Implementation of SCADA in Power Plant

SESSION 2006-2010

Project Advisor

Prof. Dr. Aftab Ahmad

AUTHORS

NAUMAN AHMAD 06-EE-61

KHUZAIMA ASLAM KHAN 06-EE-127
HAFIZ MUHAMMAD FAYYAZ 06-EE-133

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,
TAXILA

(July 2010)
Implementation of SCADA in Power Plant
By
NAUMAN AHMAD 06-EE-61
KHUZAIMA ASLAM KHAN 06-EE-127
HAFIZ MUHAMMAD FAYYAZ 06-EE-133

This Thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement

for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering

Supervised by Approved by

Internal Examiner External Examiner

Prof. Dr. Aftab Ahmad

Dean of Faculty Chairman of Faculty

DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, TAXILA
JULY 2010
 ABSTRACT
________________________________________________________

Today SCADA is the most important part of industry, water distribution, hydro power
plants, substations, electric distribution and number of other relevant fields all over the world.
SCADA has become the most advanced technology in field of automation and control.
Wherever automation and control is required, SCADA is the first priority.

ABB has commissioned SCADA in AttockGen. For numerical protection ABB has
used IED670. IED670 also provides control and monitoring for busbar, feeder, transformer
etc. IED670 can be configured and monitored with the help of Protective and Control IED
Manager PCM600 toolbox which is also overviewed. PCM600 is also the product of ABB.
From PCM600 IEDs can be easily adapted according to power system requirement. Data
from IEDs travels to the remote terminal unit (RTU). ABB uses RTU560 that is provided
with different telecontrol functions. These telecontrol functions are used when RTU560 is at
remote location. RTU560 system and module concept are also studied. Medias for the
communication of RTU and remote control center are also overviewed.

Finally different communications within plant in the implementation of SCADA are

taken into account. IED station and remote communications, RTU communication with sub-
devices and as a host device are studied. Along with this, different protocols to carry out
these communications are also considered.
 DEDICATION
_______________________________________________________

We dedicate this humble effort, the fruit of our thoughts and study, to our
magnificently precious parents whose hands always raised in prayers for us, who taught us
the lesson of patience, perseverance, self confidence and self reliance.

We also dedicate to our respectable teachers, close friends and family members
whose support led us to success.

The Authors
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
______________________________________________________

The most important acknowledgement, by far, is to ALLAH, The Almighty, The

Most Gracious, the Most Bountiful, the MASTER OF THE WORLD, Who has bestowed
us the most powerful thing in His world, the brain and enabled us to complete this final year
project successfully. All the respect to our beloved Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be
Upon Him), who after a lot of hardships and difficulties, made us able to recognize our
ALLAH and to distinguish virtue and evil.

We would like to express our profound gratitude, most sincere appreciation and
special thanks to our Project Advisor Prof. Dr. AFTAB AHMAD, without whose moral
support, invaluable suggestions and continual enthusiasm, it would have been extremely
difficult to work on this project. We also thank to Mr. Qadir Bakhsh and Mr. Shehriar
Khan for their humble suggestions and guidance.

We also like to thank our Family Members, friends, class fellows and faculty
members for their invaluable suggestions and critical review of our project. This support is
commendable.
 ABBREVIATIONS
______________________________________________________

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

HMI Human Machine Interface
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
MTU Main Terminal Unit
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
LAN Local Area Network
WAN Wide area Network
DCS Distributed Control System
VHF Very High Frequency
UHF Ultra High Frequency
OPC Open Access to Real-Time Information
HIS Historical information system
IPS Invensys Process Systems
ABB Asea Brown Bowery
CPU Central Processing Unit
PRV Pressure Regulating Valve
MAC Main Automation Contractor
MEC Main Electrical Contractor
HDCC Hydro Dispatch Control Cell
MCM Machine Condition Monitoring
I/O Input Output
IED Intelligent Electronic Devices
NPCC National Power Control Center
NCC Network Control Centers
ITI Integrated Totals
AMI Analog Measured Values
CMU Communication Unit
HCI Host Communication Interface
SCI Sub-device Communication Interface
PDP Process Data Processing
DIST Archive Disturbance Data Archive
GPS Global Positioning System
FIFO First In First Out
SPI Single point input
DPI Double point input
ADC Analog Digital Converter
DMV Digital Measured Values
DMI Digital measured value
STI Step Position Value
BCD Binary Coded Decimals
GRAY Gray code
EPR End of Period Reading Counters
IR Intermediate Reading Counters
CVT Current/Voltage-Transformer
SA Substation Automation bus
SM Substation monitoring bus
LON Locally Operated Network
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
PCM Pulse Coded Modulation
CM Multiple command
MT Multiple transmit
SCS Substation Control System
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
________________________________________________________

Chapter 1 Introduction  

1.1 SCADA System in General.............................................................................................1

1.2 Basic SCADA Communication Topologies....................................................................2
1.3 Supervisory Control ........................................................................................................3
1.4 Data Acquisition..............................................................................................................3
1.5 Modules of SCADA ........................................................................................................4
1.5.1 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) ......................................................................4
1.5.2 Master Terminal Unit (MTU) ......................................................................4
1.5.3 The Central SCADA Master System (HMI) ................................................4
1.5.4 Communication Medias ...............................................................................4
1.5.5 SCADA Software ............................................................................................................5
1.6 SCADA Security .............................................................................................................6
1.7 SCADA System Applications .........................................................................................6
1.7.1 Alarm Processing .........................................................................................6
1.7.2 Tagging and Interlock Checking ..................................................................6
1.7.3 Analytical and Forecast Tools......................................................................6
1.7.4 Historical Information System (HIS) ...........................................................6
1.7.5 Operator Training Simulator ........................................................................6
1.8 SCADA Future ................................................................................................................7
1.9 SCADA Vendors.............................................................................................................7

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Literature Survey.............................................................................................................8

2.1.1 Fundamentals of Power System Protection by Y.G.Paithankar...................8
 2.1.2 Power System Engineering ...........................................................................8
2.1.3 Securing SCADA Systems by Ronald L.Krutz............................................8
2.1.4 SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition by Stuart A. Boyer ...9
2.1.6 Research Paper on SCADA by A. Daneels & W.Salter ...............................9
2.1.7 Intrusion Detection and Cyber Security of SCADA by Dale Peterson ..........9
2.2 Background of SCADA...................................................................................................9
2.2.1 SCADA implementation by sensor to panel system ....................................9
2.2.2 Architecture for Secure SCADA and DCS Networks................................11
2.3 Remote Access of SCADA ...........................................................................................12
2.4 Implementation of SCADA in Water Distribution........................................................13
2.5 Implementation of SCADA in oil and gas pipelines.....................................................14
2.6 Application of the SCADA System in Waste water Treatment Plants .........................16
2.7 Application of SCADA in Hydro Power Plant .............................................................17
2.8 SCADA for Offshore Wind Farms................................................................................18
2.9 Already Projects on SCADA.........................................................................................19
2.9.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition ................................................19
2.9.2 SCADA Implementation at CJPL Jaranwala .............................................19
2.9.3 General SCADA Educational Laboratory for Undergraduate Students.....19
2.10 Present Project...............................................................................................................19

CHAPTER 3 Data Collection

3.1 Basic IED Applications: .............................................................................21

3.1.1 Self Supervision with Internal Event List ..................................................21
3.1.2 Voltage Selection .......................................................................................21
3.1.3 Automatic Opening of Transformer Disconnector ....................................22
3.1.4 Automatic Load Transfer from bus A to bus B..........................................23
3.2 IED Requirements .........................................................................................................23
3.2.1 Current Transformer Requirements ...........................................................23
3.2.2 SNTP Server Requirements .......................................................................23
3.3 Monitoring Functions in IED ........................................................................................23
3.3.1 Measurements.............................................................................................24
3.3.2 Event Counter.............................................................................................24
 3.3.3 Event Function ...........................................................................................24
3.3.4 Disturbance Report.....................................................................................24
3.3.5 Event List ...................................................................................................25
3.3.6 Indications ..................................................................................................25
3.3.7 Event Recorder...........................................................................................26
3.3.8 Trip Value Recorder...................................................................................26
3.3.9 Disturbance Recorder.................................................................................27
3.4 Logic Functions in IED .................................................................................................27
3.4.1 Configurable Logic Blocks ........................................................................28
3.4.2 Fixed Signal Function Block......................................................................28
3.4.3 Boolean 16 to Integer Conversion..............................................................28
3.4.4 Boolean 16 to Integer Conversion with Logic Node Representation.........28
3.4.5 Integer to Boolean 16 Conversion..............................................................28
3.4.6 Integer to Boolean 16 Conversion with Logic Node Representation.........29
3.5 Indication LEDs ............................................................................................................29
3.6 Human Machine Interface .............................................................................................29
3.7 REB670 .........................................................................................................................30
3.7.1 Differential Protection Using REB670 ......................................................31
3.7.2 Zone Selection Features .............................................................................32
3.7.3 Tripping Circuit Arrangement....................................................................33
3.7.4 Trip Circuit Supervision for Bus bar Protection ........................................33
3.8 Transformer Terminal RET 54_X .................................................................................33
3.8.1 Functions of the Transformer Terminal .....................................................34
3.8.2 Control Functions.......................................................................................35
3.8.3 Communication Functions .........................................................................35
3.8.4 Standard Functions.....................................................................................35
3.8.5 System Structure ........................................................................................35
3.9 Feeder Terminal REF 54_X ..........................................................................................36
3.9.1 Functions of the Feeder Terminal ..............................................................38
3.9.2 Protection Functions...................................................................................39
3.9.3 Control Functions.......................................................................................39
3.9.4 Communication Functions .........................................................................39
3.9.5 Standard Functions.....................................................................................39
 3.9.6 System Structure ........................................................................................39

