217

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.) INC., JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, AND/OR RAFAEL BESA PETITIONERS
VS.
JOHNSON OFFICE & SALES UNION FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW), MA. JESUSA BONSOL AND RIZALINDA
HIRONDO RESPONDENTS
G.R. NO. 172799 JULY 6, 2007
TINGA, J.
SV: THE 2 EMPLOYEES FILED A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. NLRC RULED IN THEIR FAVOR AND ORDERED REINSTATEMENT OR IF NOT
FEASIBLE, PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY. J&J ARGUES THAT IT HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN SEPARATION PAY AND
REINSTATEMENT (THEY WERE CHOOSING THE FORMER). SC HELD THAT THE CHOICE IS NOT THEIRS. GENERAL RULE: REINSTATEMENT FIRST
BEFORE SEPARATION PAY. J&J FAILED TO PROVE STRAINED RELATIONS TO JUSTIFY SEPARATION PAY INSTEAD OF REINSTATEMENT.

1. Case stemmed from an illegal dismissal case filed by Bonsol and Hirondo Against J&J LA dismissed the complaint. On
December 14, 2001 NLRC reversed, held that the violations of company procedure by Bonsol and Hirondo didn’t constitute
serious misconduct or willful disobedience warranting their dismissal. NLRC held that they are entitled to reinstatement.
Dispositive portion read “they are entitled to reinstatement to their respective former positions w/o loss of seniority rights
and privileges but without any backwages or in the alternative, to payment of separation pay each equivalent to ½ month
pay for every year of service…”
2. J&J sought partial reconsideration but it was denied. Neither party appealed from the NLRC resolution within the
reglementary period. NLRC resolution became final and executory
3. On March 5, 2002, J&J filed a motion to set case for conference before the NLRC, manifesting their willingness to pay the 2
separation pay and other monetary awards. The 2 were not in attendance when the NLRC called for said conference. LA
suggested that they prepare the check payment.
4. The 2 employees sought the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the Dec. 14 resolution and prayed for immediate
reinstatement to their former positions.
5. A conference was held and J&J reiterated its intention to pay the separation pay but the 2 employees refused. J&J then filed
a manifestation and motion arguing that the Dec 14 resolution granted them the right to choose between reinstatement
and payment of separation pay. They also claimed that reinstatement was no longer feasible because of the strained
relations between the company and Bonsol and Hirando.
6. June 18, NLRC issued a resolution directing the reinstatement of the 2 pursuant to the Dec. 14 resolution. Though it
recognized their right to choose, NLRC disregarded the claim of strained relations. J&J MR denied.
7. At the CA, in a petition for certiorari, J&J alleged that the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by the 2
employees had the effect of altering the Dec. 14 resolution which had already become final and executory. Said resolution
granted them the right to choose between reinstatement and separation pay. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. MR
denied.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the choice between reinstatement and separation pay was with the petitioners (J&J)

1. NO
- an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. And in case reinstatement is not
feasible, expedient or practical, and that reinstatement would only worsen the tension and strained relations or
where the relationship between the employer and the employees has been unduly strained by reason of their
irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in
the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement.
- Payment of separation compensation in lieu of reinstatement of an employee illegally dismissed shall be allowed if
and only if the employer can prove the existence of circumstances showing that reinstatement will no longer be
for the mutual benefit of the employer and employee.
- J&J is wrong to think that they have the prerogative to choose whether to reinstate or pay separation pay. Neither
party can choose. NLRC has the authority to execute its judgment to settle any issue re: details of its judgment
- NLRC properly exercised its authority to resolve the controversy when it ordered reinstatement. NLRC and CA
disregarded J&J’s claim that the relation has been strained. SC respects these findings (factual in nature)
- Said resolution didn’t modify Dec 14 resolution (final and executor) it only set reinstatement as the primary relief.
An alteration would be adding an award that was not among those stated in the dispositive portion of the earlier
resolution. This is not the case here.
 - The dispositive portion must be read in unanimity with the ratio decidendi of it to grasp the true intent of the
decision which in the Dec. 14 resolution which granted their right to reinstatement but acknowledged the fact that
they were not entirely without fault and in effect NLRC forfeited the award of backwages. The argument of J&J
that since the NLRC found the 2 employees not entirely blameless grants them the right to choose between
reinstatement and separation pay cannot be supported by the Dec. 14 resolution. NLRC merely forfeited their
backwages because of said fault by the employees

Held: Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.

Digest by:
Justin Benedict A. Moreto

Ramy Gallego vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., et. al.

G.R. No. 179807, July 31, 2009

Facts:

Ramy Gallego was contracted in 1992 by Bayer Philippines as crop protection technician to promote and market Bayer products by
making farm visits to convince the farmers to buy their products. Petitioner employment came to a halt in 1996 prompting Gallego
to seek another employment, but he was reemployed in 1997 as part of the product image which actually performing the same task
as crop protection technician. In 2001, he was directed to submit a resignation letter and ordered to return all pieces of service
equipment, which he refused. He continued performing his duties and received compensation until January 2002, however, in April
2002, he received a memorandum that he will be transferred to Luzon; and that he heard that respondents spread rumors that
reached the dealers in Antique that he is no longer connected with Bayer and any transaction with him will not be honored as of
April 30, 2002.

Believing he was terminated, he instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Respondents Bayer and Guillermo
denied the existence of employment relationship, while, respondents Product Image and Bergonia admitted that the petitioner was
hired as contractual employee and that he has stopped reporting for work. The Labor Arbiter declared that respondents were guilty
of illegal dismissal. On appeal by the respondents, the NLRC reversed the Arbiter’s decision and contended that petitioner was not
dismissed but has abandoned his employment by failure to report on his duties. Hence, this petition for Review.

Issues:

(1) Was there employment relation between petitioner and respondent Bayer?

(2) Was petitioner illegally dismissed from his employment?

Ruling (First Issue):

The existence of an employer-employee relationship is determined on the basis of four standards, namely: (a) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of
dismissal; and (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employee’s conduct. Most determinative among these factors
is the so-called "control test." If at all, the only control measure retained by Bayer over petitioner was to act as his de facto
supervisor in certifying to the veracity of the accomplishment reports he submitted to Product Image. This is by no means the kind of
control that establishes an employer-employee relationship as it pertains only to the results and not the manner and method of
doing the work. It would be a rare contract of service that gives untrammelled freedom to the party hired and eschews any
intervention whatsoever in his performance of the engagement. Surely, it would be foolhardy for any company to completely give
the reins and totally ignore the operations it has contracted out. In fine, Product Image is ineluctably the employer of petitioner.

(Second Issue):

The Court appreciates no evidence that petitioner was dismissed. What it finds is that petitioner unilaterally stopped reporting for
work before filing a complaint for illegal dismissal, based on his belief that Guillermo and Bergonia had spread rumors that his
transactions on behalf of Bayer would no longer be honored as of April 30, 2002. This belief remains just that – it is unsubstantiated.
While in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal

Miguela Santuyo, et al. vs. Remerco Garments Manufacturing, Inc. and/or Victoria Reyes

GR No. 174420; March 22, 2010

Facts:

Petitioners, who are employees of the Remerco Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (RGMI), were among those recalled to work by the
company, after their union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Remerco Garments Manufacturing Inc. (KMM Kilusan), staged a 2-year
illegal strike from 1992 to 1994. Among the conditions of their recall was that they would no longer be paid a daily rate but on a
piece-rate basis. However, even before RGMI could normalize its operations, the union filed a notice of strike in the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on August 8, 1995. According to the union, RGMI conducted a time and motion study and
changed the salary scheme from a daily rate to piece-rate basis without consulting it. It claimed that RGMI therefore not only
violated the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but also diminished the salaries agreed upon. It therefore committed an
unfair labor practice. The conciliation proceedings between the union and RGMI before the NCMB resulted in a lock-out. The union
went on strike in November 1995. Therafter, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code. It ordered all striking workers to return to work.

The Secretary of Labor found that the employees would receive higher wages if they were paid on a piece-rate rather than on a daily
rate basis. Hence, the new salary scheme would be more advantageous to the employees. For this reason, despite the provisions of
the CBA, the change in salary scheme was validated.

In an order dated September 18, 1996, the Secretary of Labor ordered all employees to return to work and RGMI to pay its
employees their unpaid salaries (from September 25, 1995 to October 14, 1995) on the piece-rate basis. Neither the union nor RGMI
appealed the aforementioned order. Meanwhile, however, on October 18, 1995, while the conciliation proceedings between the
union and respondent were pending, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RGMI and respondent Victoria Reyes,
accusing the latter of harassment. Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint, demanding payment of their accrued salaries
from September 25 to October 14, 1995.

Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint in view of the pending conciliation proceedings, involving the same issue, in the
NCMB. It also claimed that alleged violations of the CBA should be resolved according to the grievance procedure laid out therein. It
argued that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. The labor arbiter assumed jurisdiction over the case and
rendered a decision granting the claims of the union. The NLRC denied the appeal of the respondents. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the NLRC and ruled that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint. This prompted the petitioners to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues:

1. Did the labor arbiter have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioners?

2. Was the labor arbiter barred by prior judgment from assuming jurisdiction over the complaint?

Ruling (First Issue):

No, the labor arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the complaint. Petitioners clearly and consistently questioned the legality of
RGMI’s adoption of the new salary scheme (i.e., piece-rate basis), asserting that such action, among others, violated the existing
CBA. The controversy was not a simple case of illegal dismissal but a labor dispute involving the manner of ascertaining employees’
salaries, a matter which was governed by the existing CBA. Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that “[c]ases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.”

This provision requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the grievance machinery provided
therein and to voluntary arbitration.

Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred first to the grievance machinery and, if
unresolved within seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration. Thus, under Article 261 of the Labor
Code, voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which have not been resolved by the grievance
machinery. Pursuant to Articles 217 in relation to Articles 260 and 261 of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter should have referred the
matter to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Because the labor arbiter clearly did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter, his decision was void.

(Second Issue):

Yes, the labor arbiter was barred by prior judgment from assuming jurisdiction over the complaint. The Secretary of Labor resolved
the labor dispute between the union and RGMI in his September 18, 1996 order. Since neither the union nor RGMI appealed the said
order, it became final and executory. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code gives the Secretary of Labor discretion to assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute likely to cause a strike or a lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest and to decide the
controversy or to refer the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In doing so, the Secretary of Labor shall resolve all
questions and controversies in order to settle the dispute. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy because
RGMI had a substantial number of employees and was a major exporter of garments to the United States and Canada

Settled is the rule that unions are the agent of its members for the purpose of securing just and fair wages and good working
conditions. Since petitioners were part of the bargaining unit represented by the union and members thereof, the September 18,
1996 order of the Secretary of Labor applies to them.

Furthermore, since the union was the bargaining agent of petitioners, the complaint was barred under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgments. The parties to a case are bound by the findings in a previous judgment with respect to matters actually
raised and adjudged therein. Hence, the labor arbiter should have dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

APPEALS
Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative (G.R. No. 172101)
Date: August 27, 2016Author: jaicdn0
Facts:

Respondent Asiapro Cooperative is composed of owners-members with primary objectives of providing them savings and credit
facilities and livelihood services. In discharge of said objectives, Asiapro entered into several service contracts with Stanfilco.
Sometime later, the cooperative owners-members requested Stanfilco’s help in registering them with SSS and remitting their
contributions. Petitioner SSS informed Asiapro that being actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco, it must
be the one to register itself with SSS as an employer and remit the contributions. Respondent continuously ignoring the demand of
SSS the latter filed before the SSC. Asiapro alleges that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and its owners-
members. SSC ruled in favor of SSS. On appeal, CA reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between Asiapro and its owners-members.

Ruling: YES.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and
engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control
the worker‘s conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. All the aforesaid elements are present in this
case.

First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the exclusive discretion in the
selection and engagement of the owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be assigned at Stanfilco.

Second. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to
the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperative‘s client, Stanfilco.

Third. It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the power to
investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its team leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco.

Fourth. In the case at bar, it is the respondent cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and means of performing the
services under the Service Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work. Also, the respondent cooperative is
solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other representatives at Stanfilco. All these clearly prove
that, indeed, there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.