Partition and Dalit Politics in Bengal: The Figure of Jogendra Nath Mandal

Anwesha Sengupta

(Assistant Professor, Institute of Development Studies Kolkata)

[This is published in Debjani Sengupta, Rakshanda Jalil and Tarun Saint (eds), Looking

Back: The 1947 Partition of India, Seventy Years On, Orient Blackswan, 2017]

Introduction

This paper studies the complex nature of Dalit politics in Bengal during the times

of partition. It focuses on Jogendra Nath Mandal, a very popular Dalit leader from

Barishal (now in Bangladesh) who was also an ally of the Muslim League. 1 Through a

study of Mandal’s political career, the essay reflects on the nature and scope of caste

politics in Bengal in late 1940s and ’50s and consequently complicates our understanding

of ‘partitioned times.’2

Mandal was the leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF), a party that had

been in alliance with the Muslim League in undivided Bengal. When Bengal was

partitioned between India and Pakistan, SCF remained with the League. Mandal joined

the Pakistan cabinet as the first Law and Labour Minister. His stint was brief as he

resigned and migrated to Calcutta in October, 1950. Thereafter, he attempted to organize

the low caste refugees in West Bengal in demand for better relief and rehabilitation from

the government. However, neither as a minority minister in Pakistan nor as a refugee

leader in West Bengal, Mandal was successful. One may say that partition destroyed his

hitherto brilliant political career. Caste as the basis of political mobilization became
somewhat marginal at this juncture. But it remained relevant otherwise, particularly as a

governmental category in both East and West Bengal. The essay will focus on these

points to understand the changing nature of caste politics and the role of Jogendra Nath in

it.

Jogendra Nath in Pakistan

Jogendra Nath chaired the inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He

was handpicked by Jinnah for this occasion. 3 This was a well calculated step. Jinnah had

repeatedly claimed that once Pakistan was achieved, everyone would be treated equally

in his country, irrespective of caste, creed and religion. Choosing Mandal as the chair for

the inaugural session was definitely an attempt to show that Jinnah and his government

were eager to practice what they were saying.

As mentioned earlier, Mandal was the first Labour and Law Minister of the Pakistan

Cabinet. He was important to Pakistani politics for a number of reasons. First, it would

mean that even if Pakistan was an Islamic State, it was a liberal, democratic and modern

nation. The League had always criticized the Congress as a party of caste Hindus.

Mandal’s politics corroborated this position. Among the Hindus who had stayed put in

West and East Pakistan, Scheduled Castes were the majority. Having Mandal in the

cabinet was also a gesture to win their confidence.

celebrations across Pakistan on June 19, 1949. ‘Mandal Day’ was announced to mark

Jogendra Nath’s 43rd birthday that had already happened in January. Nonetheless, the

belated celebration was full of festivities. A ‘Mandal Day Celebration Committee’ was

formed to organize the event. Celebration began with morning prayers in various

scheduled caste localities of Karachi where people prayed for his long life. In the

evening, Mandal was given a grand reception at famous Khaliqdina Hall of Karachi.

Cabinet ministers, ministers of Sindh, important bureaucrats, ambassadors of various

countries and a few prominent caste Hindu individuals who were still in Karachi, were

invited. This was followed by a tea party at a hotel, attended by Mandal and several

central ministers and all the state ministers of Sindh. At a huge hall, tea was served to a

few women and children of the local Dalit communities also. At night, scheduled caste

localities were decorated with colourful dia, bulbs and festive illuminations. 4 ‘Mandal

Day’ was also observed in Dhaka where the function was attended by prominent League

leaders like Nurul Amin and Choudhury Khaliquzzaman. Nurul Amin mentioned that the

high position occupied by Mr. Mandal was “a proof of the kindly intentions the Quaid –

e-Azam had towards the Scheduled Castes Community.”5

The alliance between the Pakistan government and Jogendra Nath, however, did not last

long. From the beginning, there had been minor tiffs between Mandal and the League on

various issues, particularly regarding the inclusion of a Scheduled Caste minister in the

East Bengal cabinet.6 Once Mandal had even warned the East Pakistan government that

“he might have to ‘revise his policy’ and come to some understanding with the caste
Hindus in the Congress Party, much as he distrusted them”, if a minister was not

appointed from his party within a month or so.7 But these bargains and threats had not

signaled any major trouble prior to the February Riots of 1950. 8 Communal disturbances

began towards the end of 1949, when in Kalshira village of Khulna district (East

Pakistan) a house belonging to a Namasudra family was raided and the residents were

tortured by the police, for giving shelter to some Communist Party members. 9 Troubles

soon spread over almost the entire province of East Pakistan and also over eastern India.10

Jogendra Nath was deeply disturbed by this incident. Letters reached him with vivid

descriptions of assaults on the scheduled caste communities. Mandal wrote to Liaquat Ali

Khan that “widespread oppression and persecution is carried on the Scheduled Caste

people irrespective of their fault or guilt.”11 He warned that these atrocities “will only

lead to mass exodus of the Scheduled Caste people and creation of a feeling that they are

not entitled to get protection of law in Pakistan”12 The communal situation, however,

deteriorated even further in February, 1950. The politics of Mandal, based on Muslim –

Scheduled Castes solidarity, began to look irrelevant now. Jogendra Nath no longer

insisted that his followers stay put in East Pakistan. According to a report published in the

Anandabazaar Patrika, Mandal apparently wept like a child while describing the

communal situation in Bakarganj to the media.13

Mandal’s activities during the riots and his criticism of the authorities did not go well

with the government. Mandal was now an embarrassment for them. Not surprisingly,

therefore, Mandal’s recommendations were completely ignored when in accordance with

appointed as the minority minister of East Pakistan. The new minister, Dwarakanath

Barori, though a member of SCF, was not a Mandal loyalist. Mandal had earlier

commented that Barori “represented nobody but himself as a Minister” and that

“educationally and intellectually he [Barori] was absolutely unfit to become a minister”. 15

On October 15, 1950, Jogendra Nath formally resigned from the cabinet, accusing the

Pakistan government of communalism and anti-scheduled caste policies. 16 His personal

issues with Barori, who was now a close ally of the League High Command, also pushed

him towards resignation. Barori himself gave a five page long statement where he

described Mandal’s resignation letter as one of the “greedy refugees’ tale of miseries and

misfortunes invented for the purpose of liberal relief.”17

Maintaining a Separate Scheduled Caste Identity: The Caste Politics of the Muslim

League

For a moment let us look beyond Jogendra Nath to understand League’s attitude towards

the Dalit population of Pakistan. They were eager to constitutionally maintain a separate

Scheduled Caste identity as opposed to a common Hindu identity. This was evident from

various debates in the Constituent Assembly and Legislative Assemblies of Pakistan. I

will discuss two such debates briefly: a) debate around declaring the practice of

‘untouchability’ as a punishable offence, and b) debate around separate electorate for

scheduled castes in Pakistan.

‘untouchability’ be declared as a punishable offence in Pakistan, the League was

unwilling to support such a measure.18 The Muslim League representative from East

Bengal, Maulana Akram Khan, argued in the assembly that though ‘untouchability’ was a

sin but to ban it would mean an interference in matters of Hindu customs and society.

Nurul Amin argued that Hindus themselves by their behaviour made this distinction

between Scheduled Castes and Caste Hindus, and those who were speaking in favour of

abolishing ‘untouchability’ would probably not speak in the same way before an

exclusively Hindu audience. He added that the Muslims could never think of

‘untouchability’. Amin further mentioned that these members should try to eradicate

‘untouchability’ by setting up examples through their own behaviour in daily life without

the help of legislation. The League leaders, though theoretically opposed to

‘untouchability’, were not ready to assure constitutional safeguards against it. Finally, it

was decided that if the Hindu members of the House were unanimous on this,

‘untouchability’ would be declared as illegal. Thus the practice of ‘untouchability’

became a punishable offence.

Similarly, the Pakistan Congress and the League had long drawn conflict over the nature

of the electorate. The League supported separate electorate for the Scheduled Castes. The

Congress, like always, pushed for joint electorate. In the Constituent Assembly of

Pakistan on 12 March, 1949, Srischandra Chattopadhyay said that the Congress would

fight against the idea of separate electorates because “people of Pakistan, Muslims and

non-Muslims, consist of one nation and they are all Pakistanis.” 19 The issue was fiercely
debated in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in April, 1952 when the existing

electoral law was amended to provide a separate electorate for the Scheduled Castes.

Congress saw this as an attempt towards the ‘vivisection’ of the Hindu community. The

strong opposition from the Congress and majority of the Hindu members in the

Constituent Assembly on the electorate issue finally produced a compromise formula in

the form of Article 145, which declared that an Act on the electorate issue would be

formulated after ascertaining the views of the provincial assemblies. 20 Finally, when

Suhrawardy was the Prime Minister of Pakistan, a compromise bill was proposed that

provided joint electorate in East Pakistan and a separate electorate in West Pakistan. This

bill was introduced in the assembly on October 10, 1956 and was passed.21

Mandal’s resignation might have shaped such ‘divide and rule’ policy of the League

Government. The 1950 riot, which perhaps was the primary reason for Mandal’s

resignation, did not make any distinction along the caste lines, resulting into the first

massive migration of the Dalits from East Pakistan since partition. The riot also

delegitimized the long standing alliance between the League and a section of Scheduled

caste leadership. In such a context, reemphasizing on the fault lines within the Hindu

community was important for the League government. Moreover, one needs to keep in

mind the ongoing language controversy in East Pakistan while studying the minority

politics of this time. Many among the Urdu speaking ruling elite of Pakistan perceived

Bengali/Bangla as a Hindu language and the Hindu bhadraloks as the major trouble

makers in this Urdu-Bangla conflict. In this context, keeping Dalit Hindus (who were still
more numerous) separated from the upper castes, constitutionally and otherwise, was a

possible way to keep the opposition in check.

Jogendra Nath in West Bengal

Let us now go back to Jogendra Nath to understand the scope of Dalit politics in post-

partition West Bengal. Mandal’s resignation and migration to India did not win him the

confidence of the Congress Party. “Mr. Mandal’s past record is so unsavoury from India’s

point of view that it is hardly possible for us to accept him or his statement as completely

bona fide,” commented Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.22 Nehru also pointed out that

“throughout the gravest crises, including the holocaust in August and September 1947,

Mr. Mandal continued to serve Pakistan.”23

In West Bengal, Jogendra Nath dabbled with the refugee politics and, in particular,

attempted to organize the Namasudra refugees staying in various camps. But his attempt

to “reinvent his political leadership as a refugee leader” 24 was only marginally successful.

As Sekhar Bandyopadhyay and Anasua Basu Roy Chowdhury write, “Mandal’s

leadership of the refugee movement [did not] help him launch a new political career in

West Bengal. He failed to win a single elected office and died on 5 October 1968 while

conducting an election campaign.”25 Mandal’s failure shows that caste had lost its

political significance to most of the refugees in West Bengal. Secret reports of the

Intelligence Bureau on the political activities of the refugees staying at the Sealdah

Station too show how Mandal was losing ground among the refugees. One such report
briefs about the political activities of the refugees on February 6, 1958, when a protest

rally had been scheduled in Calcutta:

…. At about 11.30 hrs Shri Dhirendra Bhowmik (Praja Socialist Party)

accompanied by …Shri Jogendra Nath Mandal, (Ex-Pak Minister) again visited

Sealdah …to arrange for the proposed procession of the refugees of the place. It

was secretly learnt that during talks with the refugees Shri Jogendra Nath Mandal

expressed that the partition of Bengal was caused due to the fault of the caste

Hindus whereas the sufferance due to such partition goes to scheduled castes

people. At this the majority of the refugees of the place were annoyed and also

protested against such remarks of Shri Mandal and asked him not to entrain such

sort of feelings among the refugees of the place and thereby denouncing their unity

and they also decided not to participate in the rally of the refugees as requested by

Mr. Mandal. However Mr. Mandal and Mr. Bhowmik continued to exert their

efforts to persuade the refugees to attend the rally...

Ultimately having failed to persuade the refugees of Sealdah R.S….both Shri

Dhirendra Bhowmik and Shri Jogendra Nath Mandal left Sealdah RS at about

14.15 hrs after talking for a minute or two with Shri Bhajan Haldar, Madhu Sudan

Biswas….

Since about 15.15 hrs said Shri Bhajan Haldar and Shri Madhu Sudan Biswas were

not found at Sealdah RS. Subsequently it was learnt that about 5/6 refugees of the

place including Shri Bhajan Haldar and Shri Madhu Sudan Biswas, a man of Shri

Mandal’s community, being specially requested by Shri Jogendra Nath Mandal at

rally at Raja Subodh M. Square.

…At about 18.50 hrs Shrimati Sudha Roy (BPI) and Shri Chitto Nath (UCRC) had

visited Sealdah Railway Station and asked the refugees to join the proposed

meeting at Raja Subodh M. Square on 9.2.58 at 16.00 hrs in large numbers. It was

learnt that they condemned the above stated remarks of Shri Jogendra Nath Mandal

against the caste Hindus and supported the refugees of Sealdah R.S. They advised

them to be united and not to lend their ears to such remarks of Shri Jogendra Nath

Mandal.26

The above extract indicates that caste was losing relevance, at least for the time being, in

the refugee politics of West Bengal. However, ‘caste’ as a category was still important in

case of various rehabilitation policies of the government, especially in the scheme of

‘dispersal’. Under this scheme, Bengali Hindu refugees were sent to scarcely populated

areas within and outside West Bengal from congested zones like Calcutta. The purpose

was to reduce the demographic pressure on certain areas and to provide cheap labour in

the under developed, thinly populated regions like the Andaman Islands and

Dandakaranya. Those who were dispersed were mostly Dalit refugees from East Pakistan.

