People vs. Mercado

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mercado

*
G.R. No. 116239. November 29, 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO
ACEBRON y ADORA, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Death Penalty; Constitutionality of Republic

Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court’s 12-3 per
curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray.—The constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court’s
12-3 per curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray, wherein the
following rulings were made: 1. The death penalty is not a “cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment.” It is an exercise of the
state’s power to “secure society against the threatened and actual
evil.” 2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659 provides the
death penalty satisfy “the element of heinousness” by specifying
the circumstances which generally qualify a crime to be
punishable by death; 3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both
procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct
application. 4. The Constitution does not require that “a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven” before the death
penalty may be prescribed. Congress is authorized under the
Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and
compelling reasons are present, and the Court would exceed its
own authority if it questioned the exercise of such discretion.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; The
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to
great weight.—The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily
for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations
and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. This rule is
variously stated thus: The trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive
and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of
the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.
________________
* EN BANC
257
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 257
People vs. Mercado
Same; Same; Same; Slight contradictions even serve to

strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed.—Inconsistencies in the testimonies
of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence
and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions
in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses
and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus
safeguards against memorized perjury.
Same; Same; Same; Absolute uniformity in every detail of
testimonies cannot be expected of witnesses who by nature react
differently to what they see and hear depending upon their
situation and state of mind.—A witness’ testimony may likewise
contradict that of another witness. As long as the contradiction
involves minor details and collateral matters, the credibility of
both witnesses will not be deemed impaired. After all, no two
witnesses could testify on a matter from the same point of view or
perception. The recollection of different witnesses with respect to
the time, place, and other circumstances of a criminal event would
naturally differ in various details. Absolute uniformity in every
detail of testimonies cannot be expected of witnesses who by
nature react differently to what they see and hear depending
upon their situation and state of mind. On the contrary, if
witnesses should agree on every detail of a transaction that
occupied a considerable space of time and should undertake to tell
all that occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the same
incidents as the others in precisely the same words, that fact
should make their testimonies suspect.
Same; Same; Same; Affidavits; Affidavits are not entirely
reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the
inaccuracies that may have attended their formulation.—The
alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and their affidavits, on the other hand, refer to minor
matters that do not affect the substance of the prosecution’s
evidence. Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due
to, their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have
attended their formulation. In general, such affidavits are not
prepared by the affiants themselves but by another person (i.e.,
investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the
statement or misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts
in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation
of such affidavits.
Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites in order that a
conviction may rest on purely circumstantial evidence.—But it is
settled that a con-
258
People vs. Mercado
viction may rest on purely circumstantial evidence, provided the

following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Conspiracy; To establish the existence of conspiracy,
direct proof is not essential as it may be shown by the conduct of
the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
—Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct proof is
not essential, as it may be shown by the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime. It may be
proven by facts and circumstances from which may logically be
inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to
commit the offense charged, or it may be deduced from the mode
and manner by which the offense was perpetrated.
Same; Alibi; For alibi to prosper as a defense, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or
its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.—Alibi is
generally regarded with suspicion and is always received with
caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but
also because it can be easily fabricated and concocted. For alibi to
prosper as a defense, it must be convincing enough to preclude
any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the
accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time
of the incident. An accused who invokes the defense of alibi must
prove (a) his presence at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime and (b) the physical impossibility for
him to be at the scene of the crime.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasig City, Br. 156.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Norman M. Verzosa, Jose R. Nolasco and Rene V.
Sarmiento for accused-appellants.
259
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 259

People vs. Mercado
PER CURIAM:
1
For automatic review by the Court is the decision, dated
July 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig, convicting accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado
y Hernando and SPO1 Aurelio Acebron y Adora, of the
Philippine National Police of Tanay, Rizal, of kidnapping
with murder and sentencing them as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussions and

finding the guilt of both accused to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in
the imposition of the death penalty as a form of punishment,
nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold,
the Court hereby sentences both accused, ELPIDIO MERCADO y
HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, to death, to
proportionately indemnify the heirs of the deceased Richard
Buama in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the
sum of fifty two thousand six hundred eighty pesos (P52,680.00)
(Exhibits ‘J,’ ‘J-1’ to ‘J-7’) as expenses incident to the burial; and
the further sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) by
way of moral and exemplary damages, all without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
“Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of both
accused from the Pasig Municipal Jail to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
“Let the records of this case be forwarded immediately to the
Supreme Court for mandatory review.
2
“SO ORDERED.”
The information against accused-appellants charged—
“That on or about the 9th day of February, 1994, in the

Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then members of the PNP, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap one
Richard Buama, a 17 year old minor and boarded him in a Red
car bearing License plate No. CGZ 835 against his will thus de-
________________
1 Per Judge Martin S. Villarama.

2 RTC Decision, pp. 38-39; Records, pp. 327-328.
260

People vs. Mercado
priving him of his freedom of liberty (sic), brought him to Tanay,

Rizal in a safe house and there subjected him to extreme/brutal
physical violence, and thereafter with abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation hacked and bludgeoned/clubbed said
Richard Buama who thereby sustained mortal wounds which
directly caused his death.
3
“Contrary to law.”
Because of the gravity of the charge, no bail was

recommended for the provisional release of accused-
appellants.
When arraigned on March4 8, 1994, both accused-
appellants, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. During the trial, the prosecution presented
the following witnesses: Florencio Villareal, Eric Ona,
SPO2 Virgilio Buama, Maria Buama, Lourdes Vergara,
SPO2 Delfin Gruta, SPO2 James Mabalot, Jesus Nieves
Vergara, and Lupito Buama. Their testimonies are as
follows:
Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at
around 9 o’clock in the evening of February 9, 1994, he and
Richard Buama were picked up by accused-appellant
Elpidio Mercado near Mercado’s house in Sto. Tomas,
Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila. Mercado arrived in a car,
together with Eric Ona. Mercado suspected Florencio
Villareal and Richard Buama of being the ones who had
broken into his store and stolen money. Florencio’s friend,
Rex Bugayong, was able to run from Mercado. Florencio
and Richard were pushed into Mercado’s car. Florencio said
Mercado poked a gun at Richard which made the latter say,
“Sasama na lang po ako. Wag ninyo lang po akong
sasaktan.” (I will go with you. Just don’t hurt me.”)
Mercado drove the car to Tanay, Rizal. Florencio and
Richard were seated at the back, behind Mercado and Eric,
respectively. Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 o’clock in
the evening Mercado took the three of them (Florencio,
Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was led
inside the apartment while Richard was held outside by
Mercado. When Florencio looked through the window, he
saw Mercado slap and box Richard. Then he was brought
________________
3 Records, p. 1.
4 Id., p. 20.
261
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 261

