INTRODUCTION

A. Political law (definition, scope, etc.)

B. Historical antecedents
1. Pre-1973 Constitution
2. The 1973 Constitution
CASES:
Planas v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-35925, January 22, 1973 (aka the Plebiscite cases)

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. L-36142 (The Ratification Case)

Facts:
Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against
the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to
restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of
the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution" —
referring to that of 1935.
After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases,
Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of
the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are
acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies";
that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the
President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution
was not a free election, hence null and void."
The respondents filed their separate comment therein, alleging that "(t)he subject
matter" of said case "is a highly political question which, under the circumstances, this
...Court would not be in a position to act upon judicially," and that, in view of the
opinions expressed by three members of this Court in its decision in the plebiscite cases,
in effect upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, "further proceedings in this
case may only be an academic exercise in futility."

Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a
justiciable or political question.
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified to said
Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a
majority of the people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.
Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when
the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the
court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to
dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

First Issue
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the
issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his
vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the
Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an
approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in the negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is
political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

Second Issue
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that
the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly
ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the
light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the
referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, especially in the manner the votes therein were
cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however,
of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there
was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past
ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox
legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief
that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said
that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been
substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been
constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that
under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional
requirements for valid ratification.

Third Issue
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned
proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can
be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to
vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed
Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some
American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a
new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls
for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that
is a concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to
rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in
their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions
through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the
point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."

Fourth Issue
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the
petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he
effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate
question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and
therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and
myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the
petitions.
Fifth Issue
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in
force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief
Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are
hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.

TRAC: WON there was valid ratification.

T: There was no valid ratification.

MJ: Under the 1987 Constitution, there is only one way to ratify a proposed
amendment or revision thereto: By way of a plebiscite specifically called for that
purpose.

MN: In this case, the scheduled plebiscite was no longer held because the
President submitted directly to the people the questions

(1) Whether they approve of the proposed new constitution; and

(2) Whether a plebiscite is still needed to ratify it. Even assuming that the people
overwhelmingly voted in the affirmative on the first question and in the negative
on the second question, still this is not the form and procedure of ratification
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, a social contract binding upon all sovereign
Filipinos. In fact, the proclamation itself only said the people already accepted the
proposed constitution. Implicit therefrom is a recognition of the noncompliance
with the ratification procedure in the Constitution.

C: Thus, there was no valid ratification in this case.

3. The Martial Law proclamation

CASE:
Aquino v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-35546, September 17, 1974

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for Habeas Corpus, the petitioners, Aquino et al, having been
arrested and detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081.
The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President
“for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force...”
General Order No. 2 was issued by President Marcos in the exercise of the power he
assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial
Law.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court can inquire the validity of Proclamation 1081.

RULING:
1. The detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law. As stated in the
1973 Constitution, under Section 3 (2) Article XVII, “all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be
part of the Law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after
the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
resolved, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or
other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular national assembly.”
In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared,
therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a
valid exercise pursuant to the President’s Order.
2. The court can not inquire about the validity of the proclamation because it is a
Political Question. In the case of Tanada vs. Cuenco, "Those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive
branch of the government."
The function of the Court is to check, not to supplant. The Court makes a determination
that the Constitution has vested the making of a final decision in a body other than the
Court. They have jurisdiction over the case but not over the specific issue.

NOTE: The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ
as to the persons referred to in this case. Of the 9 SC Justices, 5 declared the case as a
Political Question, not a Judicial Inquiry, since the case has become moot and academic.
Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic
objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion,
or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence.

TRAC: Was the proclamation valid?

T: Yes, the proclamation is valid.

MJ: As stated in the 1973 Constitution, under Section 3 (2) Article XVII, “all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or
done by the incumbent President shall be part of the Law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or
the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, resolved, or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by
the regular national assembly.”

MN: In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet
disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state.
The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence.

C: The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s Order.

4. The 1986 Snap elections

CASE:
Phil. Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, December 20, 1985
RELATED LAWS:
BP 883 / Cabinet Bill No 7: calls for national elections on Feb 7, 1986 for the offices of P
& VP of the Philippines.

Art 7 Sec 9: In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of
the President, the VP shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. The
Batasang Pambansa shall by law provide for the cases mentioned of the P and VP,
declaring what officer shall then become P & VP or the manner in which one shall be
selected. In case vacancy in the office of the president occurs before the election in
1987, the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as president until a Pres and VP
or either od them shall have been elected and shall have qualified. Their term of office
shall commence at noon of the 10th day following proclamation, and shall end at noon
on the 13th day of June of the 6th year thereafter.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs claim that BP833 is in conflict with the Constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the election.

ISSUE: Whether BP 833 is unconstitutional and the court must stop and prohibit the
holding of elections.

HOLDING: No. There are less than 10 required votes to declare BP 833 unconstitutional.
Thus, petitions are dismissed, writs are denied.

RATIO:
Teehankee, Concur: The cancellation of the elections can only aggravate the prevailing
crisis and the President may find it difficult to govern effectively. Political system that
calls an election and calls it off when the momentum has already built up will not be
taken by the people kindly. The president is seeking the judgment of the people and the
court cannot stand on its way. Such a vacancy arising from an incumbent of the
Presidential inspired by the desire to seek a fresh mandate from the people is a novel
situation that was not contemplated by the framers of 1981 amendments to the 1973
constitution.

Plana, Concur: Art 7 Sec 9 does not yield to the conclusion that BP 883 is
unconstitutional. Batasang Pambansa is not obliged by the constitution to sit and wait
until actual vacancy arises before it can enact necessary legislation.

