ESTOLAS vs.

MABALOT (DAVID)

G.R. No. 133706

May 7, 2002

FACTS:

On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot located in
Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. Sometime in May, 1978, needing money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the
subject land to the petitioner for the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent, there was only a
verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting on the transfer, the DAR officials in Sta. Maria,
Pangasinan authorized the survey and issuance of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in
favor of the petitioner.

Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner redeeming the subject land and the case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform.

On July 8, 1988, the DAR’s District Office submitted an investigation report finding that respondent merely gave the subject land to
petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent and that the
money loan be returned to petitioner.

Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional Director
Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as
constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land.

CA ruled: The transfer of the subject land to petitioner is void; it should be returned to respondent. Respondent had not effectively
abandoned the property, because he tried to redeem it in 1981 and 1983.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent abandoned the subject property, thereby making it available to other qualified farmer-grantees?

HELD:

There was no abandonment and even if there was it could not be transferred to anyone other than the Government. PD 27
specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government
shall not be transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means.
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.

For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or
to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There must be an
actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being
appropriated by another.

Administrative Order No. 2, issued on March 7, 1994, defines abandonment or neglect as a “willful failure of the agrarian reform
beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any
specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two calendar years.” In the present case, no such “willful failure” has been
demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to claim dominion over the land.

Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The
proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed an abandonment, and that the subsequent
beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.

VERDE vs. MACAPAGAL

G.R. No. 151342; June 23, 2005

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitioner brought this case before the Court via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure whereas the proper remedy for him was to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals under
Rule 45 since the issue raised deals purely with a question of law. Nevertheless, as the subject petition was filed within the
prescribed fifteen-day period, and in view of the substantial issue raised therein, the Court gave due course to the same and treated
it as a petition for review on certiorari.

FACTS:

1. Macapagal and Estrella were the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of this dispute, situated in Bulacan. After their
demise, said piece of land passed on to their children (respondents herein) who are now the pro-indiviso owners of the same. On
the other hand, petitioner is the leasehold tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father, Francisco Verde, in the tenancy
thereof.

2. Respondents initiated an action for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in
Bulacan. Respondents alleged in their complaint that sometime in 1993, without their knowledge and consent, petitioner mortgaged
the subject land to dela Cruz upon the condition that the latter would be the one to work on 1/2 of said property. When confronted
regarding this matter, petitioner not only admitted that he had, indeed, mortgaged the subject land to dela Cruz but also asked for
forgiveness from respondents and assured the latter that he would pay them the agreed amount of rental. In addition, petitioner
purportedly guaranteed that he would redeem the mortgage immediately after the 1993 planting season and would never mortgage
the property again. Apparently, petitioner failed to fulfill his promise to respondents as dela Cruz still farmed the subject land in
1994. Respondents went on to argue that petitioners mortgaging the property to dela Cruz constituted abandonment which is a
ground for termination of agricultural leasehold relation under Section 8, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.

3. Respondent then brought the matter before the BARC of Bulacan for conciliation. However, proceedings before the BARC were
ineffective as the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Attached to the complaint was the joint sworn statement executed
by Sanciangco and Cruz who declared that in 1993, de la Cruz was the one who attended to ½ of the subject land by virtue of the
contract of mortgage between him and petitioner and that de la Cruz was still the one who cultivated the subject land in 1994.

4. Petitioner filed his Anwer denying the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that he only hired the services of de la
Cruz and the latter’s carabao because from 1993-1994, he did not have the means to own a beast of burden. He also stated that
from 1975 up to the filing of this action, he continues to occupy, possess and cultivate the subject land as a bona fide tenant.

However, Dela Cruz maintained that in 1993 to 1994, he was hired to work on the land tenanted by petitioner because during those
years, the latter did not have a carabao. For their part, Sayco and Cruz alleged that ever since the tenancy over the subject land was
transferred to petitioner by the death of his father, he had continuously farmed and possessed said property.

DARAB Ruling: After filing a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Provincial Adjudicator, respondents then filed an
appeal before the DARAB, which affirmed the earlier ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator that petitioner did not give up actually and
absolutely his tenancy right over the subject land as the complaint itself stated that petitioner was supposed to cultivate the
property during the 1993-1994 agricultural seasons and that the alleged mortgage must not be mistaken from personal loan, the
latter referring to borrowed money where defendant then was in dire need of financial help.

CA Ruling: Respondents filed an Appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision assailed, the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the DARAB. According to CA, Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 1199 prohibits a share-tenant from employing a
subtenant to work or furnish labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that there should
be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons
who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities. In the present case, as dela Cruz is clearly not a
member of petitioners immediate farm household nor did he depend upon petitioner for support or helps the latter in operating the
farm enterprise, the requirement of personal cultivation is obviously lacking.