CHAPTER 4 Data Integration and Processing

4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................41

4.2 General Features of RTU560 ........................................................................................42
4.3 RTU560 System Concept..............................................................................................43
4.4 RTU560 Communication and Module Concept............................................................44
4.5 RTU560 Application Functions ....................................................................................46
4.5.1 Telecontrol Functions.................................................................................47
4.5.2 General Functions ......................................................................................47
4.5.3 Programmable Logic Control (PLC)..........................................................48
4.5.4 Archive and Local Print Function ..............................................................48
4.5.5 Disturbance Data Archive ..........................................................................48
4.5.6 Integrated Human Machine Interface.........................................................49
4.5.7 Routing of SPA bus Protocol Telegrams ...................................................49
4.6 Telecontrol Functions....................................................................................................49
4.6.1 Indication Processing ................................................................................50
4.6.2 Analog Measured Value Processing ..........................................................50
4.6.3 Digital Measured Value Processing ...........................................................50
4.6.4 Integrated Total Processing........................................................................51
4.6.5 Direct Interfacing to Current/Voltage Transmitters ...................................51
4.6.6 Object Commands ......................................................................................52
4.6.7 Regulation Step Command Output ............................................................52
4.7 Communication .............................................................................................................52
4.6.1 Internal Communication.............................................................................52
4.6.2 External Communication............................................................................52

CHAPTER 5 SCADA Communication and Protocols

5.1 IED Station Communication .........................................................................................54

5.1.1 IEC 61850-8-1 Communication Protocol ..................................................54
5.1.2 LON Communication Protocol .................................................................54
 5.1.3 SPA Communication Protocol ..................................................................55
5.1.4 Single Command, 16 Signals (CD) ............................................................56
5.1.5 Multiple Command (CM) and Multiple Transmit (MT)............................56
5.2 IED Remote Communication ........................................................................................56
5.3 RTU External Communication......................................................................................57
5.3.1 Telecontrol Protocols .................................................................................57
5.3.2 Host Communication Interfaces................................................................57
5.3.3 Sub-Device Communication Interfaces .....................................................58
5.3.4 Redundant Communication........................................................................58

Chapter 6 Protection and control IED Manager PCM600

6.1 Features .........................................................................................................................59

6.2 Engineering ...................................................................................................................59
6.3 Connection of signals ....................................................................................................60
6.4 Parameter setting ...........................................................................................................60
6.5 Disturbance handling.....................................................................................................61
6.6 Communication management Tool ...............................................................................61
6.7 How to Use the IED in Conjunction with PCM 600 Toolbox....................61
Conclusion and Suggestions ..........................................................................................63
References ............................................................................................................................64
 Chapter 1

Introduction

SCADA is an acronym that stands for supervisory control and data acquisition.
SCADA refers to a system that collects data from various sensors at a factory, plant or in
some remote locations and then sends this data to a central computer which then manages and
controls the data.

SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets where centralized data
acquisition is important. These systems are used in distribution systems such as water
distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and gas pipelines, electrical utility
transmission and distribution system, and rail and other public transportation systems.
SCADA systems integrate data acquisition systems with data transmission systems and HMI
software to provide a centralized monitoring and control system for numerous process input
and outputs. SCADA systems are used to collect field information, transfer it to central
computer facility and display the information to the operator graphically or textually, thereby
allowing the operator to monitor or control an entire system from a central location in real
time. Based on sophistication and setup of the individual system, control of any individual
system, operation, or task can be automatic, or it can be performed by operator commands.

1.1 SCADA System in General

SCADA systems consist of both hardware and software. Typical hardware includes an
MTU placed at a control center, communication equipment (e.g. Radio, telephone line, cable,
or satellite), and one or more geographically distributed field sites consisting of either an
RTU or PLC, which controls actuators and/or monitor sensors. The MTU stores and
processes the information from RTU inputs and outputs, while the RTU or PLC controls the
local process. The communication hardware allows the transfer of information and data back
and forth between the MTU and RTU’s or PLC’s.

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 Figure 1.1 shows the components and general configuration of a SCADA system. The
control center houses a control server (MTU) and communication routers. Other control
center components include the HMI, engineering workstations, and the historian, which are
all connected by a LAN. The control center collects and logs information gathered by the
field sites, displays information to the HMI, and may generate actions based upon detected
events. The control center is also responsible for centralized alarming, trend analyses and
reporting. The field site performs local control of actuators and monitor sensors. Field sites
are often equipped with a remote access capability to allow field operators to perform remote
diagnostics and repairs usually aver a separate dial up or WAN connection. Standard and
proprietary communication protocols running over serial communications are used to
transport information between the control center and field sites using telemetry techniques
such as telephone line, cable, fiber and radiofrequency such as broadcast, microwave and
satellite.

Figure 1.1 Components and general configuration of a SCADA system

1.2 Basic SCADA Communication Topologies

MTU-RTU communication architectures vary among implementations. The various
architectures used include point-to-point, series-star and multi-drop. Point-to-point is
functionally the simplest type; however, it is expensive because of individual channels

2
needed for each connection. In a series connection, the number of channels used is reduced;
however, channel sharing has an impact on the efficiency and complexity of SCADA
operations. Similarly, the series-star and multi-drop configurations’ use of one channel per
device results in decreased efficiency and increased system complexity.

Figure 1.2 Basic SCADA communication topologies

1.3 Supervisory Control

A control scheme whereby a computer or controller monitors and intermittently
downloads programs sets sub-goals or adjust control parameters of a level automatic
controller.

1.4 Data Acquisition

Process of collecting data from the system through some manual or automatic means
for the purpose of producing printed reports for operating, supervisory, maintenance or data
acquisition. “The process of disciplines”

3
1.5 Modules of SCADA
Some of the modules of SCADA are discussed below briefly:

1.5.1 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)

The main function of RTU is to collect data from plant and to transmit data to
different systems through a bus which run on specific protocols. Data may be send to a MTU,
remote supervisory center or to any site. RTU is a basic component of SCADA that converts
analog signals (either from some level sensor or temperature) to digital signals that can be
accepted at the PLC level.

Modern RTU’s are usually capable of executing simple programs autonomously

without involving the host computers of the DCS or SCADA system to simplify deployment
and to provide redundancy for safety reasons.

1.5.2 Master Terminal Unit (MTU)

Data from different RTU’s or remote sites come to MTU which stores and processes
the data and sends to other computers.

1.5.3 The Central SCADA Master System (HMI)

The HMI of a SCADA system is where data is processed and presented to be viewed
and monitored by a human operator. The interface usually includes control where the
individual can interface with SCADA system. HMI can also be linked to a database, which
can use data gathered from RTU’s or PLC’s to provide graphs on trends, logistic info,
schematics for a specific sensor or machine or even make troubleshooting guides accessible.

1.5.4 Communication Medias

Some of Communication Medias used in SCADA are discussed below briefly:

i. Copper Cable

Twisted pair copper cable is the most popular medium used for SCADA
communications and it has been used in its present form for many years.

ii. Coaxial Cable

It is simply a transmission line consisting of an unbalanced pair made up

of an inner conductor surrounded by a grounded outer conductor, which is
held in a concentric by a dielectric.

4
 iii. Power Line Carrier (PLC)

PLC uses power transmission lines to transmit radio frequency signals.

PLC system operates in on-off ode by transmitting radio frequency signals
in the 10 to 500 kHz band over transmission lines. In Pakistan, for hilly
areas, SCADA communication is done over PLC because these sites are
not in-line.

iv. VHF/UHF Radio

It has no physical connection. This communication depends on distance

and the distance decides the use of specific signal. In Pakistan this type of
communication is used in plain areas where sites are in-line.

v. Satellite

It is especially when geographic placement of elements in the controlled

network is diverse through large areas with ‘virtually no terrestrial
communication networks’, removing the requirements to lay hundreds or
thousands of kms of wires. In Pakistan this mode is recently been. In
modern power plants.

vi. Fiber Optic Cable

Inside a plant communication is done with the help of optical fiber. It has
large bandwidth, so it can carry large data from plant which is de-
multiplexed by RTU. As this mode of communication is expensive on
large scale, so, it is not in use in Pakistan over large distances.

1.5.5 SCADA Software

The supervisory computer consists of a PC running either Campbell Scientifics’ HMI
software or another vendor’s software. InTouch, Intellution, Lookout and other software
packages can be used in conjunction with OPC client/server software application. Like other
HMI software packages, OPC client/server software provides a graphical interface that the
operator uses to view the status of remote sites, acknowledge alarms and control the units.

5
1.6 SCADA Security
SCADA networks were initially designed to maximize functionality, with little
attention paid to security. As a result, performance, reliability, flexibility and safety of
distributed control/SCADA systems are robust, while the security of these systems of often
weak. This makes some SCADA networks potentially vulnerable to disruption of service,
process redirection or manipulation of operational data that could result in public safety
concerns and/or serious disruptions to the nation’s critical infrastructure. Action is required
by all organizations, government or commercial to secure their SCADA networks as part of
effort to adequately protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.

1.7 SCADA System Applications

Some of the SCADA system applications are given below:

1.7.1 Alarm Processing

Alarm processing, processes the data collected and alerts the Control Center
Operators immediately, if an alarm condition is detected.

1.7.2 Tagging and Interlock Checking

Tagging and interlock checking functions help to prevent inadvertent errors and
ensure the safety of all persons working with the electricity network as well as supply
reliability.

1.7.3 Analytical and Forecast Tools

Analytical and forecast tools such as state estimator, contingency analysis, security
enhancement and short term load forecast are provided in the EMS to assist the control centre
operators to evaluate the status of its power network, forecast the system demand in future,
analyze and determine the outages of transmission and generating facilities, etc. in short, to
manage the system in a reliable and effective manner.

1.7.4 Historical Information System (HIS)

Extremely large volume of historical and future data can be stored and retrieved. The
system uses Oracle relation database as the database engine.

1.7.5 Operator Training Simulator

This provides hand-on training for the Control Centre Operators for normal,
emergency and restorative control of power system.

6
1.8 SCADA Future
Research and technology development is required to fill the technology gaps between
the problems of today and the industry solutions of tomorrow. The direction of SCADA is
towards fully automated, distributed and self healing infrastructures. More intelligence and
system level security is needed to illuminate the issues associated with optimizing at a local
level and main-in-the-middle limitations. Constant efforts are being made to push the
capability of the infrastructure to a point where humans will not be able to respond quickly
enough to prevent or secure against an outage or attack.

1.9 SCADA Vendors

Some of the SCADA vendors are given below:

¾ Mass Group
¾ OPTO 22 (Automation made simple)
¾ red lion
¾ Cal Amp
¾ IPS (INVENSYS PROCESS SYSTEMS)
¾ gridconnect
¾ ABB (Asea Brown Bowery)

7
 Chapter 2

Literature Review

The primary sources of literature for this project were books, manuals and internet.
The help files provided with SCADA components and implementation are comprehensive
and covers all topics related to this project. Prof. Dr. Aftab Ahmad also helped, to gain
insight into this topic. Specially, Mr. Shehriar Khan helped in the completion of this project.
Tours have also been made in order to collect relevant technical material.

2.1 Literature Survey

2.1.1 Fundamentals of Power System Protection by Y.G.Paithankar & S.R. Bhinde

The book provides a very comprehensive material related to the protection of power
system. As the project is based upon the power system (power plant), the book provides the
basics of power system protection for the implementation of SCADA in power plants.

2.1.2 Power System Engineering by M.L.Soni & P.V. Gupta

The book provides complete basic information of power system but according to requirement
of the project power plant portion is concerned mainly along with other helping material.

2.1.3 Securing SCADA Systems by Ronald L.Krutz

The book defines SCADA system components and functions, and provides
illustrations of general SCADA system architectures. The book also provides information
about the security importance of SCADA systems. The book also discusses the security
problems related to SCADA and the techniques to solve these security issues.

As security of SCADA systems is not prime focus of project, so only brief overview
of security risks for SCADA systems is studied from the book.

8
2.1.4 SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition by Stuart A. Boyer
The book provides basics of SCADA and gives an overview of related topics to
project. The book focuses on technologies that make SCADA easily understandable. The also
identifies basic differences between SCADA Systems of different industries. But again,
according to the project requirement only basics of SCADA is studied from the book.

2.1.5 Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial
Control Systems Security by Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, Karen Kent

The book provides basic difference between SCADA, DCS and ICS. But basically the
book is referred to study SCADA systems and the difference between SCADA and DCS and
SCADA system implementation and applications. In the book basic to deep concept of
SCADA is given but only relevant information about SCADA is taken from the book.

2.1.6 Research Paper on SCADA by A. Daneels & W.Salter

The research paper describes SCADA Systems in terms of their architecture, their
interface to the process hardware, functionality, scalability, performance and openness. Some
consideration is also given to the industrial standards of SCADA Systems.

2.1.7 Intrusion Detection and Cyber Security Monitoring of SCADA by Dale Peterson
The research paper describes how to protect SCADA from attacks of hackers, cyber
terrorists, and others who want to disrupt the critical infrastructure of SCADA System. The
paper also provides means for early detection of attacks from the most common threat agents.
The deficiencies and future specific solutions of SCADA system are also discussed. Only
brief overview of the paper is taken.

2.2 Background of SCADA

SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) has been around as long as there
have been control systems. The first ‘SCADA’ system utilized data acquisition by means of
panels of meters, lights and strip chart recorders. The operator manually operating various
control knobs exercised supervisory control. These devices were and still are used to do
supervisory control and data acquisition on plants, factories and power generating facilities.

2.2.1 SCADA implementation by sensor to panel system

The following figure shows a sensor to panel system

9
 Figure 2.1 Sensors to panel using 4–20 mA or voltage

The sensor to panel type of SCADA system has the following advantages:

¾ It is simple, no CPUs, RAM, ROM or software programming needed

¾ The sensors are connected directly to the meters, switches and lights on
the panel
¾ It could be (in most circumstances) easy and cheap to add a simple
device like a switch or indicator

The disadvantages of a direct panel to sensor system are:

¾ The amount of wire becomes unmanageable after the installation of

hundreds of sensors
¾ The quantity and type of data are minimal and rudimentary
¾ Installation of additional sensors becomes progressively harder as the
system grows
¾ Re-configuration of the system becomes extremely difficult
¾ Simulation using real data is not possible
¾ Storage of data is minimal and difficult to manage
¾ No off site monitoring of data or alarms
¾ Someone has to watch the dials and meters 24 hours a day

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2.2.2 Architecture for Secure SCADA and Distributed Control System Networks
To address the security needs of control networks, it is essential to begin with a
layered defense-in-depth approach that enables administrators to monitor the network at
every level. Primary concerns for a control system network manager include:

¾ Assuring the integrity of the data

¾ Securing remote access
¾ Validating and authenticating every device and user on the control system
network

A systematic approach to security begins with reducing the vulnerable surface of the
industrial control system network. The first step is the creation of control system-specific
policies that detail; which devices, what protocols and which applications may run on the
network, who has access to these devices and from where, and what are the types of
operations a user (or a role) is allowed to perform. The next step is to identify the appropriate
locations to implement the policy. This could be through the appropriate configuration of
controls on devices already present on the network, and by adding various network elements.

Such network elements are required to create a security perimeter, provide additional
enforcement points and segment the network for fault containment. The third step is to
monitor the implementation of the policy to ensure these controls are effective, locate any
violations and then feedback into the policy any corrections based on observed network
behavior. Security is a continuous process and requires diligent monitoring, reviewing and
adjusting to be effective. Figure below shows one of the existing technologies that can be
used for securing typical control networks.

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 Figure 2.2 Typical electric SCADA network diagram

2.3 Remote Access of SCADA

Remote access is enabled for several reasons: a plant operator/engineer may remotely
monitor equipment status, an ISO may need to collect current production data, or a vendor
may have to diagnose and fix operational problems. In order to minimize the probability of
unintentional misuse or tampering, users should be limited only to functions for which they
are authorized. For example, a vendor logging in to update a patch must not be able to run
any control system commands. If a contractor’s laptop contains spyware, or his antivirus is
not up to date, that contractor should not be allowed access to the control system network.

12
 Figure 2.3 Adding remote accesses to SCADA

2.4 Implementation of SCADA in Water Distribution

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) solutions for water systems
combined with, leak detection and use of Pressure Regulating Valve (PRV) stations may
significantly improve the situation. These measures have to be complemented with adapted
water conservation programs aimed at minimizing excessive water usage. These initiatives
shall combine to form a "water strategy" for conserving this valuable resource and making it
available at an affordable price.

Water companies are able to provide estimates of their production, imports, exports
and consumption, but are less able to point on reasons for unaccounted-for water. Water
losses can be determined by conducting periodic water balance in defined sections of a water
network. This calculation is based on the measurement of water flow, produced and imported
quantities compared to exported and consumed quantities. This can be done automatically by
the SCADA system and with RTUs, and the outcome provides a guide to how much water is
lost as a result of leakage from the network and how much of the water loss can be attributed
to other undetectable reasons.

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 Figure 2.4 SCADA systems for water distribution

Water utilities are now seeking new ways to introduce improvements in their
maintenance processes, which may also reduce operating and maintenance costs. Introduction
of electronic microprocessor based pump efficiency monitoring, combined with water
SCADA systems will result in faster return on the investment in a SCADA system.
Implementation of this process involves:

¾ Calculating the volume of pumped water as measured and logged by the RTU
¾ Monitoring of the "peak power" drawn by the pump during its activation.
¾ Monitoring the average energy supplied to that pump during the same period

2.5 Implementation of SCADA in oil and gas pipelines

SCADA minimizes risk by providing integrated products and solutions as the Main
Automation Contractor (MAC) and the Main Electrical Contractor (MEC). Solutions for oil
and gas pipeline automation include block valve stations, pump stations, tank farms in liquid
applications and compressing, reducing and metering stations in gas applications.

Benefits using the SCADA integrated approach:

14
 ¾ Risk Management - everything working right first time.
¾ Schedule Improvement - engineering, commissioning and start-up time
reduced.
¾ Cost Reduction - lower engineering, start-up and maintenance costs.
¾ Operational Efficiency - a reality that the total plant availability and
throughput will maximize the plant’s profit margin.
¾ Best Use of Technology - truly integrated solution.
¾ Designing It Right - providing best in class and fit for purpose solutions that
“build-in” long term benefits.

SCADA offers total solutions for transportation and distribution to manage the
movement of hydrocarbons through pipelines, tankers and terminals; eliminate losses; and
meet strict government regulations. From the stations to the control room, and on to the
boardroom. Pipeline data and pipeline components are presented as configurable software
objects. Each object carries a range of related information, such as electrical and mechanical
capabilities, intellectual properties and identity information that makes the object instantly
recognizable to enterprise-wide information networks. With Aspect Objects, pipeline
information is deployed rapidly and uniformly. Hence Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems improve the use of pipeline facilities. The result is faster
turnaround with increased functionality.

15
 Figure 2.5 SCADA in oil and gas pipeline

2.6 Application of the SCADA System in Waste water Treatment Plants

The implementation of the SCADA system has a positive impact on the operations,
maintenance, process improvement and savings for city Wastewater Operations. The
application discusses the system's evolvement, the external/internal architecture, and the
human-machine-interface graphical design. The system also successes in monitoring the city
sewage and sludge collection/distribution systems, wet-weather facilities and wastewater
treatment plants, complying with the USEPA requirements on the discharge, and effectively
reducing the operations and maintenance costs.

16
2.7 Application of SCADA in Hydro Power Plant
Hydro automation improves efficiency and reduces operating expense. A number of
hydro plants are operated by remote control utilizing standard SCADA concepts. The rest of
the plants are manually controlled locally at the plant site. Intelligent control systems placed
at most of protecting and loading the generating units. The corporate WAN is used to transmit
schedules to the plants from the Hydro Dispatch Control Cell (HDCC) located in the Power
Business Center. If the WAN is unavailable for some reason, the local control system simply
continues to operate the plant according to the last schedule it received. SCADA
communication channels allow for manual control of the plants if the WAN is unavailable.
The basic control components and design concept for the HDCC are shown in Figure below.

Figure 2.6 Hydro dispatch control cell

Inter-plant communications between the various components of the automation

system are accomplished through one of three LANs. Communications between the local
operating work- station and the automation hardware is over an Ethernet fiber optic LAN
configured. All the Ethernet addresses on this LAN and the machine condition monitoring

17
(MCM) LAN are configured such that access to and from internet is not possible. The MCM
LAN, which also utilizes Ethernet connections, is used to allow the transfer of data between
third party machine condition monitoring systems and the automation system. The third LAN
in the automation system is the Profibus LAN that allows communication between the
various PLCs and their remote I/O. This LAN is entirely internal to the plant.

Figure 2.7 Automation philosophy of hydro-plant

2.8 SCADA for Offshore Wind Farms

The SCADA system for wind farm monitoring and control will require a
communications network between the wind turbines in the wind farm, and back to the shore.
Candidate media for this are:

¾ Copper twisted pair (RS485)

¾ Fiber Optic - multi mode
¾ Fiber Optic - single mode
¾ Radio telemetry

18
 The SCADA system is conceptually separate to the machines and their controllers.
Unless there is a regulatory requirement that requires the machines to stop if there was a loss
of communications, the machines should be allowed to run independently of the SCADA
system status. Although the SCADA system needs to be reliable, there is no obvious benefit
in making it any more reliable than the power distribution network, if it utilizes
communications cables within the power cables.

2.9 Already Projects on SCADA

Some projects have already been done on SCADA. Two of the projects with little
description are given below:

2.9.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

This project is related to the general study of SCADA and SCADA was not
implemented in any of the particular system. Various aspects of SCADA system were studied
in this project and some work on Micro-SCADA Simulator in terms of SCADA Simulation
was also a part of this project.

2.9.2 SCADA Implementation at CJPL Jaranwala

This project was implemented in spinning plant at CJPL Jaranwala. In the project
hardware is also implemented. The sensors used are switches and the data is collected at
RTU. In the project PLC is used as RTU.

2.9.3 General SCADA Educational Laboratory for Undergraduate Students

The work is done on Ms Basis. The thesis is generally about general SCADA, modern
trends in SCADA, SCADA applications and most importantly SCADA developed in lab to
have clear understanding of SCADA for the students of undergraduate. And the project
description is given below

¾ Power factor improvement

¾ Hardware needed to calculate power parameters
¾ Control features to improve power factor

2.10 Present Project

The objective of the project is the ‘Implementation of SCADA in Power Plant’. In the
project, study and observation is carried out on how data is collected from power plant, which

19
technology is used to collect data, which mode of communication is used to transfer data
from plant to RTU, which sensors are used, which protocols are used, whether the technology
implemented is based on relay logic, PLC or IED. Also mode of communication between
power plant and National Power Control Center (NPCC) is taken under consideration.

The project is the general implementation of SCADA in power plants or substations.

This generalized concept can be applied to any power plant or substation. ABB technology is
used in the implementation in the project. If in any other power plant or substation, SCADA
is implemented other than ABB, there can be a slight difference in technology, protocols,
name of components etc but the main method and scheme will remain same. So, the study
can be applied to any power plant or substation with SCADA with a slight difference.

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 CHAPTER 3

Data Collection

Data from different components of the power plant or substation is collected with the
help of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and terminal units. Different IEDs are used to
collect data from different components of plant. This collected data is then used for
protection, monitoring and control of these components and hence control of power plant or
substation.

In this chapter features of different IEDs and terminal units from ABB are
overviewed. It is also discussed that, what are the requirements of these IEDs and terminal
units, what kind of protection is offered by these IEDs and terminal units and how data is
collected by these IEDs and terminal units.

3.1 Basic IED Applications:

3.1.1 Self Supervision with Internal Event List

The protection and control IEDs have a complex design with many included
functions. The included self-supervision function and the internal signals function block
provide good supervision of the IED. The fault signals make it easier to analyze and locate a
fault. Both hardware and software supervision is included and it is also possible to indicate
possible faults through a hardware contact on the power supply module and/or through the
software communication. Internal events are generated by the built-in supervisory functions.
The supervisory functions supervise the status of the various modules in the IED and, in case
of failure, a corresponding event is generated. Similarly, when the failure is corrected, a
corresponding event is generated.

3.1.2 Voltage Selection

The Bus bar voltage must in many cases be used as reference for line or bay
protection.

21
 Examples are:

¾ Line distance protection where the bus bar is provided with three phase
voltage transformers and the lines with only single-phase sets for Synchronism
check reference. The Synchronism check function in IED 670 has a built-in
voltage selection.
¾ Bus voltage protection e.g. Over- and under voltage, Over- and under
frequency protection functions in the bay.
¾ Voltage reference for metering functions - where three phase voltage
transformers do not exist on the object.
¾ A voltage selection can be created in IED 670 with user defined logic where
positions of disconnectors (and breakers) are used to create the required
voltage selection.
¾ The voltage transformers for a double bus system are connected to the line
protection function, which may be line distance relays or voltage or frequency
relays.
¾ Supervision of the fuse/MCB failures can be fed through the same logic and
connected to e.g. block operation of under voltage functions.

It is also a possible to block functions when both disconnectors are open.

3.1.3 Automatic Opening of Transformer Disconnector and Closing the Ring Breakers
The available function blocks to create user defined logic can be utilized for many
functions. One example is to open the transformer High voltage disconnector at internal
transformer faults in multi-breaker arrangements and then close the ring or one- and a half
breaker diameter.

The logic can include status supervision before the fault was tripped to ensure that the
sequence is only closing apparatuses already closed before the fault, information about the
fault to ensure it was a transformer fault, check that the disconnector is open before the
breaker/s is/are closed and verification that the new status has been reached before next
sequence is started.

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3.1.4 Automatic Load Transfer from bus A to bus B
With transformer applications it is sometimes required to automatically transfer the
load from one transformer to the other. It includes closing bus tie and closing transformer
breakers. It mostly also involves switching back after the normal supply has been restored to
the original transformer. The load transfer scheme includes a combination of advance logic
checking apparatus positions and the measurement of bus and transformer voltage and the use
of Synchronism check device to control the closing.

An advanced alternative exists for generating stations where the unit transformer
supplies will need to synchronize at switching and this synchronizing is done on a decaying
bus voltage on voltage level as well as frequency level depending on the available
synchronous and asynchronous machines maintaining the bus voltage.

3.2 IED Requirements

3.2.1 Current Transformer Requirements

The performance of a protection function will depend on the quality of the measured
current signal. Saturation of the current transformer (CT) will cause distortion of the current
signal and can result in a failure to operate or cause unwanted operations of some functions.
Consequently CT saturation can have an influence on both the dependability and the security
of the protection. The protection IED has been designed to permit heavy CT saturation with
maintained correct operation.

3.2.2 SNTP Server Requirements

The SNTP server to be used shall be connected to the local network, i.e. not more
than 4-5 switches/routers away from the IED. The SNTP server shall be dedicated for its task,
or at least equipped with at real-time operating system, i.e. not a PC with SNTP server
software. The SNTP server shall be stable, i.e. either synchronized from a stable source like
GPS, or local i.e. without synchronization.

3.3 Monitoring Functions in IED

Every IED is provided with the following monitoring functions:

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3.3.1 Measurements
Measurement functions are used for power system measurement, supervision and
reporting to the local HMI. The possibility to continuously monitor measured values of active
power, reactive power, currents, voltages, frequency, power factor etc. is vital for efficient
production, transmission and distribution of electrical energy. It provides to the system
operator fast and easy overview of the present status of the power system.

Additionally it can be used during testing and commissioning of protection and

control IEDs in order to verify proper operation and connection of instrument transformers
(i.e. CTs & VTs). During normal service by periodic comparison of the measured value from
the IED with other independent meters the proper operation of the IED analog measurement
chain can be verified. Finally it can be used to verify proper direction orientation for distance
or directional over current protection function.

Dead-band supervision can be used to report measured signal value to station level
when change in measured value is above set threshold limit or time integral of all changes
since the last time value updating exceeds the threshold limit. Measure value can also be
based on periodic reporting.

3.3.2 Event Counter

This function has six counters which are used for storing the number of times each
counter has been activated. All six counters have a common blocking function used, for
example, when testing. All six counters have a common reset and a common function.

3.3.3 Event Function

When using a Substation Automation system with LON or SPA communication, time
tagged events can be sent at change or cyclically from the IED to the station level. These
events are created from any available signal in the IED that is connected to the Event function
block. The event function block is used for LON and SPA communication.

3.3.4 Disturbance Report

To get fast, complete and reliable information about disturbances in the primary and/
or in the secondary system it is very important to gather information on fault currents,
voltages and events. It is also important having a continuous event-logging to be able to
monitor in an overview perspective. These tasks are accomplished by the Disturbance Report
function and facilitate a better understanding of the power system behavior and related

24
primary and secondary equipment during and after a disturbance. An analysis of the recorded
data provides valuable information that can be used to explain a disturbance, basis for change
of relay setting plan, improve existing equipment etc. This information can also be used in a
longer perspective when planning for and designing new installations, i.e. a disturbance
recording could be a part of Functional Analysis (FA).

Every disturbance report recording is saved in the IED. The same applies to all events,
which are continuously saved in a ring-buffer. The Local Human Machine Interface (LHMI)
is used to get information about the recordings, and the disturbance report files may be
uploaded to the PCM 600 (Protection and Control IED Manager) and further analysis using
the Disturbance Handling tool. If the IED is connected to a station bus (IEC 61850-8-1),
according to IEC 61850, disturbance recorder and fault location information will be available
on the bus. The same information will be obtainable if IEC 60870-5-103 is used.

3.3.5 Event List

From an overview perspective, continuous event-logging is a useful system
monitoring instrument and is a complement to specific disturbance recorder function. The
event list (EL), always included in the IED, logs all selected binary input signals connected to
the Disturbance report function. The list may contain of up to 1000 time tagged events stored
in a ring-buffer where, if the buffer is full, the oldest event is overwritten when a new event is
logged.

The difference between the event list (EL) and the event recorder (ER) function is that
the list function continuously updates the log with time tagged events while the recorder
function is an extract of events during the disturbance report time window. The event list
information is available in the IED and the user can use the Local Human Machine Interface
(LHMI) to get the information. The list can also be uploaded from the PCM 600 tool.

3.3.6 Indications
Fast, condensed and reliable information about disturbances in the primary and/or in
the secondary system is important. Binary signals that have changed status during a
disturbance are an example of this. This information is used primarily in the short term (e.g.
immediate disturbance analysis, corrective actions) to get information via the LHMI in a
straightforward way without any knowledge of how to handle the IED. There are three LED’s
on the LHMI (green, yellow and red) which will display status information about the IED (in
service, internal failure etc.) and the Disturbance Report function (trigged).

25
 The Indication function (IND), always included in the IED, shows all selected binary
input signals connected to the Disturbance Report function that have been activated during a
disturbance. The status changes are logged during the entire recording time, which depends
on the set of recording times (pre-, post-fault and limit time) and the actual fault time. The
indications are not time-tagged. The indication information is available for each of the
recorded disturbances in the IED and the user may use the Local Human Machine Interface
(LHMI) to view the information.

3.3.7 Event Recorder

Quick, complete and reliable information about disturbances in the primary and/or in
the secondary system is vital e.g. time tagged events logged during disturbances. This
information is used for different purposes in the short term (e.g. disturbance analysis,
corrective actions) and in the long term (e.g. disturbance analysis, statistics and maintenance,
i.e. Functional Analysis).

The event recorder (ER), always included in the IED, logs all selected binary input
signals connected to the Disturbance Report function. Each recording can contain up to 150
time-tagged events. The events are logged during the total recording time, which depends on
the set of recording times (pre-, post-fault and limit time) and the actual fault time. During
this time, the first 150 events for all 96 binary signals are logged and time-tagged.

The event recorder information is available for each of the recorded disturbances in
the IED and the user may use the Local Human Machine Interface (LHMI) to get the
information. The information is included in the disturbance recorder file, which may be
uploaded to the PCM 600 (Protection and Control IED Manager) and further analyzed using
the Disturbance Handling tool. The event recording information is an integrated part of the
disturbance record (Comtrade file).

3.3.8 Trip Value Recorder

Fast, complete and reliable information about disturbances such as fault currents and
voltage faults in the power system is vital. This information is used for different purposes in
the short perspective (e.g. fault location, disturbance analysis, corrective actions) and the long
term (e.g. disturbance analysis, statistics and maintenance, i.e. Functional Analysis).

The trip value recorder (TVR), always included in the IED, calculates the values of all
selected external analog input signals (channel 1-30) connected to the Disturbance Report

26
function. The estimation is performed immediately after finalizing each recording and
available in the Disturbance Report. The result is magnitude and phase angle before and
during the fault for each analog input signal. The information is used as input to the fault
location function (FL), if included in the IED and in operation.

The trip value recorder information is available for each of the recorded disturbances
in the IED and the user may use the Local Human Machine Interface (LHMI) to get the
information. The information is included in the disturbance recorder file, which can be
uploaded to the PCM 600 (Protection and Control IED Manager) and further analyzed using
the Disturbance Handling tool.

3.3.9 Disturbance Recorder

To get fast, complete and reliable information about fault current, voltage, binary
signal and other disturbances in the power system is very important. This is accomplished
by the Disturbance Recorder function and facilitates a better understanding of the behavior of
the power system and related primary and secondary equipment during and after a
disturbance. An analysis of the recorded data provides valuable information that can be used
to explain a disturbance, basis for change of IED setting plan, improvement of existing
equipment etc. This information can also be used in a longer perspective when planning for
and designing new installations, i.e. a disturbance recording could be a part of Functional
Analysis (FA).

The Disturbance Recorder (DR), always included in the IED, acquires sampled data
from all selected analog input and binary signals connected to the function blocks i.e.
maximum 30 external analog, 10 internal (derived) analog and 96 binary signals. The
function is characterized by great flexibility as far as configuration, starting conditions,
recording times, and large storage capacity are concerned. Thus, the disturbance recorder is
not dependent on the operation of protective functions, and it can record disturbances that
were not discovered by protective functions.

3.4 Logic Functions in IED

Every IED is provided with the following logic functions:

27
3.4.1 Configurable Logic Blocks
A high number of logic blocks and timers are available for user to adapt the
configuration to the specific application needs. There are no settings for AND gates, OR
gates, inverters or XOR gates. For normal On/Off delay and pulse timers the time delays and
pulse lengths are set from the CAP configuration tool. Both timers in the same logic block
(the one delayed on pick-up and the one delayed on drop-out) always have a common setting
value. Pulse length settings are independent of one another for all pulse circuits. For
controllable gates, settable timers and SR flip-flops with memory, the setting parameters are
accessible via the local HMI or Protection and Control IED Manager (PCM 600).

3.4.2 Fixed Signal Function Block

The fixed signals function block generates a number of pre-set (fixed) signals that can
be used in the configuration of an IED, either for forcing the unused inputs in the other
function blocks to a certain level/value, or for creating certain logic.

3.4.3 Boolean 16 to Integer Conversion

The B16I function block (or the Boolean 16 to integer conversion block) is used to
transform a set of 16 binary (logical) signals into an integer. It can be used – for example, to
connect logical output signals from a function (like distance protection) to integer inputs from
another function (like line differential protection).

3.4.4 Boolean 16 to Integer Conversion with Logic Node Representation

This function block (or the Boolean 16 to integer conversion with logic node
representation block) is used to transform an integer into a set of 16 binary (logical) signals.
This function block can receive an integer from a station computer – for example, over
IEC61850. These functions are very useful when you want to generate logical commands (for
selector switches or voltage controllers) by inputting an integer number.

3.4.5 Integer to Boolean 16 Conversion

This function block (or the integer to Boolean 16 conversion block) is used to
transform a set of 16 binary (logical) signals into an integer. It can be used – for example, to
connect logical output signals from a function (like distance protection) to integer inputs from
another function (like line differential protection).

28
3.4.6 Integer to Boolean 16 Conversion with Logic Node Representation
This function block (or the integer to Boolean 16 conversion with logic node
representation block) is used to transform an integer into a set of 16 binary (logical) signals.
This function block can receive an integer from a station computer – for example, over
IEC61850. These functions are very useful when you want to generate logical commands (for
selector switches or voltage controllers) by inputting an integer number.

3.5 Indication LEDs

The function block HLED (LED Monitor) controls and supplies information about the
status of the indication LEDs. The input and output signals of HLED are configured with the
PCM 600 tool. The input signal for each LED is selected individually with the PCM 600
Signal Matrix Tool (SMT). LEDs for trip indications are red and LEDs for start indications
are yellow.

3.6 Human Machine Interface

The local human machine interface is available in a small, and a medium sized model.
The principle difference between the two is the size of the LCD. The small size LCD can
display seven line of text and the medium size LCD can display the single line diagram with
up to 15 objects on each page.

The local human machine interface is equipped with an LCD that is used among other
things to locally display the following crucial information:

¾ Connection of each bay with respect to the two differential protection zones
and the check zone. The user can freely set in PST the individual bay names in
order to make easy identification of each primary bay for station personnel
¾ Status of each individual primary switchgear device (i.e. open, closed, 00 as
intermediate and 11 as bad state). The user can freely set in PCM 600 the
individual primary switchgear object names in order to make easy
identification of each switchgear device for station personnel

The local human machine interface is equipped with an LCD that can display the
single line diagram with up to 15 objects.

29
 

Figure 3.1 Bay to zone connection example

3.7 REB670
REB670 is a product of ABB. It is designed for the selective, reliable and fast
differential protection of bus bars, T-connections and meshed corners. REB 670 can be used
for protection of single and double bus bar with or without transfer bus, double circuit
breaker or one and- half circuit breaker stations. The IED is applicable for the protection of
medium voltage (MV), high voltage (HV) and extra high voltage (EHV) installations at a
power system frequency of 50Hz or 60Hz. The IED can detect all types of internal phase-to-
phase and phase-to-earth faults in solidly earthed or low impedance earthed power systems,
as well as all internal multi-phase faults in isolated or high impedance earthed power systems.

Differential protection zones in REB 670 include a sensitive operational level. This
sensitive operational level is designed to be able to detect internal bus bar earth-ground faults

30
in low impedance earthed power systems (i.e. power systems where the earth-fault current is
limited to a certain level, typically between 300A and 2000A primary by a neutral point
reactor or resistor). Alternatively this sensitive level can be used when high sensitivity is
required from bus bar differential protection (i.e. energizing of the bus via long line).

Overall operating characteristic of the differential function in REB 670 is shown in

the following figure.

Figure 3.2 REB 670 operating characteristic

3.7.1 Differential Protection Using REB670

In REB670 numerical protection relays, all CT and VT inputs are galvanically
separated from each other. All analog input quantities are sampled with a constant sampling
rate and these discreet values are then transferred to corresponding numerical values (i.e. AD
conversion). After these conversions, only the numbers are used in the protection algorithms.
Therefore, for the modern numerical differential relays the secondary CT circuit resistance
might not be a decisive factor any more.

The important factor for the numerical differential relay is the time available to the
relay to make the measurements before the CT saturation, which will enable the relay to take
the necessary corrective actions. This practically means that the relay has to be able to make
the measurement and the decision during the short period of time, within each power system
cycle, when the CTs are not saturated. From the practical experience, obtained from heavy
current testing, this time, even under extremely heavy CT saturation, is for practical CTs
around two milliseconds. Because of this, it was decided to take this time as the design
criterion in REB 670 IED, for the minimum acceptable time before saturation of a practical

31
magnetic core CT. Thus, the CT requirements for REB 670 IED are kept to an absolute
minimum.

Only three values are needed to REB670 for the differential protection.

i. incoming current (i.e. sum of all currents which are entering the protection
zone)
ii. outgoing current (i.e. sum of all currents which are leaving the protection
zone)
iii. differential current (i.e. sum of all currents connected to the protection zone)

3.7.2 Zone Selection Features

The REB670 offers an extremely effective solution for stations where zone selection
(i.e. CT switching) is required. This is possible due to the software facility, which gives full
and easy control over all CT inputs connected to the IED. The philosophy is to allow every
CT input to be individually controlled by a setting parameter. This parameter called ZoneSel
can be individually configured for every CT input, which is available within REB 670 IED.
This parameter, for every bay, can be set to only one of the following five alternatives:

i. FIXEDtoZA
ii. FIXEDtoZB
iii. FIXEDtoZA&-ZB
iv. CtrlIncludes
v. CtrlExcludes

If for a particular CT input setting parameter ZoneSel is set to FIXEDtoZA, then this
CT input will be only included to the differential zone A. This setting is typically used for
simple single zone application such as: single bus bar stations, one-and-a-half breaker
stations or double breaker stations.

If for a particular CT input setting parameter ZoneSel is set to FIXEDtoZB, then this
CT input will be only included to the differential zone B. This setting is typically used for
applications such as: one-and-a-half breaker stations or double breaker stations.

If for a particular CT input setting parameter ZoneSel is set to FIXEDtoZA&-ZB,

then this CT input will be included to the differential zone A, but its inverted current value

32
will be as well included to the differential zone B. This setting is typically used for bus
coupler or bus section bays when only one current transformer is available.

3.7.3 Tripping Circuit Arrangement

The contact outputs on REB 670 are of medium duty type. It is possible to use them to
directly trip the individual bay circuit breakers. This solution is suitable for all types of
station arrangements. The internal zone selection logic provides individual bay trip signals in
REB 670 internal software and no external relay for this purpose are required. This
arrangement insures correct trip signal distribution to all circuit breakers in case of bus bar
protection operation or individual bay breaker failure protection operation. Breaker fail
protection can be internal or external to REB 670 IED.

3.7.4 Trip Circuit Supervision for Bus bar Protection

Trip circuit supervision is mostly required to supervise the trip circuit from the
individual bay relay panel to the circuit breaker. It can be arranged also for the tripping
circuits from the bus bar protection.

However, it can be stated that the circuit from a bus bar protection trip relay located in
the bus bar protection panel is not so essential to supervise as bus bar faults are very rare
compared to faults in bays, especially on overhead power lines. Also it is normally a small
risk for faults in the tripping circuit and if there is a fault it affects only one bay and all other
bays are thus correctly tripped meaning that the fault current disappears or is limited to a low
value.

3.8 Transformer Terminal RET 54_X

RET 541/543/545 transformer terminals are designed to be used for the protection,
control, measurement and supervision of two-winding power transformers and generator
transformer blocks in distribution networks.

The main protection function is three-phase current differential protection with

stabilized and instantaneous stages for fast and selective winding short-circuit and interturn
protection. Besides 2nd and 5th harmonic restraints, the stabilized stage also includes a
waveform recognition-based blocking-deblocking feature. Reliable operation even with
partially saturated current transformers, that is, short operate times at faults occurring in the

33
zone to be protected and high stability at external faults are achieved. Increased sensitivity
can be obtained by automatic adaptation to the position changes of the on load tap changer.

In addition to the differential protection, the Basic version terminals incorporate the
following protections:

Restricted earth fault protection with stabilized numerical or high impedance

principle, unbalance and thermal overload protections, three phase over-current and
directional or non directional earth fault back-up protection with definite and IDMT
characteristics on both sides of the transformer.

With the optional automatic voltage regulation function, RET 54_ transformer
terminal can be applied as a comprehensive integrated transformer management terminal. The
voltage regulator can be applied for a single transformer or for parallel transformers with
Master Follower, Negative Reactance or Minimizing Circulating Current principles.

RET 541/543/545 terminals can measure two sets of three phase currents, phase-to-
phase or phase-to-earth voltages, neutral current, residual voltage, frequency and power
factor. Active and reactive power is calculated from the measured currents and voltages.
Energy can be calculated on the basis of the measured power. The measured values can be
indicated locally and remotely as scaled primary values. With the condition monitoring
functions, RET 54_ transformer terminal monitors e.g. trip circuits, gas pressure of the
breaker and breaker wear, and provides scheduled time intervals for maintenance.

By means of the graphic HMI display, the control functions in the transformer
terminal indicate the position of disconnectors, circuit breakers and tap changer locally. Local
control of these objects is possible via the push buttons on the front panel of the transformer
terminal. Furthermore, the transformer terminal allows position information of the objects to
be transmitted to the remote control system. Controllable objects, such as CBs, can also be
opened and closed over the remote control system.

3.8.1 Functions of the Transformer Terminal

The functions of the RET 54_ transformer terminal are categorized as:

¾ Protection functions
¾ measurement functions
¾ control functions

34
 ¾ condition monitoring functions
¾ communication functions
¾ general functions
¾ standard functions

Some of these are detailed below:

3.8.2 Control Functions

The control functions are used to indicate the position of switching devices, i.e. circuit
breakers and disconnectors, and to execute open and close commands for controllable
switching devices in the switchgear. Furthermore, there are supplementary functions for
control logic purposes, e.g. on/off switches, MIMIC alarm, LED control, numerical data for
the MIMIC and logic controlled position selection.

3.8.3 Communication Functions

The RET 54_ transformer terminal provides the IEC_103, Modbus1, DNP 3.01, SPA
and LON serial communication protocols.

3.8.4 Standard Functions

Standard functions are used for logics, such as interlocking, alarming and control
sequencing. The use of logic functions is not limited and the functions can be interconnected
with each other as well as with protection, measurement, power quality, control, condition
monitoring and general functions.

3.8.5 System Structure

The system very often resembles the system in the figure below. The protection,
control or alarm functions are implemented by using RET 54_ transformer terminals,
SPACOM units or other SPA bus devices (devices connected to the system via the SPA bus).
Generator or motor transformers are protected and controlled with RET 54_ transformer
terminals.

35
 Figure 3.3 Example of a LON-based substation automation system

3.9 Feeder Terminal REF 54_X

The REF 54_feeder terminals are designed to be used for the protection, control,
measurement and supervision of medium voltage networks. They can be used with different
kinds of switchgear including single bus bar, double bus bar and duplex systems. The
protection functions also support different types of networks, such as isolated neutral
networks, resonant earthed networks and partially earthed networks.

The functionality available for REF 54_ depends on the selected functionality level
and is also tied to the hardware configuration. The desired functions can be activated from a
wide range of protection, control, measurement, power quality, condition monitoring, general
and communication functions within the scope of I/O connections, considering the total CPU
load. Compared to the traditional use of separate products, the combination of desired
functions provides cost-effective solutions and, together with the relay configuration (IEC
61131-3 standard), allows the REF 54_ feeder terminals to be easily adapted to different
kinds of applications.

By means of the graphic HMI display, the control functions in the feeder terminal
indicate the position of disconnectors or circuit breakers locally. Further, the feeder terminal

36
allows position information from the circuit breakers and the disconnectors to be transmitted
to the remote control system. Controllable objects, such as CBs, can be opened and closed
over the remote control system. Position information and control signals are transmitted over
the serial bus. Local control is also possible via the push-buttons on the front panel of the
feeder terminal.

The feeder terminal is designed to be used for the selective short-circuit and earth
fault protection. The feeder protection type REF 54_ includes over current and earth fault
functions and is used for feeder short-circuit, time over current and earth-fault protection in
solidly, resistant or resonant-earthed networks and in isolated neutral networks. When
desired, auto-reclosing is achieved by using the auto-reclose function. Up to five successive
auto-reclose cycles can be carried out.

The REF 54_ terminal measures phase currents, phase-to-phase or phase-to-earth

voltages, neutral current, residual voltage, frequency and power factor. Active and reactive
power is calculated from measured currents and voltages. Energy can be calculated on the
basis of the measured power. The measured values can be indicated locally and remotely as
scaled primary values.

With the condition monitoring functions the REF 54_ feeder terminal monitors for
example gas pressure and breaker wear, registers the operate time and provides scheduled
time intervals for maintenance. In addition to protection, measurement, control and condition
monitoring functions, the feeder terminals are provided with a large amount of PLC functions
allowing several automation and sequence logic functions needed for substation automation
to be integrated into one unit. The data communication properties include SPA bus
communication, LON bus communication, IEC 60870-5-1031 communication, DNP 3.0
communication or Modbus communication with higher-level equipment. Further, LON
communication, together with PLC functions, minimizes the need for hardwiring between the
units.

37
 Figure 3.4 A distributed protection and control system based on REF 54_ feeder and RET
54_ transformer terminals

3.9.1 Functions of the Feeder Terminal

The functions of the REF 54_ feeder terminal are categorized as:

¾ Protection functions
¾ Measurement functions
¾ Power quality functions
¾ Control functions
¾ Condition monitoring functions
¾ Communication functions
¾ General functions
¾ Standard functions

Some of these are detailed below:

38
3.9.2 Protection Functions
Protection is one of the most important functions of the REF 54_ feeder terminal. The
protection function blocks (for example NOC3Low) are independent of each other and have
their own setting groups and data recording. Conventional current transformers can be used
for protection functions based on current measurement. Correspondingly, voltage dividers or
voltage transformers are used for protection functions based on voltage measurement.

3.9.3 Control Functions

The control functions are used to indicate the position of switching devices, that is,
circuit breakers and disconnectors, and to execute open and close commands for controllable
switching devices in the switchgear. Furthermore, there are supplementary functions for
control logic purposes, such as on/off switches, MIMIC alarm, LED control, numerical data
for the MIMIC and logic controlled position selection.

3.9.4 Communication Functions

The REF 54_ feeder terminal provides the IEC_103, Modbus, DNP 3.0, SPA and LON
serial communication protocols.

3.9.5 Standard Functions

Standard functions are used for logics, such as interlocking, alarming and control
sequencing. The use of logic functions is not limited and the functions can be interconnected
with each other as well as with protection, measurement, power quality, control, condition
monitoring and general functions.

3.9.6 System Structure

The system very often resembles the system in the following figure. The protection,
control or alarm functions are implemented by using REF 54_ feeder terminals, SPACOM
units or other SPA bus devices (devices connected to the system via the SPA bus). Generator
or motor feeders are protected and controlled with REF 54_ feeder terminals.

