Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF.
HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS
ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA
BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA
CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA
GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR
RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,
CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA
SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and
MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.
The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over
their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046
remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA
5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change
was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS
III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7
and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. 8 Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers
or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds,
namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their
argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its
failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of
islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of
locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III,
preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not
undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over
Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain
ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the
writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we
find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition
alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative 15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the
passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with
constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of
national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is
understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit,
thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the
offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and
resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional
power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper
remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, 19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no
bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court
inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance
with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the
pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively
encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize
that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign
control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly
ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine
sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago,
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. 23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of
decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in
the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a
limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of
UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III.
The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago." 24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines,
and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that
area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic
baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046
and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of
RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this
view.1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location
of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie
outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the
wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the
KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29

Extent of Extent of maritime

maritime area area using RA
using RA 3046, as 9522, taking into
 amended, taking
into account the
account UNCLOS
Treaty of Paris’
III (in square
delimitation (in
nautical miles)
square nautical
miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
Exclusive
Economic Zone 382,669
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends
way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there
are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of
maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. 30

Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA
9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart
to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS
III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of
the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the
foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough
Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of
violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat
magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin
although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange
line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is
Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa
ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong
dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule
that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its
maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III].
As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to
wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is
140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the
[UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that
length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic
survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to
Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs
as prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision
to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its
pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies
under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. 37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah
in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for
drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this
Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
"converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea
lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.38

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as "archipelagic
waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III
affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and
subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth
or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are
now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, 43
thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. 44 No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international
law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was
a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS
III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more
than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other
States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere
legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well
as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a
healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual
basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the
protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII,
Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights
to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53
UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone
beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners’ reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the
luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster:
first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute
over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE
and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA.
and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP
JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO,
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to
"prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land
area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological
and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of
the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of
said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are
left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn
are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the
rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
 XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based
on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.
In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain
that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when
the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them,
do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should
be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State
without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree
with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions,
it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-
equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
 approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
— generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation
of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15
specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of
the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law
and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already
paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D.
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The
former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment
of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17
The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on
the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If
that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted,
wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
 conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement.
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the
non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections
3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-
24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law
or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the
non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been
passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect
to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances.
Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order
of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber
license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid
down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be
saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must
have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field
or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and
presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as
"specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list
of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical
effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure
to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title
XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal
right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with
notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines
and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II
of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of
this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right
cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or
may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless
the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel
courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area
of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by
the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they
may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of
our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid
down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be
saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must
have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field
or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and
presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as
"specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list
of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical
effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure
to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title
XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
 (d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal
right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with
notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines
and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II
of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of
this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature
even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right
cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or
may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless
the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to
health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel
courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area
of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence
 and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to
implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by
the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they
may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of
our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. 2 But amidst hard evidence and clear
signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can
still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices
or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal
waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their
official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves,
if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but
now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to
Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water
quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration,
the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of
the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion
and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be
held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
 (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section,
Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila
Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for
bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the
Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part
of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste
treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision 5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate
Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving
and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR
as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform
their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action
for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but
also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the
bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine
 life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning
up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free
flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually
end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is
ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other
non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the
Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this
Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the
said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act
which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of
their usual basic functions under existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON
BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND
DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
 ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL
ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A ministerial duty
is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 9 It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." 10 Mandamus is available to compel
action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part
of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty
to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of
discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for
example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to
contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or
not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s
ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement
of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed
the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three
big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the
instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste
and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste
disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities
and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid
waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42
which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12 enjoining
the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and
choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not
to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates
the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under
the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its
location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution,
and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA
9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As
such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
 a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five
(5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve
(12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. 17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations,
has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated
budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more
than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila
and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the
proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can
prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor
and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and
furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm
water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country. 19 In relation to the instant
petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), 20 is
designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance
system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and
managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with
the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters. 22 More
specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under
EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood
control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives
and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage
and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA,
whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the
rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The
mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of
structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in
violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and
Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and
policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the
effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend
violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other
floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or
upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or
deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float
or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the
bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into
such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was
signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform
such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and
perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall
coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution
within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to
enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage
and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development." 26
Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by
it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives,
without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement
bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as
well as movement within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78, 28 the
Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports
and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial
waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is
primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid
waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in
RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition
may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned
agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila.
With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that
discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned
LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH
and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of
a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in
coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a
centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a
mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1 31 of
Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and
monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement
of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and
disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under
Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and
Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote
the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration
of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management
principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and
revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner
consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline
processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic
instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic
national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management
cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public
health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA
9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need
not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
 so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or
entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the counterpart
provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be
operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof,
any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and
prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident
at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for
utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination
with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup
operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to
have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of
the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds
where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since
the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as
lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h),
which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or
spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from
accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted
portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is
limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of
specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning
operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup
operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a
specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as
mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage
of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only
pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other
sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec.
62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by
including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to
Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading
of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay.
Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20
of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g),
Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and
"accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands concerned government
agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water
quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the
mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup
work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in
the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake
the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the
complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the
agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus,
cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that
their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what
the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is
practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of
environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general
application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the
polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be
caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water
bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically
adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an
individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such
that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so
numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond
the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned
that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may
perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and
far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water
pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup
operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and
purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term
solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important
as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland
bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup
effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality
would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other
relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the
bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their
mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the
ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision
would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of
continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which
do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR)
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and
eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems
and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal
or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts
to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or
the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers
and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or
near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may
not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to
the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly,
the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the
necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge,
including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting
waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer
their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply
with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage
problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of
the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in
the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of
pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as
prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken
of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be
established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including
LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following
the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with
the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of
waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning
of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply
discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally
unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,
groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or
dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes
the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
"dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of
petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their
respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set
timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law
and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot
be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and
bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as
they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-
minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the
State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot
shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the
Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought
to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of
the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-
99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening
events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters
to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative
Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the
Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to
determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other
sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite
where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the
marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and
aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with
Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550,
and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 46 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and
other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279
and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its
territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275
(the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from
finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining
a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation
of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain
economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive
report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9522 March 10, 2009
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED
BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:
Basepoint Station Location World Geodetic System of Distance to
Number Name 1984 next
(WGS 84) Coordinates basepoint
(M)
Latitude (N) Longitude (E)

