merchandise or object in order to alter the price
thereof by spreading false rumors or making use of any other artifice (k) Relevant market refers to the market in which a particular good or
to restrain free competition in the market; service is sold and which is a combination of the relevant product
market and the relevant geographic market, defined as follows:
3. Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, or processor of
any merchandise or object of commerce or an importer of any (1) A relevant product market comprises all those goods and/or
merchandise or object of commerce from any foreign country, either services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by
as principal or agent, wholesaler or retailer, shall combine, conspire or the consumer or the customer, by reason of the goods and/or services'
agree in any manner with any person likewise engaged in the characteristics, their prices and their intended use; and
manufacture, production, processing, assembling or importation of
such merchandise or object of commerce or with any other persons (2) The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the
not so similarly engaged for the purpose of making transactions entity concerned is involved in the supply and demand of goods and
prejudicial to lawful commerce, or of increasing the market price in any services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently
part of the Philippines, of any such merchandise or object of homogenous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas
commerce manufactured, produced, processed, assembled in or because the conditions of competition are different in those areas.
imported into the Philippines, or of any article in the manufacture of
[42]
Sec. 24. Relevant Market. - For purposes of determining the from a superior product or process, business acumen, or legal rights
relevant market, the following factors, among others, affecting the or laws;
substitutability among goods or services constituting such market and
the geographic area delineating the boundaries of the market shall be (c) Making a transaction subject to acceptance by the other parties of
considered: other obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the transaction;
(a) The possibilities of substituting the goods or services in question,
with others of domestic or foreign origin, considering the technological (d) Setting prices or other terms or conditions that discriminate
possibilities, extent to which substitutes are available to consumers unreasonably between customers or sellers of the same goods or
and time required tor such substitution; services, where such customers or sellers are contemporaneously
trading on similar terms and conditions, where the effect may be to
(b) The cost of distribution of the good or service, its raw materials, its lessen competition substantially: Provided, that the following shall be
supplements and substitutes from other areas and abroad, considered permissible price differentials:
considering freight, insurance, import duties and nontariff restrictions;
the restrictions imposed by economic agents or by their associations; (1) Socialized pricing tor the less fortunate sector of the economy;
and the time required to supply the market from those areas;
(2) Price differential which reasonably or approximately reflect
(c) The cost and probability of use rs or consumers seeking other differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
markets; and differing methods, technical conditions, or quantities in which the
goods or services are sold or delivered to the buyers or sellers;
(d) National, local or international restrictions which limit access by
users or consumers to alternate sources of supply or the access of (3) Price differential or terms of sale offered in response to the
suppliers to alternate consumers. competitive price of payments, services or changes in the facilities
furnished by a competitor; and
[43]
Sec. 15. Abuse of Dominant Position. - It shall be prohibited for one
or more entities to abuse their dominant position by engaging in (4) Price changes in response to changing market conditions,
conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict or lessen marketability of goods or services, or volume;
competition:
(e) Imposing restrictions on the lease or contract for sale or trade of
(a) Selling goods or services be low cost with the object of driving goods or services concerning where, to whom, or in what forms goods
competition out of the relevant market: Provided, That in the or services may be sold or traded, such as fixing prices, giving
Commission's evaluation of this fact, it shall consider whether the preferential discounts or rebate upon such price, or imposing
entity or entities have no such object and the price established was in conditions not to deal with competing entities, where the object or
good faith to meet or compete with the lower price of a competitor in effect of the restrictions is to prevent, restrict or lessen competition
the same market selling the same or comparable product or service of substantially: Provided, That nothing contained in this Act shall
like quality; prohibit or render unlawful:
(b) Imposing barriers to entry or committing acts that prevent (1) Permissible franchising, licensing, exclusive merchandising or
competitors from growing within the market in an anti-competitive exclusive distributorship agreements such as those which give each
manner except those that develop in the market as a result of or arising party the right to unilaterally terminate the agreement; or
(2) Agreements protecting intellectual property rights, confidential violation of the Act motu proprio or upon complaint of an interested
information, or trade secrets; party or referral by a regulatory agency (Section 12).
(f) Making supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the [49]
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188456,
purchase of other goods or services from the supplier which have no September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 69, 147.
direct connection with the main goods or services to be supplied;
[50] Id. at 147-148.
(g) Directly or indirectly imposing unfairly low purchase prices for the
goods or services of, among others, marginalized agricultural [51]
Promulgating the Eleventh Regular Foreign Investment Negative
producers, fisherfolk, micro-, small-, medium-scale enterprises, and List, issued on October 29, 2018 by President Rodrigo R. Duterte.
other marginalized service providers and producers;
[52]Sec. 2. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
(h) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price on for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
their competitors, customers, suppliers or consumers, provided that of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under
prices that develop in the market as a result of or due to a superior the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital
product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
be considered unfair prices; and authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except
(i) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
prejudice of consumers, provided that limitations that develop in the or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The
market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be a violation of this Act: general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing
body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
xxxx proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
[44] G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014, 738 SCRA 33. Philippines.
[46] [54]
Sec. 5.4(c) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
Id.
BOT Law requires, for purposes of pre-qualification, proof of the
[47] Republic Act No. 10667, Sec. 4(b). Emphasis supplied. companies' or consortia's net worth or a letter testimonial from a
domestic universal/commercial bank or an international bank with a
[48]Under Republic Act No. 10667, the Congress created the subsidiary/branch in the Philippines or any internal bank recognized
Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), an independent quasi- by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas attesting that the prospective
judicial body (Section 5), which it vested with original and primary project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with
jurisdiction over the enforcement and implementation of the Philippine them, and that they are in good financial standing and/or qualified to
Competition Act. The PCC was granted the express power to conduct obtain credit accommodations from such banks to finance the projects.
inquiry, investigate, and hear and decide on cases involving any
[55]
Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 9(1) [63]
See CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURES, Sections 514, 515, 516,
and 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 or The Judiciary 519, and 526.
Reorganization Act of 1980.
[64]
See CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURES, Sections 514, 515, 516, and
[56] Sec. 18. 519.
xxxx [65]
An Act Temporarily to Provide For The Administration of the Affairs
of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of [66]
David Cecil Johnson, Courts in the Philippines, Old: New, Michigan
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the Law Review, Vol. 14. No. 4 (Feb., 1916) p. 316.
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing. [67]Philippine Bill of 1902, Sec. 9. That the Supreme Court and the
Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
xxxx exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided, and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said
[57]See Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017, practice and method of procedure. x x x
citing Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, G.R. No. 143951, October 25,
2005, 474 SCRA 153, 160-162. See also Tuna Processing, Inc. v. [68] 11 Phil. 340 (1908).
Philippine Kingford, Inc. , G.R. No. 185582, February 29. 2012, 667
SCRA 287, 308; Chua v. Ang, G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009, [69] Act No. 2711 or An Act Amending the Administrative Code.
598 SCRA 229, 238-239; Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA [70] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Sec. 138.
575, 584; Chavez v. Puhlic Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July
9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152, 179. [71] CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. VIII, Sec. 3, as amended.
[58] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 3 Phil. 139 (1936). [72] CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. VIII , Sec. 2.
[59] G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1. [73]
An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code on the Judiciary, by Reducing the Number of Justices of the
[60]
David Cecil Johnson, Courts in the Philippines, Old: New, Michigan Supreme Court and Creating the Court of Appeals and Defining Their
Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Feb., 1916) p. 314. Respective Jurisdictions, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.
[61] Act No. 136, Sec. 2.
[74] Commonwealth Act No. 3. Sec. 3, as amended.
[62]
Act No. 190 or An Act Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions nd Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands, enacted on [75]
See Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5440 or An Act Amending
August 7, 1901 and became effective on September 1, 1901. Sections Nine and Seventeen of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
[76] Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sec. 47. and (2) whether the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
violate the Constitution and the laws (i.e., Sections 1, 15, and 20,
[77] Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sec. 9(i). Article X of the 1987 Constitution; Section 3, Article 10 of Republic Act
No. 9054 or the Organic Act of Autonomous Region of Muslim
[78] Supra note 57. Mindanao; Section 52 of Republic Act No. 8371 or The Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act of 1997). Id. at 465-582.
[79]
Angara averred that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
[86]G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783. The issue
case because it involves the interpretation of the Constitution. The
Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Electoral Commission, is whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of
asserted that the Electoral Commission cannot be the subject of a writ the Supreme Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article
of prohibition because it is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, or VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Id. at 790, 817.
person within the purview of Sections 226 and 516 of the 1901 Rules.
[87] G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1. The
Pedro Ynsua raised the same argument. Id. at 153-155.
substantive issues are: (1) As to Congressional Pork Barrel - whether
[80] Id. at 158. the 20 13 Priority Development Assistance Fund Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
[81] 103 Phil. 1051 (1957). considering that they violate the principles of constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power;
[82] Id. at 1068. Italics in the original. (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy; and
[83]
G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767. The issues
before us are: (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the (2) As to Presidential Pork Barrel - Whether or not the phrases (a) "and
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under the doctrine of separation of powers; and (2) whether the the under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, relating to the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has power under Section 21, Article Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure
VI of the 1987 Constitution to conduct inquiries into private affairs in development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
purported aid of legislation. Id. at 774-777. destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
[84]
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44. The issues Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
before us are: (1) whether the filing of the second impeachment Presidential Decree No. 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
of Representatives falls within the one-year bar provided in the legislative power. Id. at 88, 106-108.
Constitution; and (2) whether this is a political question that is beyond
[88]G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146. The substantive
the ambit of judicial review. Id. at 105, 120-126.
issue is whether the RH law is unconstitutional because it violates the
[85]
G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402. The following rights provided under the 1987 Constitution: (1) right to life;
substantive issues are: (1) whether the respondents violated (2) right to health; (3) freedom of religion and the right to free speech;
constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the (4) the family; (5) freedom of expression and academic freedom; (6)
right to information (under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 due process; (7) equal protection; (8) involuntary servitude; (9)
Constitution) when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; delegation of authority to the Food and Drugs Administration; and (10)
autonomy of local governments/Autonomous Region of Muslim [93] Id. at 374.
Mindanao. Id. at 274.
[94] Id.
[89]G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1. The substantive
issues are: (1) whether the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) [95] Id.
violates Section 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of [96] Id. at 373.
an appropriation made by law." (2) whether the DAP, National Budget
Circular No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly [97]See Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187836,
implementing the DAP violate Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 November 25, 2014, 742 SCRA 1; Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Constitution insofar as (a) they treat the unreleased appropriations Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA
and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as 78; Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545
"savings" as the term is used in Section 25(5), in relation to the SCRA 441; Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) v. Romulo,
provisions of the General Apporopriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005, 449 SCRA 1; Bayan (Bagong
and 2013; (b) they authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572,
programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and 138587, 138680 & 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA
(c) they "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the 449; Integrated Bar the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284,
GAAs. (3) whether or not the DAP violates: (a) the Equal Protection August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81; Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
Clause; (b) the system of checks and balances; and (c) the principle 106971, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 789; Solicitor General v.
of public accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991,
that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of 204 SCRA 837; Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
legislators. Id. at 59-60. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750; Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
[90]
G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; Gonzales v.
321-333. The issues are: (1) whether the President may enter into an Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA
executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities 835. See also Padilla v. Congress, G.R. No. 231671, July 25,
under Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) 2017; Ocampo v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 190431, January 31, 2017, 816
whether the provisions under Enhanced Defense Cooperation SCRA 300; Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v.
Agreement are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016, 797 SCRA 134; Funa v.
existing laws and treaties (i.e., the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Manila Economic & Cultural Office, G.R. No. 193462; February 4,
Visiting Forces Agreement). Id. at 337. 2014, 715 SCRA 247; Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 191771, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 393; Guingona, Jr. v.
[91]G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017. The issue is whether or not under Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution , it is mandatory for the 448; Francisco, Jr. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, October 2, 2009, 602
Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the event that SCRA 50; Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410; Province North
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
thereof. Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), supra note 84; Lim v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739; Matibag
[92] 84 Phil. 368 (1949). v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49; Nazareno
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015, 755
28; and De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May SCRA 90, 107.
6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420.
[113]
See Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v.
[98] G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018; Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018; De Lima
[99] Id. at 170-171. v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017; Roy III v. Herbosa,
G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016, 810 SCRA 1, 93.
[100] Id. at 179.
[114]
See Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. v.
[101] G.R. No. L-37427, June 25, 1974, 57 SCRA 408. Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 230651, September 18,
2018; Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24,
[102] Id. at 412-413. Concurring Opinion of CJ Querube Makalintal. 2018; Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14,
2018; Bureau of Customs v. Gallegos, G.R. No. 220832 (Resolution),
[103] G.R. No. L-37790, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 139, 161. February 28, 2018.
[107] [118]
Bernas, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Id. at 766.
Commentary, 2005, Ed. p. 1192.
[108] G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415.
[119] Id.
[109] Id. at 423-424.
[120]
See Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April
[110]
Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 9(1) 25, 2017; Espina v. Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855, September 21,
and 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. 2010, 631 SCRA 17; Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA
[111]
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 746; Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,
2005, 455 SCRA 460, 472. G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408; Basco v. Phil.
Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14,
[112]
See Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
Development Co., G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018; Rama v. Moises,
[121] G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
G.R. No. 197146 (Resolution), August 8, 2017; Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and
[122]
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,
Development, supra note 56; Dynamic Builders & Construction Co.
1999, 301 SCRA 96, 111.
[123] Id. at 112. connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law
rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from
[124] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for its
[125]
A petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person issuance may be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with Jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, occurred or with the Court of Appeals or this Court. (Sections 1 and 2,
or of a private individual or entity. It may be filed with the Regional Trial Rule 8.)
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or
[128]
See Section 19 of The Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts, (Sections Data and Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
1 and 3.) Environmental Cases.
The fourth exception cited Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, [141] Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, supra note 135.
1994, 235 SCRA 135, which involves the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code, also a question of law. [142] G.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 644, 669-670.
The fifth exception did not cite any jurisprudential antecedent. [143] G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012, 673 SCRA 1, 238.
The sixth exception referred to Albano v. Arranz , G.R. No. L-19260, [144] G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482, 493-494.
January 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 386, where the sole issue is whether
respondent Judge Manuel Arranz committed grave abuse of discretion [145] Supra note 96.
[146] G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, 760 SCRA 652. [161]
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc.
(AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., G.R.
[147] Supra note 113. No. 207132 & 207205, Decembee 6, 2016, 812 SCRA 452, 499.
[150] Supra note 139 at 756-757. Our appellate jurisdiction in this case is limited to reviewing and
examining the errors of law incurred by the Court of Appeals, in
[151] Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, supra note 135 at 630. accordance with the provisions of Section 138, No. 6, of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3.
[152] Supra note 141 at 669.
xxxx
[153] Supra note 142 at 46.
Rule 47 (a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides, in respect
[154] Supra note 143 at 492. to cases brought to it in connection with its appellate jurisdiction,
that only questions of law may be raised therein and that the court
[155] Supra note 96 at 272. has the power to order motu proprio the dismissal thereof if in its
opinion they are without merit. Id. at 331. (Emphasis supplied.)
[156] Supra note 145 at 667.
[164]CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Sec. 497. Hearings Confined to
[157] Supra note 113. Matters of Law, With Certain Exceptions. - In hearings upon bills of
exception, in civil actions and special proceedings, the Supreme
[158] G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017, 814 SCRA 41. Court shall not review the evidence taken in the court below, nor
retry the questions of fact, except as in this section hereafter
[159] Id. at 66. provided; but shall determine only questions of law raised by the
bill of exceptions. But the Supreme Court may review the evidence
[160]
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, 829 SCRA taken in the court below, and affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment
1. See also Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, there rendered, as justice may require, in the following cases:
1989, 177 SCRA 668, where we looked into whether or not there exist
factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national 1. If assessors sat with the judge in the hearing in the court below, and
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. (Id. at 697) both the assessors were of the opinion that the findings of the facts
Albeit, we resolved the issue by merely considering the pleadings filed and judgment in the action are wrong and have certified in writing their
by the parties, their oral a rguments, and the facts revealed during the dissent therefrom, and their reasons for such dissent, the Supreme
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Court may in connection with the hearing on the bill of exceptions,
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and review the facts upon the evidence adduced in the court below, and
respondents were represented. shall give to the dissent aforesaid such weight as in the opinion of the
judges of the Supreme Court it is entitled to, and upon such review [168] REVISED RULES or COURT, Rule 30, Sec. 5 and Rule 5, Sec. 1.
shall render such judgment as is found just;
[169] G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2016, 618 SCRA 619.
2. If before the final determination ofan action pending in the Supreme
Court on bill of exceptions, new and material evidence be discovered [170] Id. at 627-88.
by either party, which could not have been discovered before the trial
in the court below, by the exercise of due diligence, and which is of [171] Id. at 627.
such a character as probably to change the result, the Supreme Comt
may receive and consider such new evidence, together with that [172]
Unites States v. Ling Su Fan, G.R. No 3962, 10 Phil. 104, 111
adduced on the trial below, and may grant or refuse a new trial, or (1908).
render sucl1 other judgment as ought, in view of the whole case, to be
rendered, upon such terms as it may deem just. The party seeking a [173] RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 1.
new trial, or a reversal of the judgment on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, may petition the Supreme Court for such new [174] G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991 , 204 SCRA 212.
trial, and shall attach to the petition affidavits showing the facts
entitling him to a new trial and the newly discovered evidence. Upon [175] Id. at 221.
the filing of such petition in the Supreme Court, the court shall, on
notice to both patties, make such order as to taking further testimony [176] People v. Cuaresma, supra note 107 at 424.
by each party, upon the petition, either orally in court, or by
depositions, upon notice, as it may deem just. The petition, with the [177] Id.
evidence, shall be heard at the same time as the bill of exceptions;
[178]
Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217
3. If the excepting party filed a motion in the Court of First Instance for SCRA 633, 652.
a new trial, upon the ground that the findings of fact were plainly and
manifestly against the weight of evidence, and the judge overruled [179]
The Judiciary Annual Report of 2016 to June 2017, p. 13. The US
said motion, and due exception was taken to his overruling the same, Supreme Court, in contrast, received 6,305 filings in its 2016 term,
the Supreme Court may review the evidence and make such findings heard only 71 cases in arguments, and disposed 68 cases in 61
upon the facts, and render such final judgment, as justice and equity signed opm1ons. (20 17 Year-end Report on the Federal Judiciary, p.
require. But, if the Supreme Court shall be of the opinion that this 13, accessed at <https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
exception is frivolous and not made in good faith, it may impose double end/2017year-endreport.pdf>) This to us shows the US Court's
or treble additional costs upon the excepting party, and may order impressie control over its case docket through a judicious use of its
them to be paid by the counsel prosecuting the bill of exceptions, if in discretionary authority. With particular application to cases invoking
its opinion justice so requires. (Emphasis supplied.) the US Court's original jurisdiction, it appears that the socalled
[165]
"appropriateness test" is being judiciously applied to sift through the
Supra note 161 at 423-424. cases filed before it. (See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990
[166]
(1988); California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027 (1981); Arizona v.
Aspacio v. Inciong, No. L-49893, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 180, New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976); Illinois v. City qf Milwaukee, 406
184. U.S. 91 (1972).
[167] CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Secs. 56 and 132.
[180]
Ret. Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, Judicial Review of support its claims. The nature of its various allegations requires the
Constitutional Questions (2004), p. 89, citing Ashwander v. presentation of evidence and inferences, which should, at first
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). instance, be done by a trial court.[1]
[181]
Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Monopolization should not be lightly infened especially since efficient
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 83 at 160. business organizations are rewarded by the market with growth. Due
to the high barriers to economic entry and long gestation periods, it is
[182] 297 U.S. 288 (1936). reasonable for the government to bundle infrastructure projects. There
is, indeed, a difference between abuse of dominant position in a
[183] Id. at 347-348. relevant market[2] and combinations in restraint of trade.[3] The Petition
seems to have confused these two (2) competition law concepts and
[184] Supra note 83. it has not made clear which concept it wished to apply.
[185]
Id. at 161-162. See also Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr. , supra note 89 at Further, broad allegations amounting to a generalization that certain
324-325. corporations allow themselves to serve as dummies for cartels or
foreigners cannot hold ground in this Court. These constitute criminal
[185]
Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: acts. The Constitution requires that judicial action proceed carefully
Time for a Change, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 616, 620 (1974), accessed on and always from a presumption of innocence. Tall tales of
March 7, 2019 at conspiratorial actions-though they may be salacious, make for
<https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vo159/iss4/3/.> interesting fiction, and are fodder for social media-do not deserve any
judicial action. Broad generalizations of facts without conesponding
[186]
See Vicente V. Mendoza, Proposed judicial revisions will weaken evidence border on the contemptuous.
judiciary, Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29, 2018, accessed on
January 28, 2019 at <https://opinion.inquirer.net/117068/proposed- Although the Constitution grants original and concurrent jurisdiction
judicial-revisions-will-weaken-judiciary.>. with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals over actions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, this Court generally does not receive evidence, and thus,
rarely makes findings of facts contested by the patties at first instance.
CONCURRING OPINION In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,[4] this Court
held:
LEONEN, J.:
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
I agree with the disposition of this case as proposed in the Decision created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs
written by Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza. To clarify the its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts
reasons for my vote, I add the following brief points. do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence
presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine
I issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute,
or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To
Indeed, the claims made by petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc. require a effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into
more contextual appreciation of the evidence that it may present to regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within
those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all- Reiterating these rules is important. A single instance when a ruling is
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are laid means mere ratio decidendi. Ratio decidendi, when repeated in
physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur several various compositions of this Court, endows it with the status
within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual of an evolving doctrine. When reiterated in a number of cases over the
case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such years, an evolving doctrine becomes canon. The ratio decidendi,
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. baring other factors, is strengthened with reiteration and
There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level reexamination of its rationale in subsequent cases.
would not be practical considering their decisions could still be
appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals. However, to be more precise, I propose that we clarify that even if the
issues raised are questions of law, this Court is not devoid of its
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that discretion to deny addressing the constitutional issues entirely.
reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It
is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the This means restating the difference between the concept of jurisdiction
review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also and justiciability in constitutional adjudication.
has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial
courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to II
determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that
may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to Jurisdiction is the competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a case."[9] It
determine. is a power that is granted by the Constitution and by law. [10] In
situations where several courts may exercise jurisdiction either
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new originally or on an appeal, the court that first seized of the issues holds
ground or further reiterating in the light of new circumstances or in the jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the rest.[11]
light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather
than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Jurisdiction, or the competence to proceed with the case, requires
Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in several elements. To determine jurisdiction, courts assess: (1) the
order that it truly performs that role.[5] (Citation omitted) remedy or the procedural vehicle for raising the issues; [12] (2) the
subject matter of the controversy;[13] (3) the issues as framed by the
This is true whether the remedy used is the original action for certiorari parties;[14] and (4) the processes served on the parties themselves vis-
or prohibition, regardless of whether this is brought under Rule 65 of a-vis the constitutional or law provisions that grant competence.[15]
the Rules of Court or the expanded power to examine if there has been
grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or Related to jurisdiction is our application of the doctrine of granting the
instrumentality,[6] as held in Araullo v. Aquino III,[7] among others. primary administrative jurisdiction, when statutorily wananted, to the
executive department.[16] This is different from the rule on exhaustion
Through the classic eloquence of the ponente, this case reiterates the of administrative remedies[17] or the doctrine of respect for the
doctrine that the finding of grave abuse of discretion made by this hierarchy of courts,[18] which are matters of justiciability, not
Court in its original jurisdiction is generally only over cases where the jurisdiction.
material facts are not contested. Further, this case highlights that
petitioners bear the burden of clearly and convincingly elaborating on Jurisdiction, once acquired, cam1ot be waived.[19]
why the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of courts may have been
apparently violated.[8]
Determining whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is and non-controversial facts of the case, this Court does not express
justiciable is an exercise of the power granted to a court with policy. This Court should channel democratic deliberation where it
jurisdiction over a case that involves constitutional adjudication. Thus, should take place.
even if this Court has jurisdiction, the canons of constitutional
adjudication in our jurisdiction allow us to disregard the questions When interpretations of a constitutional provision are equally valid but
raised at our discretion. lead to contrary results, this Court should exercise judicial restraint
and allow the political forces to shed light on a choice. This Court steps
The general rule with respect to justiciability is one of constitutional in only when it discerns clear fallacies in the application of certain
avoidance. That is, before we proceed with even considering how a norms or their interpretation. Judicial restraint requires that this Court
word or phrase in the Constitution is violated, we first examine whether does not involve itself into matters in which only those who join in
there is an actual case or controversy. The justiciability of a democratic political deliberation should participate. As magistrates of
controversy is often couched in four (4) elements: (1) that there is an the highest court, we should distinguish our role from that of an
actual case or controversy;[20] (2) that the party raising the issues ordinary citizen who can vote.
has locus standi;[21] (3) that the case is ripe for adjudication;[22] and (4)
that the constitutional issue is the very lis mota of the case.[23] Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious and
deliberate caution. This Court should refrain from speculating on the
The third element may be rephrased into two (2) queries. The court facts of a case and should allow parties to shape their case instead.
considers whether the case has already become moot, [24] or whether Likewise, this Court should avoid projecting hypothetical situations
the issues that call for constitutional interpretation are prematurely where none of the parties can fully argue simply because they have
raised.[25] not established the facts or are not interested in the issues raised by
the hypothetical situations.[30] In a way, courts are mandated to adopt
The doctrine of avoidance is palpable when we refuse to decide on an attitude of judicial skepticism. What we think may be happening
the constitutional issue by ruling that the parties have not exhausted may not at all be the case. Therefore, this Court should always await
administrative remedies,[26] or that they have violated the doctrine of the proper case to be properly pleaded and proved.
respect for the hierarchy of courts.[27] These are specific variants or
corollaries of the rule that the case should be ripe for constitutional Plainly put, majority opinions that rule on constitutional issues
adjudication. as obiter dictum is dangerous not only because it is injudicious, but
also because it undermines the constitutional framework of
The fourth element allows this Court to grant or deny the reliefs prayed governance.
for by any petitioner if there is a statutory or procedural rule that can
be applied to resolve the issues raised, rather than deal with the III
interpretation of a constitutional issue.[28]
Thus, I propose that we further tame the concept that a case's
Angara v. Electoral Commission[29] imbues these rules with its "transcendental importance"[31] creates exceptions to justiciability. The
libertarian character. Principally, Angara emphasized the liberal elements supported by the facts of an actual case, and the imperatives
deference to another constitutional department or organ given the of our role as the Supreme Court within a specific cultural or historic
majoritarian and representative character of the political deliberations context, must be made clear. They should be properly pleaded by the
in their forums. It is not merely a judicial stance dictated by courtesy, petitioner so that whether there is any transcendental importance to a
but is rooted on the very nature of this Court. Unless congealed in case is made an issue. That a case has transcendental importance,
constitutional or statutory text and imperatively called for by the actual as applied, may have been too ambiguous and subjective that it
undermines the structural relationship that this Court has with the Even as we recall the canonical doctrines that inform the structure of
sovereign people and other departments under the Constitution. Our our Constitution, we should never lose sight of the innovations that our
rules on jurisdiction and our interpretation of what is justiciable, refined fundamental law has introduced. We have envisioned a more engaged
with relevant cases, may be enough. citizenry and political forums that welcome formerly marginalized
communities and identities. Hence, we have encoded the concepts of
However, consistent with this opinion, we cannot wholly abandon the social justice, acknowledged social and human rights, and expanded
doctrinal application of cases with transcendental impmtance. [32] That the provisions in our Bill of Rights.
approach just does not apply in this case. Here, we have just
established that cases calling for questions of fact generally cannot be We should always be careful that in our desire to achieve judicial
cases from which we establish transcendental importance. Generally, efficiency, we do not filter cases that bring out these values.
we follow the doctrine of respect for hierarchy of courts for matters
within our concurrent original jurisdiction. This Court, therefore, has a duty to realize this vision. The more
guarded but active part of judicial review pertains to situations where
IV there may have been a deficit in democratic participation, especially
where the hegemony or patriarchy ensures the inability of discrete and
Critically, the nuances of the cases we find justiciable signal our insular minorities to participate fully. While this Court should presume
philosophy of adjudication. Even as we try to filter out and dispose of representation in the deliberative and political forums, it should not be
the cases pending in our docket, this Court's role is not simply to settle blind to present realities.
disputes. This Court also perfonns the important public function of
clarifying the values embedded in our legal order anchored on the Certainly, this case falls woefully short of these noble expectations.
Constitution, laws, and other issuances by competent authorities.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
As this Court finds ways to dispose of its cases, it should be sensitive
to the quality of the doctrines it emphasizes and the choice of cases
on which it decides. Both of these will facilitate the vibrant democracy
and achievement of social justice envisioned by our Constitution. [1]
See Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April
25, 2017, 824 SCRA 327, 404-405 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
Every case filed before this Court has the potential of undoing the act
of a majority in one (1) of the political and co-equal departments of our [2] Rep. Act No. 10667 (2015), ch. III, sec. 15.
government. Our Constitution allows that its congealed and just values
be used by a reasonable minority to convince this Court to undo the [3] CONST., art. XII, sec. 19.
majority's action. In doing so, this Court is required to make its reasons
precise, transparent, and responsive to the arguments pleaded by the [4] 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J . Leonen, En Banc].
parties. The trend, therefore, should be to clarify broad doctrines laid
down in the past. The concept of a case with transcendental [5] Id. at 329-330.
impmiance is one (1) of them.
[6] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.
Our democracy, after all, is a reasoned democracy: one with a
commitment not only to the majority's rule, but also to fundamental and [7] 737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
social rights.
[8]
See Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, 602 [19]
Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. Commissioner of
Phil. 342, 360 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Bagabuyo v. Internal Revenue, 706 Phil. 442, 450 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third
Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 678, 689 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Division].
Banc]; and Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and
Management, 502 Phil. 372, 384 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En [20]
The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v.
Banc]. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018,
[9]Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20
8, 2017, 18/july2018/202275.pdf> 24 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20
17/august2017/190004.pdf> 8 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc]. [21] Id.
[10] Id. [22] Id.
[11]
See Laquian v. Baltazar, 142 Phil. 531 (1970) [Per C.J. [23] Id.
Concepcion, Second Division].
[24]
Baldo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 607 Phil. 281 (2009) [Per J.
[12]
The City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
Phil. 473, 517 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[25]
See Corales v. Republic, 716 Phil. 432 (2013) [Per J. Perez, En
[13] Id. at 515. Banc].
[14]
Dy v. Yu, 763 Phil. 491, 518 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First [26]
Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017, 814 SCRA 41, 66
Division]. [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[15]
The City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 [27] Id. at 60.
Phil. 473, 516 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[28] See General v. Urro, 662 Phil. 132 (2011) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[16]
The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v.
Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, [29] 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
2018, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph
/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20 18/july20 18/202275.pdf> [30]
See The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v.
18 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018,
[17] Id. at 19. <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20
18/july2018/202275.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]; Republic v.
[18]
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, Roque, 718 Phil. 294 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc];
329-330 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]. and Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En
Banc].
[31]
See Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949) [Per J. Tuason,
En Banc] involving the Emergency Power Act. This Court took
cognizance of the cases in Araneta, saying for the first time that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure."
[32]See The Province of Batangas v. Hon. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806, 827
(2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]; Senator Jaworski v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 464 Phil. 375, 285 (2004) [Per
J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc]; and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals, Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 805 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En
Banc].