Hence, the recourse was raised by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON because of the hiring by the petitioner of Dela Cruz’s services and that of his carabao, the agricultural lease relationship
between the parties in this case ceased to exist.

Case for Petitioner: Petitioner argues that (a)being a bona fide tenant of the subject land, he is entitled to security of tenure such
that he cannot be dispossessed of the land he had been tilling for around twenty years on the basis of mere conjecture and
hypothesis; (2) that the CA erred in reliance on the joint sworn statement of Sayco and Cruz; (3) that dela Cruz’s own affidavit
sufficiently refuted the allegations of the said joint sworn statement; (4) that as dela Cruz was supposedly a party to the alleged
contract of mortgage, the appellate court should have given credit to his affidavit instead of depending on the statements of
Sanciangco and Cruz; (5) that an agreement involving mortgage of real rights of a leasehold tenant must be reduced into writing
pursuant to the statute of frauds, otherwise, said agreement cannot bind third parties; (6) that respondents were not able to
substantiate their claim that he had abandoned the subject land more so since he continues to till the same; and (7) that under RA
No. 3844, the agricultural lessee is required to notify the agricultural lessor of his intention to abandon the leaseholding; wherein
this case, he claims that said notification is lacking.

Case for Private Respondent: Respondents contend that Petitioner’s intent to abandon the subject property was manifested when
he mortgaged the landholding to dela Cruz and allowed the latter to till said property from 1993 up to 1994 in contravention of Rep.
Act No. 1199 which limits personal cultivation of a tenanted land to the tenant himself and to his immediate household. Also,
respondents argue that Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, requires the agricultural lessee to provide the agricultural lessor with a
notice only in case of voluntary abandonment. However, as this case involves involuntary abandonment, the prescribed notice under
the law does not apply.

SC RULING with RATIO: NO. Under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 1199, a tenant is required to perform the following tasks: (1)The
preparation of the seedbed which shall include plowing, harrowing, and watering of the seedbed, the scattering of seeds, and the
care of the seedlings; (2) The plowing, harrowing, and watering of the area he is cultivating, except final harrowing of the field as an
item of contribution specified in Section thirty-two of this Act; (3) The maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies, and
irrigation canals in his holdings; (4) The pulling and bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their transplanting; (5) Care of the
growing plants; (6)

Gathering and bundling of the reaped harvest; (7) The piling of the bundles into small stacks; (8)The preparation of the place where
the harvest is to be stacked; (9) Gathering of the small stacks and their transportation to the place where they are to be stacked; and
(10)Piling into a big stack preparatory to threshing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the use of a carabao, for which petitioner
hired the services of dela Cruz, is only one phase of farm labor which is supposed to be rendered by a tenant. Cultivation does not
refer solely to the plowing and harrowing of the land. The fact that a tenant or an agricultural lessee for that matter employs farm
laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship provided an
agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Section 27(2) of Rep. Act No. 3844
permits the agricultural lessee, in case of illness or temporary incapacity, to avail himself of the services of laborers, incapacity being
any cause or circumstance which prevents the lessee from fulfilling his contractual and other obligations under the Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Decision of the DARAB dated 30 October 2000 is REINSTATED. No costs.

DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON

G.R. No. 171961. November 28. 2008.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals

FACTS:

1. Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of respondent Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
107576, situated in Capas, Tarlac.

The property was brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.

2. On June 8, 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was issued CLT No. 0-0362073 over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said
property.

3. On March 9, 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver
adjudicating among themselves all the properties left by both of their parents, except for the subject property, which was
adjudicated solely in favor of Amelia Quiazon.

4. On May 15, 1993, Amelia Quaizon filed a Complaint with the Provincial Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) against petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with her, by virtue of which
he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991, Ferdinand dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated
rental because he had already abandoned the landholding.
5. For this reason, Amelia Quiazon prayed for his ejectment from the property and the termination of their tenancy relationship

Procedural: 6. Provincial Adjudicator’s decision:

Provincial Adjudicator Romeo Bello dismissed the complaint based on his finding that the landholding had not been abandoned by
Feliciano considering that petitioner Renato dele Cruz, a member of Feliciano’s immediate family, was in actual and physical
possession thereof.

7. Amelia and her siblings filed an Application for Retention before DAR Regional Office Region 3.

DAR granted the application with an order to maintain in peaceful possession the tenants of the subject landholding.

8. DARAB:

It dismissed Amelia’s appeal from the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.

9. DARAB’s resolution:

DARAB set aside its first decision primarily based on the DAR Order granting granting the application for retention, as well as its
finding that Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz abandoned the subject landholding when they went to the U.S.A.

10. COURT OF APPEALS

It denied petition and motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ferdinand dela Cruz abandoned the landholding.

Case for Petitioner: They argued they have continuously cultivated the property.

Renato dele Cruz, a member of Feliciano’s immediate family, was in actual and physical possession and continued cultivating the
land. Case for Defendant:

Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz were already immigrants to the United States of America and that petitioner Renato dela Cruz, the
actual tiller of the land, was a usurper because his possession of the land was without the consent of the landowner. Amelia Quiazon
argued that by migrating to the U.S.A., Feliciano was deemed to have abandoned the landholding, for which reason his CLT should
now be canceled.

SC RULING WITH RATIO:

Ferdinand dela Cruz did not abandon the landholding.

Ratio:

Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) (b) an
external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.

The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the
interest that have been abandoned.

In the case, the immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the U.S.A. did not necessarily result in the abandonment of the
landholding, considering that one of his sons, petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land.

Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the land by the tenant (lessee) himself or with the aid of the
immediate farm household, which refers to the members of the family of the tenant and other persons who are dependent upon
him for support and who usually help him in the [agricultural] activities.

PETITION GRANTED

CLEMENTE DEQUITO V. VICTORIA LLAMAS

G.R. No. L-28090 (SEPT 4, 1975)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition to review by certiorari the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Bacolod City, in C.A.R.
Case No. 3469, Neg. Occ.-'67, entitled "Clemente Dequito vs. Victoria Llamas", which dismissed petitioner's complaint for
"Reliquidation and Damages".

FACTS

1. On July 3, 1962, petitioner filed a complaint for "Reliquidation and Damages" (CAR Case No. 3469) against private respondent
Victoria Llamas in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch 1, Bacolod City.

2. Plaintiff Dequito alleged that he was an agricultural share tenant for a period of nine (9) years of a one-hectare piece of land,
and in the crop year 1959-1960, an additional landholding of one-half (½) hectare was given him by defendant Llamas; that the
produce of the same land was divided 50-50, tenant- plaintiff furnishing all items of production and his labor, while defendant
contributed only her land;

that plaintiff cultivated 500 clumps of bamboos planted along his tenancy landholding on the agreement that plaintiff gets as his
share 10% of the gross sale of said bamboos; and that from crop year 1964, plaintiff was not paid 10%

that after the crop year 1961-62 defendant dispossessed tenant-plaintiff from the ½ hectare landholding that for many times
plaintiff had demanded from defendant a change in the illegal sharing basis of 50-50 to 70-30 and his 10% share of the gross sales of
bamboos, but defendant did not heed said demands;

that plaintiff obtained cash loans from defendant in the crop year 1961 to 1967, and that he had to pay usurious interests for said
loans in the form of palay;

that he suffered "mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation", thus entitling him to moral damages;

The plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff “short sharing," due him for 6 years; to order defendant to pay
him the cost of 120 cavans of palay representing plaintiff's failure to plant during crop years 1962-63 to 1966-67; to order defendant
to pay plaintiff 10% of the gross sale of bamboos; to order defendant to return the excess of one (1) cavan of palay as overpayment
of cash loan from crop year 1966-67,1963-64 to 1965-66,1961-62 to 1962-63, All amount plus "8% legal interest” computed from
the time the amount became due; to order defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as corrective or exemplary damages and P5,000.00
as moral damages, plus P1,000.00 as attorney's fees;

3. Defendant Llamas filed a motion to dismiss on the principal ground that plaintiff had already voluntarily surrendered his
landholding to defendant; that he admitted in his sworn affidavit dated June 1, 1967, "that the liquidation and the sharing basis was
in accordance with law; that all the improvements, rights and interest were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of
P700.00"

COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the Petition for Reliquidation and Damages. The
defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was as held "tenable and meritorious" on the following grounds: (1) that plaintiff (petitioner Dequito)
already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the defendant (private respondent Llamas) which is a lawful ground for
termination of tenancy relationship under Sec. 9, of Republic Act No. 1199; (2) that plaintiff Dequito had sworn under oath in an
affidavit that the liquidation and the sharing basis was in accordance with law; and (3) that all the improvements, rights and
interests were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00.

ISSUE: Did the petitioner voluntarily surrender the landholding to the defendant?

Case for Petitioner: Petitioner claims that the respondent Court of Agrarian Relations acted in grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of its jurisdiction by dismissing the complaint because plaintiff Dequito could not have in his affidavit dated June 1, 1967,
waived his rights to his claim as tenant, contrary to Article 6 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.

