Buy Side Risk Principles
Buy Side Risk Principles
Buy Side Risk Principles
David Martin
Sr. Vice President/Chief Risk Officer
AllianceBernstein L.P.
Kenneth Winston
Managing Director/Chief Risk Officer
Morgan Stanley Investment Management
Sarah Collins
Sr. Risk Management Officer
The Dreyfus Corporation
Bennett Golub
Managing Director and Head of Risk and Quantitative Analysis
BlackRock, Inc.
RISK PRINCIPLES
Jacques Longerstaey
Managing Director, Head of Risk Management
FOR
Putnam Investments
Barbara Lucas
Partner
Capital Market Risk Advisors
ASSET MANAGERS
Thomas Madden
Vice Chairman
Federated Investment Advisory Companies
Erwin Martens
Executive Vice President, Risk Management
TIAA-CREF
Leslie Rahl
President
Capital Market Risk Advisors Prepared by
Abe Riazati
Managing Director, Head of Investment Risk
Evergreen Investments
Jacob Rosengarten
Buy Side Risk Managers Forum
Managing Director
Goldman Sachs Asset Management
and
Theresa Schnepf
Managing Director, Risk Management
JP Morgan Asset Management Capital Market Risk Advisors
Mike Thorfinnson
Chief Operating Officer and Chief Risk Officer
TD Asset Management Copyright © 2008 Buy Side Risk Managers Forum
and Capital Market Risk Advisors, Inc. The Risk
Terry Watson
Global Risk& Compliance Director Principles for Asset Managers may be reproduced on
Barclays Global Investors condition that said reproductions are not sold or
otherwise reproduced for profit, and on condition that
Abraham L. Wons these Risk Principles are produced in their entirety,
Director, Operational Risk Management
Wellington Management Company
including this notice and all accompanying
disclaimers. All other rights reserved.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 5
1.1 Changing Risks Require Changes in Risk Management. ..................................5
1.2 Understanding the Relationship Between Risk and Reward Enhances All
Aspects of the Asset Management Business.........................................................6
1.3 Each Asset Manager Must Consider Risk From Its Own Perspective. ............7
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5.12 It is Important to Determine and Track Firm Risk Tolerance. ......................16
6.6 Client Risk Tolerances and Expectations Should be Known and Monitored.19
6.8 The Use of Various Statistical Tools and Avoidance of Over-Reliance on Any
Single Statistical Tool is Desirable......................................................................21
6.11 Issuer and Counterparty Credit Risk Should be Tracked and Managed on an
Aggregate Basis. ...................................................................................................22
7.2 Adequate Systems, Processes and Resources are an Integral Part of Risk
Management. ........................................................................................................23
7.3 Spreadsheet and other End-User Tool Risk Should be Reduced and/or
Controlled to the Greatest Extent Possible ........................................................24
3
7.7 Effective System Security is Necessary to Protect the Interests of Employees
and Clients ............................................................................................................26
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Buy Side Risk Managers Forum (“BSRMF”) is composed of heads of risk
management and chief risk officers from “traditional” asset management and investment
advisory companies, i.e., money managers offering mutual funds, managed accounts and
other traditional investment products1. Its membership includes asset management firms
operating in the U.S. and around the world focused on retail, high net worth and
institutional clients. The group, which explores and attempts to define best practices for
buy side firms, has prepared this document in conjunction with Capital Markets Risk
Advisers for the purpose of setting out general principles of good risk management for
use by its members. In so doing, BSRMF has drawn on the experience and expertise of
its members as well as the extensive work done in the past by various groups with respect
to risk management2.
While these earlier works have been extremely valuable in fostering the development of
sound risk management practices, BSRMF believes a new set of principles is appropriate
at this time for several reasons. First, in recent years, the asset management industry’s
understanding of risk has continued to evolve as a result of market, economic and
technological developments. Second, there is a growing appreciation among asset
managers and other market participants that risk management is not only important in
minimizing and controlling loss; it can also play a significant role in the portfolio
construction and management process, where a better understanding of the relationship
between risk and return can enhance performance. Finally, unlike earlier work which
focused on risk issues primarily from the institutional investor, hedge fund and banking
perspectives, these principles are primarily for the purpose of providing guidance to
traditional asset management firms in developing and assessing their risk management
programs and have been drafted from that perspective. Although they overlap in some
respects with principles applicable to other types of financial services firms and
institutional investors, they also differ in many ways.
1 While some “traditional” firms offer hedge funds in addition to other products, and some risk
management principles are applicable to all investment products, including hedge funds, these principles
are primarily directed at traditional (as opposed to hedge fund) managers.
2 See, for example, Risk Standards for Institutional Investment Managers and Institutional Investors,
created by the Risk Standards Working Group (1996); Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers
created by the Managed Funds Association (2005); Sound Practices for the Management and
Supervision of Operational Risk, Basel Committee Publications No. 96 (2003).
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failure of Enron and WorldCom, among other events, which changed
our understanding of the interrelationship between various risks and
how to measure and monitor them.
As a result of these and other events, thinking on risk management has evolved and no
doubt will continue to do so. Today, there is a growing awareness that risk governance is
an important aspect of risk management, that development of a risk conscious culture is
itself a form of risk management, that risk management must be applied at both the
enterprise and portfolio level, that operational risk management is at least as significant
as investment risk management and that risk management is not strictly quantitative but
also qualitative in nature. As a result of this broader understanding of risk, market
participants are increasingly aware that risk management can no longer be viewed as the
responsibility of one individual or one department; it is the responsibility of all.
1.3 Each Asset Manager Must Consider Risk From Its Own
Perspective.
While certain risks are common to all market participants, asset managers generally think
about risk differently than either proprietary traders (including commercial and
investment banks) or institutional investors. Unlike proprietary traders investing their
own capital, traditional asset managers typically invest their clients’ money according to
specific investment objectives and guidelines chosen by their clients, in some cases in
consultation with the managers. At the portfolio level, the major risk is not meeting
client objectives. Portfolio managers need to understand how well they have performed
relative to such objectives, what risk factors may lead them to deviate from these
objectives, and whether the risks being taken are concomitant with the expected rewards.
For portfolios designed to track a specific benchmark, there may be hard limits on
deviations from the benchmark. In those cases, managers are constrained in managing
portfolios. Even at the “enterprise” level, while buy side firms face comparable risks to
proprietary trading firms, i.e., with respect to those generic risks that are common to all
trading organizations such as operational and disaster recovery risk, they also face
fiduciary risk vis-à-vis their clients that proprietary trading organizations generally need
not be concerned with. These include risks relating to the management of conflicts of
interest between clients, fair allocations of limited opportunities, and management of
operational, systems, counterparty credit, legal and reputational risks in a way that
comports with the high standard of care fiduciaries are required to meet. Thus, even
where a general risk management principle is applicable to all types of market
participants, each asset manager must apply that principle in a way that is consistent with
its own unique perspective.
The purpose of the principles set forth below is to provide a general framework reflecting
the evolving understanding of risk from the buy side perspective. It is hoped that the
principles will provide a useful reference for buy side firms in developing and assessing
their own risk management structures and programs. Since buy side firms differ greatly
one from another in terms of size, complexity, product mix, client type and legal and
regulatory structures, however, what is appropriate for one firm may not be appropriate
for another. These principles are in no way intended to be prescriptive. Each firm must
determine whether and to what extent they make sense in light of its unique
characteristics.
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2. WHAT IS RISK?
Risk can be defined in many ways. In a narrow sense, risk is the possibility of loss or a
bad outcome, but in a broader sense, is a neutral measure of the degree to which
uncertainty exists about the outcome of an action. As shown from the picture below, buy
side firms are subject to a long and constantly growing roster of risks, including but not
limited to fiduciary risk, market risk, liquidity risk, counterparty and issuer credit risk,
operational risk, legal risk and reputational risk.
Even as to any single category of risk common to multiple firms, moreover, there is a
broad range of acceptable risk management approaches and often no consensus as to
what constitutes “best practice.” Accordingly, in designing and maintaining risk
management programs, it is important for buy side firms to identify the specific risks
most relevant to their businesses and to monitor how those risks change over time.
Equally important is the development of risk management programs that are achievable,
not aspirational, in the context of a particular firm, taking into account the nature of its
products and clients, as well as their size, complexity, culture and resources. The most
elaborate risk management program will fail if it doesn’t fit the organization or is beyond
the organization’s ability to implement. When it comes to buy side risk management, one
size will never fit all.
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The Operational Risk section contains risk principles relating to
various types of risks that occur in the ordinary course of business and
in disasters. It addresses the importance of identifying, assessing, and
monitoring these risks, putting in place adequate systems and
minimizing manual processes, managing counterparty credit risk, and
assuring business continuity in a disaster.
These principles are offered as a guide to boards, trustees, senior managers and risk
personnel who are developing and evaluating their risk management structure. The
degree to which any particular principle is critical to any particular firm, however, will,
as explained above, depend on many factors, and each firm is well-advised to carefully
consider its particular risks and the most effective way to address them.
5. GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
One of the keys to effective risk management is a risk governance structure that provides
appropriate senior level oversight, segregation of functions, independent control groups
and organizational checks and balances within a risk conscious culture. Principles
relevant to risk governance are set forth below.
3 In an asset management company, portfolio management, research and trading are typically front office
functions, while customer support, account opening and documentation functions are typically middle
office functions (to the extent a middle office exists), and operations and systems are back office
functions.
4 We note that, according to a recent survey of mutual funds conducted by the Investment Company
Institute (“ICI”), “[t]he vast majority of mutual fund organizations do not appear to have established the
position of CRO to oversee the organization’s risks,” although there is a growing trend towards creating
such positions. ICI, “Chief Risk Officers in the Mutual Fund Industry: Who Are They and What is their
Role Within the Organization?”
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Senior management and board level understanding of risks, definition
of risk tolerances, and setting of risk management and ethical tone;
Experience has shown the importance of adequate segregation of investment and support
functions. Depending on the size and complexity of the organization, as well as its
culture, this may necessitate dividing responsibilities between a front, middle and back
office or in the alternative, a front and back office only. From a control perspective, the
existence or non-existence of a middle office is not particularly important. What is
important is that the front office person responsible for bringing in new clients and/or
entering into transactions, i.e., the marketer, portfolio manager or trader, is not the person
(or the subordinate or superior of the person) responsible for determining the
acceptability of the client or counterparty from a credit perspective, or for checking and
entering full trade details, confirming, comparing and settling the trade, valuing the trade
initially and on an ongoing basis, monitoring the risks attributable to the transaction
(consistent with the risk measurement system that has been established), and determining
whether it is acceptable to exceed established limits without participation of various
control groups.
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5.3 Understanding and Managing Risk is Everyone’s
Responsibility.
While designated risk management professionals play a significant role in managing and
controlling risk, risk management is much more than policing and enforcing limits.
Viewed in the broadest sense, risk management is the responsibility of all. Employees at
every level must be cognizant of risks and willing to do their part to make sure those risks
within their sphere of responsibility are managed in a manner that is consistent with the
firm’s policies, disclosures provided to clients as well as client guidelines. Even the most
detailed and sophisticated risk management programs are unlikely to be effective in the
absence of a risk conscious culture.
Control groups are responsible for measuring and monitoring risk and
for conducting independent reviews of compliance with risk
management and other policies.
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5.4 Independence of Control Groups From the Line
Organization is a Good Check and Balance.
Control groups play a vital function in asset management businesses. These groups,
including risk management5, credit, legal, compliance, financial control and internal audit
can be centralized or decentralized, and can be structured in various ways, depending on
the size and complexity of the organization and the range of products traded.
Regardless how they are structured, control groups need to have sufficient independence
to be able to perform proper monitoring. This generally means that they should report
outside the business lines they are charged with monitoring, and possibly to the board, the
CEO or at other very senior levels to assure proper stature in the firm as well as access to
key decision makers.
Although in some firms the CRO serves primarily as a monitor and enforcer of limits, a
broader, more proactive role for consideration of risk is beneficial. This might entail
independent risk personnel considering risk on both an enterprise-wide and discrete basis,
coordinating the periodic identification of risks by various business groups, as well as
providing input into investment strategy, risk budgeting, portfolio construction, etc. on an
advisory basis. Alternatively, the proactive aspects of risk could be separated from the
monitoring and compliance aspects of risk management, with the former functions
performed by front office personnel and the latter performed by independent risk
managers. Either way, it is useful to consider whether risk is being taken intelligently
and strategically with a reasonable expectation of being rewarded. The goal is not to
eliminate risk, but rather to identify and understand risks being taken and insure that the
risks retained are well understood and well managed.
Another role of a CRO is to identify opportunities where risk can be laid off or
transformed. Some firms, for example, are more skilled at managing market risk than
operational risk and might elect to outsource complex, operational intensive risk and take
on direct market risk instead. Others are more skilled at managing credit risk than market
risk, etc.
5 Risk management typically includes risk monitoring and control functions as well as a strategic function.
In some firms, these functions are combined in a single organizational unit; in other firms, they are
separate. Thus the degree to which risk management should be considered a control group varies from
firm to firm.
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The CRO is also generally a key member of senior management and can add substantial
value by briefing line managers on evolving practices and new tools as well as systemic
risk themes as they evolve.
The CRO should oversee the creation and implementation of written risk policies that are
clear and realistic rather than aspirational. While line groups and other control groups,
including Legal and Compliance are involved in creation of some policies, it is usually
the CRO who insures that risk policies adequately address the risk issues relevant to the
particular firm, that consistent risk policies are adopted throughout the organization, and
that they are followed and updated on both a periodic basis and as circumstances change
(i.e. large market moves, crises, problems with competitors, changes in regulations, etc.).
One of the most important roles of effective risk policies is to clearly identify exceptions
and establish appropriate escalation procedures, and related documentation.
It is also important for fiduciaries to remember that placing client money with or out-
sourcing to external advisers and sub-advisers, administrators or other third party service
providers does not extinguish the fiduciary obligation owed to clients. Accordingly, it is
advisable that third party and outsourced relationships be reviewed and managed so as to
assure that fiduciary issues are identified and fiduciary obligations are met.
One of the most important risk controls a buy side business can have is a risk conscious
culture in which risks are well-understood, tolerances are clearly defined and risk/return
tradeoffs are considered. Creating a risk conscious culture requires conscious effort by
senior management. In addition to determining and communicating their risk tolerances,
senior managers set the ethical and fiduciary tone for the organization. Whether or not
this necessitates the adoption of a formal ethics policy (as is legally required under some
regulatory schemes) or a less formal but equally rigorous articulation of values, effective
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risk management involves having senior management define both the risk profile and
values of the organization, communicate them to employees at the outset of the
employment relationship and periodically thereafter, and require that those values be
adhered to at all times by themselves and their employees.
In addition to written policies and procedures, asset managers must adhere to investment
guidelines provided by clients or disclosed in fund or account documentation. Because of
the fiduciary and legal significance of staying within the relevant guidelines and
disclosures, it is important that these documents be clear and unambiguous on their face,
requiring little or no interpretation on the part of the firm. In addition to a legal review,
guidelines and disclosures describing investment strategies, restrictions, etc. warrant
careful review by affected business areas to be sure that each affected business unit has
the ability to comply with such guidelines.
Asset managers must always remember that they are fiduciaries. To the extent a written
ethics statement is in place, it should address how key conflicts are handled so as to
control conflicts between the interests of multiple clients and the interests of the firm and
its employees.
Risk exists at both an ‘enterprise’ and portfolio level. Both are important but lend
themselves to different metrics. Whether or not it is desirable to aggregate portfolio risk
is a firm by firm issue. Whether to aggregate market and concentration risks at the
enterprise level is a controversial issue, with no consensus on “best practice.” It is
generally agreed, however, that aggregating counterparty exposure across rpducts (equity,
debt, securities lending, etc.) and other relationships with the lender is also a vital part of
assessing overall risk.
Whatever approach is taken, risk exposures should be measured and managed and
reported on a regular basis as well as when significant market moves occur.
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6.2 Investment Risk Should be Measured and Monitored.
Regardless whether risk tolerances have been selected by the client or asset manager,
various metrics should be considered to measure and monitor investment risk. Some
common metrics include standard deviation, tracking error (standard deviation of the
difference of returns between a portfolio and a benchmark), expected shortfall, downside
semi-standard deviation, and value at risk (VaR)6. While each metric is useful, none tells
the entire story. Thus it is useful to employ a combination of metrics.
Measuring risk can be done on either an ex post or ex ante basis. Both can be important
to a robust approach. Where back-testing is used, expected returns, risks and correlations
should be updated and reassessed based on comparisons of risk and returns to what back-
tests have forecast. Risk attribution should also be performed in a manner consistent with
the methodology used for performance attribution.
Once a framework for measuring risk is established, some firms may find it useful to
allocate a risk budget and to track performance per unit of risk budget. When VaR or
other risk budgeting metrics are used, consideration should be given to tracking and
setting goals based on a return to VaR or other metric chosen.
There have been many high profile problems recently and over time (including freezes in
the asset-backed commercial paper, CDO and subprime mortgage securities markets as
well as so-called “break the buck” concerns involving money market funds triggered by
“Kitchen Sink bonds” in 1994 or SIV’s more recently) where the need to fund
redemptions and/or margin calls precipitated losses and failures at funds trading illiquid
and longer dated securities. For this reason, measuring and monitoring liquidity risk is an
important aspect of risk management.
6 VaR is widely used in banks and other “sell side” firms. For example, 99% one-day VaR would be -
3.5% if the distribution of one-day returns on the investment was such that 99% of the time, the return
was expected to be -3.5% or more. When used by an asset manager whose objective is benchmarked,
relative VaR expressing behavior versus the benchmark is used. Thus a $99 one-day relative VaR would
be -3.5% if the distribution of one-day returns was such that 99% of the time, the difference between the
return on the portfolio and the return on the benchmark was expected to be -3.5% or more..
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6.4 Concentration Risk Needs to be Tracked and Understood
Concentration risk can affect a portfolio in several ways. A concentrated, undiversified
portfolio has unique risks inherent in its structure. In addition, large concentrations in
individual instruments can make liquidation at mark-to-market prices difficult if those
mark-to-market prices are based on typical transaction size and do not reflect the size of
the position. As a result, mark-to-market values can differ significantly from liquidation
values.
In addition to concentration risk at the portfolio level, asset management firms face
concentration risk across portfolios with respect to both individual investments and
strategies. Excessive concentrations across portfolios and excessive exposure to
particular factors (value vs. growth or vintage for example) have the potential to put a
firm’s franchise at risk and need to be tracked and understood.
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Whatever client tolerances and expectations are monitored, asset managers should
consider tracking the lower bound of client risk expectations as well as the upper bound.
For example, marketing materials that say “we expect the standard deviation to be in the
range of 4-6%,” can be equally concerning to a client when the portfolio is
underperforming and the standard deviation is at 2% as when it is at 7%. Clear
procedures should be put in place for dealing with portfolios that are approaching various
tolerance parameters or guideline breaches. These might include escalating discussions
with clients, senior management, and others as parameters warrant, hard or soft limits,
and hedging techniques.
Just as portfolio managers generally make it clear that they cannot promise a given level
of return in a risky portfolio, so too should they avoid promising a specific outcome with
regard to a given risk statistic. A manager can promise to keep ex ante risk measures at
certain levels, but it is necessary to have clear client communication about the possibility
that ex post risk measures can vary from the desired outcome.
The difference between how reasonable people choose to value complex instruments can
be substantial and can actually be more significant than a 1 day VaR. New accounting
and disclosure requirements will heighten awareness and scrutiny of these issues. It is
important to ensure that the valuation methods used to price instruments traded are not
only fair but also consistent with best practices as well as all applicable laws, regulations
and accounting standards. Valuation methodologies should be consistently applied and
verifiable. Valuation policies and practices should incorporate the concept of “fair value”
with particular attention to firms operating across time zones and portfolios with
geographic diversification.
In order to achieve fairness and consistency, asset managers often use a variety of
objective third-party sources to price instruments in client portfolios. These sources
include (1) market quotations if readily available and (2) various independent pricing and
data base services. In the absence of such sources, valuations may be determined by
using pricing models based on verified assumptions, or other techniques. Otherwise,
securities and assets in a client's portfolio are valued at "fair value" as determined in good
faith by designated decision makers within the organization.
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quotations, or for which special circumstances7 make the use of readily available market
quotations inappropriate, (iii) approving models and the assumptions to be used in
connection therewith, and (iv) determining fair value for securities for which none of the
methods set forth above is deemed to be appropriate.
A risk manager looking at a single metric can get a distorted picture of risk by focusing
on a single risk element. It therefore may be advisable for asset managers to avoid over-
reliance on any single statistic. They should instead use a variety of statistics that
quantify different aspects of investment risk.
7 “Special circumstances” might include ownership of a very large or illiquid position, or other factors
that, in the reasonable judgment of the Valuation Committee, would likely make market quotations or the
prices obtained from independent pricing and database services inadequate measures of the value of a
position.
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6.11 Issuer and Counterparty Credit Risk Should be Tracked
and Managed on an Aggregate Basis
There are two types of credit risk that are relevant to asset management companies:
In dealing with issuer credit risk, asset managers typically rely on either rating agencies’
assessments where available or their own internal rating systems based on a combination
of internal and external analyses. The degree to which independent issuer credit analysis
is appropriate differs from firm to firm, depending on the nature of the instruments
traded, size, resources and other factors. For firms involved in evaluating the
creditworthiness of unrated issuers of equity, consideration should be give to the newer
equity-based credit exposure measurement tools as well as the credit default swap
market. In evaluating the creditworthiness of unrated debt issuers, the type and maturity
of instrument (i.e. 3 year bullet, 5 year inverse floater, subordinated debt, etc.) also needs
to be considered.
Counterparty credit risk is the risk of loss attributable to changes in the ability of
counterparties to meet their financial obligations. Exposure to individual counterparties
may be present in many different parts of an organization. For example, an asset
management company may trade, do repos and securities lending with, and buy debt and
equity issued by, a counterparty with whom it has outstanding derivatives transactions,
and who also serves as its administrator. Although it is difficult to develop a
comprehensive approach to managing counterparty credit risk, consideration should be
given to tracking this risk on an aggregate basis. Additionally, it should be noted that
credit exposure consists not only of today’s exposure but potential future exposure. A
$100MM, 10 year interest swap, for example, will likely have a negligible mark-to-
market at inception, but the mark-to-market can grow significantly over a 10 year period.
For this reason, firms should consider including potential future exposure as well as
today’s exposure when assessing counterparty risk.
In addition, firms might consider whether their counterparty risk measures for
collateralized transactions should include:
8
A counterparty is an obligor on whom a firm relies to fulfill contractual or financial obligations. In the
normal course of its business, a firm deals with various types of counterparties, including but not limited to
distributors, custodians, trustees, administrators, prime brokers, securities dealers, derivatives
counterparties, repo counterparties, securities lending counterparties, and external advisors and sub-
advisors.
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The bid/offer spread in a “normal market” (assuming mid point marks
are being used)
The 5-15 days that in practice it might take to deal with OTC defaults
and the potential impact of market changes during that time.
(B) The analytical and theoretic component, which includes the model’s
algorithms and functional form;
(C) The outputs of the model and how those outputs are used;
In reviewing models, many market participants focus on the analytical and theoretical
components but the other factors listed above are just as important. Model failure is
usually the result of bad input, bad assumptions embedded in the model, and/or
inappropriate application of the model rather than miscoding. A governance process on
ongoing maintenance and improvements/review of models is also desirable. It is
important to determine that a model “fits” market data if it is being used as a component
of the valuation process. It is also important to ascertain whether the model used for
valuation and the model you use for risk are similar or different.
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7.8 Risk Pertaining to Subadvisors, Custodians and Outsourced
Service Providers Should be Managed.
Asset management companies often rely on third parties including subadvisors,
custodians and various types of outsourced service providers who perform operational,
accounting, recordkeeping and other types of services. In utilizing the services of such
third parties, it is important from a risk management perspective to keep in mind that
asset managers have ongoing fiduciary obligations to their customers even though they
have delegated certain of their responsibilities to others. It is therefore critical to perform
careful reviews of the capabilities of third parties at inception of relationships and on an
ongoing basis, and to review information provided by third parties for completeness,
balance and accuracy in order to be able to determine whether such third parties meet the
risk management, credit, operational, legal and other relevant standards of the reviewing
company with respect to the function they are performing. It is not sufficient to merely
ascertain that a prospective subadvisor or provider of outsourced services has in place
risk management controls; rather, a qualitative judgment as to their sufficiency needs to
be made. Where feasible, on site visits to subadvisors, custodians and other key service
providers should be part of the initial and ongoing due diligence.
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