1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21º6’57.73" 121º57’27.71" 70.08

2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 19º57’38.19" 122º9’46.32" 99.17

3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt. 18º18’35.30" 122º20’19.07" 71.83

4 PAB- Ditolong Pt. 17º7’16.30" 122º31’28.34" 1.05

05A

5 PAB- Ditolong Pt. 17º6’14.79" 122º31’43.84" 0.39

05B

6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17º5’51.31" 122º31’42.66" 3.29

7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17º2’36.91" 122º31’3.28" 9.74

8 PAB- Digollorin Pt. 16º59’18.03" 122º27’56.61" 3.51

06B

9 PAB- Digollorin Rk. 16º49’56.11" 122º26’50.78" 2.40

 06C

10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 16º47’38.86" 122º26’4.40" 30.94

11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt. 16º18’44.33" 122º14’06.69" 116.26

12 PAB- Tinaga Is. 14º29’54.43" 122º57’51.15" 80.29

10A

13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk. 14º6.29.91" 124º16’59.21" 0.54

14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 14º6.10.40" 124º17’26.28" 96.04

15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12º41’6.37" 125º3’53.71" 6.79

16 PAB- Bacan Is. 12º36’18.41" 125º8’50.19" 5.52

13A

17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 12º32.33.62" 125º12’59.70" 0.80

18 PAB- Cube Rk. 12º31.57.45" 125º13’32.37" 4.90

14A

19 PAB- NW Manjud 12º28’36.42" 125º17’12.32" 1.30

14D Pt.

20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt. 12º27’37.51" 125º18’5.23" 7.09

21 PAB- S Sorz Cay 12º21’41.64" 125º23’7.41" 5.68

16A

22 PAB- Panablihon 12º17’27.17" 125º27’0.12" 5.21

16B

23 PAB- Alugon 12º13’21.95" 125º30’19.47" 1.94

16C

24 PAB- N Bunga Pt. 12º11’48.16" 125º31’30.88" 0.54

16D

25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt. 12º11’20.67" 125º31’48.29" 5.71

26 PAB- SE Tobabao 12º6’7.00" 125º34’11.94" 83.94

 18A Is.

27 PAB- Suluan Is. 10º45’16.70" 125º58’8.78" 56.28

19C

28 PAB- N Tuason Pt. 9º49’59.58" 126º10’6.39" 57.44

19D

29 PAB- Arangasa Is. 8º53’16.62" 126º20’48.81" 40.69

20A

30 PAB- Sanco Pt. 8º13’11.53" 126º28’53.25" 30.80

21B

31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 7º42’45.02" 126º34’29.08" 12.95

32 PAB- Languyan 7º29’49.47" 126º35’59.24" 0.54

22C

33 PAB-23 Languyan 7º29’16.93" 126º35’59.50" 0.76

34 PAB- Languyan 7º28’30.97" 126º35’57.30" 1.2

23B

35 PAB- N Baculin Pt. 7º27’29.42" 126º35’51.31" 10.12

23C

36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 7º17’19.80" 126º36’18.26" 1.14

37 PAB- S Pusan Pt. 7º16’14.43" 126º35’57.20" 63.28

24A

38 PAB- Cape San 6º17’14.73" 126º12’14.40" 1.28

25B Agustin

39 PAB-25 Cape San 6º16’8.35" 126º11’35.06" 67.65

Agustin

40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani 5º23’34.20" 125º28’42.11" 0.43

Is.

41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato 5º23’21.80" 125º28’19.59" 3.44

Pt.
42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 6º21’55.66" 126º25’11.21" 3.31

43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 5º21’58.48" 125º21’52.03" 0.87

44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5º22’2.91" 125º20’59.73" 1.79

45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt. 5º23’20.18" 125º19’44.29" 78.42

46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 6º9’8.44" 124º15’42.81" 122.88

47 PAB- Kantuan Is 6º26’47.22" 122º13.34.50" 29.44

33A

48 PAB- Tongguil Is. 6º2’33.77" 121º56’36.20" 2.38

34A

49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 6º1’8.51" 121º54’41.45" 1.72

50 PAB- Tongquil Is. 6º0’17.88" 121º63’11.17" 85.94

35A

51 PAB- Kirapusan Is 5º12.8.70" 120º41’38.14" 55.24

38A

52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka 4º47’39.24" 119º51’58.08" 43.44

Is.

53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 4º24’53.84" 119º14’50.71 0.61

54 PAB- Frances Reef 4º25’3.83" 119º14’15.15" 15.48

40A

55 PAB- Bajapa Reef 4º36"9.01" 119º3’22.75" 6.88

41A

56 PAB- Paguan Is. 4º42’52.07" 119º1’44.04" 8.40

42A

57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 4º45’55.25" 119º3’15.19" 2.28

58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4º47’5.36" 119º5’12.94" 18.60

59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 4º55’10.45" 119º22’1.30 23.37

60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis 5º2’23.73" 119º44’18.14" 44.20

Pt.

61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 5º46’35.15" 119º39’51.77" 75.17

62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is. 6º5’58.41" 118º26’57.30" 8.54

63 PAB- Taganak Is 6º4’14.08" 118º18’33.33" 13.46

48A

64 PAB-49 Great 6º11’4.65" 118º6’54.15" 3.97

Bakkungaan
Is.

65 PAB-50 Libiman Is. 6º13’39.90" 118º3’52.09" 5.53

66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 6º17’43.99" 118º0’5.44" 41.60

67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 6º52’14.53" 118º23’40.49" 75.06

68 PAB-53 South 7º30’26.05" 117º18’33.75" 26.00

Mangsee Is.

69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 7º48’30.69" 116º59’39.18" 6.08

70 PAB- Balabac Great 7º51’27.17" 116º54’17.19" 1.18

54A Reef

71 PAB- Balabac Great 7º52’19.86" 116º53’28.73" 2.27

54B Reef

72 PAB-55 Balabac Great 7º54’36.35" 116º53’16.64" 5.42

Reef

73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 8º2’0.26" 116º54’10.04" 10.85

74 PAB.61 Secam Is. 8º11’18.36" 116º59’51.87" 30.88

75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 8º87’56.37" 117º15’51.23" 7.91

76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 8º44’17.40" 117º20’39.37" 11.89

77 PAB- W Sicud Pt. 8º53’32.20" 117º28’15.78" 13.20

63A

78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt. 9º2.57.47" 117º37’38.88" 81.12

79 PAB.64 Dry Is. 9º59’22.54" 118º36’53.61" 82.76

B

80 PAB- Sinangcolan 11º13’19.82" 119º15’17.74" 74.65

65C Pt.

81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 12º19’35.22" 119º50’56.00 93.88

82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 13º53’24.45" 120º1’5.86" 115.69

83 PAB-71 Hermana 15º48’43.61" 119º46’56.09" 9.30

Mayor Is.

84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 15º57’61.67" 119º44’55.32" 12.06

85 PAB- Rena Pt. 16º9’57.90" 119º45.15.76" 0.25

72B

86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 16º10’12.42" 119º45’11.95" 6.43

87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 16º16’34.46" 119º46’19.50" 0.65

88 PAB- Piedra Pt. 16º37’12.70" 119º46’28.62" 1.30

74A

89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 16º18’29.49" 119º46’44.94" 1.04

90 PAB- Piedra Pt. 16º19’28.20" 119º47’7.69" 0.63

75C

91 PAB- Piedra Pt. 16º20’4.38" 119º47’20.48" 80.60

75D

92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 17º34’24.94" 120º20’33.36" 6.86

93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 17º41’17.56" 120º21’2.20" 14.15

 94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17º55’4.13" 120º24’40.56" 35.40

95 PAB-79 Cape 18º29’32.42" 120º33’42.41" 1.77

Bojeador

96 PAB- Bobon 18º30’52.88" 120º34’55.35" 58.23

79B

97 PAB-80 Calagangan 19º10’14.78" 121º12’52.64" 98.07

Pt.

98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 20º43’15.74" 121º46’57.80" 25.63

99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21º7’17.47" 121º56’43.85" 0.08

100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21º7’18.41" 121º56’48.79" 0.25

101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21º7’12.04" 121º57’3.65" 0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and
jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of
applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the
aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith
produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of
basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.
Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a
supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other
portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all
other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby
amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or
in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
Approved
(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE
NOGRALES ENRILE
Speaker of the House of President of the Senate
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216 was finally passed
by the Senate and the House of Representative on February 17, 2009.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-
BARUA-YAP REYES
Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives

Approved: MAR 10, 2009

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines