House Impeachment Trial Brief

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Sitting as a Court of Impeachment
In re
IMPEACHMENT OF
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
TRIAL MEMORANDUM
OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
United States House of Representatives
Adam B. Schiff
Jerrold Nadler
Zoe Lofgren
Hakeem S. Jeffries
Val Butler Demings
Jason Crow
Sylvia R. Garcia
U.S. House of Representatives Managers

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................................. 9
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT .................................................... 9
II. THE HOUSE’S IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP AND PRESENTATION OF
THIS MATTER TO THE SENATE ..............................................................................................................12
ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................................16
I. THE SENATE SHOULD CONVICT PRESIDENT TRUMP OF ABUSE OF POWER ..................................16
A. President Trump Exercised His Official Power to Pressure Ukraine into Aiding His
Reelection ....................................................................................................................................16
B. President Trump Exercised Official Power to Benefit Himself Personally ......................22
C. President Trump Jeopardized U.S. National Interests .........................................................28
II. THE SENATE SHOULD CONVICT PRESIDENT TRUMP OF OBSTRUCTION OF CONGRESS ..............30
A. The House Is Constitutionally Entitled to the Relevant Information in an
Impeachment Inquiry ................................................................................................................31
B. President Trump’s Obstruction of the Impeachment Inquiry Violates Fundamental
Constitutional Principles ...........................................................................................................34
C. President Trump’s Excuses for His Obstruction Are Meritless .........................................36
III. THE SENATE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REMOVE PRESIDENT TRUMP FROM OFFICE TO
PREVENT FURTHER ABUSES ...................................................................................................................41
A. President Trump’s Repeated Abuse of Power Presents an Ongoing Threat to Our
Elections ......................................................................................................................................41
B. President Trump’s Obstruction of Congress Threatens Our Constitutional Order ........44
C. The Senate Should Convict and Remove President Trump to Protect Our System
of Government and National Security Interests ...................................................................45
ATTACHED STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS .............................................................. SMF 1-61
INTRODUCTION
President Donald J. Trump used his official powers to pressure a foreign government to
interfere in a United States election for his personal political gain, and then attempted to cover up
his scheme by obstructing Congress’s investigation into his misconduct. The Constitution provides
a remedy when the President commits such serious abuses of his office: impeachment and removal.
The Senate must use that remedy now to safeguard the 2020 U.S. election, protect our constitutional
form of government, and eliminate the threat that the President poses to America’s national security.
The House adopted two Articles of Impeachment against President Trump: the first for
abuse of power, and the second for obstruction of Congress.1 The evidence overwhelmingly
establishes that he is guilty of both. The only remaining question is whether the members of the
Senate will accept and carry out the responsibility placed on them by the Framers of our
Constitution and their constitutional Oaths.
Abuse of Power
President Trump abused the power of his office by pressuring the government of Ukraine to
interfere in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election for his own benefit. In order to pressure the recently
elected Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, to announce investigations that would advance
President Trump’s political interests and his 2020 reelection bid, the President exercised his official
power to withhold from Ukraine critical U.S. government support—$391 million of vital military aid
and a coveted White House meeting.2
1
H. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019).
2
See Statement of Material Facts (Statement of Facts) (Jan. 18, 2020), ¶¶ 1-151 (filed as an
attachment to this Trial Memorandum).
During a July 25, 2019 phone call, after President Zelensky expressed gratitude to President
Trump for American military assistance, President Trump immediately responded by asking
President Zelensky to “do us a favor though.”3 The “favor” he sought was for Ukraine to publicly
announce two investigations that President Trump believed would improve his domestic political
prospects.4 One investigation concerned former Vice President Joseph Biden, Jr.—a political rival
in the upcoming 2020 election—and the false claim that, in seeking the removal of a corrupt
Ukrainian prosecutor four years earlier, then-Vice President Biden had acted to protect a company
where his son was a board member.5 The second investigation concerned a debunked conspiracy
theory that Russia did not interfere in the 2016 Presidential election to aid President Trump, but
instead that Ukraine interfered in that election to aid President Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton.6
These theories were baseless. There is no credible evidence to support the allegation that
the former Vice President acted improperly in encouraging Ukraine to remove an incompetent and
corrupt prosecutor in 2016.7 And the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III unanimously determined that Russia, not
Ukraine, interfered in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election “in sweeping and systematic fashion” to
help President Trump’s campaign.8 In fact, the theory that Ukraine, rather than Russia, interfered in
the 2016 election has been advanced by Russia’s intelligence services as part of Russia’s propaganda
campaign.9
3
Id. ¶¶ 75-76.
4
Id. ¶¶ 76-77.
5
Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
6
Id. ¶¶ 11, 76.
7
Id. ¶ 12.
8
Id. ¶ 13.
9
Id. ¶ 14.
2
Although these theories were groundless, President Trump sought a public announcement
by Ukraine of investigations into them in order to help his 2020 reelection campaign.10 An
announcement of a Ukrainian investigation into one of his key political rivals would be enormously
valuable to President Trump in his efforts to win reelection in 2020—just as the FBI’s investigation
into Hillary Clinton’s emails had helped him in 2016. And an investigation suggesting that President
Trump did not benefit from Russian interference in the 2016 election would give him a basis to
assert—falsely—that he was the victim, rather than the beneficiary, of foreign meddling in the last
election. Ukraine’s announcement of that investigation would bolster the perceived legitimacy of his
Presidency and, therefore, his political standing going into the 2020 race.
Overwhelming evidence shows that President Trump solicited these two investigations in
order to obtain a personal political benefit, not because the investigations served the national
interest.11 The President’s own National Security Advisor characterized the efforts to pressure
Ukraine to announce investigations in exchange for official acts as a “drug deal.”12 His Acting Chief
of Staff candidly confessed that President Trump’s decision to withhold security assistance was tied
to his desire for an investigation into alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2020 election, stated that
there “is going to be political influence in foreign policy,” and told the American people to “get over
it.”13 Another one of President Trump’s key national security advisors testified that the agents
pursuing the President’s bidding were “involved in a domestic political errand,” not national security
policy.14 And, immediately after speaking to President Trump by phone about the investigations,
one of President Trump’s ambassadors involved in carrying out the President’s agenda in Ukraine
10
See, e.g., id. ¶ 53.
11
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 16, 18.
12
Id. ¶ 59.
13
Id. ¶¶ 120-21.
14
Id. ¶ 122.
3
said that President Trump “did not give a [expletive] about Ukraine,” and instead cared only about
“big stuff” that benefitted him personally, like “the Biden investigation.”15
To execute his scheme, President Trump assigned his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, the
task of securing the Ukrainian investigations.16 Mr. Giuliani repeatedly and publicly emphasized that
he was not engaged in foreign policy but was instead seeking a personal benefit for his client, Donald
Trump.17
President Trump used the vast powers of his office as President to pressure Ukraine into
announcing these investigations. President Trump illegally withheld $391 million in taxpayer-funded
military assistance to Ukraine that Congress had appropriated for expenditure in fiscal year 2019.18
That assistance was a critical part of long-running bipartisan efforts to advance the security interests
of the United States by ensuring that Ukraine is properly equipped to defend itself against Russian
aggression.19 Every relevant Executive Branch agency agreed that continued American support for
Ukraine was in America’s national security interests, but President Trump ignored that view and
personally ordered the assistance held back, even after serious concerns—now confirmed by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO)20—were raised within his Administration about the
legality of withholding funding that Congress had already appropriated.21 President Trump released
the funding only after he got caught trying to use the security assistance as leverage to obtain foreign
interference in his reelection campaign. When news of his scheme to withhold the funding broke,
15
Id. ¶ 88.
16
See, e.g., id. ¶ 24.
17
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 25, 145-47.
18
Id. ¶¶ 28-48.
19
Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
20
Id. ¶ 46.
21
Id. ¶¶ 43, 46-48.
4
and shortly after investigative committees in the House opened an investigation, President Trump
relented and released the aid.22
As part of the same pressure campaign, President Trump withheld a crucial White House
meeting with President Zelensky—a meeting that he had previously promised and that was a shared
goal of both the United States and Ukraine.23 Such face-to-face Oval Office meetings with a U.S.
President are immensely important for international credibility.24 In this case, an Oval Office
meeting with President Trump was critical to the newly elected Ukrainian President because it would
signal to Russia—which had invaded Ukraine in 2014 and still occupied Ukrainian territory—that
Ukraine could count on American support.25 That meeting still has not occurred, even though
President Trump has met with over a dozen world leaders at the White House since President
Zelensky’s election—including an Oval Office meeting with Russia’s top diplomat.26
President Trump’s solicitation of foreign interference in our elections to secure his own
political success is precisely why the Framers of our Constitution provided Congress with the power
to impeach a corrupt President and remove him from office. One of the Founding generation’s
principal fears was that foreign governments would seek to manipulate American elections—the
defining feature of our self-government. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams warned of “foreign
Interference, Intrigue, Influence” and predicted that, “as often as Elections happen, the danger of
foreign Influence recurs.”27 The Framers therefore would have considered a President’s attempt to
corrupt America’s democratic processes by demanding political favors from foreign powers to be a
singularly pernicious act. They designed impeachment as the remedy for such misconduct because a
22
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 127, 131.
23
See id. ¶¶ 49-69.
24
Id. ¶ 50.
25
Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 50.
26
See id. ¶ 137.
27
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 6, 1787) (Adams-Jefferson Letter),
https://perma.cc/QWD8-222B.
5
President who manipulates U.S. elections to his advantage can avoid being held accountable by the
voters through those same elections. And they would have viewed a President’s efforts to
encourage foreign election interference as all the more dangerous where, as here, those efforts are
part of an ongoing pattern of misconduct for which the President is unrepentant.
The House of Representatives gathered overwhelming evidence of President Trump’s
misconduct, which is summarized in the attached Statement of Material Facts and in the
comprehensive reports prepared by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary.28 On the strength of that evidence, the House approved the First
Article of Impeachment against President Trump for abuse of power.29 The Senate should now
convict him on that Article. President Trump’s continuing presence in office undermines the
integrity of our democratic processes and endangers our national security.
Obstruction of Congress
President Trump obstructed Congress by undertaking an unprecedented campaign to
prevent House Committees from investigating his misconduct. The Constitution entrusts the
House with the “sole Power of Impeachment.”30 The Framers thus ensured what common sense
requires—that the House, and not the President, determines the existence, scope, and procedures of
an impeachment investigation into the President’s conduct. The House cannot conduct such an
investigation effectively if it cannot obtain information from the President or the Executive Branch
about the Presidential misconduct it is investigating. Under our constitutional system of divided
28
See Impeachment of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States: Report of the Comm. on the
Judiciary of the H. of Representatives, together with Dissenting Views, to Accompany H. Res. 755, H. Rep. No.
116-346 (2019); Report of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence on the Trump-Ukraine Impeachment
Inquiry, together with Minority Views, H. Rep. No. 116-335 (2019); see also Majority Staff of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. Print
2019).
29
H. Res. 755, at 2-5.
30
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
6
powers, a President cannot be permitted to hide his offenses from view by refusing to comply with a
Congressional impeachment inquiry and ordering Executive Branch agencies to do the same. That
conclusion is particularly important given the Department of Justice’s position that the President
cannot be indicted. If the President could both avoid accountability under the criminal laws and
preclude an effective impeachment investigation, he would truly be above the law.
But that is what President Trump has attempted to do, and why President Trump’s conduct
is the Framers’ worst nightmare. He directed his Administration to defy every subpoena issued in
the House’s impeachment investigation.31 At his direction, the White House, Department of State,
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
refused to produce a single document in response to those subpoenas.32 Several witnesses also
followed President Trump’s orders, defying requests for voluntary appearances and lawful
subpoenas, and refusing to testify.33 And President Trump’s interference in the House’s
impeachment inquiry was not an isolated incident—it was consistent with his past efforts to obstruct
the Special Counsel’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election.34
By categorically obstructing the House’s impeachment inquiry, President Trump claimed the
House’s sole impeachment power for himself and sought to shield his misconduct from Congress
and the American people. Although his sweeping cover-up effort ultimately failed—seventeen
public officials courageously upheld their duty, testified, and provided documentary evidence of the
President’s wrongdoing35—his obstruction will do long-lasting and potentially irreparable damage to
our constitutional system of divided powers if it goes unchecked.
31
See Statement of Facts ¶¶ 164-69.
32
Id. ¶¶ 179-83.
33
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 186-87.
34
See id. ¶¶ 191-93.
35
Id. ¶¶ 187-90.
7
Based on the overwhelming evidence of the President’s misconduct in attempting to thwart
the impeachment inquiry, the House approved the Second Article of Impeachment, for obstruction
of Congress.36 The Senate should now convict President Trump on that Article. If it does not,
future Presidents will feel empowered to resist any investigation into their own wrongdoing,
effectively nullifying Congress’s power to exercise the Constitution’s most important safeguard
against Presidential misconduct. That outcome would not only embolden this President to continue
seeking foreign interference in our elections but would telegraph to future Presidents that they are
free to engage in serious misconduct without accountability or repercussions.
* * *
The Constitution entrusts Congress with the solemn task of impeaching and removing from
office a President who engages in “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”37
The impeachment power is an essential check on the authority of the President, and Congress must
exercise this power when the President places his personal and political interests above those of the
Nation. President Trump has done exactly that. His misconduct challenges the fundamental
principle that Americans should decide American elections, and that a divided system of
government, in which no single branch operates without the check and balance of the others,
preserves the liberty we all hold dear.
The country is watching to see how the Senate responds. History will judge each Senator’s
willingness to rise above partisan differences, view the facts honestly, and defend the Constitution.
The outcome of these proceedings will determine whether generations to come will enjoy a safe and
secure democracy in which the President is not a king, and in which no one, particularly the
President, is above the law.
36
See id. ¶ 178; H. Res. 755, at 5-8.
37
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4.
8
BACKGROUND
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
To understand why President Trump must be removed from office now, it is necessary to
understand why the Framers of our Constitution included the impeachment power as an essential
part of the republic they created.
The Constitution entrusts Congress with the exclusive power to impeach the President and
to convict and remove him from office. Article I vests the House with the “sole Power of
Impeachment,”38 and the Senate with the “sole Power to try all Impeachments” and to “convict[]”
upon a vote of two thirds of its Members.39 The Constitution specifies that the President “shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”40 The Constitution further provides that the Senate may vote to
permanently “disqualif[y]” an impeached President from government service.41
The President takes an oath to “faithfully execute the Office of the President of the United
States.”42 Impeachment imposes a check on a President who violates that oath by using the powers
of the office to advance his own interests at the expense of the national interest. Fresh from their
experience under British rule by a king, the Framers were concerned that corruption posed a grave
threat to their new republic. As George Mason warned the other delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, “if we do not provide against corruption, our government will soon be at an end.”43
The Framers stressed that a President who “act[s] from some corrupt motive or other” or “willfully
38
39
40
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4.
41
42
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
43
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 392 (Max Farrand ed.,1911) (Farrand).
9
abus[es] his trust” must be impeached,44 because the President “will have great opportunitys of
abusing his power.”45
The Framers recognized that a President who abuses his power to manipulate the
democratic process cannot properly be held accountable by means of the very elections that he has
rigged to his advantage.46 The Framers specifically feared a President who abused his office by
sparing “no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected.”47 Mason asked: “Shall the man
who has practised corruption & by that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be
suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?”48
Thus, the Framers resolved to hold the President “impeachable whilst in office” as “an
essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.”49 By empowering Congress to
immediately remove a President when his misconduct warrants it, the Framers established the
people’s elected representatives as the ultimate check on a President whose corruption threatened
our democracy and the Nation’s core interests.50
The Framers particularly feared that foreign influence could undermine our new system of
self-government.51 In his farewell address to the Nation, President George Washington warned
Americans “to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one
44
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 49 (1998) (quoting James Iredell).
45
2 Farrand at 67.
46
See id. at 65.
47
Id. at 64.
48
Id. at 65.
49
Id. at 64.
50
See The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
51
See, e.g., 2 Farrand at 65-66; George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), George
Washington Papers, Series 2, Letterbooks 1754-1799: Letterbook 24, April 3, 1793–March 3, 1797, Library
of Congress (Washington Farewell Address); Adams-Jefferson Letter, https://perma.cc/QWD8-
222B.
10
of the most baneful foes of republican government.”52 Alexander Hamilton cautioned that the
“most deadly adversaries of republican government” may come “chiefly from the desire in foreign
powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.”53 James Madison worried that a future
President could “betray his trust to foreign powers,” which “might be fatal to the Republic.”54 And,
of particular relevance now, in their personal correspondence about “foreign Interference,” Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams discussed their apprehension that “as often as Elections happen, the
danger of foreign Influence recurs.”55
Guided by these concerns, the Framers included within the Constitution various
mechanisms to ensure the President’s accountability and protect against foreign influence—
including a requirement that Presidents be natural-born citizens of the United States,56 prohibitions
on the President’s receipt of gifts, emoluments, or titles from foreign states,57 prohibitions on
profiting from the Presidency,58 and, of course, the requirement that the President face reelection
after a four-year Term.59 But the Framers provided for impeachment as a final check on a President
who sought foreign interference to serve his personal interests, particularly to secure his own
reelection.
In drafting the Impeachment Clause, the Framers adopted a standard flexible enough to
reach the full range of potential Presidential misconduct: “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.”60 The decision to denote “Treason” and “Bribery” as impeachable conduct
52
Washington Farewell Address.
53
The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
54
2 Farrand at 66.
55
Adams-Jefferson Letter, https://perma.cc/QWD8-222B.
56
57
58
59
60
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4; see 2 Farrand at 550.
11
reflects the Founding-era concerns over foreign influence and corruption. But the Framers also
recognized that “many great and dangerous offenses” could warrant impeachment and immediate
removal of a President from office.61 These “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” provided for
by the Constitution need not be indictable criminal offenses. Rather, as Hamilton explained,
impeachable offenses involve an “abuse or violation of some public trust” and are of “a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.”62 The Framers thus understood that “high crimes and
misdemeanors” would encompass acts committed by public officials that inflict severe harm on the
constitutional order.63
II. THE HOUSE’S IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP AND PRESENTATION

OF THIS MATTER TO THE SENATE
Committees of the House have undertaken investigations into allegations of misconduct by
President Trump and his Administration. On September 9, 2019, after evidence surfaced that the
President and his associates were seeking Ukraine’s assistance in the President’s reelection, the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, together with the Committees on Oversight
and Reform and Foreign Affairs, announced a joint investigation into the President’s conduct and
issued document requests to the White House and State Department.64
On September 24, 2019, Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that the House was “moving
forward with an official impeachment inquiry” and directed the Committees to “proceed with their
investigations under that umbrella of [an] impeachment inquiry.”65 They subsequently issued
61
2 Farrand at 550.
62
The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (capitalization altered).
63
These issues are discussed at length in the report by the House Committee on the
Judiciary. See H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 28-75.
64
Statement of Facts ¶ 160.
65
Id. ¶ 161.
12
multiple subpoenas for documents as well as requests and subpoenas for witness interviews and
testimony.66 On October 31, 2019, the House approved a resolution adopting procedures to govern
the impeachment inquiry.67
Both before and after Speaker Pelosi’s announcement, President Trump categorically refused
to provide any information in response to the House’s inquiry. He stated that “we’re fighting all the
subpoenas,” and that “I have an Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as
president.”68 Through his White House Counsel, the President later directed his Administration not
to cooperate.69 Heeding the President’s directive, the Executive Branch did not produce any
documents in response to subpoenas issued by the three investigating Committees,70 and nine
current or former Administration officials, including the President’s top aides, continue to refuse to
comply with subpoenas for testimony.71
Notwithstanding the President’s attempted cover-up, seventeen current and former
government officials courageously complied with their legal obligations and testified before the three
investigating Committees in depositions or transcribed interviews that all Members of the
Committees—as well as staff from the Majority and Minority—were permitted to attend.72 Some
witnesses produced documentary evidence in their possession. In late November 2019, twelve of
these witnesses, including three requested by the Minority, testified in public hearings convened by
the Intelligence Committee.73
66
See id. ¶¶ 166, 180, 183, 189-90.
67
Id. ¶ 162.
68
Id. ¶ 164.
69
Id. ¶¶ 164-69.
70
Id. ¶ 183.
71
Id. ¶ 187.
72
Id. ¶¶ 188-89.
73
Id. ¶ 189.
13
Stressing the “overwhelming” evidence of misconduct already uncovered by the
investigation, on December 3, 2019, the Intelligence Committee released a detailed nearly 300-page
report documenting its findings, which it transmitted to the Judiciary Committee.74 The Judiciary
Committee held public hearings evaluating the constitutional standard for impeachment and the
evidence against President Trump—in which the President’s counsel was invited, but declined, to
participate—and then reported two Articles of Impeachment to the House.75
On December 18, 2019, the House voted to impeach President Trump and adopted two
Articles of Impeachment.76 The First Article for Abuse of Power states that President Trump
“abused the powers of the Presidency” by “soliciting the Government of Ukraine to publicly
announce investigations that would benefit his reelection, harm the election prospects of a political
opponent, and influence the 2020 United States Presidential election to his advantage.”77 President
Trump sought to “pressure the Government of Ukraine to take these steps by conditioning official
United States Government acts of significant value to Ukraine on its public announcement of the
investigations.”78 President Trump undertook these acts “for corrupt purposes in pursuit of
personal political benefit”79 and “used the powers of the Presidency in a manner that compromised
the national security of the United States and undermined the integrity of the United States
democratic process.”80 These actions were “consistent” with President Trump’s “previous
invitations of foreign interference in United States elections,”81 and demonstrated that President
74
Id. ¶ 176; see also H. Rep. No. 116-335.
75
Statement of Facts ¶ 176; see also H. Res. 755.
76
Statement of Facts ¶ 178; H. Res. 755.
77
H. Res. 755, at 2-3.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 3.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 4.
14
Trump “will remain a threat to national security and the Constitution if allowed to remain in
office.”82
The Second Article for Obstruction of Congress states that President Trump “abused the
powers of the Presidency in a manner offensive to, and subversive of, the Constitution” when he
“directed the unprecedented, categorical, and indiscriminate defiance of subpoenas issued by the
House of Representatives pursuant to its ‘sole Power of Impeachment.’”83 Without “lawful cause or
excuse, President Trump directed Executive Branch agencies, offices, and officials not to comply
with those subpoenas” and “thus interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful
subpoenas of the House of Representatives, and assumed to himself functions and judgments
necessary to the exercise of the ‘sole Power of Impeachment’ vested by the Constitution in the
House of Representatives.”84 The President’s “complete defiance of an impeachment inquiry . . .
served to cover up the President’s own repeated misconduct and to seize and control the power of
impeachment.”85 President Trump’s misconduct was “consistent” with his “previous efforts to
undermine United States Government investigations into foreign interference in United States
elections,”86 demonstrated that he has “acted in a manner grossly incompatible with self-
governance,” and established that he “will remain a threat to the Constitution if allowed to remain in
office.”87
82
Id. at 5.
83
Id. at 6.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 8.
86
Id. at 7.
87
Id. at 5, 8.
15
ARGUMENT
I. THE SENATE SHOULD CONVICT PRESIDENT TRUMP OF ABUSE OF POWER
President Trump abused the power of the Presidency by pressuring a foreign government to
interfere in an American election on his behalf.88 He solicited this foreign interference to advance
his reelection prospects at the expense of America’s national security and the security of Ukraine, a
vulnerable American ally at war with Russia, an American adversary.89 His effort to gain a personal
political benefit by encouraging a foreign government to undermine America’s democratic process
strikes at the core of misconduct that the Framers designed impeachment to protect against.
President Trump’s abuse of power requires his conviction and removal from office.
An officer abuses his power if he exercises his official power to obtain an improper personal
benefit while ignoring or undermining the national interest.90 An abuse that involves an effort to
solicit foreign interference in an American election is uniquely dangerous. President Trump’s
misconduct is an impeachable abuse of power.91
A. President Trump Exercised His Official Power to Pressure Ukraine into

Aiding His Reelection
After President Zelensky won a landslide victory in Ukraine in April 2019, President Trump
pressured the new Ukrainian President to help him win his own reelection by announcing
investigations that were politically favorable for President Trump and designed to harm his political
rival.92
88
See Statement of Facts ¶¶ 1-157.
89
See id. ¶¶ 1-157.
90
See, e.g., Report of the Impeachment Trial Comm. on the Articles Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous,
Jr., S. Rep. No. 111-347, at 6-7 (2010); Impeachment of Judge Alcee L. Hastings: Report of the H. Comm. of
the Judiciary to Accompany H. Res. 499, H. Rep. No. 100-810, at 1-5, 8, 41 (1988); 132 Cong. Rec.
H4710-22 (daily ed. July 22, 1986) (impeachment of Judge Claiborne).
91
For a more detailed discussion of abuse of power as an impeachable offense, see H. Rep.
No. 116-346, at 43-48, 68-70, 78-81.
92
Statement of Facts ¶¶ 1-151.
16
First, President Trump sought to pressure President Zelensky publicly to announce an
investigation into former Vice President Biden and a Ukrainian gas company, Burisma Holdings, on
whose board Biden’s son sat.93 As Vice President, Biden had in late 2015 encouraged the
government of Ukraine to remove a Ukrainian prosecutor general who had failed to combat
corruption.94 The Ukrainian parliament removed the prosecutor in March 2016.95 President Trump
and his allies have asserted that the former Vice President acted in order to stop an investigation of
Burisma and thereby protect his son.96 This is false. There is no evidence that Vice President Biden
acted improperly.97 He was carrying out official United States policy—with the backing of the
international community and bipartisan support in Congress—when he sought the removal of the
prosecutor, who was himself corrupt.98 In addition, the prosecutor’s removal made it more likely that
the investigation into Burisma would be pursued.99 President Trump nevertheless sought an official
Ukrainian announcement of an investigation into this theory.100
Second, President Trump sought to pressure President Zelensky publicly to announce an
investigation into a conspiracy theory that Ukraine had colluded with the Democratic National
Committee to interfere in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in order to help the campaign of
Hillary Clinton against then-candidate Donald Trump.101 This theory was not only pure fiction, but
malign Russian propaganda.102 In the words of one of President Trump’s own top National Security
Council officials, President Trump’s theory of Ukrainian election interference is “a fictional narrative
93
Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
94
See id. ¶ 12.
95
Id.
96
Id. ¶¶ 11, 17.
97
Id. ¶ 12.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.; see also id. ¶¶ 83-84, 150.
101
Id. ¶¶ 11, 84.
102
Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
17
that is being perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves” to deflect
from Russia’s culpability and to drive a wedge between the United States and Ukraine.103 President
Trump’s own FBI Director confirmed that American law enforcement has “no information that
indicates that Ukraine interfered with the 2016 presidential election.”104 The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence similarly concluded that Russia, not Ukraine, interfered in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election.105 President Trump nevertheless seized on the false theory and sought an
announcement of an investigation that would give him a basis to assert that Ukraine rather than
Russia interfered in the 2016 election. Such an investigation would eliminate a perceived threat to
his own legitimacy and boost his political standing in advance of the 2020 election.106
In furtherance of the corrupt scheme, President Trump exercised his official power to
remove a perceived obstacle to Ukraine’s pursuit of the two sham investigations. On April 24,
2019—one day after the media reported that former Vice President Biden would formally enter the
2020 U.S. Presidential race107—the State Department executed President Trump’s order to recall the
U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, a well-regarded career diplomat and anti-corruption crusader.108
President Trump needed her “out of the way” because “she was going to make the investigations
difficult for everybody.”109 President Trump then proceeded to exercise his official power to
pressure Ukraine into announcing his desired investigations by withholding valuable support that
Ukraine desperately needed and that he could leverage only by virtue of his office: $391 million in
security assistance and a White House meeting.
103
Id. ¶ 14.
104
Id. ¶ 13.
105
Id.
106
See id. ¶¶ 11-13, 83-84.
107
Id. ¶ 6.
108
Id. ¶¶ 7-9.
109
Id. ¶ 10 (quoting Mr. Giuliani).
18
Withheld Security Assistance
President Trump illegally ordered the Office of Management and Budget to withhold $391
million in taxpayer-funded military and other security assistance to Ukraine.110 This assistance would
provide Ukraine with sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars,
electronic warfare detection and secure communications, and night vision equipment, among other
military equipment, to defend itself against Russian forces that occupied part of eastern Ukraine
since 2014.111 The new and vulnerable government headed by President Zelensky urgently needed
this assistance—both because the funding itself was critically important to defend against Russia,
and because the funding was a highly visible sign of American support for President Zelensky in his
efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict from a position of strength.112
Every relevant Executive Branch agency supported the assistance, which also had broad
bipartisan support in Congress.113 President Trump, however, personally ordered OMB to withhold
the assistance after the bulk of it had been appropriated by Congress and all of the Congressionally
mandated conditions on assistance—including anti-corruption reforms—had been met.114 The
Government Accountability Office has determined that the President’s hold was illegal and violated
the Impoundment Control Act, which limits the President’s authority to withhold funds that
Congress has appropriated.115
110
Id. ¶¶ 28-48.
111
Id. ¶ 35.
112
See id. ¶¶ 30-31, 34-35.
113
Id. ¶ 39.
114
Id. ¶¶ 39, 41-42.
115
Id. ¶ 46. The GAO opinion addresses only the portion of the funds appropriated to the
Department of Defense. The opinion explains that OMB and the State Department have not
provided the information GAO needs to evaluate the legality of the hold placed by the President on
the remaining funds.
19
The evidence is clear that President Trump conditioned release of the vital military assistance
on Ukraine’s announcement of the sham investigations. During a telephone conversation between
the two Presidents on July 25, immediately after President Zelensky raised the issue of U.S. military
support for Ukraine, President Trump replied: “I would like you to do us a favor though.”116
President Trump then explained that the “favor” he wanted President Zelensky to perform was to
begin the investigations, and President Zelensky confirmed his understanding that the investigations
should be done “openly.”117 In describing whom he wanted Ukraine to investigate, President
Trump mentioned only two people: former Vice President Biden and his son.118 And in describing
the claim of foreign interference in the 2016 election, President Trump declared that “they say a lot
of it started with Ukraine,” and that “[w]hatever you can do, it’s very important that you do it if
that’s possible.”119 Absent from the discussion was any mention by President Trump of anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine.
One of President Trump’s chief agents for carrying out the President’s agenda in Ukraine,
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, testified that President Trump’s effort to condition release of the
much-needed security assistance on an announcement of the investigations was as clear as “two plus
two equals four.”120 Sondland communicated to President Zelensky’s advisor that Ukraine would
likely not receive assistance unless President Zelensky publicly announced the investigations.121 And
President Trump later confirmed to Ambassador Sondland that President Zelensky “must announce
the opening of the investigations and he should want to do it.”122
116
Id. ¶ 76.
117
Id. ¶¶ 76, 80.
118
Id. ¶ 82.
119
Id. ¶ 77.
120
Id. ¶ 101.
121
Id. ¶ 110.
122
Id. ¶ 114.
20
President Trump ultimately released the military assistance, but only after the press publicly
reported the hold, after the President learned that a whistleblower within the Intelligence
Community had filed a complaint about his misconduct, and after the House publicly announced an
investigation of the President’s scheme. In short, President Trump released the security assistance
for Ukraine only after he got caught.123
Withheld White House Meeting
On April 21, 2019, the day President Zelensky was elected, President Trump invited him to a
meeting at the White House.124 The meeting would have signaled American support for the new
Ukrainian administration, its strong anti-corruption reform agenda, and its efforts to defend against
Russian aggression and to make peace.125 President Trump, however, exercised his official power to
withhold the meeting as leverage in his scheme to pressure President Zelensky into announcing the
investigations to help his reelection campaign.
The evidence is unambiguous that President Trump and his agents conditioned the White
House meeting on Ukraine’s announcement of the investigations. Ambassador Sondland testified
that President Trump wanted “a public statement from President Zelensky” committing to the
investigations as a “prerequisite[]” for the White House meeting.126 Ambassador Sondland further
testified: “I know that members of this committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the
form of a simple question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified previously with regard to the
requested White House call and the White House meeting, the answer is yes.”127
123
Id. ¶¶ 103, 130-31.
124
Id. ¶ 3.
125
See, e.g., id. ¶ 4.
126
Id. ¶ 88.
127
Id. ¶ 52.
21
To this day, President Trump maintains leverage over President Zelensky. A White House
meeting has still not taken place,128 and President Trump continues publicly to urge Ukraine to
conduct these investigations.129
B. President Trump Exercised Official Power to Benefit Himself Personally
Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the announcement of investigations on which
President Trump conditioned the official acts had no legitimate policy rationale, and instead were
corruptly intended to assist his 2020 reelection campaign.130
First, although there was no basis for the two conspiracy theories that President Trump
advanced,131 public announcements that these theories were being investigated would be of immense
political value to him—and him alone. The public announcement of an investigation of former Vice
President Biden would yield enormous political benefits for President Trump, who viewed the
former Vice President as a serious political rival in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election.
Unsurprisingly, President Trump’s efforts to advance the conspiracy theory accelerated after news
broke that Vice President Biden would run for President in 2020.132 President Trump benefited
from such an announcement of a criminal investigation into his Presidential opponent in 2016.133
An announcement of a criminal investigation regarding a 2020 rival would likewise be extremely
helpful to his reelection prospects.
President Trump would similarly have viewed an investigation into Ukrainian interference in
the 2016 election as helpful in undermining the conclusion that he had benefitted from Russian
election interference in 2016, and that he was the preferred candidate of President Putin—both of
128
Id. ¶ 137.
129
Id. ¶¶ 141-42, 150.
130
See generally Statement of Facts; H. Rep. No. 116-346; H. Rep. No. 116-335.
131
132
Id. ¶¶ 16-19.
133
See id. ¶¶ 154-56 (then-candidate Trump’s actions relating to the FBI’s investigation into
Hillary Clinton).
22
which President Trump viewed as calling into question the legitimacy of his Presidency. An
announcement that Ukraine was investigating its own alleged 2016 election interference would have
turned these facts on their head. President Trump would have grounds to claim—falsely—that he
was elected President in 2016 not because he was the beneficiary of Russian election interference,
but in spite of Ukrainian election interference aimed at helping his opponent.
Second, agents and associates of President Trump who helped carry out his agenda in Ukraine
confirmed that his efforts to pressure President Zelensky into announcing the desired investigations
were intended for his personal political benefit rather than for a legitimate policy purpose. For
example, after speaking with President Trump, Ambassador Sondland told a colleague that President
Trump “did not give a [expletive] about Ukraine,” and instead cared only about “big stuff” that
benefitted him personally “like the Biden investigation that Mr. Giuliani was pushing.”134 And Mick
Mulvaney, President Trump’s Acting Chief of Staff, acknowledged to a reporter that there was a
quid pro quo with Ukraine involving the military aid, conceded that “[t]here is going to be political
influence in foreign policy,” and stated, “I have news for everybody: get over it.”135
Third, the involvement of President Trump’s personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani—who has
professional obligations to the President but not the Nation—underscores that President Trump
sought the investigations for personal and political reasons rather than legitimate foreign policy
reasons. Mr. Giuliani openly and repeatedly acknowledged that he was pursuing the Ukrainian
investigations to advance the President’s interests, stating: “this isn’t foreign policy.”136 Instead, Mr.
134
Id. ¶ 88.
135
Id. ¶ 121. Mr. Mulvaney, along with his deputy Robert Blair and OMB official Michael
Duffey—who were subpoenaed by the House, but refused to testify at the President’s direction, see
id. ¶ 187—would provide additional firsthand testimony regarding the President’s withholding of
official acts in exchange for Ukraine’s assistance with his reelection.
136
Id. ¶ 18.
23
Giuliani said that he was seeking information that “will be very, very helpful to my client.”137 Mr.
Giuliani made similar representations to the Ukrainian government. In a letter to President-elect
Zelensky, Mr. Giuliani stated that he “represent[ed] him [President Trump] as a private citizen, not as
President of the United States” and was acting with the President’s “knowledge and consent.” 138
President Trump placed Mr. Giuliani at the hub of the pressure campaign on Ukraine, and directed
U.S. officials responsible for Ukraine to “talk to Rudy.”139 Indeed, during their July 25 call, President
Trump pressed President Zelensky to speak with Mr. Giuliani directly, stating: “Rudy very much
knows what’s happening and he is a very capable guy. If you could speak to him that would be
great.”140
Fourth, President Trump’s pursuit of the sham investigations marked a dramatic deviation
from longstanding bipartisan American foreign policy goals in Ukraine. Legitimate investigations
could have been recognized as an anti-corruption foreign policy goal, but there was no factual basis
for an investigation into the Bidens or into supposed Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.141
To the contrary, the requested investigations were precisely the type of political investigations that
American foreign policy dissuades other countries from undertaking. That explains why the scheme
to obtain the announcements was pursued through the President’s chosen political appointees and
his personal attorney;142 why Trump Administration officials attempted to keep the scheme from
becoming public due to its “sensitive nature”;143 why no credible explanation for the hold on security
assistance was provided even within the U.S. government;144 why, over Defense Department
137
Id.
138
Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added).
139
Id. ¶ 24.
140
Id. ¶ 78.
141
Id. ¶¶ 11-15, 122.
142
Id.
143
Id. ¶ 42.
144
Id. ¶¶ 43-48.
24
objections, President Trump and his allies violated the law by withholding the aid;145 and why, after
the scheme was uncovered, President Trump falsely claimed that his pursuit of the investigations did
not involve a quid pro quo.146
Fifth, American and Ukrainian officials alike saw President Trump’s scheme for what it was:
improper and political. As we expect the testimony of Ambassador John Bolton would confirm,
President Trump’s National Security Advisor stated that he wanted no “part of whatever drug deal”
President Trump’s agents were pursuing in Ukraine.147 Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Sondland
was becoming involved in a “domestic political errand” in pressing Ukraine to announce the
investigations.148 Jennifer Williams, an advisor to Vice President Mike Pence, testified that the
President’s solicitation of investigations was a “domestic political matter.”149 Lt. Col. Alexander
Vindman, the NSC’s Director for Ukraine, testified that “[i]t is improper for the President of the
United States to demand a foreign government investigate a U.S. citizen and a political opponent.”150
William Taylor, who took over as Chargé d’Affaires in Kyiv after President Trump recalled
Ambassador Yovanovitch, emphasized that “I think it’s crazy to withhold security assistance for
help with a political campaign.”151 And George Kent, a State Department official, testified that
“asking another country to investigate a prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy
of the rule of law.”152
145
Id. ¶¶ 45-46.
146
Id. ¶ 140.
147
Id. ¶ 59. Although Bolton has not cooperated with the House’s inquiry, he has offered to
testify to the Senate if subpoenaed.
148
Id. ¶ 58.
149
Id. ¶ 84.
150
Id. ¶ 83.
151
Id. ¶ 118.
152
Id. ¶ 55 (recalling his statement to Ambassador Volker in July 2019).
25
Ukrainian officials also understood that President Trump’s corrupt effort to solicit the sham
investigations would drag them into domestic U.S. politics. In response to the President’s efforts, a
senior Ukrainian official conveyed to Ambassador Taylor that President Zelensky “did not want to
be used as a pawn in a U.S. reelection campaign.”153 Another Ukrainian official later stated that “it’s
critically important for the west not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites[.]”154
And when Ambassador Kurt Volker tried to warn President Zelensky’s advisor against investigating
President Zelensky’s former political opponent—the prior Ukrainian president—the advisor
retorted, “What, you mean like asking us to investigate Clinton and Biden?”155 David Holmes, a
career diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, highlighted this hypocrisy: “While we had advised our
Ukrainian counterparts to voice a commitment to following the rule of law and generally
investigating credible corruption allegations,” U.S. officials were making “a demand that President
Zelensky personally commit on a cable news channel to a specific investigation of President
Trump’s political rival.”156
Finally, there is no credible alternative explanation for President Trump’s conduct. It is not
credible that President Trump sought announcements of the investigations because he was in fact
concerned with corruption in Ukraine or burden-sharing with our European allies, as he claimed
after the scheme was uncovered.157
Before news of former Vice President Biden’s candidacy broke, President Trump showed no
interest in corruption in Ukraine, and in prior years he approved military assistance to Ukraine
without controversy.158 After his candidacy was announced, President Trump remained indifferent
153
Id. ¶ 68.
154
Id. ¶ 104.
155
Id. ¶ 150.
156
Id. ¶ 151.
157
Id. ¶ 143.
158
See id. ¶¶ 2, 33.
26
to anti-corruption measures beyond the two investigations he was demanding.159 When he first
spoke with President Zelensky on April 21, President Trump ignored the recommendation of his
national security advisors and did not mention corruption at all—even though the purpose of the
call was to congratulate President Zelensky on a victory based on an anti-corruption platform.160
President Trump’s entire policy team agreed that President Zelensky was genuinely committed to
reforms, yet President Trump refused a White House meeting that the team advised would support
President Zelensky’s anti-corruption agenda.161 President Trump’s own Department of Defense, in
consultation with the State Department, had certified in May 2019 that Ukraine satisfied all anti-
corruption standards needed to receive the Congressionally appropriated military aid, yet President
Trump nevertheless withheld that vital assistance.162 He recalled without explanation Ambassador
Yovanovitch, who was widely recognized as a champion in fighting corruption,163 disparaged her
while praising a corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor general,164 and oversaw efforts to cut foreign programs
tasked with combating corruption in Ukraine and elsewhere.165
Moreover, had President Trump truly sought to assist Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts, he
would have focused on ensuring that Ukraine actually conducted investigations of the purported issues
he identified. But actual investigations were never the point. President Trump was interested only
in the announcement of the investigations because that announcement would accomplish his real
goal—bolstering his reelection efforts.166
159
See id. ¶ 88.
160
See id. ¶¶ 1-2.
161
See id. ¶¶ 22-24.
162
See id. ¶¶ 36 n.73, 39.
163
See id. ¶ 7.
164
See id. ¶¶ 8-9, 81.
165
See id. ¶ 82 n.138.
166
See e.g., id. ¶¶ 82, 131.
27
President Trump’s purported concern about sharing the burden of assistance to Ukraine
with Europe is equally without basis. From the time OMB announced the illegal hold until it was
lifted, no credible reason was provided to Executive Branch agencies for the hold, despite repeated
efforts by national security officials to obtain an explanation.167 It was not until September—
approximately two months after President Trump had directed the hold and after the President had
learned of the whistleblower complaint—that the hold, for the first time, was attributed to the
President’s concern about other countries not contributing more to Ukraine.168 If the President was
genuinely concerned about burden-sharing, it makes no sense that he kept his own Administration
in the dark about the issue for months, never made any contemporaneous public statements about
it, never ordered a review of burden-sharing,169 never ordered his officials to push Europe to
increase their contributions,170 and then released the aid without any change in Europe’s
contribution.171 The concern about burden-sharing is an after-the-fact rationalization designed to
conceal President Trump’s abuse of power.
C. President Trump Jeopardized U.S. National Interests
President Trump’s efforts to solicit foreign interference to help his reelection campaign is
pernicious, but his conduct is all the more alarming because it endangered U.S. national security,
jeopardized our alliances, and undermined our efforts to promote the rule of law globally.
Ukraine is a “strategic partner of the United States” on the front lines of an ongoing conflict
with Russia.172 The United States has approved military assistance to Ukraine with bipartisan
support since 2014, and that assistance is critical to preventing Russia’s expansion and aggression.
167
See id. ¶¶ 41-48.
168
See id. ¶¶ 43-45.
169
See id. ¶ 44.
170
See id.
171
See id. ¶ 131.
172
Id. ¶ 28.
28
This military assistance—which President Trump withheld in service of his own political interests—
“saves lives” by making Ukrainian resistance to Russia more effective.173 It likewise advances
American national security interests because, “[i]f Russia prevails and Ukraine falls to Russian
dominion, we can expect to see other attempts by Russia to expand its territory and influence.”174
Indeed, the reason the United States provides assistance to the Ukrainian military is “so that they
can fight Russia over there, and we don’t have to fight Russia here.”175 President Trump’s delay in
providing the military assistance jeopardized these national security interests and emboldened Russia
even though the funding was ultimately released—particularly because the delay occurred “when
Russia was watching closely to gauge the level of American support for the Ukrainian
Government.”176 But for a subsequent act of Congress, approximately $35 million of military
assistance to Ukraine would have lapsed and been unavailable as a result of the President’s abuse of
power.177
The White House meeting that President Trump promised President Zelensky—but
continues to withhold—would similarly have signaled to Russia that the United States stands behind
Ukraine, showing “U.S. support at the highest levels.”178 By refusing to hold this meeting, President
Trump denied Ukraine a showing of strength that could deter further Russian aggression and help
Ukraine negotiate a favorable end to its war with Russia.179 The withheld meeting also undercuts
President Zelensky’s domestic standing, diminishing his ability to advance his ambitious anti-
corruption reforms.180
173
Id. ¶ 31.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. ¶ 4.
177
Id. ¶¶ 132-33.
178
Id. ¶ 4 & n.8.
179
See id. ¶ 50.
180
See id.
29
Equally troubling is that President Trump’s scheme sent a clear message to our allies that the
United States may capriciously withhold critical assistance for our President’s personal benefit,
causing our allies to constantly “question the extent to which they can count on us.”181 Because
American leadership depends on “the power of our example and the consistency of our purpose,”
President Trump’s “conduct undermines the U.S., exposes our friends, and widens the playing field
for autocrats like President Putin.”182 And President Trump’s use of official acts to pressure Ukraine
to announce politically motivated investigations harms our credibility in promoting democratic
values and the rule of law in Ukraine and around the world. American credibility abroad “is based
on a respect for the United States,” and “if we damage that respect,” American foreign policy cannot
do its job.183
* * *
President Trump abused the powers of his office to invite foreign interference in an election
for his own personal political gain and to the detriment of American national security interests. He
abandoned his oath to faithfully execute the laws and betrayed his public trust. President Trump’s
misconduct presents a danger to our democratic processes, our national security, and our
commitment to the rule of law. He must be removed from office.
II. THE SENATE SHOULD CONVICT PRESIDENT TRUMP OF OBSTRUCTION OF CONGRESS
In exercising its responsibility to investigate and consider the impeachment of a President of
the United States, the House is constitutionally entitled to the relevant information from the
181
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Fiona Hill and David Holmes: Hearing Before the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 175 (Nov. 21, 2019).
182
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie “Masha” Yovanovitch: Hearing Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 19 (Nov. 15, 2019) (Yovanovitch Hearing Tr.).
183
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and George Kent: Hearing Before
the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 165 (Nov. 13, 2019).
30
Executive Branch concerning the President’s misconduct.184 The Framers, the courts, and past
Presidents have recognized that honoring Congress’s right to information in an impeachment
investigation is a critical safeguard in our system of divided powers.185 Otherwise, a President could
hide his own wrongdoing to prevent Congress from discovering impeachable misconduct,
effectively nullifying Congress’s impeachment power.186 President Trump’s sweeping effort to shield
his misconduct from view and protect himself from impeachment thus works a grave constitutional
harm and is itself an impeachable offense.
A. The House Is Constitutionally Entitled to the Relevant Information in an

Impeachment Inquiry
The House has the power to issue subpoenas and demand compliance in an impeachment
investigation. The Supreme Court has long recognized that, “[w]ithout the power to investigate—
including of course the authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes or through
judicial trial—Congress could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional
function wisely and effectively.”187 The Court has stressed that it is the “duty of all citizens” and
“their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
committees and to testify fully with respect to matters within the province of proper
investigation.”188 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress’s “power of inquiry—with
184
4 Annals of Cong. 601 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Lyman) (noting that Congress
has “the right to inspect every paper and transaction in any department” during an impeachment
inquiry).
185
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to the House as the
“inquisitors for the nation” for purposes of impeachment); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 193
(1880); 4 James D. Richardson ed., Messages and Papers of Presidents 434-35 (1896); see also H. Rep.
No. 116-346, at 139-42 (collecting examples of past Presidents beginning with George Washington
acknowledging the importance of Congress’s right to information from the Executive Branch in
impeachment inquiries).
186
See generally H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 139-48.
187
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1955).
188
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957).
31
process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”189
Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information.”190
This principle is most compelling when the House exercises its “sole Power of
Impeachment.” Congress’s already “broad” investigatory authority,191 and its need for information,
are at their apex in an impeachment inquiry. The principle that the President cannot stand in the
way of an impeachment investigation is “of great consequence” because, as Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story long ago explained, “the president should not have the power of preventing a thorough
investigation of [his] conduct, or of securing [himself] against the disgrace of a public conviction by
impeachment, if [he] should deserve it.”192 A Presidential impeachment is “a matter of the most
critical moment to the Nation” and it is “difficult to conceive of a more compelling need than that
of this country for an unswervingly fair inquiry based on all the pertinent information.”193 The
Supreme Court thus recognized nearly 140 years ago that where the House or Senate is determining
a “question of . . . impeachment,” there is “no reason to doubt the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses, and their answer to proper questions, in the same manner and by the use of the same
means that courts of justice can in like cases.”194
Like the Supreme Court, members of the earliest Congresses understood that, without “the
right to inspect every paper and transaction in any department . . . the power of impeachment could
never be exercised with any effect.”195 Previous Presidents have acknowledged their obligation to
189
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
190
Id. at 175.
191
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
192
2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1501 (2d ed. 1851).
193
In re Report & Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to
House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D.D.C. 1974).
194
Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 190. The Court in Kilbourn invalidated a contempt order by the
House but explained that the “whole aspect of the case would have changed” if it had been an
impeachment proceeding. Id. at 193.
195
4 Annals of Cong. 601 (statement of Rep. William Lyman).
32
comply with an impeachment investigation, explaining that such an inquiry “penetrate[s] into the
most secret recesses of the Executive Departments” and “could command the attendance of any
and every agent of the Government, and compel them to produce all papers, public or private,
official or unofficial, and to testify on oath to all facts within their knowledge.”196 That
acknowledgement is a matter of common sense. An impeachment inquiry cannot root out bad
actors if those same bad actors control the scope and nature of the inquiry.
President Trump is an aberration among Presidents in refusing any and all cooperation in a
House impeachment investigation. Even President Nixon produced numerous documents in
response to Congressional subpoenas and instructed “[a]ll members of the White House Staff . . .
[to] appear voluntarily when requested by the [House],” to “testify under oath,” and to “answer fully
all proper questions”197—consistent with the near uniform cooperation of prior Executive Branch
officials who had been subject to impeachment investigations.198
Because President Nixon’s production of records in response to the House Judiciary
Committee’s inquiry was incomplete in important respects, however, the Committee voted to adopt
an article of impeachment for his obstruction of the inquiry.199 As the Committee explained, in
refusing to provide materials that the Committee “deemed necessary” to the impeachment
investigation, President Nixon had “substitute[ed] his judgment” for that of the House and
interposed “the powers of the presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of
Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and judgments necessary to exercise the sole
196
Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 698 (1846) (statement of President James K. Polk); see
also H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 139-42.
197
Remarks by President Nixon (Apr. 17, 1973), reprinted in Statement of Information: Hearings
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, H. of Representatives: Book IV—Part 2, Events Following the Watergate
Break-in (1974).
198
H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 142; see Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United
States: Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H. of Representatives, H. Rep. No. 93-1305, at 196 (1974).
199
See H. Rep. No. 93-1305, at 10.
33
power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House.”200 The Committee stated that it
was not “within the power of the President to conduct an inquiry into his own impeachment, to
determine which evidence, and what version or portion of that evidence, is relevant and necessary to
such an inquiry. These are matters which, under the Constitution, the House has the sole power to
determine.”201 In the face of Congress’s investigation and the mounting evidence of his misdeeds,
President Nixon resigned before the House had the chance to impeach him for this misconduct.
B. President Trump’s Obstruction of the Impeachment Inquiry Violates

Fundamental Constitutional Principles
The Senate should convict President Trump of Obstruction of Congress as charged in the
Second Article of Impeachment. President Trump unilaterally declared the House’s investigation
“illegitimate.”202 President Trump’s White House Counsel notified the House that “President
Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry under these
circumstances.”203 President Trump then directed his Administration categorically to withhold
documents and testimony from the House.
The facts are undisputed. As charged in the Second Article of Impeachment, President
Trump “[d]irect[ed] the White House to defy a lawful subpoena by withholding the production of
documents” to the Committees; “[d]irect[ed] other Executive Branch agencies and offices to defy
lawful subpoenas and withhold the production of documents and records from the Committees”;
and “[d]irected current and former Executive Branch officials not to cooperate with the
Committees.”204 In response to President Trump’s directives, OMB, the Department of State,
Department of Energy, and Department of Defense refused to produce any documents to the
200
Id. at 4.
201
Id. at 194.
202
See Statement of Facts ¶ 177.
203
See id. ¶ 169.
204
H. Res. 755, at 7; see Statement of Facts ¶ 169.
34
House, even though witness testimony has revealed that additional highly relevant records exist.205
To date, the House Committees have not received a single document or record from these
departments and agencies pursuant to subpoenas, which remain in effect.
President Trump personally demanded that his top aides refuse to testify in response to
subpoenas, and nine Administration officials followed his directive and continue to defy subpoenas
for testimony.206 For example, when the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena for Mick
Mulvaney’s testimony, he produced a November 8 letter from the White House stating: “the
President directs Mr. Mulvaney not to appear at the Committee’s scheduled deposition on
November 8, 2019.”207 When President Trump was unable to silence witnesses, he resorted to
tactics to penalize and intimidate them. These efforts include President Trump’s sustained attacks
on the anonymous whistleblower, and his public statements designed to discourage witnesses from
coming forward and to embarrass those who did testify.208
Refusing to comply with a Congressional impeachment investigation is not a constitutionally
valid decision for a President to make. President Trump’s unprecedented “complete defiance of an
impeachment inquiry . . . served to cover up the President’s own repeated misconduct and to seize
and control the power of impeachment.”209 President Trump’s directive rejects one of the key
features distinguishing our Republic from a monarchy: that “[t]he President of the United States [is]
liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction . . . removed.”210 Allowing President Trump to
avoid conviction on the Second Article would set a dangerous precedent for future Presidents to
205
206
Id. ¶¶ 186-87.
207
Id. ¶ 186.
208
Id. ¶ 190 & nn.309-10.
209
H. Res. 755, at 8.
210
35
hide their misconduct from Congressional scrutiny during an impeachment inquiry without fear of
accountability.
Notwithstanding President Trump’s obstruction, the House obtained compelling evidence
that he abused his power. The failure of President Trump’s obstruction and attempted cover-up,
however, does not excuse his misconduct. There can be no doubt that the withheld documents and
testimony would provide Congress with highly pertinent information about the President’s corrupt
scheme. Indeed, witnesses have testified about specific withheld records concerning President
Trump’s July 25 call with President Zelensky and related materials,211 and public reports have
referred to additional responsive documents, including “hundreds of documents that reveal
extensive efforts to generate an after-the-fact justification for” withholding the security aid.212
C. President Trump’s Excuses for His Obstruction Are Meritless
President Trump has offered various unpersuasive excuses for his blanket refusal to comply
with the House’s impeachment inquiry. President Trump’s refusal to provide information is not a
principled assertion of executive privilege, but rather is a transparent attempt to cover-up
wrongdoing and amass power that the Constitution does not give him, including the power to
decide whether and when Congress can hold him accountable.
First, while Congressional investigators often accommodate legitimate Executive Branch
interests, the President’s blanket directive to all Executive Branch agencies and witnesses to defy
Congressional subpoenas was not based on any actual assertion of executive privilege or
211
See Statement of Facts ¶ 184 & nn.296-97.
212
Id. ¶ 45. As noted above, the testimony of Messrs. Mulvaney, Blair, and Duffey would
shed additional light on the White House’s efforts to create an after-the-fact justification for the
President’s withholding of security assistance. Ambassador Bolton’s testimony would likewise be
illuminating in this regard given public reporting of his repeated, yet unsuccessful, efforts to
convince the President to lift the hold.
36
identification of particular sensitive information.213 The White House Counsel’s letter alluded to
“long-established Executive Branch confidentiality interests and privileges” that the State
Department could theoretically invoke,214 and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel
preemptively dismissed certain subpoenas as “invalid” on the ground that responsive information
was “potentially protected by executive privilege.”215 But neither document conveyed an actual
assertion of executive privilege,216 which would require, at a minimum, identification by the
President of particular communications or documents containing protected material.217 The White
House cannot justify a blanket refusal to respond to Congressional subpoenas based on an executive
or other privilege it never in fact invoked.
Regardless, executive privilege is inapplicable here, both because it may not be used to
conceal wrongdoing—particularly in an impeachment inquiry—and because the President and his
agents have already diminished any confidentiality interests by speaking at length about these events
in every forum except Congress.218 President Trump has been impeached for Obstruction of
Congress not based upon discrete invocations of privilege or immunity, but for his directive that the
Executive Branch categorically stonewall the House impeachment inquiry by refusing to comply
with all subpoenas.219
To the extent President Trump claims that he has concealed evidence to protect the Office
of the President, the Framers considered and rejected that defense. Several delegates at the
Constitutional Convention warned that the impeachment power would be “destructive of [the
213
See id. ¶ 172.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
See, e.g., Landry v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
218
See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Statement of Facts ¶ 173 &
n.280.
219
See H. Res. 755, at 7.
37
executive’s] independence.”220 But the Framers adopted an impeachment power anyway because, as
Alexander Hamilton observed, “the powers relating to impeachments” are “an essential check in the
hands of [Congress] upon the encroachments of the executive.”221 The impeachment power does
not exist to protect the Presidency; it exists to protect the nation from a corrupt and dangerous
President like Donald Trump.
Second, President Trump has no basis for objecting to how the House conducted its
impeachment proceedings. The Constitution vests the House with the “sole Power of
Impeachment”222 and the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”223
The rights that President Trump has demanded have never been recognized and have not
been afforded in any prior Presidential impeachment.224 President Trump has been afforded
protections equal to or greater than those afforded Presidents Nixon and Clinton during their
impeachment proceedings in the House.225 Any claim that President Trump was entitled to due
process rights modeled on a criminal trial during the entirety of the House impeachment inquiry
ignores both law and history. A House impeachment inquiry cannot be compared to a criminal trial
because the Senate, not the House, possesses the “sole Power to try Impeachments.”226 The
Constitution does not entitle President Trump to a separate, full trial first in the House.
Even indulging the analogy to a criminal trial, no person appearing before a prosecutor or
grand jury deciding whether to bring charges would have the rights President Trump has claimed.
220
2 Farrand at 67.
221
222
223
224
See, e.g., Statement of Facts ¶ 163; see also U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
225
Statement of Facts ¶ 163; 165 Cong. Rec. E1357 (2019) (Impeachment Inquiry
Procedures in the Committee on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 660); Investigatory Powers of the
Comm. on the Judiciary with Respect to its Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rep. No. 105-795 (1998); H. Rep. No.
93-1305, at 8.
226
38
As the House Judiciary Committee Chairman observed during Watergate, “it is not a right but a
privilege or a courtesy” for the President to participate through counsel in House impeachment
proceedings.227 President Trump’s demands are just another effort to obstruct the House in the
exercise of its constitutional duty.
Third, President Trump’s assertion that his impeachment for obstruction of Congress is
invalid because the Committees did not first seek judicial enforcement of their subpoenas ignores
again the Constitutional dictate that the House has sole authority to determine how to proceed with
an impeachment. It also ignores President Trump’s own arguments to the federal courts.
President Trump is telling one story to Congress while spinning a different tale in the courts.
He is saying to Congress that the Committees should have sued the Executive Branch in court to
enforce their subpoenas. But he has argued to that court that Congressional Committees cannot sue
the Executive Branch to enforce their subpoenas.228 President Trump cannot tell Congress that it
must pursue him in court, while simultaneously telling the courts that they are powerless to enforce
Congressional subpoenas.
President Trump’s approach to the Judicial Branch thus mirrors his obstruction of the
Legislative Branch—in his view, neither can engage in any review of his conduct. This position
conveys the President’s dangerously misguided belief that no other branch of government may
227
Impeachment Inquiry: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Book I, 93d Cong. 497
(1974) (statement of Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr.).
228
See Statement of Facts ¶ 192; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summ. J. at
20, Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives, No. 19-3224 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2019), ECF No. 40;
Defs.’ and Def.-Intervenors’ Mot. to Dismiss at 46-47, Comm. on Ways & Means v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, No. 19-1974 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2019), ECF No. 44; see also Brief for Def.-Appellant at 2, 32-
33, Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 2019).
39
check his power or hold him accountable for abusing it.229 That belief is fundamentally incompatible
with our form of government.
Months or years of litigation over each of the House’s subpoenas is in any event no answer
in this time-sensitive inquiry. The House’s subpoena to former White House Counsel Don
McGahn was issued in April 2019, but it is still winding its way through the courts over President
Trump’s strong opposition, even on an expedited schedule.230 Litigating President Trump’s
direction that each subpoena be denied would conflict with the House’s urgent duty to act on the
compelling evidence of impeachable misconduct that it has uncovered. Further delay could also
compromise the integrity of the 2020 election.
* * *
When the Framers entrusted the House with the sole power of impeachment, they obviously
meant to equip the House with the necessary tools to discover abuses of power by the President.
Without that authority, the Impeachment Clause would fail as an effective safeguard against tyranny.
A system in which the President cannot be charged with a crime, as the Department of Justice
believes, and in which he can nullify the impeachment power through blanket obstruction, as
President Trump has done here, is a system in which the President is above the law. The Senate
should convict President Trump for his categorical obstruction of the House’s impeachment inquiry
and ensure that this President, and any future President, cannot commit impeachable offenses and
then avoid accountability by covering them up.
229
See also Statement of Facts ¶ 164 (“I have an Article II, where I have the right to do
whatever I want as president.”).
230
See id. ¶ 192 & n.316.
40
III. THE SENATE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REMOVE PRESIDENT TRUMP FROM OFFICE TO
PREVENT FURTHER ABUSES
President Trump has demonstrated his continued willingness to corrupt free and fair
elections, betray our national security, and subvert the constitutional separation of powers—all for
personal gain. President Trump’s ongoing pattern of misconduct demonstrates that he is an
immediate threat to the Nation and the rule of law. It is imperative that the Senate convict and
remove him from office now, and permanently bar him from holding federal office.
A. President Trump’s Repeated Abuse of Power Presents an Ongoing Threat to

Our Elections
President Trump’s solicitation of Ukrainian interference in the 2020 election is not an
isolated incident. It is part of his ongoing and deeply troubling course of misconduct that, as the
First Article of Impeachment states, is “consistent with President Trump’s previous invitations of
foreign interference in United States elections.”231
These previous efforts include inviting Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential
election.232 As Special Counsel Mueller concluded, the “Russian government interfered in the 2016
presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.”233 Throughout the 2016 election cycle, the
Trump Campaign maintained significant contacts with agents of the Russian government who were
offering damaging information concerning then-candidate Trump’s political opponent, and
Mr. Trump repeatedly praised—and even publicly requested—the release of politically charged
Russian-hacked emails.234 The Trump Campaign welcomed Russia’s election interference because it
“expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian
efforts.”235
231
H. Res. 755, at 5.
232
233
Id. ¶ 13.
234
Id. ¶¶ 152-56.
235
Id. ¶ 152.
41
President Trump’s recent actions confirm that public censure is insufficient to deter him
from continuing to facilitate foreign interference in U.S. elections. In June 2019, President Trump
declared that he sees “nothing wrong with listening” to a foreign power that offers information
detrimental to a political adversary. In the President’s words: “I think I’d take it.”236 Asked whether
such information should be reported to law enforcement, President Trump retorted: “Give me a
break, life doesn’t work that way.”237
Only one day after Special Counsel Mueller testified to Congress that the Trump Campaign
welcomed and sought to capitalize on Russia’s efforts to damage the President’s political rival in
2016, President Trump spoke to President Zelensky, pressuing Ukraine to announce investigations
to damage President Trump’s political opponent in the 2020 election and undermine Special
Counsel Mueller’s findings.238 President Trump still embraces that call as both “routine” and
“perfect.”239 President Trump’s conduct would have horrified the Framers of our republic.
In its findings, the Intelligence Committee emphasized the “proximate threat of further
presidential attempts to solicit foreign interference in our next election.”240 That threat has not
abated. In a sign that President Trump’s corrupt efforts to encourage interference in the 2020
election persist, he reiterated his desire for Ukraine to investigate his political opponents even after
the scheme was discovered and the impeachment inquiry was announced. When asked in October
2019 what he hoped President Zelensky would do about “the Bidens,” President Trump answered
236
Id. ¶ 156.
237
Id.
238
Id. ¶¶ 76, 157.
239
Id. ¶ 77 n.132.
240
H. Rep. No. 116-335, at XI.
42
that it was “very simple” and he hoped Ukraine would “start a major investigation.”241 Unsolicited,
he added that “China should [likewise] start an investigation into the Bidens.”242
President Trump has also continued to engage Mr. Giuliani to pursue the sham
investigations on his behalf.243 One day after President Trump was impeached, Mr. Giuliani claimed
that he gathered derogatory evidence against Vice President Biden during a fact-finding trip to
Ukraine—a trip where he met with a current Ukrainian official who attended a KGB school in
Moscow and has led calls in Ukraine to investigate Burisma and the Bidens.244 During the trip, Mr.
Giuliani tweeted: “The conversation about corruption in Ukraine was based on compelling evidence
of criminal conduct by then VP Biden, in 2016, that has not been resolved and until it is will be a
major obstacle to the US assisting Ukraine with its anti-corruption reforms.”245 Not only was Mr.
Giuliani perpetuating the false allegations against the former Vice President, but he was reiterating
the threat that President Trump had used to pressure President Zelensky to announce the
investigations: that U.S. assistance to Ukraine would be withheld until Ukraine pursued the sham
investigations. Mr. Giuliani has stated that he and the President continue to be “on the same
page.”246 Ukraine, as well, understands that Mr. Giuliani represents President Trump’s interests.247
President Trump’s unrepentant embrace of foreign election interference illustrates the threat
posed by his continued occupancy of the Office of the President. It also refutes the assertion that
the consequences of his misconduct should be decided by the voters in the 2020 election. The aim
of President Trump’s Ukraine scheme was to corrupt the integrity of the 2020 election by enlisting a
foreign power to give him an unfair advantage—in short, to cheat. That threat persists today.
241
242
Id.
243
See id. ¶¶ 144-49.
244
Id.
245
Id. ¶ 146.
246
Id. ¶ 149.
247
Id. ¶¶ 19, 69, 89.
43
B. President Trump’s Obstruction of Congress Threatens Our Constitutional
Order
President Trump’s obstruction of the House’s impeachment inquiry intended to hold him
accountable for his misconduct presents a serious danger to our constitutional checks and balances.
President Trump has made clear that he refuses to accept Congress’s express—and
exclusive—constitutional role in conducting impeachments.248 He has thereby subverted the
Constitution that he pledged to uphold when he was inaugurated on the steps of the Capitol. By his
words and deeds, President Trump has obstructed the House’s impeachment inquiry at every turn:
He has dismissed impeachment as “illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional”;249 directed the Executive
Branch not to comply with House subpoenas for documents and testimony;250 and intimidated and
threatened the anonymous intelligence community whistleblower as well as the patriotic public
servants who honored their subpoenas and testified before the House.251
President Trump’s obstruction is part of an ominous pattern of efforts “to undermine
United States Government investigations into foreign interference in United States elections.”252
Rather than assist Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
election and his own campaign’s exploitation of that foreign assistance, President Trump repeatedly
used the powers of his office to impede it. Among other actions, President Trump directed the
White House Counsel to fire the Special Counsel and then create a false record of the firing,
tampered with witnesses in the Special Counsel’s investigation, and repeatedly and publicly attacked
the legitimacy of the investigation.253 President Trump has instructed the former White House
248
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 169-71; U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
249
250
Id. ¶ 169.
251
Id. ¶ 177.
252
H. Res. 755, at 7-8.
253
See Statement of Facts ¶ 193.
44
Counsel to defy a House Committee’s subpoena for testimony concerning these matters and the
Department of Justice has argued that the courts cannot even hear the Committee’s action to
enforce its subpoena.254
President Trump’s current obstruction of Congress is, therefore, not the first time he has
committed misconduct concerning a federal investigation into election interference and then sought
to hide it. Allowing this pattern to continue without repercussion would send the clear message that
President Trump is correct in his view that no governmental body can hold him accountable for
wrongdoing. That view is erroneous and exceptionally dangerous.
C. The Senate Should Convict and Remove President Trump to Protect Our
System of Government and National Security Interests
The Senate should convict and remove President Trump to avoid serious and long-term
damage to our democratic values and the Nation’s security.
If the Senate permits President Trump to remain in office, he and future leaders would be
emboldened to welcome, and even enlist, foreign interference in elections for years to come. When
the American people’s faith in their electoral process is shaken and its results called into question,
the essence of democratic self-government is called into doubt.
Failure to remove President Trump would signal that a President’s personal interests may
take precedence over those of the Nation, alarming our allies and emboldening our adversaries. Our
leadership depends on the power of our example and the consistency of our purpose,” but because
of President Trump’s actions, “[b]oth have now been opened to question.”255
Ratifying President Trump’s behavior would likewise erode longstanding U.S. anti-
corruption policy, which encourages countries to refrain from using the criminal justice system to
254
Id. ¶ 192 & n.316.
255
Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 19.
45
investigate political opponents. As many witnesses explained, urging Ukraine to engage in “selective
politically associated investigations or prosecutions” undermines the power of America’s example
and our longstanding efforts to promote the rule of law abroad.256
An acquittal would also provide license to President Trump and his successors to use
taxpayer dollars for personal political ends. Foreign aid is not the only vulnerable source of funding;
Presidents could also hold hostage federal funds earmarked for States—such as money for natural
disasters, highways, and healthcare—unless and until State officials perform personal political favors.
Any Congressional appropriation would be an opportunity for a President to solicit a favor for his
personal political purposes—or for others to seek to curry favor with him. Such an outcome would
be entirely incompatible with our constitutional system of self-government.
* * *
President Trump has betrayed the American people and the ideals on which the Nation was
founded. Unless he is removed from office, he will continue to endanger our national security,
jeopardize the integrity of our elections, and undermine our core constitutional principles.
Respectfully submitted,
Adam B. Schiff
Jerrold Nadler
Zoe Lofgren
Hakeem S. Jeffries
Val Butler Demings
Jason Crow
Sylvia R. Garcia
January 18, 2020 U.S. House of Representatives Managers*