People vs. Mercado
inside. Mercado later went upstairs. According to Florencio,

Richard asked if they could leave the place as he held his
stomach in pain, but Florencio replied that the door was
padlocked. Eventually, Mercado came down with Acebron.
Richard was made to sit on the floor in the kitchen of the
apartment. Mercado then told Acebron that he had brought
him a present (“pasalubong”) and that they were going to
kill two boys—a small one and a big one who was dark. In
reply, Acebron said, “Pare, huwag yung maliit dahil kasing
hawig ng anak ko, saka magbe-birthday pa kinabukasan.”
(‘Buddy, not the small one because he resembles my son
who will celebrate his birthday tomorrow.”) As the
conversation was made within his hearing distance,
Richard became so scared that he could not answer when
asked by Acebron about a girl’s picture found in his wallet.
This angered Acebron who boxed Richard’s in the stomach.
Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to take off all his
clothes and lie face down on the kitchen floor. Mercado
asked his aide Jeff to get a rope. Jeff brought a piece of
rattan rope and tied Richard’s hands, while Mercado tied
Richard’s feet. This happened at about 11:30 in the
evening. Mercado also ordered Jeff to get rags with which
to blindfold and gag Richard and then asked Acebron to get
a bolo or a big knife. After getting a bolo, Acebron and Jeff
put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado’s
car. They then drove away, leaving behind Florencio and
Eric in the apartment. After two hours, Mercado and
Acebron came back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the
bloodstains off the bolo. He asked Mercado where Richard
was, to which Mercado replied, “Wala na. Pinatahimik ko
na.” (“Gone. I have already silenced him.”)
Mercado and Acebron then took Eric and Florencio to a
beer-house in Tanay, Rizal and warned them not to tell
anyone about the incident or they and their families would
be killed. For fear of his life and that of his family,
Florencio promised he would not. From the beerhouse,
Mercado drove to Acebron’s apartment, where the latter
was dropped off, and then proceeded home to Pasig with
Eric and Florencio.
Florencio waited three days for news about Richard. On
February 12, 1994, with still no news about Richard,
Florencio decided to talk to Richard’s sister, a flower
vendor whose store was located
262

People vs. Mercado
near the Pasig Church. Florencio told her to look for

Richard in Tanay; he even promised to help them once they
found him. Actually, it was Richard’s brother, Virgilio
Buama, a policeman, who found Richard’s body in a
morgue in Morong, Rizal. He was told by a funeral parlor
employee that they had retrieved Richard’s body near the
boundary of Laguna. Florencio
5
attended the wake of his
friend in Sto. Tomas, Pasig.
Virgilio Buama, a policeman and brother of Richard,
last saw the latter on December 25, 1993 as Richard lived
with their mother. On February 11, 1994, Virgilio learned
from his sister, Maria Buama, that Richard had been
picked up by a policeman on February 9, 1994. Hence, he
went to see Florencio Villareal, who related to him how
Richard had been kidnapped and killed by Mercado.
Virgilio took Florencio to his house, and the following day,
February 12, 1994, they went to the PNP headquarters at
Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, where Florencio was shown pictures
by Maj. Patricio Abenido. Florencio picked out pictures of
Mercado and Acebron and identified them as the culprits in
the killing of Richard. Florencio gave a sworn statement
concerning the incident to SPO2 James Mabalot at the
PNP headquarters. Mercado was thereafter ordered to
report to the Provincial Director, Col. Maralit, and it was
there that Florencio pointed to Mercado as the person who
had kidnapped and killed Richard. Acebron was likewise
called, and he and Mercado were detained at the Rizal PNP
Command Stockade.
Virgilio found Richard’s body at the San Francisco
Funeral Homes in Morong, Rizal. The owner/manager of
the funeral parlor told him that Richard’s body had been
recovered in Mabitac,6
Laguna. Virgilio brought the remains
of his brother home.
Eric Matanggihan Ona, 21 years old, was in the house of
his neighbor Coco San Juan, in Sto. Tomas, Pasig, Metro
Manila, at around 9 o’clock in the evening of February 9,
1994 when Mercado arrived and asked him to go with him,
after Mercado had asked Eric’s father for permission to do
so. Along the way, Eric asked Mercado where they were
going, and the latter said that they
________________
5 TSN, April 5, 1994, pp. 2-29; TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 3-41; TSN, May
4, 1994, pp. 2-32.
6 TSN, May 4, 1994, pp. 1-34.
263
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 263

People vs. Mercado
would look for “Bunso” (Florencio Villareal’s nickname)

who had stolen money from his video machines. Eric went
with Mercado in the latter’s car.
Florencio voluntarily went with them when Eric and
Mercado saw him. Later, they saw Richard and Rex
Bugayong seated on the street gutter. When the two saw
the car stop, Rex stood up and ran away. Mercado told Eric
to go after Rex, but Eric refused to do so because Rex was
his friend. Mercado was able to get Richard. Mercado
placed his arm around Richard’s shoulders while his other
hand poked a gun at Richard’s side. Eric heard Richard
pleading with Mercado not to hurt him and saying that he
would go with him. Eric knew that Mercado poked a gun at
Richard because the latter was Mercado’s suspect in the
robbery of his store. He heard Mercado ask, “Eric, bakit
naman pinasok nina Richard Buama at Florencio Villareal
ang tindahan ko?” (“Eric, why did Richard Buama and
Florencio Villareal break into my store?”) He answered that
he did not know anything about it. Then, Mercado told
Richard and Florencio, “Nagkamali kayo ng tinalo. Isang
napakalaking bangungot ang ginawa ninyo.” (“You picked
on the wrong guy. What you have done is a big
nightmare.”) According to Eric, they then boarded
Mercado’s car. Along the way, Eric asked Mercado where
they were going, to which Mercado replied, “Sa Tanay.
Have you been there?” Mercado asked Richard how many
they were in the family, to which Richard replied that they
were ten and that one of his brothers was “one of them.”
(“Kabaro ninyo”) Mercado also asked them when their
birthdays were and whether they would like to have
another birthday.
Upon reaching Tanay, they were brought to an
apartment. There Mercado hit Richard on the face and told
him to take off his clothes. Mercado then went upstairs to
wake up Acebron. Acebron tried to talk to Richard, but the
latter would not speak. This so angered Acebron that he
boxed Richard hard on the stomach. Mercado then asked
his aide named Jeff to tie Richard’s hands and feet and to
blindfold and gag him. This done, Acebron and Jeff loaded
Richard into the luggage compartment of the car. Eric
described Richard as pale (“maputla”). He had hematoma
on his stomach and a swollen right cheek that was blackish
in color. Eric saw Acebron get a bolo from the kitchen, a
long one, “mapurol” (“dull and not
264

People vs. Mercado
sharp”), and with a black handle. Fearing for his safety,

Eric kept quiet. Mercado warned them not to tell anybody
about the incident; otherwise, they would be killed.
After two hours, Mercado and Acebron returned to the
apartment without Richard. Eric saw the bolo with
bloodstains. He asked Mercado, “Tata Pedi, where is
Richard?” Mercado answered, “Wala na, pinagpahinga ko
na.” (“He is gone. I have laid him to rest.”)
At around 4 o’clock in the morning, they went to the
nearby “Space” beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal where they were
made to drink. It was there that Eric heard Mercado and
Acebron’s conversation. Mercado asked, “Pare, ilan na ba
ang napatay mo?” (“How many have you killed?”) Acebron
said, “Ako, labimpito.” (“Me, 17.”) Mercado countered,
“Pare, ako dalawampu’t lima.” (“Buddy, me, 25.”) Acebron
said Richard was the 17th person he had killed while
Mercado said that Richard was his 25th victim.
Thereafter, with Eric and Florencio in tow, Mercado
brought Acebron back to the apartment and they then went
home to Pasig in Mercado’s car. They reached Sto. Tomas,
Pasig at around 5:30 in the morning. Mercado again
warned them: “Eric, Bunso, yung sinabi ko, ha.” (“Eric,
Bunso, don’t forget what I told you.”) Eric took that to
mean that they should not tell anyone about the incident;
otherwise, something bad would happen to them. Hence,
hounded by fear, Eric did not report the matter to the
police. He also did not know that Richard had been killed.
He said if he had known that Richard was already dead
when Mercado brought him home, he would have reported
the matter to police authorities.
Richard’s brothers and sisters searched for him the
following day, but Eric, fearing for his life, did not talk to
them. It was only when he saw the wake being held for
Richard at the Sto. Tomas Chapel that Eric realized that
Richard was dead. After Richard’s wake, Mercado told Eric
to look for Florencio lest the latter talk about the incident.
Eric did not obey Mercado. When Mercado asked him if he
had seen Florencio, Eric said he had not. Thereafter,
someone from the PNP headquarters in Hilltop picked him
265
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 265

People vs. Mercado
up. At the 7investigation conducted, Eric executed a sworn

statement.
The sisters Maria Buama and Lourdes Buama Vergara
testified that Richard was informally adopted by the
Buama family. When Richard was six months old, his
mother gave him to Maria at the Pasig Immaculate
Conception Church on June 18, 1977. They considered
Richard as their own brother and a member of their family.
It was Florencio who informed them that Mercado had
picked him up and Richard on February 9, 1994. In the
evening of February 11, 1994, upon learning about the
incident, Maria and Lourdes went to Mercado’s house cum
store in Sto. Tomas, Pasig where Richard used to play
video machines. Mercado’s wife told them that Richard no
longer came to the video store as he had done something
wrong. Asked what it was that Richard had done,
Mercado’s wife failed to answer because someone inside the
store said, “Hinahanap si Richard ng mga kapatid niya.”
When asked why his parents were not informed about
Richard’s alleged mischief, Mercado’s wife allegedly replied
it was because their store had not yet been emptied.
(“Hindi pa raw nauubos ang tindahan nila.”) Lourdes and
Maria eventually found Richard’s body in the early
morning of February 12, 1994. For the wake the Buama
family held for Richard at the Chapel of Sto.8
Tomas in
Pasig and his funeral, they spent P52,680.00.
SPO2 James Mabalot took the statements of Eric and
Florencio. When the latter implicated Mercado and
Acebron, SPO2 Mabalot took the two boys to the
Administrative Building. From the pictures of almost all of
the more than 100 members of the PNP Rizal, Eric and
Florencio picked those of Mercado and Acebron. The
statements that Eric and Florencio executed were signed in
the presence of both SPO2 Mabalot and his superior. SPO2
Mabalot and his team thereafter went to a funeral parlor in
Morong, Rizal where they were told that Richard’s body
had been taken to the
________________
7 TSN, May 11, 1904, pp. 1-37; TSN, May 18, 1994, pp. 2-29
(transcribed by Floriza R. Decas Armas); TSN, May 18, 1994, pp. 2-18
(transcribed by Gina A. Talaro).
8 TSN (Maria Buama), May 25, 1994, pp. 3-19; TSN (Lourdes Vergara),
June 1, 1994, pp. 3-11.
266

People vs. Mercado
PNP Crime Laboratory Services for autopsy. They learned

that Richard’s body had been found at the boundary of
Rizal and Laguna.
On the way to that site, SPO2 Mabalot and his team
dropped by the Tanay Police Station to coordinate with the
Tanay police in the investigation of the case. When
Florencio, who was with them, saw Mercado’s car parked
outside the police station, he recognized it as the one used
in taking them from Pasig to Tanay. When SPO2 Mabalot
and his team opened the car, they found blood spots on the
backseat. The car was then taken to the PNP Headquarters
in Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal for proper identification and
examination of the bloodstains.
On orders of Col. Maralit, Mercado and Acebron were
placed in detention. SPO2 Mabalot wanted Florencio and
Eric to confront Mercado and Acebron, but Florencio and
Eric were so
9
scared to do so for fear that the accused might
hurt them.
Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Acting Chief of the Medico-
Legal Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, executed and signed the postmortem
examination report on Richard’s body. Her report shows
that the cadaver had previously been embalmed; that there
were two marks at the back of the left hand; that both
hands were tied with plastic cord while both feet were tied
with rattan; and that it sustained nine injuries on the
head, neck, left upper extremity, and the left arm. There
were abrasions, lacerations, and stab wounds. The multiple
abrasions on the forehead and the back of the left arm were
possibly secondary to a fall against a hard surface. The
lacerations were on the lower jaw, on the front right ear, at
the right ear lobe, and two on the right side of the neck.
These could have been caused by a blunt object such as a
piece of wood, an iron bar, a hollow block, or anything hard.
There were also injuries and other lacerations on the back
of the head towards the right side which could have been
caused by the application of blunt force. Opening of the
head revealed hematoma or accumulation of blood. The
medical report stated that Richard died10of “(i)ntracranial
hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture.”
________________
9 TSN, June 1, 1994, pp. 25-55.

10 TSN, June 8, 1994, pp. 2-14.
267
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 267

People vs. Mercado
Accused-appellants’ defense was alibi. SPO1 Miguel

Catapusan, Administrative Officer of the Tanay PNP
Municipal Station, testified that accused-appellants both
reported for work on February 9, 1994 at the police station.
The morning and evening Formation Sheets and the Police
Duty Roster Book or the logbook showed that accused-
appellant Elpidio Mercado and accused-appellant Aurelio
Acebron were both present from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.
However, after signing the logbook in the morning,
accused-appellants were told to report to the Rizal PNP
Headquarters Command between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
regarding some important matters. After the head count
that night, the Chief of Police briefed the policemen 11
on
their assignments for thirty minutes, until 8:30 p.m.
Testifying in his own defense, accused-appellant Elpidio
Mercado said that before he joined the PNP Tanay, Rizal,
he was with the Philippine Navy since 1976. He was
transferred to the Philippine Coast Guard in 1981 where
he served until 1986. When the EDSA Revolution broke
out, he was assigned to Malacañang as a member of the
Presidential Security Group (PSG) until 1991. His next
assignment from 1991 to 1992 was at the Maritime
Command, Anti-smuggling Division. Thereafter, he was
assigned to Task Force Habagat under Col. Panfilo Lacson
of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). In
1993, he was assigned to the PNP of Rizal. For his military
and police services, Mercado claimed 12
he received several
awards, commendations, and medals.
On February 9, 1994, Mercado reported to the Tanay
police station because Col. Maralit had summoned him the
night before. After signing the logbook, Mercado, together
with Acebron and one SPO4 Bias, asked permission from
their superior officer to go to the PNP Hilltop Headquarters
for an investigation. They left the Tanay Police Station at
8:10 a.m. and proceeded to the Hilltop Headquarters where
they stayed until 5:00 p.m. They went back to the Tanay
Police Station to attend the evening formation that lasted
up to 8:30 p.m. Thereafter, Mercado went home with
Acebron. They invited SPO4 Bias to have dinner with them
in their house at Plaza Aldea, Tanay. The house was
provided to them by
________________
11 TSN, June 15, 1994, pp. 2-34.

12 Exhs. 8 to 11 (Mercado).
268
268 SUPREME COUET REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mercado
the local government of Tanay, and they shared it with

SPO2 Sagat and Chief Inspector Genabe. After SPO4 Bias
went home at 10 o’clock in the evening, Mercado went to
bed. At around 7 o’clock in the morning the following day,
February 10, 1994, Acebron woke Mercado up as he
prepared to go to the office. Mercado told Acebron to inform
his officer that he would not attend the morning formation.
Mercado said he was married and that his wife stayed in
their house in Sto. Tomas, Baltazar St., Pasig, Metro
Manila, to attend to their store and two video machines. He
usually went home every 15th and 30th of the month
except when there were special occasions. He owned a red
Chevrolet car, but it was seized by the 221st Mobile Force
on the ground that it was used in a crime. Mercado claimed
that the travel time from Pasig to Tanay was one-and-a-
half hours and if traffic was heavy, two hours.
Mercado denied the allegations against him. He claimed
that Eric and Florencio implicated them in the crime
because of an incident on January 23, 1994 in which Eric
created trouble in his video machine shop. Mercado saw
Eric strangling a kid. He was going to pacify Eric, but the
latter uttered bad words against him. So, he slapped Eric.
The youngsters scampered, but Acebron, who was visiting
Mercado, was able to grab Florencio. Mercado hit Florencio
on the back of the head and told him not to show their faces
anymore in his store because they were driving away his
customers. Since then, Eric and Florencio harbored ill
feelings against him. They had been calling his house and
threatening his family that they would kill his son and
rape his daughters. Hence, as a precautionary measure, he
sent his children to Cavite; only his wife, sister-in-law,
13
and
their maid remained in their house in Pasig.
Aurelio Acebron, the other accused-appellant, also
testified. He said that before he joined the Tanay Police
Force in November 1993, he had been a member of the
Philippine Constabulary since 1975. He was assigned to
the 61st PC Battalion in Basilan and Cebu until 1978.
From 1978 to 1979, he was an investigator of the
Constabulary Metrocom. From 1979 to 1982, he was also
an inves-
________________
13 TSN, June 15, 1994, pp. 32-62.
269
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 269