Escolin, Concur: The petition is political in character. Judicial department has no

authority to determine the constitutionality of the acts of legislature/executive. The
jurisdiction of the court is the issue involved, not the provision which may be applied.
Given the circumstances and a statute that’s not clearly proven to violate the
constitution, the court should not prevent the electorate from giving expression to their
sovereign will.

Relova, Concur: The provision does not say that actual vacancy must exist on the day of
the election. Had the president not issued the letter of resignation, then the BP was
without authority to enace BP 883. Furthermore, so much time, money and effort have
already been spent. BP has passed the law and the president has approved it.

Gutierrez, Dissent: No official, no matter how high, is above the law. It is elementary in
the law of public office that no valid election or appointment can be made until such
position is vacant. I cannot accept the fictitious “vacancy” enacted by the President is the
vacancy referred to in the law. The president must first resign, let the Speaker of BP act
as president until a new president is elected. Snap elections to make executive
accountable to people are for parliamentary systems. Ours is a presidential.
De La Fuente, Dissent: “resignation” must result to a permanent vacancy. If the
president merely needed a vote of confidence, then the proper vehicle would be
“referendum”, not snap elections, or a constitutional amendment.

Alampay, Dissent: Appeals to what is claimed to be the present popular wish should
not assume any significance in the ruling of this court.

Patajo, Dissent: There is no vacancy. Constitutions do not change with the varying tides
of public opinion.

TRAC: wae labot kai political question ni.

Doctrine: The issue turned into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of
the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign
capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the
election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new
president.

5. The Cory Aquino revolutionary government

CASES:
Lawyer’s League v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986 (minute resolution)
(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by the SC

SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C.
Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs.
Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C.
Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is
claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the
reasons to be stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that
they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus
oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the
Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government
but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this
Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under
her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.----------------------------------------
--
DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
TRAC:

T: Yes it is a legitimate government.

MJ: The legitimacy of Aquino’s government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs

to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.

MN: And the people have made the judgment; they accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which

C: Aquino’s government is a legitimate government.

In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Renato S. Puno, A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29,
1992

FACTS:
1. Petitioner, Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, of the CA wrote a letter dated 14
November 1990, addressed to the court, for the correction of his seniority ranking in the
court of Appeals.

2. In 1980 Petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the CA

3. In 1983, CA was reorganized and became the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

4. In 1984 petitioner became an appointed government employee and has ceased to

become a member of the Judiciary.

5. In 1986 after EDSA Revolution, petitioner was recommended to return to the CA

as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and was assigned the rank of number
eleven (11).

6. On July 1986, appointments were signed and petitioner had a rank or number
twenty six (26), and showed that he had a lower rank compared to some of his juniors

7. Petitioner claims that the change in seniority ranking could only be attributed to
inadvertence for otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 33 that repealed BP 129

8. In A resolution dated 14 November 1990, Court granted Puno’s request. There

were no written opposition to or comment on petitioner’s aforesaid request. Puno’s
seniority rank is directed from 11 to 5.

9. There was a motion for reconsideration of this resolution dated November 29

1990.
10. It was contended that the present Court of Appeals is a new court established by
the revolutionary government and have no earlier appointments to the abolished
courts.

11. Petitioner claimed that even if the President rose to power by virtue of a revolution
she had pledged that no right provided under the unratified 1973 Constitution be
absent in the Freedom Constitution and th last sentence of Section 2 of EO No. 33
virtually reenacted the last sentence of Sec 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg 129.

ISSUE: Whether the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate
any claim to precedence for seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.

RULING: The Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
revolution and the Court of Appeals established under the EO No. 33 was an entirely
new court, having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts. This
negates any claim to precedence for seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the
previous abolished courts.

TRAC:

T: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC.

MJ: A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as
as sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence. A government as a result of people's
revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations
or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others

MN: The Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system, abolished by the
revolution and the Court of Appeals established under the EO No. 33 was an
entirely new court, having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished
courts. This negates any claim to precedence for seniority admittedly enjoyed by
petitioner in the previous abolished courts.

C: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution,
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") and
created the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily
tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of Former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.

EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the
power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP
Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27
July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendations on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a

search warrant captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The
raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other
items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry,
and land titles.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379 (“RA No. 1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth
Dimaano, the alleged mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other
income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public
office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint

because there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated, among others.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the
search and seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.”
Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue
of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were
“taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that
the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search
applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government
may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

Issue:
Whether or not the search at Dimaano’s home was legal.

Ruling:
The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.

Rationale:

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in
President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was
“done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“ The resulting government
was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal
limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during
the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine
Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over
of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate
the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.

The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
remained in effect during the interregnum.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy,
under the ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government,

assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the ICCPR to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each signatory State “to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”

The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that
“[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the
UDHR did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a UDHR, the Court has
interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the UDHR.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another matter and is not the issue here.
Suffice it to say that the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary international
law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international
law laid down in the ICCPR. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate
the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de
jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher
municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The
Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary
government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed
the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders
should not have also violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government
did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified
the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include
the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis
to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per
se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items,
merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.

TRAC: Was the revolutionary government bound by the Constitution.

T: The seizure of the items not included in the search warrant is illegal and void.

MJ: The directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the Supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during this interregnum, a person could not
invoke an exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
Constitution nor a Bill of Rights.

MN: In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the

warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described
in the warrant.
II. The 1987 Constitution
A. Definition; features; parts
B. Characteristics of a good written Constitution
C. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy
1. Unconstitutionality of law cannot be cured by reenactment

CASE:
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5,
2014

FACTS:

● Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and

placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles,
submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application
was accepted. She was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract and
was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. on June 26, 1997.
● Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr.
Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.”
● Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that: she was illegally dismissed; she
asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation
costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages; and identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign
principal.
● Sameer Overseas alleged that Joy’s termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her “failure to comply with the work requirements
of her foreign employer.” It also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of
P70,000 and added that Wacoal’s accreditation with petitioner had already been
transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific). Thus,
petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
● Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It
alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between them.
● The Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint. It ruled that her complaint was
based on mere allegations. Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. NLRC reversed LA’s decision.
● National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. It
found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were
just causes for termination. There was no sufficient proof to show that
respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with
 company requirements. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed
in terminating respondent. The National Labor Relations Commission did not
rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees. It also refused to entertain
the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. The National Labor
Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of
salary in the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000
withheld from her, and attorney’s fees of NT$300.
● NLRC denied Joy’s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
● The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC w/ respect to the finding
of illegal dismissal, her entitlement of 3 months worth salary, reimbursement
of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.
● Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND RULINGS: (related to the topic)

1. Whether Cabiles was entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract.

Yes, Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with
attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this
court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process. A statute or provision which was
declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.”

2. Whether the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is unconstitutional

Yes. The court was aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042
upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Republic Act No. 10022
was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the
clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s
termination from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by
Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
 However, the law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as
unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the

government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise.
The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in
light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with
the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of
law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The court was not convinced that the situation has changed so as to reverse a
binding precedent.

3. Whether the reinstated clause (limiting wages that should be recovered by an

illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months) violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.

Yes. Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of
“privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.” In creating laws, the legislature
has the power “to make distinctions and classifications.” In exercising such
power, it has a wide discretion. The equal protection clause does not infringe on
this legislative power. There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the
law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who
do not fall within the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection
clause prescribes a reasonable classification. A reasonable classification “(1)
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class.”

In this case, the reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable
classification. The adoption of the reinstated clause subjected the money claims
of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year
to a cap of three months worth of their salary. There was no such limitation on
the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term
employment.

OTHER ISSUES:
4. Whether there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal.

NO, Sameer Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer.
The employer must show adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause. Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for
termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be

shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship
against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and
workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and 3) the
communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.

In this case, Sameer agency merely alleged that Joy failed to comply with her
foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No
evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother
to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were
violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. There
was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards
against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. Thus, there was
no just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal.

5. Whether Sameer failed to comply with the due process requirements of notice
and hearing.

Yes, Sameer failed to comply with the due process requirements. A valid
dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of
dismissal. The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two
written notices before termination. One of the written notices must inform the
employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other
notice must “inform the employee of the employer’s decision.” Aside from the
notice requirement, the employee must also be given “an opportunity to be
heard.”

Sameer failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Joy
started working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July
14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month from her first workday.
She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her
termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was
properly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right
to due process of law was violated.
TRAC:

T: : The Constitution is supreme.

MJ: A law that has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court cannot be
cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same similar law provision.

MN: In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of

the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise.
The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in
light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity. Thus,
when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of
the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed
as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

C: The Constitution is Supreme.

2. Constitutional supremacy not an automatic excuse for non-compliance of treaty

CASE:
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a
treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada
with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the
U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . .
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

II. ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a
treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.
The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary
since Congress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require
the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA
to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the
sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up
to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations
under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.

TRAC:
T: Constitutional Supremacy is not an automatic excuse for non- compliance of
treaty.

MJ: Under 1987 Constitution Sec. 25 Art XVIII prohibits military bases and troops
or facilities in the country, except these conditions are met, (a) it must be under a
treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and (c)recognized asa treaty by the other contracting state.
MN: The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador
Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of
America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to
comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance
with the mandate of the Constitution.

3. Corollary concept: judicial supremacy

D. Self-executing vs. non-self-executing provisions

CASE:
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated
28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check
issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security
to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent
GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court
on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.
Issues:
1.Whether Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
2. Whether the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether the submission of matching bid is premature.
4. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in
refusing the matching bid

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is self- executing provision.

The Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.

2. Whether the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

The court agree, in its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While
it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of
the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are
accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and
the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

3. It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid
did the latter have a cause of action.

4. There was grave abuse of discretion.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.

TRAC:
T: It is self- executing provision.

MJ: A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liabilities imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.

MN: On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable.

E. Constitutional construction

CASES:
Title: Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

Doctrine: Principles of Constitutional Construction: (1) verba legis - the Constitution

must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed; (2)
ratio legisest anima - the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers; and (3) ut magisvaleat quam pereat - the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole.

Facts:
This is a consolidated case in relation to the second impeachment proceedings filed
against Chief Justice Davide.

The first impeachment complaint filed by the former President Estrada on June 2, 2003,
on the grounds of culpabale violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and
other higher crimes, was dismissed on August 5, 2003 by the House Committee for
being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks after or on October 23,
2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution.

The petitioners herein question the constitutionality of sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of

the House Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress for being contrary to Section 3(5) of
Article XI of our present Constitution or the one-year bar rule. Said provisions are as
follow:
Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of
the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such
official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one
(1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the
same official. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed
or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argued that

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term initiate does not
mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean to file because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of
the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit:
(1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; o
(2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or
(3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.

Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one-year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective
body, has yet to act on it.

Issue:
WON sections 16 and 17, Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, sections 16 and 17, Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional.
In construing the constitution, basis must be made according to the following principles
of Constitutional Construction.

1.) Verbalegis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. In the case of
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration the Court stated “We look to the
language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.”