256
*
The House Managers wish to acknowledge the assistance of the following individuals in
preparing this trial memorandum: Douglas N. Letter, Megan Barbero, Josephine Morse, Adam A.
Grogg, William E. Havemann, and Jonathan B. Schwartz of the House Office of General Counsel;
Daniel Noble, Daniel S. Goldman, and Maher Bitar of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence; Norman L. Eisen, Barry H. Berke, Joshua Matz, and Sophia Brill of the House
Committee on the Judiciary; the investigative staff of the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform; and David A. O’Neil, Anna A. Moody, and Laura E. O’Neill.
46
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Sitting as a Court of Impeachment
In re
IMPEACHMENT OF
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
ATTACHMENT TO THE TRIAL MEMORANDUM

OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS...................................................................................................... 2
I. President Trump’s Abuse of Power ........................................................................................................ 2
A. The President’s Scheme to Solicit Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election from
the New Ukrainian Government Began in Spring 2019 .......................................................... 2
B. The President Enlisted His Personal Attorney and U.S. Officials to Help Execute
the Scheme for His Personal Benefit.......................................................................................... 8
C. The President Froze Vital Military and Other Security Assistance for Ukraine ................11
D. President Trump Conditioned a White House Meeting on Ukraine Announcing It
Would Launch Politically Motivated Investigations...............................................................19
E. President Trump Directly Solicited Election Interference from President Zelensky .......25
F. President Trump Conditioned the Release of Security Assistance for Ukraine, and
Continued to Leverage a White House Meeting, to Pressure Ukraine to Launch
Politically Motivated Investigations ..........................................................................................29
G. President Trump Was Forced to Lift the Hold but Has Continued to Solicit Foreign
Interference in the Upcoming Election ...................................................................................39
H. President Trump’s Conduct Was Consistent with His Previous Invitations of
Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections .....................................................................................47
II. President Trump’s Obstruction of Congress ......................................................................................49
A. The House Launched an Impeachment Inquiry .....................................................................50
B. President Trump Ordered Categorical Obstruction of the House’s Impeachment
Inquiry 51
C. Following President Trump’s Directive, the Executive Branch Refused to Produce
Requested and Subpoenaed Documents .................................................................................55
D. President Trump Ordered Top Aides Not to Testify, Even Pursuant to Subpoena ........58
E. President Trump’s Conduct Was Consistent with His Previous Efforts to Obstruct
Investigations into Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections ...................................................60
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. House of Representatives has adopted Articles of Impeachment charging President
Donald J. Trump with abuse of office and obstruction of Congress. The House’s Trial
Memorandum explains why the Senate should convict and remove President Trump from office,
and permanently bar him from government service. The Memorandum relies on this Statement of
Material Facts, which summarizes key evidence relating to the President’s misconduct.
As further described below, and as detailed in House Committee reports, 1 President Trump
used the powers of his office and U.S. taxpayers’ money to pressure a foreign country, Ukraine, to
interfere in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election on his behalf. President Trump’s goals—which
became known to multiple U.S. officials who testified before the House—were simple and starkly
political: he wanted Ukraine’s new President to announce investigations that would assist his 2020
reelection campaign and tarnish a political opponent, former Vice President Joseph Biden, Jr. As
leverage, President Trump illegally withheld from Ukraine nearly $400 million in vital military and
other security assistance that had been appropriated by Congress, and an official White House
meeting that President Trump had promised Volodymyr Zelensky, the newly elected President of
Ukraine. President Trump did this despite U.S. national security officials’ unanimous opposition to
withholding the aid from Ukraine, placing his own personal and political interests above the national
security interests of the United States and undermining the integrity of our democracy.
When this scheme became known and Committees of the House launched an investigation,
the President, for the first time in American history, ordered the categorical obstruction of an
1
See Report of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence on the Trump-Ukraine Impeachment
Inquiry, together with Minority Views, H. Rep. No. 116-335 (2019); Impeachment of Donald J. Trump,
President of the United States: Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the H. of Representatives, together with
Dissenting Views, to Accompany H. Res. 755, H. Rep. No. 116-346 (2019).
impeachment inquiry. President Trump directed that no witnesses should testify and no documents
should be produced to the House, a co-equal branch of government endowed by the Constitution
with the “sole Power of Impeachment.” 2 President Trump’s conduct—both in soliciting a foreign
country’s interference in a U.S. election and then obstructing the ensuing investigation into that
interference—was consistent with his prior conduct during and after the 2016 election.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
I. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ABUSE OF POWER
A. The President’s Scheme to Solicit Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election

from the New Ukrainian Government Began in Spring 2019
1. On April 21, 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky, a political neophyte, won a landslide victory
in Ukraine’s Presidential election. 3 Zelensky campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, and his
victory reaffirmed the Ukrainian people’s strong desire for reform. 4
2. When President Trump called to congratulate Zelensky later that day, President
Trump did not raise any concerns about corruption in Ukraine, although his staff had prepared
written materials for him recommending that he do so, and the White House call readout incorrectly
indicated he did. 5
2
3
Transcript, Deposition of Lt. Colonel Alexander S. Vindman Before the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence 16 (Oct. 29, 2019) (Vindman Dep. Tr.); Anton Troianovski, Comedian
Volodymyr Zelensky Unseats Incumbent in Ukraine’s Presidential Election, Exit Polls Show, Wash. Post (Apr.
21, 2019), https://perma.cc/J8KE-2UJU.
4
Id.
5
See White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 21, 2019) (Apr. 21
Memorandum), https://perma.cc/EY4N-B8VS; Deb Riechmann et al., Conflicting White House
Accounts of 1st Trump-Zelenskiy Call, Associated Press (Nov. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/A6U9-
89ZG.
SMF 2
3. During the call, President Trump promised President-elect Zelensky that a high-level
U.S. delegation would attend his inauguration and told him, “When you’re settled in and ready, I’d
like to invite you to the White House.” 6
4. Both events would have demonstrated strong support by the United States as
Ukraine fought a war—and negotiated for peace—with Russia. “Russia was watching closely to
gauge the level of American support for the Ukrainian Government.” 7 A White House visit also
would have bolstered Zelensky’s standing at home as he pursued his anti-corruption agenda. 8
5. Following the April 21 call, President Trump asked Vice President Mike Pence to
lead the American delegation to President Zelensky’s inauguration. During his own call with
President-elect Zelensky on April 23, Vice President Pence confirmed that he would attend the
inauguration “if the dates worked out.” 9
6. On April 23, the media reported that former Vice President Biden was going to enter
the 2020 race for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States. 10
6
Apr. 21 Memorandum at 2, https://perma.cc/EY4N-B8VS.
7
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and George Kent: Hearing Before the
H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 40 (Nov. 13, 2019) (Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr.).
8
See, e.g., Transcript, Interview of Kurt Volker Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence 58-59 (Oct. 3, 2019) (Volker Interview Tr.); Transcript, Interview of George Kent
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence 202 (Oct. 15, 2019) (Kent Dep. Tr.);
Transcript, Deposition of Fiona Hill Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence 64-65
(Oct. 14, 2019) (Hill Dep. Tr.); see also Transcript, Deposition of David A. Holmes Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence 18 (Nov. 15, 2019) (Holmes Dep. Tr.) (“[A] White House
visit was critical to President Zelensky,” because “[h]e needed to demonstrate U.S. support at the
highest levels, both to advance his ambitious anti-corruption agenda at home and to encourage
Russian President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky’s peace efforts.”).
9
Transcript, Deposition of Jennifer Williams Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence 36-37 (Nov. 7, 2019) (Williams Dep. Tr.).
10
Matt Viser, Joe Biden to Enter 2020 Presidential Race with Thursday Video Announcement, Wash.
Post (Apr. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/M2B9-6J48.
SMF 3
7. The next day, April 24, the State Department executed President Trump’s order to
recall the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, Marie “Masha” Yovanovitch, who was a well-regarded career
diplomat and champion for anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine. 11
8. The removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch was the culmination of a months-long
smear campaign waged by the President’s personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, and other allies of the
President. 12 The President also helped amplify the smear campaign. 13
9. Upon her return to the United States, Ambassador Yovanovitch was informed by
State Department officials that there was no substantive reason or cause for her removal, but that
President Trump had simply “lost confidence” in her. 14
10. Mr. Giuliani later disclosed the true motive for Ambassador Yovanovitch’s removal:
Mr. Giuliani “believed that [he] needed Yovanovitch out of the way” because “[s]he was going to
make the investigations difficult for everybody.” 15
11. Mr. Giuliani was referring to the two politically motivated investigations that
President Trump solicited from Ukraine in order to assist his 2020 reelection campaign: one into
former Vice President Biden and a Ukrainian gas company, Burisma Holdings, on whose board
11
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie “Masha” Yovanovitch: Hearing Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 21-22 (Nov. 15, 2019) (Yovanovitch Hearing Tr.);
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Fiona Hill and David Holmes: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm.
on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 18-19 (Nov. 21, 2019) (Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr.); Holmes Dep. Tr. at 13-
14, 142.
12
See, e.g., Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 25; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21-22; Hill-Holmes
Hearing Tr. at 19-21.
13
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:40 PM),
https://perma.cc/D4UT-5M6F (referencing Sean Hannity’s interview with John Solomon regarding
his opinion piece in The Hill titled As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton Emerges
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/2M35-LUQE).
14
Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21-22, 34-35.
15
Adam Entous, The Ukrainian Prosecutor Behind Trump’s Impeachment, New Yorker (Dec. 16,
2019), https://perma.cc/5XMR-BS8L (quoting Mr. Giuliani).
SMF 4
Biden’s son sat; 16 the other into a discredited conspiracy theory that Ukraine, not Russia, had
interfered in the 2016 U.S. election to help Hillary Clinton’s campaign. One element of the latter
conspiracy theory was that CrowdStrike—a NASDAQ-listed cybersecurity firm based in Sunnyvale,
California, that the President erroneously believed was owned by a Ukrainian oligarch—had
colluded with the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to frame Russia and help the election
campaign of Hillary Clinton. 17
12. There was no factual basis for either investigation. As to the first, witnesses
unanimously testified that there was no credible evidence to support the allegations that, in late
2015, Vice President Biden corruptly encouraged Ukraine to remove then-Prosecutor General
Viktor Shokin because he was investigating Burisma. 18 Rather, Vice President Biden was carrying
out official U.S. policy—with bipartisan support 19—and promoting anti-corruption reforms in
Ukraine because Shokin was viewed by the United States, its European partners, and the
International Monetary Fund to be ineffectual at prosecuting corruption and was himself corrupt. 20
16
See White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 4 (July 25, 2019) (July 25
Memorandum), https://perma.cc/8JRD-6K9V; Kyle Cheney, “Of Course I Did”: Giuliani Acknowledges
Asking Ukraine to Investigate Biden, Politico (Sept. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/J7PY-N3SG.
17
July 25 Memorandum at 3, https://perma.cc/8JRD-6K9V; see also Remarks by President
Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press Conference, White House (July 16, 2018),
https://perma.cc/6M5R-XW7F (“[A]ll I can do is ask the question. My people came to me, Dan
Coates came to me and some others—they said they think it’s Russia. I have President Putin; he just
said it’s not Russia. I will say this: I don’t see any reason why it would be, but I really do want to see
the server.”); Transcript of AP Interview with Trump, Associated Press (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://perma.cc/2EFT-84N8 (“TRUMP: . . . Why wouldn’t (former Hillary Clinton campaign
chairman John) Podesta and Hillary Clinton allow the FBI to see the server? They brought in
another company that I hear is Ukrainian-based. AP: CrowdStrike? TRUMP: That’s what I heard.
I heard it’s owned by a very rich Ukrainian, that’s what I heard.”).
18
See, e.g., Volker Interview Tr. at 203.
19
See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Rob Portman, Portman, Durbin, Shaheen, and Senate
Ukraine Caucus Reaffirm Commitment to Help Ukraine Take on Corruption (Feb. 12, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9WD2-CZ29 (quoting bipartisan letter urging then-President Poroshenko of
Ukraine “to press ahead with urgent reforms to the Prosecutor General’s office and judiciary”).
20
See, e.g., Kent Dep. Tr. at 45, 91-94 (describing “a broad-based consensus” among the
United States, European allies, and international financial institutions that Mr. Shokin was “a typical
SMF 5
In fact, witnesses unanimously testified that the removal of Shokin made it more likely that Ukraine
would investigate corruption, including Burisma and its owner, not less likely. 21 The Ukrainian
Parliament removed Shokin in March 2016. 22
13. As to the second investigation, the U.S. Intelligence Community determined that
Russia—not Ukraine—interfered in the 2016 election. 23 The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence reached the same conclusion following its own lengthy bipartisan investigation. 24
Special Counsel Robert Mueller, III, likewise concluded that the “Russian government interfered in
the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.” 25 And FBI Director Christopher
Ukraine prosecutor who lived a lifestyle far in excess of his government salary, who never
prosecuted anybody known for having committed a crime” and who “covered up crimes that were
known to have been committed.”); Daryna Krasnolutska et al., Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of
Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/YYX8-U33C (quoting Yuriy
Lutsenko, Ukraine’s then-Prosecutor General: “Hunter Biden did not violate any Ukrainian laws—at
least as of now, we do not see any wrongdoing. A company can pay however much it wants to its
board . . . . Biden was definitely not involved . . . . We do not have any grounds to think that there
was any wrongdoing starting from 2014 [when Hunter Biden joined the board of Burisma].”).
21
See Kent Dep. Tr. at 45, 93-94; Volker Interview Tr. at 36-37, 330, 355.
22
See Kent Dep. Tr. at 101-02.
23
Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, ICA 2017-01D, Assessing Russian Activities and
Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/M4A3-DWML; see, e.g., id. at ii (“We
assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US
presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process,
denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess
Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We
have high confidence in these judgements.”).
24
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the
2016 U.S. Election, Vol. II (May 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/96EC-22RU; see, e.g., id. at 4-5 (“The
Committee found that the [Russian-based Internet Research Agency (IRA)] sought to influence the
2016 U.S. presidential election by harming Hillary Clinton’s chances of success and supporting
Donald Trump at the direction of the Kremlin. . . . The Committee found that the Russian
government tasked and supported the IRA’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election.”).
25
Robert S. Mueller III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential
Election, Vol. I at 1 (2019) (Mueller Report), https://perma.cc/DN3N-9UW8.
SMF 6
Wray, a Trump appointee, recently confirmed that law enforcement “ha[s] no information that
indicates that Ukraine interfered with the 2016 presidential election.” 26
14. As Dr. Fiona Hill—who served until July 2019 as the Senior Director of European
and Russian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) under President Trump until July
2019—testified, the theory of Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election is a “fictional narrative that
is being perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves” to deflect from
Russia’s own culpability and to drive a wedge between the United States and Ukraine. 27 In fact,
shortly after the 2016 U.S. election, this conspiracy theory was promoted by none other than
President Vladimir Putin himself. 28 On May 3, 2019, shortly after President Zelensky’s election,
President Trump and President Putin spoke by telephone, including about the so-called “‘Russian
Hoax.” 29
15. President Trump’s senior advisors had attempted to dissuade the President from
promoting this conspiracy theory, to no avail. Dr. Hill testified that President Trump’s former
Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster
“spent a lot of time trying to refute this [theory] in the first year of the administration.” 30 Bossert
26
Luke Barr & Alexander Mallin, FBI Director Pushes Back on Debunked Conspiracy Theory About
2016 Election Interference, ABC News (Dec. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/8JKC-6RB8 (quoting Mr.
Wray).
27
Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 40-41, 56-57.
28
Press Statement, President of Russ., Joint News Conference with Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orban (Feb. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/5Z2R-ZECB (“[A]s we all know, during the
presidential campaign in the United States, the Ukrainian government adopted a unilateral position
in favour of one candidate. More than that, certain oligarchs, certainly with the approval of the
political leadership, funded this candidate, or female candidate, to be more precise.”).
29
See Kent Dep. Tr. at 338; @realDonaldTrump (May 3, 2019, 10:06 AM)
https://perma.cc/7LS9-P35U.
30
Hill Dep. Tr. at 234; see also id. at 235.
SMF 7
later said the false narrative about Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election was “not only a
conspiracy theory, it is completely debunked.” 31
B. The President Enlisted His Personal Attorney and U.S. Officials to Help
Execute the Scheme for His Personal Benefit
16. Shortly after his April 21 call with President Zelensky, President Trump began to
publicly press for the two investigations he wanted Ukraine to pursue. On April 25—the day that
former Vice President Biden announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for
President—President Trump called into Sean Hannity’s prime time Fox News show. Referencing
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election, President Trump said, “It sounds like big stuff,”
and suggested that the Attorney General might investigate. 32
17. On May 6, in a separate Fox News interview, President Trump claimed Vice President
Biden’s advocacy for Mr. Shokin’s dismissal in 2016 was “a very serious problem” and “a major
scandal, major problem.” 33
18. On May 9, the New York Times reported that Mr. Giuliani was planning to travel to
Ukraine to urge President Zelensky to pursue the investigations. 34 Mr. Giuliani acknowledged that
“[s]omebody could say it’s improper” to pressure Ukraine to open investigations that would benefit
President Trump, but he argued:
[T]his isn’t foreign policy—I’m asking them to do an investigation that

they’re doing already, and that other people are telling them to stop.
And I’m going to give them reasons why they shouldn’t stop it because
31
Chris Francescani, President Trump’s Former National Security Advisor “Deeply Disturbed” by
Ukraine Scandal: “Whole World Is Watching,” ABC News (Sept. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/C76K-
7SMA (quoting Mr. Bossert).
32
Full Video: Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA Abuse, Comey, Real
Clear Politics (Apr. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/3CLR-9MVA.
33
Transcript: Fox News Interview with President Trump, Fox News (May 6, 2019),
https://perma.cc/NST6-X7WS.
34
Kenneth P. Vogel, Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That Could Help
Trump, N.Y. Times (May 9, 2019) (Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip), https://perma.cc/SC6J-4PL9.
SMF 8
that information will be very, very helpful to my client, and may turn
out to be helpful to my government. 35
Ukraine was not, in fact, “already” conducting these investigations. As described below, the Trump
Administration repeatedly tried but failed to get Ukrainian officials to instigate these investigations.
According to Mr. Giuliani, the President supported his actions, stating that President Trump
“basically knows what I’m doing, sure, as his lawyer.” 36
19. In a letter dated May 10, 2019, and addressed to President-elect Zelensky, Mr.
Giuliani wrote that he “represent[ed] him [President Trump] as a private citizen, not as President of
the United States.” In his capacity as “personal counsel to President Trump, and with his
knowledge and consent,” Mr. Giuliani requested a meeting with President Zelensky the following
week to discuss a “specific request.” 37
20. On the evening of Friday, May 10, however, Mr. Giuliani announced that he was
canceling his trip. 38 He later explained, “I’m not going to go” to Ukraine “because I’m walking into
a group of people that are enemies of the President.” 39
21. By the following Monday morning, May 13, President Trump had ordered Vice
President Pence not to attend President Zelensky’s inauguration in favor of a lower-ranking
delegation led by Secretary of Energy Rick Perry. 40
35
Id. (quoting Mr. Giuliani).
36
Id. (quoting Mr. Giuliani).
37
Lev Parnas Production to the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence at 28 (Jan.
14, 2019), https://perma.cc/PWX4-LEMS (letter from Rudolph Giuliani to Volodymyr Zelensky,
President-elect of Ukraine (May 10, 2019)).
38
See Andrew Restuccia & Darren Samuelsohn, Giuliani Cancels Ukraine Trip amid Political
Meddling Charges, Politico (May 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/V5S8-2FV4.
39
Giuliani: I Didn’t Go to Ukraine to Start an Investigation, There Already Was One, Fox News
(May 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/HT7V-2ZYA.
40
Williams Dep. Tr. at 37; Volker Interview Tr. at 288-90; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 125-27.
SMF 9
22. The U.S. delegation—which also included Ambassador to the European Union
Gordon Sondland, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Kurt Volker, and
NSC Director for Ukraine Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman—returned from the inauguration
convinced that President Zelensky was genuinely committed to anti-corruption reforms. 41
23. At a meeting in the Oval Office on May 23, members of the delegation relayed their
positive impressions to President Trump and encouraged him to schedule the promised Oval Office
meeting for President Zelensky. President Trump, however, said he “didn’t believe” the delegation’s
positive assessment, claiming “that’s not what I hear” from Mr. Giuliani. 42 The President cast his
dim view of Ukraine in personal terms, stating that Ukraine “tried to take me down” during the 2016
election—an apparent reference to the debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the
2016 election to help Hillary Clinton and harm his campaign. 43
24. Rather than commit to a date for an Oval Office meeting with President Zelensky,
President Trump directed the delegation to “[t]alk to Rudy, talk to Rudy.” 44 Ambassador Sondland
testified that “if [the delegation] never called Rudy and just left it alone nothing would happen with
Ukraine,” and “if [the President] was going to have his mind changed, that was the path.” 45
Following the May 23 meeting, Secretary Perry and Ambassadors Sondland and Volker began to
coordinate and work with Mr. Giuliani to satisfy the President’s demands. 46
41
Volker Interview Tr. at 29–30, 304.
42
Id. at 305.
43
Id. at 304; Transcript, Interview of Gordon Sondland Before the H. Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence 337 (Oct. 17, 2019) (Sondland Dep. Tr.).
44
Sondland Dep. Tr. at 62, 69-70; Volker Interview Tr. at 305; Transcript, Impeachment
Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy Morrison: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 116th Cong. 39-40 (Nov. 19, 2019) (Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr.).
45
Sondland Dep. Tr. at 90.
46
See id. at 77-78; Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 17, 19; see also Timothy Puko & Rebecca
Ballhaus, Rick Perry Called Rudy Giuliani at Trump’s Direction on Ukraine Concerns, Wall Street J. (Oct. 16,
2019) (Rick Perry Called Rudy Giuliani), https://perma.cc/E4F2-9U23.
SMF 10
25. Mr. Giuliani is not a U.S. government official and has never served in the Trump
Administration. Rather, as he has repeatedly made clear, his goal was to obtain “information [that]
will be very, very helpful to my client”—President Trump. 47 Mr. Giuliani made clear to
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, who were in direct communications with Ukrainian officials,
that a White House meeting would not occur until Ukraine announced its pursuit of the two political
investigations. 48
26. On June 17, Ambassador Bill Taylor, whom Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had
asked to replace Ambassador Yovanovitch, arrived in Kyiv as the new Chargé d’Affaires. 49
27. Ambassador Taylor quickly observed that there was an “irregular channel” led by
Mr. Giuliani that, over time, began to undermine the official channel of U.S. diplomatic relations
with Ukraine. 50 Ambassador Sondland similarly testified that the agenda described by Mr. Giuliani
became more “insidious” over time. 51 Mr. Giuliani would prove to be, as the President’s National
Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton told a colleague, a “hand grenade that was going to blow
everyone up.” 52
C. The President Froze Vital Military and Other Security Assistance for Ukraine
28. Since 2014, Ukraine has been engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with Russia in
the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. 53 Ukraine is a “strategic partner of the United States,” and
47
Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip, https://perma.cc/SC6J-4PL9.
48
See, e.g., Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Sondland: Hearing Before the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 18 (Nov. 20, 2019) (Sondland Hearing Tr.) (“[A]s I testified
previously . . . Mr. Giuliani’s requests were a quid pro quo for arranging a White House visit for
President Zelensky”); id. at 34, 42-43.
49
Transcript, Deposition of William B. Taylor Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence (Oct. 22, 2019) (Taylor Dep. Tr.).
50
Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 34-36.
51
Sondland Dep. Tr. at 240.
52
Hill Dep. Tr. at 127 (Dr. Hill, quoting Mr. Bolton).
53
See Taylor Dep. Tr. at 20, 23, 27-28, 31, 33-34; Transcript, Deposition of Ambassador
Marie “Masha” Yovanovitch Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence 16, 18, 73, 302
SMF 11
the United States has long supported Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. 54 As Ambassador Volker
and multiple other witnesses testified, supporting Ukraine is “critically important” to U.S. interests,
including countering Russian aggression in the region. 55
29. Ukrainians face casualties on a near-daily basis in their ongoing conflict with
Russia. 56 Since 2014, Russian aggression has resulted in more than 13,000 Ukrainian deaths on
Ukrainian territory, 57 including approximately 3,331 civilians, and has wounded another 30,000
persons. 58
30. Since 2014, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its annexation of the Crimean
Peninsula, Congress has allocated military and other security assistance funds to Ukraine on a broad
bipartisan basis. 59 Since 2014, the United States has provided approximately $3.1 billion in foreign
assistance to Ukraine: $1.5 billion in military and other security assistance, and $1.6 billion in non-
military, non-humanitarian aid to Ukraine. 60
(Oct. 11, 2019) (Yovanovitch Dep. Tr.); see also Conflict in Ukraine Enters Its Fourth Year with No End in
Sight, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights (June 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/K9N8-
F22E.
54
Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 28.
55
Volker Interview Tr. at 329; see Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 17-18; Volker-Morrison
Hearing Tr. at 11.
56
Transcript, Deposition of Catherine Croft Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence 16 (Oct. 30, 2019) (Croft Dep. Tr.).
57
Kent Dep. Tr. at 338-39.
58
Viacheslav Shramovych, Ukraine’s Deadliest Day: The Battle of Ilovaisk, August 2014, BBC
News (Aug. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/6B2F-B72W.
59
See Transcript, Deposition of Laura Katherine Cooper Before the H. Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence 16, 38, 98 (Oct. 23, 2019) (Cooper Dep. Tr.); Vindman Dep. Tr. at 41, 57,
165; Transcript, Deposition of Mark Sandy Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence
59-60 (Nov. 16, 2019) (Sandy Dep. Tr.); Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 29-30; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 38,
40-41, 171, 217-18, 281-82; Letter from Senators Jeanne Shaheen et al. to Acting White House Chief
of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Sept. 3, 2019) (Sept. 3 Letter), https://perma.cc/4TU8-H7UR; Letter from
Senator Christopher Murphy to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform
(Nov. 19, 2019) (Nov. 19 Letter), https://perma.cc/4BDP-2SRJ.
60
Cory Welt, Cong. Research Serv., R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S.
Policy 30 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/4HCR-VKA5; see also Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 97
SMF 12
31. The military assistance provided by the United States to Ukraine “saves lives” by
making Ukrainian resistance to Russia more effective. 61 It likewise advances U.S. national security
interests because, “[i]f Russia prevails and Ukraine falls to Russian dominion, we can expect to see
other attempts by Russia to expand its territory and influence.” 62 Indeed, the reason the United
States provides assistance to the Ukrainian military is “so that they can fight Russia over there, and
we don’t have to fight Russia here.” 63
32. The United States’ European allies have similarly provided political and economic
support to Ukraine. Since 2014, the European Union (EU) has been the largest donor to Ukraine. 64
The EU has extended more macro-financial assistance to Ukraine—approximately €3.3 billion—
than to any other non-EU country and has committed to extend another €1.1 billion. 65 Between
2014 and September 30, 2019, the EU and the European financial institutions (including the
European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and others)
committed over €15 billion in grants and loans to support the reform process in Ukraine. 66
According to EU data, Germany contributed €786.5 million to Ukraine between 2014 and 2017; the
United Kingdom contributed €105.6 million; and France contributed €61.9 million over that same
period (not including the amounts these countries contribute through the EU). 67
(testimony of David Holmes) (“The United States has provided combined civilian and military
assistance to Ukraine since 2014 of about $3 billion, plus two $1 billion—three $1 billion loan
guarantees. That is not—those get paid back largely. So just over $3 billion.”).
61
Taylor Dep. Tr. at 153.
62
Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 18.
63
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 11.
64
Iain King, Not Contributing Enough? A Summary of European Military and Development Assistance
to Ukraine Since 2014, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/FF6F-
Q9MX.
65
EU-Ukraine Relations—Factsheet, European External Action Serv. (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://perma.cc/4YKE-T2WT.
66
Id.
67
See EU Aid Explorer: Donors, European Comm’n, https://perma.cc/79H6-AFHY.
SMF 13
33. In 2017 and 2018, the United States provided approximately $511 million and $359
million, respectively, in foreign assistance to Ukraine, including military and other security
assistance. 68 During those two years, President Trump and his Administration allowed the funds to
flow to Ukraine unimpeded. 69
34. For fiscal year 2019, Congress appropriated and authorized $391 million in taxpayer-
funded security assistance to Ukraine: $250 million in funds administered by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and $115 million in funds administered by the State Department, with another $26
million carried over from fiscal year 2018. 70
35. DOD planned to use the funds to provide Ukraine with sniper rifles, rocket-
propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, electronic warfare detection and secure
communications, and night vision equipment, among other military equipment, to defend itself
against Russian forces, which have occupied part of eastern Ukraine since 2014. 71 These purposes
were consistent with the goals of Congress, which had appropriated the funds administered by
DOD under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) for the purpose of providing
“training; equipment; lethal assistance; logistics support, supplies and services; sustainment; and
68
U.S. Foreign Aid by Country, USAID, https://perma.cc/9YK2-9BKJ (last updated Sept. 23,
2019) (Ukraine data for fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018).
69
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale: Hearing Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 22-23 (Nov. 20, 2019) (Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr.);
Cooper Dep. Tr. at 95-96.
70
Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, § 9013
(2018); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 7046(a)(2) (2019); Conference
Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 31, H. Rep. No. 116-9, at 869 (2019) (allocating $115,000,000 in
assistance to Ukraine for the Foreign Military Financing Program); Aaron Mehta, U.S. State
Department Clears Ukraine Security Assistance Funding. Is the Pentagon Next?, Def. News (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://perma.cc/723T-9XUN (noting that approximately $26 million rolled over from fiscal year
2018).
71
Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, (June 18, 2019) (DOD
Announces $250M to Ukraine), https://perma.cc/U4HX-ZKXP.
SMF 14
intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine, and . . . replacement of
any weapons or articles provided to the Government of Ukraine.” 72
36. On June 18, 2019, after all Congressionally mandated conditions on the DOD-
administered aid—including certification that Ukraine had adopted sufficient anti-corruption
reforms—were met, DOD issued a press release announcing its intention to provide the $250
million in security assistance to Ukraine. 73
37. On June 19, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) received questions from
President Trump about the funding for Ukraine. 74 OMB, in turn, made inquiries with DOD. 75
38. On June 27, Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney reportedly emailed his senior
advisor Robert Blair, “Did we ever find out about the money for Ukraine and whether we can hold
it back?” Mr. Blair responded that it would be possible, but they should “[e]xpect Congress to
become unhinged” if the President held back the appropriated funds. 76
39. Around this time, despite overwhelming support for the security assistance from
every relevant Executive Branch agency, 77 and despite the fact that the funds had been authorized
72
Pub. L. No. 115-245, § 9013.
73
DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, https://perma.cc/U4HX-ZKXP. DOD had
certified in May 2019 that Ukraine satisfied all anti-corruption standards needed to receive the
Congressionally appropriated military aid. See Letter from John C. Rood, Under Sec’y of Def. for
Pol’y, Dep’t of Def., to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs (May 23, 2019),
https://perma.cc/68FS-ZXZ6 (‘‘Ukraine has taken substantial actions to make defense institutional
reforms for the purposes of decreasing corruption . . . . [N]ow that this defense institution reform
has occurred, we will use the authority provided . . . to support programs in Ukraine further.’’).
74
Sandy Dep. Tr. at 24-25; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
75
Sandy Dep. Tr. at 24-28.
76
Eric Lipton et al., Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze: 84 Days of Conflict and Confusion, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 29, 2019) (Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze), https://perma.cc/TA5J-NJFX.
77
See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 13, 16, 32, 46, 60-62, 64-65; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 28, 132, 170.
SMF 15
and appropriated by Congress with strong bipartisan support, 78 the President ordered a hold on all
military and other security assistance for Ukraine. 79
40. By July 3, OMB had blocked the release of $141 million in State Department funds.
By July 12, all military and other security assistance for Ukraine had been blocked. 80
41. On July 18, OMB announced to the relevant Executive Branch agencies during a
secure videoconference that President Trump had ordered a hold on all Ukraine security
assistance. 81 No explanation for the hold was provided. 82
42. On July 25—approximately 90 minutes after President Trump spoke by phone with
President Zelensky—OMB’s Associate Director for National Security Programs, Michael Duffey, a
political appointee, instructed DOD officials: “Based on guidance I have received and in light of the
Administration’s plan to review assistance to Ukraine, including the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative, please hold off on any additional DoD obligations of these funds, pending direction from
that process.” 83 He added: “Given the sensitive nature of the request, I appreciate your keeping that
information closely held to those who need to know to execute the direction.” 84
78
See Nov. 19 Letter, https://perma.cc/4BDP-2SRJ; Sept. 3 Letter,
https://perma.cc/4TU8-H7UR.
79
Williams Dep. Tr. at 54; Croft Dep. Tr. at 15; Kent Dep. Tr. at 303-305; Transcript,
Deposition of Ambassador David Maclain Hale Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence 81 (Oct. 31, 2019) (Hale Dep. Tr.); Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 181-82;
Transcript, Deposition of Ambassador Tim Morrison Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence 264 (Nov. 6, 2019) (Morrison Dep. Tr.).
80
Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 178-79; see also Stalled Ukraine Military
Aid Concerned Members of Congress for Months, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/5CHF-HFKJ;
Sandy Dep. Tr. at 38-39 (describing July 12 email from White House to OMB stating “that the
President is directing a hold on military support funding for Ukraine.”).
81
See Sandy Dep. Tr. at 90; Hill Dep. Tr. at 225; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 35; Vindman
Dep. Tr. at 181; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 153-54.
82
Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 35; Hill Dep. Tr. at 225.
83
Email from Michael Duffey, Assoc. Dir. for Nat’l Sec. Programs, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to David Norquist et al. (July 25, 2019, 11:04 AM), https://perma.cc/PG93-3M6B.
84
Id.
SMF 16
43. In late July, the NSC convened a series of interagency meetings during which senior
Executive Branch officials discussed the hold on security assistance. 85 Over the course of these
meetings, a number of facts became clear: (1) the President personally directed the hold through
OMB; 86 (2) no credible justification was provided for the hold; 87 (3) with the exception of OMB, all
relevant agencies supported the Ukraine security assistance because, among other things, it was in
the national security interests of the United States; 88 and (4) there were serious concerns about the
legality of the hold. 89
44. Although President Trump later claimed that the hold was part of an effort to get
European allies to share more of the costs for security assistance for Ukraine, officials responsible
for the security assistance testified they had not heard that rationale discussed in June, July, or
August. For example, Mark Sandy, OMB’s Deputy Associate Director for National Security
Programs, who is responsible for DOD’s portion of the Ukraine security assistance, testified that the
European burden-sharing explanation was first provided to him in September—following his
85
Kent Dep. Tr. at 303, 307, 311; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 36; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182-
85, Cooper Dep. Tr. at 45.
86
Kent Dep. Tr. at 303-305; Hale Dep. Tr. at 81.
87
Croft Dep. Tr. at 15; Hale Dep. Tr. at 105; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 21; Kent Dep. Tr. at 304,
310; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 44-45; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 91, 97; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162-63. Mr. Morrison
testified that, during a Deputies Committee meeting on July 26, OMB stated that the “President was
concerned about corruption in Ukraine, and he wanted to make sure that Ukraine was doing enough
to manage that corruption.” Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165. Mr. Morrison did not testify that concerns
about Europe’s contributions were raised during this meeting. In addition, Mark Sandy testified that,
as of July 26, despite OMB’s own statement, senior OMB officials were unaware of the reason for
the hold at that time. See Sandy Dep. Tr. at 55-56.
88
Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 181-82; Kent Dep. Tr. at 305; Morrison Dep.
Tr. at 264.
89
Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47-48. For example, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper testified that, during an interagency meeting on July 26 involving
senior leadership from the State Department and DOD and officials from the National Security
Council, “immediately deputies began to raise concerns about how this could be done in a legal
fashion” and there “was a sense that there was not an available mechanism to simply not spend
money” that already had been notified to Congress or earmarked for Ukraine. Cooper Dep. Tr. at
47-48.
SMF 17
repeated requests to learn the reason for the hold. 90 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura
Cooper, whose responsibilities include the Ukraine security assistance, testified that she had “no
recollection of the issue of allied burden sharing coming up” in the three meetings she attended
about the freeze on security assistance, nor did she recall hearing about a lack of funding from
Ukraine’s allies as a reason for the freeze. 91 Ms. Cooper further testified that there was no policy or
interagency review process relating to the Ukraine security assistance that she “participated in or
knew of” in August 2019. 92 In addition, while the aid was being withheld, Ambassador Sondland,
the U.S. Ambassador to the EU, was never asked to reach out to the EU or its member states to ask
them to increase their contributions to Ukraine. 93
45. Two OMB career officials, including one of its legal counsel, ultimately resigned, in
part, over concerns about the handling of the hold on security assistance. 94 A confidential White
House review has reportedly “turned up hundreds of documents that reveal extensive efforts to
generate an after-the-fact justification” for the hold. 95
46. Throughout August, officials from DOD warned officials from OMB that, as the
hold continued, there was an increasing risk that the funds for Ukraine would not be timely
obligated, in violation of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 96 On January 16, 2020, the U.S.
90
91
Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 75-76.
92
Cooper Dep. Tr. at 91.
93
Sondland Dep. Tr. at 338-39.
94
95
Josh Dawsey et al., White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Efforts to Justify
Trump’s Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Wash. Post (Nov. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/99TX-
5KFE. Because the President obstructed the House’s investigation, the House was unable to obtain
documents to confirm this reporting.
96
See Sandy Dep. Tr. at 75; Kate Brannen, Exclusive: Unredacted Ukraine Documents Reveal
Extent of Pentagon’s Legal Concerns, Just Security (Jan. 2, 2020) (Just Security Report),
https://perma.cc/VA6U-RYPK (reporting about review of unredacted copies of OMB documents
that were produced to the Center for Public Integrity in redacted form).
SMF 18
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that OMB had, in fact, violated the
Impoundment Control Act when it withheld from obligation funds appropriated by Congress to
DOD for security assistance to Ukraine. GAO stated that “[f]aithful execution of the law does not
permit the President to substitute his own policy priorities for those that Congress has enacted into
law.” 97
47. In late August, Secretary of Defense Mike Esper, Secretary of State Pompeo, and
National Security Advisor Bolton reportedly urged the President to release the aid to Ukraine,
advising the President that the aid was in America’s national security interest. 98 On August 30,
however, an OMB official advised a Pentagon official by email that there was a “clear direction from
POTUS to continue to hold.” 99
48. Contrary to U.S. national security interests—and over the objections of his own
advisors—President Trump continued to withhold the funding to Ukraine through August and into
September, without any credible explanation. 100
D. President Trump Conditioned a White House Meeting on Ukraine

Announcing It Would Launch Politically Motivated Investigations
49. Upon his arrival in Kyiv in June 2019, Ambassador Taylor sought to schedule the
promised White House meeting for President Zelensky, which was “an agreed-upon goal” of
policymakers in Ukraine and the United States. 101
Matter of Office of Mgmt. & Budget—Withholding of Ukraine Sec. Assistance, B-331564

97
(Comp. Gen. Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/5CDX-XLX6.

98
See Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze, https://perma.cc/TA5J-NJFX.
99
See Just Security Report, https://perma.cc/VA6U-RYPK (quoting email from Michael
Duffey to Elaine McCusker).
100
See, e.g., Sandy Dep. Tr. at 133 (“[W]ere we ever given any reason for the hold? And I
would say only in September did we receive an explanation that the hold—that the President’s
direction reflected his concerns about the contributions from other countries for Ukraine.”); Cooper
Dep. Tr. at 93-94; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 181-82; Williams Dep. at 91-92.
101
Taylor Dep. Tr. at 24-25 (“In late June, one of the goals of both channels was to facilitate
a visit by President Zelensky to the White House for a meeting with President Trump, which
SMF 19
50. As Ambassador Volker explained, a White House visit by President Zelensky would
constitute “a tremendous symbol of support” for Ukraine and would “enhance[] [President
Zelensky’s] stature.” 102
51. Ambassador Taylor learned, however, that President Trump “wanted to hear from
Zelensky,” who had to “make clear” to President Trump that he was not “standing in the way of
‘investigations.’” 103 It soon became clear to Ambassador Taylor and others that the White House
meeting would not be scheduled until the Ukraine committed to the investigations of “Burisma and
alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 elections.” 104
52. Ambassador Sondland was unequivocal in describing this conditionality. He
testified:
I know that members of this committee frequently frame these

complicated issues in the form of a simple question: Was there a quid
pro quo? As I testified previously with regard to the requested White
House call and the White House meeting, the answer is yes. 105
53. According to Ambassador Sondland, the public announcement of the investigations—
and not necessarily the pursuit of the investigations themselves—was the price President Trump
sought in exchange for a White House meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky. 106
54. Both Ambassadors Volker and Sondland explicitly communicated this quid pro quo
to Ukrainian government officials. For example, on July 2, in Toronto, Canada, Ambassador Volker
President Trump had promised in his congratulatory letter of May 29. [The] Ukrainians were clearly
eager for the meeting to happen. During a conference call with Ambassador Volker, Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Reeker, Secretary Perry,
Ambassador Sondland, and Counselor of the U.S. Department of State Ulrich Brechbuhl on June
18, it was clear that a meeting between the two presidents was an agreed-on—agreed-upon goal.”).
102
Volker Interview Tr. at 59, 328.
103
Id.
104
105
Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26.
106
Id. at 43.
SMF 20
conveyed the message directly to President Zelensky and referred to the “Giuliani factor” in
President Zelensky’s engagement with the United States. 107 Ambassador Volker told Ambassador
Taylor that during the Toronto conference, he counseled President Zelensky about how he “could
prepare for the phone call with President Trump”—specifically, that President Trump “would like
to hear about the investigations.” 108
55. Ambassador Volker confirmed that, in “a pull-aside” meeting in Toronto, he
“advise[d] [President Zelensky] that he should call President Trump personally because he needed
to . . . be able to convey to President Trump that he was serious about fighting corruption,
investigating things that happened in the past and so forth.” 109 Upon hearing about this discussion,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs George Kent told
Ambassador Volker that “asking for another country to investigate a prosecution for political
reasons undermines our advocacy of the rule of law.” 110
56. On July 10, at a meeting with Ukrainian officials in Ambassador Bolton’s office at
the White House, Ambassador Sondland was even more explicit about the quid pro quo. He
stated—in front of multiple witnesses, including two top advisors to President Zelensky and
Ambassador Bolton—that he had an arrangement with Mr. Mulvaney to schedule the White House
visit after Ukraine initiated the “investigations.” 111
57. In a second meeting in the White House Ward Room shortly thereafter,
“Ambassador Sondland, in front of the Ukrainians . . . was talking about how he had an agreement
with Chief of Staff Mulvaney for a meeting with the Ukrainians if they were going to go forward
107
Kurt Volker Text Messages Received by the House Committees at KV00000027 (Oct. 2,
2019) (Volker Text Messages), https://perma.cc/CG7Y-FHXZ.
108
Taylor Dep. Tr. at 65-66.
109
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 70.
110
Kent Dep. Tr. at 246-47.
111
Hill Dep. Tr. at 67.
SMF 21
with investigations.” 112 More specifically, Lt. Col. Vindman testified that Ambassador Sondland said
“[t]hat the Ukrainians would have to deliver an investigation into the Bidens.” 113
58. During that meeting, Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman objected to Ambassador
Sondland intertwining what Dr. Hill later described as a “domestic political errand” with official
national security policy toward Ukraine. 114
59. Following the July 10 meetings, Dr. Hill discussed what had occurred with
Ambassador Bolton, including Ambassador Sondland’s reiteration of the quid pro quo to the
Ukrainians in the Ward Room. Ambassador Bolton told her to “go and tell [the NSC Legal
Advisor] that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and Mulvaney are cooking up on
this.” 115
60. Both Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman separately reported Sondland’s description of
the quid pro quo during the July 10 meetings to NSC Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg, who said he
would follow up. 116
61. After the July 10 meetings, Andriy Yermak, a top aide to President Zelensky who
was in the meetings, followed up with Ambassador Volker by text message: “Thank you for
Id. at 69.
112
Vindman Dep. Tr. at 64.

113
114
Id. at 69-70; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 31; see Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 92.
115
Hill Dep. Tr. at 70-72.
116
Id. at 139 (“I told him exactly, you know, what had transpired and that Ambassador
Sondland had basically indicated that there was an agreement with the Chief of Staff that they would
have a White House meeting or, you know, a Presidential meeting if the Ukrainians started up these
investigations again.”); Vindman Dep. Tr. at 37 (“Sir, I think I—I mean, the top line I just offered,
I’ll restate it, which is that Mr. Sondland asked for investigations, for these investigations into Bidens
and Burisma. I actually recall having that particular conversation. Mr. Eisenberg doesn’t really work
on this issue, so I had to go a little bit into the back story of what these investigations were, and that
I expressed concerns and thought it was inappropriate.”). A third NSC official, P. Wells Griffith,
also reported the July 10 meeting to the NSC Legal Advisor, but he refused to comply with a
subpoena and did not testify before the House.
SMF 22
meeting and your clear and very logical position . . . I feel that the key for many things is Rudi [sic]
and I [am] ready to talk with him at any time.” 117
62. Over the next two weeks, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker coordinated with Mr.
Giuliani and senior Ukrainian and American officials to arrange a telephone call between President
Trump and President Zelensky. They also worked to ensure that, during that phone call, President
Zelensky would convince President Trump of his willingness to undertake the investigations in
order to get the White House meeting scheduled. 118
63. On July 19, Ambassador Volker had breakfast with Mr. Giuliani at the Trump Hotel
in Washington, D.C. After the meeting, Ambassador Volker reported back to Ambassadors
Sondland and Taylor about his conversation with Mr. Giuliani, stating, “Most impt is for Zelensky
to say that he will help investigation—and address any specific personnel issues—if there are any.” 119
64. The same day, Ambassador Sondland spoke with President Zelensky and
recommended that the Ukrainian leader tell President Trump that he “will leave no stone unturned”
regarding the investigations during the upcoming Presidential phone call. 120
65. Following his conversation with President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland emailed
top Trump Administration officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Mr. Mulvaney, and Secretary
Perry. Ambassador Sondland stated that President Zelensky confirmed that he would “assure”
117
Volker Text Messages at KV00000018.
118
See, e.g., id. at KV00000037; Ambassador Gordon D. Sondland, Opening Statement Before the
U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence 15 (Nov. 20, 2019) (Sondland Opening
Statement), https://perma.cc/Z2W6-A9HS (“As I communicated to the team, I told President
Zelensky in advance that assurances to run a fully transparent investigation and turn over every
stone were necessary in his call with President Trump.”).
119
120
Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 37-38 (Ambassador Taylor quoting Ambassador Sondland).
SMF 23
President Trump that “he intends to run a fully transparent investigation and will ‘turn over every
stone.’” 121
66. Secretary Perry responded to Ambassador Sondland’s email, “Mick just confirmed
the call being set up for tomorrow by NSC.” About an hour later, Mr. Mulvaney replied, “I asked
NSC to set it up for tomorrow.” 122
67. According to Ambassador Sondland, this email—and other correspondence with top
Trump Administration officials—showed that his efforts regarding Ukraine were not part of a rogue
foreign policy. To the contrary, Ambassador Sondland testified that “everyone was in the loop.” 123
68. The Ukrainians also understood the quid pro quo—and the domestic U.S. political
ramifications of the investigations they were being asked to pursue. On July 20, a close advisor to
President Zelensky warned Ambassador Taylor that the Ukrainian leader “did not want to be used as
a pawn in a U.S. reelection campaign.” 124 The next day, Ambassador Taylor warned Ambassador
Sondland that President Zelensky was “sensitive about Ukraine being taken seriously, not merely as
an instrument in Washington domestic, reelection politics.” 125
69. Nevertheless, President Trump, directly and through his hand-picked representatives,
continued to press the Ukrainian government for the announcement of the investigations, including
during President Trump’s July 25 call with President Zelensky. 126
121
Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27; Sondland Opening Statement at 21, Ex. 4.
122
Sondland Opening Statement at 21, Ex. 4.
123
124
125
126
See, e.g., id. at KV00000019; July 25 Memorandum at 3-4, https://perma.cc/8JRD-6K9V.
SMF 24
E. President Trump Directly Solicited Election Interference from President
Zelensky
70. In the days leading up to President Trump’s July 25 call with President Zelensky,
U.S. polling data showed former Vice President Biden leading in a head-to-head contest against
President Trump. 127
71. Meanwhile, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker continued to prepare President
Zelensky and his advisors for the call with President Trump until right before it occurred.
72. On the morning of July 25, Ambassador Sondland spoke with President Trump in
advance of his call with President Zelensky. Ambassador Sondland then called Ambassador Volker
and left a voicemail. 128
73. After receiving Ambassador Sondland’s message, Ambassador Volker sent a text
message to President Zelensky’s aide, Mr. Yermak, approximately 30 minutes before the call:
Heard from White House—assuming President Z convinces trump he

will investigate / “get to the bottom of what happened” in 2016, we
will nail down date for visit to Washington. Good luck! 129
74. In his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland confirmed that Ambassador Volker’s
text message to Mr. Yermak accurately summarized the directive he had received from President
Trump earlier that morning. 130
75. During the roughly 30-minute July 25 call, President Zelensky thanked President
Trump for the “great support in the area of defense” provided by the United States and stated that
Ukraine would soon be prepared to purchase additional Javelin anti-tank missiles from the United
States. 131
127
See, e.g., Washington Post–ABC News Poll, June 28–July 1, 2019, Wash. Post (July 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/NS4B-PRWC.
128
Sondland Hearing Tr. at 53-54.
129
130
131
See July 25 Memorandum at 2, https://perma.cc/8JRD-6K9V.
SMF 25
76. President Trump immediately responded with his own request: “I would like you to
do us a favor though,” which was “to find out what happened” with alleged Ukrainian interference
in the 2016 election and to “look into” former Vice President Biden’s role in encouraging the
removal of the former Ukrainian prosecutor general.
77. Referencing Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference in the
2016 election, President Trump told President Zelensky, “[T]hey say a lot of it started with
Ukraine,” and “[w]hatever you can do, it’s very important that you do it if that’s possible.” 132
78. President Trump repeatedly pressed the Ukrainian President to consult with his
personal lawyer, Mr. Giuliani, as well as Attorney General William Barr, about the two specific
investigations. 133 President Trump stated, “Rudy very much knows what’s happening and he is a
very capable guy. If you could speak to him that would be great.” 134
79. President Zelensky agreed, referencing Mr. Giuliani’s back-channel role, noting that
Mr. Yermak “spoke with Mr. Giuliani just recently and we are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani
will be able to travel to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine.” 135
80. Later in the call, President Zelensky heeded the directives he had received from
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker: he thanked President Trump for his invitation to the White
House and then reiterated that, “[o]n the other hand,” he would “ensure” that Ukraine pursued “the
132
Id. at 3-4. President Trump continues to embrace this call as both “routine” and
“perfect.” See, e.g., Remarks by President Trump upon Arriving at the U.N. General Assembly, White House
(Sept. 24, 2019) (Trump Sept. 24 Remarks), https://perma.cc/ZQ4P-FGT4; Colby Itkowitz, Trump
Defends Call with Ukrainian President, Calling It “Perfectly Fine and Routine,” Wash. Post (Sept. 21, 2019),
https://perma.cc/T3ZM-GKLB.
133
See July 25 Memorandum at 4-5, https://perma.cc/8JRD-6K9V.
134
Id. at 4.
135
Id.
SMF 26
investigation” that President Trump had requested. President Zelensky confirmed the investigations
should be done “openly.” 136
81. During the call, President Trump also attacked Ambassador Yovanovitch. He said,
“The former ambassador from the United States, the woman, was bad news and the people she was
dealing with in the Ukraine were bad news so I just want to let you know that.” He later added,
“Well, she’s going to go through some things.” President Trump also defended then-Ukrainian
Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko, who was widely known to be corrupt. 137
82. The President did not mention any other issues relating to Ukraine, including
concerns about Ukrainian corruption, President Zelensky’s anti-corruption reforms, or the ongoing
war with Russia. The President only identified two people in reference to investigations: Vice
President Biden and his son. 138
83. Listening to the call as it transpired, several White House staff members became
alarmed. Lt. Col. Vindman immediately reported his concerns to NSC lawyers because, as he
testified, “[i]t is improper for the President of the United States to demand a foreign government
investigate a U.S. citizen and a political opponent.” 139
84. Jennifer Williams, an advisor to Vice President Pence, testified that the call struck
her as “unusual and inappropriate” and that “the references to specific individuals and
investigations, such as former Vice President Biden and his son, struck me as political in nature.” 140
136
Id. at 3, 5.
137
See id. at 2.
138
See generally id. Mr. Trump had previously engaged in efforts to cut aid to anti-corruption
programs in Ukraine and other foreign nations. See Erica Werner, Trump Administration Sought Billions
of Dollars in Cuts to Programs Aimed at Fighting Corruption in Ukraine and Elsewhere, Wash. Post (Oct. 23,
2019), https://perma.cc/R9AJ-AZ65.
139
Transcript, Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Jennifer Williams and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander
Vindman: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 19 (Nov. 19, 2019)
(Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr.).
140
Id. at 34; Williams Dep. Tr. at 148-49.
SMF 27
She believed President Trump’s solicitation of an investigation was “inappropriate” because it
“appeared to be a domestic political matter.” 141
85. Timothy Morrison, Dr. Hill’s successor as the NSC’s Senior Director for Europe and
Russia and Lt. Col. Vindman’s supervisor, said that “the call was not the full-throated endorsement
of the Ukraine reform agenda that I was hoping to hear.” 142 He too reported the call to NSC
lawyers, worrying that the call would be “damaging” if leaked publicly. 143
86. In response, Mr. Eisenberg and his deputy, Michael Ellis, tightly restricted access to
the call summary, which was placed on a highly classified NSC server even though it did not contain
any highly classified information. 144
87. On July 26, the day after the call, Ambassador Sondland had lunch with State
Department aides in Kyiv, including David Holmes, the Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv. During the lunch, Ambassador Sondland called President Trump directly from
his cellphone. President Trump asked Ambassador Sondland whether President Zelensky was
“going to do the investigation.” Ambassador Sondland stated that President Zelensky was “going to
do it” and would “do anything you ask him to.” 145
88. After the call, it was clear to Ambassador Sondland that “a public statement from
President Zelensky” committing to the investigations was a “prerequisite” for a White House
meeting. 146 He told Mr. Holmes that President Trump “did not give a [expletive] about Ukraine.”
Rather, the President cared only about “big stuff” that benefited him personally, like “the Biden
141
Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 15.
142
Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
143
Id. at 43.
144
Id. at 43, 47-50, 52; see also Vindman Dep. Tr. at 49-51, 119-22.
145
Holmes Dep. Tr. at 24.
146
SMF 28
investigation that Mr. Giuliani was pushing,” and that President Trump had directly solicited during
the July 25 call. 147
F. President Trump Conditioned the Release of Security Assistance for Ukraine,

and Continued to Leverage a White House Meeting, to Pressure Ukraine to
Launch Politically Motivated Investigations
89. As discussed further below, following the July 25 call, President Trump’s
representatives, including Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, in coordination with Mr. Giuliani,
pressed the Ukrainians to issue a public statement announcing the investigations. At the same time,
officials in both the United States and Ukraine became increasingly concerned about President
Trump’s continuing hold on security assistance. 148
90. The Ukrainian government was aware of the hold by at least late July, around the
time of President Trump’s July 25 call with President Zelensky. On the day of the call itself, DOD
officials learned that diplomats at the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, D.C., had made multiple
overtures to DOD and the State Department “asking about security assistance.” 149
91. Around this time, two different officials at the Ukrainian Embassy approached
Ambassador Volker’s special advisor to ask her about the hold. 150
92. By mid-August, before the hold was public, Lt. Col. Vindman also received inquiries
from the Ukrainian Embassy. Lt. Col. Vindman testified that during this timeframe, “it was no
secret, at least within government and official channels, that security assistance was on hold.” 151
93. The former Ukrainian deputy foreign minister, Olena Zerkal, has acknowledged that
she became aware of the hold on security assistance no later than July 30 based on a diplomatic
147
Holmes Dep. Tr. at 25-26.
148
See, e.g., Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 13-14; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 222; Sandy Dep. Tr. at
59-60.
149
Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 13-14.
150
Croft Dep. Tr. at 86-88.
151
SMF 29
cable—transmitted the previous week—from Ukrainian officials in Washington, D.C. 152 She said
that President Zelensky’s office had received a copy of the cable “simultaneously.” 153 Ms. Zerkal
further stated that President Zelensky’s top advisor, Andriy Yermak, told her “to keep silent, to not
comment without permission” about the hold or about when the Ukrainian government became
aware of it. 154
94. In early August, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, in coordination with Mr.
Giuliani, endeavored to pressure President Zelensky to make a public statement announcing the
investigations. On August 10—in a text message that showed the Ukrainians’ understanding of the
quid pro quo—President Zelensky’s advisor, Mr. Yermak, told Ambassador Volker that, once a date
was set for the White House meeting, he would “call for a press briefing, announcing upcoming visit
and outlining vision for the reboot of US-UKRAINE relationship, including among other things
Burisma and election meddling in investigations[.]” 155
95. On August 11, Ambassador Sondland emailed two State Department officials, one
of whom acted as a direct line to Secretary Pompeo, to inform them about the agreement for
President Zelensky to issue a statement that would include an announcement of the two
investigations. Ambassador Sondland stated that he expected a draft of the statement to be
“delivered for our review in a day or two[,]” and that he hoped the statement would “make the boss
[i.e., President Trump] happy enough to authorize an invitation” for a White House meeting. 156
96. On August 12, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador Volker an initial draft of the
statement. The draft referred to “the problem of interference in the political processes of the
Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine Knew of Aid Freeze in July, Says Ex-Top Official in Kyiv, N.Y.
152
Times (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/SD98-VPRN.

153
Id. (quoting Ms. Zerkal).
154
Id. (quoting Ms. Zerkal’s summary of a statement by Mr. Yermak).
155
156
Sondland Opening Statement at 22, Ex. 7; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28, 102.
SMF 30
United States,” but it did not explicitly mention the two investigations that President Trump had
requested in the July 25 call. 157
97. The next day, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland discussed the draft statement with
Mr. Giuliani, who told them, “If [the statement] doesn’t say Burisma and 2016, it’s not credible[.]” 158
As Ambassador Sondland would later testify, “Mr. Giuliani was expressing the desires of the
President of the United States, and we knew these investigations were important to the President.” 159
98. Ambassadors Volker and Sondland relayed this message to Mr. Yermak and sent him
a revised statement that included explicit references to “Burisma and the 2016 U.S. elections.” 160
99. In light of President Zelensky’s anti-corruption agenda, Ukrainian officials resisted
issuing the statement in August and, as a result, there was no movement toward scheduling the
White House meeting. 161
100. Meanwhile, there was growing concern about President Trump’s continued hold on
the security assistance for Ukraine. The hold remained in place through August, against the
unanimous judgment of American national security officials charged with overseeing U.S.-Ukraine
policy. For example, during a high-level interagency meeting in late July, officials unanimously
advocated for releasing the hold—with the sole exception of OMB, which was acting under
157
158
Volker Interview Tr. at 113.
159
160
Volker Text Messages at KV00000023. Ambassador Volker claimed that he “stopped
pursuing” the statement from the Ukrainians around this time because of concerns raised by Mr.
Yermak. Ambassador Kurt Volker, Testimony Before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Committee on Oversight 8 (Oct. 3, 2019) (Volker
Opening Statement), https://perma.cc/9DDN-2WFW; Volker Interview Tr. at 44-45, 199; Volker-
Morrison Hearing Tr. at 21.
161
See, e.g., Sondland Opening Statement at 16 (“[M]y goal, at the time, was to do what was
necessary to get the aid released, to break the logjam. I believed that the public statement we had
been discussing for weeks was essential to advancing that goal.”).
SMF 31
“guidance from the President and from Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney to freeze the assistance.” 162
But even officials within OMB had internally recommended that the hold be removed because
“assistance to Ukraine is consistent with [U.S.] national security strategy,” provides the “benefit . . .
of opposing Russian aggression,” and is backed by “bipartisan support.” 163
101. Without an explanation for the hold, and with President Trump already conditioning
a White House visit on the announcement of the investigations, it became increasingly apparent to
multiple witnesses that the security assistance was being withheld in order to pressure Ukraine to
announce the investigations. As Ambassador Sondland testified, President Trump’s effort to
condition release of the security assistance on an announcement of the investigations was as clear as
“two plus two equals four.” 164
102. On August 22, Ambassador Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo in an effort to
“break the logjam” on the security assistance and the White House meeting. He proposed that
President Trump should arrange to speak to President Zelensky during an upcoming trip to Warsaw,
during which President Zelensky could “look [President Trump] in the eye and tell him” he was
prepared “to move forward publicly . . . on those issues of importance to Potus and to the U.S.”—
i.e., the announcement of the two investigations. 165
103. On August 28, news of the hold was publicly reported by Politico. 166
162
Hale Dep. Tr. at 81; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184.
163
164
Sondland Hearing Tr. at 56-58; see also Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190 (Ambassador Taylor’s “clear
understanding” was that “security assistance money would not come until the [Ukrainian] President
committed to pursue the investigation”); Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 32 (Mr. Holmes’s “clear
impression was that the security assistance hold was likely intended by the President either as an
expression of dissatisfaction with the Ukrainians, who had not yet agreed to the Burisma/Biden
investigation, or as an effort to increase the pressure on them to do so.”).
165
Sondland Opening Statement at 23.
166
Caitlin Emma & Connor O’Brien, Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront
Russia, Politico (Aug. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/54RZ-Q6NJ.
SMF 32
104. As soon as the hold became public, Ukrainian officials expressed significant concern
to U.S. officials. 167 They were deeply worried not only about the practical impact that the hold
would have on efforts to fight Russian aggression, but also about the symbolic message the now-
publicized lack of support from the Trump Administration sent to the Russian government, which
would almost certainly seek to exploit any real or perceived crack in U.S. resolve toward Ukraine.
Mr. Yermak and other Ukrainian officials told Ambassador Taylor that they were “desperate” and
would be willing to travel to Washington to raise with U.S. officials the importance of the
assistance. 168 The recently appointed Ukrainian prosecutor general later remarked, “It’s critically
important for the west not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites[.]” 169
105. On September 1—within days of President Trump rejecting the request from
Secretaries Pompeo and Esper and Ambassador Bolton to release the hold 170—Vice President Pence
met with President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland after President Trump cancelled his trip. 171
106. In advance of this meeting, Ambassador Sondland told Vice President Pence that he
“had concerns that the delay in aid had become tied to the issue of investigations.” 172 Sondland
testified that Vice President Pence “nodded like, you know, he heard what I said, and that was pretty
much it.” 173
167
Volker Text Messages at KV00000020; Volker Interview Tr. at 80-81; Taylor Dep. Tr. at
34.
168
Taylor Dep. Tr. at 137-38.
169
Roman Olearchyk, Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, Fin. Times (Nov. 28, 2019),
https://perma.cc/YMX9-XJ2B (quoting current Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan
Ryaboshapka).
170
Behind the Ukraine Aid Freeze, https://perma.cc/TA5J-NJFX.
171
Readout of Vice President Mike Pence’s Meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
White House (Sep. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/K2PH-YPVK; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 41.
172
173
Id. at 38.
SMF 33
107. During the meeting that followed, which Ambassador Sondland also attended, “the
very first question” that President Zelensky asked Vice President Pence related to the status of U.S.
security assistance. 174 President Zelensky emphasized that “the symbolic value of U.S. support in
terms of security assistance . . . was just as valuable to the Ukrainians as the actual dollars.” 175 He
also voiced concern that “any hold or appearance of reconsideration of such assistance might
embolden Russia to think that the United States was no longer committed to Ukraine.” 176
108. Vice President Pence told President Zelensky that he would speak with President
Trump that evening. Although Vice President Pence did speak with President Trump, the President
still did not lift the hold. 177
109. Following the meeting between Vice President Pence and President Zelensky,
Ambassador Sondland pulled aside President Zelensky’s advisor, Mr. Yermak, to explain that “the
resumption of U.S. aid would likely not occur until Ukraine took some kind of action on [issuing a]
public statement” about the investigations. 178
110. Immediately following that conversation, Ambassador Sondland walked over to Mr.
Morrison, who had been standing across the room observing their interactions. Ambassador
Sondland told Mr. Morrison that “what he had communicated [to Mr. Yermak] was that . . . what
could help [Ukraine] move the aid was if the prosecutor general would go to the mike [sic] and
announce that he was opening” the investigations. 179
174
Williams Dep. Tr. at 81.
175
Id. at 82.
176
Id. at 82-83.
177
Id. at 94.
178
179
Morrison Dep. Tr. at 134.
SMF 34
111. Later that day, Mr. Morrison reported this conversation to Ambassador Bolton, who
advised him to “stay out of it” and to brief the NSC’s lawyers. Mr. Morrison subsequently reported
the conversation to Mr. Eisenberg. 180
112. Mr. Morrison also informed Ambassador Taylor about his conversation with
Ambassador Sondland. Ambassador Taylor was “alarmed by what Mr. Morrison told [him] about
the Sondland-Yermak conversation.” 181 He followed up by texting Ambassador Sondland, “Are we
now saying that security assistance and WH meeting are conditioned on investigations?”
Ambassador Sondland responded, “Call me.” 182
113. Ambassadors Sondland and Taylor then spoke by telephone. Ambassador Sondland
again relayed what he told Mr. Yermak and explained that he had made a “mistake” in telling
Ukrainian officials that only the White House meeting was conditioned on a public announcement of
the investigations. He clarified that “everything”—the White House meeting and security assistance
for Ukraine—was conditioned on the announcement of the investigations. 183 Ambassador Sondland
explained to Ambassador Taylor that “President Trump wanted President Zelensky in a public box,
by making a public statement about ordering such investigations.” 184
114. On September 7, President Trump and Ambassador Sondland spoke by telephone. 185
As Ambassador Sondland relayed later that day during a call with Mr. Morrison, President Trump
180
Id. at 182-83.
181
182
183
184
Id.; see also Taylor Dep. Tr. at 144.
185
In Ambassador Sondland’s testimony, he was not clear on whether he had one or two
conversations with the President in which the subject of a quid pro quo came up, or on precisely
which date such conversations took place during the period of September 6 through 9. Regardless
of the date, Ambassador Sondland did not contest telling both Mr. Morrison and Ambassador
Taylor—both of whom took contemporaneous notes—of a conversation he had with the President
that reaffirmed Ambassador Sondland’s understanding that President Zelensky had to make a public
statement announcing the investigations in order to obtain the White House meeting and security
SMF 35
told him “that there was no quid pro quo, but President Zelensky must announce the opening of the
investigations and he should want to do it.” 186
115. Mr. Morrison conveyed the substance of the September 7 call between President
Trump and Ambassador Sondland to Ambassador Taylor. Mr. Morrison said that the call had given
him “a sinking feeling” because he feared the security assistance would not be released before
September 30, the end of the fiscal year, and because he “did not think it was a good idea for the
Ukrainian President to . . . involve himself in our politics.” 187 At Ambassador Bolton’s direction,
Mr. Morrison reported Ambassador Sondland’s description of the President’s statements to the NSC
lawyers. 188
116. The next day, September 8, Ambassador Sondland confirmed in a phone call with
Ambassador Taylor that he had spoken to President Trump and that “President Trump was
adamant that President Zelensky himself had to” announce the investigations publicly. 189
117. Ambassador Sondland also told Ambassador Taylor that he had passed President
Trump’s message directly to President Zelensky and Mr. Yermak and had told them that “although
this was not a quid pro quo, if President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would be at a
stalemate”—meaning “Ukraine would not receive the much-needed military assistance.” 190
assistance. See Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109. Both documentary evidence and testimony confirmed
that the conversation described by Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor occurred on September 7.
See, e.g., Morrison Dep. Tr. at 144-45; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 38; Volker Text Messages at KV00000053
(Sondland text message to Volker and Taylor on September 8 stating, “Guys, multiple convos with
Ze, Potus. Lets talk”).
186
Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-91.
187
Id. at 145.
188
Id. at 223, 238.
189
190
Sondland Hearing Tr. at 7; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
SMF 36
118. Early the next morning, on September 9, Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassadors
Sondland and Volker: “As I said on the phone, I think it’s crazy to withhold security assistance for
help with a political campaign.” 191
119. The Ukrainians succumbed to the pressure. In early September, President Zelensky
agreed to do a televised interview, during which he would publicly announce the investigations. The
Ukrainians made arrangements for the interview to occur on CNN later in September. 192
120. The White House subsequently confirmed that the release of the security assistance
had been conditioned on Ukraine’s announcement of the investigations. During a White House
press conference on October 17, Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney acknowledged that he had
discussed security assistance with the President and that the President’s decision to withhold it was
directly tied to his desire that Ukraine investigate alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S.
election. 193
121. After a reporter attempted to clarify this explicit acknowledgement of a “quid pro
quo,” Mr. Mulvaney replied, “We do that all the time with foreign policy.” He added, “I have news
for everybody: get over it. There is going to be political influence in foreign policy.” 194
191
192
Sondland Hearing Tr. at 110-11; Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine’s Zelensky Bowed to Trump’s
Demands until Luck Spared Him, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/A5JE-N25L; Fareed
Zakaria, Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump’s “Quo” on My Show. Here’s What Happened., Wash. Post
(Nov. 14, 2019) (Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump’s “Quo”), https://perma.cc/MMT7-D8XJ.
193
Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, White House (Oct. 17, 2019) (Oct. 17
Briefing), https://perma.cc/Q45H-EMC7 (“Q. So the demand for an investigation into the
Democrats was part of the reason that he ordered to withhold funding to Ukraine? MR.
MULVANEY: The look back to what happened in 2016— Q. The investigation into Democrats.
MR. MULVANEY: —certainly was part of the thing that he was worried about in corruption with
that nation. And that is absolutely appropriate. Q. And withholding the funding? MR.
MULVANEY: Yeah. Which ultimately, then, flowed.”).
194
Id.
SMF 37
122. Multiple foreign policy and national security officials testified that the pursuit of
investigations into the Bidens and alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election was not part of
official U.S. policy. 195 Instead, as Dr. Hill described, these investigations were part of a “domestic
political errand” of President Trump. 196 Mr. Kent further explained that urging Ukraine to engage in
“selective politically associated investigations or prosecutions” undermines our longstanding efforts
to promote the rule of law abroad. 197
123. Ambassador Volker, in response to an inquiry from President Zelensky’s advisor,
Mr. Yermak, confirmed that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) did not make an official request
for Ukraine’s assistance in these investigations. 198
124. Within hours after the White House publicly released a record of the July 25 call,
DOJ itself confirmed in a statement that no such request was ever made:
The President has not spoken with the Attorney General about having
Ukraine investigate anything related to former Vice President Biden or
his son. The President has not asked the Attorney General to contact
Ukraine—on this or any other matter. The Attorney General has not
communicated with Ukraine—on this or any other subject. 199
195
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 146-47 (Mr. Morrison did not follow up on the
President’s request to “investigate the Bidens” because he “did not understand it as a policy
objective”); Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 119 (Mr. Vindman confirmed that he was not “aware
of any written product” from the NSC suggesting that these investigations were “part of the official
policy of the United States”); Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 179 (“Mrs. Demings[:] Was Mr. Giuliani
promoting U.S. national interests or policy in Ukraine . . . ? Ambassador Taylor[:] I don’t think so,
ma’am. . . . Mr. Kent[:] No, he was not.”).
196
Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 92.
197
198
Volker Interview Tr. at 197.
199
Morgan Chalfant & Brett Samuels, White House Memo Shows Trump Pressed Ukraine Leader to
Look into Biden, Hill (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/5LHW-V4EB (quoting DOJ spokesperson
Kerri Kupec).
SMF 38
G. President Trump Was Forced to Lift the Hold but Has Continued to Solicit
Foreign Interference in the Upcoming Election
125. As noted above, by early September 2019, President Zelensky had signaled his
willingness to announce the two investigations to secure a White House meeting and the security
assistance. He was scheduled to make the announcement during a CNN interview later in
September, but other events intervened. 200
126. On September 9, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs announced a joint
investigation into the scheme by President Trump “to improperly pressure the Ukrainian
government to assist the President’s bid for reelection.” 201 The same day, the Committees sent
document production and preservation requests to the White House and the State Department. 202
127. NSC staff members believed that the Congressional investigation “might have the
effect of releasing the hold” on Ukraine military assistance, because it would have been “potentially
politically challenging” to “justify that hold.” 203
128. Later that day, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) wrote to
the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Intelligence Committee notifying them that a
200
Taylor Dep. Tr. at 207-209; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 158 (“[A]s we’ve determined, as
we’ve discussed here on September 11th, just before any CNN discussion or interview, the hold was
released, the hold on the security assistance was released.” (quoting Ambassador Taylor)).
201
Press Release, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, Three House Committees
Launch Wide-Ranging Investigation into Trump-Giuliani Ukraine Scheme (Sept. 9, 2019) (Sept. 9
Press Release), https://perma.cc/AX4Y-PWSH.
202
Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, et al., to Pat A.
Cipollone, Counsel to the President 3-4 (Sept. 9, 2019) (Sept. 9 Letter), https://perma.cc/R2GH-
TZ9P; Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, et al., to Michael R.
Pompeo, Sec’y, Dep’t of State (Sept. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/C4W4-UBTF.
203
SMF 39
whistleblower had filed a complaint on August 12 that the ICIG had determined to be both an
“urgent concern” and “credible.” The ICIG did not disclose the contents of the complaint. 204
129. The ICIG further stated that the Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) had
taken the unprecedented step of withholding the whistleblower complaint from Congress. 205 It was
later revealed that the Acting DNI had done so as a result of communications with the White House
and the Department of Justice. 206 The next day, September 10, Chairman Schiff wrote to Acting
DNI Joseph Maguire to express his concern about the Acting DNI’s “unprecedented departure
from past practice” in withholding the whistleblower complaint and observed that the “failure to
transmit to the Committee an urgent and credible whistleblower complaint, as required by law, raises
the prospect that an urgent matter of a serious nature is being purposefully concealed from the
Committee.” 207
130. The White House was aware of the contents of the whistleblower complaint since at
least August 26, when the Acting DNI informed the White House Counsel’s Office of the
complaint. 208 White House Counsel Pat Cipollone and Mr. Eisenberg reportedly briefed President
204
Letter from Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Community, to
Chairman Adam Schiff, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, and Ranking Member
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence 2 (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/K78N-SMRR.
205
Id.
206
Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14, 19-24.
207
Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9X9V-G5ZN.
208
Transcript, Whistleblower Disclosure: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
116th Cong. 110 (Sept. 26, 209) (testimony of Joseph Maguire, Acting Dir., Nat’l Intelligence)
(Maguire Hearing Tr.) (“Chairman Schiff, when I received the letter from Michael Atkinson on the
26th of August, he concurrently sent a letter to the Office of White House Counsel asking the White
House counsel to control and keep any information that pertained to that phone call on the 25th.”).
SMF 40
Trump on the whistleblower complaint in late August and discussed whether they had to give it to
Congress. 209
131. On September 11—two days after the ICIG notified Congress of the whistleblower
complaint and the three House Committees announced their investigation—President Trump lifted
the hold on security assistance. As with the implementation of the hold, no credible reason was
provided for lifting the hold. 210 At the time of the release, there had been no discernible changes in
international assistance commitments for Ukraine or Ukrainian anti-corruption reforms. 211
132. Because of the hold the President placed on security assistance for Ukraine, DOD
was unable to spend approximately $35 million—or 14 percent—of the funds appropriated by
Congress for fiscal year 2019. 212
133. Congress was forced to pass a new law to extend the funding in order to ensure the
full amount could be used by Ukraine to defend itself. 213 Still, by early December 2019, Ukraine had
not received approximately $20 million of the military assistance. 214
209
Michael S. Schmidt et al., Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower Complaint When He Released Aid to
Ukraine, N.Y. Times (Nov. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/7473-YFSY.
210
See Morgan Philips, Trump Administration Lifts Hold on $250M in Military Aid for Ukraine,
Fox News (Sept. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/8ABM-XNPV.
211
See, e.g., Morrison Dep. Tr. at 244; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306; Williams Dep. Tr. at 147.
Mr. Sandy testified that he was not aware of any other countries committing to provide more
financial assistance to Ukraine prior to the lifting of the hold on September 11. Sandy Dep. Tr. at
180. Lt. Col. Vindman similarly confirmed that none of the “facts on the ground” changed before
the President lifted the hold. Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306.
212
Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-47; H. Rep. No. 116-335, at 474.
213
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020, and Health Extenders Act of 2019, Pub. L. No.
116-59, § 124 (2019).
214
Molly O’Toole & Sarah D. Wire, Millions in Military Aid at Center of Impeachment Hasn’t
Reached Ukraine, L.A. Times (Dec. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/AR26-3KY2 (citing a DOD aide).
SMF 41
134. Although the hold was lifted, the White House still had not announced a date for
President Zelensky’s meeting with President Trump, and there were indications that President
Zelensky’s interview with CNN would still occur. 215
135. On September 18, a week before President Trump was scheduled to meet with
President Zelensky on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, Vice President
Pence had a telephone call with President Zelensky. During the call, Vice President Pence “ask[ed] a
bit more about . . . how Zelensky’s efforts were going.” 216 Additional details about this call were
provided to the House by Vice President Pence’s advisor, Jennifer Williams, but were classified by
the Office of the Vice President. 217 Despite repeated requests, the Vice President has refused to
declassify Ms. Williams’ supplemental testimony.
136. On September 18 or 19, at the urging of Ambassador Taylor, 218 President Zelensky
cancelled the CNN interview. 219
137. To date, almost nine months after the initial invitation was extended by President
Trump on April 21, a White House meeting for President Zelensky has not occurred. 220 Since the
initial invitation, President Trump has met with more than a dozen world leaders at the White
215
Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33; Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 106-07; see also Zelensky Planned
to Announce Trump’s “Quo”, https://perma.cc/MMT7-D8XJ.
216
Williams Dep. Tr. at 156.
217
Classified Supp’l Submission of Jennifer Williams to the House Permanent Select Comm.
on Intelligence (Nov. 26, 2019) (describing additional details of the Vice President’s call with
President Zelensky on September 18).
218
Taylor-Kent Hearing Tr. at 106-07; Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33.
219
Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump’s “Quo”, https://perma.cc/MMT7-D8XJ.
220
Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46-47 (testimony of David Holmes) (“And although the hold
on the security assistance may have been lifted, there were still things they wanted that they weren't
getting, including a meeting with the President in the Oval Office. . . . And I think that continues to
this day.”).
SMF 42
House, including a meeting in the Oval Office with the Foreign Minister of Russia on December
10. 221
138. Since lifting the hold, and even after the House impeachment inquiry was announced
on September 24, President Trump has continued to press Ukraine to investigate Vice President
Biden and alleged 2016 election interference by Ukraine. 222
139. On September 24, in remarks at the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly,
President Trump stated: “What Joe Biden did for his son, that’s something they [Ukraine] should be
looking at.” 223
140. On September 25, in a joint public press availability with President Zelensky,
President Trump stated that “I want him to do whatever he can” in reference to the investigation of
the Bidens. 224 The same day, President Trump denied that his pursuit of the investigation involved a
quid pro quo. 225
141. On September 30, during remarks at the swearing-in of the new Labor Secretary,
President Trump stated: “Now, the new President of Ukraine ran on the basis of no corruption. . . .
But there was a lot of corruption having to do with the 2016 election against us. And we want to get
to the bottom of it, and it’s very important that we do.” 226
221
John Hudson & Anne Gearan, Trump Meets Russia’s Top Diplomat amid Scrap over Election
Interference, Wash. Post (Dec. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/X5WC-LKT5; see also Philip Bump, Trump
Promised Zelensky a White House Meeting. More Than a Dozen Other Leaders Got One Instead, Wash. Post
(Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/4XSP-R3JB (compiling White House meetings involving foreign
officials since April 2019).
222
E.g., H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 124; see also Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46-47.
223
Trump Sept. 24 Remarks, https://perma.cc/ZQ4P-FGT4.
224
Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting, White
House (Sept. 25, 2019) (Trump Sept. 25 Remarks), https://perma.cc/XCJ4-A67L.
225
Trump Quotes Sondland Quoting Him: “I Want Nothing. I Want No Quid Pro Quo.,” CBS News
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/X34R-QG3R.
226
Remarks by President Trump at the Swearing-In Ceremony of Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia, White
House (Sept. 30, 2019) (Trump Sept. 30 Remarks), https://perma.cc/R94C-5HAY.
SMF 43
142. On October 3, when asked by a reporter what he had hoped President Zelensky
would do following their July 25 call, President Trump responded: “Well, I would think that, if they
were honest about it, they’d start a major investigation into the Bidens. It’s a very simple answer.” 227
The President also suggested that “China should start an investigation into the Bidens, because what
happened in China is just about as bad as what happened with—with Ukraine. 228
143. On October 4, President Trump equated his interest in “looking for corruption” to
the investigation of two particular subjects: the Bidens and alleged Ukrainian interference in the
2016 election. He told reporters:
What I want to do—and I think I have an obligation to do it, probably

