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A.M. No.

L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro
he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review
by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the
sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the
roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the
authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving
moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re
Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is
placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court
decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343;
and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been
thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of
executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence
of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it
were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex
parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the
pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent
being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being
purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the
Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552,
556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and
his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982

IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES

ESCOLIN, J.:

This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his name in the roll of attorneys.

The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision promulgated on September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public document,
penalized under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar
and in his capacity as a notary public, aknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for
probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court, finding
that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality thereof, petitioner commenced service of the sentence.

Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his
disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1

On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political rights. 2

Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice of law, the first of which was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August 30,
1968.

On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was deferred "until after the integration of the bar has been effected." 3
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among others, of the following documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar Association
signed by 78 members thereof, indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4 ; the certificate of the mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, where petitioner has been
residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen 5 a certification of Governor William B. Villegas of Negros
Oriental, attesting to the fact that since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported himself as a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has been
active and has cooperated in civic and social undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified life" 6 ; the certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the
College of Law, Siliman University, vouching to petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life ... and because of his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the
community and regained the confidence of the people and of his other associates: 7 the statement of Atty. Alexander G. Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces ... is a person of good moral character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8 ; and the clearance
certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of
Dumaguete City, to the effect that petitioner "is a person of good moral character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he "has never been accused or convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9

When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then president, Atty. Marcelo D. Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner's request for reinstatement.

On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original disbarment proceedings, filed an opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this was followed by
a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces, barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and referred to this Court,
opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer."

Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan, made the following observations:

By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the following matters have been referred to the Integrated Bar for comment:

(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus-Paras to respondent's petition and supplementary petition for reinstatement in the roll of attorneys; and

(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting
the Office of the President to oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.

It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above
stated petition for reinstatement.
Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received a petition dated February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the
Municipality of Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5, 1978 the President of the
Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking him to comment on the above mentioned petitions and telegram.

This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated November 3, 1978, which is being forwarded herewith to the Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent
papers.

It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to the adverse allegations and charges which have been referred to him. The charges of immorality (publicly
maintaining a querida) and gambling are general statements devoid of particular allegations of fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental - namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who tops the list of persons who have signed the February 14, 1978 petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces,
appears to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a Certification to the effect that Mr. Vailoces 'is personally known to me as a person of exemplary character, a
peace loving and law abiding citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities and that he is one of our respectable citizens in our community.' That this official
should now sign a petition containing statements exactly opposite in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it is not altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces'
imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor Mana-ay.

As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged absence of remorse on the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged belligerence and display of open defiance and
hostility, etc. are matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and charges in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is significant that Mr. Vailoces in his
comment states: "If she is indeed that much desperately so in need of cash assistance, considering really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her
satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her but only with a modest amount because I am only a small farmer with still three college students to support."

Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor Vailoces stating as grounds for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces' petition for reinstatement the alleged 'grounds
of non-reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by soliciting cases,' there is such a lack of specificity and particularity in such statement of grounds
that one is at a loss as to how a person in the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces could properly defend himself against such charges.

Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner's "reinstatement in the rolls of attorneys."

This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras and Nicanor Vailoces to the Solicitor General for investigation and recommendation; and on
August 4, 1982, the latter, after conducting an investigation, submitted his report, recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in the roll of attorneys upon taking his
oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has sufficiently proven himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the plenary pardon
extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement.

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements
of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence [7
C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815]

The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-
law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney ... [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].

Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his community.
The favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of
Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the community attest to his moral
reform and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession
for a period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.

Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor ... that if reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself
honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016

LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, AND FE V. FLORES, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA, JR. Respondent.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents should not be the occasion to establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases should first be duly and
competently established either in criminal or civil proceedings appropriate for that purpose.

The Case

We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint lodged against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a public document concerning realty, and for
allegedly concealing his true age m order to secure his appointment as state prosecutor.

Antecedents

Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr., and Fe Flores presented their adverse claim1 on the parcel of land situated in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7919 of the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte under the names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L. Alipao.2
The Register of Deeds annotated the adverse claim on January 23, 2007 as Entry No. 67251.3 On December 27, 2007, an affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, which appeared to have
been signed by them,4 was also annotated on TCT No. 7919 as Entry No. 72573.5 On March 26, 2008, the Register of Deeds canceled TCT No. 7919,6 and issued two new TCTs in
the name of the respondent.7chanrobleslaw

On October 29, 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores- Lura, and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the
respondent with gross dishonesty on the basis of their assertion therein that they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.8 They thereby further charged him with
dishonesty for concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in 2006 as a state prosecutor. They avered that he was disqualified for the position because he had
already been 70 years old at the time of his appointment,9 having been born on June 26, 1936; that they submitted as proof: (1) the residence certificate issued in the name of
"Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom they claimed was the respondent himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate;10 (2) the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Roman
Villanueva, Sr. showing that the respondent was 14 years old when he signed the document as "Isabelo Villanueva";11 (3) the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Tupi, South Cotabato12 showing that he was 26 years old when he got married on December 24, 1961; and (4) the affidavits respectively executed by his siblings, Francisca V.
Flores13 and Tarcela V. Sajulan.14chanrobleslaw

The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against him.15 He contended that the complainants did not
present sufficient proof showing that he had falsified the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal; and asserted that the basis for the partition of the contested property had been the
compromise agreement entered into by him and his siblings, including Francisca, the complainants' mother;16 and that he had been born on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his
birth certificate.17chanrobleslaw

IBP Report and Recommendation

After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) submitted his report and recommendation18 finding the respondent liable
for gross misconduct in relation to the forged the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, and recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of law. Commissioner Fernandez
dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation to the respondent's age because his birth certificate prevailed over the documents submitted by the complainants.19chanrobleslaw

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-27820 adopting the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-278

CBD Case No. 10-2684

Lily Salado, et al. vs.

Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it 1s hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct when he falsified an Affidavit of Waiver/Withdrawal by reason of which TCT Nos. RT-8320 and 8381 in his name were
issued, Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, the charge of falsifying his age to qualify as DOJ Prosecutor is
hereby Dismissed for lack of merit.21 (Bold emphasis in the original)

The pat1ies respectively sought reconsideration.22 On June 6, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration but granted that of the
complainants, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-417


CBD Case No. 10-2684

Lily Salado, et al.

Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings and resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration
of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration.

RESOLVED FUTHER, to GRANT the Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration, considering Respondent's gross dishonesty by making himself younger when he applied as Public
Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-278, dated March 20, 2013, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification, increasing the penalty imposed on Atty.
Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.23 (Bold emphasis in the original)

Issue

Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and gross dishonesty?

Ruling of the Court

We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors considering that the charges were not competently substantiated.

Falsification must be proved in the

appropriate criminal or civil proceeding,

not in the disbarment proceeding

The complainants support their allegations of falsification by presenting the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal itself and its annotation on TCT No. 7919; and by denying their having
signed the same. However, such proof was inadequate to establish that the respondent had been the author of the alleged falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.
We emphasize that allegations of falsification or forgery must be competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed.24 As such, the allegations should first be
established and determined in appropriate proceedings,25cralawred like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be
uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole
issue to be addressed and determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.26
Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior
determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.

Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the due execution and authenticity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, a notarized document.27 In view of this, the
complainants' mere denial of having signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to overcome the positive value of it as a notarized document.28 It is settled that
notarization converts a private document into a public document, whereby the document becomes entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.29 The notarized document then has
in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the presumed regularity of its execution, whoever alleges the contrary should present evidence that is clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant.30chanrobleslaw

II

The birth certificate is the best evidence

of the respondent's date of birth

The complainants have also charged the respondent with dishonesty for having concealed his true age in order to secure his appointment as a state prosecutor. They have
presented in support of the charge the residence certificate issued in the name of one "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr."; an extrajudicial settlement signed by one "Isabelo Villanueva"; the
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato showing that the respondent was 26 years old when he got married in 1 961; and the affidavits of the
respondent's two siblings.

In contrast, the respondent submitted his certificate of birth that indicated his birthdate as "November 29, 1943."

Still, the complainants doubted the veracity of the respondent's bit1h certificate on the ground of its having been belatedly registered at his own instance.

The Court nonetheless finds for the respondent.


Firstly, as previously emphasized, the allegation of the falsity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal should first be determined in the appropriate criminal or civil proceeding, not in
this proceeding for disbarment. Consequently, we desist from definitively ruling on the weight of the evidence presented by the complainants.

Secondly, a birth certificate consists of entries related to the fact of birth in public records, and is made in the performance of duty by the local civil registrar as a public officer.31 It
is thus treated as the prima facie evidence of the fact of one's birth, and can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As such, the birth certificate
submitted by the respondent was decisive on the date of his birth in the absence of clearer and more convincing contrary evidence.

Thirdly, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate cannot be successfully assailed on the basis alone of its being belatedly entered in the local civil registry. This is because the
State expressly allows the late registration of births not only at the instance of the father, mother, or guardian in case the person whose birth is to be registered is under 18 years of
age, but also at the instance of the person himself when already of age.33chanrobleslaw

To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late registration of the respondent's birth should not adversely affect the validity of the entries made in his birth certificate.

And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants bore the burden of proof in this disbarment proceeding against the respondent. They must establish their charges of
falsification and dishonesty by convincing and satisfactory proof.34 Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of finding his culpability.35 The foregoing disquisitions on the
falsification show that the complainants did not discharge their burden of proof thereon. They also did not convincingly establish that the respondent had willfully adjusted his true
age to secure his appointment as a state prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment happened on February 22, 200636 but his late registration of his birth occurred on July 3, 2006.37 If
the intention for the late registration was to make it appear that he st ill met the age requirement for public prosecutors, he should have effected the late registration prior to the
appointment, not several months subsequently. In addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification" showing him to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan on September 20,
2003, and to have been born on November 29, 1943.38 Under the circumstances, that he had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable himself to meet the age requirement for
the position of state prosecutor three years later became plainly improbable.

III

Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers

in the public service involving their qualifications

should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices

having administrative supervision over them


The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a disbarment or suspension complaint brought against a lawyer employed in the government service whether or
not the complaint pertained to an act or conduct unrelated to the discharge of his official functions,39 the investigation should be carried out by the agency or office having
administrative supervision over him or her when the allegations of the complaint relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed to the public office.

Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed as a state prosecutor should be directed to the Secretary of Justice who had
administrative supervision over him under the law,40 and not to this Court in the guise of the disbarment complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and the proceeding
thereon should focus only on the qualification and fitness of the respondent lawyer to continue membership in the Bar.41chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for lack of factual and legal merit.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK, PHIL., INC., REPRESENTED BY LUIS MARCO I. AVANCEÑA, Complainant, v. ATTY. REBECCA S. FRANCISCO-SIMBILLO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A complaint for disbarment based on the respondent attorney's alleged moral turpitude cannot prosper after the criminal cases charging him with offenses involving moral turpitude
were dismissed by the competent trial courts. The rule regarding this ground for disbarment requires the respondent attorney's conviction of the offense involving moral turpitude
by final judgment.

Antecedents

On March 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from the attorney for complainant Intradent Zahnetchnik Philippines, Inc. informing about several
criminal cases filed and pending against respondent Rebecca Francisco-Simbillo. The criminal cases had been filed by the complainant to charge the respondent with estafa and
qualified theft in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City (docketed as I.S. No. XV-12-INV-11-J-03189), and with violation of Article 291 of the Revised Penal Code in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (docketed as I.S. No. XV-03-INV-11-J-08553). The complainant pointed out that the charges for estafa and qualified theft involved
moral turpitude.1chanrobleslaw

At the time, the results of the 2011 Bar Examinations had just been released, and the respondent was among those who had passed. She was in due course formally notified by the
OBC of the letter of the complainant, and thereby required to file her comment within 15 days from notice. The OBC also informed her that she could join the mass oath taking for
the new lawyers, but she would not be allowed to enroll her name in the Roll of Attorneys until the charges against her had been cleared.2 Upon the advice of the OBC, she had the
other option to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that the letter of the complainant would be automatically converted to a disbarment complaint against her.
Choosing the latter, she signed the Roll of Attorneys on May 3, 2012.3chanrobleslaw

In her comment, the respondent stated that she had been employed by the complainant for four years; that her employment had lasted until she was illegally dismissed; that she
instituted a labor case against the complainant; that the criminal charges filed against her were intended to malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to force her to desist from
pursuing the labor case; and that at the time of the filing of her comment, the criminal complaints brought against her were still pending determination of probable cause by the
respective Offices of the City Prosecutor.4chanrobleslaw

On June 8, 2012, the respondent filed a manifestation stating that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had already dismissed the criminal charge docketed as XV-12-
INV-11-J-03189.5chanrobleslaw

The complainant immediately countered that although the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had dismissed its complaint for estafa and qualified theft, it had timely
brought an appeal to the Department of Justice (DOJ); and that the criminal case against the respondent should still be considered as pending.6chanrobleslaw

On February 18, 2015, the respondent filed a motion seeking the resolution of this disbarment case, alleging that the DOJ had denied the complainant's appeal in respect of XV-12-
INV-11-J-03189; and that as to the criminal charge docketed as XV-03-INV-11-J-08553, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had filed an information against her in the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City, but Branch 33 of that court had eventually dismissed the information upon the Prosecution's motion for the withdrawal of the information
with leave of court.7chanrobleslaw

Issue

May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper?

Ruling of the Court


We rule in favor of the respondent.

We observe that this administrative case started as a complaint to prevent the respondent from being admitted to the Philippine Bar on the ground of the existence of criminal
charges brought against her for crimes involving moral turpitude. Indeed, Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that any applicant for admission to the Bar must show
that no charges against him or her for crimes involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. However, this administrative case has since
been converted to one for disbarment but without the complainant, which has all the while continued to actively participate herein, alleging any ground for finding the respondent
administratively liable except those already averred in its letter to the OBC. The complainant has not also shown that there were other criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed
against the respondent.

Under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do. In fine, in order to hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of his or
her having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a pending case involving moral turpitude against him or her, because Section 27 of
Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have been found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude.

The complainant did not allege, much less prove, that the respondent had been convicted by final judgment of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude. On the contrary, the
criminal cases that were the sole bases for the complaint for disbarment had already been dismissed after due proceedings. Although the complainant might have availed itself of
the available remedies to review or reverse the dismissals, it behooves the Court to terminate this case against her now considering that, as indicated, the mere existence or
pendency of the criminal charges for crimes involving moral turpitude is not a ground for disbarment or suspension of an attorney.9chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this disbarment case against respondent Arty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

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