Though the government did not have a stated policy of keeping the upper castes in

Calcutta and driving the Dalits away, in practice that was effectively the case. The fact

that, even in face of this ‘divide-and-send’ policy, the refugees tried to present a united

opposition shows that perhaps Mandal’s mode of politics was a thing of the past. As caste

became marginal in popular politics, new alliances were forged in terms of class under
the Left opposition in West Bengal. But this did not mean an obliteration of caste-based

practices. Far from that—the schism in the society and the refugee population in

particular often got reframed in terms of colony-residents and camp-dwellers.

Manoranjan Byapari, a Dalit refugee, wrote in his autobiography,

Among the refugees from East Bengal, there were two classes. The educated,

well-to-do, upper caste bhadraloks among them had good connections with the

influential people of this country. They despised the low caste subaltern camp

residents. They utilized their connections and occupied plots in and around

Calcutta. I have read that there are 149 such colonies. No poor, low caste,

illiterate person got a place here in these colonies…The camp refugees had no

leader…no one remembered them. Suddenly the government woke up from its

slumber and decided to rehabilitate us. Where? In Dandakaranya.27

Conclusion:

In this short piece, I have tried to understand the scope of caste politics in East and West

Bengal (and also in Pakistan in general) in the aftermath of partition. On one hand, by

focusing on Jogendra Nath Mandal’s political career, I have tried to understand the scope

of Dalit mobilization in partitioned Bengal; on the other, by briefly discussing various

policies I have attempted to show the eagerness of the government to keep the Dalits and

the upper castes segregated. Mandal (or any other leader) was not very successful in

making caste crucial in Bengal politics after 1947. Bandyopadhyay and Basu Ray

Chaudhury have argued that partition disintegrated the Namasudra community and
weakened their capacity to mobilize politically.28 Indeed, partition had deep impact on the

Namasudras. Some of them stayed put in East Pakistan, rest migrated to West Bengal and

then were resettled in various parts of the province, and also in areas like Andaman,

Bihar, Orissa and Dandakaranya. Moreover, new binaries were becoming important in the

postcolonial times. Competing trends of mass mobilization could be identified where

Hindu-Muslim, Bengali- Non-Bengali (in East Pakistan), and mobilization along class

lines became important. However, caste remained important to the governments: either

for the ‘developmental’ needs of Nehruvian India or to keep the primarily Non-Muslim

opposition in East Pakistan divided in times of troubles over state language.

Consequently, caste as an identity remained crucial to the Dalits in shaping their

experiences of decolonization, even when it did not manage to surface as a major factor

in the high politics of Bengal.

