EN BANC

[G.R. No. 159883. March 31, 2008.]

DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG , petitioner, vs . HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), REGIONAL DIRECTOR
of the Department of Health, Region VIII, and FLORA DELA PEÑA ,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 168059. March 31, 2008.]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN , petitioner, vs . DR. PEDRO F.

GOBENCIONG and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS (CEBU CITY) ,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 173212. March 31, 2008.]

DR. PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG , petitioner, vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN

(VISAYAS), REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the Department of Health,
Region VIII, and FLORA DELA PEÑA , respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR. , J : p

The Petitions
Before the Court are these three petitions, two interposed under Rule 45 and one
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. These petitions stemmed from OMB-VIS-ADM-97-
0370 entitled Dr. Flora de la Peña v. Dr. Rafael C. Omega, Chief of Hospital, Dr. Pedro F.
Gobenciong, Administrative O cer IV, Crisologo R. Babula, Supply O cer IV, et al., all
of Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center, Tacloban City. ICASEH

The rst, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
159883 , seeks to nullify the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 dated November 26, 2002 and
August 27, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49585,
denying petitioner Gobenciong's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and, thus,
effectively a rming the assailed Order 3 dated August 24, 1998 of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas, preventively suspending him from office.
In the second, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
168059 , the O ce of the Ombudsman assails, as tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, the Decision 4 dated April 29, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687, which
set aside the Ombudsman's Decision 5 of March 21, 2000 and Order of August 10,
2000 Order 6 in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 but only insofar as it imposed a penalty of one-
year suspension on Gobenciong.
The third, a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
173212 , seeks to set aside the Decision and Resolution 7 dated April 29, 2005 and
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 May 29, 2006, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687, which sustained the
aforesaid March 21, 2000 and August 10, 2000 rulings in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370.
On January 17, 2006, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 159883
with G.R. No. 168059 , both to be considered as en banc cases. 8 The consolidation of
G.R. No. 173212 with the first two cases later followed. 9
The Facts
During the period material, Gobenciong held the position of Administrative
O cer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), a public hospital in
Tacloban City. On December 3, 1996, the appropriate EVRMC o ce issued Requisition
and Issue Voucher No. (RIV) EO-1-96 for one unit hemoanalyzer (also called particle
counter), among other items. On its face, RIV EO-1-96 carried, for the hemoanalyzer, the
speci cations "electric 220V, 50 feed shelves capacity" with a handwritten unit price
quotation of PhP1,195,998. ADCIca

After public bidding where Alvez Commercial, Inc. (Alvez) emerged as the best
bidder, Purchase Order No. (PO) EO-5-96 dated December 9, 1996 was issued covering
two units of nebulizer and one unit particle counter with speci cations "23 Parameters,
Genius, Italy, electric 220V, fully automated" at the unit price as aforestated.
As hospital documents would show, the nebulizers and the hemoanalyzer
appeared to have been delivered on December 20, 1996 and accepted by Engr. Jose M.
Jocano, Jr. and Supply O cer III Crisologo R. Babula, per Certi cation of Acceptance
they signed to attest having accepted all the articles delivered by Alvez per Sales
Invoice No. 0786. Similarly, Babula signed Sales Invoice No. 0786 to acknowledge
receipt in good condition of the articles covered thereby. In addition, it was made to
appear in a Commission on Audit (COA) Inspection Report that Jocano and
Gobenciong had certi ed as correct the nding/recommendation that the two
nebulizers and the hemoanalyzer had been inspected as to quality and quantity as per
Sales Invoice No. 0786.
On December 26, 1996, Disbursement Voucher No. (DV) 101-9612-1986, for
PhP1,161,817.35, net of creditable VAT, was prepared. Gobenciong, among others,
signed the voucher to attest that the expense covered thereby was necessary, lawful,
and incurred under his direct supervision. Appended to DV 101-9612-1986 were
documents adverted to earlier, such as Sales Invoice No. 0786, the Certi cation of
Acceptance, the COA Inspection Report, PO EO-5-96, and RIV EO-1-96. HCaDIS

The issuance on December 27, 1996 of Landbank Check No. 456359 in the
amount of PhP1,161,817.35 in favor of Alvez, which then purportedly issued Receipt
No. 0815, followed.
On March 31, 1997, or little over three months after the supposed delivery of the
hemoanalyzer, Alvez addressed a letter to EVRMC to assure the hospital that it would
be replacing the yet to-be-delivered slightly defective hemoanalyzer with another unit.
On April 1, 1997, Alvez actually delivered the promised replacement — a Genius particle
counter with Serial No. 36162. It was installed on April 2, 1997 and inspected the
following day by Jocano and Gobenciong.
The instant case started when Dr. Flora dela Peña, Head of the EVRMC
Laboratory Unit, led, on June 20, 1997, an administrative complaint before the O ce
of the Ombudsman-Visayas, charging Gobenciong, Jocano, Babula, and three other
EVRMC o cers with Falsi cation of Public Documents and Misconduct. The complaint
was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370.
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 In a related move, dela Peña also led a complaint with the Department of Health
(DOH) which forthwith formed a committee to look likewise into the alleged anomalous
purchase of the expensive hemoanalyzer. The investigation culminated in the ling by
the DOH Secretary of a Formal Charge 1 0 dated October 29, 1997 for Grave
Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service against Gobenciong and three others. CDTHSI

Ombudsman Ordered Preventive Suspension

On August 24, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas, upon dela Peña's motion,
issued an Order, placing all, except one, of the respondents in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370
under preventive suspension and directed the proper DOH o cer to immediately
implement the Order. 1 1
Following his receipt on November 9, 1998 of a copy of the said order,
Gobenciong wrote Dr. Lilia O. Arteche, DOH Regional Director for Region VIII, requesting
the deferment of the implementation of the preventive suspension until after his to-be-
filed motion for reconsideration shall have been resolved.
Conformably with the Ombudsman's directive, 1 2 Arteche, via a Memorandum 1 3
dated November 11, 1998, informed the affected respondents in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-
0370 that their six-month preventive suspension shall take effect immediately upon
their receipt of the memorandum.
On November 12, 1998, Gobenciong sought reconsideration of the August 24,
1998 preventive suspension order. But due to the virtual denial of his plea for the
deferment of his preventive suspension, Gobenciong, without awaiting the O ce of the
Ombudsman's action on his motion for reconsideration, went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a plea for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO). The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49585. ATHCac

On November 19, 1998, the CA issued a TRO enjoining then Deputy Ombudsman-
Visayas Arturo Mojica and Arteche from implementing the order of preventive
suspension in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370. 1 4
As later developments would show, the TRO, while duly served, evidently went
unheeded, for Gobenciong failed to get back to his work or get his salary until after the
lapse of the suspension period in May 1999. This turn of events impelled Gobenciong
to move that Arteche and Mojica be cited in contempt. The CA, however, did not act on
the motion.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370
Before the CA could resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 49585, the Ombudsman rendered on
March 21, 2000 a Decision, nding Gobenciong and several others guilty in OMB-VIS-
ADM-97-0370. The decretal portion of the Ombudsman's Decision partly reads
WHEREFORE, nding substantial evidence to hold respondents RAFAEL
C. OMEGA, PEDRO F. GOBENCIONG , CRISOLOGO R. BABULA, and JOSE M.
JOCANO of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, it is
respectf ully recommended that they be meted the penalty of
SUSPENSION FROM THE SERVICE FOR ONE (1) YEAR WITHOUT PAY. 1 5
(Emphasis added.) HTCISE

The above guilty verdict was mainly predicated on the nding that the
Certi cation of Acceptance and the COA Inspection Report, among other documents,
were falsi ed, there being no actual delivery on December 20, 1996 of the covered
hemoanalyzer. There was thus no legal basis for the issuance of DV 101-9612-1986
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 and the corresponding Landbank check for PhP1,161,817.35.
Subsequently, Gobenciong, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the
Ombudsman, by an Order of August 10, 2000, denied their motion.
In due time, Gobenciong appealed from the above decision and order to the
appellate court, the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61687.
On November 16, 2000, the O ce of the Ombudsman-Visayas, through Director
Virginia P. Santiago, by an Order, 1 6 directed the DOH Regional O ce No. VIII to
immediately implement its Decision and impose the penalties decreed therein, which, in
the case of Gobenciong, was one-year suspension from office without pay.
On December 11, 2000, Gobenciong moved that Santiago be cited in contempt
of court 1 7 for issuing the November 16, 2000 Order despite being noti ed of his
appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687. Like his earlier similar motion, this motion was neither
denied nor granted by the CA. DICcTa