People vs. Mercado
tigator at the regional headquarters of the RT Division in

Zamboanga City. From 1982 to 1985, he served in the
Military Police Brigade in Camp Aguinaldo. At the Rizal
PNP Command, he was also an investigator. During his
active duty, he received 22 commendations, two medals,
and six military merit medals. He was also awarded a
bronze medal in the aftermath of the 1989 failed coup
d’etat in Makati.
Acebron claimed that on February 9, 1994, he reported
for work before 8 o’clock in the morning as shown by the
logbook he signed. With Mercado and SPO4 Bias, he was
ordered to report to Supt. Crescendo Maralit at Hilltop,
Taytay, Rizal. They left Tanay at 8:10 a.m. and arrived at
Hilltop at 9 o’clock that same morning. They conferred with
Supt. Maralit from 2 until 5 o’clock in the afternoon. They
then went back to the Tanay PNP station and reported to
Major Genabe. Acebron attended the evening formation
that lasted up to 8:30 in the evening, after which he went
home to Plaza Aldea, Tanay together with Mercado and
SPO4 Bias. They had dinner with Bias and Major Genabe.
Bias left at 10 o’clock in the evening and they settled for
the night. The following morning, he woke up at 6 o’clock.
Before leaving for the office, he woke up Mercado who,
however, said that he would not attend the morning
formation as he would go directly to his assignment at Post
No. 2.
Acebron also denied all accusations against him. He
claimed that he had been implicated in revenge for what
happened on January 23, 1994 when he collared Florencio
and Mercado hit the boy’s back for causing trouble in
Mercado’s video shop. Acebron claimed that he had been
asked by police officers Mabalot and Ople to testify against
Mercado, but he refused. He claimed he had been detained 14
on February 12, 1994 after he was implicated in this case.
Corroborating other defense witnesses, SPO4 Teofilo
Paz Bias swore that at 7:30 in the morning on February 9,
1994, he attended the morning formation at the Tanay
police station. Mercado and Acebron were there present. At
past 8:00 a.m., as he accompanied Mercado and Acebron to
the headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, they saw Col.
Maralit with whom they conferred from 2:00 p.m.
________________
14 TSN, June 22, 1994, pp. 4-37.
270

People vs. Mercado
until 5:00 p.m. They then went back to Tanay to attend the
evening formation which lasted until about 8:45 in the
evening. Major Genabe ordered him to go with Mercado
and Acebron to discuss in the house the result of the
investigation at Hilltop, Taytay. They arrived in that house
at 9:00 p.m. While they were having dinner, they discussed
what had happened at the investigation of Mercado and
Acebron by the Provincial Director. At 10 o’clock that
evening, after supper, Bias went home to Pililla, Rizal.
15
The
following morning, he saw Acebron report to work.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court
found both accused guilty and sentenced them to death.
Hence, this appeal. The joint brief of accused-appellants
Mercado and Acebron contains the following assignment of
errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
CLASHING MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES ON THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO (2) PROSECUTIONS (sic)
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES. THEIR CONTRADICTING
TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCES CREATED NOT ONLY
REASONABLE DOUBT BUT RATHER ESTABLISHED
FACTUAL ERROR THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT ACQUITTAL
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE DIRECT
MATERIAL EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF POLICE LOGBOOK
OR DUTY ROSTER BOOK (EXHIBITS “6”—MERCADO AND
“4”—ACEBRON) AND TESTIMONIES OF SPO2 POLICE
CATAPUSAN THAT BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ATTENDED THE MORNING FORMATION AT 8:00 IN THE
MORNING OF FEBRUARY 9, 1994 AT TANAY, RIZAL, THEN
ATTENDED A CONFERENCE CALL OF SUPT. CHIEF
COLONEL MARALIT THE WHOLE DAY AT TAYTAY, RIZAL,
THEN BACK TO TANAY, RIZAL AT 6:00 P.M. AND BOTH
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
________________
15 TSN, June 22, 1994, pp. 38-49.
271
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 271

People vs. Mercado
ATTENDED THE EVENING FORMATION AT 8:00 P.M.

WHICH LASTED UP TO 8:45 P.M., AFTER WHICH, THEY
(SPO1 BIAS, MERCADO & ACEBRON) PROCEEDED TO
MAJOR GENABE AT THE TANAY APARTMENT AND MADE
REPORT REGARDING THE CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY
COL. MARALIT UP TO 10:00 P.M. HENCE, PHYSICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ACCUSED MERCADO TO PICK UP
THE VICTIM AT 9:00 P.M. AT PASIG, METRO MANILA.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST
(sic) A CONSPIRACY, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE AND BASIS
IN FACT AND IN LAW THAT WILL SUPPORT ITS DECISION.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE, THERE BEING
NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED THAT HOMICIDE HAS BEEN
COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OR AS A CONSEQUENCE
OF KIDNAPPING.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

LACK OF JURISDICTION IN WRITING THE DECISION WITH
UNDUE HASTE AND INCREDIBLE SPEED ONE (1) DAY
AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF ACCUSED (sic) 32-PAGE JOINT
MEMORANDUM ON JULY 21, 1994, WITHIN THE 15-DAY
PERIOD GRANTED BY THE COURT AND PROMULGATING
ITS DECISION ON THE NEXT DAY, JULY 22, 1994,
CONSISTING OF 39 PAGES, THUS, RESULTING IN FATAL
ERROR OF CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED SENTENCING
THEM TO DEATH BASED ON WRONG APPRECIATION OF
FACTS, SPECULATIONS AND PROBABILITIES AND
DESPITE PATENT FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE WHAT HAVE BEEN ALLEGED UNDER THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION.
272
People vs. Mercado
These assigned errors boil down to the following main

issues: (1) credibility of witnesses, (2) alibi as a defense,
and (3) the presence of conspiracy.
These issues will be discussed in the course of this
decision, although not necessarily in the order discussed by
accused-appellants in their brief. But before doing so, we
first consider the threshold question raised in the
Supplemental Brief filed for accused-appellants by
collaborating counsel Rene V. Sarmiento with regard to the
constitutionality of Republic Act No 7659 providing for the
death penalty for 13 heinous crimes.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RA. 7659 AND RA. 8177
Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act 7659 violates

the 1987 Constitution because—
1. There are no compelling reasons to impose the

death penalty for the crimes of treason, qualified
piracy, qualified bribery, parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons, destructive arson, rape,
plunder, importation of prohibited drugs, etc.
2. R.A. No. 7659 violates the constitutional ban
against infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
3. R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to
equality before the law.
4. R.A. No. 7659 repudiates the obligation of the
Philippines under international law.
5. Death penalty
16
is not deterrence to the commission
of crimes.
The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 has already

been settled in the Court’s
17
12-3 per curiam Resolution in
People vs. Echegaray, wherein the following rulings were
made:
________________
16 Supplemental Brief for Accused-Appellants, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 389-