Endnotes:
1
Dwaipayan Sen has extensively worked on Jogendra Nath Mandal. Please see Dwaipayan Sen, ‘No Matter how
Jogendra Nath had to be Defeated: The Scheduled Castes Federation and the Making of Partition in Bengal
1945-47’, Indian Economic and Social History Review 49, No. 3 (2012): 321-364. See also Dwaipayan Sen, The
Emergence and Decline of Dalit Politics in Bengal: Jogendranath Mandal, the Scheduled Castes Federation
and Partition, 1932-1968, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2012. However, Sen’s work is
in the nature of a biography. My research adds on to Sen’s work as in my thesis my primary aim had been to
understand the locations of religious minorities in East Pakistan, keeping caste as an important entry point.
Jogendra Nath is important in my research, but not the main subject of my research, though in this short piece
the primary focus of mine will be on Mandal. See Anwesha Sengupta, Breaking Up Bengal: Land, People and
Things, 1947 – 1952, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
2016.
2
The phrase ‘partitioned times’ has been coined by Ranabir Samaddar. He has argued that the experiences of
decolonization in South Asia has been shaped by the partition of British India to the extent that it is more
appropriate to refer ‘post-colonial times’ as ‘partitioned times’. See Ranabir Samaddar, ‘The Last Hurrah that
Continues’ in Divided Countries, Separated Cities: The Modern Legacy of Partition, Eds. Ghislaine Glasson
Deschaumes and Rada Ivekovic (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 21.
3
See Mahapran Jogendra Nath, Volume 4, ed. Jagadish Chandra Mandal (Kolkata: Chaturthho Dunia, 2004), 23.
4
Mahapran Jogendra Nath, Volume 4, 94-95 (translation mine).
5
‘Weekly Report from British Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca to British High Commissioner in Karachi
No 25 for the period ending June 25, 1949’,IOR/ L/Pj/5/325, British Library (BL).
6
East Pakistan and East Bengal have been used interchangeably throughout the essay as both the words were in
official usage till 1956. After 1971, East Pakistan became a sovereign nation-state known as Bangladesh.
7
Weekly Report No 24 for the period ending 20 June, 1948, IOR/L/Pj/5/322, BL.
8
For details on February Riots in East Pakistan see the entries in Tajuddin Ahmed, Tajuddin Ahmed’s Diary,
Volume 2 (Dhaka: Pratibhash, 2000), 76. Also see A.G. Stock’s Memoir, translated into Bengali by Mubbasera
Khanam in Daccar Smriti, ed. Muntassir Mamoon, (Dhaka: Maula Brothers, 2001). The riot spread in West
Bengal and Assam with equal intensity. For details see Sekhar Bandyopadhyay’s, ‘The Minorities in Post-
Partition West Bengal: The Riots of 1950’ in Minorities and the State: Changing Social and Political Landscape
of Bengal , Eds. Abhijit Dasgupta, Masahiko Togawa, and Abul Barkat (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2011), 3-
17; Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, ‘Remembering the Communal Violence of 1950 in Hooghly’ Journal of
Borderland Studies, 27, No.1, (2012): 45-59.
9
See Dilip Haldar, Atrocities on Dalits since the Partition of Bengal: A Human Right Question (New Delhi:
Mittal Publications, 2008), 19-20.
10
This was not the only event that led to the February Riots of 1950. There were economic causes too that
strained Indo-Pakistan relations, particularly East and West Bengal’s relations. However, this was one of the
major events that instigated the riots.
11
Letter dated January 19, 1950. Jagadish Chandra Mandal (son of Jogendra Nath Mandal)’s personal record
collection.
12
Letter dated January 19, 1950.
13
Anandabazaar Patrika, April 12, 1950.
14
The Nehru Liaquat Pact was signed on April 8, 1950 to deal with the communal situation in East Pakistan,
West Bengal and Assam. It took measures to stop harassing the religious minorities who were migrating across
the border, recognized the refugees’ rights to return, set up an enquiry commission to enquire about the recent
disturbances, included a minority minister in the West Bengal, Assam and East Bengal ministry to restore
confidence among the religious minorities among other provisions.
15
Excerpt from The Civil and Military Gazette, July 9, 1950 in Mahapran Jogendra Nath, Volume – 4, 155-156.
16
See Jogendra Nath Mandal’s resignation letter. http://bengalvoice.blogspot.in/2008/05/appendix-1-jogendra-
nath-mandals.html. Last accessed 26/4/2015.
17
Reported in Hindustan Standard, October 19, 1950, taken from Mahapran Jogendra Nath, volume 5, 38-39.
18
See Dawn, October 9, 1952. After creation of Pakistan, Congress party was the main opposition in both
Constituent Assembly and East Bengal Legislative Assembly. The Indian National Congress would soon declare
that their counterpart in Pakistan was a separate independent party. A new party would also be formed by some
of the Congress leaders of East Pakistan. And gradually Muslim Awami League would emerge as the main
opposition of the Muslim League.
19
M.G. Kabir, Minority Politics in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House, 1980), 31.
20
Kabir, Minority Politics, 57.
21
Kabir, Minority Politics, 60.
22
Nehru’s letter to Chief Ministers, 16 October, 1950, Selected Works, Second Series, Volume 15, Part 1, 554.
23
Nehru’s letter to Chief Ministers, 16 October, 1950.
24
Sekhar Bandyopadhyay and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, In Search of Space: The Scheduled Castes
Movement in West Bengal after Partition, Policies and Practices, No.59 (Kolkata: Mahanirban Calcutta Research
Group, February 2014), 10.
25
Bandyopadhyay and Basu Ray Chaudhury, In Search of Space,12.
26
Copy of Secret Report No. Nil dated 6.2.58 from R.I.O Sealdah, File on Sudha Roy (Bolshevik Party of India),
F. No -67/39; Part III, 1939, IB Records, West Bengal State Archives (WBSA), Kolkata.
27
Manoranjan Byapari, ‘Ananta Ratrir Chandal’, in Deshbhag: Binash O Binirman, Ed. Madhumoy Pal
(Kolkata: Gangchil, 2011) 212-213.
28
Bandyopadhyay and Basu Ray Chaudhury in In Search of Space.