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49585

Long after the issuance of the Decision dated March 21, 2000 in OMB-VIS-ADM-
97-0370, the CA, on November 26, 2002, rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 49585,
denying Gobenciong's petition for certiorari assailing the directive, and the
implementation thereof, for the immediate execution of his preventive suspension.
Dispositively, the CA wrote:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition for
certiorari is DENIED DUE COURSE and hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 1 8
The CA dismissed Gobenciong's petition on the strength of Section 24 in relation
to Sec. 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989. The interplay of both sections expressly empowers the Ombudsman, under
de ned conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all
but three categories of public o cials and employees under investigation by his o ce
and to direct the immediate implementation of the corresponding suspension order. acHDTA

Gobenciong's motion for reconsideration of the above decision was rejected by

the appellate court on August 27, 2003.
Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 159883 .
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687
On April 29, 2005, the CA, on the postulate that the disciplinary authority of the
O ce of the Ombudsman is merely recommendatory, rendered its Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 61687, partially granting due course to Gobenciong's appeal and effectively
modifying the Decision dated March 21, 2000 of the Ombudsman. The decretal portion
of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us GRANTING the petition led in this case and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision dated March 21, 2000 and the Order dated August 10, 2000 rendered
and issued by the O ce of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 insofar
as said o ce directly imposes upon the petitioner the penalty of suspension
from the service for one (1) year without pay. 1 9
HIEAcC

Invoked as part of the ratio decidendi of the CA Decision was Tapiador v. O ce

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 of the Ombudsman, 2 0 which the appellate court viewed as declaring that the
disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to
recommending to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out. In
the concrete, as gleaned from the CA Decision, this means that the Ombudsman cannot
compel the DOH to impose the penalty recommended in its underlying Decision of
March 21, 2000.
Therefrom, the parties availed themselves of different remedies to contest
before this Court the above decision of the CA.
The O ce of the Ombudsman, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the appellate court, assailed the above decision through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No. 168059 . 2 1
On the other hand, Gobenciong led his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
Decision dated April 29, 2005, 2 2 which the CA denied via its Resolution dated May 29,
2006. Thus, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari led by Gobenciong, now
docketed as G.R. No. 113212 . cCaIET

In the meantime, on January 16, 2005, Gobenciong retired from the service:
The Issues
In G.R. No. 159883 , petitioner Gobenciong submits that the CA erred:
A.

. . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE

SUSPENSION ORDER DESPITE THE [TRO] IT ISSUED AND THE CONTINUED
DEFIANCE OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OF THE [TRO].
B.

. . . IN NOT HOLDING PUBLIC RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF

COURT FOR DEFYING THE [TRO]. DaTEIc

C.
. . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION ORDER —

1. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION VIOLATED PETITIONER'S

RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW;

2. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION VIOLATED PETITIONER'S

RIGHT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; AND

3. DESPITE THE FACT THAT TO DO SO WOULD SANCTION AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 27(1) AND THE
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 24 OF [RA] 6770.

I n G.R. No. 168059 , petitioner O ce of the Ombudsman raises the following

grounds for the allowance of its petition:
I.
THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT BAR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FROM
EXERCISING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES IN GENERAL. TIAEac

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 II.

CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY CLOTHED THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

WITH FULL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY IN GENERAL,
COMPLETE WITH ALL THE REQUISITE COMPONENTS AS CONTAINED IN [RA]
6770, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED CONGRESS TO
GRANT THE OMBUDSMAN ADDITIONAL POWERS;
B. CONGRESS, BOTH PURSUANT TO ITS EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY IN THE CASE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWERS, ENACTED [RA] 6770 PROVIDING THEREIN
THE OMBUDSMAN'S FULL AND COMPLETE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
POWER AND DUTY;
C. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE SAID STATUTORY GRANT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER WHICH CAN BE REMOTELY
CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND aTIAES

D. VESTING THE OMBUDSMAN WITH FULL DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY

IS ABSOLUTELY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE SOVEREIGN INTENT, AS
EXPRESSED BY THE LETTER OF, AND IN THE DELIBERATIONS ON, THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, I.E., THE INTENT TO CREATE AN EFFECTIVE, RATHER THAN
EFFETE, PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE INSULATED FROM POLITICAL
INFLUENCE.
III.
THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE OMBUDSMAN
INCLUDES THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE PENALTY AND TO CAUSE
THE SAME TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE HEAD OF AGENCY CONCERNED,
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. [RA] 6770 CONTAINS EXPRESS PROVISIONS GRANTING THE
OMBUDSMAN THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE AND CAUSE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES; SDAcaT

B. A DISCIPLINARY POWER BEREFT OF THE NECESSARY COMPONENT

OF DETERMINING THE PENALTY AND CAUSING THE IMPLEMENTATION
THEREOF IS OTIOSE;
C. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PENALTIES
ASSESSED BY THE OMBUDSMAN IS SUBJECT TO SECTION 13(3), ART. XI OF
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE INDEPENDENT FIRST PART OF SECTION 15(3)
OF [RA] 6770, THE LATTER PROVISIONS STILL EMPOWER THE OMBUDSMAN
TO "ENSURE COMPLIANCE" WITH ITS "RECOMMENDATIONS"; AND
D. A CONTRARY RULE CAN ONLY RESULT IN FURTHER LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL ABSURDITIES.
IV.
THE RELIANCE BY THE HONORABLE [CA] ON THE OBITER DICTUM IN
TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, . . . DISPOSSESSING THE
OMBUDSMAN OF ITS DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY, CONSTITUTES A GRAVE
ERROR CONSIDERING THAT: HTaSEA

A. SUCH A PASSING STATEMENT MUST BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN

THAT THE OMBUDSMAN CANNOT "DIRECTLY" IMPLEMENT ITS
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 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS; AND
B. SUCH A STATEMENT IS AND HAS REMAINED AN OBITER DICTUM
WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THE STATUS OF A LEGAL DOCTRINE.
I n G.R. No. 173212 , petitioner Gobenciong argues that the CA committed
errors of law:
A.
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL [RA] 6770, SECTIONS
15 (1), 19, AND 21, [INSOFAR] AS THEY GRANT TO THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS
DEPUTIES THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ANY ACT OR
OMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE, OR TO TAKE OVER, AT ANY STAGE, FROM ANY INVESTIGATORY
AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT, THE INVESTIGATION OF SUCH CASES, FOR BEING
AN INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. ASDCaI

B.
. . . WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL [RA] 6770, SECTIONS
15 (1), 19, 21, 24 AND 25, [INSOFAR] AS THEY GRANT TO THE OMBUDSMAN
AND HIS DEPUTIES THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE, PROSECUTE AND
PENALIZE, ANY ACT OR OMISSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY
PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE, OR TO TAKE OVER, AT ANY STAGE FROM
ANY INVESTIGATORY AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT, THE INVESTIGATION OF
SUCH CASES, AND TO IMPOSE SUSPENSION, EITHER PREVENTIVE OR AS
PENALTY, FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
C.
. . . WHEN IT ACQUIESCED TO THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS)'S
VIOLATION OF [RA] 6770, THE OMBUDSMAN LAW. CaEIST

D.
. . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
(VISAYAS) FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF CONDUCT GROSSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
E.
. . . IN REFUSING TO CITE DIRECTOR VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO OF THE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
The grounds relied upon and the errors assigned may be reduced into three
issues, to wit: rst, whether the preventive suspension ordered by the Ombudsman is
immediately executory, the ling in due time of a motion to reconsider the
corresponding order notwithstanding; second, whether the disciplinary power of the
Ombudsman is merely recommendatory and excludes the authority to "ensure
compliance" of his "recommendations"; and third, whether RA 6770, on the ground of
undue delegation of legislative authority and under the equal protection clause, is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Ombudsman and his deputies the authority "to
investigate, prosecute and penalize any act or omission, administrative or otherwise, of
any public o cer or employee, or to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases". EaHcDS

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 The Court's Ruling
There is nothing novel about the underlying determinative issues raised by any of
the petitioners. The Court, in a catena of recent cases, has for the most part fully settled
them; and the corresponding dispositions in those cases militate against Gobenciong's
cause, as articulated in his twin Petitions for Review on Certiorari, but augur well for the
Ombudsman's petition.
First Main Issue: Provisionary Orders of the Ombudsman Immediately
Executory
As Gobenciong argues, his timely ling of a motion for reconsideration of the
subject preventive suspension order stripped such order of its otherwise quality of
immediacy. He points out that while Sec. 27 of RA 6770 provides for the immediate
execution of provisionary orders of the Ombudsman, Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure, which is purportedly derived from said Sec. 27, intentionally
omitted the matter of immediate execution. Pushing the point, Gobenciong would then
argue that this omission contextually worked to repeal part of said Sec. 27. To
Gobenciong, the repeal is within the Ombudsman's power to effect under the last
paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770. TcSAaH

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Gobenciong would posit the view that
the immediate implementation of his preventive suspension, despite his having moved
for reconsideration, violated his right to due process and to the equal protection of law.
In this regard, he cites the more lenient, but just as applicable and effective, Civil Service
law which allows an appeal from an order of preventive suspension and does not
consider the same as immediately executory.
Finally, Gobenciong makes reference to the matter of the CA having issued a
TRO, which both the DOH and the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas ignored, and to the CA's
subsequent refusal to resolve his contempt motion.
We are not convinced.
Repeals by implication are not favored, as laws are presumed to be passed with
full knowledge of all existing legislations on the subject. In order that one law or what
passes for one may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent,
that is, the former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. 2 3 CTIDcA

Even as we concede the Ombudsman's authority to amend certain procedural

rules of RA 6770, we agree with the CA's holding on the absence of an irreconcilable
con ict, vis-à-vis the implementation of a preventive suspension order, between Sec. 27
of RA 6770 and Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. For reference,
we reproduce the pertinent provisions of both issuances:
Sec. 27 of RA 6770
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
O ce of the Ombudsman must be led within ve (5) days after receipt of
written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision; cITaCS

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the

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 interest of the movants. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within
three (3) days from ling; Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained.
. . . Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.
The above rules may be amended or modi ed by the O ce of the
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. 2 4
Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure
Sec. 8. Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation; Grounds. —
Whenever allowable, a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be
entertained if led within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision by the
respondent on any of the following grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;IcaEDC

b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been

committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed,
and the hearing o cers shall resolve the same within ve (5) days from receipt
thereof.
Indeed, there exists no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two sets of
provisions respecting the immediate implementability of a preventive suspension order
emanating from the Ombudsman. As it were, the con ict concerns only the period for
ling a motion for reconsideration. What was once the ve-day reglementary period
fixed under Sec. 27 (2), RA 6770 is now 10 days under Sec 8, Rule III, Ombudsman Rules
of Procedure. Apart from this change, both sections in question can validly be
harmonized and given effect at the same time.
We cannot, accordingly, subscribe to Gobenciong's contention that Sec. 27 (1),
RA 6770 is deemed repealed for not being incorporated or carried into the
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. For, if this outlandish posture of Gobenciong is, under
the premises, pushed to its logical conclusion, then any and all related provisions of RA
6770 not touched upon in the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure would be considered
abrogated, regardless of the absence of real con icts. The Court need not belabor the
absurdity of Gobenciong's logic. ECDAcS

Reading and harmonizing together the aforequoted Sec. 27 (1) of RA 6770 and
Sec. 8, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, it is at once apparent that the
immediately executory quality of a preventive suspension order does not preclude the
preventively suspended respondent from seeking reconsideration of such order. In ne,
the existence and availment, if this be the case, of the right to move for reconsideration
does not motu proprio stay the immediate execution of the provisionary order of
preventive suspension. The unquali ed use of the phrase "immediately effective and
executory" in Sec. 27 (1) of RA 6770 suggests this conclusion.
An order of preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. And it is usually made immediately effective and executory to prevent the
respondent from using his/her position or o ce to in uence prospective witnesses or
tamper with the records which may be vital to the prosecution of the case. 2 5
At any rate, RA 6770 itself contains limiting bars to the exercise by the
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 Ombudsman or his deputies of the power to impose preventive suspension. Sec. 24 of
RA 6770 thus provides: DAEIHT

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may

preventively suspend any o cer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such o cer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by
the O ce of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the O ce of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
Expounding on the limitation adverted to, the Court has held that a preventive
suspension order shall issue only if the Ombudsman, or any of his deputies exercising
sound judgment, determines that the evidence of guilt is strong and that any of the
three conditions set forth in Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is present. Thus, in Garcia v. Mojica, the
Court held that the Ombudsman and his deputies have the discretion to exercise such
determination, thus: DcICEa

There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of

respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension
against an o cial like the petitioner, to prevent that o cial from using his
o ce to intimidate or to in uence witnesses or to tamper with records that
might be vital to the prosecution of the case against him. 2 6
As things thus stand, the O ce of the Ombudsman can, as a matter of statutory
empowerment, validly order the immediate execution of a preventive suspension after
determining the propriety of the imposition, regardless of the remedy of
reconsideration made available under the law to the suspended respondent.
Accordingly, Gobenciong's lament about his right to due process, being violated as a
result of the immediate implementation of his preventive suspension, has really no legal
leg to stand on. And if only to stress a point, a preventive suspension, not being a
penalty for an administrative infraction, is imposable without prior hearing.
The foregoing considered, the matters of the issuance by the CA of a TRO
bearing on the implementation of the preventive suspension in question and
Gobenciong's unacted contempt motions have become moot and academic, for the
preventive suspension had been served and the CA had, for all intents and purposes,
denied the said motions. IcDCaS

This brings us to the issue of the alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
Gobenciong parlays the theory that the application of RA 6770, which authorizes the
Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension, instead of the civil service
provisions of the Administrative Code, which limits the disciplining authority's
prerogative to only imposing a prevention suspension for a period not exceeding 90
days, violates the equal protection guarantee.
We are not persuaded. At its most basic, the equal protection clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination; it does
not demand absolute equality. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law
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 which applies only to those persons falling within a speci ed class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class and provided further that there is a substantial distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. 2 7 In Miranda v.
Sandiganbayan, where the issue of equal protection was raised, albeit the 60-day
preventive suspension limit under the Local Government Code was involved, we ruled
against any violation of the constitutional proscription against the equal protection of
the law; thus: SCIacA

In essence, [the dissenting opinion] avers that there is no substantial

distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman
and those imposed by executive o cials. On the contrary, there is a world of
difference between them. The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with
unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these
statutory protections are scal autonomy, xed term of o ce and classi cation
as an impeachable officer. This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier
cited case of Garcia v. Mojica. Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for
imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act
of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt
is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the
charge against such o cer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him. 2 8aTEACS

Second Main Issue: Ombudsman has power to ensure compliance with

imposition of penalties pursuant to his administrative disciplinary authority
The O ce of the Ombudsman's assertion, about being in possession of full
administrative disciplinary authority over public o cials and employees, except
impeachable o cials, members of Congress, and the Judiciary, including the power to
determine the penalty therefor and to cause the same to be implemented by the head
of the government agency concerned, is correct. Jurisprudence on the matter is settled.
Accordingly, any suggestion that its power to remove, suspend, or censure is merely
advisory or recommendatory has to be rejected outright. And the CA's reference to
Tapiador 2 9 to underpin its conclusion on the recommendatory nature of the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority is misplaced and erroneous, the cited portion of
Tapiador being a mere obiter dictum. The Court made this abundantly clear inLedesma
v. Court of Appeals 3 0 and subsequently in O ce of the Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals. 3 1 In Ledesma, we held that the pronouncement in Tapiador on the authority of
the Ombudsman is at most an obiter dictum, which cannot be cited as a doctrinal
pronouncement of the Court, ratiocinating as follows: DCATHS

Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning;
that is, that the Ombudsman's action is only advisory in nature rather than one
having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
. . . Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were (sic)
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the
petitioner from the government service . . . Under Section 13, subparagraph (3),
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recommend"
the removal of the public o cial or employee found to be at fault, to the public
official concerned.
For their part, the Solicitor General and the O ce of the Ombudsman
argue that the word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase
"and ensure compliance therewith." The proper interpretation of the Court's
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 statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to
determine the administrative liability of a public o cial or employee at fault,
and direct and compel the head of the o ce or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of
the Ombudsman's functions and not its jurisdiction. HSaCcE

We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons

militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision.
Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case
was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to
prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made
reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter
dictum and, as it is unsupported by su cient explanation, is
susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us
in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of
this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination . 3 2 (Emphasis ours.)
For good measure, we further stated:
. . . That the refusal, without just cause, of any o cer to comply with an
order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring o cer or employee is a ground
for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law. . . . By stating that the Ombudsman "recommends" the
action to be taken against an erring o cer or employee, the provisions of the
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be
coursed through the proper o cer, which in this case would be the head of the
BID. 3 3
In O ce of the Ombudsman, on the core issue of whether the Ombudsman can
only recommend, but cannot impose, administrative sanctions over erring public
officers and employees, the Court reiterated its ruling in Ledesma, observing:
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the O ce of the
Ombudsman's power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
ne, censure, or prosecution of a public o cer or employee found to be at fault,
in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such
power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. 3 4 STDEcA

And to put to rest any uncertainty that might have been occasioned by a
misreading of Tapiador, we proceeded to explain in O ce of the Ombudsman that the
O ce of the Ombudsman's basic constitutional mandate as "[protector] of the people"
is embodied in Sec. 13 3 5 of RA 6770, while its speci c constitutional functions are
substantially reiterated in Sec. 15 3 6 of the same RA. Thus, the authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is of constitutional origin,
proceeding as it does from Sec. 13 (1), Article XI of the Constitution, 3 7 which reads:
Sec. 13. The O ce of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or

omission of any public o cial, employee, o ce or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

Not to be overlooked of course is RA 6770 which grants, as it were, the

Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority as said statute is replete with
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 provisions that, to borrow from Office of the Ombudsman: cCTAIE

cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the

authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings
in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive suspension public o cers or
employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said
penalty. 3 8
Among others, the provisions cited in O ce of the Ombudsman were Secs. 19,
39 21, 4 0 22, 4 1 23, 4 2 and 25 4 3 of RA 6770.
As a nal point, in O ce of the Ombudsman, we stressed that the history of RA
6770 bears out the conclusion that Congress intended the O ce of the Ombudsman to
be "an activist watchman", not merely a passive one, 4 4 possessing full administrative
disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal and to
prosecute a public o cer or employee found to be at fault. The Court, in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, 4 5 gave validation to the legislative intent adverted to.
The parallel holdings in Ledesma and O ce of the Ombudsman would later be
echoed in a slew of cases, among the latest of which were Commission on Audit,
Regional O ce No. 13, Butuan City v. Hinampas 4 6 and O ce of the Ombudsman v.
Santiago. 4 7 EHITaS

Third Main Issue: RA 6770 provisos granting investigative, prosecutorial and

disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman not unconstitutional
We now come to the concluding inquiry.
Gobenciong asseverates that the grant unto the Ombudsman under RA 6770 of
the power to take over a disciplinary case, at any stage of the investigation, to
investigate any act or omission, administrative, or otherwise, and to direct the
implementation of a preventive suspension order constitutes unconstitutional
delegation of authority. He describes the exercise by the Ombudsman and his deputies
of such powers as a "roving commission", devoid of any limitation and check-and-
balance mechanism, adding that RA 6770 does not provide any guiding standard. To
Gobenciong, such unbridled power and "wide and sweeping authority" are "laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption".
We are not persuaded.
As earlier discussed, the O ce of the Ombudsman is a creature of the
Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the o ce to be strong and
effective, with su cient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as
protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government They,
however, left it to Congress to invest the o ce with more broad powers to enforce its
own action. 4 8 And so it was that RA 6770 was enacted empowering, under Sec. 15 (1)
thereof, the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
government, the investigation of cases [of which he has primary jurisdiction]." ScTaEA

Clearly then, the espoused, theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable.

For, in the ultimate analysis, it is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and
allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and
disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman.
Lest it be overlooked, the unconstitutionality of a law must clearly be
demonstrated. It cannot be predicated on speculations or hypothetical fears that its
provisions may be perverted or the powers granted abused. All powers are susceptible
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 to misuse and abuse, but that is hardly a reason to strike down the law. While the Court
may declare a law or portions thereof unconstitutional, it is imperative that the
petitioner shows a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one. 4 9 And it is basic that the matter of constitutionality
shall, as a rule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the case and raised and argued at
the earliest opportunity. Estarija v. Ranada formulates the rule in the following wise:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the
Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites
are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a person
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.AECIaD

For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the
law requires that the question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at
the earliest opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo, we held that the earliest
opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it was not raised in the
pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if
not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. 5 0
The issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
this means before the O ce of the Ombudsman, or at least before the CA. Withal, it
cannot now be considered in Gobenciong's petitions for review. This is not to say,
however, that what Gobenciong considers as a question of a constitutional nature is
absolutely necessary to the disposition of this case. SaCIAE

Finally, Gobenciong's submission about the O ce of the Ombudsman taking

over the case from the DOH strikes us as a clear case of a misleading afterthought. For
the fact of the matter is that the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas did not wrest jurisdiction
from the DOH over the administrative aspect of this "ghost delivery" case. Far from it.
The records tend to show that the O ce of Ombudsman-Visayas took cognizance of
and assumed jurisdiction of what would later be OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 on June 20,
1997 when dela Peña led her complaint for falsi cation and misconduct against
Gobenciong and other hospital o cials. This was four months before the DOH formally
charged Gobenciong, et al. on October 29, 1997 with an offense arising from the
anomalous procurement of a hemoanalyzer. The mere ling of the formal charge,
without more, did not as it cannot oust the O ce of the Ombudsman of its jurisdiction
over the administrative case. Jurisdiction, once it attaches, continues until the case is
concluded.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 159883 and 173212 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the appealed Decision and Resolution dated
November 26, 2002 and August 27, 2003, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
49585 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 168059 is hereby
GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution dated April 29, 2005 and May 29,
2006, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61687 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated March 21, 2000 and the Order dated August 10, 2000
of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0370 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED
IN TOTO. cCSDTI

Costs against Dr. Pedro F. Gobenciong.

SO ORDERED.
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 Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Reyes and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Nachura, J., took no part. signed pleading as Solicitor General.

Footnotes

1. Rollo (G.R. No. 159883), pp. 30-37. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Edgardo F. Sundiam. caCEDA

2. Id. at 39-40.

3. Id. at 41-43. Per Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) I Allan Francisco S. Garciano, reviewed by
GIO III Virginia Palanca-Santiago, recommended by Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
Arturo C. Mojica, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on October 16, 1998.
4. Rollo (G.R. No. 168059), pp. 103-114. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and
concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas.

5. Rollo (G.R. No. 173212), pp. 71-77. Per GIO I Allan Francisco S. Garciano, reviewed by
Director Virginia Palanca-Santiago, recommended by the OIC, Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., and approved by the Ombudsman on May 19, 2000.

6. Id. at 78-80.

7. Id. at 62-63.
8. Rollo (G.R. No. 159883), p. 137.

9. Id. at 213C.
10. Id. at 82-83.

11. Supra note 3, at 43.

12. Rollo (G.R. No. 159883), p. 45.

13. Id. at 46.

14. Id. at 49. ISTCHE

15. Supra note 5, at 76-77.

16. Rollo (G.R. No. 173212), pp. 81-82.

17. Id. at 85-88, dated December 8, 2000.

18. Supra note 1, at 36.

19. Supra note 4, at 114.

20. G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 322.
21. The Office of the Ombudsman earlier filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; rollo (G.R.
No. 168059), pp. 135-144.

22. Id. at 194-207.

23. Dipidio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun, G.R. No.
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 157882, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 586, 612.
24. The penultimate paragraph of Sec. 27 providing for a direct appeal in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court had been declared
unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA
470.

25. Alonzo v. Capulong, G.R. No. 110590, May 10, 1995, 244 SCRA 80, 86; citations omitted.
26. G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 207, 221; citing Gloria v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 287; Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 134495,
December 28, 1998, 300 SCRA 494.

27. See Tiu v. Guingona, G.R. No. 127410, Jan. 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 278 and Ichong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957). ISTDAH

28. G.R. No. 154098, July 27, 2005, 464 SCRA 165, 196.

29. Supra note 20.

30. G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 437.

31. G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 92.
32. Supra note 30, at 448-449.

33. Supra note 30, at 449-450.

34. Supra note 31, at 108.

35. Sec. 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of
the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.
36. Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation
of such cases; SIcEHC

(2) Direct . . . any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section
21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply
with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
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 an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations
as it may provide in its rules of procedures, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on
Audit for appropriate action; aDICET

xxx xxx xxx

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in
paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence: Provided, that the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine
what cases may not be made public: Provided further, That any publicity issued by the
Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the government and make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency[.]

37. See Garcia, supra note 26, at 218.

38. Supra note 31, at 116.

39. Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions; . . .

40. Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned, or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. aTEHCc

41. Sec. 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable
by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if
warranted.
42. Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent
with due process.

(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the
proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings
against erring public officers or employees, . . . . Any delay without just cause in acting
on any referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for
administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals are
addressed and shall constitute a graft offense . . . .

43. Sec. 25. Penalties. — (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807,
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 the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without
pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or
both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, . . . .
44. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 31, at 119. IcDESA

45. G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001, 354 SCRA 651.

46. G.R. Nos. 158672, 160410, 160605, 160627 & 161099, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 245.
47. G.R. No. 161098, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 305.

48. Ledesma, supra note 30, at 452-453.

49. Cawaling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, October 26, 2001, G.R. Nos. 146319 & 146342,
368 SCRA 453, 457.

50. G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 652, 664. AEDcIH

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