Case for Defendant: Plaintiff had already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to defendant; that he admitted in his sworn
affidavit dated June 1, 1967, "that the liquidation and the sharing basis was in accordance with law; that all the improvements, rights
and interest were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00"

SC RULING with RATIO: We are firmly convinced that petitioner never waived any of his rights as a tenant contrary to law, but rather
he declared under oath that the "sharing basis was in accordance with law", a plain and clear declaration of facts made in a public
document.
 Petitioner never questioned the authenticity of his affidavit of June 1, 1967, and did not for a moment raise any question on the
voluntariness of its execution.

The respondent Court observed the petitioner to be a literate person and one who could not have been deceived by the contents
of the affidavit which was written in a dialect he knows and understands and it could safely be presumed that when petitioner
signed the sworn statement he knew the meaning and import of all its contents.

What clearly appear in the affidavit are admissions or declarations against his own interest made by the petitioner when he stated
under oath.

Petitioner himself, in his voluntary executed sworn statement, the contents of which he fully understood, stated as a fact that the
sharing basis was in accordance with law. If petitioner now contends that it was not so, thus reneging on his own sworn admission of
the existence of a fact, then he must have perjured himself when he voluntarily and knowingly stated under oath that the sharing
basis was in accordance with law. We will not allow such perfidy to prevail because a party to a litigation must always come to court
in good faith and with clean hands.

If the petitioner miscalculated on the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary surrender of his landholding for an agreed
consideration, he must assume the consequences of his error. After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made admissions
and declarations against his own interest under the solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has
done. He cannot, even "with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live."

He ought to know that if he has rights to protect as a tenant, the landowner has also rights under the law. The protective mantle of
social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to hoodwink courts of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea
of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner. False pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in
a compassionate society.

The matter of loans with alleged usurious interest mentioned in petitioners' complaint, the same could be the subject matter of a
separate action if the claim is supported by signed memorandum or receipt of the loans as required by Sec. 20 of Act 3844 and the
provisions of the Usury Law.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is dismissed, and the Orders dated July 24, 1967, and September 1, 1967, of the respondent court dismissing
petitioner's complaint are AFFIRMED.

POLICARPIO and ERLINDA NISNISAN vs. CA, Spouses MANCERA

GR 126425 | August 12, 1998

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule45) assailing the CA decision affirming the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
Petition for reinstatement of tenancy holding filed by Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan.

FACTS:

Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan own a 4.9 hectare piece of land in Davao del Sur. They are the parents of Policarpio
Nisnisan (petitioner).

Since 1961, Policarpio has been cultivating one hectare of the land.

In April 1976, the father Gavino Nisnisan entered into a leasehold tenancy agreement with Policarpio Nisnisan, with a 1/3:2/3
sharing (the bigger share going to the son).

In December 1978, the father sold the whole 4.9 hectare land to the Spouses Mancera. As a result of the share, the spouses were
ousted from the land.

In 1982, Policarpio and Erlinda filed a petition with the RTC (CAR) for reinstatement of the tenancy holding. The Mancera spouses
countered that they had already voluntarily surrendered their landholding.

RTC Ruling – dismissed. It held that the affidavit of Gavino Nisnisan that the land was untenanted. Said affidavit was filed with the RD
and annotated on the TCT. Thus, this affidavit "shattered the claim of tenancy of Policarpio"
CA Ruling – affirmed. It affirmed the RTC adding that aside from the affidavit that was annotated, there was an earlier annotated
Affidavit of Non–Tenancy per Justice Circular 31. Furthermore, the CA gave weight to the assertion of the father Gavino in an
Affidavit that the alleged tenancy was fictitious and done only so that Policarpio can borrow from the Government's Masagana 99
program, which Policarpio didnt repay.

ISSUE: WON the spouses Policarpio and Erlinda have voluntarily surrendered their landholding.

Case for Petitioner: They have a contract of the tenancy agreement (in the dialect of Davao). Even assuming the land was sold, the
vendee should still respect and security of tenure of the tenants thereon, and thus they cannot be evicted except on lawful grounds
and causes.

Case for Respondent: It was fictitious. There are affidavits of Non–Tenancy annotated on the Titles. Further, it was voluntarily
surrendered.

SC RULING:

NO. There is no proof that the spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan have voluntarily surrendered their landholding.

AS held in Cuao vs CA, even an annotation of the Certification by a representative of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform is not
conclusive of the legal nature and incidents of the tenancy relations between the parties. It neither adds to the validity or
correctness of that certification nor converts a defective and invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties. These
certifications are merely provisional and not binding upon the courts.

Further, the spouses Policarpio have a document of the tenancy relationship. It clearly shows that the subject land is agricultural;
that petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate the same by planting rice thereon; and, that there is sharing of the
harvests between the said parties. It is of particular note that this evidence was never controverted by the father Gavino Nisnisan.
Hence, this strong piece of evidence cannot be overcome by a mere self–serving affidavit of Gavino Nisnisan, even if it is annotated
on the title.

Furthermore, the respondents practically admitted the tenancy relationship when they averred that the petitioners voluntarily
surrendered the landholding. On this score, they did not present any proof that Policarpio voluntarily surrendered the landholding,
other than their bare assertions. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses
against private respondents before the CAR militates against the private respondents claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily
surrendered their landholding to them.

Thus, the agricultural leasehold relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term or period in an agricultural
leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected for cause,
which, however, is absent in the case at bar.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: CA decision is modified in that the petitioners are declared tenants and AFFIRMED in all other respects.

BIENVENIDO T. BUADA, ISAIAS B. QUINTO, NEMESIO BAUTISTA, ORLANDO R. BAUTISTA, FREDDIE R. BAUTISTA, CARLITO O.
BUADA, GERARDO O. BUADA, ARMANDO M. OLIVA, ROGELIO F. RAPAJON, EUGENIO F. FLORES, Petitioners, vs. CEMENT
CENTER,INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 180374 January 22, 2010

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which granted Cement Center’s Petition for Review and
nullified and set aside the decisions of the Regional Adjudicator and of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) dismissing the
Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages filed by Cement Center.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners were tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by Cement Center.

2. Cement Center filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages against petitioners with the DARAB. It
claimed that petitioners entered into a Compromise Agreement with Cement Center whereby the former, for and in consideration
of P3,000 each, voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite Cement Center’s repeated demands,
petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.
3. Petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
They claimed that:

a. Cement Center induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that the subject landholdings are no longer viable
for agricultural purposes.

b. Cement Center assured them that they would only apply for the conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the
land only upon the approval of said application and that thereafter, they will each be paid a disturbance compensation.

c. Cement Center promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. But, should the application
for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants and could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.

PROCEDURAL:

Regional Adjudicator Ruling: Case dismissed. The Compromise Agreement was not enforceable because it violated the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 12, which requires the payment of disturbance compensation which should not be less than five times the
average of the annual gross value of the harvest on their actual landholdings during the last five preceding calendar years. The
disturbance compensation of P3,000 being offered by Cement Center to each of the petitioners is grossly inadequate. Cement
Center likewise did not offer homelots to the petitioners as required under the aforesaid order. Since Cement Center’s application
for conversion was denied, then the purpose for the execution of the Compromise Agreement was rendered nugatory. As a
consequence of the denial of the application, the subject landholdings shall be placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) compulsory coverage, as provided under the Administrative Order No. 12.

(Cement Center appealed to the DARAB).

DARAB Ruling: Appeal denied. Cement Center failed to prove that petitioners voluntarily surrendered their tenancy rights over the
subject landholdings. Since the application for conversion was denied, then the Compromise Agreement is not a perfected
obligation; it is as if the petitioners’ voluntary surrender never existed.

(Cement Center filed a Petition for Review before the CA)

CA Ruling: Petition granted. The Compromise Agreement executed by the parties is valid. Its enforceability is not subject to the
approval by the DARAB of Cement Center’s application for conversion.

Likewise, the deficiency in consideration is not a ground to annul an otherwise valid and enforceable agreement. Petitioners are
found to be literate on the ground that they were able to affix their signatures to the agreement.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners as tenants-farmers intended to absolutely and voluntarily surrender their tenancy rights over the
subject landholdings.

Case for Petitioners: They did not execute the Compromise Agreement with a view to absolutely sell and surrender their tenancy
rights in exchange for P3,000.00 for each of them. The agreement was subject to suspensive conditions, i.e., the approval of Cement
Center’s application for conversion of the land to non-agricultural and their subsequent absorption as laborers in the business that
Cement Center will put up on said land, or, if the application will not be approved, petitioners will continue to be tenants of the land
and could later on qualify as beneficiaries of the CARP. They were not aware that these conditions were not incorporated in the
Compromise Agreement because they were not literate in the English language used. Neither were they represented by counsel nor
were the contents of the agreement explained to them. The Compromise Agreement should be interpreted in accordance with the
real intention of the parties pursuant to Articles 1370 and 1371 of the Civil Code. Since they are illiterate in the English language,
they could not have given their valid consent to the Compromise Agreement. The disturbance fee of P3,000.00 for each tenant
violates Administrative Order No. 12.

Case for Cement Center: Petitioners voluntarily surrendered their landholdings. The Compromise Agreement does not reflect the
conditions alleged by petitioners. Parol evidence should not be allowed to prove such conditions; that petitioners cannot claim that
they are illiterate in the English language and that the contents of the agreement were not explained to them as it is incumbent
upon every contracting party to learn and know the contents of an instrument before signing and agreeing to it; and, that it was not
necessary for petitioners to be assisted by counsel in signing the agreement as the execution thereof is not akin to a custodial
investigation or criminal proceedings wherein the right to be represented by counsel is indispensable. As to the disturbance fee, the
sum of P3,000.00 for each tenant is fair and sufficient because apart from said amount, petitioners were allowed to cultivate the
lands for a single cropping without any obligation to pay any lease rental in the form of palay or cotton harvest or any other mode of
payment.

SC RULING with RATIO: NO. The Compromise Agreement did not constitute the "voluntary surrender" contemplated by law. Cement
Center failed to present evidence to show that the disturbance compensation package corresponds with the compensation required
by the said Administrative Order. Neither was there any showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five times the
average annual gross value of the harvest on petitioners’ actual landholdings during the preceding five calendar years.

Moreover, it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their sole source of livelihood. There was
likewise no showing that the money was indeed advantageous to petitioners’ families as to allow them to pursue other sources of
livelihood. To stress, tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must be
convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices.

The evidence on record and Cement Center's arguments are insufficient to overcome the rights of petitioners as provided in the
Constitution and agrarian statutes.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decisions of the Regional Adjudicator and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board dismissing
respondent’s Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Garchitorena vs. Panganiban

FACTS:

1. Garchitorena (petitioner) is the owner and landholder of a farm land in Camarines Sur. He filed a petition for permission to
transfer its tenants (respondents) or eject them because he sought to convert the portion being occupied from palay to pasture land
and because the respondents have not paid their rent.

2. At the lower court, the respondents were declared in default. However, the order of default was lifted because the subject land
has not been proven to be within the perimeter recommended for grazing land and the respondent judge found that the failure to
pay rentals was not deliberate.

ISSUE: whether or not ejectment is proper?

Case for Petitioner: Petitioner wants to convert the use of the land from agricultural to pasture land by either transferring or ejecting
the tenants.

Case for Respondent: Failure to pay rentals was not deliberate.

SC Ruling: The Court remanded the case back to the lower court to determine the feasibility of transferring the tenants to other
portions suitable for agricultural land. However, the Court reversed the annulment of the order of default and allowed petitioner to
convert the land into pasture land.

Ration: If the non-payment of rentals were due to a poor harvest owing to an extraordinary event or an unusual act of God, the
refusal of His Honor, respondent Judge, to order the ejectment of the other respondents upon the ground that their omission was
not deliberate would be justified. However, when said omission takes place for several years and the land normally has a poor yield,
by reason of the condition of its soil, as it is in the case at bar, said refusal has the effect of authorizing the respondents to hold the
land for life, or, at least, indefinitely, without giving the owner or landowner any share in its produce, thus virtually depriving him of
one of the attributes of ownership, which is the enjoyment of the possession and use of the thing owned, as well as of the products
thereof. Our Constitution and tenancy laws do not countenance such result. To begin with, the same amounts to a taking of private
property for private use and without compensation. Secondly, the principle of social justice cannot and should not be so construed
as to violate the elementary principles of justice and bring about a patent injustice. Thirdly, if the land in dispute is as poor for
agricultural purposes as it is, the continuance thereon of respondents herein would tend to perpetuate their precarious condition,
instead of promoting their well-being and economic security, which is the immediate objective of social justice. It is to the best
interest, therefore, of said respondents that they be transferred to lands that may offer them and their families a better future.
FELISA R. FERRER, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO CARGANILLO, SERGIO CARGANILLO, SOLEDAD AGUSTIN and MARCELINA SOLIS,
respondents G.R. No. 170956. May 12, 2010.*

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the CA

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EJECTMENT WILL PROSPER

FIRST DARAB Case No.7862. YES

Domingo Carganillo apparently sublet the subject landholding to his brother because he was applying for work abroad without the
knowledge and consent of the Complainant.

PARAD Ruling -> in favor of Carganillo because Complainant failed to prove by convincing evidence the truth of her allegations.

DARAB Ruling -> Affirmed Parad

CA -> Affirmed

SC -> Reversed, Petitioner has sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence the fact of subleasing. The evidence presented
were: 1) Photocopy of an Investigation Report saying that there was a sublease; 2) Affidavit of Clarion saying that she knew for a fact
that Carganillo mortgaged his tenancy rights to his brother. In view thereof, Domingo and Sergio should be dispossessed of the
agricultural landholding in violation of RA 3844 Sec 36. “xxx Except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executor if after due hearing it is shown that: xxx (7) the lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding
in violation of the term of paragraph 2 of Section twenty seven.”

SECOND DARAB CASE NO. 7863. NO

Tenant Isabelo died. During his lifetime, he subleased the said landholding to Soledad without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant.

PARAD Ruling -> Dismissed complaint.

DARAB Ruling -> Dismissed the appeal

CA -> Affirming DARAB

SC -> Petitioner has not established her claim of sublease. No evidence was presented pointing Soledad or even stating the name
Soledad in any of the pleadings. As the agricultural lessor(Ferrer), she has the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. The evidence presented were uncorroborated and unsubstantial.

THIRD DARAB CASE NO. 7864 and 7865. NO

For 7864, Tenant Marcelina is the successor of Pedro(first tenant). When Pedro died Marcelina took over the cultivation of the 14k
m2 without the knowledge and consent of the complainant. During the lifetime of Pedro, he failed to pay the lease rentals for 3
consecutive years. Hence the case for ejectment against Marcelina.

For 7865, Irene Aguinaldo and Ferrer(complainant) co-owned a 6.8k m2 landholding tenanted by Marcelina. Ferrer averred that
Marcelina has not fully paid the rental for the use of the land on the third cropping season. Hence this other case of ejectment
against Marcelina.

PARAD RULING -> Dismissed both for lack of merit and evidence

DARAB and CA Ruling -> Darab dismissed, which was confirmed by CA

SC -> With respect to 7864, dismissed the appeal of Ferrer because the petition stated that she was the landowner even in the
certification of non-forum shopping, However, it appears in the PARAD records that the owners of the subject 14k m2 agricultural
land are Pajarito, Madolora, Lagado. Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with respect to the first case against
Marcelina. Thus for failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing party with respect to the said case, the appeal must be dismissed. Such
failure however does not affect the appeal in the 3 other cases Felisa filed as owner/co-owner of the landholdings subject of the said
3 other cases.
SC -> With respect to 7865, Ferrer alleged that the landholding in question is principally devoted to the planting of palay three times
a year. However, Marcelina did not deliver her share in the third cropping. Ferrer did not present any evidence to establish her claim
that the subject agricultural land can regularly support a third cropping. Neither did she present evidence to establish that their
leasehold agreement includes a provision on third cropping. Hence, her allegation of non-payment of the leasehold rentals for the
third cropping likewise finds no support in evidence.

WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition.

1. In DARAB Case No. 7862, we hereby AUTHORIZE THE DISPOSSESSION of respondents Domingo and Sergio Carganillo from the
subject landholding.

2. In DARAB Case No. 7863, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Soledad Agustin for failure of the petition
to establish her claim.

3. In DARAB Case No. 7864, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Marcelina Solis for failure of the petitioner
to establish her claim and to properly indicate the appealing party in violation of Section 4 in relation to Section 5 Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

4. In DARAB Case No. 7865, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Marcelina Solis for failure of the petitioner
to establish her claim.

SO ORDERED.

ZURBANO vs ESTRELLA (1985)

Facts:

1. PD 27 (October 21, 1972), decreeing the emancipation of the tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring the
ownership of the land they till.

2. Petitioners challenged the validity of the Letter of Instruction from the President directing the Minister of Agrarian Reform
to “undertake to place under the Land transfer Program of the government pursuant to PD 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with
areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares will
aggregate areas or lands used for residential commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families”, on the ground that

a. it is class legislation and, therefore, violative of the equal protection guarantee;

b. that it is “a form of tyrannical imposition by a strong and powerful state” and, as such, violative of the due process clause;
and

c. that it would as applied to petitioners, be a taking of private property without just compensation.

3. Petitioner-spouses are owners of agricultural lands, with 6 parcels planted to coconuts, 56 hectares in are and 2 parcels of
Riceland, 1.86 hectares in size.

4. The 2 parcels of Riceland were being included in the Land Transfer Program.

5. Dir. Pejo (Minister of Agrarian Reform) denied that the Letter of Instruction assailed is unconstitutional, setting forth its
background as an implementing measure of PD 27, the validity of which is not in doubt.

SC: DISMISSED.

1. There is no legal basis for declaring Letter of Instruction No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due process and
taking of private property without just compensation grounds.

2. The Constitution decrees no less than the emancipation of tenants, and there are safeguards therein to assure that there be
no arbitrariness or injustice in its enforcement. There are, moreover built-in safeguards to preclude any unlawful taking of the
private property.
BENIGNO CASTRO, ET AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Herein petitioners were previously tenants of respondent but were terminated dues to mechanization; respondent hired herein
petitioners for contract of service. In which petitioners signed. Respondent has claim that petitioners have started to cultivate
different portion of lands owned by respondent Candido baron without his permission. The petitioners filed a motion praying that
they be considered as tenants. Due to this respondent filed his answer with counter-claim praying for the issuance of an
interlocutory order immediately restraining the plaintiffs (petitioners) from disturbing the peaceful possession, enjoyment and
administration of defendant's landholding.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners may still be considered as tenants.

Held: The court in resolving the case cited the ruling of the court of appeals as follows, Plaintiffs testified that they used to sign the
contracts they executed 'together' at the place of defendant and this fact is supported by the contracts they executed all dated May
15, 1972, which they admitted to have signed. This proves that the contracts were being executed with their full knowledge and
awareness knowing they represented their agreement.

There was no evidence adduced by any or all of the herein plaintiffs that they objected to the terms and conditions of the contracts
they signed, nor of the fact that they were signing from year to year contracts in name only, and which allegedly were never
enforced because the 50-50 sharing arrangement was followed. It is unthinkable to this Court that a landowner whose land is under
administration and mechanization would ever agree to subvert his own contracts to his prejudice and actual loss. Evidently,
defendant, who had ejected some of the plaintiffs, could not have intended them to become tenants again after they agreed in
writing to be mere hired laborers.

2. G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,

Facts: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the
P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, they also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O
No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection.
They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive
orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which
was denied to the petitioners. In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy
their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

Issue: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

Held: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police power and
the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the
compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or
the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.

LUZ FARMS v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Facts: In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines. It includes the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its
coverage. In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39 of the said law.
Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of certain sections of RA 6657, of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under RA
6657, and of the IRR of Section 11. It prays that the aforesaid statutes be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law should include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage.

Held: No. It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage
of the agrarian reform program of the government. The intention of the Committee was to limit the application of the word
“agriculture”. Thus, Section II of RA 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforesaid agro-industrial activities are made to
be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY v. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD

Facts: On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College,
now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap"
wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty
members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they
paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship between
the lessees and the CMU.

When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as
tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for
distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the
condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue: Whether or not the Central Mindanao University land is covered by CARP.

Held: No, the land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when and what lands
are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's
present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively
exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and
academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.

ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA v. HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA

Facts: Petitioner challenges in this petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order the validity and constitutionality of Letter
of Instructions No. 474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 enforced by the then Minister and the Regional Director of
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and likewise seeks the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0046145 issued to Domingo
Paitan by the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

The records show that petitioner Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland which was tenanted by husband of private respondent
herein under an agricultural leasehold agreement. On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold
agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure to do the tilling and cultivation of the riceland due to
his long illness; and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties. On June 2, 1978, the former Presiding Judge of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the case to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as
to whether or not it was proper for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316 but said office failed to act upon the request
for certification, for a period of more than three (3) years. Instead on July 10, 1980, the Riceland was placed under the Land Transfer
Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, which implemented Letter of Instructions No. 474, which placed
all tenanted ricelands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas under the Land Transfer Program of the government. On July 10, 1980, a certificate of Land Transfer was
finally awarded in favour of Domingo Paitan. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to Magana but were
deposited instead with the Land Bank and credited as amortization payments for the riceland.

Issue: Whether or not mere issuance of a certificate of land transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee.
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, and Letter of Instructions No. 474 is Constitutional.

Held:

The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee of the land described therein. At most, the
certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms
for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition
permanent nor irrevocable.

This Court has therefore clarified, that it is only compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer grantee to an
emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become
fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. At best the farmer/grantee prior to compliance with these
conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.

The promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already
been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it in that issue. As for the power of President
Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

The issue of the constitutionality of the taking of private property under the CARP law has already been settled by this Court holding
that where the measures under challenge merely prescribe the retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power
by the government, but where to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, then there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative.

Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative
bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.

ROXAS & CO., INC., v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these
haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Petitioner Roxas
& Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda
Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda
Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T44664 and T-44665.·202 On May 6, 1988,
petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda Caylaway but the sane was denied.

Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use but the petition was likewise
denied.

Issue: Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should observe due process.

Held: For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to
a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested
parties; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps designed to comply
with the requirements of administrative due process. The taking contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise
of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.