2.) Where there is ambiguity, ratio legisest anima. The words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. Thus, in the case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary the Court ruled “A foolproof yardstick in
constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. xxx The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of
the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant
to that reason and calculated to effect to that purpose.”

3.) Ut magisvaleat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. In the

same case stated above, this Court affirmed that: “It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.”

In the case at bar, the word initiate must be interpreted to determine to be able to rule
on the constitutionality of Sections 17 and 18 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules.

Initiate, of course, is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,

to commence, or set going. As Websters Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language concisely puts it, it means to perform or facilitate the first action,
which jibes with Justice Regalados’ position, and that of Father Bernas’.

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be
pried from its records which expressly provides that the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus, when a proposal reached the floor proposing that a vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment
proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does. This resulted to the said line being deleted in the provisions of the 1987
Constitution.

Father Bernas, a member of the Constitutional Commission, further clarified that when
Section 3 (5), Article XI of the Constitution says, “No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year,” it means
that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of to initiate which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they
understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and
not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated
lawyers confuse it.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,
by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment

proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term initiate a meaning different from filing and referral.

Hence, they are unconstitutional.

TRAC: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year
bar provided in the Constitution.

T: Yes, it falls falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

MJ: In construing the constitution, basis must be made according to the principles
of Constitutional Construction. In the case at bar, the word initiate must be
interpreted to determine to be able to rule on the constitutionality of Sections 17
and 18 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules.

Initiate, of course, is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to

begin, to commence, or set going. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.

MN: In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against
the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.

Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012

Facts: Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the
evils of political pressure and partisan activities, 15 of the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and independent
body to recommend nominees to the President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial

appointment process, and

called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1)
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Pursuant to
the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each
House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by
rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An

eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. It has been the situation since then.

At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

Francisco I. Chavez, (petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight
(8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter
and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

(WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the

Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1)
member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution)

Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its basic sense, that it can only have one representative. The practical purpose of the
seven-member composition of the JBC is solution to stalemate voting.

Bicameralism of “Congress” refers to its legislative function in the government. The

Constitution is clear in the distinction of the role of each house in the process of
lawmaking.
In the JBC, since there is no need for a liaison between the Senate and House of
Representatives when nominating judicial officers. “Congress” must therefore refer to
the entire Legislative department. It is clear that the Constitution orders that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only.

Even though finding the current composition of the JBC as unconstitutional, all its prior
official actions are valid. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized under the doctrine of operative facts. These official actions are not
nullified.

…. more explanation:

● SEVEN members:

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to
justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to
use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people
through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC.
Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in

their participation in the JBC.

No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers.

Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system

By adding to the four (4) regular members,

Three (3) representatives from the major branches of government:

- The Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department),

the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department),

anda representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department).

The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition
to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.

--------------------
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC
Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,
which reads:

Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC
is intended to curtail (limit) the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of
judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC.

As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of
the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
appointment of judges.

Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which
could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear
violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution.

DISSENTING OPINION.LEONEN, J.:

To belabor the point: There is no presiding officer for the Congress of the Philippines,
but there is a Senate President and a Speaker of the House of Representatives. There is
no single journal for the Congress of the Philippines, but there is a journal for the Senate
and a journal for the House of Representatives. There is no record of proceedings for the
entire Congress of the Philippines, but there is a Record of proceedings for the Senate
and a Record of proceedings for the House of Representatives. The Congress of the
Philippines does not discipline its members. It is the Senate that promulgates its own
rules and disciplines its members. Likewise, it is the House that promulgates its own
rules and disciplines its members.

No Senator reports to the Congress of the Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the
Senate. No Member of the House of Representatives reports to the Congress of the
Philippines. Rather, he or she reports to the House of Representatives.

Congress, therefore, is the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress does not
exist separate from the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Thus, when the Constitution provides that a "representative of Congress" should

participate in the Judicial and Bar Council, it cannot mean a Senator carrying out the
instructions of the House or a Member of the House of Representative carrying out
instructions from the Senate.

It is not the kind of a single Congress contemplated by our Constitution. The opinion
therefore that a Senator or a Member of the House of Representative may represent the
Congress as a whole is contrary to the intent of the Constitution. It is unworkable.
To alternate the seat given to Congress between the Senate and the House of
Representatives would mean not giving a seat to the Congress at all. Again, when a
Senator is seated, he or she represents the Senate and not Congress as a whole. When a
Member of the House of Representative is seated, he or she can only represent Congress
as a whole. Thus, alternating the seat not only diminishes congressional representation;
it negates it.

TRAC: (2) Whether the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

T: YES

MJ: The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-
member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting.

MN: It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however,cannot be said in
the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC.

C: Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of
the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to
ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is
the Chairman.

The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of
Sec. 13, Article VII which declares:

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution.

Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par.
(2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The
provision relied upon by the respondents provides:

Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE No. 1: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB?

No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in
the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself,
to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise “any other office”
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means
“from office; by virtue of office.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office.” The additional duties must not only be
closely related to, but must be required by the official’s primary functions. If the
functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related,
inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet
official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of “any other office”
prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have
received from the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de

facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has
been held that “in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good
faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto,
is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action
recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of

the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

I. Elements of a state
A. People
B. Territory
1. Read Article I of the 1987 Constitution
CASE: Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011
(Archipelagic Doctrine)
I
Facts: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,

among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of
their particular arguments are as follows:

RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying
the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
Issues: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is
unconstitutional.

Rulings: No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to
Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not
to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime
zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic
waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further
stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and
subsoil and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS
III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international
family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or
diminution of territories.

Discussions: The provision of Art I 1987 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic
doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight
baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the
archipelagic doctrine.

TRAC:

T: No, RA 9522 is constitutional.

MJ: The provision of Art I 1987 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic
doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight
baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA
9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition
in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.

MN: The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for
the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the
international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect
like enlargement or diminution of territories.

2. The international law concept of association; “a state within a state”

CASE:
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of

pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with
the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were
held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.)
rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held
which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body,
it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands
of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has
the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-
AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as
―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other
hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE
was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the formulation of
the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD
violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by
Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the
Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the
Constitution and the laws.

HELD: The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it
does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives
of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information
under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a
mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at
all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public
disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both
provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on
matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State
to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing
legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these
freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between
the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a
public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching
orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to
conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly
provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a
need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace
process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying
principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be
defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but
by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the comprehensive peace
process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda
and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace
process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate
“continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more
than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the
National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information,
comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of
the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress
(PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and
concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of
the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes
petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the
MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners
assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government
under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing
some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would
be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different
provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties
actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3
on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is
in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a
structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period
of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the
―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the
still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of
―association in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international
law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context, that concept
of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative
in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to
enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the
ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on
any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among
other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even
the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with
the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already
requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the
following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15.
There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and
the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of
the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution
provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term ―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted,
the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in
relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the
2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are
automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present
components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion
therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in
the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned
in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State
recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development. An associative arrangement does not
uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the
associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally
been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent
with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended,
the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1,
2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it
virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws
will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process
is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

TRAC:

T: It is unconsitutional
MJ: According to the international law state within state is a concept that cannot be
done.

MN: In the case at bar, all elements of a state is present in BJE

C. Government
1. Definition
2. Functions
a. Distinctions: constituent vs. ministrant (Note: OUTDATED)

CASES:
ACCFA v. ACCFA Supervisors’ Association, G.R. No. L-23605, November 29, 1969

Facts: On Sept 4 1961, A collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the
Unions and ACCFA. Few months thereafter, the unions started protesting against alleged
violations and non-implementation of said agreement.

On October 25, 1962, the Unions, together with its mother union, filed a complaint with
the Court of Industrial Relations against ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of
Unfair Labor practice, namely the violation of the collective bargaining agreement
discouraging the members of the unions of their right to self- organization of which the
CIR ruled in favor of the petitioner union.

During the pendency of aforementioned cases, the President of the Philippines signed
into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), which among
other things required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) and changed its
name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA).

On March 17, 1964 the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers'
Association filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial
Relations (Case No, 1327-MC) praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agents for the supervisors and rank and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA, of
which the trial court certified both union as the exclusive bargaining representatives.
The ACA challenged the decision on the ground that it is engaged in governmental
function of which CIR has no jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the ACA performs governmental function

Held: YES. The implementation of the land reform program of the government
according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary,
function; and for that purpose, Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the
Land Reform Project Administration.

The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not

proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson
described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating
to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of
political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people—these letter functions being ministrant, the exercises of which
is optional on the part of the government

Rationale: It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted
and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes.
There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the
said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality, It
is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the
governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the
land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a
government office, -with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested
no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are
subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions
and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions
disappears.

Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration v. CIR, G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975

Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged
overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in
accordance with CA No. 444.
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence,
this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising
governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No.
444.
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

RULING: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of
the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of
its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant
consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency.
As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading
ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction
between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v.
Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow that just because petitioner is engaged in
governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond
the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that
petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear
the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden
would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have
required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that
one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for
astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground
certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

Legal Basis for the 2 cases

SC: The distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the
government has become obsolete. Such distinction has been blurred because of
the repudiation of laissez faire policy in the Constitution.

The government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the

increasing social challenges of times.

b. Parens patriae

CASES:
Government v. El Monte de Piedad, G.R. No. L-9959, December 13, 191

Facts: A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863.

Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the
relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The
Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned
the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the
$80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that
only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the
Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000,
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912,
and the costs of the cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to
question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending
that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by
their heirs.

Issues: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint

against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended
beneficiaries?

Discussions: In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being
the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce
such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with
such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back
the money intended for the people.

Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as
parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or
government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public
nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where
no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most
beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The
beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly
look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that
this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from
a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to
be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.
Cabanas v. Pilapil, G.R. No. L-25843, July 25, 1974

FACTS: Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the father of
Millian Pilapil, left an insurance having his child as the beneficiary and authorized his
brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower
court decided to give the mother of the child the right to act as trustee while her child is
a minor citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code. The welfare of the child is
the paramount consideration here, and the mother resides with the child so she is the
rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State parens
patriae, called for the mother to take responsibility. The defendant appealed for the
case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the
insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?

HELD: The decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. The
provisions of Article 320 and 321 of the
Civil Code became the basis of the decision. The former provides that “the father,
or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the
Court of First Instance." The latter provides that "The property which the
unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any
lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother
under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; ...
With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle,
without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test
of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent
consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as
an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest..
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity
to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to
the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more,
there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall
strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt
that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a
constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto
null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the
plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No.
2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

FACTS: The petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, the host off the television program, Ang Dating
Daan, made remarks that were found malicious. Two days before the MTRCB, separate
but almost identical complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other
private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo(INC), against petitioner in
connection with the petitioner’s remarks. After the preliminary conference in which
petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating
Daan for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. 1986,
creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of P.D. No. 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances in his television
show, Ang Dating Daan.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the utterance of the petitioner may be considered as a protected
form of speech.
2. Whether or not the television program may be subjected to suspension.

HELD:
1. Yes. The Court rules that the petitioner, in his utterance, cannot avail the
constitutional protection of free speech. The language of the petitioner was categorized
as indecent. The statements said by the petitioner were made in a medium accessible to
the children.
Under the clear and present danger doctrine, freedom of speech and of press
susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect.

2. Yes. The language of the petitioner that was made accessible to the children may lead
to failure of the government to protect and promote the welfare of the youth. The State
is mandated under Section 13 of 1987 Constitution to recognize and support the vital
role of the youth in nation-building

Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

Facts: Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie
got pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie gave birth.. Jenie
then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname,
Aquino.When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:

· Certificate of Live Birth

· AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography

· Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother

Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.Trial
court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was
unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father) which states that:

· “Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he

expressly recognizes paternity”

● Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any
express recognition of paternity.

Issue: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity

Ruling: Yes.

Rationale: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an

illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously
recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature
by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted
to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.

Legal Basis for Parens Patriae Cases

MJ: One important task of the State is to act for the State as parens patriae, or
guardians of the rights of the people.

MN: Govt. vs Monte Piedad: SC upheld the right of the government to file a case as
parens patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants:

Cabanas v. Pilapil - The State acting as parens patriae chose the mother of an
illegitimate child as against his uncle by his father who had expressly designated
the uncle.

Soriano v. Laguardia: The welfare of the children and the State’s mandate to
protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterance in TV
broadcast.

3. types of government: de jure vs. de facto

CASES:
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945 (by: Saysip, Regine Lea
P.)

Facts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance
of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case
which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto government.

Issues:
 1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the

Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General

MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before

them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

● Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a
de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the
military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine
upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International
Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the
territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents
of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not
look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for
authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the
powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and
such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage
of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of
courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a
conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in
force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or
 changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a
de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws
or make new ones.”
● General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his
proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
● If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese
military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue
said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a
foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape
upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in
case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings:

1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The

governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the

Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political
complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of
 the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not

only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well

as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements
and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de
facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and
valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again
into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not,
and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in
using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation,
to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international
law.
3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration

is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place,

in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into
his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War
states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And
Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be
said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will
for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial.
From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by
the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue
 local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.”
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary
pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.

MJ: According to the well-known principles of international law all judgements

and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto
governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before
and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the
titular sovereign. Law, once established, continues until changed by some
competent legislative power (not changed by mere change of sovereignty)

Peralta v. Director, G.R. No. L-49, November 12, 1945

Topic: Types of Government

Facts: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila

charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and
distribution of goods and other necessaries... was prosecuted for the crime of robbery

He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to

serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and
Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and
purposes of... which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America,
and therefore, null and void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law
created to serve... the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc

The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on
the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a
political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed
under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity,
according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case
is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said
Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the

Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be

a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without... due process of law.

Issues: The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the
law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ... summary procedure adopted for that
court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon the petitioner the
penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if
they were then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the
Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Ruling: "The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and

organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino
people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant
or the

Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese
military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation...
of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, 'under enemy duress,
a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was established on
October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor the
sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant
independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or
recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation
and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or
sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations."

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the
legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established in
International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered
state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of nations. The
authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority
and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the
ordinary courts and authorities of the... occupied district."
A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the
ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by
the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes,
or for the maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially
the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws
regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p.
349.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of
life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or...
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of
which petitioner was convicted.

In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and
it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.

TRAC:

T: Yes, habeas corpus should be granted.

MJ: It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate through the National Assembly of the so -called Republic of the
Philippines, Act No. 65, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses
by imprisonment, and to try those who are accused of crimes in the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction as an instrument of the Japanese-
controlled government.

MN: However, by the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration
of the Commonwealth Government the punitive sentence ceased to be valid as the
belligerent occupants also ceased to exercise power and control over the
Philippine territory.

The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the
military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good
and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration
therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Alcantara v. Director, G.R. No. L-6, November 29, 1945

FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release
of the petitioner on the ground that he was unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his
liberty by the respondent.
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious
physical injuries. Upon appeal, the CA of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified the
sentence to indeterminate penalty of 4mos and 21 days of Arresto Mayor to 3yrs, 9mos
and 3days of Prission Correccional.
The petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the ground that said court
was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by
Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices
constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in question

ISSUE: WON the court had jurisdiction over the case on the ground that said court was
created during the Japanese Occupation; and WON it has authority to hold sessions in
Baguio pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 3.

RULING: the court denied the petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and held
that the sentence served by petitioner has no political complexion (Political Complexion
is an act punished as a crime against the government). The court cited the case of Cham
vs. Valdez wherein it ruled “that the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the
Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese
regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial
acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of
the Commonwealth Government, except those with political complexion.”
This Court held that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese
occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and
was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into
several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in
each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected no substantial change in its
nature and jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by
the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments, the judgments of such court, like
those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, remain good
and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the
Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion.
Obviously, the .sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He
was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the
Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code Therefore, the sentence that he was serving is
valid and enforceable.

TRAC:

T: The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied having no political

complexion.
MJ: It has been held that the Constitution of the Commonwealth, being a political
law, was not effective in the Philippine during the Japanese occupation.

MJ: The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was not necessary because the
validity of the judicial proceedings was approved and under the Constitution
Commonwealth of the Philippines. The regular judicial tribunals of the occupied
territory continues and is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands because it is easier to preserve order through
the agency of the native officials, and also because the natives are more
competent to administer the laws of the territory.

Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947

TRAC:

T: The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code.

MJ: The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory

occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier.There is no
such thing as suspended allegiance.

MN: The change of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government
and same sovereign people.

Lawyer’s League v. Aquino, supra

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a
Quo Warranto case, praying for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

HELD: FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of
Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid
down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is . . .”

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but
EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused
and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at
that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by
Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod
na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this –
it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent
to resign is clear when he said “x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are
words of resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The
only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after transition period.
His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving
the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the president
which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion
of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75
which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which
states: “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S
NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.
Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is
the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President,
the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment
process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before
the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case
does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial
publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.

TRAC: Is the government of President GMA at the precise moment of her succession to
the Office of the President in February 2001 a revolutionary government?

T: NO, the government of President GMA at the precise moment of her succession
to the Office of the President in February 2001 was not a revolutionary
government.
MJ: A revolutionary government is established in derogation of the existing legal
order. It is extra-constitutional in the sense that it comes into being in complete
breach of the prevailing constitutional norms.

MN: In this case, the government of PGMA was established by way of succession
when the Office of the President became vacant upon the resignation of President
Estrada. This is in accordance with, and not in derogation of, the 1987
Constitution, which states that if the Office of the President becomes vacant, the
Vice President shall succeed as President.

C: Thus, the government of President GMA was not revolutionary.

TRAC: Was the situation of the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of EDSA People
Power 2 similar to the situation of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation when
we had two presidents, one for the de jure government and another for the de facto
government? (5 points)

T: NO, the situation of the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of EDSA People
Power 2 was not similar to the situation of the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation.

MJ: Under normal times when the presidential succession is in accordance with
the procedure enshrined in the Constitution, the government of the new
President is both de jure and de facto. On the other hand, when a state is under a
belligerent occupation, the government established by the belligerent occupant is
considered de facto while the rightful government, which is not in power in the
meantime, is de jure.

MN: In the case of the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of EDSA People
Power 2, we only had one government, which was both de jure and de facto, the
government of PGMA. It was de jure because it had legal title by virtue of a valid
succession under the Constitution. It was also de facto because it was in actual
control of the whole country. On the other hand, during the Japanese occupation,
we had two governments: the de jure Commonwealth Government and the de
facto Japanesesponsored government.

C: Thus, at that time we had concurrently two presidents—one for each

government. Thus, the situation of the Philippines in the immediate aftermath of
EDSA People Power 2 was not similar to the situation of the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation.

4. The Government of the Republic of the Phils.

5. “government” vs. “administration”

D. Sovereignty
1. Definition
2. types: legal vs. political sovereignty

Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

Doctrine: sovereignty as auto-limitation

Facts: To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second
World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions — inspired by
that grand political body, the United Nations — were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and
Bretton Woods.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties
governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body
administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.

Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding
member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the
Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new
opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty
associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country."

Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines —
and this is of special interest to the legal profession — will benefit from the WTO system
of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement
bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore,
trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived
at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak
and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and
(2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Issue: Whether or not the limitations provided in the WTO-GATT Agreement is
unconstitutional?

Ruling: No, the limitations provided in the WTO-GATT agreement is not

unconstitutional.

The law has provided that the Philippines has consented to the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation. A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopt the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity of all nations. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in
granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens.

In the instant case, WTO-GATT is a collection of treaties governing access to the

economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the
agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement. WTO-GATT is part of the
international law. The mere fact that the Philippines joined to the WTO-GATT results to
the country’s consent in waiving a portion of its sovereignty to the contents of the WTO-
GATT.

Hence, the limitations provided in the WTO-GATT agreement is not

unconstitutional.

4. doctrine of jus postliminium

CASE: Co Kim Cham v. Valdez, supra

FACTS: Petitioner Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese
military occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the liberation of
Manila, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on his case, citing that the
proclamation of Gen. Douglas McArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling
law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese military occupation.

ISSUES: Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese
military occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation by Gen. McArthur invalidates all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.

Whether or not if they weren’t invalidated by the general’s proclamation, could the
courts continue hearing the cases pending before them.

HELD: The governments by the Philippine Executive commission and the Republic of
the Philippines under the Japanese military occupation being a de facto government, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
government which are not political complexion were good and valid and by virtue of the
well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by American and
Filipino forces. According gto that principle in international law, the fact that a territory
which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, does not wipe out the effects done by an invader, which for
one reason or another it is within his competence to do. In the book of Isagani Cruz, the
right of postliminy says Vatel is that in which persons or things taken by the enemy are
restored to the former state on coming actually into the power of the nation to which
they belong. In the present concept now, it also imports the reinstatement of the
authority of the displaced government once control of the enemy is lost over the
territory affected. In short non-political acts performed during the occupation (civil
rights) remain valid even after the occupation but acts of political automatically lose
their validity upon the end of the occupation.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy that is issued to the
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering him to take cognizance and
continue the final judgment of the proceedings in civil case no. 3102 of the said court.

5. effect of suspension or change in sovereignty

CASES:
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, supra

Focus Topics: De Facto Governemnt; Government; Elements; State

FACTS
Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the
CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,
respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued
by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUES
I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation
were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation.

II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American
Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now
the proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces

HELD:
I. AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. If [the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission
and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were
de facto governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain
good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by
virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

II. NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.
[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in
said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
international law.

[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or

reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military
and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in
chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation, it is to be presumed that General
Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government
and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United
States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by
the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by
the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of
1907.

III. AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and
judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration
of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they
(the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to
be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion.”

From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is
restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to
continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACT: The Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernandio Guerrero discovered that the
documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies
had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the
newspaper La Nacion – edited by the respondent, Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated
Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the
Minsters of the Crown.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force and can be
applied?

HELD: No, Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is now not in force and cannot be
applied. As ruled by the Court, the Article 256 was abrogated by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines because it is inconsistent with the
democratic principles of the government. Hence, Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case.
Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982

FACTS: Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 2012 for lack of an
appeal. A project of partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the
parties thereto was petitioner Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was
adjudicated the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

The fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of
the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc, owned and managed by Judge Asuncion.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion
charging him with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491, par. 5 of the New
Civil Code, pars.1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of RA No. 3019, Section
12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. A
certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints. Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned
provisions.

HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act
Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities for next time.

Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein.
Respondent judge purchased the said lot after the decision rendered was already final
because no party filed for an appeal within the reglementary period which makes the lot
in question no longer the subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy
the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather from a Dr. Arcadio Galapon.
Petition is hereby DENIED.

Vilas v. City of Manila, No. 53, April 3, 1911 (220 U.S. 345)

Facts: The City of Manila as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property
rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action. There is identity
of purpose between Spanish and Americans charters and substantial identity of
municipal powers, area, and inhabitants.
Argument against liability: ayuntamien to of Manila was a corporation entity created by
the Spanish government, when the sovereignty of Spain ceased, municipality, ceased as
well. --> analogy to doctrine of principal and agent,
deathof principal=death of agent
Dual Character of Municipal Corporations:1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a
part of the sovereignty of the state 2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic
person. Stands for the community in the administration of local
affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental
powers are conferred. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is
no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as
a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession.
McKinley’s instruction: relinquishment or cession…cannot in any respect impair the
property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all
kinds…
Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals were safeguarded. The
cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity
survived both military occupation and cession.
The corporate identity and liability of the city was not extinguished.

Issue: Whether or not, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to the US,
followed by a reincorporation of
the city, present municipality liable for obligations of old city – YES

Ruling: The cases of Trigas and Vilas went off upon demurrers, and no question of
remedy arises. The appeal of Aguado is from a decree upon a final hearing denying him
all relief.
All three of the plaintiffs in error are entitled to proceed to judgment when they shall
establish their several claims is obvious. But in the Aguado Case it is sought to establish
his claim as a charge against certain property and funds
held by the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund. Aguado is, nevertheless, entitled
to a judgment. The designation of the city in the petition as trustee may be regarded as
descriptive. The debt having been incurred by the city, it must be regarded as a city
liability.
The decree in the Aguado Case must be reversed and the case remanded, with direction
to render judgment and
such other relief as may seem in conformity with law. The judgments in the Trigas and
Vilas Cases will be reversed
and the cases remanded, with direction to overrule the respective demurrers, and for
such other action as may be
consistent with law, and consistent with this opinion.

Government v. El Monte de Piedad, supra

Facts: When an earthquake struck Manila, Philippines in June 3, 1863, inhabitants of the
Spanish dominion paid for $400,000. to the Philippine Treasury for aid. After which,
there was an amount of 80,000 left; it was then invested to El Monte de Piedad Bank
which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. When the government tried to
withdraw the amount by virtue of Act. 2109, the bank can’t provide such. The
government filed a complaint, and to the banks defense claimed that the government
has subrogated Spain’s rights and that the Philippine government is not an affected
party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Further, the bank argues that the
government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending,
war between the United States and Spain ensued, later under the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, Philippine Islands was then ceded to the United States. With this,
Monte De Piedad further contended citing that the $80,000 were not included in the
treaty’s provision stating Spain relinquished “all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts,
structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with
law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain.”(1st
paragraph, Art.8, Treaty of Paris) and that the obligation of Monte De Piedad to return
the amount to the government, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty.

Issue:
1. If the Treaty of Paris provisions precluded the recovery of the amount of $80,000
from the bank to the government.
2. Whether the obligation of Monte de Piedad to return the $ 80,000 to the Government
was removed when Spain ceded the PH islands to the United States, as then claimed by
El Monte, not the proper party to maintain the recovery of the funds.

HELD:
1.) Right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the said amount must
be "other immovable property" mentioned in the treaty, but upon contractual
obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the U.S.
2.) No, although there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the
inhabitants of the ceded region. Vilas vs Manila (220 U. S., 345) And that all laws in force
which conflict with the political character, constitution, or institution of the substituted
sovereign, lose their force. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U.S., 167.) It is
equally settled in the same public law that great body of municipal law (national law)
which regulates private (civil Laws) and domestic rights continues in force until
abrogated or changed by the new ruler.”

If the laws pertaining to the recovery of the funds were political in character
of the new sovereign, they become inoperative. In the case at bar, the laws
conferring upon the government power to supervise and control special charities
are not in conflict with the political character of the United States, thus the right
party to maintain the recovery of the funds.

Further, the Philippine government was not a mere nominal party, because it was
exercising its sovereign function of powers and is seeking to carry out a trust devolved
upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the U.S.

Also, the only person who could claim to the damages by this payment to Monte, IF it
was unlawful are the donors or the cetuis que trustent (beneficiary of a trust);
consequently, the plaintiff was not a proper party to bring action.

Further, the only practicable course the government could take is to assume control of
the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. Impracticability
was not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain their
action; money given to charity became a public property only applicable to its specific
purpose, which was intended for, but within those limits allowed for public use , and
became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the
Philippine government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.)
To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound
public policy, as it tends to discourage such benevolent acts in the future.

II. Doctrine of state action

CASE:
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra

Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual
“strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to
accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale
may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in
refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it
was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the
elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for
it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in
the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always
open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing
to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute
the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the
subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.