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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19034 February 17, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, a plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PEDRO CRISOSTOMO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Andres R. Faustino for appellants.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appelle.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The appellants were prosecuted and tried in the Court of First Instance of Cavite and sentenced by said
court as follows:
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde guilty
as principals, and Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat as accomplices, of the
consummated crime of abduction through violence, without any modifying circumstance and sentences
the first three to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal and the last three to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law and to pay each a one-
sixth part of the costs.

Pedro Crisostomo is further sentenced to pay to the offended party the sum of P500 as an endowment.

Such is the judgment from which all of the accused appeal to this court, alleging at the trial court erred:

1. In holding that the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient and that the facts alleged in the
information were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. In holding that the conspiracy and connivance between the accused at the time of committing the
supposed crime of abduction were duly proven.

3. In sentencing the accused Pedro Crisostomo to pay the supposed offended party the sum of P500 as
an endowment.

4. In holding that the crime committed by the accused falls within the provision of article 445 of the
Penal Code and in sentencing them under said article.

It is an undisputed fact that after 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning of December 26, 1920, Macaria Gabriel,
the offended party, and the accused Pedro Crisostomo were found in the barrio of Salinas, municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite. Neither is it disputed that the other accused were there on that occasion. Where the
prosecution and the defense disagree it is in that while the former contends that the offended party was
abducted by the accused against her will, the latter asserts that there was an agreement between her
and Pedro Crisostomo and that both of them, by mutual accord, had escaped from the parental house of
said Macaria Gabriel when the latter's brothers Constantino Gabriel overtook them.
The evidence shows sufficiently and beyond a reasonable doubt that while Macaria Gabriel and her aunt
Candida Acuña were walking in the direction of their houses from that of Gregoria Acuña, to whom
Macaria had paid the sum of P30, the accused met them on the way and Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo
Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde, who were with the accused, dragged Macaria Gabriel along and took her
against her will to a rice field, Macaria Gabriel not having been able to prevent it by her cries and strife,
and the insults proferred by her against those people who maltreated her in such a way, while the other
defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of Candida Acuña,
thus preventing her from helping her niece until another woman, Gregoria Acuña, attracted by the cries
of Candida, repaired to the place and, with a club with which she was provided, attacked those who
were holding Macaria Gabriel, and they lastly released her. As soon as Candida Acuña was released by
her aggressors, she went to the house of Macaria Gabriel and reported the matter to the latter's brother,
Constantino, who ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had just released her,
which they did upon seeing Constantino.

Aside from the earmarks of veracity prevailing in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution,
whom the trial judge saw while testifying and gave credit to, it must be taken into consideration that the
manner of eloping planned, according to the defense, by Macaria Gabriel, is improbable in the case of a
woman like the offended party who, by reason of her 30 years' age, must be presumed more reflexive
and cautions in carrying out a preconceived plan than a young woman, on account of the vehement
impulse of passion, does not usually take any precaution and possess a serene judgment which by its
own nature is the lesser development, the tender is her age. If it were true that it was Macaria's object
to escape, she would not have done so in the daytime, nor would she have gone in company with
Candida Acuña, nor would she have, so childishly and in the presence of several persons, as the defense
pretends, taken advantage of the circumstances (which does not appear to have been sought by her) of
her companion entering the house of Gregoria Acuña to speak with the latter for some minutes. It does
not appear that the offended party was under the vigilance of her relatives and, in view of her age, she
would have naturally enjoyed a certain degree of liberty such as to go, as she did, to the barrio of Salinas,
Bacoor, from her residence in Palicot, Imus; with which liberty she could have planned and carried into
effect with full success her escape from the parental house.

Furthermore, the accused Pedro Crisostomo spontaneously, admitted to Lieutenant Sotto of the
Constabulary having, with his companions, deemed it advisable to abduct Macaria, in view of the fact
that she firmly answered in the negative to his proposal and, on another occasion, he requested Epifanio
Gabriel, another brother of the offended party, to intervene in his favor and that he considered the fault
committed by him as an offense not only against Macaria but also against her family.
The record as whole does not leave room for doubt that the defendants took away Macaria Gabriel
against her will.

But in order that this fact may constitute abduction, it is necessary that the other element thereof
should have been proven, to wit, that if unchaste designs.

The defendant Pedro Crisostomo testified that his intention in eloping with Macaria was to get married
with her in Bacoor. While it was not proven that the offended partly consented to such an elopement,
the violent taking away is not incompatible with such intention to marry the woman taken away. Does
this intention to marry constitute unchaste designs? Our answer is in the negative in this particular case
in which not only the woman, but the man as well, had the required age for consenting to marriage, and
it does not appear that either of them had any impediment to contracting it.

In arriving at this conclusion we are not unmindful of the fact that as a general proposition the intention
to marry may sometime constitute unchaste which may vitiate such an intention, as in the case of
abduction of a minor with the latter's consent, in which the male knows that she cannot legally consent
to the marriage and yet he elopes with her. In an abduction of this nature seduction is presumed by the
law which may very well be covered by the intention to her married.

For this reason, Viada, in defining abduction under the old Spanish laws, says in general as follows:

By abduction is meant the taking away of a woman from her house or the place where she may be for
the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry or to corrupt her (libidinis causa).

But when, in explaining abduction through violence, he specifies the elements constituting the same, he
says:

The elements constituting this crime are these: . . . 3. That it be committed with unchaste designs, that is
to say, with intent to abuse her. If such an intention does not exist, the act will no longer constitute the
crime of abduction, but a crime against liberty, or that of illegal detention defined and punished in article
495 and following of this Code.
Consequently, the unchaste designs that constitute the essential elements of the crime of abduction
through violence is the intention to abuse the abducted woman.

Therefore, even considering it as proven that in kidnapping Macaria Gabriel, Pedro Crisostomo had the
intention to marry her, such designs cannot in this case be considered as unchaste.

There is, however, the testimony of the offended party, the only one of course on this point, to the effect
that, while the accused and his two companions held her and dragged her along, he kissed her many
times against her will. However, she herself says the following:

They dragged me along and at a certain distance I got seasick became unconscious etc. (Folio 2,
transcript of stenographic notes.)

Those acts that she thought were kisses under those circumstances in which she was seasick and
unconscious cannot be considered proven, and the kissings cannot be held to be such in fact and no
merely accidental collisions of heads or faces in those moments in which, according to her, Pedro
Crisostomo had caught hold of her by the waist and the back and her head was hanging (folio 9,
transcript of stenographic notes); and much less can such kissings be held proven over the categorial
denial of Pedro Crisostomo of having kissed her (folio 49, id.).

Furthermore, it does not appear from the evidence that outside of those supposed kissings, the accused
or any of them ever committed any slight unchaste act with the offended woman during the whole time
in which she was in their hands, the length of which time is not specified in the evidence, but which
ought to have been sufficient for them to commit any unchaste act, inasmuch as the offended party was
under the control of her abductors during the long period of time that elapsed from the moment that
her companion Candida Acuña was seized by the other three accused until Gregoria Acuña succeeded in
driving them away from the time that Candida Acuña took the way and to the barrio of Salinas, Bacoor,
where the affair occurred, and then to the barrio of Palicot, Imus, where the house of the offended party
was, reported the matter there to Constantino Gabriel and the latter went to barrio of Salinas and saw
the abductors, until the latter saw him and released their victim.

If Pedro Crisostomo was in such a state of passion that he kissed several times the offended party, while
he and his companions were pushing her and dragging her along, it cannot be conceived why the same
or greater exteriorations of such a vehement and disorderly passion were not made during the rest of
the period, which was long enough, in which he held Macaria Gabriel in his power.

But such testimony alone of the offended party as to Pedro Crisostomo's having kissed her, perceived by
her in those moments in which she was excited and was doing all her efforts to escape and was seasick,
and which was positively denied by the said accused, cannot be considered proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the defendants were actuated by unchaste designs,
but such unchaste designs were not proven. It was not necessary to show that such unchaste designs
were carried into effect, but it was required to establish the existence itself of the unchaste intention;
but no act or circumstance tending to show such a fact was proven in the record.

We have, therefore, the kidnapping of a woman which was not proven to have been committed with
unchaste designs. Abduction, being one of the ways which illegal detention, can be committed, specially
qualified by lewd intention, the kidnapping of a woman without unchaste designs must according to
Viada and to our Penal Code, be considered as illegal detention.

And the act proven in the record constitutes this last crime. It is no argument against this constitution
that the accused deprived the offended party of her liberty without placing herein an inclosure; because
illegal detention as defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but
also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her liberty. Our Penal Code says:

ART. 481. Any private individual who shall lock up or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.

Neither is it an argument against this finding in the present case that the information by which this
prosecution was initiated is for another crime, for it is alleged therein that the "defendants conspiring
and confederating together, did intentionally, unlawfully, and criminally and with unchaste designs" (the
latter were not proven) and "through force kidnap" (the information gives the verb in singular but it
must be considered as plural, it being a grammatical error) "Macaria Gabriel on a road leading to Salinas,
Bacoor, Cavite, taking her therefrom to a rice field in said municipality against her will." As may be seen,
it is alleged in this information that the defendants, in the manner aforesaid deprived the offended party
of her liberty.
It was intimated in the discussion of this case among the member of the court that the crime committed
as shown by the record may be held to constitute attempted coercion in so far as the defendants
attempted through force to compel the offended party to marry Pedro Crisostomo. In the first place,
while it is not sufficiently proven that the defendants, or any of them, had any lewd design in performing
the act, yet it is not proven also that they did in fact attempt to compel the offended party to contract
marriage. According to the facts proven, it can rather be supposed, which hypothesis is incompatible
with compulsion to contract marriage, that the accused merely tried to take the offended party away
from the environment of the family, in the hope that, in that way, she might be persuaded without force
or violence whatsoever to marry Pedro Crisostomo. Finally there is doubt as to whether the acts
committed by the defendants may be held as directly tending to compel the offended party to get
married, for, in order that there may be an attempt to commit such a crime, the acts performed must be
direct; that is to say, they must be the beginning of the execution of the crime, with a direct, rational,
and necessary tendency to produce the aforesaid result. The mere fact of taking away the offended party
which is an external act, in view of the evidence introduced, might as well have been for the purpose of
injuring or affronting her, or of compelling her through force to marry Pedro Crisostomo. Viada gives an
example which appears to us clear:

A criminal decides to poison his father, which is an internal act and which is beyond the sanction of the
law. He buys a poisonous substance. There we have an external act. But is it in itself sufficient to
constitute a crime? Certainly, not, for said poison might as well have been bought for the purpose of
killing a person, or for getting rid of venomous animals; in a word, it is an act which is not necessarily
connected with the crime. (Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, pp. 34, 35, edition of 1890.)

Turning now to the participation of the defendants in the commission of the crime, there can be no
doubt that Pedro Crisostomo took part therein as principal. Neither can there be any doubt that the
defendants Lorenzo Alcoba and Casimiro Garde, who held the offended party and dragged her along to a
rice field, assisted by Pedro Crisostomo, are likewise principals for having taken direct part in the
commission of the crime (art. 13, No. 1, Penal Code).

As to the defendants Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, who, according to the
evidence, did not lay hands on the offended party, but did hold the latter's companion Candida Acuña,
evidently for the purpose of preventing said Candida from helping Macaria, they must be held to be
accomplices for having cooperated in the performance of the crime by simultaneous acts (art. 14, Penal
Code).
The defense alleges that there is not in the record any proof of the confederacy and conspiracy between
the defendants. It is true that no witness testified to having seen or heard the accused conspire or
confederate. But in view of the simultaneous act of the defendants — three seizing Macaria Gabriel and
the other three getting hold of her companion to prevent her from helping Macaria in any manner
possible, which is a joint act and tends to the same end, to wit, that of illegally depriving Macaria of her
liberty — it cannot be conceived that there was no agreement between the defendants and, for this
reason, said act constitutes in itself evident and sufficient proof of the conspiracy and confederacy.

The errors assigned by the appellants to the action of the trial court are groundless, except the one
concerning the classification of the crime committed, which we find to be that of illegal detention
defined and punished in article 481 of the Penal Code, and as to the endowment which Pedro
Crisostomo was sentenced to pay to the offended party, it cannot be upheld, this not being a case of
abduction, but illegal detention.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants found guilty, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, of the crime of illegal detention. Pedro Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and
Casimiro Garde, as principals, and Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, as
accomplices, and each of the first three above-mentioned is sentenced to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, with the accessories of the law, provided in article 61 of the Penal Code; and the three
appellants lastly mentioned, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, with the
accessories of the law provided in said article 61 of the Penal Code. Each of the appellants shall pay his
proportionate part of the costs of this instance. So ordered.

Malcolm, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-43406 January 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MELECIO TORRES ET AL., defendants.

MELECIO TORRES, FIDEL GERVASIO, NICOLAS CHAVEZ, ENGRACIO VARONA and MACARIO GARILLO,
appellants.
Florentino T. Ocampo for appellants.

Miranda and De la Rosa for appellant Chavez.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The appellants, Melecio Torres, Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona, and Macario Garillo,
were charged in the Court of First Instance of Cavite with the crime of forcible abduction with physical
injuries. After due trial, they were found guilty: and Melecio Torres, as the principal culprit, was
sentenced to suffer not less than eight years of prision mayor and not more than twelve years one day of
reclusion temporal, while Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona and Macario Garillo, were
each sentenced to suffer less than and one day of prision mayor. In assessing the penalty to be imposed,
the court took into consideration the aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed in the
nighttime and by a hand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts which led to the filing of the information against the appellants are fully set forth in the
decision of the trial court, and it would be a work of supererogation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Most of the errors assigned both in the brief for the appellant Nicolas Chavez and in that for the other
appellants, relate to the correctness of the findings of fact made by the trial court. It is contended that
"the court a quo erred in not finding as it is a fact that the accused Melecio Torres had amorous relations
with the alleged offended party, Dalisay Bonifacio, previous to the 8th of November 1934." It is also
contended that "the court a quo erred in not finding it as a fact that the accused Melecio Torres and the
complainant Dalisay Bonifacio, on November 6, 1934 agreed to elope on the 8th of November, 1934, and
consequently, that what happened was in reality a fake abduction." No evidence was adduced in support
of these contention except the testimony of Melecio Torres himself the truth of which was challenged by
Dalisay Bonifacio denied having sustained amorous relations with Melecio Torres. She also denied having
agreed to elope with him. The circumstance which the girl was carried away by Melecio Torres and his
co-accused were such as to preclude the conclusion that it was done with her consent If there was really
an agreement between Melecio Torres and Dalisay Bonifacio to elope, it is inconceivable why they did
not select a more auspicious occasion to carry out their plan. It is likewise inconceivable why Melecio
Torres had to secure the assistance of four other men.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Torres' co-accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution, and their
participation in the commission of the crime was duly established. The testimony of these witnesses is
clear and convincing, while the witnesses for the defense have incurred in serious contradictions. No
motive whether was shown on the part of the prosecution witnesses that might have induced them the
testify falsely, while the evidence for the defense comes mostly from interested
sources.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for the appellant Nicolas Chavez contend that the lower court erred in not granting the latter a
separate trial. The record shows that the application for a separate trial was made after two witnesses
for the prosecution had already testified. The application came too late; it should have been made
before the commencement of the trial. (U.S. vs. Morales, 8 Phil., 300.)chanrobles virtual law library

That there was conspiracy to abduct Dalisay Bonifacio and that Nicholas Chavez not only had knowledge
of, but took part in the conspiracy, the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable doubt. We find no
merit in the contention that Nicholas Chavez had no knowledge of the unchaste designs of Melecio
Torres.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

One of the points stressed by counsel for appellant Melecio Torres and others relates to the testimony of
Drs. Pablo Anzures, Pedro Matias, and Sancho Rillo concerning the virginity of the complaining witness.
Apart from the fact that the virginity of the offended abduction ,medical authorities are by no means
agreed that a woman is not a virgin merely because the hymen is not present. It is claimed by some
authorities, upon the basis of clinical observations, that the hymen is not always present. it is state of
undoubted virginity; that sometimes it is torn away in childhood due to various causes. We are not
inclined to consider the virginity of the complaining witnesses as a determining factor in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime committed by the appellants is that defined in article 342 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized reclusion temporal. In fixing the penalty two aggravating circumstances should be taken into
consideration: Namely; (1) that the crime was committed in the nighttime, and (2) by a band. In the
absence of any mitigating circumstance, the penalty prescribed should be imposed in its maximum
period, or from seventeen years, four months and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Melecio Torres is hereby sentenced to
suffer is not less than eight years of prision mayor and not more than seventeen years, four months and
one day of reclusion temporal. Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona, and Macario Garillo, are
each sentenced to suffer not less than six years and one day of prision mayor, and not more that
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Modified as above indicated, the judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Hull, Vickers, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9298. February 11, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRAULIO DE VIVAR, Defendant-Appellant.

Miguel de Leon for Appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ABDUCTION; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. — Article 446 of the Penal Code punishes the abduction of a
woman, committed against her will and with lewd designs. Viada, in his commentaries on the said code,
says that the elements constituting this crime are three: (1) The person kidnapped must be a woman. It
is immaterial whether she be a widow, a married woman, or 3 virgin, for all three classes are comprised
with the generic term of "woman." (2) The crime must be committed against her will. (3) It must be
committed with unchaste designs that is, with the intention of lying with the woman.

2. ID.; ID. — The injured party went voluntarily with defendant to a place where she believed she would
find her fiancee, and as soon as she became convinced that he was not there she attempted to return
home, but defendant opposed her returning and took her against her will to the place where he defiled
her. This opposition by defendant to the woman’s returning home was the commencement of the
abduction committed with violence or against her will; and, as he then, and subsequently for three days,
retained her in his company and against her will, continuously with unchaste designs these acts
constitute the crime of abduction with force, provided for and punished by the article above cited.

3. ID.; ID. — It matters not whether the kidnapping of the aggrieved person was effected after she had
voluntarily left her house, deceived, as she was, by defendant, or whether it took place in the house
itself; nor does it matter whether she was not then of legal age, because the acts performed by
defendant with respect to her involved offenses against liberty, honor and public order. These are the
offenses which the law punishes in the crime of abduction with force, and these same acts contain the
elements that go to make up the said crime, and not that of abduction with consent as defined in article
446 of the Penal Code.

DECISION

ARAULLO, J. :

This action against Braulio de Vivar was commenced and tried in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
by virtue of an information filed by the fiscal of the said province dated January 22, 1912, and drawn up
in the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the preliminary investigation made in the justice of the peace court of Magalang, Pampanga,
P. I., by reason of a complaint filed by Prudencio Bondoc against the said Braulio de Vivar for the crime of
abduction, the undersigned charges Braulio Vivar with the said crime, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That, early in the morning of December 30, 1911, in the municipality of Magalang, Pampanga, P. I., the
said Braulio de Vivar did abduct Teodora Bondoc, an unmarried woman 22 years of age, removing her,
against her will and with unchaste designs, from the control of Prudencio Bondoc, her father, in whose
company she was then living; an act committed in violation of law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The accused pleaded not guilty and after trial and the introduction of evidence by both the prosecution
and the defense, the said Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment on April 26, 1913,
wherein he found the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the information and sentenced him to the
penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify Teodora Bondoc in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this
judgment the defendant appealed alleging in his defense in this court that the trial judge erred: (1) In
holding that the facts and evidence of record showed the existence of the crime of abduction and that
this crime was committed by defendant, as defined by article 445 of the Penal Code; and (2) in holding
that the crime of abduction was committed against the person of the aggrieved party, Teodora Bondoc,
she being of legal age.

After a careful examination of the evidence presented at the trial, we find that it- conclusively proves the
following facts: Teodora Bondoc, an unmarried woman 22 years 8 months and 17 days of age on the date
of the commission of the crime, the daughter of the railroad station agent in Magalang, Province of
Pampanga, was living at the time at said station with her father and was being courted by Benigno
Indiongco, an employee of the same railroad company in the central station of Manila. Defendant, who
was one of the said company’s train conductors, served as an intermediary between the lovers. Early in
the morning of December 30, 1911, the said Teodora Bondoc left her house and accompanied by
defendant who was waiting for her outside went to a spot near a growth of sugar cane, a short distance
from the station in the said pueblo, in the belief that her lover, Indiongco, was awaiting her there for the
purpose of joining her and eloping with her, an elopement which defendant made her believe had been
planned the night before. When defendant and the young woman arrived at the place referred to, as the
latter did not see her lover she inquired about him of defendant, who replied that before delivering her
to him she should be for defendant. Thereupon she attempted to return home, but defendant caught
her by the hand, gave her a slap (textual, from record) and dragged her into the midst of the sugar cane
growing nearby, where, threatening her with a dagger he had in his hand, he overcame her resistance
and succeeded in lying with her. Defendant kept Teodora Bondoc among the sugar cane until nighttime,
when he took her, also by force, in a cart through the fields to the house of a relative of his in the vicinity
of a wood in the municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac. There he remained with her alone for three
days and, taking advantage of her helplessness and by intimidating her, lay with her several times during
that period, until, as a result of the search and inquiries made by her father and brother, she was found
in the said house and freed from defendant’s control. Consequently a complaint was made against the
said Braulio de Vivar and later the information was filed that gave rise to this prosecution.

The admission on the part of defendant that he served as an intermediary between Benigno Indiongco
and Teodora Bondoc, the former residing in this city of Manila, and the latter in Magalang, defendant
being a train conductor on the line between these points, a position which put him in a way to enjoy the
confidence of both the lovers; the fact, likewise admitted by him, that he kept the young woman in a
house far from the pueblo of the municipality of Capas and there lived with her for three days; the fact
that he secretly removed her from Magalang to the house during the night and in so doing traveled by
roads off the main thoroughfare; and more especially the fact that defendant received no instructions
whatever from the young woman’s lover to tell her to wait for him on December 30 either in Magalang,
or in Capas, or in any place whatsoever, during the three days that defendant retained her in the said
pueblo, for Indiongco himself so specifically testified and this is also proven by the fact that the latter
remained in this city on those very days, when it would have been very easy for him to have gone to any
of those points — evident proof that defendant tricked the young woman into believing that her lover
was awaiting her outside of her house early in the morning of December 30, and that defendant’s
purpose in so doing was to possess her and realize his unchaste designs, knowing as he did, for she had
so told him, that she was willing to elope with her lover from her father’s — house are facts which, in
connection with the other evidence of record and especially with the clear and positive testimony of the
aggrieved party herself, who at the trial candidly and feelingly related the various acts committed by the
defendant to the injury to her person and honor and in treacherous abuse of the friendship and
confidence reposed in him by his friend and companion, Benigno Indiongco, bring out in bold relief and
prove without the slightest doubt the truth of the occurrence as hereinbefore related, pursuant to the
evidence introduced at the trial.

According to this evidence, Teodora Bondoc left her father’s house of her own free will early in the
morning of December 30, 1911, to join her lover and fiancee, in the belief that he was waiting for her in
Magalang whither she was conducted by the defendant. Therefore, she was not abducted (sustraida)
either against her will or with her consents inasmuch as she left her house to repair to the meeting
which defendant made her believe had been prearranged by her fiancee, Indiongco. If the latter had
been in that place and, taking advantage of the presence of his sweetheart, Teodora Bondoc, had taken
her away with him for unchaste purposes, thus removing her from her father’s control, it could then be
said that the act committed was the crime of abduction with consent, provided she was of the age
specified by law for the existence of such a crime, and in that case the defendant would have been a
coprincipal or accomplice in the said crime. This crime not having been committed, then neither the fact
that Teodora Bondoc left her house voluntarily on that occasion to go to the place where defendant
made her believe that her fiancee was wait- ing, nor the fact that she was then accompanied by
defendant, should be taken into consideration in the present case with regard to the defendant, either
for the qualification of the crime or for the determination of his liability therein, because Teodora
Bondoc then left the paternal abode, not on account of the defendant, nor to join him, but on account of
her fiancee, Indiongco, to go with him wherever he might take her, for she was ready to elope with him
from her father’s house; however, as the elopement did not take place, and as there is no evidence that
in any way shows what intention Indiongco might have entertained with regard to this young woman if it
had, there are no grounds upon which to qualify such an act and to deduce therefrom the attendant
liability.
Article 445 of the Penal Code punishes by reclusion temporal the abduction of a woman against her will
and with lewd designs. Viada, in his Commentaries on the Penal Code, says that the elements
constituting this crime are three: (1) The person kidnapped must be a woman. It is immaterial whether
she be a widow, a married woman, or a virgin, for all three classes are comprised within the generic term
of "woman." (2) The crime must be committed against her will. (3) It must be committed with unchaste
designs — that is, with the intention of lying with the woman.

The evidence introduced at the trial shows that Teodora Bondoc voluntarily went with the defendant to
the place where she expected to find her fiancee, Indiongco; as soon as she became convinced that he
was not there she attempted to return home, but this the defendant opposed; he caught her by the
hand, slapped her and dragged her into the midst of some sugar cane near by where, by means of
threats and the use of force, he dishonored the young woman. On the night of that same day he took
her, also by force, to Capas, where he kept her for three days, during which period he again lay with her
several times, until she was found by members of her family.

It is unquestionable that Teodora Bondoc, who had freely gone to the place where she believed she
would find her fiancee, lost her liberty from the moment defendant opposed, in the manner aforestated,
her returning home, and that, consequently, it was against her will that she was taken by defendant into
the sugar cane. This was the commencement of the abduction of the young woman, committed by
defendant with violence and against her will. When he got her into the cane field, he abused her by
means of force and intimidation. If defendant had then left her free, the crime committed by him might
perhaps have been classified as rape, because then the deprivation of her liberty would have been but
brief and only for the purpose of his lying with her. But, considering that defendant retained her among
the sugar cane until night, continued to retain her in Capas for three days longer in his company and
against her will, and that he also enjoyed her carnally there; and considering the deprivation of liberty of
the aggrieved party during all of that time, in connection with the unchaste designs which defendant
entertained toward her and which were the motive of his abducting her against her will, the acts
committed by this defendant, and which were proved at the trial, constitute the crime of abduction,
provided for and punished by article 445 of the code.

As Viada says in his aforecited work, abduction is under stood to be the kidnapping of a woman by
removing her from her home, or from whatever place she may be, to take her to some other, for the
purpose of her abductor’s marrying her or corrupting her. Defendant deceived Teodora Bondoc by telling
her that her fiancee, Indiongco, was await ing her outside of her house, early in the morning of
December 30th, and he accompanied her to the place where he said Indiongco was waiting; but upon
their arrival there he first forced her to enter the growth of sugar cane and afterwards, in the same
manner, took her to Capas for the purpose of satiating his brutal appetite. Briefly, he stole Teodora
Bondoc in the one place and took her to the other and kept her in his power for three days for the
purpose of corrupting her. It matters not whether the kidnapping of the young woman was effected after
she had voluntarily left her house, deceived, as she was, by the defendant, or whether it took place in
the house itself; nor does it matter whether the offended party was or was not then of legal age,
because the acts performed by defendant with respect to her involved offenses against liberty, honor
and public order. These are offenses which the law punishes in the crime of abduction with force, and
those same acts contain the elements that go to make such crime, and not that of abduction with
consent to which article 446 of the Penal Code refers.

The trial court, therefore, did not incur any of the errors assigned by counsel for defendant, and as, in
the judgment appealed from, the penalty specified in the said article 44 of the Penal Code was imposed
in the medium degree, it not being found that the commission of said crime was attended by any generic
circumstance that would modify the liability incurred by defendant, the said judgment, together with the
accessory and other penalties therein provided, must be, as it is hereby, affirmed. However, in view of
the nature of the principal penalty imposed upon the defendant, he shall not suffer subsidiary
imprisonment for insolvency in the Payment of the indemnity to which he was sentenced. With the costs
against the appellant, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., and Johnson, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42665 June 30, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO, HERMINIGILDO SUNPONGCO and ARSENIO CALAYAG, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Felipe T. Sineneng for accused Silvestre Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag.

CORTES, J.:

Defendants appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The appeal was elevated by the Court of Appeals to this
Tribunal in view of the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court.

Juanita Angeles is the complainant in this complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. At the time the
alleged crime was committed she was 43 years of age, single, a registered pharmacist by profession and
a rice merchant doing business in Hagonoy, Bulacan.

In her complaint she pointed to the three accused-appellants together with one Benjamin Gabriel as the
perpetrators of the crime. On March 4, 1965 an information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal accusing
the four men of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of October, 1964, in the municipality of Guiguinto province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Silvestre Sunpongco,
Benjamin Gabriel, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of violence,
force, intimidation and trickery and with lewd designs, abduct the complaining witness Juanita F.
Angeles, single, by then and there taking and carrying her out of a jeep while she was in Guiguinto and
then forcibly loaded in an automobile and thereafter brought to the Hill Top Hotel in Tagaytay City
against her will, and once there by means of violence, threats and intimidation, the said accused
Silvestre Sunpongco have carnal knowledge of the said Juanita F. Angeles against her will.
That in the commission of this crime the following aggravating circumstances were present, to wit:
conspiracy, use of motor vehicle and superior strength. [Records, pp. 61-621.

On June 9, 1965, the accused were arraigned and without the assistance of counsel, they all pleaded not
guilty.

Subsequently, on joint motion of the fiscal and the private prosecutors and over the objection of the
defense, accused Benjamin Gabriel was discharged by the court to become a state witness.

The prosecution's version of what transpired on the date when said crime was committed is summarized
by the trial court, to wit:

... that on October 23, 1964, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Juanita Angeles, the offended party,
left her residence at Hagonoy, Bulacan to get rice from the RCA warehouse of Dr. Lansan at Guiguinto
Bulacan. She was with one Benita Fabian and they rode a passenger jeep driven by Virgilio Gan. As they
reached the south approach of Tabang Bridge, Guiguinto Bulacan, a car overtook them and stopped right
in front of their jeep, thus forcing them to stop. The car was being driven by accused Arsenio Calayag,
and the passengers were the accused Silvestre Sunpongco, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin
Gabriel. Thereafter, the three passengers just mentioned . ..., alighted from the car and boarded the
jeep, after which Silvestre Sunpongco co ordered its driver to proceed to the old road. Silvestre
Sunpongco sat at the back of Juanita Angeles, Benjamin Gabriel sat behind the driver, and Herminigildo
Sunpongco forced himself at the left side of the driver, while Arsenio Calayag followed in the Car he was
driving.

Upon reaching an uninhabited place on the old road, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered the jeep to stop and
the three accused got out. Silvestre tried to pull the offended party out of the jeep, but she struggled
and fought back so he ordered Benjamin Gabriel to help him. Benita Fabian, meanwhile, embraced
Juanita on the waist and pleaded with the three accused to leave Juanita alone, but Herminigildo
Sunpongco separated them by force. Despite her struggling and resisting, the accused were able to pull
the offended party out of the jeep, and although Juanita embraced Benita Fabian and asked the latter
not to leave her, Silvestre kept on pulling her as Benjamin Gabriel continued pushing her until they were
finally able to force her into the car with the aid of a drawn gun. Then Benita Fabian, who was able to
free herself from Herminigildo Sunpongco, ran towards the car but Silvestre closed its doors at once.
Then Herminigildo pushed Benita and she fell to the ground, after which the former got into the car and
it sped away.
They proceeded towards Manila, then to the Hilltop Hotel in Tagaytay City, which is owned by Federico
Suntay, a first cousin of accused Silvestre Sunpongco. Upon reaching the hotel, Benjamin Gabriel,
Herrninigildo Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag alighted and went inside, while Silvestre and Juanita were
left in the car. Then Silvestre tried to pull her out of the car but she resisted, so he drew out his gun again
and told her that while he did not like to do it, that was the only way to bring her out. Finally, Silvestre
was able to pull her out of the car. He brought her inside the hotel, with one of his arms around her
shoulders and the other arm poking the gun at her side, pushed her into a room and locked the door.

Once inside the room, Silvestre Sunpongco pushed Juanita Angeles and she fell on a chair. Then he
embraced and kissed her, and continued taking liberties, as she cried and fought back. Afterwards he
removed his pants, pushed her and forced her to lie down on the bed. Although she kicked and rolled on
the bed, Silvestre was able to overcome her when he hit her on the stomach, as a result of which she lost
consciousness. It was then that Silvestre Sunpongco succeeded in having his first sexual intercourse with
her. After that, he went out and locked the room. Due to hunger and physical exhaustion, she must have
dozed off, and when she woke up, Silvestre Sunpongco was on top of her again. She struggled and tried
to resist him, but to no avail. Silvestre Sunpongco consummated the second sexual intercourse.

Then somebody called for Silvestre and he left the room. Suddenly, she heard the voice of her brother
calling her name, so she rushed out to him. Dr. Jose Angeles was there with some CIS agents. She was
physically examined the next day by Dr. Ramon Pascual, captain in the Medical Corps of the Philippine
Constabulary, who submitted his medicolegal report marked Exhibit "A" containing his findings as
follows: lacerations in the complainant's vagina at 9 and 11 o'clock positions, which must be due to the
insertion of a penis; vaginal smears are positive for spermatozoa; contusions at the posterior cervical and
anterolateral aspect middle third of the right hip, all of which are compatible with recent sexual contact.

Benita Fabian corroborated the testimony of Juanita Angeles up to when she was left behind at Tabang,
after the car carrying all the accused and the offended party sped towards Tagaytay City. [Records, pp.
523-527].

xxx xxx xxx

During the time material to this case Silvestre Sunpongco was 34 years old, a widower with six children,
and a La Mallorca bus driver whose highest educational attainment is only grade four. The other
accused-appellant Arsenio Calayag was then 36 years of age, married and the regular driver of the car
borrowed by Silvestre Sunpongco and used by them. Herminigildo Sunpongco, the third accused-
appellant, was then 27 years old, married and is a nephew of Silvestre Sunpongco.

During the trial of the criminal case, specifically, after the defense had started presenting its evidence
but before Silvestre Sunpongco took the witness stand, said accused jumped bail and it was not until six
years thereafter that he was arrested and the trial resumed.

The principal accused-appellant Silvestre Sunpongco adduced in evidence his own version of the case
before the trial court as follows:

He started courting the complainant a few weeks after the death of his first wife, and the complainant
accepted and they agreed to get married. On October 23, 1964 he went to Malolos, on previous
agreement with her, for the express purpose of eloping with her. That morning, he rode the car of his
sister driven by Arsenio Calayag. On the way, he gave a lift to Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin
Gabriel. Upon arriving at Malolos, Juanita Angeles was not there, but they saw her in a jeep going to
Guiguinto So, they followed. At Tabang, he alighted from the car and complainant alighted from the jeep
and they talked. Accused Silvestre told her: "If you really love me, You will come with me and we will get
married." They agreed to go to Manila to get married, but they later changed their minds and instead
proceeded to Cavite. On the way they stopped at the Aristocrat Restaurant to eat, stayed there for more
than an hour, then proceeded to Hilltop Hotel at Tagaytay. Later that evening, while in the hotel, Pepito
Mangahas, Dr. Jose Angeles and some CIS agents arrived. Pepito asked Silvestre why they were there,
and said accused replied that he and complainant had eloped. Then he gave to Pepito the letters which
complainant wrote to him. Thereafter, he was brought to Camp Crame.

He did not forcibly abduct complainant, he said. Complainant filed this case against him because she was
threatened and forced to do so by her brother. He also added that he did not know why Benjamin
Gabriel, his boyhood friend, testified for the prosecution. He jumped bail because Dr. Angeles told him:
"I am ready to spend even how much just to put you in jail". [Records, pp. 529- 531].

The two other accused-appellants Arsenio Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco gave similar testimonies
in the trial court as follows:
Between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. on October 23, 1964 Arsenio Calayag was driving the car owned by Nena de
Marucot Silvestre Sunpongco's sister, which was borrowed by accused Silvestre, towards Manila.
Silvestre had Benjamin Gabriel as companion. On the way, they stopped to give Herminigildo Sunpongco
a lift. Thereupon, Silvestre requested Herminigildo to go with them because he was going to elope with
Juanita Angeles, to which he consented. After crossing Tabang Bridge, they overtook the jeep on which
Juanita Angeles and her companion Benita Fabian were riding and which was being driven by Virgilio
Gan, and blocked its way so it had to stop. Thereupon, Silvestre, Herminigildo and Benjamin Gabriel
alighted from the car and boarded the jeep. Silvestre Sunpongco pulled the complainant by the hand to
the car as Benjamin Gabriel simultaneously pushed her from the back. At the same time, Benita Fabian
was holding on to the complainant and embracing her, so Herminigildo held Benita to prevent her from
going into the car as instructed by Silvestre. From Tabang, they proceeded to Hilltop Hotel, Tagaytay City,
stopping only once to buy gasoline. Upon reaching the hotel, Silvestre Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel
led Juanita Angeles inside, while Arsenio Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco left for Hagonoy, but were
apprehended on the way by CIS agents. [Records, pp. 528-529].

On October 2, 1975, after due trial, the Bulacan Court of First Instance rendered a decision convicting the
three accused-appellants, to wit:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO, HERMINIGILDO SUNPONGCO and
ARSENIO CALAYAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, as defined and penalized under Articles 335 and 342 in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT,
with the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally the complainant Juanita
Angeles in the slim of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs. [Records, p. 539].

They now interpose this present appeal. Silvestre Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag filed a joint brief and
assigned two errors. Herminigildo Sunpongco likewise filed his own appellant's brief and assigned three
errors allegedly committed by the trial court.

Consolidating the assignments of errors made by herein accused-appellants, they raise the following
points:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT HAD ACQUIRED JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
WAS COMMITTED AND THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY THEREOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED HEREIN
TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

I. The alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court is assailed by accused-appellants Silvestre
Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag on the ground that the sworn complaint of Juanita Angeles was not
formally offered in evidence by the prosecution during the trial of the case.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 110 section 5 (formerly section 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure require that the offenses of abduction and rape and
other offenses which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed
by the Offended party. Compliance with this is a jurisdictional and not merely a formal requirement.

The Rules of Court further provides that evidence which has not been formally offered shall not be
considered by the court. [Rule 132, section 35].

Applying these rules to the case at bar it is admitted that the sworn complaint of Juanita Angeles was not
formally offered in evidence by the prosecution, This failure to adhere to the rules however is not fatal
and did not oust the court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Jurisprudence reveals that if the
complaint in a case which cannot be prosecuted de oficio is forwarded to the trial court as part of the
records of the preliminary investigation of the case, the court can take judicial notice of the same
without the necessity of its formal introduction as evidence for the prosecution [People v. Savellano, G.R.
No. L-31227, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 320, 324; People v. Tampus G.R. No. L-42608, February 6, 1979, 88
SCRA 217, 221; and People v. Rondina G.R. No. L-47895, April 8, 1987, 149 SCRA 128, 132-133].

The records of this case forwarded to the Court of First Instance include the complaint filed by Juanita
Angeles in the municipal court of Guiguinto Bulacan which conducted the preliminary investigation
[Records, page 31. Likewise the minutes of the September 3, 1965 hearing shows that the subject
complaint was marked as Exhibit "X" by the court as disclosed by the records on page 91.
II. Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of forcible abduction. The
elements of forcible abduction are (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age,
civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her will and (3) that the abduction is with
lewd designs.

On the other hand article 335 of the same Code defines the crime of rape and provides for its penalty.
The elements of rape pertinent to this case are: (1,) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (2) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.

Silvestre Sunpongco would insist that he and complainant were sweethearts who agreed to elope on
that fateful day in October, This defense however is belied by the manner in which the so-called
"elopement" was carried out. Juanita Angeles' version that the abduction was carried out against her will
is borne out by the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution as well as by two of the
accused-appellants, Arsenio Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco. These two admitted during the trial
having seen the complainant resisting as she was forced to board the car. On cross-examination, Arsenio
Calayag testified thus:

ATTY. OCAMPO:

Q You said while Juanita Angeles was sitting inside the jeep Silvestre Sunpongco was holding her
hands, is it not also a fact he was at the same time pulling Juanita Angeles out of the jeep?

A Yes, sir.

Q You also stated that when Juanita Angeles was already on the ground ... Silvestre Sunpongco,
Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel led her to the car. Will you please tell the Honorable
Court how the three of them led her to the car?

A They were holding her.

Q The three of them?

Q Who?

A Benjamin Gabriel and Silvestre Sunpongco-

xxx xxx xxx

Q On what part of the body Silvestre Sunpongco holding Juanita Angeles?

A Hands only.

Q How about Benjamin Gabriel?

A Waist sir.

Q While Silvestre Sunpongco was holding Juanita Angeles on the hands and Benjamin Gabriel by
the waist they were pushing her to the car?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Silvestre Sunpongco was pulling her by the arm Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her?
A Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Is it not a fact that while Silvestre Sunpongco was pulling her and Benjamin Gabriel was pushing
her Juanita Angeles was struggling?

xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir. [TSN, June 23, 1967, pp. 90-92, 94-951. (Emphasis supplied).

Herminigildo Sunpongco likewise admitted having witnessed the vain struggles of Juanita Angeles and at
the same time her tears when he stated on cross- examination that:

ATTY. OCAMPO:

Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court how Silvestre A Sunpongco was leading Juanita Angeles
after she alighted from the jeep in that old road?

A I noticed that he (sic) was being pulled by the hands of Silvestre Sunpongco while her other hand
was holding the jeep.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And Juanita Angeles was crying at that time?

A Yes, sir.
Q And she was finally led into the car by Silvestre Sunpongco because Silvestre Sunpongco was
pulling her while Benjamin Gabriel was pushing her at the back?

A Yes, sir.

Q All along Juanita Angeles was crying?

A Yes, sir. [TSN, July 21, 1967, pp. 123-1241. (Emphasis supplied).

The three accused-appellants would further negate the probability of carrying on the abduction
considering the incident took place in broad daylight and the group had to travel from Guiguinto Bulacan
to Tagaytay City. They aver that in view of these circumstances complainant could have screamed or
raised an outcry to summon assistance. Juanita Angeles' conduct however can be explained by her fear
at that time when four men suddenly confronted them and positioned themselves in such a way that
resistance would be impossible. Further during their travel to Tagaytay City Juanita Angeles was rendered
practically helpless. She was forced to sit between Silvestre Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel while
Arsenio Calayag and Herminigildo Sunpongco sat in front of the car.

The presence of the lewd design is manifested by the subsequent rape that occurred.

At this point, it is noteworthy to mention that the crime of rape is difficult both to prove and to disprove
considering the very nature of the offense involving as it does in most cases only two persons.
Consequently, the final resolution of the trial court would hinge on whose version is more credible, more
plausible and more trustworthy considering the circumstances surrounding its commission.

The case at bar is no different. To prove that the crime of rape was committed the court has to examine
carefully the evidence presented by the parties. In this instance the circumstance of force and
intimidation attending the crime of rape is manifested not only by the testimony of the complainant but
the medicolegal report filed by Capt. Ramon Pascual as well.
His findings are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Extragenital:

xxx xxx xxx

Contusion at the posterior cervical region, measuring 6 cm. by 4 cm., at the posterior midline, 143 cm.
above the heel. Contusion at the anterolateral aspect middle third of the right leg, measuring 7 cm. by 5
cm., 3 cm. from its anterior midline, 27 cm. above the heel.

Genital:

There is moderate amount of pubic hair, evenly distributed. The labia majora and minora are in
coaptation There is moderate amount of leucorrheal discharge. On separating the lips are revealed
abrasions at perineum and at both sides of the vulva. The hymen disclosed lacerations at 9 and 11
o'clock positions. The external vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance upon introduction of the
examining index finger and the virgin-sized speculum. The cervix is normal in color and consistency, with
an abraded area at its lower lip. The uterus is not enlarged.

MICROSCOPIC FINDINGS:

Vaginal smears are positive for spermatozoa and negative for gram-negative diplococci.

REMARKS:

Findings are compatible with recent sexual contact. [Records, pp- 23-24].
As stated by the Supreme Court, "(P)hysical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesse, ..." [People v. Sacabin, G.R. No. L-36638, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
707, 713].

Moreover the conduct of the complainant after the incident took place further strengthens her case.
After the forcible abduction and the rape took place and her rescue that same night, she lost no time the
following day to have herself examined at the Philippine Constabulary Central Laboratory Office at 8:30
in the morning, she went to the Criminal Investigation Service office at Camp Crame to give her
testimony, and she filed her complaint before the fiscal's office. Compare this to the conduct of accused-
appellants particularly Silvestre Sunpongco who jumped bail in the course of the trial and was not
arrested until after six years.

It also behooves this Court to look into the possible motive Juanita Angeles could have had in filing the
criminal complaint against accused-appellants had she not been wronged, considering her age, status,
reputation and educational attainment, for on this point, accused-appellants argue that the complainant
was merely threatened and forced by her brother, Dr. Jose Angeles, to file the complaint against them.
Considering the evidence presented this Court finds the appellants' stance as implausible.

III. Anent the last error assigned by the accused-appellants, they would refute the testimony given
by accused-turned state witness Benjamin Gabriel summarized by the trial court, as:

Sometime in the second week of October, 1964, between 8:00 and 9:00 P.M., he met the accused
Silvestre Sunpongco, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag by previous appointment at the
"glorietta" in Hagonoy, Bulacan, at which time Silvestre told them to wait for Juanita Angeles on her way
to church the next day, a Sunday, and then take her by force, place her inside the car, and bring her to
Tagaytay where Silvestre would rape her so that she would be his, because somebody from Pulilan was
courting her. They waited for Juanita as planned, but she failed to appear. Saturday night of the
succeeding week, they met again and agreed to consummate their plan to abduct Juanita Angeles the
day after, also a Sunday, but again she did not appear. Silvestre Sunpongco told them to wait for another
occasion.

On October 20, 1964 they met again in the same place. This time, Silvestre told them that on Friday,
October 23,1964 Juanita Angeles would get rice from the RCA at Guiguinto and they will wait for her at
the crossing at Malolos to snatch her and take her to Tagaytay in order that he would rape her. On
October 23,1964, between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M., they all met in front of the municipal building of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, rode a car belonging to Nena Marucot the sister of Silvestre Sunpongco, which was
being driven by Arsenio Calayag, and proceeded to the appointed police at Malolos, where they stopped
and waited for Juanita Angeles. After a while, they saw her coming in a jeep driven by Virgilio Gan. They
followed the jeep and on reaching Tabang Bridge, they blocked its way and forced it to stop.

The rest of his story is a corroboration of those of the other prosecution witnesses, although he ended it
by saying that once Juanita Angeles was placed inside a room at the Hilltop Hotel by Silvestre Sunpongco,
the latter ordered this witness to stay on guard outside while he ordered Herminigilo Sunpongco and
Arsenio Calayag to return to Hagonoy; that at 5:00 P.M. he entered one of the rooms because he had
fever, and that at about 9:00 P.M. a hotel boy woke him up and told him to tell Silvestre Sunpongco that
somebody was looking for him. [Records, pp. 523-528].

The accused-appellants in denying the existence of conspiracy would question the discharge of Benjamin
Gabriel to become a state witness. Particularly they aver that Benjamin Gabriel's testimony cannot be
substantially corroborated in its material points.

An indicium of conspiracy is ". ... when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent were in fact concerted
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. ... (People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-35700 October 15, 1973, 53 SCRA 246, 2541.

This Court agrees with the prosecution contention that coupled with the testimonies of Juanita Angeles
and Benita Fabian, the following are sufficient corroboration of Benjamin Gabriel's testimony on
conspiracy:

(1) After the jeep where Juanita Angeles and Benita Fabian were riding and forced to stop by a car
occupied by appellants, the appellants and Benjamin Gabriel all got off from said car and approached the
jeep.
(2) Herminigildo Sunpongco, Benjamin Gabriel and Silvestre SunPori9co boarded the jeep used by
the complainant and Benita Fabian. Thereafter, Silvestre ordered the driver of the jeep to proceed to an
old road.

(3) Arsenio Calayag, in the meantime drove the car and followed the jeep that carried complainant
and the other appellants.

(4) Upon reaching an isolated place, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered the driver of the jeep to stop. The
car also stopped. Whereupon, the appellants riding in the jeep alighted.

(5) To force Juanita Angeles into the car, Silvestre Sunpongco pulled Juanita by the hand, Benjamin
Gabriel pushed her at the back, while Arsenio Calayag positioned himself behind the wheel of the car,
ready to drive the moment Juanita was successfully brought into it. As this was going on, Herminigildo
Sunpongco was holding Benita to prevent her from giving the complainant a helping hand. (6) From the
time the car finally drove off with Juanita Angeles, up to the time it reached Tagaytay City, appellants
Herminigildo Sunpongco, Benjamin Gabriel, Silvestre Sunpongco and Arsenio Calayag were inside the
vehicle. [Appellee's Brief, pp. 12-131.

The discharge of Benjamin Gabriel to become a state witness is likewise questioned by Herminigildo
Sunpongco who avers that on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution it is he who
appears to be the least guilty. On this point suffice it to state that, " .... (A)ll that the law requires, in
order to discharge an accused and to use him as a state witness is that the defendant whose exclusion is
required does not appear to be the most guilty, not necessarily that he is the least guilty, ... [People v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55533, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 107, 112].

Considering the testimonies and evidence presented this Court is of the belief that the trial court did not
err in convicting herein appellants of the crime charged.

However, the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneously designated "life imprisonment". The
correct term is reclusion perpetua [People v. Abletes G.R. No. L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 248].

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED with
the modification that the indemnity awarded by the trial court is raised to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY,"
EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-appellee.

Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and Dueñas for
defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.

Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.

PER CURIAM:

The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:

The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO
AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG
LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the
crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct
the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their
common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by
means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code.

That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without
taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to
execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and
permitting the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the
Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and
Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:

1. Use of a motor vehicle.

2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery
difficult;

3. Abuse of superior strength;

4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the act; and

5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for the commission.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted
amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such
time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on
their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2,
1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda,
Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to
be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to
establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and
Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the
case dismissed against the aforementioned accused.

Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from
the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-
1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised
Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime,
the Court hereby orders its confiscation.

This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and
Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of
them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.

The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and
single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course
in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It
was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00
per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to
P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.

So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound
from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid
Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four
men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She
stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left,
at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car
(Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This
prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the
car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.

The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously.
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl
held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her
strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car.
Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right
arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva
toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.

When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men
inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her
arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in,
appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The
maid was left behind.

The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio
Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the
appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language that the
appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her
face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva
started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon
hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She
continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the
family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already
dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was
much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was
beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The
appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino would stand up and talk in
whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.

The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street.
Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the
help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed
or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The
blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.

Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda
and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling
meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed
their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of
the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea,
however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light
was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the
proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the
assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid.
They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another
unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her
efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and
feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the
complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her
clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with
which to cover herself, but she could not find one.

Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on
the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her.
Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and
Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose
cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant
crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.

The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and
Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in
abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room.
They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the
room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former
succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for
the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face
and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would
know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's
turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him,
he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was
struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door,
threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape
what with their presence.

After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes,
told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the
impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by
a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was
released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were
apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The
appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she
was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on
his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.

Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They
finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the
studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-
known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab.
After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant
Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was
already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept
asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.

It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her
mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the
house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have
been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's
instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed
her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and
pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external
physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo
Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence
when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived
home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested
him to postpone the interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter
were still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should
be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed.
Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva,
accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the
Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B")
wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the
afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr.
Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.

During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also
at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one
of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to
the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons
inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her.
She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and
related the role played by him.

At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat.
Marcos G. Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was
involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated,
among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva
to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda
who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.

After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant
Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh.
"B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to
Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.

After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and
Cañal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the
evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons who
abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of
Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-
2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the
Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had tattoo marks on his right hip.
After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him, and
he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."

Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his
statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of
them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to
abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of
the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her
body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that
he and his other three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva
was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car
and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the
complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.

In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on
different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor
was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision.
With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the court that he
found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index
finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva
complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the
extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or
tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows
administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject
while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been sustained on or about
June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the doctor declared that he found injuries on
the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse committed on June 26,
1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not
usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to mention the
possibility that the subject might have douched herself.

The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We quote
hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in
Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time,
which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to
the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so
much so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at
their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new
acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black
topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel
repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring
Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a small car
whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and
coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman
continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she
swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to
the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the
presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's
grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl
into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also admit
that they did nothing to stop him.

Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl who
was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to
Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard
her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have
a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl
presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease
for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she
consented to do the performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were
limited to the four of them.

Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not before
Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The
three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused
testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows
before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them
removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal stripped to the skin "because it
was hot." The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard
him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted
about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This
accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and
Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently
still discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy
Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to
by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would
appear as if she had just come from her work.

Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies
how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay
Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons
after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help
raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Cañal to join
them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa,
Aquino detached himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his
relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal,
gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house
where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be
apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to
Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas.

The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and
reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's
testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertion of
the trial judge on this point:

As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing
happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for
fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its
utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this
kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as
easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the worlds after
the rough handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show.
There is no fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen
for money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and
meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and
so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn
the men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the
wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of
trade assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform
first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to
do a striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when.
Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the very precautious nature of
their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected
that they could demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did
not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to
pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about
the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most
stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe Maggie
de la Riva consented to do.

Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their
interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their
surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion
that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the
hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt.

Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The Court
realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Cañal as the
man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that
the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot."
What kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of
adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform
before a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold
and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours
where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!

All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense
has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained,
cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal) examination
conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of
which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was
examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the
insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises
and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two
persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time,
for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by
the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out
a case against the accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it
does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what
purpose? Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all
the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she
really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation?

A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the case
will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480;
Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25,
1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie
during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The
telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and
traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any
struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.

In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony should not
be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it
is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration nothing
less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood
alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which
the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the
least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the
declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or
polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in
maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the
offended party most often is the only one available to prove directly its commission and that
corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of
its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a position of having to accept such
uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR
530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.

1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De
la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they
generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the
complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is
claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no
to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible
abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they
helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally;
that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the
former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful
and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later
took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the
least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the
amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by lewd
designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.

2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been
clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's
vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an
expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse,
especially if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the examination was
conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid
infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the
consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration
(People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused
by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated
tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and
earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same
with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay
her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such
an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the
cervix.

3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of
successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of
June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them
raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering
that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical
person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact
that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her
statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her
family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not
then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant
did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was
threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different
parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they
possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that
Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they
came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even
allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have
come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to
the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of
popularity and earnings as a movie actress.

4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on
the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating
details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were
involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements
were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by
the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is
suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence
at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal
admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss De la Riva at the ABS
Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that
only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it appear
that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been
prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed
to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any
of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario
of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his
statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he
was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the
circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their statements
categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the
statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to
depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given.
However, even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of
evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.

The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground
that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478)
and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17
of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United
States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs.
Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have
provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the
proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second
stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18).
The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only
because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the
meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the
said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the
members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.

5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital
offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the
penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The
contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission
of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it
matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its
attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May
29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961).
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court
to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant
Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the
better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-
16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for
there this Court ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty,
"did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned
in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the
proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of
guilty with the statement that .

I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents of
aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said
accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for three times — and his decision was still the
same.

Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to
Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the
maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish
only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life
imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation
here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.

6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case
from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court
a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused
were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been
influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a
presumption of innocence and to fair trial."

We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed
to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all
that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary
if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape
upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the
crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding
(crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction — in
other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction
and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.

What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111
which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:

ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the
appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to
consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the
penalty to be imposed.

Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a
definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the
following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime
having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman,
et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to
them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance
which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With
respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset
by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the
proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances
remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each
of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)

In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by
analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the
penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed
forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the
ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one
death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.

We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account
in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs.
Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has
only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs.
Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused
guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders
and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case
of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have
committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have
explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no
substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for
the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences
imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in
which this Court imposed on each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and
separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established,
the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the
felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the
appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of
the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and
practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:

The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in
futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to
forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the
imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital
penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The
foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it
fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between
imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could
be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of
offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of
the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does
not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is
a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive
clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or
penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the
corresponding penalties prescribed by law.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed
simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or
more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties
shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital
penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous
service.

The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance.
The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal
perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence
irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible
character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could
effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter
delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in
recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of
the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death
penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the
maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is
commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years
corresponding to a single life sentence.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our
finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of
aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.

————

Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for
reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by
the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with
Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the
intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The
car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the
Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure
payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly
installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered with
the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien
was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with
notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well
as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land
Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.

Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5,
1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a
preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for
the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was
not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together
with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car
was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to
surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal
case.

During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed
with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On
October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation
as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on
October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on
October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement,
but the same was also denied.

On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the
car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to
pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the
premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory.
Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of
execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention
was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General
contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car,
the order of confiscation is correct.

Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the
only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's
statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not, however,
intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were
made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the
identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime;
that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several
months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the
possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the
replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation
and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the property of a
third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for
confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered
to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.

————

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of
the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on
December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and
only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio
Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a
consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall,
jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a
total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its
confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its
possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 85822 April 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RONILO ALBURO, ZALDY RODRIGUEZ, AND JOHN DOE, accused, RONILO ALBURO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Florido & Associates for accused-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
We affirm the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch XIX, 1 finding Ronilo Alburo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify Evelyn Cantina
in the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the costs.

On 3 February 1986, Evelyn Cantina filed a complaint for Forcible Abduction with Rape against Ronilo
Alburo, Zaldy Rodriguez and John Doe. The complaint reads:

That on or about the 27th day of January, 1986 at about 6:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Ronilo Alburo, who was armed with a butcher's
knife, conniving and confederating together with Zaldy Rodriguez and John Doe and mutually helping
one another, with deliberate intent, by the accused, Zaldy Rodriguez and John Doe holding one Evelyn
Cantina and preventing the latter from disembarking from the jeep driven by accused Ronilo Alburo took
her to Beverly Hills against her will and once there, said accused Ronilo Alburo, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said Evelyn Cantina without the consent and
against the will of the latter. (p. 1, Original Record)

Accused John Doe was subsequently identified as Dionisio Sumalinog.

Upon being arraigned, the accused individually entered pleas of not guilty. Towards the end of the
presentation of the prosecution evidence, the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the complaint
against Zaldy Rodriguez and Dionisio Sumalinog. The motion was granted and trial proceeded against
Ronilo Alburo.

The prosecution evidence upon which the Trial Court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is summarized in the People's Brief as follows:

At or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1986, Evelyn Cantina was already dismissed from
her classes at the Abellana National High School, located at Jones Avenue, Cebu City. From there, her
classmates, Priscilla Atillo and Aniceta Bringuila, accompanied her in walking towards Colon Street, Cebu
City, to buy some medicine. Not long after, a passenger jeepney plying the Guadalupe. Carbon market
route stopped by the side of the road. The driver, Ronilo Alburo, invited the three girls to board his
jeepney. As Colon Street is very near, Evelyn Cantina declined the invitation at first. Alburo was however,
insistent in giving the three girls a lift. Finally, the latter accepted the invitation by taking the front seat,
with Evelyn sitting right beside the driver. At that time however', Zaldy Rodriguez and Dionisio Sumalinog
were already seated at the passengers' area at the back (t.s.n., pp. 18-21, April 24, 1986, Priscilla Atillo).

Upon reaching the corner of Jones Avenue and Colon Street, the jeepney driven by Alburo stopped at
the red traffic light. At this juncture, Bringuila and Atillo disembarked. Evelyn was also about to alight but
she was prevented by Alburo who threatened to raise her skirt if she insists on alighting and following
her two companions. Bringuila and Atillo tried to help Evelyn by pulling her out but meanwhile, the
green light turned on and the jeepney sped off towards Juan Luna Street (t.s.n., pp. 17-26, April 24,
1986, Priscilla Atillo).

Reaching Juan Luna, the jeepney then made a U-turn on its return trip to Guadalupe. Meanwhile, Zaldy
Rodriguez transferred to the front seat beside Evelyn (t.s.n., p. 20, August 6, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

Anticipating that the jeepney driven by Alburo would make a return trip to Guadalupe, Atillo and
Bringuila posted themselves beside the corner of Colon and Juan Luna Streets near the Cebu City Savings
Bank, where vehicles would stop at the red light signal (t.s.n., p. 34, April 24, 1986, Priscilla Atillo).

Indeed, on its way to Guadalupe, the jeepney driven by Alburo stopped at the corner of Colon and Juan
Luna Streets when the red light signaled. Evelyn attempted to go down from the jeepney but, she was
prevented by Zaldy Rodriguez who placed his leg as barricade. Realizing that Evelyn was being prevented
from disembarking, Atillo and Bringuila who stood by the roadside, close to the jeepney, attempted to
pull Evelyn from the vehicle. However, they did not succeed. Then the jeepney again sped off and
headed towards Jones Avenue when the green light turned on (t.s.n., p. 22, August 6, 1986, Evelyn
Cantina).

On the way to the Capitol and upon reaching the Fuente Osmeña Police Station, the jeepney turned left
along B. Rodriguez Street. When it was already near the Southern Medical Center, Zaldy Rodriguez and
Dionisio Sumalinog got off from the jeepney, leaving only Alburo and Evelyn on board. Alburo then drove
off, turning right at V. Rama Avenue, passing thru Englis, he place where Evelyn resides. The latter then
begged Alburo that she be allowed to disembark. Alburo did not heed Evelyn's plea. Instead, he pulled a
knife and threatened to slash her side if she would disembark. The jeepney then proceeded to Beverly
Hills (t.s.n., pp. 27-30, August 16, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).
Thinking that Evelyn might have been dropped by Alburo at her residence in Englis Atillo and Bringuila
boarded another jeep. They were hoping that Evelyn was already home and that they could get the
notebook which one of them left with her. However, only Evelyn's mother was there. They then realized
that Evelyn was really in trouble and so they related to her mother what happened. Alarmed by such
information, the latter sought the help of Ester Dakay, a neighbor and close friend (t.s.n., pp. 5-10, May
13, 1986, Priscilla Atillo).

The husband of Ester Dakay, a jeepney driver who fully knew Ronilo Alburo and the latter's route from
Guadalupe to downtown, Cebu City, called up by phone Evelyn's father, who came home not long after
(t.s.n., p. 26, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay). Together, they then formed search teams to look for Evelyn.
Lourdes Cantina and Ester Dakay went as search team No. 1. Riding on a taxi, they searched the
reclamation area and made inquiries from the motels. On the other hand, Evelyn's father as well as her
uncle, rode on two separate motorcycles, making up search teams 2 and 3, and scoured the streets of
the city. However, the search proved futile (t.s.n., pp. 2932, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

In an isolated area at barangay OPPRA (Capitol Hills), Alburo stopped the jeepney. Holding the knife, he
went down from the jeepney and threateningly came close to Evelyn. He then pointed the knife at her
and told her that at something would happen to her if she would shout. Then he pushed Evelyn's head
against the steering wheel which rendered the latter unconscious.

When Evelyn regained her senses she found herself without her panty anymore. Blood was on her vagina
and she felt pain on her stomach. She saw Ronilo Alburo with his face close to hers, getting up from her
then raising his pants. She cried and asked Alburo what he had done to her. He did not answer her
inquiries. Instead, he made her walk for a while, outside of the jeepney, accordingly, to ease the pain she
felt. Then he made her sit back on the front seat with him, still under threat of death (t.s.n., pp. 11-19,
August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

It was already dark when Alburo drove back to the City. Still under threat of death, Evelyn remained
seated beside him. To make it appear that nothing really happened, Alburo even picked up some
passengers along the way (t.s.n., p. 33, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina).

At about seven o'clock in the evening, while Lourdes and Ester were standing near Power Foods
Restaurant at Jones Avenue, Ester spotted the jeepney coming from the Capitol heading towards
downtown. Ester signaled the jeepney to stop. As the jeepney slowed down, she saw Evelyn seated
between Alburo and a male passenger (t.s.n., pp. 40-41, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

Evelyn who appeared very weak and who was in tears, alighted from the vehicle upon order from her
mother Lourdes Cantina. As she was embraced by Ester, she whispered to Ester that Alburo should not
be allowed to abscond because he had raped her (t.s.n., pp. 42-43, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay). A
commotion followed as an altercation between Lourdes and Alburo started. The passengers at the back
area disembarked. Ester and Evelyn then sat down at the passenger's area with a certain Boyet Junio a
Barangay Tanod (t.s.n., p. 48, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

During the confrontation, Lourdes demanded that Alburo should bring Evelyn and Ester to the Fuente
Osmeña Police Station. At first, Alburo refused claiming that nothing wrong had happened between him
and Evelyn. When Ester told him he had nothing to be afraid of if he was telling the truth he however,
relented and drove the jeepney towards Fuente Osmeña (t.s.n., pp. 43-45, August 15, 1986, Evelyn
Cantina).

Lourdes did not board the jeepney as she decided to look for her husband in order to inform him that
they had already found Evelyn. While the jeepney was proceeding towards Fuente Osmeña, Alburo
changed his mind. He made a left turn at Visitacion Street on the pretext that he would pick up a friend
who could accompany him to the police station. At Visitation Street, Alburo parked the jeepney. He took
out the engine key and the cash collections, then left the vehicle. As Alburo had gone, Evelyn narrated to
Ester how she was raped by Alburo. She even gave to Ester the knife which was left in the jeepney by
Alburo (t.s.n., pp. D-4-57, May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

After about 15 minutes, Ester realized that Alburo would not return anymore. She then called by phone
the jeepney owner who came later and drove them to Fuente Osmena Police Station (t.s.n., p. 60, p. 65,
May 13, 1986, Ester Dakay).

When Ester and Evelyn arrived at the Fuente Osmeña Police Station, Lourdes was already there. The two
women then reported to the police the abduction of Evelyn by Rodriguez, Sumalinog and Alburo. Ester
also submitted the knife (Exhibit "A") to the police. Thereafter, Lourdes and Ester accompanied Evelyn to
the Southern Islands Medical Center for the latter's medical examination. As they could not be
accommodated there immediately, they went to the Cebu City Medical Center (t.s.n., pp. 52-53, August
15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina). At the Cebu City Medical Center where Evelyn was examined by Dra. Juliet
Lastimosa and was found to have fresh lacerations on her vagina with positive presence of spermatozoa
(t.s.n., pp. 52-53, August 15, 1986, Evelyn Cantina). The medical certification (Exhibit "B") was issued by
Dra. Lastimosa on the following morning.

On that same evening, Ester, Lourdes and Evelyn made a second appearance at the police station and
the complaint for abduction with rape was formally lodged by Evelyn. Her affidavit was initially taken by
the Investigator. The knife. (Exhibit "A") which was submitted earlier that night remained in the
possession of the police. As the panty (Exhibit "E") and the skirt (Exhibit "D" were still worn by Evelyn,
they were submitted only the following day. The skirt was torn on the right side (Exhibit "D-2") and had
some blood stains (Exhibit "D-1"). The panty also had some blood stains (Exhibit "E-1"). (pp. 3-1 1, Brief
for the Appellee)

Appellant, on the other hand, presented five (5) witnesses and offered several documentary exhibits in
his defense. His theory runs thus:

Accused Alburo's theory or main line of defense is that he and Evelyn Cantina were sweethearts, thus, if
ever there was sexual intercourse between Ronilo and Evelyn on 27 January 1986, it was with the free
and voluntary consent of complainant Evelyn Cantina. The defense witnesses testified to the fact that on
several occasions they saw Evelyn riding the jeepney driven by Ronilo and the former was seating beside
the accused at the front seat of the motor vehicle.

One of the witnesses even testified to the effect that she saw Evelyn visiting Ronilo at the latter's rented
room for a number of times. In short, the accused tried to convey before the trial court that it is of public
knowledge in the neighborhood of Ronilo that the accused and Evelyn were lovers." (pp. 5-6, Brief for
the Accused-Appellant)

The Trial Court gave no credence to the defense version and, as heretofore stated, sentenced Appellant
to reclusion perpetua. Before us now, Appellant maintains:

I. The lower court erred in giving credit to the claim of the prosecution that the alleged offended victim
Evelyn Cantina was forcibly raped by the accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo.
II. The trial court erred in giving credit to the testimony of the offended party which lacks candor or
credibility and probability, and in not considering that her testimony was due to fear of her parents that
they would castigate and punish her if found that she and Ronilo were lovers.

III. The trial court erred in considering that the facts and circumstances presented as evidence by the
prosecution militates against a finding of rape.

IV. The trial court erred in not believing that the accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo and Evelyn Cantina
were sweethearts and lovers, and that the carnal act done by them on 27 January 1986 was motivated
by mutual passion and love and therefore voluntary.

V. The trial court erred in not believing the testimonies of the appellant Ronilo Alburo and of Dina Lopez,
Placido Alegrado Manuel Rama and Corazon Gabato defense witnesses, who declared that on several
occasions they saw Evelyn riding the jeepney.

VI. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant at least on the ground of reasonable
doubt. (pp. 7-8, Ibid.)

After evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we are not persuaded by the theory that Appellant and
Evelyn were sweethearts.1âwphi1 If they were, surely, Evelyn would not have jeopardized their
relationship by accusing him of having deflowered her and, on top of it all, filing a criminal charge against
him. Evelyn's picture, allegedly given to Appellant as a remembrance of their romantic relationship, was
actually given to Ruel Sipi her former boyfriend. She emphatically denies having given Appellant any such
token. Neither was Appellant able to present any convincing evidence to substantiate his claim like love
letters, notes and other symbols of affection.

Moreover, if, in fact, they had been lovers, Evelyn would have boarded Appellant's jeep voluntarily and
alone unaccompanied by her two classmates. If the latter had any inkling that Evelyn did want to go with
Appellant, they would not have shown so much concern for her welfare and safety like following the
passenger jeepney driven by Appellant to the traffic lights, trying to pull Evelyn down from the jeepney,
failing in which, they eventually reported the incident to Evelyn's mother.
Appellant's argument that Evelyn charged him with the crime out of fear of her parents who did not
approve of their relationship is unconvincing because, if it had been so, Evelyn could have easily told her
mother after the latter had successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing untoward had happened
between her and Appellant. Her normal reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she loved
and had a clandestine affair with. But, on the contrary, Evelyn lost no time in denouncing Appellant and
exposing to her family and the authorities the disgrace that had befallen her.

Appellant's other assigned errors focus on the issue of credibility of witnesses in respect of which it is
well settled that Appellate Courts will not generally disturb the factual findings of Trial Courts which are
in a better position to weigh the conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless it is found that the Trial
Courts have plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case (People vs. Cruz, Sr., G.R. No. L-71462, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 609, citing other
cases).

In reviewing the evidence adduced by the prosecution for this crime of Rape, we have likewise been
guided by three well-known principles, namely, (1) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility,
is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) that in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weaknesses of the evidence for the defense (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 850).

The factual milieu of this criminal charge before us gives us no reason to depart from these established
rules. On the contrary, we find that Appellant had taken Evelyn away against her will, with lewd designs,
subsequently forced her to submit to his lust and rendering her unconscious in the process, thereby
justifying his conviction for the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape under Article 48 in
relation to Articles 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code, with which he has herein been charged.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification of the amount of
indemnity to be paid the offended party, which is hereby increased to P20,000.00, in line with decisional
jurisprudence.

Costs against accused-appellant Ronilo Alburo.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93410 May 7, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROLANDO GODINES and DANNY MORENO, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ruben A. Songco for defendants-appellants.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The herein defendants-appellants were convicted of the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
P20,000.00 moral damages to the offended party. They appealed their case to this Court seeking an
acquittal. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, and considering the evidence on record, their
acquittal is well-nigh beyond realization.
In an information filed with the trial court on September 28, 1988, the provincial prosecutor of Masbate
accused the defendants-appellants Rolando Godines and Danny Moreno of having conspired in the
commission of the crime of forcible abduction with rape as penalized under the Revised Penal Code.1
Thereafter, the appellants were arraigned accordingly and they pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. In due time, a trial ensued.

Esther Ancajas, the private complainant, testified as follows: In the evening of March 17, 1988, she was
sleeping in the house of one Alejandro Vilaksi at Sitio Sincamas, Sta. Cruz, San Pascual, Masbate. She was
awakened by a commotion emanating from an adjacent room occupied by Vilaksi and his wife Milagros.
She lit a kerosone lamp to ascertain what was going on. Thereafter, she saw the defendants-appellants
talking to the couple. Godines eventually hacked Milagros. Moreno stood by the window to serve as a
lookout person. The couple's son Vicente ran away from the house after seeing Godines hack Milagros.
Godines got some money from the couple. Thereafter, the appellants prepared to leave the house. In the
meantime, Ancajas tried to escape from the house with her small child. The appellants, however, saw
her and grabbed her. The two men dragged Ancajas and the child out of the house and forcibly brought
them to a nearby vacant lot with tall grasses, about 600 meters away from the Vilaksi residence. Both
men were apparently armed; Godines had a pistol and Moreno had a knife. They threatened to kill
Ancajas if she resisted their advances. As they were dragging her to the vacant lot, they fondled her
private parts. Upon their arrival at the vacant lot, the appellants took turns in having carnal knowledge
of Ancajas. Godines did it first. While one was raping the girl, the other was holding on to the child. All
the while, the appellants threatened to kill Ancajas if she put up any resistance. Ancajas tried to resist
but the appellants simply overpowered her. After the appellants had finished satisfying their carnal
desires, they threatened her anew with death because they suspected that Ancajas recognized them.
Ancajas knew who they were but for fear of losing her life, she denied knowing any of them. Thus, the
appellants warned her not to report the incident to the authorities if she valued her life. Ancajas took
refuge in the house of a neighbor, Elpidio Aballe. She fell unconscious there. She eventually regained her
consciousness after which she narrated to Aballe the ordeal she went through. Ancajas later informed
her parents and the authorities about the incident.

Ancajas submitted herself to a medical examination. Rizaliano Deliarte, the municipal health officer of
San Pascual, Masbate prepared the following report —

(1) Scant pubic hair;

(3) Vagina easily admits two fingers, the forefinger and the middle finger; and

(4) Physical Examination—Abrasion multi-linear or lateral aspect of left shoulder joint, which means
that the abrasions were located on the lateral aspect and run across the chest, left shoulder joint, and
this could have been caused by a hard object hitting the skin of the persons, such as stone, tip of wood,
sand and even finger nails.2

Deliarte later on testified that on account of these manifestations, it is possible that Ancajas had been
raped.

The defense, however, had a different version of the story. The witness for the defense testified as
follows: Sometime in the afternoon of March 17, 1988, the two accused attended a religious service at
the local Iglesia Ni Cristo church with a number of friends and relatives. They were together with a
certain Felomino Moreno, the wife of Godines, and two children. When the religious service was over,
they proceeded to the house of Felomino Moreno. They passed for a certain Generoso Umpad along the
way. Before they reached their destination, Godines declared that he was feeling ill. Upon their arrival at
the house of Felomino Moreno, everyone in the household attended to Godines. Umpad gathered some
medicinal herbs for him. Godines and his wife spent the night in the said house. They went home at 7
o'clock the following morning. Danny Moreno stayed up to 10 o'clock in the evening. He slept in the
house of Generoso Umpad from 11 o'clock p.m. The next day, Vicente Vilaksi went to see Godines at the
latter's house in order to borrow a hammock. Godines then accompanied Vicente to the Vilaksi
residence. There, he saw Ancajas and Elpidio Aballe. Later on in the afternoon of the same day, police
authorities arrested the accused.

Godines asserted that he could not have committed the crime because he had to stay in the house of
Felomino Moreno to recuperate from his illness and that he was able to go home the next day. He also
asserted that the house of Felomino Moreno is about two kilometers away from the house of Alejandro
Vilaksi where the incident in question took place. Godines likewise intimated that he knew Esther
Ancajas since they were small children and that they never had a misunderstanding. For his part, Danny
Moreno maintained that the house of Generoso Umpad is about three kilometers away from the house
of Vilaksi. He also admitted that, like Danny Moreno, he knew Ancajas and that there was never any
unpleasant relationship between them in the past. Both accused related that Ancajas knew the two of
them as well.

The trial court did not sustain the version of the defense. The trial court observed that there were
serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense and that a distance of a few
kilometers from the scene of the crime is not a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that it was
impossible for the accused to have committed the crime. Moreover, the trial court invited attention to
the fact that alibi is a defense which is easily concocted and that the same cannot prevail against positive
identification by credible witnesses. The trial court also found the version of the prosecution credible in
that no Filipino woman will publicly admit that she has been raped unless the same is true because her
natural disposition is to protect her honor. In addition, the trial court held that the crime of forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main purpose of the accused is to rape the victim.

As stated earlier, the trial court found both accused guilty of rape.

Both accused filed a motion for reconsideration on March 5, 1990. The trial court denied the motion on
March 7, 1990.

The case was elevated to this Court by way of this appeal. The appellants raise the following errors
allegedly committed by the trial court —

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE WAS COMMITTED ON THE VICTIM.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND THEIR WITNESSES
WERE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTED EACH OTHER.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER
WITNESSES WERE INSUFFICIENT AND INCREDIBLE.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS A DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESS HAS (SIC) A
MOTIVE IN FILING THE CHARGE OF RAPE.

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPREHENDING THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WERE (SIC) NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.3

After a careful evaluation of the entire record of the case, the Court finds no reason to reverse the
decision appealed from.

Inasmuch as the assigned errors are interrelated, the Court will consider them altogether.
The appellants insist that there are no conclusive medical findings that the complainant had indeed been
raped. This assertion is untenable. A medical examination is not an indispensable element in a
prosecution for rape.4 At any rate, the medical evidence discloses that the private complainant suffered
abrasions on her body thereby confirming that she had been physically violated through the use of force.

The appellants contend that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent and as such
do not serve as valid grounds for their conviction.

The contention is untenable.

It is true that an accusation for rape can easily be fabricated because the nature of the crime is that it is
difficult to prove. More often than not, only the victim and the accused are in a position to testify on the
matter so much so that the conviction or acquittal of the accused hinges solely upon the credibility of
the witnesses.5 In the case at bar, the private complainant categorically identified the authors of the
crime. She had no motive to conjure up a serious charge against the appellants. The appellants
themselves admit that before the incident in question took place, there was no unpleasant relationship
between the accused on the one hand and the private complainant on the other. The record, as a matter
of fact, is devoid of inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses. The actuations of the
private complainant after the commission of the rape upon her are consistent with that of a rape victim.
What remains as the decisive factor is the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of
the rape.

The Court reiterates its oft-mentioned observation that it is very difficult to believe that a woman would
be willing to undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience and scandal of a public prosecution for rape,
as well as an examination of the private parts of her anatomy, if her intention is not to bring her rapists
to justice.6 Besides, the trial court had the opportunity of a first hand assessment of the testimonies of
the witnesses, an opportunity that is not available to this Court. Thus, the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses in a prosecution of a crime against chastity commands the highest respect
from the Supreme Court,7 in the absence of valid reasons for holding otherwise. No valid reasons have
been presented by the appellants to merit a deviation from this principle.

The defense of alibi raised by the appellants is of no value in the case at bar. In order for the appellants
to establish alibi, they must show that it was impossible for them to have been present at the place
where the crime was committed at the time of the commission of the same.8 Alibi must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence.9 In the case at bar, the defense of alibi relied upon by the appellants does
not preclude the possibility that they were present at the scene of the crime and at the time the same
was committed. The distance between the alleged whereabouts of the appellants at the time of the
commission of the crime and the scene of the crime itself may be easily negotiated by ordinary means.
The defense witnesses themselves testified that Godines was not too ill to preclude his moving about
the premises. As stated earlier, the material factor is that there is positive identification of the accused as
the authors of the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.10 Needless to say, alibi is an
issue of fact which is best resolved by the trial court.11

In view of these observations, the Court does not find it necessary to pass upon the assigned error as to
the alleged delay in the filing of the complaint.

As to the crime committed by the appellants, the trial court correctly held that forcible abduction is
absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to rape the victim.

The appellants are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in the commission of the
offense charged. No doubt the evidence show the appellants through force and intimidation and
conspiring with each other successfully raped the victim by taking turns in raping her while the other
held the child of the victim and threatened her against resisting. Obviously two (2) rapes were
committed by the appellants. In a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.12

Under Section 3 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, it is provided:

Sec. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. — When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information, and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and
every one of them setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each case.

In this case the appellants failed to object to the information filed and the evidence presented against
them. Consequently the Court may convict them of as many offenses as has been charged and proven
and may impose on them the penalty for the offenses committed.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the review of the penalty,
indemnity and damages.13 It may also include the nature and number of the offenses committed. Each
of the appellants is guilty as principal of two (2) rapes, namely the rape he himself committed and the
rape which his co-accused committed with his active and indispensable cooperation.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby modifies the appealed judgment by finding each of the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) rapes, so each of them is hereby imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment for each rape and each to indemnify the offended party P50,000.00 with costs against
defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.