Republic of the Philippines At about 10:30 that evening, while her brothers and her sister were already

her brothers and her sister were already asleep,

SUPREME COURT she was awakened because a knife was pointed at her. They were then sleeping at
Manila the sala of the house. Aside from the knife pointed at her, she felt her breast being
mashed. While the knife was being pointed at her and her breast being mashed,
she was told that if she makes any noise or if she told anybody they would all be
THIRD DIVISION
killed including her aunt. She recognized the person to be the accused, Endriquito
Reynaldo, as she was familiar with his voice and his two hands which were hairy.
  After having mashed her breast, still pointing the knife at her, he dragged her to
their room and ordered her to take off her clothes. He was pointing the knife at the
right side of her body somewhere on the right waistline. When she was inside the
G.R. No. 116305 July 2, 1998 bedroom and was ordered to take off her clothes, she was very much frightened
and did not seem to know what to do. She was lying down when she was told to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, take off her clothes. Then the accused laid on top of her while pointing the knife
at her. He was then naked. While he was on top of her he inserted his penis inside
her vagina. She lost track of what was happening and she become unconscious.
vs. When she regained her consciousness the accused was gone. She noticed a
whitish and sticky substance at the side of her vagina. She felt her body aching
ENDRIQUITO REYNALDO alias QUITO, defendant-appellant. including her breast, stomach and vagina. She went to sleep after that. The
following morning she washed her clothes, took a bath and cleaned the house.

At about 12:00 o'clock while they were having lunch, her aunt Josefina Nobleza,
who was looking after them since their parents were in Manila came over. She
KAPUNAN, J.: was crying and her aunt asked her what it was about and she told her aunt about
what happened to her and the person responsible for it, naming the accused,
This is an appeal from the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Sixth Endriquito Reynaldo. After she informed her aunt about it, her aunt went to the
Judicial Region 25 in Criminal Case No. 31084 finding accused Endriquito Reynaldo alias "Quito" Police that May 29, 1987, while she went to her grandmother's place as she had a
guilty of the crime of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify very bad headache from her failure to sleep the night before. Her aunt returned
the complainant Anacyl Barrera in the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and to pay costs. 1 from the Poblacion with policemen and arrested the accused who was living with
her sister a house away. The accused was brought to town while she was brought
to the hospital for medical examination and later brought home.
On the basis of a complaint dated May 29, 1987 2 filed by the victim Anacyl Barrera, an Information
dated October 23, 1987, 3 was filed against accused-appellant, as follows:
She filed a complaint in connection with the said incident against the accused in
the Municipality of Miag-ao specifically with the Municipal Court (Exh. "A" and
That on or about May 28, 1987, in the Municipality of Miagao, Iloilo, Philippines, "A-1"). She gave a written statement when investigated (Exh. "B" and "B-1" and
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Exh. "B-2").
with the use of a knife and by means of force and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge
with Anacyl Barrera, a girl 16 years of age, against her will and/or consent. Three days after the incident her parents from Manila arrived as they were
notified. She told them of the incident and informed them that it was the accused
who raped her. She was examined at the Guimbal General Hospital, Gimbal,
CONTRARY TO LAW. Iloilo.

At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4 On cross-examination, complainant testified that the accused is single as it is the
wife of Bernardo Mondana who is the sister of the wife of her uncle. Their house
The trial court summarized the testimony of sixteen-year old Anacyl Barrera as follows: at Barangay Bambanan is one story, a one-room bamboo and nipa house
surrounded by a bamboo pole. Before they went to sleep that night she inspected
all the doors and windows and they were locked and they slept on the sala with
She knows the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo already before May 28, 1987, as the her brothers and sisters. She was on the outer-most portion near the door, also
wife of her uncle is the sister of the wife of the accused. Accused had been living near her brothers and sisters. They were under a mosquito net. She was able to
in Barangay Bambana, Miag-ao, Iloilo, for a long time already. She knows the identify the accused because she touched his hand and his face when she was told
accused for about 7 years before May 28, 1987. to take off her clothes. The room where she was brought was very near the place
where they slept and she did not resist because the accused was constantly
On the evening of May 28, 1987, she was inside their house at Barangay pointing the knife about a foot long at her. She was inside the room when she was
Bambanan, Miag-ao, Iloilo. She was together with her two brothers, eleven and required to take off her clothes without resistance as the four of them would be
eight years old, and a nine year old sister. She was then fifteen years old going killed.
sixteen.
 He laid on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina which was able to WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ENDRIQUITO REYNALDO guilty
penetrate her. She felt pain in her vagina at the inner part and she lost beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and punished under Art.
consciousness because of pain. When she regained consciousness accused was 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
seated by the side telling her not to tell anybody or else he would kill all four of of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law.
them. The following morning she felt the pains on the inner part of her thighs and Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the complainant Anacyl Barrera the sum
on both sides of her vagina. She, her sister sad two brothers were the only of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay costs. Accused is
occupants of the house. Her aunt Josefina Nobleza looked after them who usually credited in full of the period while undergoing preventive imprisonment provided
comes in the morning. On that morning of May 29, 1987 she came over but she he agrees in writing to conform with prison regulations regarding convicted
stayed for a short time only. She did not inform her aunt of what happened to her prisoners laid down by prison authorities. 11
that morning neither her brothers and sister. Her aunt came back about lunch time
because her brother informed her aunt about it. Her aunt changed clothes and
In the instant appeal, appellant contends that:
went to the Poblacion. She later came back with four policemen who went around
the house to find out the damaged portion. Her aunt informed them of the identity
of the rapist to be the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo, so that the accused was THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
arrested because she had already told the policemen when she went to the IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF
Poblacion. She was investigated by the Policemen and confirmed the statement of THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
her aunt that it was Endriquito Reynaldo who raped her. 5 REASONABLE DOUBT. 12

Dr. Alberto G. Gatusang conducted the physical examination of the complainant on May 29, 1987 and Appellant points to alleged contradictions in the testimony of the complainant regarding her
made the following findings: identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant asserts that while the
complainant testified on direct examination and cross-examination that she was able to identify her
attacker by his voice and seeing his hairy arms as well as the beard on his face, on further cross-
Internal Examination
examination, the complainant testified that she was able to recognize her assailant as she touched his
hand and his face.
= No laceration or hematomas noted at the vaginal opening.
Complainant testified on direct examination as follows:
= Presence of whitish discharge at the vaginal canal.
Q Because you were awakened at that time, did you
= Admits 1 finger inside the vaginal canal with resistance. recognize the man?

x x x           x x x          x x x A Yes, sir.

REMARKS: Vaginal smear for presence of sperm = Q Who was that man?

(-) negative findings. 6 A Enriquito Reynaldo. 13

Dr. Gatusang testified in court that the fact that the vagina of the victim bore no lacerations or Q You said Endriquito Reynaldo. The one whom you
hematomas did not discount the possibility of the rape having occurred. The whitish discharge found on identified a fe(w) moments ago?
the victim's vaginal canal may either be semen or the victim's natural discharge. The fact that the victim
complained of pain and her vaginal canal offered resistance when a finger was inserted into it could
A Yes, sir.
mean that there was partial or full penetration of the labia minora. 7 Dr. Gatusang further testified that
the absence of sperm in the victim's vaginal canal may be due to the victim's having cleaned herself after
the incident or the possibility that ejaculation happened outside the vaginal canal. 8 Q Can you again point to where he is inside the courtroom?

Appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the defense of alibi. He alleged that at the A (Witness pointing again to the same person inside the
time of the incident, he was with a certain Rogelio Norada at the latter's house in Barangay Kirayan, and Courtroom who upon being asked identify [sic] himself as
slept there for the night, leaving only the following morning to peddle fish in Barangay Tikdalan. 9 He Enriquito Reynaldo.)
arrived at his house at two o'clock in the afternoon, where he was later arrested by policemen bearing a
warrant. 10
Q Because that was already ten o'clock in the evening, can
you tell the Court how were you able to identify him?
The defense also presented Rogelio Norada to corroborate appellant's alibi.
A Through his voice.
In a Decision dated October 29, 1991, the trial court convicted appellant as follows:
 Q You are familiar with his voice? A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.) 16

A Yes, sir. We agree with the Solicitor General that the alleged contradictions in the testimony of the complainant
pointed to by appellant are "more imaginary than real" 17 and do not detract from the credibility and
trustworthiness of the complainant's positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Q Aside from his voice, (by) what other means were you
As discussed by the Solicitor General:
able to identify him?

. . . The testimony of private complainant as to how she was able to identify

A Through his two hands which were hairy. (Emphasis
appellant on that fateful evening of May 28, 1987 must be taken according to the
supplied.) 14
particular stage or sequence of the incident to which it relates.

On cross-examination, the complainant made the same identification as follows:

When private complainant claimed on direct examination that she was able to
identify appellant through his voice and hairy hands, she was referring to the
Q And you testified that on May 28, 1987 at around 10:30 initial stage of the incident when she was awakened because of the knife that was
in the evening, somebody awakened you and pointed a pointed at her body by somebody whom she was able to recognize at that time
knife at you? through his voice and hairy hands (TSN, December 2, 1988, pp. 5-6).

A Yes, sir. Her testimony on cross-examination that she was able to recognize appellant only
because she was able to recognize appellant only because she was already asked
by appellant to remove her clothes with the knife pointed at her (pp. 9-10,
Q Because of that, you did not shout? TSN, Ibid.). On the other hand, her testimony that she was able to see appellant
because of the light is uncertain as to the particular stage of the incident to which
A I did not shout because a knife was pointed at me. it pertains.

Q And, you were able to identify the rapist by his beard in But even assuming that there were some contradictions in the manner by which
the face? private complainant had been able to recognize appellant, they do not detract from
her positive identification of appellant as the person who raped her since they all
point to the fact that private complainant was able to recognize the person who
A Yes, sir, and because of his voice also. raped her that fateful evening. 18

Q And, likewise, because of his hairy arms? Appellant further faults the identification made by the victim on the ground that the victim's basis of
identifying her attacker is the fact that she touched the latter's hairy hand and bearded face. 19
A Yes, sir.
It is not necessary that the witness's knowledge of the fact to which he testifies should have been
Q And, that is your only identification of the rapist? obtained in any particular manner, and he may testify to what he hears, feels, tastes, smells, or sees. 20

A Yes, sir, and because there was a light I was able to see Thus, identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified has been held sufficient, and it is
him." (Emphasis supplied.) 15 an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had known
each other personally and closely for a number of years. 21 Here, the complainant testified that she had
known appellant for seven years prior to the incident because he lived only a house away from
On further cross-examination, the complainant testified, thus; theirs. 22 Appellant himself admitted having known the complainant by name in the three to four years
that he had stayed in Barangay Bambanan. 23 As observed by the trial court, the complainant and
Q And, were you able to identify that the accused was the appellant "were familiar with each other since they lived together in the same barangay [and] . . . the
one who pointed that knife? house of the complainant is barely ten armslength away from the house where the accused
lived." 24 Indeed, people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and by
name, 25 and may be expected to know each other's distinct and particular features and characteristics.
A Because he told me to take off my clothes at the same
time pointing the knife at me. I was able to recognize him
because I touched his hand and his face. We have consistently held that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh the
testimony of a witness in the light of his demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby
Q And that was the only identity you make that the accused placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. 26 In the instant case,
was the one who executed the act? the trial court considered the testimony of the complainant, the sole witness to the crime, as worthy of
faith thus:
 The Court has meticulously examined and scrutinized the testimonial evidence G.R. No. L-20986             August 14, 1965
presented as well as the observations of the demeanor of the complainant and the
accused while they were giving their testimony in Court. The testimony of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
complainant was straightforward, natural and candid which are earmarks of truth.
vs.
It leaves not a scintilla of doubt regarding the veracity of her statements. It was
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao,
clear, logical and conclusive. 27
ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE GUSTILO alias Peping, FILOMENO
MACALINAO, JR. alias White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding, and MAGNO
We find no reason to disturb such conclusion. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable that a young barrio lass MONTANO alias Edol, respondents.
like the complainant, who is inexperienced with the ways of the world, would fabricate a charge of
defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial and tarnish
Davao Provincial Fiscal Alejandro B. Ruiz and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Martin V. Delgra, Jr. for
her family's honor and reputation unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the
petitioner.
wrong committed against her. 28 Furthermore, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the spontaneity of
No appearance for respondents.
the complainant's reactions subsequent to the crime — she had unflinchingly named and pointed out
appellant, then roaming in the vicinity of her house, as the offender, when her aunt asked her why she
was crying at around noon of the day following the incident 29 — as well as the failure of appellant to DIZON, J.:
impute upon her an improper motive to accuse him of the crime bolster her credibility. 30
In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose
In the Light of the victim's positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, appellant's Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band
defense of alibi must fail. We note besides that the defense failed to prove physical impossibility of with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the
appellant being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Defense witness Rogelio Norada Police Force of Digos, Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial
testified that Barangay Kirayan Norte where appellant claimed he was at the night of May 28, 1987, was confession made to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his
a mere ten kilometers away 31 from Barangay Bambanan, and access between the two barangays was participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him
easy with transport such as jeepneys, trucks, tricycles and even trisicads. 32 to to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up this
testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged
co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground
The trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. Article
that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The
335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines provides that carnal knowledge of a woman may
respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without
be committed when force or intimidation is used. The act of holding a knife by itself is strongly
mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the
suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a
witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised
woman to submission. 33
the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the
present petition for certiorari praying that the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not necessarily negate the commission of declared erroneous and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Bano to
rape. 34 Neither is the existence of lacerations on the victim's sexual organ indispensable. 35 What is answer the question in full.
essential is that there be penetration of the sexual organ no matter how slight. 36
The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime of rape is committed with the use of a timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court having found neither made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, the proper penalty hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to
is reclusion perpetua. 37 And in conformity with jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97
offended party shall be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). 38 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Sixth Judicial In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions
Region, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 31084 finding appellant Endriquito Reynaldo alias "Quito" below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape is hereby AFFIRMED, with the sole modification names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's
that the civil indemnity awarded the victim, Anacyl Barrera, is increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show
(P50,000.00). that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the
question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in
full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to
SO ORDERED.
show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the
commission of the offense.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant
Manila
to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned
and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.
EN BANC
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction issued heretofore is a result thereof, Acapulco, Jr., in the company of the others, brought appellant to the Ozamiz City Hall
hereby set aside. and turned him over to the police authorities.7

Republic of the Philippines However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) at the following hearing on 22 May
SUPREME COURT 1997 that he would like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.8 The RTC ordered
Manila appellant's re-arraignment and the latter accordingly entered a plea of guilty.9 The court conducted an
inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of appellant's plea and his full comprehension of the consequences
thereof. Prosecution was likewise charged to establish the guilt and degree of culpability of appellant.10
EN BANC

In accordance with the court's directive, the prosecution continued with the presentation of its evidence
G.R. No. 174056             February 27, 2007
in chief. It presented Dr. Pedrita Rosauro, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the body of the
[Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
victim, and who testified that the victim was raped before she was killed. The examination by Dr.
Rosauro revealed that AAA sustained four (4) stab wounds in front, two (2) stab wounds in her back and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee one (1) lacerated wound each on her neck and on her middle upper extremity. Furthermore, she found 6
vs. and 12 o'clock laceration wounds on the external genital organ of the victim. 11
ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and RONTE ABABO (acquitted),
Appellants,
Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as witness against his co-accused Abapo.
Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise explained that he had
DECISION previously confessed to Magallano, Arañas and Acapulco that he alone committed the crime in the hope
that the parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might take pity on him.12
TINGA, J.:
In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was allegedly committed, he was with his
1 mother and three (3) siblings at the Labo River, about two (2) kilometers away from Barangay Pantaon,
For review before the Court is the Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 April 2006, washing their clothes.13 In support thereof, Abapo presented his mother Virgencita Abapo, Elisa Carreon
affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ozamiz City, Branch and Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi.14 The defense also presented witness Arañas
15,3 dated 10 March 1999, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with who reiterated his earlier testimony that appellant confessed to him that he alone was responsible for the
homicide. raping and killing of the victim.15 Finally, Eugenio Bucog, a teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was
presented to demonstrate Abapo's good character when he was his student.16
In an Information4 dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante alias Rowing and
co-accused Ronie Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the crime of rape with homicide On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellant's plea of guilty, the
of an eight (8)-year old child, thus: RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant was sentenced to
suffer the death penalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
That on or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the indemnity for the life of the victim, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and costs.17 On the other hand, the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each trial court acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and Except for the lone testimony of appellant, the RTC held that no other evidence was adduced to prove
intimidation, to wit: by then and there pinning down one [AAA],5 a minor, 8 years of age, and succeeded the participation of Abapo. Moreover, the court a quo found that appellant's testimony implicating
in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 o'clock lacerated wounds Abapo was not worthy of credence coming as it did from a polluted source.18
of [sic] the vagina as well as fatal stab wounds on the different parts of her body and which were the
direct cause of her death thereafter. With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
Pursuant to this Court's decision in People v. Mateo,19 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals.
CONTRARY to Article 335 in relation with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision20 affirming the appellant's conviction, but
6
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment.  Thereafter, the with modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim. The dispositive portion of the said
case proceeded to trial with the prosecution first presenting two witnesses: (1) Emelio Magallano, Decision states:
President of Purok I, Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City; and (2) Sofronio Arañas, a Civilian Volunteer
Officer (CVO) of the same barangay. "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozami[s] City, is hereby
Magallano and Arañas testified that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of 10 April 1997, appellant went AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby
to Magallano's home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself raped and killed his (appellant's) increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱100,000.00, including the award of moral damages from ₱30,000.00 to
niece, AAA, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City. Subsequently, Magallano accompanied appellant to the ₱50,000.00. Conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Efren
residence of Arañas where he reiterated his confession. That same night, Magallano, Arañas, appellant Mateo, We refrain from entering judgment, and the Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to elevate
and family members of the witnesses proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain Santiago Acapulco, the entire records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court for its final disposition.
Jr. who conducted an investigation. Appellant repeated his narration and confessed to the barangay
captain that he had raped and killed the victim, and that he was alone when he committed the crime. As SO ORDERED."21
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to simultaneously submit The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was committed by reason or
supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire.22 On 21 November and 24 on the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the penalty of death at that
November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they are adopting the briefs time.26 Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play the provisions of Section 3, Rule 116
they filed before the Court of Appeals.23 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus -

Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for review: Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
I
degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF

Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three (3) conditions that
HIS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY AND HIS ALLEGED SEPARATE CONFESSIONS TO
the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the accused: (1) it must conduct
ONE EM[I]LIO MAGALLANO, AND ONE SOFRONIO ARAÑAS, THE LATTER BEING
a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of
HEARSAY AND WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE WHATSOEVER.
his plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence
II on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. 27

THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to the number
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct
LATTER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit. 28 However, the logic behind the
OWNING UP ONLY TO THE CRIME OF SIMPLE RAPE. 24 rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at
times pleaded guilty.29 An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are
The ultimate issue is whether appellant's guilt was established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life
and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct the prescribed plea.30 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
"searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilty and full comprehension thereof. determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.31
Consequently, appellant's plea of guilty was made improvidently and it is rendered
inefficacious.25 Nevertheless, the Court must rule against appellant as the evidence on record is ample to In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it is evident that the
sustain the judgment of conviction independent from his plea of guilty. RTC did not strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 above. A mere warning

The crime of rape with homicide is punishable with death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. 32 Such procedure falls short of the
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which provides: exacting guidelines in the conduct of a "searching inquiry," as follows:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a (1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
woman under any of the following circumstances: (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
1. By using force or intimidation; during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

The crime of rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. (3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
xxxx capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

xxxx
 (4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the xxxx
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
Pros. Edmilao:
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the
duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime May we ask that we will present her [sic] in the next hearing.1awphi1.net
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
Court:
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do
The court will call the accused to the witness stand.
so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature
of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
xxxx
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the
latter. (The witness after having administered an oath, took the witness stand and declared that he is:

(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. ROGELIO GUMIMBA
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.33
20 years old

An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate the court's treatment of appellant's
change of plea, viz: Single

Atty. Cagaanan: Occupation- duck raising

Considering the voluntary plea of guilty of the accused[,] we pray that the mitigating circumstance to Resident of Capucao, Ozamiz City)
prove his plea of guilty be appreciated in favor of the accused. We likewise pray that another mitigating
[circumstance] of voluntary surrender be appreciated in his favor. xxxx

Pros. Edmilao: Court:

Considering the gravity of the crime, may we ask your Honor that we will present evidence inorder [sic] The court will allow the prosecutor or the defense to profound [sic] question [sic] on the matter and the
that it will give also justice to the victim. accused understand [sic] and fully comprehend [sic] the consequence of his plea of guilty.

Court: xxxx

Present evidence to prove gravity of the crime. Pros. Edmilao:

Pros. Edmilao: Q Mr. Rogelio Gumimba[,] are you the same accused in this case in Crim. Case No. RTC 2074?

Our first witness is the ABC president. A Yes, sir.

Court: Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of age[.] Since you have admitted this in what
particular place wherein [sic] you raped and slew [AAA]?
What matter will Santiago Acapulco testify?
A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.
Court:
Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from her house?
Was there cruelty done by the accused in picking [sic] the life of the minor girl?
A Very near, sir.
Q Can you estimate how many meters? A No, Your Honor.

A One meter, sir. Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?

Q Was it committed inside or outside the house? A I was drank [sic] at that time.

A Outside. Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?

Q In what particular place of the house[:] in front, at the side or at the back? A Banana skin.

A At the back of the house of the victim. Q How did you tie [AAA]?

Q Will you please tell the court, how did you do it, will you please narrate. A I tied both her hands.

A I raped her by tying her hand, then I killed her. Q The hands of [AAA], you placed at the back?

Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her? A In front of her.

A I saw her roaming around. Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?

Q In committing the crime, were you alone? A After that I went home.

Atty. Anonat: Q You did not stab [AAA]?

Objection… A I stabbed her, Your Honor.

Court: Q What weapon did you use in stabbing her?

Sustained. A A long bolo.

Pros. Edmilao: Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?

You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and raped her and stabbed her, were you the one A Yes, Your Honor.
alone [sic]?
Q After stabbing her, what did you do to her?
Atty. Anonat:
A No more, Your Honor.
Objection…
Q How many times did you stab [AAA]?
Court:
A I could not count how many stab wounds I inflicted to [sic] her.
Sustained.
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
Court:
A I could no longer count how many stab wounds, Your Honor.
Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you understand the consequence of your A (The witness demonstrated that from the floor about 3 feet high was the height of [AAA])
pleading guilty?
Q If you are standing and [AAA] is also standing side by side with you, up to what part of your body is
A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence. the height of [AAA]?

Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide, did you understand? A Up to my waist line.

A Yes, Your Honor, I understand. Atty. Cagaanan:

Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be sentenced to die? Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?

A Yes, I am aware. A Yes, sir.

Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your voluntary will? Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this crime?

A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two. A No, sir.34

Q You mean to say there were two of you who raped [AAA]? The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the evidence for the prosecution
undeniably establishes appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant gave a subsequent
A Yes, your Honor.
testimony when he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against his co-accused. This second
testimony which constitutes another judicial confession, replete with details and made consciously as it
Q Before raping her, was [AAA] wearing clothes? was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier plea of guilty improvident. The latter testimony left
no room for doubt as to the voluntariness and comprehension on appellant's part of his change of plea,
as well as completed his narration of how he raped and killed the victim. The pertinent portions of the
A Yes, Your Honor. second testimony follow, thus:

Q Was [AAA] wearing [a] panty before you raped her? Pros. Jose A. Edmilao:

A Yes, Your Honor. Q While you were gathering firewoods [sic] and Ronie Abapo was pasturing carabao, do you recall of
any untoward incident that happened?
Q Did you remove her panty before raping her?
A We raped and killed.
A No, You Honor, I did not.
Q Whom did you rape and kill?
Q How did you rape [AAA]?
A [AAA].
A I have sexed [sic] with her.
Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion, because you said we?
Q What do you mean by I "remedio" her, you mean you have inserted your penis into the vagina of
[AAA]? A Ronie Abapo.

A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of [AAA]. xxxx

Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina of [AAA]? Q While she [AAA] was there gathering oranges, you mean to say you were close to the place [AAA]
was?
A The vagina of [AAA] is very small.
A I, together with Ronie Abapo go [sic] near to the place [AAA] was.
Q Can you tell this Court how tall was [AAA]?
Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA] was climbing, was she still up there at A We undress[sed] her.
the orange tree?
Q What was she wearing at that time?
A She already came down.
A She wore a dress.
Q When she came down, what followed next then?
Q What about Ronie Abapo?
A We held her hands.
A He did not undress.
Q Who held her hands?
Q How did you let your penis out?
A The two of us.
A I removed my t-shirt.
Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand was held by Ronie Abapo?
Q How about your pants?
Atty. Anonat:
A I also removed my pants.
Objection, leading.
Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her hand?
Pros. Edmilao:
A She did not cry, because we covered her mouth.
Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did you do it?
Q Who covered her mouth? You or Ronie?
A We held her hands and tied it [sic] with banana skin.
A Ronie.
Q Who tied the hands of [AAA]?
Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do then when he was on [sic] the act of
A Both of us. raping her?

Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did you place her? A I was just near to [sic] them.

A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place. Q The after Ronie Abapo, what did you do then?

Q What happened then after [AAA] was brought to the [sic] grassy place? A He told me that you will be the next [sic].

A We killed her. Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did you do next?

Q Before you killed her, what did you do to her? A I also raped her.

A We raped her. Q Again, when you said you raped her, you inserted your penis into the vagina of [AAA]?

Q Who raped her first? A It did not enter [sic].

A It was Ronie Abapo, then followed by me. Q Why?

Q How did you rape her? A It did not penetrate, because I was afraid.
Q But your penis erected [sic]? Q Who called you?

A No, Your Honor. A Ronie Abapo.

Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse, was he able to insert his penis into the Q Why did he call you?
vagina of [AAA]?
A He asked me, what to do with [AAA]. It might be that she will tell us to somebody [sic], we will kill
A No, sir, because he was watching, if there was person [sic] around. her.

Q Were you able to see the penis of Ronie inserted into the vagina of [AAA]? Q What did you do?

A I have [sic] not seen. A I did not answer.

xxxx Q And what was your answer?

Q You said that you and Ronie Abapo raped [AAA], what do you mean or what do you understand by A Because he keep [sic] on persuading me.
the word rape?
Q How did he persuade you?
A We undressed her.
A He persuaded me because we might be caught.
Q Why did you undress her?
Q And what did he tell you to do?
A We undressed her, because we want [sic] to do something to her.
A That we will kill [AAA].
Q What is that something that you want [sic] top do to [AAA]?
Q How did he tell you that?
A We raped her.
A Rowing[,] we will kill her.
Q When you said we raped her, you mean, you inserted your penis inside the vagina of [AAA]?
Q And what was your reply?
A No, sir.
A I refused.
Q But you tried to insert your penis inside the vagina?
Q When you refused, what did he do then?
A Yes, sir.
A He keep [sic] on persuading me.
Q And your penis touched the vagina of [AAA]?
Q And what did eventually came [sic] to your mind?
A Yes, sir.
A Evil came to my mind, so we killed her.
Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because [AAA] is [sic] still a small girl?
Q How did you kill her?
A Yes, sir.
A We stabbed her.
Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did you do to [AAA]?
Q What weapon you used [sic] when you killed her?
A I walked away, but he called me.
A A long bolo. Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?

Q Whose [sic] the owner of that long bolo? A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.

A Mine, but Ronie Abapo used it. xxxx

Q Who was the first one to use it? Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?

A Ronie Abapo. A No, sir.

Q But the bolo was in your hands, how did [sic] he be able to use it? Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?

A I put it on the ground and he got it. A In our place.

Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA] first hit? Q It [sic] it there in your home?

A In the stomach. A Already taken.

Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo? Q Who got?

A I cannot remember anymore. A The barangay captain.

Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also hit? Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and killing of [AAA] aside from here in
Court?
A At the left side.
A I have already told.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
A My neighbor.
Q How many times?
Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?
A Only one.
A Emilio Magallano.
Q What part of her body was she hit?
Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?
A At the stomach.
A Sofronio Aranas.
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed
[AAA]? Q Who else?

A Yes, sir. A Rico Magallano.

Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on her? Q Who else?

A He [sic] was already dead. A The wife of Panyong.

Q In the reporting [sic] this matter[,] were you together with Ronie Abapo telling these persons that you Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy on AAA's body, it was established
raped [AAA]? that the victim had 6 and 12 o'clock lacerations on her external genital organ. Thus, it is clear that the
rape was consummated.
A I was alone.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Arañas on what appellant had
confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies, it should be conceded,
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping with Ronie Abapo?
cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to be in writing,
among others, to be admissible in evidence.42 That is why the testimonies are of use in the case as
A No, sir. corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by the hearsay rule. The
testimonies covered are independently relevant statements which are not barred by the hearsay
rule.1awphi1.net
Q Why not?

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such statements were made is
A According to Emilio that the mother of the victim might be [sic] pity enough to me, because I am relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply. The statements
related to them. are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
Q When you reported to these persons you have mentioned, did you also tell them that you were such a fact.43
together with Ronie Abapo in killing and raping?
Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
A No, sir.35 motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a
crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit.44
While the trial court found appellant's second testimony insofar as it implicated his co-accused to be
unworthy of credence, there is absolutely nothing on record which militates against its use as basis for Next, we address appellant's contention that he can only be convicted of simple rape, as this is the only
establishing appellant's guilt. In fact, in his Brief, appellant submits that he must be convicted of simple crime to which he has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already been dead after his co-
rape alone and not rape with homicide. Thus, he admits in writing, albeit implicitly, that he raped the accused had allegedly hacked her first, appellant theorizes that he, at most, would be guilty of an
victim. impossible crime.

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have known positively that
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only completely contradicts his
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause of death. In light of the particular circumstances of
but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.36 Thus, as we have ruled in People v. the event, appellant's mere conjecture that AAA had already expired by the time he hacked her cannot
Derilo:37 be sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible crime. An examination of the testimony is again
called for, thus:
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find
no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this Pros. Edmilao:
Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence
thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was [AAA] first hit?
court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his
guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for
the simple reason that the conviction is based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the A In the stomach.
offense charged.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still be convicted if there is
adequate evidence on record on which to predicate his conviction. x x x x
A I cannot remember anymore.

Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the separate testimonies of appellant, that at around
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also hit?
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8 April 1997, appellant was gathering firewood not far from the house
of the victim AAA in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City. He met co-accused Ronie Abapo who was then
pasturing his carabao also within the vicinity of the victim's home. They spotted the victim picking A At the left side.
oranges with her three (3)-year old brother at the back of their house and together approached her from
behind, tied her hands with banana skin and dragged her to a grassy place.38 Abapo raped the victim
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
first.39 Thereafter, appellant followed suit.40 Once they had finished with their dastardly acts, they
stabbed and killed the victim with a long bolo which belonged to appellant. 41
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q How many times? 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DYING DECLARATION; MUST BE COMPLETE IN ITSELF
TO BE ADMISSIBLE. — It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in
itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted
A Only one.
the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The doctrine
Q What part of her body was she hit? of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore’s classic work: "The
application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely
a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is
A At the stomach. immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that
the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie Abapo and also stabbed AAA? short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be
of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he
A Yes, sir. wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to
tell." The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on her? little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from
saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he
was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
A He [sic] was already dead. truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.

Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead? 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — It is clear to the Court that the dying
declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by
death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.45 assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should be sustained. not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not
However, with the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant
Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty as the doer of the bloody deed.
imposed upon appellant is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.46
3. ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; MUST BE CREDIBLE WHEN NO IDENTIFICATION WAS SHOWN AT
ALL. — The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature.
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in light of prevailing jurisprudence. When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and
Accordingly, appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱100,000.00 as quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before Eulalia’s
exemplary damages.47 death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay
another in such a violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 00193 is AFFIRMED was shown at all, certainly weakens the case of the prosecution.
WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the victim, AAA, in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil 4. ID.; ID.; GUILT OF ACCUSED; NOT ESTABLISHED BY HIS RELUCTANCE OR INABILITY
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱100,000.00 as TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMAL WAKE OF THE VICTIM. — Appellant’s failure to present
exemplary damages, plus costs. himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not
give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that
he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had
SO ORDERED. dropped in the Valencias’ house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed the body
(before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in
FIRST DIVISION the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial judge that such
behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common
[G.R. No. 75028. November 8, 1991.] cultural trait of the Filipinos.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y 5. ID.; ID.; OFFER OF COMPROMISE IN CRIMINAL CASES; RULE; NOT APPLICABLE IN
CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. CASE AT BAR. — We do not feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of
the (extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the
Rodolfo P. Liwanag for Accused-Appellant. accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred
in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle
the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did
not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could
SYLLABUS not fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A
much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused charged.
had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.
The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

DECISION "The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son
Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia’s 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas
St., Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981, p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession.