a duty to do it: corruption—we are looking for corruption. When you
look at what Biden and his son did, and when you look at other
people—what they’ve done. And I believe there was tremendous
corruption with Biden, but I think there was beyond—I mean, beyond
corruption—having to do with the 2016 campaign, and what these
lowlifes did to so many people, to hurt so many people in the Trump
campaign—which was successful, despite all of the fighting us. I
mean, despite all of the unfairness. 229
When asked by a reporter, “Is someone advising you that it is okay to solicit the help of other
governments to investigate a potential political opponent?,” Trump replied in part, “Here’s what’s
okay: If we feel there’s corruption, like I feel there was in the 2016 campaign—there was
tremendous corruption against me—if we feel there’s corruption, we have a right to go to a foreign
country.” 230
144. As the House’s impeachment inquiry unfolded, Mr. Giuliani, on behalf of the
President, also continued to urge Ukraine to pursue the investigations and dig up dirt on former
227
Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, White House (Oct. 3, 2019) (Trump
Oct. 3 Remarks), https://perma.cc/WM8A-NRA2.
228
Id.
229
Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (Trump
Oct. 4 Remarks), https://perma.cc/C78K-NMDS.
230
Id.
SMF 44
Vice President Biden. Mr. Giuliani’s own statements about these efforts further confirm that he has
been working in furtherance of the President’s personal and political interests. 231
145. During the first week of December, Mr. Giuliani traveled to Kyiv and Budapest to
meet with both current and former Ukrainian government officials, 232 including a current Ukrainian
member of Parliament who attended a KGB school in Moscow and has led calls to investigate
Burisma and the Bidens. 233 Mr. Giuliani also met with the corrupt former prosecutor generals,
Viktor Shokin and Yuriy Lutsenko, who had promoted the false allegations underlying the
investigations President Trump wanted. 234 Mr. Giuliani told the New York Times that in meeting with
Ukrainian officials he was acting on behalf of his client, President Trump: “[L]ike a good lawyer, I
am gathering evidence to defend my client against the false charges being leveled against him.” 235
146. During his trip to Ukraine, on December 5, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: “The
conversation about corruption in Ukraine was based on compelling evidence of criminal conduct by
then VP Biden, in 2016, that has not been resolved and until it is will be a major obstacle to the US
assisting Ukraine with its anti-corruption reforms.” 236 Not only was Mr. Giuliani perpetuating the
231
See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel & Benjamin Novak, Giuliani, Facing Scrutiny, Travels to Europe to
Interview Ukrainians, N.Y. Times (Dec. 4, 2019) (Giuliani, Facing Scrutiny, Travels to Europe),
https://perma.cc/N28V-GPAC; Dana Bash & Michael Warren, Giuliani Says Trump Still Supports His
Dirt-Digging in Ukraine, CNN (Dec. 17, 2019) (Giuliani Says Trump Still Supports His Dirt-Digging),
https://perma.cc/F399-B9AY.
232
Giuliani, Facing Scrutiny, Travels to Europe, https://perma.cc/HZ6F-E67G; David L. Stern
& Robyn Dixon, Ukraine Lawmaker Seeking Biden Probe Meets with Giuliani in Kyiv, Wash. Post (Dec. 5,
2019) (Ukraine Lawmaker Seeking Biden Probe), https://perma.cc/C3GW-RF4T; Will Sommer, Rudy’s
New Ukraine Jaunt Is Freaking Out Trump’s Lieutenants—and He Doesn’t Care, Daily Beast (Dec. 6, 2019)
(Rudy’s New Ukraine Jaunt), https://perma.cc/UNR9-VWFZ.
233
Ukraine Lawmaker Seeking Biden Probe, https://perma.cc/W3Q2-E8QY.
234
Philip Bump, Giuliani May Be Making a Stronger Case Against Trump Than Biden, Wash. Post
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/7HR4-TC9W; Rudy’s New Ukraine Jaunt,
https://perma.cc/UNR9-VWFZ.
235
Giuliani, Facing Scrutiny, Travels to Europe, https://perma.cc/HZ6F-E67G.
236
Rudy Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter (Dec. 5, 2019, 1:42 PM),
https://perma.cc/829X-TSKJ.
SMF 45
false allegations against Vice President Biden, but he was reiterating the threat that President Trump
had used to pressure President Zelensky to announce the investigations: that U.S. assistance to
Ukraine could be in jeopardy until Ukraine investigated Vice President Biden.
147. Mr. Giuliani told the Wall Street Journal that when he returned to New York on
December 7, President Trump called him as his plane was still taxiing down the runway. “‘What did
you get?’ he said Mr. Trump asked. ‘More than you can imagine,’ Mr. Giuliani replied.” 237
148. Later that day, President Trump told reporters that he was aware of Mr. Giuliani’s
efforts in Ukraine and believed that Mr. Giuliani wanted to report the information he’d gathered to
the Attorney General and Congress. 238
149. On December 17, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that President Trump has been “very
supportive” of his continuing efforts to dig up dirt on Vice President Biden in Ukraine and that they
are “on the same page.” 239
150. Such ongoing efforts by President Trump, including through his personal attorney,
to solicit an investigation of his political opponent have undermined U.S. credibility. On September
14, Ambassador Volker advised Mr. Yermak against the Zelensky Administration conducting an
investigation into President Zelensky’s own former political rival, former Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko. When Ambassador Volker raised concerns about such an investigation, Mr. Yermak
237
Rebecca Ballhaus & Julie Bykowicz, “Just Having Fun”: Giuliani Doubles Down on Ukraine
Probes, Wall Street J. (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/5B69-2AVR.
238
David Jackson, Trump Says Rudy Giuliani Will Give Information About Ukraine to Justice
Department, Congress, USA Today (Dec. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/7RXJ-JG7F.
239
Giuliani Says Trump Still Supports His Dirt-Digging, https://perma.cc/F399-B9AY; see also
Asawin Suebsaeng & Erin Banco, Trump Tells Rudy to Keep Pushing the Biden Conspiracies, Daily Beast
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/S5K6-K8J9 (quoting source who reported that President Trump
told Mr. Giuliani to “keep at it”).
SMF 46
retorted, “What, you mean like asking us to investigate Clinton and Biden?” 240 Ambassador Volker
offered no response. 241
151. Mr. Holmes, a career diplomat, highlighted this hypocrisy: “While we had advised
our Ukrainian counterparts to voice a commitment to following the rule of law and generally
investigating credible corruption allegations,” U.S. officials were making “a demand that President
Zelensky personally commit on a cable news channel to a specific investigation of President
Trump’s political rival.” 242
H. President Trump’s Conduct Was Consistent with His Previous Invitations of

Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections
152. President Trump’s efforts to solicit Ukraine’s interference in the 2020 U.S.
Presidential election to help his own reelection campaign were consistent with his prior solicitation
and encouragement of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, when the Trump Campaign
“expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian
efforts.” 243
153. As a Presidential candidate, Mr. Trump repeatedly sought to benefit from Russia’s
actions to help his campaign. For example, during a public rally on July 27, 2016, then-candidate
Trump declared: “Russia, if you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are
missing” from opposing candidate Hillary Clinton’s personal server. 244 Within hours, Russian
hackers targeted Clinton’s personal office for the first time. 245
240
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 139; see Kent Dep. Tr. at 329.
241
Kent Dep. Tr. at 329.
242
Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 32.
243
Mueller Report, Vol. I at 1-2.
244
Mueller Report, Vol. I at 49 (quoting then-candidate Donald Trump).
245
Id. Beginning in early November 2019, while the House’s impeachment inquiry was
ongoing, Russian military hackers reportedly hacked Burisma’s server using “strikingly similar”
tactics to those used to hack the DNC in 2016. See Nicole Perlroth & Matthew Rosenberg, Russians
SMF 47
154. Days earlier, WikiLeaks had begun releasing emails and documents that were stolen
by Russian military intelligence services in order to damage the Clinton campaign. 246 WikiLeaks
continued releasing stolen documents through October 2016. 247 Then-candidate Trump repeatedly
applauded and sought to capitalize on WikiLeaks’s releases of these stolen documents, even after
Russia’s involvement was heavily reported by the press. 248 Members of the Trump Campaign also
planned messaging and communications strategies around releases by WikiLeaks. 249 In the last
month of the campaign, then-candidate Trump publicly referred to the emails hacked by Russia and
disseminated by WikiLeaks over 150 times. 250
155. Multiple members of the Trump Campaign used additional channels to seek Russia’s
assistance in obtaining damaging information about Clinton. For example, senior representatives of
the Trump Campaign—including the Campaign’s chairman and the President’s son—met with a
Russian attorney in June 2016 who had offered to provide damaging information about Clinton
from the Russian government. 251 A foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign also met
repeatedly with people connected to the Russian government and their associates, one of whom
claimed to have “dirt” on Clinton in the form of “thousands of emails.” 252
156. Even after Special Counsel Mueller released his report, President Trump confirmed
his willingness to benefit from foreign election interference. When asked during a televised
Hacked Ukrainian Gas Company at Center of Impeachment, N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5NSA-BELW.
246
Mueller Report, Vol. I at 6.
247
Id., Vol. I at 58.
248
See Aaron Blake, The Trump Team’s History of Flirting with—and Promoting—Now-Accused-
Criminal Julian Assange, Wash. Post (Nov. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/UL9R-YQN.
249
Mueller Report, Vol. I at 54; id., Vol. II at 18.
250
Judd Legum, Trump Mentioned WikiLeaks 164 Times in Last Month of Election, Now Claims It
Didn’t Impact One Voter, ThinkProgress (Jan. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/5J46-Y8RG.
251
Mueller Report, Vol. I at 110-20.
252
Id., Vol. I at 83-84, 87-89.
SMF 48
interview in June 2019 whether he would accept damaging information from a foreign government
about a political opponent, the President responded, “I think I’d take it.” 253 President Trump
declared that he sees “nothing wrong with listening” to a foreign power that offers information
detrimental to a political adversary. 254 Asked whether such an offer of information should be
reported to law enforcement, President Trump retorted: “Give me a break, life doesn’t work that
way.” 255 Just weeks later, President Trump froze security assistance to Ukraine as his agents were
pushing that country to pursue investigations that would help the President’s reelection campaign. 256
157. In addition, President Trump’s request for the investigations on the July 25 call with
President Zelensky took place one day after former Special Counsel Mueller testified before the
House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence about the
findings of his investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 Presidential election and President
Trump’s efforts to undermine that investigation. 257 During his call with President Zelensky,
President Trump derided former Special Counsel Mueller’s “poor performance” in his July 24
testimony and speculated that “that whole nonsense . . . started with Ukraine.” 258
II. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S OBSTRUCTION OF CONGRESS
158. President Trump ordered categorical obstruction of the impeachment inquiry
undertaken by the House under Article I of the Constitution, which vests the House with the “sole
Power of Impeachment.” 259
253
Transcript: ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos’ Exclusive Interview with President Trump, ABC
News (June 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/C8DS-637R.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Sandy Dep. Tr. at 37-39; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
257
See Press Release, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, House Judiciary and
House Intelligence Committees to Hold Open Hearing with Special Counsel Robert Mueller (July
19, 2019), https://perma.cc/6TZZ-BJKS.
258
The July 25 Memorandum at 3, https://perma.cc/8JRD-6K9V.
259
SMF 49
A. The House Launched an Impeachment Inquiry
159. During the 116th Congress, a number of Committees of the House have undertaken
investigations into allegations of misconduct by President Trump and his Administration, including
to determine whether to recommend articles of impeachment. 260
160. As discussed above, on September 9, the Intelligence Committee and the
Committees on Oversight and Reform and Foreign Affairs announced they would conduct a joint
investigation into the President’s scheme to pressure Ukraine to announce the politically motivated
investigations. 261
161. Given the gravity of the allegations that President Trump was soliciting foreign
interference in the upcoming 2020 election, Speaker Nancy P. Pelosi announced on September 24
that the House was “moving forward with an official impeachment inquiry.” 262 Speaker Pelosi
directed the Committees to “proceed with their investigations under that umbrella of [an]
impeachment inquiry.” 263
162. On October 31, the House enacted a resolution confirming the Committees’
authority to conduct the impeachment inquiry and adopting procedures governing the inquiry. 264
260
See, e.g., Resolution Recommending That the House of Representatives Find William P. Barr, Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued
by the Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rep. No. 116-105, at 13 (June 6, 2019) (“The purposes of this
investigation include . . . considering whether any of the conduct described in the Special Counsel’s
Report warrants the Committee in taking any further steps under Congress’ Article I powers. That
includes whether to approve articles of impeachment with respect to the President[.]”); Directing
Certain Committees to Continue Their Ongoing Investigations as Part of the Existing House of Representatives
Inquiry into Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise its Constitutional Power
to Impeach Donald John Trump, President of the United States of America, and for Other Purposes, H. Rep. No.
116-266, at 4 (Oct. 2019).
261
Sept. 9 Press Release, https://perma.cc/AX4Y-PWSH.
262
Press Release, Speaker of the House, Pelosi Remarks Announcing Impeachment Inquiry
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/6EQM-34PT.
263
Id.
264
H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019).
SMF 50
163. The procedures adopted by the House afforded procedural privileges to the
President that were equivalent to, or in some instances exceeded, those afforded during prior
impeachment inquiries. 265 Transcripts of all witness interviews and depositions were released to the
public, and President Trump was offered—but refused—multiple opportunities to have his counsel
participate in proceedings before the Judiciary Committee, including by cross-examining witnesses
and presenting evidence. 266
B. President Trump Ordered Categorical Obstruction of the House’s

Impeachment Inquiry
164. Even before the House launched its impeachment inquiry into President Trump’s
misconduct concerning Ukraine, he rejected Congress’s Article I investigative and oversight
authority, proclaiming, “[W]e’re fighting all the subpoenas,” 267 and “I have an Article II, where I
have the right to do whatever I want as president.” 268
165. In response to the House impeachment inquiry regarding Ukraine, the Executive
Branch categorically refused to provide any requested documents or information at President
Trump’s direction.
166. On September 9, 2019, three House Committees sent a letter to White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone requesting six categories of documents relevant to the Ukraine investigation
265
Compare 165 Cong. Rec. E1357 (2019) (Impeachment Inquiry Procedures in the
Committee on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 660), with Investigatory Powers of the Committee on the
Judiciary with Respect to Its Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rep. No. 105-795 (1998), and with Impeachment Inquiry:
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Book III, 93d Cong. 2249-52 (1974); see also H. Rep. No.
116-346, at 17-25.
266
H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 22-24.
267
Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, White House (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/W7VZ-FZ3T.
268
Remarks by President Trump at Turning Point USA’s Teen Student Action Summit 2019, White
House (July 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/EFF6-9BE7.
SMF 51
by September 16. 269 When the White House did not respond, the Committees sent a follow-up
letter on September 24. 270
167. Instead of responding directly to the Committees, the President publicly declared the
impeachment inquiry “a disgrace,” and stated that “it shouldn’t be allowed” and that “[t]here should
be a way of stopping it.” 271
168. When the White House still did not respond to the Committees’ request, the
Committees issued a subpoena compelling the White House to turn over documents. 272
169. The President’s response to the House’s inquiry—sent by Mr. Cipollone on October
8—sought to accomplish the President’s goal of “stopping” the House’s investigation. Mr.
Cipollone wrote “on behalf of President Donald J. Trump” to notify Congress that “President
Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry under these
circumstances.” 273
170. Despite the Constitution’s placement of the “sole Power” of impeachment in the
House, Mr. Cipollone’s October 8 letter opined that the House’s inquiry was “constitutionally
invalid,” “lack[ed] . . . any basis,” “lack[ed] the necessary authorization for a valid impeachment,”
and was merely “labeled . . . as an ‘impeachment inquiry.’” 274
269
Sept. 9 Letter, https://perma.cc/R2GH-TZ9P.
270
Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, et al., to Pat A.
Cipollone, Counsel to the President 3 (Sept. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/SCG3-6UEW.
271
Remarks by President Trump upon Air Force One Arrival, White House (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5RWE-8VTB.
272
Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, et
al., to John Michael Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff to the President (Oct. 4, 2019) (Oct. 4 Letter),
https://perma.cc/6RXE-WER8.
273
Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House
of Representatives, et al. 7 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/5P57-773X (Oct. 8 Cipollone Letter).
274
Id. at 1-3, 6.
SMF 52
171. The letter’s rhetoric aligned with the President’s public campaign against the
impeachment inquiry, which he has branded “a COUP, intended to take away the Power of the
People,” 275 an “unconstitutional abuse of power,” 276 and an “open war on American Democracy.” 277
172. Although President Trump has categorically sought to obstruct the House’s
impeachment inquiry, he has never formally asserted a claim of executive privilege as to any
document or testimony. Mr. Cipollone’s October 8 letter refers to “long-established Executive
Branch confidentiality interests and privileges” but the President did not actually assert executive
privilege. 278 Similarly, a Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel November 1, 2019 opinion
only recognized that information responsive to the subpoenas was “potentially protected by executive
privilege.” 279
173. In addition, the President and his agents have spoken at length about these events to
the press and on social media. Since the impeachment inquiry was announced on September 24, the
President has made numerous public statements about his communications with President Zelensky
and his decision-making relating to the hold on security assistance. 280
174. The President’s agents have done the same. For example, on October 16, Secretary
Perry gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal. During the interview, Secretary Perry stated that
275
@realDonaldTrump (Oct. 1, 2019, 4:41 PM), https://perma.cc/UX8Z-BFKL.
276
Letter from President Donald J. Trump to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, House of
Representatives (Dec. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/MY49-HRXH.
277
Id.
278
Oct. 8 Cipollone Letter at 4.
279
Exclusion of Agency Counsel from Congressional Depositions in the Impeachment
Context, 43 O.L.C. *1 (Nov. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/T2PH-KC9V (emphasis added).
280
See, e.g., Trump Sept. 25 Remarks, https://perma.cc/XCJ4-A67L; Trump Sept. 30
Remarks, https://perma.cc/R94C-5HAY; Remarks by President Trump and President Niinistö of the
Republic of Finland Before Bilateral Meeting, White House (Oct. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/FN4D-
6D8W; Trump Oct. 3 Remarks, https://perma.cc/WM8A-NRA2; Trump Oct. 4 Remarks,
https://perma.cc/C78K-NMDS; @realDonaldTrump (Nov. 10, 2019, 11:43 AM),
https://perma.cc/F9XH-48Z2; id. (Dec. 4, 2019, 7:50 PM), https://perma.cc/Q4VY-T3CN; id.,
https://perma.cc/3WCM-AQJG.
SMF 53
after the May 23 meeting at which President Trump refused to schedule a White House meeting
with President Zelensky, Secretary Perry “sought out Rudy Giuliani this spring at President Trump’s
direction to address Mr. Trump’s concerns about alleged Ukrainian corruption.” 281 During a phone
call with Secretary Perry, Mr. Giuliani said, “‘Look, the president is really concerned that there are
people in Ukraine that tried to beat him during this presidential election. . . . He thinks they’re
corrupt and . . . that there are still people over there engaged that are absolutely corrupt.’” 282
175. On October 17, Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney acknowledged during a White
House press conference that he discussed security assistance with the President and that the
President’s decision to withhold it was directly tied to his desire that Ukraine investigate alleged
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. 283
176. On December 3, 2019, the Intelligence Committee transmitted a detailed nearly 300-
page report documenting its findings about this scheme and about the related investigation into it, to
the Judiciary Committee. 284 The Judiciary Committee held public hearings evaluating the
constitutional standard for impeachment and the evidence against President Trump—in which the
President’s counsel was invited to participate, but declined—and then reported two Articles of
Impeachment to the House. 285
281
Rick Perry Called Rudy Giuliani, https://perma.cc/S2ED-AUPR.
282
Id. (quoting Secretary Rick Perry).
283
Oct. 17 Briefing, https://perma.cc/Q45H-EMC7.
284
H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 11 (“On December 3, 2019, in consultation with the Committees
on Oversight and Reform and Foreign Affairs, HPSCI released and voted to adopt a report of
nearly 300 pages detailing its extensive findings about the President’s abuse of his office and
obstruction of Congress.”).
285
The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for Presidential
Impeachment: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019); The Impeachment
Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Presentations from H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence and H.
Comm. on the Judiciary Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Dec. 9, 2019).
SMF 54
177. The President maintained his obstructionist position throughout this process,
declaring the House’s investigation “illegitimate” in a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi on December
17, 2019. 286 President Trump further attempted to undermine the House’s inquiry by dismissing
impeachment as “illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional” 287 and by intimidating and threatening an
anonymous Intelligence Community whistleblower as well as the patriotic public servants who
honored their subpoenas and testified before the House. 288
178. On December 18, 2019, the House voted to impeach President Trump and adopted
two Articles of Impeachment. 289
C. Following President Trump’s Directive, the Executive Branch Refused to

Produce Requested and Subpoenaed Documents
179. Adhering to President Trump’s directive, every Executive Branch agency that
received an impeachment inquiry request or subpoena defied it. 290
180. House Committees issued document requests or subpoenas to the White House, the
Office of the Vice President, OMB, the Department of State, DOD, and the Department of
Energy. 291
286
See, e.g., Letter from President Donald J. Trump to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House of
Representatives (Dec. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y6X4-TTPR.
287
Katie Rogers, At Louisiana Rally, Trump Lashes Out at Impeachment Inquiry and Pelosi, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/RX9Z-DQHK.
288
See e.g., Danny Cevallos, Trump Tweeted as Marie Yovanovitch Testified: Was It Witness
Tampering?, NBC News (Nov. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/RG5N-EQYN; @realDonaldTrump
(Sept. 29, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://perma.cc/9C3P-E437; Trump War Room—Text FIGHT to
88022 (@TrumpWarRoom) (Dec. 26, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://perma.cc/M5H7-B4VS (retweeted by
@realDonaldTrump on Dec. 26, 2019).
289
H. Res. 755, 116th Cong (2019).
290
See H. Rep. No. 116-335, at 180-92.
291
Oct. 4 Letter, https://perma.cc/6RXE-WER8; Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel,
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, et al., to Vice President Michael R. Pence (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://perma.cc/E6TR-5N5F; Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, et al., to Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Oct. 7,
2019), https://perma.cc/2HBV-2LNB; Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, et al., to Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y, Dep’t of State (Sept. 27, 2019),
SMF 55
181. In its response, the Office of the Vice President echoed Mr. Cipollone’s assertions
that the impeachment inquiry was procedurally invalid, 292 while agencies such as OMB and DOD
expressly cited the President’s directive. 293
182. The Executive Branch has refused to produce any documents in response to the
Committees’ valid, legally binding subpoenas, even though witness testimony has revealed that
highly relevant records exist. 294
183. Indeed, by virtue of President Trump’s order, not a single document has been
produced by the White House, the Office of the Vice President, OMB, the Department of State,
https://perma.cc/8N7L-VSDR; Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select

Comm. on Intelligence, et al., to Mark Esper, Sec’y, Dep’t of Def. (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/LMU8-XWE9; Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, et al., to Rick Perry, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy (Oct. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/586S-AR8A.
292
Letter from Matthew E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President, to Chairman Elijah E.
Cummings, House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, et al. (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://perma.cc/L6LD-C4YM.
293
Letter from Jason Yaworske, Assoc. Dir. for Legislative Affairs, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Oct. 15,
2019), https://perma.cc/AL7W-YBLR; Letter from Robert R. Hood, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for
Legislative Affairs, Dep’t of Def., to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, et al. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/79ZG-ASGM.
294
See, e.g., Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-32 (briefing materials for President Trump’s
call with President Zelensky on July 25 prepared by Lt. Col. Vindman, Director for Ukraine at the
NSC); Vindman Dep. Tr. at 53 and Morrison Dep. Tr. at 19-20 (notes relating to the July 25 call
taken by Lt. Col. Vindman and Mr. Morrison, the former Senior Director for Europe and Russia on
the NSC); Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186-87 and Morrison Dep. Tr. at 166-67 (an August 15 “Presidential
decision memo” prepared by Lt. Col. Vindman and approved by Mr. Morrison conveying “the
consensus views from the entire deputies small group” that “the security assistance be released”);
Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43 (NSC staff summaries of conclusions from meetings at the principal,
deputy, or sub-deputy level relating to Ukraine, including military assistance); Sondland Hearing Tr.
at 78-79 (call records between President Trump and Ambassador Sondland,); Vindman Dep. Tr. at
36-37 (NSC Legal Advisor Eisenberg’s notes and correspondence relating to discussions with Lt.
Col. Vindman regarding the July 10 meetings in which Ambassador Sondland requested
investigations in exchange for a White House meeting); Holmes Dep. Tr. at 31 (the memorandum of
conversation from President Trump’s meeting in New York with President Zelensky on September
25); Sondland Opening Statement (emails and other messages between Ambassador Sondland and
senior White House officials, including Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney, Senior Advisor to the Chief
of Staff Blair, and then-National Security Advisor Bolton, among other high-level Trump
Administration officials).
SMF 56
DOD, or the Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized requests or demands
for records in their possession, custody, or control. These agencies and offices also blocked many
current and former officials from producing records to the Committees. 295
184. Certain witnesses, however, defied the President’s order and identified the substance
of key documents. For example, Lt. Col. Vindman described a “Presidential Decision Memo” he
prepared in August that conveyed the “consensus views” among foreign policy and national security
officials that the hold on aid to Ukraine should be released. 296 Other witnesses identified additional
documents that the President and various agencies were withholding from Congress that were
directly relevant to the impeachment inquiry. 297
185. Some responsive documents have been released by the State Department, DOD, and
OMB pursuant to judicial orders issued in response to lawsuits filed under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). 298 Although limited in scope and heavily redacted, these FOIA
productions confirm that the Trump Administration is withholding highly pertinent documents
from Congress without any valid legal basis. 299
295
See H. Rep. No. 116-335, at 180-244.
296
Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186-87; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 166-67; see also, e.g., Sandy Dep. Tr. at
58-60 (describing an OMB memorandum prepared in August that recommended removing the
hold).
297
Taylor Dep. Tr. at 33-34, 45-46 (describing August 27 cable to Secretary Pompeo,
WhatsApp messages with Ukrainian and American officials, and notes); Volker Dep. Tr. at 20
(describing State Department’s possession of substantial paper trail of correspondence concerning
meetings with Ukraine); Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 61 (describing classified email to Under Secretary
Hale); id. at 197-200 (describing a dispute between George Kent and the State Department
pertaining to subpoenaed documents).
298
See, e.g., State Department Releases Ukraine Documents to American Oversight, American
Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/N7K2-D7G3; Joint Status Report at 1, American
Oversight v. Dep’t of State, No. 19-cv-2934 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019), ECF No. 19.
299
For example, documents produced by OMB, unredacted copies of which reportedly were
obtained by the online forum Just Security, corroborate the witnesses who testified that the military
aid for Ukraine was withheld at the express direction of President Trump and that the White House
was informed that doing so may violate the law. See Just Security Report, https://perma.cc/VA6U-
RYPK.
SMF 57
D. President Trump Ordered Top Aides Not to Testify, Even Pursuant to
Subpoena
186. President Trump directed government witnesses to violate their legal obligations and
defy House subpoenas—regardless of their offices or positions. In some instances, the President
personally directed that senior aides defy subpoenas on the ground that they are “absolutely
immune” from compelled testimony. 300 Other officials refused to appear “as directed by” Mr.
Cipollone’s October 8 letter. 301 Still others refused to appear because—consistent with the House
Deposition Rules drafted by the then-majority Republicans—agency counsel was not permitted in
the depositions. 302
187. This Administration-wide effort to prevent witnesses from providing testimony was
coordinated and comprehensive. In total, twelve current or former Administration officials refused
to testify as part of the House’s impeachment inquiry into the Ukrainian matter, nine of whom did
so in defiance of duly authorized subpoenas. 303 House Committees advised such witnesses that their
refusal to testify may be used as an adverse inference against the President. 304 Nonetheless—despite
300
See Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to William Pittard, Counsel to
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Nov. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/9PHC-84AM; Letter from
Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to William Burck, Counsel to Deputy Counsel to the
President for Nat’l Security Affairs John Eisenberg (Nov. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/QP4G-
YMKQ.
301
See, e.g., Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Dir. for Leg. Affairs, Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Nov. 4,
2019), https://perma.cc/4AYC-8SD9 (asserting OMB’s “position that, as directed by the White
House Counsel’s October 8, 2019 letter, OMB will not participate in this partisan and unfair
inquiry,” and that three OMB officials would therefore defy subpoenas for their testimony).
302
See H. Rep. No. 116-335, at 195, 198-99, 201, 203. Such witnesses included Robert Blair,
Michael Ellis, P. Wells Griffith, Russell Vought, and Brian McCormack. Id.
303
See id. at 193-206 (describing and quoting from correspondence with each witness who
refused to appear).
304
See H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 200, 365; see, e.g., Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al., to Michael Duffey, Assoc. Dir. for Nat’l Sec.
Programs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/3S5B-FH94; Email from
Daniel S. Noble, Senior Investigative Counsel, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, to
SMF 58
being instructed by senior political appointees not to cooperate with the House’s impeachment
inquiry, in directives that frequently cited or enclosed copies of Mr. Cipollone’s October 8 letter 305—
many current and former officials complied with their legal obligations to appear for testimony.
188. House Committees conducted depositions or transcribed interviews of seventeen
witnesses. 306 All members of the Committees—as well as staff from the Majority and the
Minority—were permitted to attend. The Majority and Minority were allotted an equal amount of
time to question witnesses. 307
189. In late November 2019, twelve of these witnesses testified in public hearings
convened by the Intelligence Committee, including three witnesses called by the Minority. 308
190. Unable to silence certain witnesses, President Trump resorted to intimidation tactics
to penalize them. 309 He also levied sustained attacks on the anonymous whistleblower. 310
Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff to the President (Nov. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/A62P-
5ACG.
305
See, e.g., Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Sec’y of State for Mgmt., Dep’t of State, to
Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch 1 (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/48UC-KJCM (“I write on behalf of the Department of State, pursuant to the
President’s instruction reflected in Mr. Cipollone’s letter, to instruct your client . . . consistent with
Mr. Cipollone’s letter, not to appear before the Committees.”); id. at 3-10 (enclosing Mr. Cipollone’s
letter); Letter from David L. Norquist, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def., to Daniel Levin,
Counsel to Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. Laura K. Cooper 1-2 (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/WM97-DZJZ (“This letter informs you and Ms. Cooper of the Administration-
wide direction that Executive Branch personnel ‘cannot participate in [the impeachment] inquiry
under these circumstances.’” (quoting Mr. Cipollone’s letter)); id. at 25-32 (enclosing Mr. Cipollone’s
letter).
306
See H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 9; see also Read for Yourself: President Trump’s Abuse of Power,
House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, https://perma.cc/2L54-YY9P.
307
See H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 9.
308
See id. at 10-11.
309
See H. Rep. No. 116-335, at 217-20 (detailing the ways that “President Trump publicly
attacked and intimidated witnesses who came forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas
and testify about his conduct.”); H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 366-67.
310
See H. Rep. No. 116-335, at 221-23 (detailing the ways that President Trump “threatened
and attacked an Intelligence Community whistleblower”); H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 366-67.
SMF 59
E. President Trump’s Conduct Was Consistent with His Previous Efforts to
Obstruct Investigations into Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections
191. President Trump’s obstruction of the House’s impeachment inquiry was consistent
with his previous efforts to undermine Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation of Russia’s
interference in the 2016 election and of the President’s own misconduct.
192. President Trump repeatedly used his powers of office to undermine and derail the
Mueller investigation, particularly after learning that he was personally under investigation for
obstruction of justice. 311 Among other things, President Trump ordered White House Counsel Don
McGahn to fire Special Counsel Mueller; 312 instructed Mr. McGahn to create a record and issue
statements falsely denying this event; 313 sought to curtail Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation in a
manner exempting his own prior conduct; 314 and tampered with at least two key witnesses. 315
President Trump has since instructed McGahn to defy a House Committee’s subpoena for
testimony, and his DOJ has erroneously argued that the courts can play no role in enforcing
Congressional subpoenas. 316
193. Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation—like the House’s impeachment inquiry—
sought to uncover whether President Trump coordinated with a foreign government in order to
obtain an improper advantage during a Presidential election. 317 And the Mueller investigation—like
the House’s impeachment inquiry—exposed President Trump’s eagerness to benefit from foreign
311
See generally Mueller Report, Vol. II; H. Rep. No. 116-346, at 159-61.
312
Mueller Report, Vol. II at 85-86.
313
Id., Vol. II at 114-17.
314
Id., Vol. II at 90-93.
315
Id., Vol. II at 120-56.
316
See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, — F. Supp. 3d —, No. 19-2379. 2019 WL
6312011 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir.). The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the case on January 3, 2020.
317
Mueller Report, Vol. I at 1 (describing the scope of the order appointing Special Counsel
Mueller).
SMF 60
election interference. 318 In the former instance, the President used his powers of office to
undermine an investigation conducted by officials within the Executive Branch. 319 In the latter, he
attempted to block the United States House of Representatives from exercising its “sole Power of
Impeachment” assigned by the Constitution. In both instances, President Trump obstructed
investigations into foreign election interference to hide his own misconduct.
318
See, e.g., id., Vol. I at 1-2 (the Trump Campaign “expected it would benefit electorally from
information stolen and released through Russian efforts”).
319
See generally id., Vol. II. As the Mueller Report summarizes, the Special Counsel’s
investigation “found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting undue influence
over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction
investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the
President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from
efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney General’s recusal; to
the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect
contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony.” Id., Vol. II at 157.
SMF 61

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What are the two articles of impeachment against President Trump?

What are the two articles of impeachment against President Trump?

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Sitting as a Court of Impeachment

United States House of Representatives

U.S. House of Representatives Managers

Constitution and their constitutional Oaths.

and a coveted White House meeting.2

relented and released the aid.22

Zelensky’s election—including an Oval Office meeting with Russia’s top diplomat.26

part of an ongoing pattern of misconduct for which the President is unrepentant.

The House of Representatives gathered overwhelming evidence of President Trump’s

integrity of our democratic processes and endangers our national security.

President Trump obstructed Congress by undertaking an unprecedented campaign to

preclude an effective impeachment investigation, he would truly be above the law.

President’s wrongdoing35—his obstruction will do long-lasting and potentially irreparable damage to

our constitutional system of divided powers if it goes unchecked.

free to engage in serious misconduct without accountability or repercussions.

preserves the liberty we all hold dear.

President, is above the law.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT

part of the republic they created.

permanently “disqualif[y]” an impeached President from government service.41

abusing his power.”45

suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his guilt?”48

our democracy and the Nation’s core interests.50

danger of foreign Influence recurs.”55

II. THE HOUSE’S IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP AND PRESENTATION

Committees of the House have undertaken investigations into allegations of misconduct by

issued document requests to the White House and State Department.64

the impeachment inquiry.67

comply with subpoenas for testimony.71

Notwithstanding the President’s attempted cover-up, seventeen current and former

investigating Committees in depositions or transcribed interviews that all Members of the

the Intelligence Committee.73

participate—and then reported two Articles of Impeachment to the House.75

House of Representatives.”84 The President’s “complete defiance of an impeachment inquiry . . .

I. THE SENATE SHOULD CONVICT PRESIDENT TRUMP OF ABUSE OF POWER

political benefit by encouraging a foreign government to undermine America’s democratic process

solicit foreign interference in an American election is uniquely dangerous. President Trump’s

misconduct is an impeachable abuse of power.91

A. President Trump Exercised His Official Power to Pressure Ukraine into

Ukrainian announcement of an investigation into this theory.100

Second, President Trump sought to pressure President Zelensky publicly to announce an

U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, a well-regarded career diplomat and anti-corruption crusader.108

security assistance and a White House meeting.

efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict from a position of strength.112

mandated conditions on assistance—including anti-corruption reforms—had been met.114 The

Congress has appropriated.115

on Ukraine’s announcement of the sham investigations. During a telephone conversation between

should be done “openly.”117 In describing whom he wanted Ukraine to investigate, President

corruption reforms in Ukraine.

the opening of the investigations and he should want to do it.”122

for Ukraine only after he got caught.123

Withheld White House Meeting

investigations to help his reelection campaign.

House meeting on Ukraine’s announcement of the investigations. Ambassador Sondland testified