Case Title: PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs.

JULIE CHANDUMAL, respondent.

G.R. No. 195619, September 5, 2012
PONENTE: REYES, J.
Topic: Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem
Doctrine: The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired
either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission
to its authority. If a defendant has not been properly summoned, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over its person, and a judgment rendered against it is null and void.
FACTS:
A Contract to sell of a property located at Talon Dos, Las Pinas City, was entered between BF Homes
Inc. and the Jullie Chandumal. On February 1993 BF Homes sold in favor of PDB all of its rights
and participation in the said contract. Chandumal paid the amortizations faithfully until 1994 when
she defaulted. A notice of delinquency, rescission and to vacate was sent to her, giving her 30 days to
vacate the property, despite the demand she fails to pay. Thus, in 1999, PDB filed a judicial
confirmation of rescission. As alleged by PDB it tried to deliver its surrender value of P10,000.00, but
defendant refused.
Summons was issued but despite few attempts it’s unavailing for she is out of house always, this
prompt the PDB to file a motion ex parte to declare her in default, which was granted by the court
accordingly. Subsequently, Chandumal file a motion to set aside the order with admission of attached
Answer. RTC denied the same together with the Motion for Reconsideration and instead allow PDB
to present ex parte evidence. Thus an appeal was filed before the CA which rendered to annulled the
RTC’s decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed by PDB but to no avail. Hence, this Petition for
Review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in annulling RTC’s decision.
RULING:
It is fundamental rule in Civil case that jurisdiction over the defendant was acquired through valid
service of summons. If the defendant was not summoned properly the court acquires no jurisdiction.
Where the action is in personam, may be made through personal service, where summons may be
served by handling the copy thereof to the defendant, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. Personal service of summons is always be the first option, if he cannot be served
with it within reasonable time that’s the time that substituted service may be resorted to.
In this case however, sheriff resorted to substituted service due to his failure to serve it personally. To
be valid the Substituted service of summons requisites are as follows:
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service;
 2. Specific details in the return;
3. A person suitable age and discretion;
4. Competent person in charge;
The sheriffs return fails to alleged the present of the above requisites, the return of summons failed
to assert in detail the actual exertion of efforts to locate her, it merely states that the whereabouts of
the defendant is unknown and does not verified said fact, it does not even have asked Chandumal’s
mother of as to her specific whereabout. Thus the CA decision is affirmed, and declared that there is
no valid rescission of contract made.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals,
as well as its Resolution dated February 16, 2011, denying the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 82861 are AFFIRMED in so far as there was no valid service of summons. Further, the Court
DECLARES that there was no valid rescission of contract pursuant to R.A. No. 6552. Accordingly,
the Decision dated May 31, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 255 in Civil Case
No. LP-99-0 137 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and is therefore, DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS.

FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012.
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.
Topic: Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints
Doctrine: Section 12. Third-party complaint. — A third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.
FACTS:
Felix Paras a fish buyer and seller, rode a bus on his way home to Manila from Bicol, owned and
operated by Inand Trailways and driven by Calvin Coner. On their way, somewhere in Maharlika
Hiway, Tiaong Quezon it bumped with a Philtranco Bus, as a result of the impact Inland Bus Bumped
into a Cargo Truck which causes considerable damages to vehicles and injuries to the Passengers and
the death of Coner. Paras incurred severe damages especially fractures on left and right leg. Unable to
obtain sufficient financial assistance from inland he filed breach of contract of carriage against the
same.
As defense, inland alleged that utmost diligence was observed by their driver Coner, and it was the
same observation of the investigators who responded saying that its the Philtranco Bus which bumped
into their bus. Inland after leave of court filed a third party complaint against Philtranco. After Trial
the RTC Branch 71 of Antipolo, Rizal rendered the decision against Philtranco ordering it jointly and
severally with Apolinar Miralles (Driver) to pay all the damages. All parties appealed to CA on different
grounds. The CA agreed to the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was also denied, thus this petition anchored on grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in deciding the case against Philtranco.
RULING:
NO. The Court did not erred, the court does not disturb with the unanimous findings of negligence
on the part of Philtranco’s driver which is the direct proximate cause of the damages suffered by Paras
and Inland.
The parties implead of new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to relief exist under the
applicable substantive law. The rule is merely a procedural mechanism, and cannot be utilized unless
there is some substantive basis under the applicable law.
Apart from the requirement that the third party complainant should assert a derivative or secondary
claim for relief from the third party defendant there are other limitations on said party’s ability to
implead. The crucial characteristics of a claim under section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original defendant
is attempting to transfer to the third-party the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
The requisites for a third party action are:
a. that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action;
b. That the claim of the third party defendant must belong to the original defendant;
c. the claim of the original defendant must be based upon the plaintiffs claim against the original
defendant;
d. The defendant is attempting to transfer to the third – party defendant the liability asserted to him
by the original plaintiff.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on September 25, 2002. by ordering PHILTRANCO SERVICE
ENTERPRISES, INC. and APOLINAR MIRALLES to pay, jointly and severally, as follows:
1. To Felix Paras:
(a) P1,397.95, as reimbursement for the costs of medicines purchased between February 1987 and July
1989;
(b) P50,000.00 as temperate damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P36.000.00 for lost earnings;
(e) 10% of the total of items (a) to (d) hereof as attorney's fees; and
(f) Interest of 6% per annum from July 18, 1997 on the total o[ items (a) to (d) hereof until finality of
this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter until full payment.
2. To Inland Trail ways, Inc.:
(a) P250,000.00 as temperate damages;
(b) 10% of item (a) hereof; and
(c) Interest of 6% per annum on item (a) hereof from July 18, 1997 until finality of this decision, and
12% per annum thereafter until full payment.
3. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139539, February 5, 2002.
PONENTE:
Topic: Manner of making allegations
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed with the RTC of Quezon City Br. 93 a complaint against Ernesto Santiago for damages
and injunction, with Preliminary Injunction. Cerrofer prayed that Ernesto and his agents be enjoined
from claiming possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of Tala Estate Subd. In Quezon City and
from making use the same as a Jeepney terminal.
Due to the competing claims of the parties, the case become clear to be not merely a case of collection
but a case involving the review of the Titles at this point the defendant filed a motion to dismiss due
to the fact that the court cannot discuss the matter without passing over the question of ownership.
The Court decided to dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction.The plaintiff appealed, the CA
dismissed the appeal as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence this appeal via Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred.
RULING:
The Rules of Procedure requires that the complaint must state a concise statement of the ultimate
facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.
A complaint states cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely:
1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or its created;
2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals
and the order of the trial court dismissing the case. We remand the case to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, Quezon City, for further proceedings.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 3, PETITIONER, VS.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 192975, November 12, 2012.
SAMAHANG KABUHAYAN NG SAN LORENZO KKK, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
VICE PRESIDENT ZENAIDA TURLA, PETITIONER, VS.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 192994, November 12, 2012.
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Remedies of defendant when the motion is denied
Doctrine: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither
terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the
motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan for cancellations of Titles and
reversion against the RCAM who appears to be the owner of 8 parcels of land covering 39, 790 Square
Meters. Said titles allegedly emanated from Decree 57486 issued by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office pursuant to the decision of LRC Case No. 5 of G.L.R.O , however it appears on record that it
should be Lot 495, 496, 497, 498 and 638 and should not include Lot 43 to 50. RCAM sold the same
to the other named defendants and titles were issued in their favor, this parcels of land are certified to
be unclassified lands by the Bureau of Forestry.
KKK the other petitioner and the occupants of the said lot, filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene, which was subsequently granted by the RTC. During the Pre-trial RCAM filed a Motion to
Dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint. RTC denied the Motion filed by
RCAM for being premature. Motion for reconsideration was filed but denied, Hence elevated to CA
on Certiorari. The CA Ruled in favor of the RCAM, ruling that reversion suits should be instituted
before the CA, the RTC being a co-equal of the land registration courts which decisions is prayed to
be annulled. Both Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied thus the Petition under Rule
45 seeking to set aside the Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in deciding the case against Petitioners.

RULING:
The Petitions are meritorious. The Petitioners did not wish to annul a decision of the then CFI sitting
as a Land Registration Court but wishes to annul the titles issued in favor of the RCAM.
An order denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposed of a case as it leaves something to be done by the Court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. The denial of said Motion cannot be questioned in a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of Judgment. But if the
denial of the Motion was tainted with grave abuse of discretion the remedy of certiorari may be
justified.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed April 22, 2010 Decision and July 19, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 84 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: SPOUSES RAMON VILLUGA and MERCEDITA VILLUGA, PETTIONERS,

VS.
KELLY HARDWARE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC., represented by ERNESTO
V. YU, Executive Vice-President and General Manager, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012.
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
Topic: Meaning of “genuine issue”
Doctrine: Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleading. – An amended pleading supersedes the
pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in
evidence against the pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the
amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money in RTC Bacoor, Cavite for an amount
equivalent to P259,809.50 as principal obligation reimbursements of attorney's fees plus litigation and
other related expenses. Petitioners in their answer admitted the purchases but denied the amount claim
since according to them payments were already been made with it they are willing to pay after
verification of the amount in order to buy peace. Respondent signified willingness to settle provided
that Sps. will pay interest and litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all incidental expenses.
Motion for Partial Judgment was filed base on the premise but was opposed. RTC issued an Order
deferring resolution of respondent's Motion for Partial Judgment on the ground that there is no clear
and specific admission on the part of petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent.
With Leave of Court complaint was amended alleging the owing came from various construction
materials and supplies, in which only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50.
Later, second amended complaint was filed.
A Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that petitioners' Comments on
respondent's Request for Admission is a mere scrap of paper as it was signed by petitioners' counsel
and not by petitioners themselves and that it was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of
Court. Respondent goes on to assert that petitioners, in effect, were deemed to have impliedly
admitted the matters subject of the said request. Respondent also contended that it is already entitled
to the issuance of a summary judgment in its favor as petitioners not only failed to tender a genuine
issue as to any material fact but also did not raise any special defenses, which could possibly relate to
any factual issue. However, the motion was favored by RTC. Petitioners filed an appeal with the CA
who rendered its presently assailed Decision, affirming the orders of the RTC. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari seeking to
reverse and set aside said Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Summary Judgment is proper in consideration of the alleged lack of genuine issue.
RULING:
The summary judgment issued by the RTC is improper and without legal bases, considering that
genuine issues were raised in the pleadings filed by petitioners.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and
useless delays. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits,
depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.
Respondent did not allege as to how petitioners' partial payments of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were
applied to the latter's obligations. In fact, there is no allegation or admission whatsoever in the said
Complaint and Amended Complaint that such partial payments were made. Petitioners, on the other
hand, were consistent in raising their affirmative defense of partial payment in their Answer to the
Complaint and Answer to Amended Complaint. Having pleaded a valid defense, petitioners, at this
point, were deemed to have raised genuine issues of fact. But when the second amended complaint
was filed this defense did not raise anymore a genuine issue of fact.
On the basis of the foregoing, petitioners' defense of partial payment in their Answer to Second
Amended Complaint, in effect, no longer raised genuine issues of fact that require presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Hence, the summary judgment of the RTC in favor of respondent is
proper.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ, RELLY CARPIO,
ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS, CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN
and GERALD GARY RENACIDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000.
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
Topic: Issuance of Writ
Doctrine: Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform
to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is
calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. A preliminary
injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court
issuing a final injunction.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a magazine allegedly Obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit,
injurious to young readers, and devoid of all moral values published in Miriam Colleges school paper
(Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) on September-October 1994
issue (Vol. 41, No. 14).
In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled Foreplay, Jerome wrote: Alam ko, nakakagulat ang
aming pamagat. Jerome then proceeded to write about previous reactions of readers to women-writers
writing about matters erotic and to gay literature. He justified the Magazines erotic theme on the
ground that many of the poems passed on to the editors were about sekswalidad at ibat ibang
karanasan nito. Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat tungkol sa maselang usaping ito xxx at sa
isang institusyon pang katulad ng Miriam! Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not
garapal and sa mga tulang ito namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-sensasyonal) ng
pamagat na Libog at iba pang Tula. He finished Foreplay with these words: Dahil para saan pa ang
libog kung hindi ilalabas?
Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board, and
Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli
Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. Informing them of letters of complaint
filed against them for they allegedly violated regulations in the student handbook. They were ask to
submit their affidavits and to attend a hearing at the DSA Conference Room. Students do not answer
and instead ask to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS)
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board,
after a review of the Discipline Committees report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students
consisting of Dismissal, Expulsion and Suspension.
The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the
jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
CIII, issued an order denying the plaintiffs prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. The students
thereafter filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration and RTC grants the writ of
preliminary injunction. Again Motion for Reconsideration was filed, prompting the judge to dismiss
the case without prejudice of filing the same to another venue. Petition for certiorari and prohibition
of preliminary injunction/restraining order questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24
February 1995, but it was decided to be referred to CA. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22
February 1995, as well as the student’s suspension and dismissal, void.
ISSUE:
When a Preliminary Injunction may be issued.
RULING:
It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary restraining order, not a
preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the CA ever issued a preliminary injunction.
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment
or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to perform to refrain from performing
a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain
the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits
of the case can be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination
of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. Under the former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day
by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no
such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the
aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private respondent Joel Tan whose suspension has long
lapsed.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and LYDIA
MARCIANO, PETITIONERS, VS.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 183367, March 14, 2012
PONENTE: SERENO, J.
Topic: Period of Effectivity of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
Doctrine: Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a TRO may be issued only if it
appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction
could be heard.
FACTS:
In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia,
Batangas. The municipal government, through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited
petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct a
shopping center. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), APRI undertook to construct a shopping
complex in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate,
manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. On 6 February 2003,
respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum
of Agreement with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 87. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-004.
The RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to file their Answer to the Complaint.
However, the summons was returned unserved, as petitioners were no longer holding office in the
given address. As such, Service by Publication was resorted to, the petitioners was declared in default
and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled to declare null and void the MOA
to pay the damages in favor of the Municipality and the unfinished structure declared forfeited in favor
of the Municipality of Padre Garcia.
No timely appeal made, respondent filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which was granted by
the RTC. A Writ of Execution was thus issued.
Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Motion for the
Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction but was denied. Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not issuance of Writ of Temporary Restraining Order is proper.
RULING:
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights and interests. An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling
the applicant to the relief demanded.
Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order
to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 26 March 2008
and 16 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 are AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals is directed to
proceed with dispatch to dispose of the case before it.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, PETITIONER, VS.

CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLES BROADCASTING
SERVICE, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009.
PONENTE: TINGA, J.
Topic: Quo Warranto
Doctrine: Under Section 1 of Rule 66, an action for the usurpation of a public office, position
or franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise.
Even while the action is maintained in the name of the Republic, the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon complaint, and upon good reason
to believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be established by proof.
FACTS:
Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and Peoples Broadcasting Service, Inc.
(PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved in the operation of radio
broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of
two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582. R.A. No. 7477, enacted on 5 May 1992,
granted PBS a legislative franchise to construct, install, maintain and operate radio and television
stations within the Philippines for a period of 25 years. R.A. No. 7582, enacted on 27 May 1992,
extended CBSs previous legislative franchise to operate radio stations for another 25 years. The CBS
and PBS radio networks are two of the three networks that comprise the well-known Bombo Radyo
Philippines.
He thus prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on
account of the alleged violation of the conditions set therein, as well as in its legislative franchises. The
NTC ruled that it was not competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same being more properly
the subject of an action for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review under
Rule 43 was resorted to in the Court of Appeals, in its decision it uphold the NTC’s decision. The
appellate court agreed with the earlier conclusion that the complaints were indeed a collateral attack
on the legislative franchises of CBS and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to
thresh out the issues raised in the complaints. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NTC has the power to cancel the CPCs it has issued to legislative franchisees.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative this case is not a proper subject of quo warranto. The Radio Control
Act in 1931 requires broadcast stations to obtain a legislative franchise and such requirement was not
repealed by E.O. 546 which established the NTC, the administrative agency which has regulatory
jurisdiction over broadcast stations. When the Congress grants a legislative franchise, it is the legal
obligation of the NTC to facilitate the operation by the franchisee of its broadcast station and since
public administration of the airwaves is a highly technical function, the Congress has delegated to the
NTC the task of administration over the broadcast spectrum. The licensing power of the NTC arises
from the necessary delegation by Congress of legislative power geared towards the orderly exercise by
franchisees of the rights granted them by Congress.
The life and authority of an administrative agency emanates solely from an Act of Congress, and its
faculties confined within the parameters set by the legislative branch of government. Even as the NTC
is vested with the power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power
to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise prevent broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs
from operating radio and television stations. Although the Radio Control Act empowered the
government through the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to suspend or revoke
issued licenses, the NTC did not retain such power when it was established by E.O. 546 to replace the
previous regulatory agencies. Said E.O. 546 promulgated by then President F. Marcos in the exercise
of his legislative power withheld from it the authority to cancel licenses and CPCs.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Case Title: NATIONAL POWER CORP., Petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES NORBERTO AND JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, Dasmariñas,
Cavite Branch, REYNALDO FERRER, and S.K. DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER CORP.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007.
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.
Topic: Appointment of Commissioners; Commissioners’ Report; Court Action upon
Commissioners’ Report
Doctrine: Based on the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that in addition
to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they
are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to
provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend
them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and
(3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings.
FACTS:
NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No.
6395, as amended, with the mandate of developing hydroelectric power, producing transmission lines,
and developing hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an
easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the areas of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for
the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmarias-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line
Project.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way
against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated, which were
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-313327, T-671864, and T-454278. The affected
areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial
court granted. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over the lots owned by respondent’s spouses
de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer. Saulog intervene to the case and just compensation for the property
of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and
petitioner to submit their compromise agreement. The trial court fixed the just compensation to be
paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. Motion for Reconsideration was filed but denied.
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA but same was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the Petition.
RULING:
The Court finds the Petition meritorious especially in the way the case was handled by the
Commissioners. Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection
performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a
hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice
of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in
their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective
causes during the said hearings.
The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken
is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the
principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is
indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 28, 1999 and March 23, 2000 Orders of
the Imus, Cavite RTC and the November 18, 2002 Decision of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. This
case is remanded to the said trial court for the proper determination of just compensation in
conformity with this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.