FELICIANO, J.: Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas
Herminia Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7).

In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother
Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery with Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p.
homicide committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph 3).

"That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o’clock. And at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, his classes
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Pioquinto de Joya y were dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8).
Cruz, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry and cart At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia’s neighbor by the name
away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1) piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former’s house to visit a friend. While at her
and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage and prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia’s house. She noticed appellant
FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia’s. (TSN, June 11, 1981, pp.
him to take the said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with 2-4).
treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched
hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed instrument causing injuries which with her own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and
directly caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.cralawnad asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were present (1) abuse . . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui." After saying these words, she let go
of superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; of Alvin’s hand and passed away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14 and 17).
(4) abuse of confidence.
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own
Contrary to law." 1 blood. His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her
of what happened. (TSN, Id).
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision
dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood." (TSN,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph March 11, 1980, p. 20).

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed,
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of riding his bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate
superior strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her mother’s hands were stretched open and her
in the dwelling of the victim. The accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against feet were wide apart. Blood was oozing out of her mother’s ears. She then embraced her mother and
him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code. placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN,
October 12, 1978, pp. 25-26).
The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of P550.00. Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o’clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia
Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When
The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined immediately in the asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother’s ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor.
National Penitentiary pending review of his case by the Supreme Court. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately
left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29).
The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the Supreme Court for
review. Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of
her mother was likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).
SO ORDERED." 2
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the
In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic assertion: wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the
that the lower court erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime aparador was destroyed. (TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-17).
 bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia’s house without the consent of the victim;
When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2)
rooms thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto 3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found
(Exhibits "A" to "A-11" ; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17). near a cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia
identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;
Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that
her mother could be embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-34). 4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in
the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the
door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, 5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake.
October 12, 1978, pp. 24-25).
We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair grandmother who was sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what
she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui." After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not
before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.). disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must be noted at once, however,
that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they
Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased.
(Valencia’s) house. (TSN, Id.). If they were designed to designate the object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used
by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin:
On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin’s question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr.
Madrid was ‘shock, secondary to punctured wound neck’ (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in
neck, just below the right ear wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the
from one side of the neck to the opposite side." (Exhibit "D-2")."cralaw virtua1aw library subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he
intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness has
In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore’s classic work:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
conviction against appellant. These factors, as set out in the decision of the trial court, were the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be
merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it
"In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all
victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying statement of the that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder)
deceased, which are: Herminia testified that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make,
quarreled over a bicycle which the former took from their house without the consent of the latter; that the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole
Exhibit ‘B’ (step-in beach walk type) which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body might be of a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the
of the victim was identified by Herminia as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have
which she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited them in their house; the testimony been able to tell." 4 (Emphasis supplied).cralawnad
of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in
the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused admitted, although his wife is the sister The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or
of the husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it was lying in state no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that
without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented
is the dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her ‘Apo, Apo, what happened?’ from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness
and she answered, ‘Si Paki’, then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5
Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called
Paki.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other
words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible
The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the deceased leads communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the
only to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author of the crime."cralaw virtua1aw deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through
library her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of
her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the
Si Paqui" ; conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of
the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before Eulalia’s death does not, in our
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent
weeks before the robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly
weakens the case of the prosecution.
A Yes, sir.
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in
the living room where Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that Q What did you and Atty. Aguilar discuss when you finally was able to see Atty. Aguilar?
such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant’s wife, who
was also the sister of Herminia’s husband. Rubber or beach walk slippers are made in such quantities by A When I went there, I was introduced to Atty. Aguilar and Atty. Aguilar asked me as to what I liked to
multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, happen.
shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant’s wife. And even if conclusive identification
of the slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those Q What did you say?
very slippers on that fatal afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly
connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying. At most, under that assumption, the presence of that A I said if it will be settled, well and good.
slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to the house of the Valencias and
there mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he did Q Anything else that transpired?
enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had been
perpetrated, and there had found many persons in the house viewing the body. A He even told me if I might be able to convince both my wife and her sisters.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around
3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not Q Did he tell you he can settle this?
proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the
robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers no basis for A He was very certain that he can settle this, the very reason why he told me because I was very certain
supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her as to what happened.
through the neck and had ransacked both floors of the Valencia house.
Q Was the accused Pioquinto de Joya present when you were discussing this with his lawyer?
Appellant’s failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during
the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. A Yes, sir.
Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor.
Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias’ house in the afternoon Eulalia Diamse was Q He heard who this lawyer was telling you?
killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His
reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable A It is possible because he is only one or two meters distance away.
to agree with the trial judge that such behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary experience of man"
although respect for the dead is a common cultural trait of the Filipinos.chanrobles law library : red Q Did the accused say anything?

In the Solicitor-General’s brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against A None, sir." (Emphasis supplied)
appellant included: "the attempt on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle
the case amicably." 6 We have examined the testimony that the Solicitor General pointed to in referring We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of
to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably. That testimony, given by Arnedo Valencia, appellant, through his counsel, to offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware
son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya, was as of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Q You also testified that before the release of the accused from the municipal jail, you had a "SECTION 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission that
conversation with him, is that right? anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer. However, in
criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
A Yes, sir. may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt." (Emphasis supplied)

Q What was this conversation about? We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the
(extended) family of the deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused"
A He called for me and took me to his counsel Atty. Aguilar and according to him if only Atty. Aguilar nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the
can talk with me, everything will be settled. instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the
criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did not
Q Have you seen and talked to this Atty. Aguilar? believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not
fairly be deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A
A Yes, I went with him to Manila, sir. much higher level of explicitness and specific detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused
had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with homicide.
Q When was this?
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted,
A The time he was fetched out of jail. dying declaration and a number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give
rise to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider,
Q You are referring to the municipal jail? after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce
that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime:
Court remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the
evidence supporting the judgment of conviction.
1. That the crime was committed during nighttime to insure impunity of the accused;
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant’s guilt of the crime of robbery and
homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt. 2. That the accused used unlicensed firearms in the commission of the crime.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and
CONTRARY TO LAW.
appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

It is so ordered. Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat, pleaded not
guilty. Trial proceeded against appellant only. Accused Villamor Asuncion remained at large.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Hence, this appeal.
THIRD DIVISION

The Facts
[G.R. No. 94545. April 4, 1997]
Version of the Prosecution
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @
PRAN and VILLAMOR ASUNCION, accused, FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @
The prosecution presented witnesses Corazon and Pedro Dayao and Lolita Ambre to testify on the
PRAN, Accused-Appellant.
circumstances of the crime; and Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr., on the results of the autopsy he conducted.

.
Corazon Dayao, 25, married, was visiting at the Ambre residence to see her husband Pedro, who was the
driver of Mr. & Mrs. David Ambre. That evening of September 18, 1987 at about 7:30 oclock, she was
DECISION in the terrace of the victims house sorting dirty clothing. The night was dark and it was raining, but a
Coleman lamp was placed atop the cement railing (pasamano) of the terrace, lighting an area of about
seven (7) meters. Only a terrace rail separated her from David, who was around half a meter away from
PANGANIBAN, J.:
her. She noticed Lolita beside her husband. Just then, she heard five (5) successive gunshots, and she
saw David fall prostrate to the ground. Seeing that David wanted to say something, she called Lolitas
The threshold issue here is whether the antemortem statement of the deceased identifying the accused attention and said, Manang, adda kayat nga ibaga ni Manong kenka. (Ate, it looks like Kuya has
constitutes a dying declaration sufficient to sustain the conviction of appellant. something to tell you.)4 She pulled Lolita towards the victim. Lolita asked her husband who had shot
him and the latter answered, It was Pare Pran.5 She heard Davids words because, like Lolita, she had
also placed her head near David who was still alive at the time.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31,
promulgated on June 28, 1990, in Criminal Case No. 615, finding Appellant Francisco Santos y Baingan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The dispositive portion2 thereof reads: Lolita Ambre, the widow, testified that she and her husband had just come out of their canteen. She
washed her feet while her husband, facing north, looked at the drivers side of their jeep. Then she heard
a gunshot and her husband cried, Apo! Startled, Lolita jumped up and down until she was told by
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable
Corazon that her husband wanted to tell her something. When she went near him, he
doubt, the accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
said, Pare Pran.6 She knew that her husband was referring to Francisco Santos, the godfather of their
the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos plus all the accessory penalties provided for by law.
youngest child. She held her husband, but their driver took her inside the house.
The detention of the accused shall be fully credited in his favor.

Lolita, the widow, 34, housekeeper, gave a sworn statement7 to Pfc. Domingo D. Cuntapay on
Cost against the accused.
September 25, 1987 implicating only Asuncion. The following day, during the preliminary
investigation, she executed an affidavit before Judge Felipe Castaneta, disclosing that her husbands
SO ORDERED. assailant was Francisco Santos.8 On October 5, 1987, she executed another sworn statement before Pfc.
Cuntapay reiterating her previous statement to Judge Castaneda.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellant was charged with murder by Provincial Fiscal Anthony A. Foz in an Information3 dated
November 18, 1987 which reads: Pedro Dayao Jr., 29, the Ambre spouses driver, testified that he was inside the Ambres house that
evening, rolling a rope, when he heard five (5) gun bursts. It was followed by the cry of Lolita
bellowing, Jun, they have shot your Manong!10 He rushed outside and then escorted Lolita and his wife
That on or about 7:30 oclock in the evening of September 18, 1987 in Barangay Ponggo, Municipality Corazon back to the house.
of Nagtipunana, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and armed with a
long firearm of undetermined caliber, did then and there, with intent to kill and with evident Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr., 58, married, municipal health officer of Maddela, Quirino, conducted an
premeditation and treachery, shot one David Ambre which caused his instant death. autopsy on the victims cadaver. In his report,11 the following postmortem findings appear:
Gunshot wound (entrance) roughly oval in shape about-7 mm. in dia. surrounded by contusso-abraded The Trial Courts Ruling
colar located at the postero-lateral aspect of the left side of the body and about 7 cm. below the angle of
the axillary fossa, directed inward to the thoracic cavity injuring the left lung and bisecting the lower
The trial court considered the words of the victim as a dying declaration and a positive identification of
ventricle of the heart and injuring the right lobe of the lungs making an exit at the right hypochondriac
appellant against which the latters defense of alibi, the weakest defense in criminal cases, cannot prevail.
region about 2 cm. in dia. and about 9 cm. below the nipple.

Issues
Gunshot wound thru and thru at the latero-medical aspect of the distal third of forearm (entrance) about
6 mm. in dia. medial aspect making an exit at the lateral aspect of the forearm with a distance between
the entrance and exit about 1.3 cm. In his brief,19 appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court:

Cause of Death: Severe internal hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound. I

He further clarified that, although the Certificate of Death he issued indicated that the Interval Between The lower court erred in believing that the victim David Ambre made an alleged dying declaration,
Onset and Death was instant, he was sure the victim still had a few seconds or minute before he actually despite evidence that death was instantaneous and that he could not have uttered imputing words after he
died.12 He opined that during those few seconds or minute, it was possible for a victim to utter about two was shot.
or three words, which could be audible and intelligible. Death due to bullet wounds in the heart or lungs
is not as instantaneous as that due to a bullet in the head.
II

Version of the Defense

Assuming that the deceased could have made a dying declaration, the trial court nonetheless erred in
finding appellant to be the culprit although what was supposedly uttered by the deceased were merely
Testifying in his own behalf, appellant, 41, married, declared that he and the deceased had treated each the words Pare Pran.
other like brothers. Interposing alibi, he swore that when the crime was committed, he was at his house
waiting for his sick sisters arrival from Baguio. He did not leave his house until the following day when
III
he learned of the victims death. He and his wife even went to visit the wake of the deceased. 13 He further
denied that his alias was Pran. It was Frank.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court a quo erred in totally believing prosecution witnesses Lolita Vda. De Ambre and Corazon
Dayao as regards their having allegedly heard the deceased impute the crime to appellant, although the
He also testified that a certain Mrs. Zeny Bayaua, a close friend of the widow, approached and admitted
circumstances then obtaining negate such testimonies.
to him, I know that you are not the one who killed, but you tell us those persons who killed. He told her
that he did not know the identity of the victims killer.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
IV
To buttress this, the defense counsel, Atty. Ernesto Salunat, 44, married, testified that on one occasion,
Mrs. Bayaua asked him to, (p)lease convince your client Mr. Santos to tell who really killed Mr. Ambre. The lower court erred in convicting appellant of the crime charged, instead of acquitting him therefor.
He retorted that he was concerned only with appellant; to which Lolita and Mrs. Bayaua
responded, Kung sabihin lang ni pare Frank kung sino ang pumatay sa asawa ko hindi namin siya
ididiin..16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The threshold issue is whether the last words of the deceased qualify as a dying declaration sufficient to
sustain appellants conviction.

The defense also presented Mariano Pimentel, 49, married, Governor of Quirino, who testified that his
cousin-in-law Zeny Bayaua told him, "Manong adda gayam kenka ni Francisco Santos. Manong awan Appellant contends that the victim had no chance to make a dying declaration, let alone make any
met ket ti basol na ngem pinabasol mi laeng isuna tapno ipudno na no asinno ti talaga nga utterance, in view of his instantaneous death; that assuming arguendo that he was able to do so, the
pimmatay. (Kuya, Francisco Santos is staying with you; actually, Kuya, he is not the real assailant but uttered words failed to impute the crime to him; and that, under the circumstances, it was incredible for
we just put the blame on him to pressure him to say who the real culprit is.)17 He summoned appellant the prosecution witnesses to have heard the deceased say anything. These contentions are not
who used to work as a janitor in the capitol during weekends. He was told by appellant that he persuasive. We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
(appellant) did not know who killed the victim. Hence, he told appellant to tell his lawyer what he had
heard from Mrs. Bayaua. First Issue: The Instantaneous Death

Dr. David Longid, 42, a physician-surgeon and a former municipal health officer in Tabuk, was called The evidence on record does not at all support appellants contention that the victim died instantaneously
as an expert witness to establish that the death of the victim was instantaneous. However, Dr. Longid as to render a dying declaration physically impossible. Despite the statement in the victims Certificate of
admitted that the interval between onset and death of a person who had sustained wounds in the heart Death that the interval between onset and death was instant, the undisputed fact as positively and
and lungs depended on the caliber of the gun used and on his physical makeup. If he was of strong build, categorically testified to by Corazon and Lolita is that the victim remained alive for a few seconds
his heart would still pump blood for a while and it would take more than ten seconds before he would during which he was able to say Pare Pran. This view is bolstered by the expert witnesses, Dr. Hufana
die. He declined to state whether it was impossible for the victim to speak during those few seconds and Dr. Longid himself who was presented by the defense, who both testified that a bullet that had hit
preceding death.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the heart and lungs did not necessarily result in instantaneous death.
The testimony of the two doctors is bolstered by experts on the matter. Thus Pedro Solis, in his treatise Furthermore, the interval between the shooting and the utterance of appellants name did not preclude the
on legal medicine, states: possibility of a dying declaration. Corazon testified that all these took place for a short time
only.23 Lolita described the same period in this wise:24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The heart may fail and cause death due to an existing disease independent of trauma. Coronary
insufficiency, myorcardial fibrosis, valvular lesion or tamponade due to the rupture of the ventricle are Q - And what did you do immediately after having heard the gun report?
common lesions.
A - I was jumping and jumping, sir.
Wounds of the heart are produced by sharp instruments, bullets or the sharp ends of the fractured ribs.
Contusion of the heart is easily produced on slight trauma on account of its vascularity. Wounds of the
Q - For how long more or less?
ventricle if small and oblique are less dangerous than those of the auricle because of the thickness of its
wall. The right ventricle is the most common site of the wounds due to external violence, because it is
the most exposed part of the heart. A - A short time when the wife of the driver called me to attend (sic) my husband, sir.

Foreign bodies like bullets, shrapnels, fragments of a shell may be embedded in the myocardium Q - Now, this is very important which I would like you to state, at that short period of time in your
without any cardiac embarrassment. The person may live for a long time and may die of some other estimation, how many minutes?
causes.20 (Underscoring supplied.)
A - I could not estimate, sir.
Solis opines further that a victim who has sustained injury to the heart may still be capable of a
volitional act like speaking, thus:
Q - Not even calculate for how long?

Sometimes it is necessary to determine whether a victim of a fatal wound is still capable of speaking,
A - It was shorter than when I was seated here, sir.
walking or performing any other volitional acts. A dying declaration may be presented by the prosecutor
mentioning the accused as the assailant; the offender may allege that the physical injuries inflicted by
him while the victim was inside his house and that he walked for some distance where he fell, or that the Q - Now?
victim after the fatal injury made an attempt to inflict injuries to the accused which justified the latter to
give another fatal blow. The determination of the victims capacity to perform volitional acts rests upon
the medical witness. A - Yes, sir.

x x x Wounds of the big blood vessels, like the carotid, jugular or even the aorta, do not prevent a person Q - You mean coming from the place where you were or at the place where you were there and take at
from exercising voluntary acts or even from running a certain distance. Penetrating wound of the heart is your seat? (sic)
often considered to be instantaneously fatal but experience shows that the victim may still be capable of
locomotion. Rupture of the organs is not always followed by death. The victim has for sometime still A - The moment I seated here, sir.
retains (sic) the capacity to move and speak.21 (Underscoring supplied.)
Second Issue: Dying Declaration
In People vs. Obngayan,22 the Court resolved a similar issue of whether the victim could have been
conscious, notwithstanding the serious nature of his injuries, when his antemortem statement was taken.
The Court observed: We affirm the ruling of the trial courts decision to consider the victims revelation to Lolita and Corazon
as a dying declaration and as a part of res gestae.

x x x()The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a given wound,()
according to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 212), is always one that must be That the last words were uttered by the deceased is established by the testimony of Corazon,25 thus:
decided upon the merits of a particular case. They cited a case from Viberts Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed.,
p. 286, where a man after being shot in the chest threw a lamp at his adversary. The lamp started a fire; "Q -What did you do when you saw David Ambre laid flat from (sic) the ground?
and to extinguish the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of water from the court yard. When the fire
was extinguished, the man lay down on bed and died. Vibert performed the autopsy, and found that the
left ventricle of the heart had been perforated by the revolvers bullet. It is evident from the foregoing A - I called for his wife because he wanted to tell something, sir.
that Dr. Acostas assertion that the victim of a gunshot wound immediately loses consciousness, after
infliction of the wound, may not be true in all cases. x x x Q -Who wanted to tell something?

In the case at bar, it is therefore not amazing that the victim, despite his wounds, did not immediately A -David Ambre, sir.
lose consciousness and was still able to recognize his assailant and relay the latters identity to his wife.

Q -Do you mean to tell that David Ambre still alive when you saw him? (sic)
A -Yes, sir. QUESTION

Q -And what did you do when you saw David Ambre wanting to say something? How did he tell you that it was Francisco Santos who shot him?

A -I pulled his wife and we put our ear(s) near the mouth of David Ambre, sir. ANSWER When my husband was shot, he told me that it was Francisco Santos who shot him.

Q -And what happened next when you went near the body of David Ambre? Q -Will you describe to the court how he told you that it was Francisco Santos who shot him?

A -The wife asked from David Ambre who shot him, sir. A -When he was shot, he shouted Apo!

Q -And what did David Ambre tell his wife? Q -And after that, what happened next?

A -He told it was Pare Pran, sir. A -And Corazon Dayao called for me.

Q -Do you know this Pare Pran being referred to by David Ambre? Q -And why did Corazon Dayao call(ed) for you?

A -Yes, sir. A -Because my husband as if he wanted to say something from his look.

Q - If he is in Court today, can you point at him? Q -Now, when you were called by Corazon Dayao that your husband David Ambre wanted to say
something to you, what did you do?
A -Yes, sir.
ANSWER I went near my husband, sir.
Q -Will you point at the Pare Pran you mentioned who is now in Court today?
COURT Put on record that witness is crying.
A There, sir.
FISCAL ANTHONY FOZ -
(Witness stood up and pointed a man in a blue t-shirt and identified himself to be Francisco Santos.)"
And what did your husband tell you?
26
The victims wife, Lolita,  corroborated Corazons testimony as follows:
ANSWER He uttered Pare Pran.
COURT
QUESTION
What was the cause of the death of your husband?
And do you know this Pare Pran' that your husband is telling?
ANSWER - They shot him, sir.
ANSWER I know him, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)
COURT - When you say they shot him, whom are you referring?
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who knows of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation. 27 As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites
ANSWER - Francisco Santos, sir (Witness pointing to Francisco Santos, the accused in this case).
for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness
of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
FISCAL ANTHONY FOZ concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; and (4) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of
inquiry.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Why do you say that it was Francisco Santos who shot him?

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise
ANSWER - My husband told me. or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand.29 This may be
proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the Lolitas reason has been sufficiently explained in her testimony. While she did not intimate to the police
decedents wounds, or other relevant circumstances.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary that her husband had identified the assailant when she was interviewed on the night of the killing, she
did reveal her husbands antemortem statement a week later. Such delay, however, was not without
reason. Lolita testified:
In the case at bar, the victims declaration consisted of the words Pare Pran. Under the circumstances,
however, he could not have been expected to articulate his awareness of something so obvious -- the
inevitability of his demise -- or to have the energy to do so. The nature and extent of said injuries "QUESTION - According to you, your husband told you that it was the accused Pare Pran who allegedly
underscored the seriousness of his condition and they later proved by themselves that the utterances of kill(ed) your husband, is it not?
the deceased were made under a consciousness of an impending death. 31 That his demise thereafter came
swiftly, although not instantaneously, further emphasized the victims realization of the hopelessness of
ANSWER - Yes, sir.
his recovery.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q - You were investigated by the Police on September 25, 1987, is that correct?
We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It was the height of jocularity for
appellant to have suggested that it was highly possible that the deceased mentioned his name to Lolita so ANSWER - Yes, sir.
that she would tell him to come to decedents succor, or for another reason. Such conjecture finds no
basis on record. On the other hand, this speculation is belied by the clear, straightforward testimonies of
ATTY. SALUNAT - Did you mention to the Police that it was accused Pare Pran who killed your
Lolita and Corazon. Despite several attempts, counsel for the defense failed to make Lolita admit that
husband?
the victim mentioned appellants name for a vague and undefined purpose, other than to identify his
assailant.33 Lolita adamantly stuck to her testimony that her husband told her that he was shot
by Pare Pran.34 The unrebutted testimony of Corazon further clarified that the victim said those words in ANSWER - No, sir.
answer to his wifes question as to who shot him.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
QUESTION - In other words, when you were investigated, you never mentioned that it was Francisco
The deceaseds condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his assailant deserves full faith Santos who allegedly killed your husband?
and credit and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.
ANSWER - Not yet sir because I was still afraid at that time because the accused was not yet
Furthermore, the same declaration was also properly admitted in evidence by the trial court as part apprehended that time.
of res gestae, and rightly so. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as
such when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in Q - You were afraid to tell the Police that Francisco Santos was the villain because he was not yet
question and its immediately attending circumstances.36 The utterance of the victim satisfies these three arrested?
requisites. Clearly, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.
A - Yes, sir.
The propriety and the signifacance of admitting the dying declaration of the victim under the rule on res
gestae is explained by Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, thus: Q - Is it not a fact that when you identified Francisco Santos, the Police will arrest him?

The requisites for the admissibility of the victims ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae and A - Yes sir, it was Villamor Asuncion who told the Police that they have to arrest Francisco Santos.
also as a dying declaration are present in this case, hence the same should be admitted under both
exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Citing People vs. Gueron, et al., L-29365, March 25, 1983, 121 SCRA
115; People vs. Baltao, L-47686, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 859) While the admissibility thereof would Q - You love your husband?
naturally not be affected whether viewed under either or both consideration the advantage of resting the
issue on the aforesaid dual bases is that its admission would be invulnerable to a theorized absence of an A - Yes, sir.
element of one of said exceptions. This is particularly important in this case, considering that the very
identification of the assailant and the accuracy thereof are essentially based on that declaration of the
victim.37 (Underscoring supplied.) Q - In fact you are crying because you love him so much?

Third Issue: Credibility of Witness A - Yes, sir.

Appellant assails the credibility of the witness Lolita Ambre because of her delay in reporting ATTY. SALUNAT - So, why did you not tell the Police who killed him?
the antemortem declaration. We do not agree. Well-settled is the rule that delay in reporting
the antemortem declaration does not automatically render the testimony doubtful. Failure to reveal or ANSWER - Because I was afraid that I would be the next victim because he was not yet
disclose the assailants identity at once does not necessarily affect, much less impair, the credibility of arrested."39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
said witness. The initial reluctance to volunteer information about a criminal case and/or the
unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are common and have been
judicially declared to have no effect on credibility.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Fear was therefore the compelling reason why Lolita did not divulge the identity of appellant when the WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED, except that the
police first investigated her. Self-preservation is, after all, the most fundamental of human indemnification to the heirs is INCREASED to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
instincts.40 The following day, she lost no time in executing a sworn statement on the matter. She
repeated the information before the municipal judge who conducted the preliminary investigation and
SO ORDERED.
thereafter to the fiscal. On the witness stand, she remained steadfast on the matter notwithstanding a
grueling cross-examination.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Moreover, Corazon also heard the victims antemortem declaration. She executed a statement to the
Manila
police also on September 26, 1987. Even at the trial of the case, she adhered to her earlier account of
what she heard the victim say.
FIRST DIVISION
Furthermore, the trial court found the testimonies of Lolita and Corazon to be credible. Because a trial
court has the opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their conduct and demeanor at  
the witness stand, its findings on their credibility deserve great weight and respect. In the absence of any
showing that the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted such facts or
G.R. No. 128181 June 10, 1999
circumstances that materially affect the disposition of the case, its conclusions on the credibility of
witnesses should not be disturbed.41 We have examined the records of this case and we have been unable
to find any reason -- and the appellant has not shown any -- to depart from this rule. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO RADA and ADRIANO SACDALAN, accused-appellants.
Fourth Issue: Alibi vs. Dying Declaration

 
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate without much opportunity to
check or rebut it. To establish alibi as a valid defense, an accused must show that he was at some other MELO, J.:
place for such a period of time and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place of
the crime during its commission.42 In the present case, appellant failed to establish the physically
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. He anchored his Accused-appellants Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan were charged with Multiple Murder before
defense on the fact that at that time, he was in his house which was only about 500 meters from the the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region (Branch 63, Calauag, Quezon) in an Information
Ambre residence.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary dated April 16, 1990, to wit:

Furthermore, alibi is unavailing as a defense where there is positive identification of the accused as the That on or about the 19th day of September, 1989, at Barangay Vinas,
perpetrator of the offense, or when there is an antemortem declaration received in evidence either as a Municipality of Calauag, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
dying declaration or as part of res gestae,44 or both. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with
firearms of undetermined calibers, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
Treachery other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with said firearms the following: Simeon Castillo, Isidro Castillo and
Leonora Castillo, thereby inflicting upon them gunshot wounds on different parts
On the other hand, treachery qualifies the killing as murder. This qualifying circumstance of alevosia is
of their bodies, which directly caused their death.
present when an offender employs means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.45 Under the cover of darkness, appellant shot an unarmed and unsuspecting That the accused attacked and shot Simeon Castillo, Isidro Castillo, and Leonora
victim. The shooting was swift and without warning. The wounds sustained by the victim bespeak of the Castillo suddenly and unexpectedly without giving them any opportunity to
futility of any defense he could have mounted under these circumstances. Means, method or form was defend themselves or to escape.
obviously employed in the execution of the felony which insured its commission without risk to
assailant coming from any defense which the victim might have taken.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(p. 18, Rollo.)

The allegation in the Information on the use of an unlicensed firearm in this case has alerted the Court to
appellants possible separate criminal liability under Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866, following Pleas of not guilty having been entered, trial was undertaken, following which the court a quo rendered
the ruling in People vs. Quijada.47 However, a thorough review of the records reveals that the the now appealed decision dated September 9, 1996, finding accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
prosecution abandoned its case against appellant for illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. No gun murder and disposing:
was ever recovered nor presented in evidence, much less proven to be unlicensed. Thus,
the Quijada ruling finds no application in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds
accused Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
All things considered, appellant has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of David the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery defined and penalized under Article
Ambre. 248 (par. 1) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences said two accused to
 suffer the penalty of THREE (3) counts each of RECLUSION directed medially, penetrating the thoracic cavity, without
PERPETUA together with all of its accessories prescribed by law and to pay the point of exit.
heirs of the victim Simeon Castillo jointly and severally with the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00); the heirs of the victims Isidro Castillo and
5. Gunshot wound No. 5, with point of entrance of 1 cm.
Leonora Castillo jointly and severally the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
Diameter, with contusion collar, at the right anterior chest
PESOS (P100,000.00) as civil indemnities without subsidiary imprisonment in
level of the 3rd ICS, para-axillary line, directed medially,
case on insolvency plus costs of the suit.
penetrating the thoracic cavity, without point of exit.

The accused Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan are to be credited of their
Dr. Lucido asserted that Simeon Castillo's cause of death was skull fracture and massive hemorrhage
preventive imprisonment if any and proper under Article 29 of the Revised Penal
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds (tsn, Id., pp. 16-26).
Code as amended by Republic Act No. 6127.

Juanito Castillo, son of victims Isidro and Leonora Castillo, recalled that at about 1 o'clock in the
(p. 61,
morning of September 19, 1989, he was awakened by loud gunfire coming from the direction of his
parents' house which is located some 100 meters away from his own house. Soon thereafter, his sister
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Milia, arrived informing him that their father Isidro and brother Simeon were already dead. He and his
family then rushed to his parents' house. He embraced his wounded mother, Leonora, who told him that
accused-appellants Rada and Sacdalan were the ones who entered their house and killed Isidro and
Dr. Winefredo Lucido, Municipal Health Officer of Calauag, Quezon, testified that he conducted a  post
Simeon. For fear of their lives, Juanito cautioned his relatives then present not to reveal the identities of
mortem examination on the cadavers of Isidro Castillo and Simeon Castillo at about 9:30 o'clock in the
the assailants. He then brought his mother to the hospital for medical treatment. On their way to the
morning of September 19, 1989.
hospital, Leonora repeated to him the names of the perpetrators of the crime. Upon reaching the Lopez
Memorial Hospital, he was informed that his mother would be needing blood for her operation. So,
His post mortem examination of Isidro Castillo revealed the following fatal injuries sustained by the Juanito left for Lucena City and returned later with the needed blood only to find out that his mother had
victim: in the meantime died (tsn, Nov. 8, 1990, pp. 8-16).

Gunshot wound No. 1 with contusion collar at the hypogastric region 2 cms. Juanito likewise said that his parents were killed because they witnessed the earlier killing by accused-
below the umbilicus, directed posteriously, penetrating the abdominal cavity with appellants of a neighbor, Alfredo Drez. He also declared that prior to the incident, accused-appellants,
point of exit 3 cms. diameter at the left lumbar region. who were CAFGU members, were always asking Simeon to reveal the whereabouts of Martin
Villanueva, a brother-in-law, who is a member of the NPA (tsn, Id.,pp. 18-19).
The witness declared that said injuries resulted in massive hemorrhage which caused the victim's death
(tsn, Nov. 5, 1990, pp. 6-13). He further asserted that he did not report the matter to the local authorities for fear of retaliation from
accused-appellants. Instead, the Castillos went to the Human Rights Commission office at Lucena City
on September 26, 1989 where they filed the complaint against accused-appellants (tsn, Id., pp. 24-25).
On the other hand, Dr. Lucido's autopsy of the cadaver of Simeon Castillo showed that the victim
sustained five gunshot wounds:
Dr. Zadi Zaballero, a physician at the Magsayay Memorial District Hospital, testified that when he
treated Leonora on September 19, 1989 at about 3 o'clock in the morning, Leonora was non-ambulatory
1. Gunshot wound No. 1 with point of entrance of 1 cm. and was suffering cardio-respiratory distress. Leonora sustained fatal wounds which directly caused her
Diameter with contusion collar, at the right temporal death, to wit: (1) gunshot wound, 3-point entry, sternum 0.5 cm. with contusion collar, no point of exit;
region, directed medially, penetrating the cranial cavity, (2) gunshot wound, point of entry 0.5 cm., axilla, right with contusion collar, no point of exit; (3)
without point of exit. gunshot wound, point of entry 0.5 cm. 3rd intercostal space right midclavicular line with contusion
collar, no point of exit; (4) avulsed skin and muscle 4.0 cm. distal 3rd left forearm, medial aspect, left
2. Gunshot wound No. 2 with point of entrance of 1 cm. (tsn, Nov. 20, 1990, pp. 5-11).
Diameter with contusion collar at the right intrascapulay
region directed anteriorly, penetrating the thoracic cavity Zenaida Lopez Castillo, granddaughter of Isidro and Leonora Castillo, declared that at about 1 o'clock in
without point of exit. the morning of September 19, 1989, while she was vacationing at her grandmother's house in Vinas,
Calauag, Quezon, she was awakened by someone knocking and calling her aunt, Aida Castillo.
3. Gunshot wound No. 3 with point of entrance of 1 cm. Afterwards, Zenaida felt that somebody stoned the roof of her grandmother's house, one stone hitting the
Diameter with contusion collar at the right thigh, distal portion of the roof of the room where she slept and another one landing on the roof of her Tia Aida.
portion, lateral aspect, directed medially with point of exit Zenaida remained reclined and stood up only when she heard her uncle, Simeon Castillo, go out of his
of 6 cms. At the medial aspect, distal portion of the right room and switch on the light at the balcony. Then, Zenaida heard several gunshots and saw her uncle
thigh. Simeon fall down. Her aunt, Aida Castillo, rushed to her husband. Moments later, two armed men in
fatigue uniforms, whom Zenaida identified as accused-appellants Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan,
entered their house. Zenaida, out of extreme fear, hid her face under a blanket. At this point, she heard
4. Gunshot wound No. 4 with point of entrance of 1 cm. her Tia Aida asking for mercy and she heard two more shots. Immediately after the shooting, Zenaida
Diameter with contusion collar, at the right axillary region, asked another aunt, Milia, to fetch her uncle Juanito Castillo. Upon arrival, Juanito embrace Leonora
Castillo who told him that the culprits were accused-appellants Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan.
Then, Zenaida recalled that her uncle warned her and other relatives present not to tell anyone who the other relatives went to the headquarters of Sgt. Marilag where they gave their written statements in
assailants are. While on their way to the hospital for Leonora's treatment, Zenaida added that her connection with the killing incident (tsn, June 4, 1992, pp. 6-15).
grandmother repeatedly mentioned the names of accused-appellants (tsn, Nov. 22, 1990, pp. 6-16).
Bonifacio Rada refuted the testimony of Aida Castillo that he and Adriano Sacdalan were the ones who
Aida Villanueva Castillo testified that at about 1 o'clock in the morning of September 19, 1989, she was killed Simeon Castillo and his parents Isidro Castillo and Leonora Castillo. He claimed that before 1
awakened by someone knocking at their window and calling out her name. After two minutes, o'clock in the morning of September 19, 1989, he and co-accused Adriano Sacdalan, together with other
somebody stoned their house and she woke up her husband Simeon Castillo. Simeon turned on the light members of the CAFGU, were in the house of Barangay Councilman Vio Tolentino at Bgy. Triumpo,
at the balcony of their house. He was about to reach the room of his parents when he was felled by Guinayangan, Quezon resting after patrol duty on the evening of September 18, 1989. They were
gunshots fired from outside. Aida rushed to her husband who lay slumped near the door of his parents' awakened by several gunshots and so, they proceeded to the place where the shots were fired. They later
room all bloodied and with a gunshot wound in the head. Afterwards, Aida saw Bonifacio Rada and found out that the family of Castillo was gunned down. Bonifacio Rada further claimed that he did not
Adriano Sacdalan enter their house pointing their guns at her husband. Aida, who was crying and know of any reason why the Castillo family would insist that he and Adriano Sacdalan are the
cradling her husband, pleaded for accused-appellants to stop, saying, "Tama na, Tama na!" Aida alleged perpetrators of said crime (tsn, July 22, 1992, pp. 10-25).
that both were wearing fatigue uniforms and were armed with long firearms (tsn, Jan. 14, 1991, pp. 5-
13)
Adriano Sacdalan reiterated the claim of co-accused Bonifacio Rada that at around 1 o'clock in the
morning, while they were resting in the house of Barangay Councilman Vio Tolentino, they heard
Accused-appellants are both known to Aida Castillo. Bonifacio Rada, a civilian volunteer of the gunshots coming from the direction of Bgy. Vinas. Their commanding officer, Sgt. Verde, commanded
CAFGU, is also a resident of Barangay Vinas, Calauag, Quezon while Adriano Sacdalan is a resident of them to proceed to said place to investigate (tsn, Sept. 22, 1992, pp. 5-9).
Barangay Triumpo, Guinayangan, Quezon, a Councilman and also a CAFGU member (tsn, Id., pp. 13-
14).
The prosecution presented Jaime Folloso as a rebuttal witness. He testified that Sgt. Marilag arrived in
their barangay at about 6 o'clock in the morning and not 4 o'clock as alleged by Sgt. Marilag. Folloso
Aida Castillo confirmed to her brother-in-law Juanito that it was Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan claimed that there were two batches of empty shells which he entrusted to Sgt. Marilag. He clarified that
who entered their house and fired at the people therein. Aida recounted that Juanito said that the only two empty shells were found inside the house while 36 empty shells were found outside the house
identities of the assailants should not then be divulged as they might return and kill the mall (tsn, Id., p. (tsn, March 21, 1995, pp. 6-13).
18).
Contesting the verdict of the trial court, accused-appellants interposed the instant appeal, contending that
The defense, on the other hand, presented its version through the following witnesses: the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Sgt. Jolly Verde, a military non-commissioned officer, testified that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of After a careful review of the evidentiary record, we find no reason to disturb the findings and
September 18, 1989, he and other CAFGUs were resting in the house of Barangay Councilman Vio conclusions of the trial court. Accused-appellants' disclaimers must fail in the light of the positive
Tolentino at Bgy. Triumpo, which is two kilometers away from Bgy. Vinas. Among the CAFGUs with identification made by Aida Castillo and Zenaida Castillo who were both present when the killings took
Sgt. Verde at that time were accused-appellants Bonifacio Rada and Adriano Sacdalan. At around 1 place.
o'clock in the morning of September 19, 1989, they heard gunshots from the direction of Bgy. Vinas.
They immediately proceeded to Bgy. Vinas to investigate. On the way, they met Epifanio Yamo from
Accused-appellants try to make much capital out of inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
whom they inquired about the incident. Epifanio told them that the firing came from Bgy. Vinas. And
witnesses, particularly Aida Castillo, Juanito Castillo, and Zenaida Castillo. They point out that while
still, on the way, they met two women, who when asked where they came from answered, "sa
Juanito Castillo declared that when his mother Leonora Castillo identified accused-appellants as the
pinangyarihan" without mentioning any specific place (tsn, Feb. 18, 1992, pp. 20-31).
assailants, no one was actually attending to and beside his mother, while Aida Castillo, on the other
hand, claimed that there were four persons who were beside her mother-in-law when the latter revealed
When the team finally arrived at the scene of the crime, Sgt. Verde found the three victims. He likewise the identities of the assailants. Still, according to accused-appellants, Zenaida Castillo likewise
saw Aida Castillo crying and asked her who the villains were but Aida Castillo said that she did not contradicted Juanito Castillo when she testified that she, together with the family of her Tio Juanito and
know. Sgt. Verde further averred that they did not find any empty shells inside the house but found M- Tia Aida, were around Leonora Castillo when the latter mentioned the names of Bonifacio Rada and
16 empty shells outside the house. Failing to obtain information about the identities of the perpetrators Adriano Sacdalan.
of the crime, Sgt. Verde and his men decided to pursue the killers by following the footprints which led
them to Bgy. Apad Taisan. However, they failed to overtake the killers (tsn Id., pp. 34-37).
The alleged contradictions in the testimony of the eyewitnesses pointed out by accused-appellants refer
to a minor detail which is not sufficient to overthrow the probative value accorded by the trial court to
Vio Tolentino, a barangay councilman of Bgy. Triumpo, Guinayangan, Quezon, claimed that the group the testimony of said eyewitnesses.
of Sgt. Jolly Verde which was composed of eleven persons including accused-appellants Bonifacio Rada
and Adriano Sacdalan, rested in his house on September 18, 1989. These men left at around 1 o'clock in
On the contrary, the testimony of the abovenamed witnesses further bolster the fact that victim Leonora
the morning of September 19, 1989 after hearing gunshots coming from the direction of Bgy. Vinas. Vio
Castillo repeatedly identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. It has been our
Tolentino affirmed that accused-appellants are his friends (tsn, Feb. 19, 1992, pp. 10-15).
consistent ruling that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not
destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a
Sgt. Leopoldo Marilag of the military camp at Bgy. Tabugon, Calauag, Quezon, declared that at around rehearsed testimony (People vs. Quel, 29, 279 SCRA 145 [1997]; People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629
4 o'clock in the morning of September 19, 1989, he investigated the shooting incident which took place [1995]).
in Bgy. Vinas. He asked Aida Castillo regarding the identities of the persons responsible for the killing
but Aida maintained that she did not recognize these persons. The following morning, Aida Castillo and
On the whole, the alleged variance in the declarations of Juanito and that of Aida and Zenaida as to A. She can utter a word and I even ask the patient what
whether other persons were present when Leonora identified accused-appellants as the killers, is does she feel and she mentioned that she hard a difficulty
inconsequential. The witnesses testifying to the same event do not have to be consistent in every detail of breathing.
as differences in recollection or viewpoints or impressions are inevitable (People vs. Fabros, 214 SCRA
694 [1992]). Indeed, if rights were to be lost merely because witnesses, while agreeing on the essential
(tsn, Nov. 20,
fact, fail to testify harmoniously on all the particulars, a very large proportion of cases involving wrongs
would find no redress in law. Hence, variations in the testimony of witnesses on the same side in respect
to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not usually impair the weight of their united testimony to the To be sure, Leonora's revelation of the names of accused-appellants should be considered as a dying
prominent facts (People vs. De Gracia, 264 SCRA 200 [1996]). declaration. An ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death,
all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled (People vs. Montilla, 211 SCRA 119 [1992]).
On the other hand, it is the testimony of defense witnesses which glaringly cannot agree on material
points. While Sgt. Jolly Verde claimed that his group arrived at the crime scene ahead of the group of We agree with the trial court in appreciating treachery in this case. Treachery or alevosia is properly
Sgt. Leopoldo Marilag (tsn, Feb. 18, 1992, pp. 56-57) the latter's testimony point to the contrary (tsn, appreciated when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
Sept. 9, 1993, pp. 39-42). It should further be carefully noted that Sgt. Verde also declared that when forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution thereof, without
they arrived in the house of Aida Castillo, they found three dead persons inside the house (tsn, Feb. 18, risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. And "an unexpected and
1992, p. 34). This runs counter to the testimony of Aida Castillo that the group of Sgt. Verde arrived sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by
after her brother Juanito Castillo had left to bring Leonora Castillo to the hospital (tsn, Jan. 14, 1991, p. reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia" (People vs. Soldao, 243 SCRA
20). Sgt. Verde's testimony is clearly dubious because it is an established fact that Leonora Castillo was 119 [1995]). In this case, the attack employed by accused-appellants was clearly attended by treachery
brought and later died in the hospital. because they fired their guns while Isidro Castillo and Leonora Castillo were lying down in their room
and while the third victim, Simeon Castillo, was switching on the light in their balcony. Evidently, these
casualties were defenseless, vulnerable, and helpless as the attack was sudden and unexpected, affording
The slight delay of only 7 days on the part of the prosecution witnesses in reporting the incident does
the victims no warning at all. Accused-appellants even positioned themselves outside the house of the
not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by these witnesses to the police authorities
victims while firing their guns, obviously to insure that there would be no risk to themselves. Still not
of accused-appellants' identities immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against
contented, they went inside the house after the initial shooting and upon seeing the already wounded
human experience. In fact, the Court has consistently ruled that the initial reluctance of witnesses to
Simeon Castillo, fired two more shots to finish him off despite the pleas for mercy of Simeon's wife,
volunteer information about a criminal case due to fear of reprisal is common and has been judicially
Aida Castillo.
declared not to affect credibility (People vs. Israel, 231 SCRA 155 [1994]; People vs. Malimit, 264
SCRA 167 [1996]; People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 [1996]).
All that accused-appellants could offer by way of defense are alibi and denial. These defenses cannot
prevail over the positive identification of credible prosecution witnesses (People vs. Villanueva, 242
As satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses, they did not file a report with the local
SCRA 47 [1995]; People vs. Layno, 264 SCRA 558 [1996]) as well as where there is an ante
authorities because they feared for their lives since accused-appellants were CAFGU members and had
mortem statement of the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res
strong connections with the police and military officers. This was the reason why the crime was reported
gestae (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]). Especially must this be so, in view of defense
instead to the Human Rights Commission. Moreover, neither substantive nor procedural law requires
witnesses Sgt. Verde and Kagawad Tolentino's claim that the place where they allegedly were at the
any person witnessing a crime to immediately report the matter to the proper authorities or to give his or
time of the incident is only about two kilometers from the crime scene (tsn, Feb. 18, 1992, p. 42; Feb.
her statement thereon (People vs. Jamiro, 279 SCRA 290 [1997]).
19, 1992, pp. 16-17). Essential to a valid defense of alibi is the physical impossibility of the accused to
be present at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission thereof (People vs. Daquipil, 240
Likewise, the record is bereft of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses have improper motives to SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]). Accused-appellants failed to
testify falsely against accused-appellants. Thus, we adhere to the established rule that absent evidence demonstrate any of these elements in the case at bench.
showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit (People vs. Agunais,
Accused-appellants further argue that it is highly unnatural for them to enter the victims' house without
279 SCRA 52 [1997]; People vs. Constantino, 235 SCRA 384 [1994]; People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148
anything to conceal their identity considering the fact that they were both familiar and known to the
[1992]).
Castillos. This argument deserves scant consideration. Not all perpetrators of a gruesome crime would
hide their faces, especially so when the crime is committed at nighttime, as in this case. The criminal
Accused-appellants contend that it is improbable for victim Leonora Castillo to have made a dying assault occurred at around 1 o'clock just past midnight and accused-appellants might have thought that it
declaration anent their identities as Leonora's physical condition, after sustaining the fatal gunshot would be difficult to determine their identities because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people
wounds, rendered her incapable of perceiving. This argument is belied by the expert testimony of Dr. in the streets. That is why there was no need for them to hide their identities.
Zaballero, the physician who treated Leonora, to this effect:
The trial court correctly found the sequence and combination of the facts and circumstances proven as
Q. Doctor, when you treated her on September 19, 1989, sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, accused-
your patient is capable of voluntary movement? appellants have failed at this instance to present any substantial basis for overturning the conclusion
reached by the trial court.1âwphi1.nêt
A. Yes, sir.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Q. In fact, she can speak or talk?
SO ORDERED. SPO3 Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and other police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped
carry Alexander to an ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who shot him to which he
answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which appellant is known.11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila Alexander’s wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by Alexander that it was appellant
who shot him.12 Alexander died the following day.13
SECOND DIVISION
Dr. Tito D. Doromal, Philippine National Police medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the body
of Alexander. The autopsy report stated the cause of death to be hemorrhage secondary to pellet
G.R. No. 177147               November 28, 2007
wounds.14 Testifying on his report, Dr. Doromal explained that Alexander died from a gunshot wound
(Formerly G.R. No. 147313)
which penetrated the ribs and lacerated the right lobe of the liver, colon, stomach, duodenum, and right
kidney. The entrance wound was located at the middle-back portion of the body. Seven (7) pellets were
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, recovered on the muscle of the upper and middle abdominal wall.15
vs.
JOEMARIE CERILLA, VELASCO, JR., Appellant.
The defense’s evidence consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and of his wife, Madoline, his
stepdaughter, Franlin, PO1 Manolito Javelora, PO3 Alberto Sarmiento, and PO3 Wilson Allona.
DECISION Appellant interposed alibi as his main defense. He claimed that Alexander, together with his daughter
and Sendin, had gone to his house on 24 April 1998 at around 6:00 p.m. where they were welcomed and
offered snacks.16 They were having a conversation when a blackout occurred. Alexander then asked
TINGA, J.: permission to leave. After the visitors had left, appellant ordered his stepdaughter Franlin to buy candle
at the store across their house. Appellant and Madoline posted themselves at their doorway holding a
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 dated 26 October 2006 in CA-G.R. CR- flashlight to light Franlin’s path. Upon Franlin’s return to the house, appellant heard an explosion and he
HC No. 00032 which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of immediately closed the door. Later, the policemen
Iloilo City, Branch 23 dated 15 August 2000 in Criminal Case No. 496502 finding appellant Joemarie
Cerilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty went to his house and told him that he was a suspect in the shooting of Alexander and was then brought
of reclusion perpetua. to the police station.17 The following day, he was subjected to paraffin test the result of which turned out
to be negative.18
On 6 July 1998, an Information was filed against appellant charging him of the crime of murder
committed as follows: Appellant’s testimony was corroborated by Madoline and Franlin. PO1 Javelora declared that when he
asked Alexander who shot him, the latter did not answer.19 Likewise, PO3 Sarmiento and Allona stated
That on or about April 24, 1998, in the Municipality of Leganes, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and that when they went to the hospital to interrogate Alexander, the latter could not give a definite answer
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm with as to who shot him.20
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot Alexander Parreño with the firearm which the accused was then On 15 August 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced
provided, hitting and inflicting pellet wound at the right back portion of his body which caused his him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
death.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 aforecited, judgement is hereby rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER, hereby sentencing the said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
The prosecution’s evidence shows that at around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659[,] amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Parreño (Alexander), his 14-year old daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe Sendin (Sendin), went to said accused is further condemned to indemnify the surviving heirs of the deceased, Alexander Parreño,
the house of appellant. They were cordially welcomed and entertained by appellant and his wife.5 An the sum of ₱257,774.75 by way of actual damages; the amount of ₱30,000.00 by way of moral damages
hour later, a blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the couple to leave, and the sum of ₱50,000.00 by way of death compensation. The accused who is detained is entitled to be
which the latter acknowledged.6 On their way home, Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the credited in full with the entire period of his preventive detention. The Jail Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation
latter closely following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters Center is ordered to remit the said accused to the National Penitentiary at the earliest opportunity.

from appellant’s house, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle immediately turned her back and saw SO ORDERED.21
appellant pointing a gun at Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards her.7 Sendin, who
was also with Alexander and Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and proceeded to the The trial court regarded the victim’s dying declaration as the most telling evidence pointing to appellant
house of Mrs. Parreño.8 Meanwhile, Michelle was cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter as the assailant.22 It appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying the crime to murder because the
repeatedly told her that it was appellant who shot him.9 Twenty minutes later, Alexander’s other victim was unarmed and walking on his way
daughter, Novie Mae, arrived; she was also told by Alexander at that moment that it was appellant who
shot him.10
home when he was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant. 23 The trial court ruled that A: When I heard the shot, I turned back and I saw Joemarie pointing to my Dad.
appellant’s alibi and denial could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible
witnesses.24 Moreover, it observed that appellant was not able to prove the impossibility of his presence
COURT:
at the crime scene which could have proven his alibi.25

Q: What did he point towards your Dad?

In view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant, the case was initially elevated to this
Court for review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,26 the case was referred to the
Court of Appeals. A: Firearm.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling but modified the award of moral damages from PROSECUTOR PADILLA:
Thirty Thousand Pesos to Fifty Thousand Pesos.27 Hence, the instant appeal.
Q: You said Joemarie was pointing a firearm to your father. Was it [a] long or short firearm?
In a Resolution dated 16 July 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desired.28 Both parties manifested that they would adopt their
A: About 11 inches.
briefs filed before the appellate court.29 Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Q: After you saw Joemarie pointing a firearm to your father, what happened next?
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution's
eyewitness, Michelle, as well as the dying declaration of Alexander considering that the circumstances
under which the crime was committed rendered the identification of the gunman impossible. A: I saw my father staggering towards me and I saw Joemarie Cerilla ran.

This argument essentially challenges the credibility of the witnesses, including the eyewitness, whose Q: Where was he going?
testimonies were relied upon by the trial court in convicting appellant. Basic is the principle that the
findings of fact of a trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high A: Maybe towards his house.31
respect, if not conclusive effect. This is because the
xxxx
trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best position to
discern whether they are telling the truth. This rule holds true especially when the trial court's findings Q: If this Joemarie Cerilla is inside the Courtroom, can you identify him?
have been affirmed by the appellate court.30
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Appellant’s authorship of the crime was proven by the positive identification of an eyewitness and the
victim’s dying declaration.
Q: Please point to him. (Witness pointing to the accused Joemarie Cerilla).32

The prosecution presented Michelle, who categorically identified appellant as the one who shot
Alexander, viz: Michelle’s account of how her father was shot by appellant was corroborated by the post-mortem
examination which reveals that the entrance wound is located at the back of the victim. 33 In the same
vein, the medico-legal expert concluded that the gunshot was fired at a close range, as evidenced by the
Q: While you and your father were walking towards home, did you remember anything presence of a power burn measuring four (4) centimeters in diameter surrounding the periphery of the
unusual that happened? wound 34 and penetrating his internal organs.35

A: Yes, Ma’am. Significantly, the eyewitness’s positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is fully
supported the victim’s dying declaration.
Q: What was that?
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which
A: I heard an explosion. concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is
impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of
retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person
Q: Where were you in relation to your father when you heard that shot? after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning
the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.36
A: I was in front of my Daddy and he was at my back.
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending
Q: You said you heard a shot, what did you do when you heard a shot?
death would make a careless and false accusation. 37 It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the
accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the circumstances under A: Not once but about 10 times.45
which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and
Shortly thereafter, Novie Mae arrived and was told by Alexander that it was appellant who
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant’s death renders it impossible his taking the witness opened fire at him:
stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it,
therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in
Q: When you reached Confessor Street, what happened?
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the
mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of
death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an A: I saw that my elder sister was assisting my father.
oath administered in court.38
COURT:
Of the doctrines that authorize the admission of special classes of hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying
declarations is the most mystical in its theory and, traditionally, among the most arbitrary in its
Q: What’s the name of your sister?
limitations. In the United States, the notion of the special likelihood of truthfulness of deathbed
statements was widespread long before the recognition of a general rule against hearsay in the early
1700s. Not surprisingly, nearly as soon as we find a hearsay rule, we also find an exception for dying A: Michelle.
declarations.39
COURT:
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: first, the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers
not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a Proceed.
direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarant’s injury or the cause of
death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the FISCAL:
killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are
admissible.40 Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a Q: When you saw your sister Michelle assisting your father, what [sic] happened next?
fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration A: And I immediately went near my father and asked him who shot him and he answered it
admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the was Joemarie Cerilla who shot him.
deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.41 Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant
would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be Q: Before you reached your father, did you observe his physical appearance of what
admissible. Accordingly, declarations made by a child too young to be a competent witness or by a happened to him?
person who was insane or incapable of understanding his own statements by reason of partial
unconsciousness are not admissible in evidence.42 Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the A: Yes, Ma’am, he was supporting with his arm and when I asked him he still made a
declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must be response.
sustained that he would have been competent.43 Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. 44 Anent this requisite, the
same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the Q: You said [that] before you approached your father[,] you saw him supporting his body,
stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexander’s ante mortem statement in the present what was his position at that time?
criminal case for murder.
A: He was in a position of lying with his hand on the road and my sister was assisting him.
The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with unanimity that
they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him. Michelle recounted: xxx

Q: You said your father moved towards you, what happened next? Q: Were you able to observe why your father was sitting on the ground and supporting
himself not to fall.
A: I approached my father and cuddled him.
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: What happened next?
Q: Why, [sic] what did you observe?
A: While I was cuddling my father he said, "Day, it was Joemarie who shot me."
A: My father was supporting himself in order that blood will not [ooze] from his body and
Q: How many time he said he was shot? his body will not fall down.46
SPO3 Dequito, who responded immediately to the crime scene, corroborated the testimonies Q: When you reached that hospital and your own mother led you to where Alexander was, in
of the Alexander’s children, to wit: what part of the hospital did you first see him.

Q: So, what did you do when you arrived at the crime scene? A: Outside the operating room.

A: We advised the group to carry Mr. Parreño to the ambulance because the ambulance was Q: What was the situation of your husband when you first saw him?
on the way and after our mobile arrived, the ambulance arrived also [sic] so we carried Mr.
Parreño to be brought to the hospital.
A: He was leaning on his side and many nurses attending to him and saying "araguy."

COURT:
xxx

Q: Meaning you loaded the victim into the ambulance?

Q: Between you and your husband who spoke first?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: My husband.

Q: And after he was loaded, what did you do?

Q: What were the exact words stated by your husband?

A: Before the ambulance left the area, I questioned the victim who shot him and he answered
A: He told me that it was Joemarie who shot him.48
Alias "Pato." I am referring to Joemarie Cerilla, the accused.

These statements comply with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First, Alexander’s declaration
Q: The accused Cerilla, Alias "Pato"?
pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the
injuries49 he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as his condition was so serious that his
A: Yes, Your Honor. demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have been
competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution
for murder where he was the victim.
PROSECUTOR:

Other police officers were presented by the defense to refute the dying declaration.1âwphi1 PO1
Q: Can you remember the exact words uttered by the victim when you asked him who shot
Javelora alleged that he happened to pass by the crime scene and saw a young girl crying. The girl led
him?
him to her father who was sitting on the roadside. He asked the victim who shot him but he did not get
any reply.50 PO3 Allona and Sarmiento arrived at the hospital and questioned Alexander as to who shot
A: He answered me that: I questioned him, "Who shot you?" and he answered that it was him but the latter told them, "I am not sure because it was dark."51 These statements cannot be construed
Cerilla and I further asked him "The husband of Madoline" and he answered "Yes, Alias as a categorical statement of the victim denying knowledge as to the identity of his assailant. It can be
"Pato", the husband of Madoline.47 recalled that at the time Alexander was being questioned, he was already being readied for surgery. At
that point, he was understandably no longer fit to respond to questions. Between these two seemingly
conflicting testimonies, it is the positive identification made by Alexander in his dying declaration
Likewise, Alexander’s wife, Sonia, testified: which must be sustained.

Q: You said from your house when you were told by the girls that your husband was shot, Appellant insists that there was an inherent impossibility in identifying the assailant with clarity since
what did you do? there was a power blackout at the time of the commission of the crime and was then a moonless night.

A: I looked for a taxi and proceeded to the hospital. The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s and
Michelle’s positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this did not
xxx prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot was delivered
at close range.
Q: When you arrived at the hospital, where did you go first?
In dismissing appellant’s contention, the trial court rationalized:
A: To my husband.
x x x This argument deserves scant consideration. In the case of People v. Hillado, G.R. No. 122838[,]
promulgated on May 24, 1999[,] citing the case of People v. Oliano, "visibility at nighttime is possible
xxx not only at the exact minute and date when the moon is full as indicated in the calendar. Thus, a person’s
nocturnal eyesight, is not necessarily diminished just because there is no illumination from the moon,
because it is a fact that our eyes can actually adjust to the darkness so that we can still see objects clearly SECOND DIVISION
even without sufficient lighting. In the case at bar, it would not be so hard for Michelle to identify a
person’s fact especially if the latter – as in the present case – was barely two (2) arms length away from
[G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997]
them which is confirmed by the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the body of the victim. We stress,
that the normal reaction of the person is to direct his sight towards the source of a startling [shot] or
occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, the most natural reaction of the victims in criminal violence is to THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE
strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is and PETER DOE, Accused-Appellants.
committed. Added to this is the fact that the accused Joemarie Cerilla and the victim Alexander Parreño
have known each other quite well before the incident so that they became familiar with each other’s face
DECISION
and physical features. x x x 52

ROMERO, J.:
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were not shown to be impelled by ill motive to testify falsely
against appellant. Besides, Susan, Michelle and Novie Mae, being immediate relatives of the deceased,
would naturally be interested in having the real culprit punished.53 Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts
are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under an information 1 dated July 13, 1992, which reads
The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi.54 It was not physically
as follows:
impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is only 120-150 meters,
more or less.55 That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating together and helping one another, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat,
Appellant counters that there was absence of any motive on his part to kill the victim; that it was not
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the
clearly proven that he fired a gun, based on the paraffin test; and that he appeared calm and composed
latter was drinking liquor with his friends at Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and
and showed no indication of guilt when he was invited by the police officers shortly after the
carried away using a PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said
commission of the crime.
Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will.

Time and again, we have ruled that a negative finding on paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one
CONTRARY TO LAW.
has not fired a gun because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrates or
gunpowder, as when the culprit washes his hands or wears gloves. 56 The trial court correctly rejected the
result of the paraffin test in light of the positive identification of appellant. A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution
presented four witnesses.2 On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.
The trial court held that the killing was qualified by treachery because Alexander, who was unarmed,
was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant without any risk to the latter from any The material facts and events as found by the court a quo are:
defense which the former might make. There was no opportunity given to Alexander to repel the assault
or offer any defense of his person. There was not the slightest provocation on his part.57 We agree with
the findings of the trial court. The presence of treachery was evident in the execution of the crime. It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr.
Appellant suddenly, and without warning, shot Alexander from his back. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. Because the killing of Alexander, although qualified by child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was Payat. 3 When
treachery, was not attended by any other aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him not
reclusion perpetua. to run because they were policemen and because he had an atraso or a score to settle with them. They
then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the
latters mother of the abduction.
We deem it proper to further impose exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 which is
recoverable in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the
commission of the crime.58 The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to
establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty and this was the motive behind the
formers kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2006, affirming with
modification the Regional Trial Court Judgment dated 15 August 2000 finding appellant, Joemari
Cerilla, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on
appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Alexander Parreño ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SO ORDERED. On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding Bernal guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda, Jr. under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral were drinking at Tarsings Store on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them.
suffering.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the store and asked for
Payat. When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was handcuffed and taken away by the
unidentified men.
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses allegedly
illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in
January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.
time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not
to do it again because she (was) a married woman.9 Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reason
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what is important is to
determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled
exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by
with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused
the simple expedient of disposing of their victims bodies.
was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. 10 Openda, Jr.s revelation to
Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus: Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

ART. 267. - Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: successors-in-interest and against third persons.

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days. With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to
assume that declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is,
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the
threats to kill him shall have been made. declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his
aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer. true.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above- Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime,
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. is admissible in evidence13 because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims liberty, which is the essential
element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarinos testimony. He alleges that the latter
with the two other unknown individuals as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of could not have seen the actual handcuffing because Tarsings Store could not be seen from the billiard
thought and community of purpose.7 Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence hall. Sagarinos testimony shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came
of a chain of circumstances only.8 The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the back with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.
participation of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.

"Q The three of them together?

The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his two
companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend
and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his A Yes, sir.
two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to Tarsings Store to check if a certain
person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latters Q And what about you, where did you stay?
presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already
handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernals companions.
A I just stayed in the billiard hall.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both
Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?
A The two came back. Q He was alone?

Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back? A Yes, sir.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A The companions of Bernal. The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be
irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility that
when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the latter could have already brought home his son
Q And what did these two men do?
before proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seen by Sagarino.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarinos testimony by imputing revenge as his motive for
testifying. He alleges that on July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged kidnapping, five policemen
From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. The arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza,
lower court correctly rejected this argument by holding that: Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the place and staying at the
billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the places he mentioned.
But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing
store. On the contrary, he says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal referred to when "Q - Minutes later do you know what happened?
he requested one of this two companions to go see if that person was still there at the store, and that he
came to know that he was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the billiard hall already
"A - They came back.
handcuffed, with the two unidentified companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main
road.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Q - What did you do after they came back?
If one had a direct view of Tarsings Store from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested his
companion to check if Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed "A - I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were looking (for)?
out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:
"Q - What was their answer?
"Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his child, is that correct?
"A - They answered in the negative.
A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Q - Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do?
On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:
"A - I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?)
"Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see him again?
"Q - What was the answer of the policemen?
A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and proceeded to Tarcing
Store and arrested Jun-jun Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda, fifteen minutes
"A - The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because accordingly (sic) they were
later, Bernal came.
marijuana pushers.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)

Bernals position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made by
pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous.
A He was coming from outside.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive against
Q He has with him his son? Bernal. If the latters allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by the police at the
time he gave his testimony in court. No such arrest was, however, made.
A He was with nobody, sir.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino
sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarinos forthright answers to the questions of the
Q Are you sure of that?
prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or
kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
A Yes, sir. witness, but must be credible in itself.21 This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established
rule that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal,
absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the question The above-named petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
of credibility of witnesses.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since time immemorial. They trace
their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in 1945. He was survived by his nephews and
nieces, now deceased, except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiro’s grand nieces and grand
We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to resurface. Considering
nephews (herein petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.

When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they found that portions
Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, recommended to this Court
of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina Calderon and Renato Macapagal,
the penalty of seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as
respondents. According to petitioners, spouses Calderon used falsified documents to justify their
maximum. The maximum penalty must be determined in accordance with rules and provisions of the
possession of 20,116 square meters of the land which they sold to the government. For his part, Renato
Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however, " it is left entirely within the
Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent No. 045802-1165 which led to the issuance to him
discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-665 over an area of 18,787 square meters. Because of these
the periods in to which it may be subdivided."23 Consistent with this ruling, this court imposes reclusion
incidents, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bracnh 73, Antipolo City a complaint for
temporal, in its maximum period, as the minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
quieting of title, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2418.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSEDand the appealed decision
Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petitioners’ allegations in their
dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.
complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bought their property in 1958 and, since then, have
been in possession of the same. They planted trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the
Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal. corresponding realty taxes. She does not know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.

SO ORDERED. Before the hearing of the case, or on July 20, 1993, petitioners and Macapagal entered into a
Compromise Agreement.2 Petitioners acknowledged therein his ownership of the portions of the land
consisting of 18,787 square meters covered by OCT No. P-665. This agreement was approved by the
Republic of the Philippines trial court.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
After petitioners had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demurrer to evidence. In an
Order dated March 20, 1995, the trial court granted their motion and dismissed the complaint.
FIRST DIVISION

On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated July 31, 2000 affirming the
G.R. No. 144208             September 11, 2007 Order of the trial court dismissing their complaint. The appellate court held:

EFREN TANDOG, FELIX TANDOG, FELIPE TANDOG, JOSEFINO TANDOG, HELEN Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,
TANDOG, CATALINA TANDOG, ROMEO TANDOG, DOMINGO TANDOG, CATALINA record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question
SANTOS, MARIA BAUTISTA CATANYAG, ARTEMIO CATANYAG, ANGELES or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for
CATANYAG, APOLONIA CATANYAG, ADORACION CATANYAG, ARCELY CATANYAG, filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim,
and AMPARO CATANYAG, all represented by EFREN TANDOG, petitioners, encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim "expresio unius est exclusio alterius," these
vs. grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not
RENATO MACAPAGAL, SPOUSES ALFONSO and MARINA CALDERON, and the LANDS be considered valid for the same action. (Titong v. CA, G.R. No. 111141, March 6, 1998)
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, respondents.

The appellants had nothing to show for this. The most that they did was to mark a DEED OF
DECISION ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY & OR RIGHTS OR INTERESTS THEREIN as
Exh. "D" and a SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY as Exh. "E", which allegedly are the
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: falsified documents used by the appellees as basis for their claim over the subject lot. x x x

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as xxx
amended, assailing the Decision1 dated July 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57812. Under Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that for the evidence to be
considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are: document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been
offered as part of the evidence of a party. (Vda de Oñate v. CA, G.R. 116149, Nov. 23, 1995)
Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must
The subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147,991 square meters situated at Sitio Inarawan, formally be offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. x x x
Barangay Inuman, San Isidro, Antipolo City.
 It does not help either that the testimonies presented are on the whole hearsay and unreliable EN BANC
as to the existence and right of the amorphous Casimero Policarpio and the hereditary link
between him and the appellants. [G.R. No. L-24989. July 21, 1967.]

PEDRO GRAVADOR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT

Hence, this present petition.
SUPERVISOR OF BAYAWAN-STA. CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE DIVISION
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
Petitioners contend that the allegations of spouses Calderon that they purchased their property and SCHOOLS and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, (all sued in their official and personal
Macapagal’s claim that he applied for a Free Patent are judicial admissions which they (petitioners) capacities), Respondents-Appellants.
consider as cloud upon their interest in the disputed property.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General I.C . Borromeo and Solicitor F. J .
Bautista for Respondents-Appellants.
The petition must fail.
Newton E. Serion for Petitioner-Appellee.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason SYLLABUS
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; FINDINGS OF FACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS; EFFECT.
title. — That the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by
substantial evidence, is a settled rule of administrative law.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; DATE OF BIRTH; CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENCING THE SAME. — Although
or any interest therein.
a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had
learned it from his parents and relatives, and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or tradition. Indeed, even in his application for backpay, filed through the Office of the Superintendent of
parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where Schools, on October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He
there is a written or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance
prescription or adverse possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title. 3 System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901. Again
the import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral
case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made
While petitioners alleged that respondents’ claim of adverse possession is a cloud on their (petitioners’) ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree
interest in the land, however, such allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, December 11,
relied upon by respondents to justify their possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also
formally offered in evidence by petitioners. We have consistently ruled that documents which may have by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be
considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.4 3. ID.; QUO WARRANTO; PERIOD WITHIN WHICH ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT. — Suits for
quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one year.
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action.5 Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did 4. ID.; RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; APPLICATION OF RULE
not present any evidence to prove that Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in- WHERE RIGHT ASSERTED MAY BE NULLIFIED IF OBSERVANCE THEREOF IS INSISTED
interest. Their testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree. In order that pedigree may UPON. — The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its
be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section 39 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is observance would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.
necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by
a person related to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the
actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration; and (d) the act or
declaration was made ante litem motam, or prior to the controversy.6 DECISION

Records show that petitioners failed to establish by evidence any or all the above requisites.
CASTRO, J.:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57812. Costs against petitioners.
The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina,
SO ORDERED. Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then Superintendent of Schools Angel
Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on
the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. The advice Employee’s Record Card 5 and an Employee’s Record of Qualifications 6 state that the petitioner was
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph born on December 11, 1901. These are the records on which the petitioner bases his claim.

"According to your pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools, including your Employee’s The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where the
Record Card, which has just been found in connection with the verification of the services of all school petitioner was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no record of
officials including elementary school principals in this division, you were born on November 26, 1897. the petitioner’s birth.
As of this date, therefore, you are now 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old.
According to the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and
"In view of the above, you are hereby advised of your separation from the service effective immediately therefore the correct date of birth of the petitioner is December 11, 1901. The court also took into
unless you can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below sixty- account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
five of age today."cralaw virtua1aw library dated March 15, 1924, filed by the petitioner’s brother, Romulo Gravador, now deceased. It is therein
stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the co-owners of a piece of land, was at the time 23 years old.
A few days later, the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said
elementary school. The respondents now contend that the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to
establish the date of birth (December 11, 1901) of the petitioner. They argue that these records were
On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement made only because it was thought that the pre-war records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-
on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to war records had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as
his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes, both controlling; and that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner was born on
of Amlan, Negros Oriental, in which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court.
born on December 11, 1901, in the Municipality of Amlan, formerly known as New Ayuquitan,
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines" because "we were the neighbors of the late spouses, That the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial
NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner’s parents] and that we were evidence, is a settled rule of administrative law. But whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore, we were also invited during the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. The school official based his
baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO GRAVADOR."cralaw virtua1aw library determination of the petitioner’s age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which the petitioner
does not appear to have taken a part. 7 On the other hand, the petitioner relies on post-war records which
On October 19, 1964 the petitioner wrote to the Division Superintendent of Schools, reiterating his he personally accomplished to prove the date of his birth. 8
claim that he had not reached the age of 65 and enclosing some papers in support thereof.
It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-war records, for three cogent
On April 13, 1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First reasons.
Instance of Negros Oriental. He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the
Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment to him of not only his back salaries but also In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his
damages in the total amount of P52,400. Named as respondents were Eutiquio Mamigo, the District birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in
Supervisor, the Superintendent of Schools, the Director of Public Schools and the Secretary of such case is an assertion of a family tradition. 9 Indeed, even in his application for back pay which he
Education. filed with the Department of Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on October
7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He repeated the same
The respondents filed their answer, entered into a stipulation of facts with the petitioner, and thereafter assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance System and the
the case was submitted for decision. The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on December Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901.
11, 1901 and accordingly granted his petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the
petitioner was reinstated. In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can
The respondents appealed directly to this Court. not be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration
regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed
thereby had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner only by evidence of family
to him of the corresponding retirement benefits. We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
court’s decision on the merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based, among
other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree, 1 and that payment of benefits already made Finally, the parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10,
to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date of his birth would not exempt him from 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been
the obligation to make a refund should this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born on November born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as the pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is
26, 1897, as the respondents claim. admittedly older than he. 10

The controversy on the petitioner’s date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Still it is argued that the petitioner’s action was prematurely brought because he had not availed of all
Division of Schools of Negros Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show his date of birth to be administrative remedies. This argument is without merit. Suits for quo warranto to recover a public
November 26, 1897. These records consist of two Insular Teacher’s Cards 2 and one Employee’s office must be brought within one year. 11 Before filing this case the petitioner waited for eight months
Record Card. 3 It is on the basis of these records that the Superintendent of Schools determined the for the school officials to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little more would obviously be
petitioner’s age to be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days on August 15, 1964. unfair to him since on April 13, 1965, when this case was filed, he had only four months left within
which to bring the case to court. There was neither manner nor form of assurance that the decision of the
On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher’s Report Card, 4 an Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in the nullification of the claim being 2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latters own acts and
asserted. 12 those of his family?

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by estoppel, laches and/or
prescription?
FIRST DIVISION
4. Damages.7cräläwvirtualibräry
G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben
FRANCISCO L. JISON, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, Respondent. Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao,
Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
DECISION
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked for
FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence. Towards the
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCOs wife suffered a miscarriage or abortion, thereby
depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCOs wife managed a nightclub on the
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995 decision of the ground floor of Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day,
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 328601 which reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 16373.2 The latter dismissed the complaint nicknamed Pansay.
of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of
petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO).
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya (nanny) of Lourdes from
July 1946 up to February 1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two (2) weeks before Adela
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error, which, in this started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in September 1946, or about one month after
instance, necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a general rule, factual issues are not within the she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia Jison,
province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living room, and in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that
Court of Appeals, this case falls under an exception to this rule.3cräläwvirtualibräry FRANCISCO was the father of her baby. To which, Lilia replied: I did not tell you to make that baby so
it is your fault. During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was
supposedly inside the house listening.
In her complaint4 filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been
married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he worked as
FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, FRANCISCOs houseboy at the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio
and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that
FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her MONINA, FRANCISCOs daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of introduction from
support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public Lagarto.
accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to
expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
MONINA,8 and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6) telephone cards (Exhs. G
to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him
In his answer,5 FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar as FRANCISCOs daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCOs house, but when the latter and his wife would
during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and come over, Arsenio would conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her
did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or face. Once, Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in
impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong.
MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having
and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
malicious filing of the complaint.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was FRANCISCO who instructed
After MONINA filed her reply,6 pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the following that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his wife were around; that although
issues: FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the Bacolod house only once, they called each other
through long distance; and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as Daddy during their lone meeting
at the Bacolod house and were affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about the end of 1945 or the stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then for about a week the second time.
start of 1946? On both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that
FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like his (FRANCISCOs) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City, initially MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever FRANCISCOs wife was not
touched on how he and his wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would speak with and address FRANCISCO as Daddy,
Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the Jison and Lopez families, which without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money
showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, then thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCOs office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal
told the court that the family of Vice-President Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is for the funeral expenses of MONINAs mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the
considered a relative xxx by reputation, by actual perception. Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to court that he simply wanted to help bring out the truth and nothing but the truth, and that MONINAs
X-18, photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez, which filiation was common knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
showed MONINA with the former Vice-President and other members of the Lopez family.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCOs office to MONINA were not
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for some of reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr. Lagarto explained that
MONINAs school needs and even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and FRANCISCOs wife and children should not know [of] this. Rudy further revealed that as to the garden
that another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, a certain Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped meetings between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek
MONINA with her studies and problems, and even attended MONINAs graduation in 1978 when she both upon arriving and before leaving, and FRANCISCOs reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say
obtained a masteral degree in Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X- in the Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you, daughter?); and that MONINA was free to go
12). Moreover, upon Remedios recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes, MONINA would join
Financing Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of them for lunch.
FRANCISCOs wife, and among whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and Dantheas husband. In
closing, Zafiro identified MONINAs Social Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Central
employer and where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first
served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first cousin of her Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the latter part of 1965 when
Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her P15.00 monthly
managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea as being reputedly the daughter of Mr.
allowance given upon FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo further declared that MONINAs filiation
Frank Jison; and on several occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latters husband
was pretty well-known in the office; that he had seen MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main
understand that MONINA was reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]. While MONINA worked at
building to the office, with FRANCISCOs arm on MONINAs shoulder; and that the office paid for the
Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of
burial expenses of Pansay, but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCOs
1966, as Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin University, Danthea
wife. Alfredo also disclosed that the disbursements for MONINAs allowance started in 1961 and were
and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During MONINAs 6-month stay with them, she
recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and
was not charged for board and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere employee, all owing to
was employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as FRANCISCOs accountant-
what Remedios had said regarding MONINAs filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned
auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza,
from Merchant Financing as she was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Dantheas husband who
and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA.
lived in Bacolod City.
When Alfredo asked her how she came to work there, she answered that her Daddy, FRANCISCO,
recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza. Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO from 1969 up to at Miller, Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a procurement officer, hacienda overseer and, later, as
hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask her Daddy
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at
(meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but FRANCISCO answered that he did
Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954, MONINA and her
not have the money to give, then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the
mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for about an hour, during which
middle of September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and
time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of
bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA
the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their
entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA
conversation. As FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask
to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to MONINA if she signed the
for the sustenance of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head and asked: How
papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol intended not to give MONINA a copy of the
are you Hija?, to which MONINA answered: Good morning, Daddy. After FRANCISCO
document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a
told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and said to Pansay: I am giving
copy of the document she signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to
this for the child.
his motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as
FRANCISCOS daughter.
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagartos office where Dominador was to get the days
expenses, while MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next month, Dominador
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was employed by
saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that MONINA was there to get her allowance
FRANCISCOs wife at the Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at
from her Daddy. In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don
FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda expenses, typing vouchers and office papers,
Vicente (father of FRANCISCOs wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift and she was calling Don
and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his work, Rudy knew the
Vicente, Lolo (grandfather). At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around. Then sometime
persons receiving money from FRANCISCOs office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his
in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagartos office to get the marketing expenses, Dominador saw
job, Rudy gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a
MONINA once more claiming her allowance.
certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that he first met
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for FRANCISCO, arranged for her employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was
Dominador was at Mrs. Francos residence as she recommended him for employment with her sister, interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start working first
Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. week of September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs.
Francos daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who Cuaycong at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that
MONINA was. Dominador answered that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter with Pansay, and she resigned and asked him for money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak
then Mrs. Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was sending Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send
MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin. MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her hand,
after which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to
Bacolod City and promised that he would give her the money.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of Esperanza Amolar
(Pansay), testified that he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to November 1945 at
Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to work at Elena Apartments in Manila. By MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket (Exh. M)
November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where she revealed to Lope that which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls
FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope dont get hurt and were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards (Exhs. G to L), with annotations at the back reading:
dont cause any trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child. Three (3) days charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-
after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received permission from FRANCISCO to resign because 1). PLDT issued a certification as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise
he (Lope) was hurt. introduced in evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on
MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40 years old and a
Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo and sign a
Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by FRANCISCO. She went to
1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) Atty. Tirols office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated
and FRANCISCO.9 MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado that she was not FRANCISCOs daughter. She explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was
from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other that he would pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her
school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw illegitimacy. She started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol
FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, responded that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could not be
MONINA studied in different schools,10 but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling. blamed for being brought into the world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to
the latters Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA
subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they discussed the affidavit which she refused to
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an
sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA
accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the
going abroad, the affidavit would keep her peace.
hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of
San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However,
expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirols office, she was accompanied by one
start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit (Exh. P)11 would boomerang against
her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2) semesters at FRANCISCO as it is contrary to law. MONINA returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol
University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh. Z showing that FRANCISCO once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21
was listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1]), she transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. September 1971, she signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself
Francos house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of and finish her studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check
Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to
senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA
passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.
her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as Guardian (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-
2).
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of introduction (Exhs.
S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to wit: Luz, the Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother), addressed to another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilios daughter), for
household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid Natang; the yaya of the adopted Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that
triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and others. MONINA likewise enumerated the MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting
members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam and graduate
Doroy, and others), and identified them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to travel abroad, for which reason, she
corroborated the prior testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and her having obtained a letter of introduction from former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United
lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence in Bacolod City, while working at the hospital States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).
owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as FRANCISCOs
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO at Elena wife was going to arrive at the latters Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and
Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of
going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Francos mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. the stay of FRANCISCOs wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice President Fernando Lopez
Upon her return from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a
recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with Mrs. Rosario that MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iigo never heard FRANCISCO mention that
Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly recognized MONINA was his (FRANCISCOs) daughter.
MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As additional proof of her close relationship with the family of
Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCOs daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know) MONINA at the
1985.
Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes first son, Mark. Over lunch one
day, Lourdes aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA to each other, but they were referred to
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes house
Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's in Sta. Clara Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-
testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two (2) occasions when she met with hunting. However, Lourdes did not comply with the request.
Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings
to get married.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz from 1968
up to 1971, however, he did not personally interview her before she was accepted for employment.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening procedure before being hired. Jose recalled that one
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCOs
Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. daughter. Jose then told Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her
from spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him that she
planned to leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange, she
FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while employed
would sign a document disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to
by him, Pansay would sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he,
request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienzas report.
his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff was
Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCOs personal lawyer, about the matter.
composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she
never communicated with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly
denied having had sexual relations with Pansay  and disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs birth. Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirols) office in Iloilo. Jose then
In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose relayed Atty. Tirols
that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with a check
Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirols office, Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his
likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha secretary reading some documents. MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the
Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter. document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to
reimbursement from and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he fired Alfredo
Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position during the formers absence. Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946, testified that she knew
FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor. that Pansay was Lourdes nanny; that Lourdes slept in her parents room; that she had not seen
FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay; that there was no unusual relationship between
FRANCISCO and Pansay,  and if there was any, Dolores would have easily detected it since she slept in
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long distance calls from his Bacolod residence;
the same room as Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever FRANCISCOs wife was out of
nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this, he fired certain people in his office for their failure
town, Pansay would bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in the
to report this anomaly. As regards the caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that
room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped working for
since MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the caretaker thought that he could allow people
FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.
who lived at the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCOs) house.

The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys Garden from 1963 up to 1974, then from 1980
up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not know MONINA; that he
learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October 1986, thereby
and that he never saw MONINA at Nellys Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at hearing only the testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about half of MONINAs testimony on direct
Nellys Garden to give money to MONINA. examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard the rest of MONINA's testimony and those of
FRANCISCOs witnesses.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCOs bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986, testified that
FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified discrepancies; and that he never In its decision of 12 November 199012 the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint
saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial with costs against MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof, it observed:
court, however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCOs haciendas,
and not vouchers pertaining to the latters personal expenses.
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against
defendant Francisco Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at the time when plaintiff,
Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nellys Garden from 1964 up to 1984 as a reckoned from her death of birth, was already thirty-nine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it
field inspector, paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo was instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiffs mother, Esperanza Amolar. For the years
Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered between plaintiffs birth and Esperanzas death, no action of any kind was instituted against defendant
either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latters parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such an
action against defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20, 1965, considering that she I
was then already nineteen years old or, within a reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more had to
supervene before this complaint was eventually instituted.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS CASE
AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANTS DELAY IN
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without, however, FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies of the witnesses other than
those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.
II

The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for witness Lope
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS
Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November
WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.
1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion
that copulation did indeed take place between Francisco and Esperanza; and that MONINAs attempt to
show opportunity on the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider that there was also the opportunity for III
copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also residing at Nellys
Garden at that time. The RTC also ruled that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED
of MONINA paled in light of jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein were considered.
COPIES OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS PART OF HER
EVIDENCE.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINAs evidence
thereon may either be one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-
IV
serving evidence." To the first category belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo
Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINAs filiation was based, as to the former, on utterances of
defendants wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while as to the latter, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE ACTUAL ACT
Alfredo's conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendants daughter, OF COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANTS MOTHER SHOULD HAVE
from his personal observation of plaintiffs facial appearance which he compared with that of defendants POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.
and from the way the two (plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that he
had then opportunity to closely observe them together. To the second category belonged that of
Dominador Savariz, as: V

At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and allegedly on those occasions THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY IDENTIFIED
when defendants wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard pieces of NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.
conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to the paternity of the latters child. xxx
VI
The RTC then placed MONINAs testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded her by
FRANCISCOs relatives under the third category, since the latter were never presented as witnesses, for THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P)
which reason the trial court excluded the letters from FRANCISCOs relatives (Exhs. S to V). SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF REINFORCING
SAID CLAIM.13
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for it was of the
perception that the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellees Brief.14cräläwvirtualibräry
to illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family Code has so provided; or by laches, which is
[a] creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results, and addressed to the sound discretion of the
court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon In its decision of 27 April 1995,15 the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no vested or acquired
the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, xxx there seems to be no rights were affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of
inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff. the Family Code.16 While the Court of Appeals rejected the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused its
discussion on the other means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit (Exh. continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the Rules
P/Exh. 2) which she signed when she was already twenty-five years, a professional and under the able of Court and special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial admission, a family
guidance of counsel. bible wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by
silence, testimonies of witnesses xxx.17 To the Court of Appeals, the bottom line issue was whether or
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the not MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter by preponderance of
complaint with malice, she having been propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause. evidence, as to which issue said court found:

MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and sought reversal of [N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is the
the trial courts decision on the grounds that: illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts
of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly
Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to establish MONINAs filiation: betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx

As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolars testimony by saying that Lope could not In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has been
have detected Esperanzas pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point in time [sic] she was still conclusively established by the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and
in the initial stage of pregnancy. Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had admitted his paternity of the appellee, and
by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import of his testimony. As xxx Lope xxx was asked about an also by the testimonies of appellant, Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo
incident that transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to
that Lope could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his sister. school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del
At any rate, what is important is not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a]
sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her pregnancy, and that upon monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants
being confronted, [FRANCISCO] assured him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give
then that in an attempt to find fault with Lopes testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co.,
that even [FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was confronted by Lope about what he allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having
had done to Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity by assuring Lope of appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing
support for both Esperanza and their child. appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-
5), appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the
acts of [FRANCISCOs] relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as [FRANCISCOs] daughter
The Court of Appelas further noted that Casabuena and Savariz testified on something that they
(Exh U) or as their relative (Exhs T & V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of
personally observed or witnessed, which matters FRANCISCO did not deny or refute. Finally, said
Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA]
court aptly held:
has been considered by the Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company
of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies xxx let alone such circumstantial Lopez is appellees first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by appellees cousin,
evidence as [MONINAs] Birth Certificates xxx and Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear the Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in
name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go along with the trial courts theory that [MONINAs] as [a] secretary in the Merchants Financing Corporation of which she was the manager, and further
illegitimate filiation has not been satisfactorily established. allowed her to stay with her family free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz
declared that sometime in February, 1966 appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to
appellant as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison.
xxx

Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINAs]
Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCOs] former Baptismal Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in evidence as part of [MONINAs]
employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. xxx testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to further reinforce [MONINAs] claim that she is
[FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar.
xxx
True it is that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on
Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter of appeal. But the rule admits of certain exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who rendered
[FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof, We find more weight in the former. the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the
The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her] witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCOs] acts trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and
and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations omitted] In the
illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs] witnesses xxx whose testimonies were not
deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with given credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment. xxx
respect to those given by [MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired [them] from
their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCOs] vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome The Court of Appeals then decreed:
the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does not hold sway in hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee
the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges granted by law.
contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however
explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse xxx. Further, the
testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx could not Costs against appellee.
have been true, for as pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit xxx almost five months after
she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. xxx
SO ORDERED.

At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not
absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 29 March As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINAs testimonial evidence is shaky,
1996,18 FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of contradictory and unreliable, and proceeds to attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in the
Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of law: main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected Pansays pregnancy in November 1945 when they
met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did not in fact
witness the meeting between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior
I.
motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central Bank
supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d) Danthea Lopez was not
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE related to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment MONINA received from Danthea was due to
RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE] the formers employment at Merchants Financing Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup
IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE Hotel; besides, Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and
RESPONDENT'S MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 4020 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not
OCCURRED. come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the trial court as regards the testimonies of
Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
II.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINAs testimony that he answered for her schooling was self-
serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary evidence; and assuming he did, such
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE should be interpreted as a manifestation of kindness shown towards the family of a former household
RESPONDENT'S TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR helper.
AND CONVINCING.

Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO points to the fact
III. that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the families of
Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs.
RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME ARE Cuaycong; and MONINAs employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to
HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC her educational attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO ever
RULES OF EVIDENCE. facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot,21 the quantum of evidence to
prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof, was not met.
IV.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals reliance on the
certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as
IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN STATEMENT (EXH. P/EXH. 2) IN circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons
A MANNER NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME who issued them did not testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,22 the contents of the
COURT. baptismal certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest who
solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the name of the
V. father appearing therein was Franque Jison, which was not FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits
E and F, the names of the childs parents were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not
Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as legitimate,
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE while the fathers occupation as laborer. Most importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO
PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES. signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the childs birth to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar. As to MONINAs educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Baas v. Baas23 which
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second paragraph of recognized that school records are prepared by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus
MONINAs complaint wherein she claimed that he and Pansay had sexual relations by about the end of incompetent to prove paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO cites
1945 or the start of 1946, it was physically impossible for him and Pansay to have had sexual contact Colorado v. Court of Appeals,24 and further asserts that MONINA did not present any of the persons
which resulted in MONINAs birth, considering that: with whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at best, mere second
cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by his relatives (Exhs.
S to V) as they were not identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private respondent in her the telephone cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made
complaint that her mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, she from his residence.
would have been born sometime in late September or early October and not August 6, 1946 xxx. The
instant case finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs. Mendez,19 thus: xxx
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals interpretation of
MONINAs affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran counter to Dequito v. Llamas,25 and overlooked that at
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him at the time the time of execution, MONINA was more than 25 years old and assisted by counsel.
in question was unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during the time of or even after
her employment by him.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals failure to consider the long and
unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs arguments, leading FRANCISCO to file The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the
his reply thereto. burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence
in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to submit their
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
respective memoranda, which they subsequently did.
defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of
plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner. evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of
greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters relating to the probability of truth.32
applicable law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code
of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As correctly cited by the
Court of Appeals, Uyguangco26 served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the Family With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
Code27 regarding its retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold
true here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed away and the former
FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant consideration. While it has
having actually resisted the latters claim below.
been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for
such indulgence,33 this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances,
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity
the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or
various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus: mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long
before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other
than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs evidence is
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or coherent, logical and natural.34cräläwvirtualibräry

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. We
instrument signed by the parent concerned. agree with MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth
on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs
mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between
FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter
and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as
FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code. circumstances and events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with
FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which facts:
MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high
standard of proof28 is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an 1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the employ of the former;
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection
and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal
not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all 2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct which the Court
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.29cräläwvirtualibräry of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:

By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of [L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books,
time.30cräläwvirtualibräry board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellants
hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on the principle that an appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing
family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls,
and convincing evidence.31cräläwvirtualibräry having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
 residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of
Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5) the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or
those articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a
person.42 These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family,43 or those
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years
which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition. 44 Other examples of these
publicly,35 spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.36
objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones,45 monuments or coffin plates.46cräläwvirtualibräry
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error must fail.
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of some of above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted
MONINAs documentary evidence. on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation,47 it having been observed that:

MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E [T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common
and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person.37 Simply marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.48cräläwvirtualibräry
put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself,
the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's
the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latters
school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed,
part.38 In like manner, FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates
relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
(Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove
paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on
the date so specified.39 However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2), subject of the
paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that fourth assigned error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA contends that she
FRANCISCO spent for her education. signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no savings and needed the money to support herself and
finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation
could not be waived and that FRANCISCOs ploy would boomerang upon him. On the other hand,
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local
FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years
Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove
old at the time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its
MONINAs filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they
genuineness and due execution could not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
partner at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter as
MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had deleterious
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, namely effects upon the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO.
Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to
MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue,40 as MONINA witnessed
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the Court of Appeals:
the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable
to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does not hold sway in
than the documents in question.41 As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, the face of [MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which
however, this requires further elaboration. contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however
explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse xxx.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not
absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a
contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx
received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied) Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would have been
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation.
For as clearly established before the trial court and properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals,
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first
MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the sworn
underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may
statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating
not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the
within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of
second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private
the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that the standard to
documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding phrase [e]ntries
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.
contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and convincing evidence and more than merely All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to
preponderant,49 has been met by MONINA. establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous
possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.

The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential elements of laches
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was
are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as That is not true, I do not
situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the
believe that, or None that I know. In declining then to lend credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an
resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
statements, laid down as early as 1921:
complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant
in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.58 The last element is the
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be
our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.59cräläwvirtualibräry
narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make
statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to prove the
existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs delay in asserting her
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is
related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of
their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
expressions as I dont know or I dont remember. xxx50cräläwvirtualibräry be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified or likewise considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.60 Since the
unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCOs attempt to prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within
MONINAs favor may not succeed. As may be gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches
furnish as to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that Baylosis would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
allegedly took advantage of his position while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from
this bare claim, FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias
against FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.
As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either. Nonito Jalandoni
avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in June 1988;51 that during his employment at Nelly Costs against petitioner.
Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever having seen MONINA there, neither did he know
of any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCOs office manager before passing
SO ORDERED.
away) regarding the disbursement of MONINAs allowance.52 Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandonis
testimony regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINAs allowance; declared that
Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any further
elaboration, however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCOs
personal expenses, merely those intended for one of FRANCISCOs haciendas.53 Then, Iigo Superticioso
confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis was dismissed by Mr. Jison for
irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of
confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that MONINA received money from FRANCISCOs office,
neither was there a standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.54cräläwvirtualibräry

It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are likewise insufficient to
overcome MONINAs evidence. The former merely consist of denials as regards the latters having gone
to Nelly Garden or having received her allowance from FRANCISCOs office, which, being in the form
of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony; 55 bare assertions as regards
the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCOs personal expenses incapable of evincing that
FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause for
the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what then serves as the coup de grce is that despite
Superticiosos claim that he did not know MONINA,56 when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll
ticket indicating that on 18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office,
Superticioso admitted that his nickname was Iing and that there was no other person named Iing in
FRANCISCOs office.57cräläwvirtualibräry