390.
17 335 Phil. 343; 267 SCRA 682 (1997).
273
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 273

People vs. Mercado
1. The death penalty is not a “cruel, unjust, excessive

or unusual punishment.’’ It is an exercise of the
state’s power to “secure society against the
threatened and actual evil.”
2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659
provides the death penalty satisfy “the element of
heinousness” by specifying the circumstances which
generally qualify a crime to be punishable by death;
3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both procedural and
substantial safeguards to insure its correct
application.
4. The Constitution does not require that “a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of
crime should first be perceived and statistically
proven” before the death penalty may be prescribed.
Congress is authorized under the Constitution to
determine when the elements of heinousness and
compelling reasons are present, and the Court
would exceed its own authority if it questioned the
exercise of such discretion.
In the 18subsequent case of Echegaray vs. Secretary of

Justice, the Court sustained the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8177, providing for death by lethal
injection against claims that death by lethal injection was
cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and that the law
violated treaty obligations Petitioner in that case argued
that death by lethal injection constituted cruel, degrading,
and inhuman punishment because: (1) Republic Act No.
8177 failed to provide for the drugs to be used in
administering lethal injection, the dosage for the drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering drug(s)
to the convict; (2) Republic Act No. 8177 and its
implementing rules did not fix either the date of execution
of the convict or the time for notifying him, with the result
that such uncertainties’ cause pain and suffering to the
convict, and (3) the possibility of botched executions or
mistakes in administering drugs renders lethal injection
inherently cruel.
Rejecting petitioner’s contention that death by lethal
injection violates the prohibition against cruel, degrading,
and inhuman punishment in Section 19(1), Article III of
the Constitution, the Court said:
“Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per

se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-
cited case of
________________
18 297 SCRA 754 (1998).
274

People vs. Mercado
Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that ‘[p]unishments

are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word
as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.’ Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law ‘cruel,
degrading or inhuman’? The Court believes not. For reasons
hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are
matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
19
administrative officials.”
As to the contention that the re-imposition of the death

penalty violates international treaty obligations,
particularly the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Court explained:
“Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual’s

right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on
the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the
‘most serious crimes.’ Pursuant to Article 28 of the Covenant, a
Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40
of the Covenant, States Parties to the Covenant are required to
submit an initial report to the Committee on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized within the
Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those
rights within one year of its entry into force for the State Party
concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the
Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 6
interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that ‘(while) it
follows from Article 6(2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to
abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use
and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the ‘most serious
crimes.’ Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their
criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to
restrict the application of the death penalty to the ‘most serious
crimes.’ The article strongly suggests (pars. 2[2] and [6]) that
abolition is desirable, x x x. The Committee is of the opinion that
the expression ‘most serious crimes’ must be read restrictively to
mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional
measure. Further, The Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of
Those Facing the Death Penalty adopted by the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the
term ‘most
________________
19 Id., p. 772.
275
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 275

People vs. Mercado
serious crimes’ should not go beyond intentional crimes, with

lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
“The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by
the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22, 1989,
respectively. The Optional Protocol provides that the Human
Rights Committee shall receive and consider communications
from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the
rights set forth in the Covenant.
“On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at
the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed
nor ratified said document. Evidently, petitioner’s assertion of our
20
obligation under the Second Optional Protocol is misplaced.”
Accused-appellants further argue that Republic Act No.

7659 denies equality before the law. They cite studies here
and abroad allegedly showing that “the death penalty has
most often been used against the poor.” This statement is
too sweeping to merit further serious consideration.
Anyone, regardless of his economic status in life, may
commit a crime. While there may be perceived imbalances
in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate
safeguards in the Constitution, the law, and procedural
rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law.
As pointed out by Representative Pablo Garcia when
interpellated by Representative Joker Arroyo during the
congressional deliberation on the death penalty bill:
“x x x. (T)here is something more in the bill that protects the

rights of every accused person, be he rich or poor. I refer to the
provisions under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. The
Constitution itself protects, envelops the accused with the mantle
of protection guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Section 1 of Article
III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. In other words,
the accused cannot be deprived of his life without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
________________
20 Id., pp. 781-783.
276

People vs. Mercado
laws. In other words, the laws protect the rich and the poor, the
lettered and the unlettered. That is guaranteed by the
21
Constitution, x x x.”
22
Similarly, in People vs. Mijano, this Court recently said:
“Finally, accused-appellant in his reply brief contends that the

death penalty law is violative of the equal protection clause of the
1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like him, the
poor, the uneducated, and the jobless.
The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or,
as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law.
Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal
person in the law, which does not treat the person differently
because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses (Bernas,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, 1987 ed., p. 6).
x x x x x x x x x
“Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no
distinction. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons—
rich or poor, educated, or uneducated, religious or non-religious.
No particular person or classes of persons are identified by the
law against whom the death penalty shall be exclusively
imposed.”
Accused-appellants’ claim that the death penalty does not

deter the commission of crimes is without any basis. To be
sure, deterrence is not the only aim of the law. As
Representative Pablo Garcia, the principal author of the
death penalty bill, explained
23
“more than deterrence, x x x is
retributive justice.” In People vs. Echegaray, it was
further stated:
The abolitionists in Congress insisted that all criminal reforms

first be pursued and implemented before the death penalty be
reimposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed
that the only compelling reason contemplated by the Constitution
is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the
government to resort to that could check the chaos and the
destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of
our colleagues are of the opinion that the compelling reason
________________
21 RECORD OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (February 10, 1993), p.

671; quoted in Appellee’s Supplemental Brief, p. 17.
22 311 SCRA 81, 93-94 (1999).
23 Quoted in the Appellee’s Supplemental Brief, p. 20.
277
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 277

People vs. Mercado
required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and

significant change in the sociocultural milieu after the suspension
of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are,
however, interpretations only of the phrase ‘compelling reasons’
but not of the conjunctive phrase ‘compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.’ The imposition of the requirement that there be a
rise in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension of
the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand,
for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death
penalty first prove itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal
behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of
criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was
indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice
it to say that the constitution in the first place did not require
that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it
requires is that there be compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.
“Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that Congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be
valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of
crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following
the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last
recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R-A.
No. 7659 cites that there has been an ‘alarming upsurge of such
crimes,’ for the same was never intended by said law to be the
yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659
states is that the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order
and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
24
impose the death penalty for said crimes.’ ”
Indeed, today, even members of the Court who originally

dissented from the majority ruling sustaining the validity
of Republic Act No. 7659 agree on the imposition of the
death penalty without in the least changing their view
about the constitutionality of the penalty.
________________
24 Supra at 383-384.
278

People vs. Mercado
25
As we did in People vs. Godoy, we restate mankind’s age-old
observation and experience on the penological and societal effect
of capital punishment: “If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
26
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.”
We now consider the merits of this case.
II. THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
The question of credibility

27
of witnesses is primarily for the
trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations 28
and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.
This rule is variously stated thus: The trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to
great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to
be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
29
29
been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of
the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment
of the credibility30
of witnesses deserves high respect by
appellate courts.
In the case at bar, inconsistencies and discrepancies in
the testimonies of the two principal prosecution witnesses,
Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona, are alleged as
undermining their credibility, to wit:
(1) Florencio testified that on February 9, 1994 at

about 9 o’clock in the evening, he and the victim,
Richard Buama, were picked up by Mercado and
Eric while he and Richard, in the company of Rex
Bugayong, were passing time near Mercado house.
Eric belied this testimony when, on cross-
examination, he said that he and Mercado saw
Florencio first at about 8 o’clock, not 9 o’clock in the
evening of February 9, 1994 at the
________________
25 321 Phil. 279; 243 SCRA 64 (1995).

26 Id., p. 346.
27 People vs. Dianos, 297 SCRA 191 (1998).
28 People vs. Manuel, 298 SCRA 184 (1998).
29 People vs. Lozano, 296 SCRA 403 (1998).
30 People vs. Abangin, 297 SCRA 655 (1998).
279
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 279

People vs. Mercado
corner of Sto. Tomas Street, Pasig, one block away

from the place where they later found Richard.
(2) Florencio testified that when they were
apprehended at the corner of Baltazar Street,
Mercado pushed him straight into the car, and held
and poked a gun at Richard. On the other hand,
Eric testified that Florencio voluntarily went with
them into the car as Mercado, with a .38 black gun
tucked at his side, placed his arm around Richard’s
shoulder.
(3) In his sworn statement, Florencio stated in answer
to Question No. 3, “At kami po ay dinala ng pulis na
humuli sa amin doon sa inuupahan niyang bahay
at isinakay kami sa kanyang kotse at kami ay
dinala sa Tanay, Rizal.” However, in answer to
Question No. 6, Eric said Una kaming dinala sa
bahay na inuupahan ni Elpidio Mercado dito sa
Pasig.” Eric denied Florencio’s statement that they
did not stay in Mercado’s house; instead, they just
circled the place and then proceeded to Tanay, Rizal
right away. Florencio in fact contradicted his own
statement at the trial by declaring that they just
passed by Mercado’s house and did not stay there.
(4) In his testimony, Florencio said that on their way to
Tanay, Rizal, he did not hear conversation between
Mercado and Eric. Yet Eric testified that, upon
reaching Rosario, he talked to Mercado and asked
him where they were going. Mercado answered, “Sa
Tanay, have you been there?” Mercado even asked
them their birthdays and if they still wanted to
have birthdays.
(5) Florencio testified that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal
and alighting from the car he was brought inside
the apartment and that when he peeped through
the window he saw Mercado slapping Richard on
the face. On the contrary, Eric testified that upon
their arrival in Tanay, Rizal, they alighted from the
car and were told to go inside the apartment and it
was there where Mercado slapped Richard on the
face and asked him to undress.
(6) Florencio further testified that after Richard had
taken off his clothes as ordered by Mercado, the
latter asked Richard to lie down, face downward,
and thereafter, Richard’s feet and hands were tied
by Mercado and his aide, Jeff, with a rattan rope.
Eric stated on cross-examination that when Richard
was lying down, Mercado stepped on Richard’s left
cheek, implying that Richard lay not with his face
down but with his right cheek on the ground.
(7) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that upon
reaching Tanay, Rizal, they were taken into an
apartment opposite a beerhouse. On the other
hand, Eric claimed that the apartment was some
130 to 150 meters away from the beerhouse.
280

People vs. Mercado
(8) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that after
Richard was beaten up, his hands and feet were
tied and then Mercado and his police companion
loaded (sinakay) Richard into the car. Eric,
however, testified that Richard was loaded in the
baggage compartment of the car by Acebron and
Jeff. On cross examination, Florencio contradicted
himself by admitting that it was Acebron and Jeff
who loaded Richard into the car.
(9) Florencio testified that, although Mercado asked
Acebron to get a bolo, the latter got a long knife (not
a bolo) with a “sharp pointed edge” (sic). Eric
declared that the bolo taken by Acebron was
“mapurol.”
(10) Eric testified that on February 12, 1994, he was
investigated ahead of Florencio by SPO2 James
Mabalot and insisted that his statement was the
truth. He even stated that as he was being
investigated, Florencio was around, talking.
However, this testimony was contradicted by SPO2
James Mabalot who declared that it was Florencio
who was first investigated as shown by the fact that
Florencio was investigated at 6:20 p.m., while Eric
was investigated at 10:45 p.m. of February 12,
1994.
(11) On cross-examination, Eric testified that while
SPO2 Mabalot was investigating him and Florencio,
SPO1 Buama was just outside the office and even
saw him. SPO1 Buama confirmed this statement.
However, SPO2 Mabalot said that when he
investigated Florencio and Eric, SPO1 Buama was
not present having then already left.
(12) SPO1 Buama testified that Richard was his full
blood brother, but his sister, Maria Buama, said
that Richard was an adopted child, although
31
they
considered him their full blood brother.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer

only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and
positive identification of the assailants. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies
are not rehearsed.32 They are thus safeguards against
memorized perjury.
Nor are such inconsistencies and even improbabilities
unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or
33
33
senses. An adroit
________________
31 Joint Appellant’s Brief, pp. 92-97; Rollo, pp. 200-210.

32 People vs. Cleopas and Pirame, G.R. No. 121998, March 9, 2000, 327
SCRA 552.
33 People vs. Leangsiri, 322 Phil. 226, 250-251; 252 SCRA 213 (1996).
281
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 281

People vs. Mercado
cross-examiner may trap a witness, into making

statements contradicting his testimony on direct
examination. Intensive cross-examination on points not
anticipated by a witness and his lawyer may make a
witness blurt out statements which do not dovetail even
with his own testimony. Yet, if it appears that the same
witness has not willfully perverted the truth, as may be
gleaned from the tenor of his testimony and the conclusion
of the trial judge regarding his demeanor and behavior on
the witness stand, his testimony on material points may be
accepted.
A witness’ testimony may likewise contradict that of
another witness. As long as the contradiction involves
minor details and collateral matters, the credibility of both
witnesses will not be deemed impaired. After all, no two
witnesses could testify on a matter from the same point of
view or perception. The recollection of different witnesses
with respect to the time, place, and other circumstances of
a criminal event would naturally differ in various details.
Absolute uniformity in every detail of testimonies cannot
be expected of witnesses who by nature react differently to
what they see 34and hear depending upon their situation and
state of mind. On the contrary, if witnesses should agree
on every detail of a transaction that occupied a
considerable space of time and should undertake to tell all
that occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the
same incidents as the others in precisely the same
35
words,
that fact should make their testimonies suspect.
Applying these rules to this case, the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Florencio Villareal and
Eric Ona pointed out by appellants concern only minor
details which do not detract from the essential points of
their testimonies that accused-appellants, after beating up
the victim, took him away in accused-appellant Mercado’s
car, and, when they returned to the apartment, both
admitted that they had “silenced” the victim or had “laid
him to rest.”
________________
34 People vs. De Castro, 322 Phil. 374, 382 and 384; 252 SCRA 391
(1996).
35 See People vs. Geguira, G.R. No. 130769, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA
11 citing People vs. Resayaga, 153 Phil. 634; 54 SCRA 350 (1973).
282

People vs. Mercado
The alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses and their affidavits, on the other
hand, refer to minor matters that do not affect the
substance of the prosecution’s evidence. Affidavits are not
entirely reliable evidence in court due to, their
incompleteness and the 36inaccuracies that may have
attended their formulation. In general, such affidavits are
not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another
person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own
language in writing the statement or misunderstood the
affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and
impatience that usually attend the preparation of such
affidavits. As this Court has often said:
“An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete

and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and
sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid
of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
37
that belongs to the subject.’ ”
“ ‘We have too much experience of the great infirmity of
affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and ignorant, the
language presented to the court is not his; it is, and must be, the
language of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may be,
and too often is, the expression of that person’s erroneous
inference as to the meaning of the language used by the witness
himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to
the witness, he may not understand what is said in a language so
different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having
expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it
translated by a person on whom he relies, into language not his
own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to
acquiesce; and testimony not intended by him is brought before
the court as his.’ (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v.
38
Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299).”
________________
36 People vs. Rivera, 295 SCRA 99, 109 (1998).

37 Id., citing People vs. Resayaga, supra at p. 643 and People vs.
Alcantara, 144 Phil. 623, 633; 33 SCRA 812 (1970).
38 People vs. Geguira, supra.
283
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 283

People vs. Mercado
For this reason, affidavits have generally 39

been considered
inferior to testimony given in open court.
Neither is the credibility of prosecution witnesses
Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona in any way lessened,
much less impaired, by the motives imputed to them by
accused-appellants who claim that the former testified
against them on account of an incident on January 23, 1994
when Mercado slapped Eric and hit Florencio on the back.
Accused-appellants’ contention is nothing more than a
desperate attempt to discredit said witnesses. It is
inconceivable that these principal prosecution witnesses,
two young boys, would impute a crime as heinous as
kidnapping with murder to anyone if the same was not
true. Indeed, it would be contrary to the natural order of
events and of human nature, and against the presumption
of good faith for Florencio
40
and Eric to falsely testify against
accused-appellants. These young boys, in testifying
against accused-appellants, would have nothing to gain
and everything to lose, including their lives. Florencio and
Eric knew that, even if accused-appellants were
bemedalled military and police officers, they had no
compunction at all in claiming to have killed a number of
people. Even granting that such braggadocio was simply
meant to frighten these young boys into silence, it would
nonetheless have the same effect on them and would have
deterred them from testifying against accused-appellants
had what they testified to been a mere fabrication.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE

PROSECUTION
It is true that no eyewitnesses were presented by the
prosecution to testify on the actual killing of Richard
Buaman. But it is settled that a conviction may rest on
purely circumstantial evidence, provided the following
requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circum-
________________
39 People vs. Agbayani, 348 Phil. 341, 367; 284 SCRA 315 (1998), cit-ing
People vs. Marcelo, 223 SCRA 24, 36 (1993) and People vs. Enciso, 223
SCRA 675, 686 (1993).
40 People vs. Villamor, 354 Phil. 396, 407; 292 SCRA 384 (1998).
284

People vs. Mercado
stances is such 41 as to produce a conviction 42

beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, in People vs. Fulinara, wherein
the victim was kidnapped in the evening and the following
day his body found in a ravine, this Court said:
“While the positive identification made by the key witness does

not refer to the actual killing of the deceased, the circumstantial
evidence on record constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellants are indeed
guilty of the offense charged. It is not only by direct evidence upon
which guilt may be predicated. The accused may also be convicted
on circumstantial evidence.”
In this case, the following circumstances, viewed in their

entirety, show beyond shadow of a doubt that accused-
appellants are indeed guilty of kidnapping with murder:
(1) Mercado picked up Richard on the night of

February 9, 1994 near his (Mercado’s) house in
Pasig and, poking a gun at him, forced him to ride
with him in his car;
(2) Mercado took Richard to his apartment in Tanay;
(3) Mercado slapped and boxed Richard before bringing
him inside the apartment;
(4) Mercado went up the second floor of the apartment
and came down with Acebron;
(5) Mercado and Acebron took turns in subjecting
Richard to physical abuse;
(6) Mercado ordered his aide named Jeff to get a piece
of rope with which to bind Richard and Jeff obliged
by getting a rattan rope;
(7) Richard was gagged and his limbs were bound;
(8) Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage
compartment of Mercado’s car;
(9) Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo before they
drove away;
(10) Accused-appellants rode together in the car with
Richard in its compartment;
________________
41 Rule 133, sec. 4; People vs. Llaguno, 349 Phil. 39, 58; 285 SCRA 124
(1998).
42 317 Phil. 31, 51; 247 SCRA 28 (1995).
285
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 285

People vs. Mercado
(11) After two hours, accused-appellants returned to the

apartment without Richard;
(12) When Florencio asked Mercado about Richard’s
whereabouts, Richard replied, “Wala na,
pinatahimik ko na.” (“Gone, I already silenced
him”);
(13) When Eric asked Mercado the same question, the
latter replied, “Wala na, pinagpahinga ko na.” (“He
is gone. I have laid him to rest”);
(14) Eric saw Acebron wiping off bloodstains on the bolo;
(15) At the disco bar, accused-appellants bragged about
the fact that Richard was the 25th person and the
17th person Mercado and Acebron had killed,
respectively;
(16) Richard’s body was found in a morgue on February
12, 1994;
(17) The victim’s body showed signs that his hands and
feet had been tied and his mouth stuffed with a
towel; and
(18) Mercado warned Eric and Florencio not to talk to
anyone regarding the incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain clearly

pointing to accused-appellants’ culpability to the crime of
kidnapping with murder.
IV. THE EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in

finding conspiracy in the commission of the crime because
the prosecution allegedly failed to establish a common
resolution between them to commit the crime charged. This
argument is likewise without merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. To establish the existence of
conspiracy, direct proof is not essential, as it may be shown
by the conduct of the accused
43
before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. It may be proven by facts and
circumstances from which may logically be inferred the
existence of a common design among the accused to commit
the
________________
43 People vs. Gungon, 351 Phil. 116, 131; 287 SCRA 618 (1998).
286

People vs. Mercado
offense charged, or it may be deduced from the

44
mode and
manner by which the offense was perpetrated. In this case
the concatenation of facts and circumstances establish
beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-appellants
conspired to kill Richard, to wit: (1) upon reaching the
Tanay apartment, which he shared with Acebron, Mercado
went upstairs and called Acebron; (2) as they came
downstairs, Mercado told appellant Acebron that he had a
present for him and that they were going to kill someone,
saying “Pare, may regalo ako sa iyo, may papatayin tayo”;
(3) Mercado and Acebron slapped and boxed Richard; (4)
when told by Mercado to get a bolo, Acebron did so; (5)
Acebron helped in loading Richard into the car’s luggage
compartment; (6) Mercado and Acebron left the apartment
together in Mercado’s car with Richard in the car’s luggage
compartment; (7) after two hours, the two came back to the
apartment without Richard; (8) when Eric and Florencio
asked them where Richard was, they answered that
Richard had been “silenced” or had been “laid to rest”; and
(9) Acebron washed a bloodstained bolo.
V. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ ALIBI
Invoking alibi as a defense, accused-appellants argue that

it was impossible for them to be in Pasig at the time of the
commission of the crime because they were then in Tanay,
Rizal on official duty, as members of the PNP force in that
town. For this purpose, they cite the PNP logbook, duly
signed by them. However, as the trial court pointed out:
“This defense, however, collapsed with the testimony of SPO4

Bias when he affirmed before the Court that travel time between
Tanay and Pasig could take less than an hour, especially at
nighttime. Moreover, the Court finds wanting the evidence
presented by the defense to support its claim that both accused
were indeed present at the Tanay PNP Headquarters until about
8:30 p.m. of February 9, 1994.
“Firstly, it was admitted by the defense that the duty logbook
and the morning/evening formation sheet do not always reflect
the whereabouts of the Tanay PNP members for the day such that
even when they
________________
44 People vs. Silvestre, 314 Phil. 397, 416; 244 SCRA 479 (1995).
287
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 287

People vs. Mercado
have deviated from their regular assignments, no note whatsoever

appears on said log-book. Accused were at the Hilltop
Headquarters in Taytay’ from around 9:15 a.m. to 5 p.m. of
February 9, 1994 and yet, the duty log-book they submitted in
Court show otherwise. In said log-book, the Post/Assignment of
accused Acebron was “Intel Optvs/follow-up” while accused
Mercado was supposed to be at “Post OP #2.” The Court does not
believe this log-book is reliable. Secondly, again by the defense’
own admission, Tanay PNP members sign their names once on
the log-book and this will be enough to confirm their presence or
attendance for the entire day. Surely, the possibility that all the
PNP members do not in fact arrive at and leave their office at the
same time of 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. can not be disregarded. Still, a
reading of the entries in the log-book submitted by the defense
would somehow suggest this. The physical impossibility of
accused Mercado, at least, being in Pasig at around 9 p.m. on
February 9, 1994 is not established. The defense of alibi is,
45
therefore, rejected by the Court.”
Indeed, alibi is generally regarded with suspicion and is

always received with caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be
easily fabricated and concocted. For alibi to prosper as a
defense, it must be convincing enough to preclude any
doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the
accused at the locus criminis
46
or its immediate vicinity at
the time of the incident. An accused who invokes the
defense of alibi must prove (a) his presence at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the crime and (b)
the physical
47
impossibility for him to be at the scene of the
crime.
In this case, even granting that accused-appellants were
in Tanay at the time they were supposed to have taken the
two prosecution witnesses and the victim to Pasig, it was
still not physically impossible for them to be in that place.
Pasig is only an hour’s drive from Tanay and when traffic
is light, as it would generally be late in the evening, the
distance could be negotiated in less time. Significantly,
when the three young men were taken from Pasig at
around 9 o’clock in the evening, accused-appellants had
already been discharged from their duties because, by their
own admission,
________________
45 RTC Decision, pp. 33-34; Records, pp. 322-323.

46 People vs. Tulop, 352 Phil. 130, 150; 289 SCRA 316 (1998).
47 People vs. Magpantay, 348 Phil. 107, 112; 284 SCRA 96 (1998).
288

People vs. Mercado
the evening formation at the Tanay Police Station ended at

around 8:30 that evening.
Above all, given Florencio and Eric’s clear and positive
identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime, the failure of the defense to give any plausible
reason for Florencio and Eric to testify falsely against
accused-appellants48
renders the batter’s alibi bereft of any
probative value.
Their positive identification
49
by the witnesses prevails
over their alibi and denial.
VI. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
LIABILITY
Accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping because, by

placing the victim in an enclosed place consisting of the
luggage compartment of the car, they detained or otherwise
deprived him of his liberty. There was also actual restraint
of the victim’s liberty when he was taken at gunpoint 50
from
Pasig to accused-appellants’ apartment in Tanay. The
evidence proves that Mercado initiated the kidnapping of
the victim. Acebron’s subsequent loading of the victim into
the car’s compartment after tying the latter shows
community of criminal purpose with Mercado. However,
although both were police 51
officers, they acted in this case in
their private capacities.
The crime was committed by accused-appellants on
February 9, 1994, after the amendment of the Revised
Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No.
7659. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as thus
amended, provides:
“Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any private

individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than

three days.
________________
48 See People vs. Ramos, 297 SCRA 618, 640 (1998).

49 People vs. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422, 431; 265 SCRA 571 (1996).
50 People vs. Gungon, supra at 134.
51 People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583, 597 (1998).
289
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 289

People vs. Mercado
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public

authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.
“The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention

was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
“When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.” (Italics supplied)
52
In People vs. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two
separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to
death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found
the accused guilty of the “special complex crime” of
kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last
paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. This Court said:
“x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the

concept of ‘special complex crime’ of kidnapping with murder or
homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the
courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped
victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the
killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide
can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No.
7659.” (Italics supplied)
________________
52 297 SCRA 618 (1998).
290

People vs. Mercado
Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court correctly found

accused-appellants guilty of kidnapping with murder and
sentenced each of them to death.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining
their adherence to the 53
separate opinions expressed in
People vs. Echega-ray that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional,
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the
law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed.
It does not matter whether there are circumstances
qualifying the killing as murder. Under the last paragraph
of Article 267, it is sufficient that the victim is “killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention.” In any event, the
killing of Richard Buama as a consequence of his
kidnapping was committed under circumstances which
make it murder. His limbs were tied and his mouth gagged
before he was taken away. When his body was discovered,
his limbs were still tied and his mouth gagged, indicating
that treachery attended the killing of Richard Buama.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 civil indemnity and
P100,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to
the Buama family as heirs of the deceased Richard Buama
pursuant to Articles 2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code. It is
not disputed, however, that Richard had not been legally
adopted by the Buamas, and so the latter cannot be
considered his heirs, the term “heirs” being limited to the
deceased’s “spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants
and descendants” per the definition of “heirs” under
Articles 782
54
and 2206 of the Civil Code. For this reason, in
one case, the award of moral damages for the death of a
brother caused by quasi-delict was disallowed. In this case,
since the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama are not
known, the awards of civil indemnity and moral and
exemplary damages to the Buamas should be disallowed.
________________
53 267 SCRA 682 (1997).

54 Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybañez, 24 SCRA 989
(1968).
291
VOL. 346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 291

People vs. Mercado
As to the award of P52,680.00 for actual damages incurred

for wake and funeral expenses, only the amount of
P22,690.00 is supported by receipts (Exhs. J-2 to J-7).
Accused-appellants contend that these receipts constitute
hearsay evidence because the witness who identified them,
Lourdes Vergara, admitted that she merely collated the
same but had otherwise no personal
55
knowledge of the56facts
pertaining to their issuance. In People vs. Paraiso, this
Court disregarded the list of burial expenses for being
hearsay since it was prepared by the victim’s sister-in-law
and not by the victim’s eldest son who testified thereon.
The Court held that actual damages should be based upon
competent proof and on the best evidence available.
One receipt (Exh. J-5) for P1,300.00 shows that it was
issued by the Immaculate Conception Parish Church in
Pasig to Lourdes Vergara, and it was for Richard Buama’s
burial mass. Another receipt (Exh. J-7), for the amount of
P2.210.00 for flowers for Richard Buama’s wake, was
issued by Lourdes Vergara herself as the owner of the
flower shop. These two receipts should be considered
competent evidence of the amount of expenses indicated
therein, and therefore the total amount of P3,510.00 should
be awarded to Lourdes Vergara as actual damages.
VII. ALLEGED HASTE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN

DECIDING THE CASE
One last point. Accused-appellants bewail the fact that the

trial court rendered its decision just57
a day after it had
received their Joint Memorandum. Accused-appellants
charge that their case was decided with “fantastic,
incredible and unbelievable speed” with the result that
“grave58 and serious errors” were committed in convicting
them.
This contention has no merit. A review of the trial
court’s decision shows that its findings were based on the
records of this case
________________
55 TSN, p. 14, June 1, 1994.

56 G.R. No. 127840, Nov. 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 422.
57 Appellants’ Joint Brief, pp. 125-129; Rollo, pp. 233-237.
58 Id., pp. 126-128.
292

People vs. Mercado
and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the

trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the
case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious
performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed
to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have
been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty
that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for
the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day
period between the filing of accused-appellants’
memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was
sufficient time to consider their arguments and to
incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge
does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in
favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he
cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due
dispatch. The trial court in this case committed no
reversible errors and, consequently, except for some
modification, its decision should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig City, finding accused-appellants Elpidio
Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with
murder and imposing upon each of them the DEATH
PENALTY, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages are
DELETED and accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally to Lourdes Vergara the amount of
P3,510.00 as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred
for the victim’s wake and funeral.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for his
use in case he decides to exercise his prerogative of mercy.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
293
VOL.346, NOVEMBER 29, 2000 293

Abasolo vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of trial
courts on credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of
respect. (People vs. Atad, 266 SCRA 262 [1997])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

People vs. Mercado

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

People vs. Mercado

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

People vs. Mercado

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED