G.R. No. 182239. March 16, 2011.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

HERMIE M. JACINTO, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Rape; Witnesses; The credible, natural, and

convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused, more so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-
legal findings of the examining physician.—In the determination
of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider
the three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. Necessarily, the credible,

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient

to convict the accused. More so, when the testimony is supported
by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.
Same; Same; Same; Alibi; The defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the
crime, except when it is established that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime.—Further, the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime, except when it is established that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
Same; Same; Statutory Rape; Elements.—A man commits
rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12)
years of age even in the absence of any of the following
circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority.
Same; Same; Same; A victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering
that she could have a good look at him during the commission of
the crime.—The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts
of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are
now in dispute. The defense would want us to believe that it was
Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when
the crime was committed. We should not, however, overlook the
fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant,
especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she
could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.
AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and
AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the
situs criminus that it would be impossible for the child not to
recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to
the rice field.
Same; Alibi; For alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably
by disinterested witnesses.—For alibi to prosper, it is necessary
that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed
thuswise. Its witnesses

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People vs. Jacinto

cannot qualify as such, “they being related or were one way or

another linked to each other.”
Same; Same; The court must be convinced that it would be
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.—Time and
again, that the court must be convinced that it would be
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime. Physical
impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between
the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime
was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away
and could not have been physically present at the scene of the
crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.
Same; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (Republic Act
No. 9344); Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the retroactive
application of the law to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of said law, and who
were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense—with more reason, the law should apply where the
conviction by the lower court is still under review.—In the
determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals
correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3)
years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006. We recognize its
retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People
v. Sarcia, 599 SCRA 20 (2009): [Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]
allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years
at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason,
the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by
the lower court is still under review.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Discernment is that mental
capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act, which capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case.—Sec. 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the
child is found to have acted with

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discernment, in which case, “the appropriate proceedings” in

accordance with the Act shall be observed. We determine
discernment in this wise: Discernment is that mental capacity of a
minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
records in each case. x  x  x The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it
was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of
the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness. In the
present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: “(1)
choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to
prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim x x x, to weaken her
defense” are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s
mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his
unlawful action.
Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Minority; Penalties; While
under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a
minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.—In a more recent
case, the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita
J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified: Under Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death
is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
(Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, appellant should be meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Same; Same; Civil Liability; The fact that the offender was
still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on
the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her
family.—We have consistently ruled that: The litmus test x x x in
the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character
of the crime committed, which would have warranted the
imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is re-

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People vs. Jacinto

duced to reclusion perpetua. Likewise, the fact that the offender

was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim
and her family. The respective awards of civil indemnity and
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are, therefore,
proper. Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the
penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the
Court of Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of exemplary damages
should be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Same; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006; Statutory
Construction; Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who
has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence
to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.—Applying Declarador v. Gubaton, 499 SCRA 341
(2006), which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of
Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended,  the aforestated provision does not
apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Meanwhile, on 10
September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,
overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus: The xxx provision
makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by
the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule
provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to
a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a
minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another
who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also
not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of
sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found
guilty of a heinous crime. The legislative intent reflected in the
Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency

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People vs. Jacinto

Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of

this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the
provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law.
Same; Same; While the suspension of sentence lasts only until
the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years, to give meaning to the legislative intent of
the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the
law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when
he/she was still a child.—These developments notwithstanding,
we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer
apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the Rule
are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-
five (25) years old. Be that as it may, to give meaning to the
legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child
in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender
shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is
given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive
member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with
the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Thus,
appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other
training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

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596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 People vs. Jacinto

PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that
the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that
there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused
to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose
judgment of conviction has become final and executory only
after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of
suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still
be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and
reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as “An Act Establishing a Comprehensive
Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes.”
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of
the

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1 People v. Antivola, G.R. No. 139236, 3 February 2004, 421 SCRA 587,
598; People v. Nogar, G.R. No. 133946, 27 September 2000, 341 SCRA 206,
217.
2 People v. Trayco, G.R. No. 171313, 14 August 2009, 596 SCRA 233,
253; People v. Paraiso, G.R. No. 131823, 17 January 2001, 349 SCRA 335,
350-351.
3  To maintain the confidentiality of information on child abuse cases,
and consistent with the application in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No.
167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419) of: (1) the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) and its implementing rules;
(2) Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004) and its implementing rules; and (3) this Court’s
Resolution dated 19 October 2004 in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on
Violence against Women and Their Children),

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judgment of his conviction.4

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the

Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No.
1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00

o’clock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality
of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating
circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years old.”7

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8

During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the existence of the
following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing

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the real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other
information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including
those of her immediate family or household members are withheld.

4  Records, pp. 64-69. Decision dated 26 March 2004 of the Regional

Trial Court penned by Judge Ma. Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca; Id., at p. 77. Order
dated 6 April 2004 of the Regional Trial Court penned by Judge Penaco-
Sitaca; CA Rollo pp. 134-159. Decision dated 29 August 2007 penned by
Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Romulo V.
Borja and Mario V. Lopez concurring.
5 Records, p. 2.
6 The docket no. indicated in the covering of the trial court’s record of
the case and the majority of the Orders and other court processes,
including the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, is Criminal Case No. 1679-13-1411.
7 Records, p. 2. Information dated 20 March 2003.
8 Id., at p. 22. Order dated 15 July 2003.
9 Id., at p. 25. Pre-Trial Order dated 4 August 2003.

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People vs. Jacinto

that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter

entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon
presentation of the original or upon identification thereof
by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense
presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of
the story.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and

rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be summarized
in the following manner:
 FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were
born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of appellant lies
at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access
the road, appellant has to pass by FFF’s house, the
frequency of which the latter describes to be “every minute
[and] every hour.” Also, appellant often visits FFF because
they were close friends. He bore no grudge against
appellant prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls
him kuya. She sees him all the time—playing at the
basketball court near her house, fetching water, and
passing by her house on his way to the road. She and
appellant used to be friends until the incident.14
At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January
2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the
store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed
CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not
alarmed. He

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10 TSNs, 13 October 2003 and 18 February 2004.

11 TSN, 16 September 2003.
12 TSN, 1 March 2004.
13 TSN, 16 September 2003, pp. 5 and 12.
14 TSN, 13 October 2003, pp. 4-5.

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VOL. 645, MARCH 16, 2011 599

People vs. Jacinto

thought she was watching television at the house of her

aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the
evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the store, he
saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing
sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left
the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house
of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the
hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the “lower area
or place.”20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko
(sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held her hand
while on the road near the store.22 They walked towards
the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and
Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie
down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed
her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25
he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart,
pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull
movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27

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 15 TSN, 16 September 2003, pp. 2-3.
16 TSN, 1 March 2004, p. 2.
17 Id.
18 Id., at pp. 8-9.
19 Id., at p. 3.
20 Id.
In its decision, the trial court translated the testimony in the following
manner: “xxx leaving the store at the same time, he saw Hermie holding
the child by the hand and proceeding downward while he proceeded
upward to the house of Lita Lingkay to watch TV.” Records, p. 67.
Decision dated 26 March 2004.
21 TSN, 13 October 2003, p. 18.
22 Id., at pp. 7 and 14.
23 Id., at pp. 16 and 18.
24 Id., at pp. 6-7.
25 Id., at p. 16.
26 Id., at pp. 7-8.
27 Id., at p. 8.

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Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28

She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from
downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her face
greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing
from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury and
found on her neck a contusion that was already turning
black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw white
substance and mud on her vagina.35 AAA told him that
appellant brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at
the back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away
her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and
boxed her breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the
Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the
Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did to AAA.41
Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the
store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to
check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45

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28 Id.
29 Id., at p. 9.
30 TSN, 16 September 2003, p. 4.
31 Id.
32 Id., at p. 6.
33 Id., at p. 4.
34 Id., at p. 6.
 35 Id., at pp. 4 and 6.
36 Id., at p. 15.
37 Id., at pp. 4 and 15.
38 Id.
39 Id., at p. 5.
40 Id., at p. 6.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id., at p. 7.
45 Id., at p. 17.

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People vs. Jacinto

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date,

Julito was still watching television at the house of Rita.46
AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48
Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened
to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her.49
Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito
asked appellant, “Bads, did you really rape the child, the
daughter of [MMM]?” but the latter ignored his question.51
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen
were coming to which the appellant responded, “Wait a
minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and
my knees.”52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of
appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the
police station to have the incident blottered.54 FFF also had
AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health
center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health
Physician, issued a medical certificate56 dated 29 January
2003. It reads:

Injuries seen are as follows:

1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area

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46 TSN, 1 March 2004, pp. 10-11.

47 Id., at p. 10.
48 Id., at p. 3.
49 Id.
50 Id., at p. 4.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id., at p. 5.
 54 TSN, 16 September 2003, p. 7.
55 Id., at pp. 7-8.
56 Records, p. 9. Medico-legal Certificate issued on 29 January 2003 by
the Municipal Health Office.

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People vs. Jacinto

6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-
like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position
Impression
       MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS

Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA

submitted herself to another examination at the provincial
hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B.
Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital,
attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated
29 January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:

P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar

findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of
examination. (sic)59

Evidence for the Defense

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a

different version of the story. To corroborate his testimony,
Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the
witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the
time of the commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went
further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant,
pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition, Antonia Perocho
[Antonia], sister-in-law of

_______________

57 Id.
58 Id., at p. 12. Medico Legal Certificate issued on 29 January 2003 by
the provincial hospital.
59 Id.
60 TSN, 8 January 2004, p. 9; TSN, 9 February 2004, pp. 3-4.
61 Id., at p. 8.

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People vs. Jacinto
appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito
after the rape incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with
his parents whose house stands at the back of FFF’s
house.64 He denied that there was a need to pass by the
house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water.65
He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for
FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy something from
the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003,
appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party.
At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including
appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro],
were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s
uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the
store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able
to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the
time because he had a watch .68
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house,
confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday
party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the
evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She
recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes
later. She also observed that appellant’s white shorts and
white sleeveless shirt were clean.69

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62 TSN, 22 March 2004, p. 5.

63 Id., at p. 3.
64 TSN, 2 February 2004, p. 7.
65 Id., at p. 8.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id., at pp. 2-4.
69 TSN, 9 February 2004, pp. 3-4.

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At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the

party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his
uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out
to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next
to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she
saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black
T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered and she was
wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it
was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the
kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes
later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running
towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following
behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house,
Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to
her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She
witnessed the punching incident and testified that
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF
tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and
left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed
appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant.
Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member
admonished FFF.83 

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70 TSN, 8 January 2004, p. 7.

71 Id., at pp. 6 and 9.
72 Id., at p. 7.
73 Id., at p. 8.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id., at p. 9.
77 Id., at p. 11.
78 Id., at p. 10.
79 Id.
80 Id., at p. 9.
81 Id., at p. 10.
82 Id., at p. 11.
83 Id., at pp. 11-12.

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People vs. Jacinto

On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in

the evening, she was watching the television along with
other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who
was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a
shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly
embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not
answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and
went out of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the
evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a
bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but
returned at around 8 o’clock in the evening. This time, he
boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered
its decision,86 the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl,
the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA]
P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
With costs.”87

The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly

discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently
born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17)
years old when the crime was committed on 28 January
2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and
reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89
Thus:

_______________

84 TSN, 22 March 2004, pp. 2-4.

85 TSN, 2 February 2004, p. 5.
86 Records, pp. 64-69.
87 Id., at p. 69.
88  Id., at pp. 71-72. Motion to Re-open Trial for Reception of Newly
Discovered Evidence of Minority on the Part of the Accused dated 1 April
2004.
89 Id., at p. 77. Order dated 6 April 2004.

606

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

“WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death

penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty
impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. x x x”

Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the

Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling in
People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

“x x x that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate

penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto
is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.”91

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due

course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal.92 This Court
required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they
have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any
supplement.94

_______________

90  CA Rollo, pp. 32-33. Resolution of the Supreme Court Third

Division, 8 September 2004, G.R. No. 163715.
91 CA Rollo, p. 158. Decision dated 29 August 2007.
92 Id., at p. 169. Resolution of the Court of Appeals 22nd Division, 19
November 2007, CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213.
93 Rollo, p. 36. Resolution of the Supreme Court 2nd Division, 25 June
2008, G.R. No. 182239.
94 Id., at pp. 37-40. Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) of
the Accused-Appellant dated 12 August 2008; Id. at 41-44.

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People vs. Jacinto

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that

“THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE”95
by invoking the principle that “if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the
evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will
not suffice to support a conviction.”96

Our Ruling

We sustain the judgment of conviction.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a
person accused of rape, we consider the three well-
entrenched principles:

“(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult

to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in
which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.”97

_______________

  Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) of the People of the

Philippines dated 22 August 2008.
95  CA Rollo, p. 92. Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated 25 January
2006.
96 Id., at p. 95 citing People v. Lagramada, G.R. Nos. 146357 & 148170,
29 August 2002.
 97 People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 188106, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA
807, 814 citing People v. Glivano, G.R. No. 177565, 28 January 2008, 542
SCRA 656, 662 further citing People v. Malones, 425 SCRA 318, 329
(2004).

608

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing

testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused.98 More so, when the testimony is supported by the
medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the
crime,100 except when it is established that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the
locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a

child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of
any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat
or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.102
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain.
The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion
of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA
and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently
proved such fact.
AAA testified:

_______________

98  People v. Cadap, G. R. No. 190633, 5 July 2010, 623 SCRA 655 citing People v. Corpuz,

G.R. No. 168101, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 435, 444.

99  People v. Leonardo, G.R. No. 181036, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 166; People v. Alcazar, G.R.

No. 186494, 15 September 2010, 630 SCRA 622.

100 People v. Antivola, supra note 1; People v. Nogar, supra note 1.

101 People v. Trayco, supra note 2.

102 Art. 266-A paragraph 1(d), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 2 of The Anti-Rape

Law of 1997.

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People vs. Jacinto

PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and
boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
 Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs
positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.103

The straightforward and consistent answers to the

questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to
test that AAA well understood the information elicited
from her, said it all—she had been raped. When a woman,
more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is
essential to show that

_______________

103 TSN, 13 October 2003, pp. 7-8.

610

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and

immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.105
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr.
Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5
o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by
the penetration of an object; that the redness of the
introitus could have been “the result of the repeated
battering of the object;” and that such object could have
been an erect male organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the
physician’s finding of penetration conclusively established
the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108

II

The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of

the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime
are now in dispute.
 The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito
who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when
the crime was committed.109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim
of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when
he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have
a good look at him during the commission of the crime.110
AAA had

_______________

104  People v. Amatorio, G.R. No. 175837, 8 August 2010, 627 SCRA
292.
105 People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA
435, 448.
106 TSN, 8 January 2004, pp. 2-4,
107 Id., at p. 3.
108 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 186533, 9 August 2010, 627 SCRA 452
citing People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 325-326; 425 SCRA 318, 335
(2004).
109 CA Rollo, p. 93. Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated 25 January
2006.
110 People v. Antivola, supra note 1 at pp. 597-598.

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People vs. Jacinto

known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA

even walked together from the road near the store to the
situs criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child
not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all
the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

“The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so

young, that it was accused, whom she called “kuya” and who used
to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was
wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her,
was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute
the crime to someone else—one Julito Apiki, but the child, on
rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it
was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who
molested her.”112

In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled

that the determination by the trial court of the credibility
of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect
considering that it has “the opportunity to observe the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances,
calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their
oath,”113 unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been “ignored, overlooked,
114
misconstrued, or misinterpreted.”
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:

“x  x  x His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the
track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise
in

_______________

111 TSN, 13 October 2003, pp. 7 and 14-16.

112 Records, p. 68. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 26 March 2004.
113 People v. Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, 15 December 2010 638 SCRA 576 citing
People v. Fernandez, 426 Phil. 169, 173; 375 SCRA 476, 480 (2002).
114 People v. Ayade, G.R. No. 188561, 15 January 2010, 610 SCRA 246, 253.

612

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused

and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted
that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit,
asked him “What is this incident, Pare?”, thus corroborating the
latter’s testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the
incident from the child.”115

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant

that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi
weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their
respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of
the appellant’s very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro
Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he
gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been
drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt
Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination,
she revealed that her husband was not around before,
during, and after the rape incident because he was then at
work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their
house for the second time and boxed appellant.117 It was
actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked
appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session
started only after the appellant’s errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to
deserve consideration.

_______________

115 Records, p. 68. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 26 March

2004.
116 TSN, 9 February 2004, p. 8.
117 Id., at pp. 6 and 8.
 118 Id., at p. 7.
119 Id., at pp. 7-8.

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VOL. 645, MARCH 16, 2011 613

People vs. Jacinto

Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro

joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s
statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of
sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled
that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s
claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house
of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified
to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by
Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a
sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito
wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white),
and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA
walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after she
returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia
recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In
this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order.
Thus:

“x  x  x. The child declared that after being raped, she went
straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped
her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry
among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan
would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the
house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it
was only later, after she had been brought there by her mother
Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her—just as
Julito Apiki said.”120

Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the

corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed
thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, “they being
related or were one way or another linked to each other.”121

_______________

120  Records, pp. 68-69. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 26
March 2004.
121 People v. Antivola, supra note 1.

614

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto
 Even assuming for the sake of argument that we
consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the
defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be
convinced that it would be physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of
the commission of the crime.122
“Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility
of access between the situs criminis and the location of the
accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.”123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand
meters from the place of the commission of the crime was
considered not physically impossible to reach in less than
an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the
accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this
Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness
attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to
gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She
could have merely presumed that the accused slept all
throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and
friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in
their company at the time of the commission of the crime
were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following
manner:

_______________

122 People v. Paraiso, supra note 2.

123 People v. Trayco, supra note 2 at p. 253 citing People v. Limio, G.R.
Nos. 148804-06, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 597.
124 Supra note 2.
125 People v. Trayco, supra note 2 at p. 351 citing People v. Arlee, G.R.
No. 113518, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 201; People vs. Cañete, 287 SCRA
490 (1998); People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997).
126 Id.
127 People v. Antivola, supra note 1.

615

VOL. 645, MARCH 16, 2011 615

People vs. Jacinto

“Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and

Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and co-worker, in
unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the
fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an
established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape
occurred, was a stone’s throw away from the fishpond.
Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the
entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was
impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for
almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much
occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being
harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters
away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire
attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not
farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out
unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim,
brought her inside his house and ravished her, then
returned to the fishpond as if he never left.”128 (Emphasis
supplied.)

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense

witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from
the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary
human experience. Moreover, considering that the
farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the
house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few
minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to
the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the
crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
appellant could have committed the rape after buying the
bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle’s
house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his
corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was
within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.130

_______________

128 Id., at pp. 598-599.

129 CA Rollo, p. 148.
130 Id., at p. 149.

616

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically

impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place
of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has
sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.

III

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court

of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the
commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the
rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131

“[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive

application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission
of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still
under review.”133 (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from

_______________

131 G.R. No. 169641, 10 September 2009, 599 SCRA 20.

132  Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Servicing
Sentence.—Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act.
xxx
133 People v. Sarcia, supra note 131 at p. 48.

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VOL. 645, MARCH 16, 2011 617

People vs. Jacinto

criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted

with discernment, in which case, “the appropriate
proceedings” in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.134
We determine discernment in this wise:

“Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully

appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
records in each case.136
x x x The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor’s cunning and shrewdness.”138

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals

that: “(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate
the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim
x  x  x, to weaken her defense” are indicative of then
seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action.139

_______________

134 SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.—x x x

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
xxxx
135  Madali v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180380, 4 August
2009, 595 SCRA 274, 296 citing the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law
136 Id., at pp. 296-297.
137 Remiendo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184874, 9 October
2009, 603 SCRA 274, 289.
138  Id. citing Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, 26 April 2006, 488
SCRA 376.
139 CA Rollo, p. 151.

618

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty

should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born
on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5)
years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003,
the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is
committed against a child below seven (7) years old141
applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the
penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the
penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing
the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law,
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals
excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided
in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in
its appreciation

_______________

140 Records, pp. 73-74. Certificate of Live Birth and Certification from

the Municipal Office of the Civil Registrar issued on 30 March 2004.
141 Paragraph 6, sub-paragraph 5, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
142 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines).
143  ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen
years of age.—When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his
case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last
of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. x x x
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen yeras of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period.
144 G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006, 506 SCRA 168.
 145 Id., at p. 215.
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

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VOL. 645, MARCH 16, 2011 619

People vs. Jacinto

of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of

appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion
perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the
Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender

is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of mino- 

_______________

ART. 71. Graduated scales.—In the cases in which the law prescribes
a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in article 61 shall be observed in graduating
such penalty.
xxxx
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor,
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
xxxx
146 CA Rollo, p. 154.
147 People v. Sarcia, supra note 131.

620

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto
rity, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of

reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:

“The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity

is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would
have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.”149

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at

the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the
gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her
family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are,
therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively
lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages
awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152
the amount of exemplary damages should be increased
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration;
Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the
Period of Suspension of Sentence

_______________

148 Id., at p. 41.
149 Id., at p. 45.
150 Id., at p. 43.
151 Id., at p. 46.
152 Id. citing People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, 31 March 2009, 582
SCRA 738.

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People vs. Jacinto

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of

sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding
that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the
judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:

“SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.—Once the child

who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of
the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x”

Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was

promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held
that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended,154  the aforestated provision does not
apply to one

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153 G.R. No. 159208, 18 August 2006, 499 SCRA 341.

154  Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful
Offender.—If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the
court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts
charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of
pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the
youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well
as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further
proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training
institution operated by the government or any other responsible person
until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter period
as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
or the

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622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death,

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court
promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the
ruling in Gubaton. Thus:

“The x  x  x provision makes no distinction as to the nature of

the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike
P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and
Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle
of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital
offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence

_______________

government training institution or responsible person under whose care he has

been committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his
sentence, the court may require the Department of Social Welfare and
Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the
offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or
government training institution as the court may designate subject to such
conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has
once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is
convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to
one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals. (Emphasis
supplied.)
155 CA Rollo, pp. 155-156.
156 People v. Sarcia, supra note 131.

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People vs. Jacinto

to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.”157

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate

deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further
strengthened the new position of this Court to cover
heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

“If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is

charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense,
and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of
Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s]
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through
a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be
the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x  x  x”
(Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated

the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law,
which reflected the same position.160
_______________

157 Id., at pp. 49-50.

158 Id., at p. 50 citing Senate Bill No. 1402 on Second Reading by the
13th Congress, 2nd Regular Session, No. 35, held on 9 November 2005,
amendments by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago.
159 Id.
160  Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition
Orders.—If the child is found guilty of the offense charged, the court,
instead of executing the judgment of conviction, shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Suspension of sentence can be availed of even if the child is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above twenty-one (21)
years old, at the time of the pronouncement of guilt,

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624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the

benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to
appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and
Section 48163 of the

_______________

without prejudice to the child’s availing of other benefits such as

probation, if qualified, or adjustment of penalty, in the interest of justice.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a child in

conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, but
shall nonetheless apply to one who is convicted of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment pursuant
to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and
after application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. (Emphasis supplied.)
161 People v. Sarcia, supra note 131at p. 50.
162 Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.—
x x x
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis supplied.)
163  Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition
Orders.—
x x x x
If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No.
9344, or to extend the suspended sentence for a maximum period
of up to the time the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age, or
to order service of sentence. (Emphasis supplied.)

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People vs. Jacinto

Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is

now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative
intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child.
The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act
in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life
and become a productive member of the community. The
age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material.
What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp
or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.164

“Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural

Camps and Other Training Facilities.—A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities
that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.”

Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall

be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s
confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training
facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding
appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of

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164 People v. Sarcia, supra note 131 at p. 51.

165 Id., at p. 52.

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626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Jacinto
 qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2)
appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance
with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.

Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De

Castro and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

Note.—A categorical and positive identification of an

accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi
and denial. (People vs. Bon, 506 SCRA 168 [2006])
By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old;
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect. (Ortega vs. People, 562 SCRA 450 [2008])
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