39
Figure 3.5 Example of a LON-based substation automation system

40
 CHAPTER 4

Data Integration and Processing

All the components in a power plant are connected to a remote terminal unit (RTU).
So, all the data from different components is integrated at RTU. Then, from RTU the data is
send to local control unit and also to remote control unit (MTU).

ABB uses RTU560 as its remote terminal unit. Its basic features and its configuration
to integrate data are discussed in this chapter.

4.1 Introduction
The RTU560 is required to be configurable to nearly all demands made on remote
stations in networks for electricity, gas, oil, water or district heating.

Increasing capabilities of decentralized control and closed-loop control solutions

allows running more functions to be done in the station directly. The RTU560 supports this
by own PLC programs which may use for control tasks on one side and by the capability to
communicate with the external control, protection and monitoring units via serial lines on the
other side. The RTU560 will distribute process information from these units on the demands
for station and network control to several network control centers (NCC). Following figure
will clear the idea.

41
 Figure 4.1 Typical configuration of a telecontrol system

4.2 General Features of RTU560

The telecontrol system RTU560 should be in the position to transmit nearly all kind of
process information, derived from various units in the station, to the control centers and to
marshal commands received from the control centers to the addressed control unit within the
station.

Beside the acquisition and processing of the directly parallel wired process signals to
the RTU560 IO-process interface, the RTU560 is designed for the link of serial
communication routes within the station as well to the higher control level. This can be
another RTU560 router station or a network control center. Within the station it is the
connection of other existing additional control, protection or monitoring devices (Intelligent
Electronic Devices = IED) via serial interfaces.

Functional system features of the RTU560 to fulfill the requirements for remote
control stations:

¾ High functional scope for telecontrol applications functions

42
 ¾ PLC capabilities to execute control and closed loop control applications for
pump stations, hydro power plants, station interlocking for electrical
substations, etc..
¾ Archiving of process and station events in a sequence of events list in the
Flash memory. Accessible via Intranet or equivalent independent network.
¾ Archiving of Integrated Totals (ITI) and Analog Measured Values (AMI) in
the Flash memory. Accessible via Intranet or equivalent independent network.
¾ Reading and archiving of disturbance files from protection relays on request of
the protection relay. Reading of the disturbance files by file transfer over a
separate communication network (e.g. Intranet) on user's demand. Independent
and direct information of available new disturbance files in the disturbance file
archive to the NCC.
¾ Possibility to build (engineer) group alarms for the typical alarm messages,
beside a PLC program.
¾ Interfacing nearly all types and big numbers of IEDs in a station via serial
telecontrol protocols, like IEC 60870-5-103, MODBUS, SPA-Bus, DNP 3.0,
or via Ethernet like IEC 60870-5-104 or IEC 61850.
¾ Marshalling and filtering process events to the connected NCCs. Decoupling
transaction sequences and delay times to the different NCCs by using a
separate process data base per NCC link.
¾ Remote access for diagnostic purposes via Web-Browser and Internet or
Intranet. With detailed information down to each process signal.
¾ Integrated HMI (Human Machine Interface) for process supervision and
control. Via Web-Browser and Internet or Intranet.

4.3 RTU560 System Concept

The RTU560 is based on a communication node which is highly flexible. The number
of CMU boards depends on the demands in a station or router RTU. The figure blow shows
the basic concept for the RTU560 family.

43
 Figure 4.2 RTU560 System concepts

Each CMU type has a number of serial interfaces to connect serial communication
links. Each CMU can run up to two different communication protocols either as Host
Communication Interface (HCI=Slave protocol) or as Sub-device Communication Interface
(SCI = master protocol).

This concept allows cascading the number of CMUs to the demands on different
protocols and interfaces.

The second main point is the internal communication concept. To avoid several
special conversions etc. all process informations, regardless from which interface received,
are converted into an internal presentation and distributed to all CMUs via the RTU560
System bus. Therefore each protocol module needs always only the conversion into / from
the internal presentation. This requests also that each protocol module has its own process
data base for signal processing etc.

4.4 RTU560 Communication and Module Concept

The high processing performance of the RTU560 is accomplished by the efficient
distribution of the tasks to the communication and processing units (CMU) and the micro-

44
controllers on the I/O boards. The software concept is designed to communication and
application modules which have clear interfaces between each other. This allows configuring
and arranging the modules in a good flexibility to the project demands.

Already the RTU232 has the basis of this concept by splitting the work between the
CPU board (23ZG21) and the IO boards. Each IO board has its own micro-controller and
does the basic tasks for the connected process signals, like time stamping, threshold
monitoring for analog input signals or command output supervision for switching commands.

Figure 4.3 Example of a RTU560 organization in hardware modules

The above picture about the RTU560 organization shows the modularity by
connecting the IEDs, IO modules and the NCCs to different CMU. The below picture shows
a configuration in modules which are needed for a typical medium RTU560 with one CMU.

The main modules are:

45
 i. HCI Host Communication Interface
ii. SCI Sub-device Communication Interface
iii. PDP Process Data Processing (includes communication via
the

560 RTU serial peripheral bus with the i/o boards)

iv. PLC Programmable Logic Control

v. Archive Process event archive Integrated Total Information (ITI)
Archive Analog measured value (AMI) archive
vi. DIST. Archive Disturbance Data Archive
vii. Load Profile Archive for Alpha Counter Load Profiles
viii. Integrated HMI Integrated Human Machine Interface

Figure 4.4 Example of communication and application modules within one CMU

4.5 RTU560 Application Functions

The RTU560 supports a number of application functions which are requested for
typical remote substations. The module concept gives the possibility to configure these
functions on request and cost optimized.

46
4.5.1 Telecontrol Functions
The main task of an RTU is the telecontrol task. Telecontrol means "remote control".
This involves the use of radio waves for radio control of devices or machinery at a remote
location. This is used principally for remote control of machinery and the industrial
equipment used for engineering work, construction, forestry and the like.

Binary Signals

¾ Binary signal acquisition with a time resolution of 1 ms

¾ Event detection and time stamping
¾ Digital filter for signal bouncing
¾ Chatter suppression of unstable signals
¾ Signal inversion
¾ Calculating group alarms (AND, OR) with a time stamp of the signal
forcing the group alarm (no PLC program)
¾ Monitoring double indications and double commands
¾ Integrated totals with up to 125 Hz
¾ Integrated totals with up to 8 kHz by pre-divider and for continuous
counting
¾ RTU560A / C supports (1-out-of-n)-check for interposing relays of
output commands

Analog Signals

¾ Zero dead-band supervision

¾ Live-zero monitoring (e.g. 4 … 20/40 mA)
¾ Smoothing
¾ Threshold monitoring with integration method
¾ Threshold monitoring with absolute threshold

4.5.2 General Functions

i. Support of different time synchronization methods
¾ by GPS/DCF77/IRIG-B receiver
¾ by telecontrol protocol (e.g. IEC 60870-5-101)
¾ by external minute pulse (e.g. from a master clock within the station)
ii. Distribution

47
4.5.3 Programmable Logic Control (PLC)
The PLC module has access to the controlling process via its process interface imaged
in the RTU560 process DB actualized by the internal communication. That allows to use
nearly all process information from direct connected process signals as well as from process
data points received via serial communication line. Control information for actuators to the
process will be handled in the same way from the PLC to the physical output signals etc. The
overall transaction time for a PLC task is therefore given by the PLC cycle time plus the
update time between the process actuators and sensors and the PLC's RTU560 process DB.

4.5.4 Archive and Local Print Function

Besides the queuing of events in the specific protocol queues it is possible to store
important information for a longer period and to access this information at a later time on
demand.

The RTU560 supports this function with a local archive which is organized in the
Flash memory. For special purposes it is also possible to print these events on a local printer,
connected to the RTU560.

The following data types may be stored in the archive.

¾ Process events with time stamp

¾ Process commands
¾ RTU560 system events and system messages
¾ Login / logout to the Integrated HMI
¾ Analog measured values
¾ Integrated totals

4.5.5 Disturbance Data Archive

Protection relays and combined bay control and protection units (e.g. the ABB REF
54x, Rex5xx units) have the capability to store information about a trip in a file. These files
will be kept in the relay until a new file overwrites it or it is transmitted to an external unit.

The RTU560 supports the user with an automatic reading of the disturbance files out
of the relays, when the relay indicates a new disturbance file. The file is stored in the
RTU560 disturbance file archive. The reserved Flash memory can be configured and may be
in the range of up to 128 MB. The RTU560 handles a disturbance file directory to store the
files per protection relay. The total number of files per relay is fixed (typ. 8 files) and is given

48
by the total number of relays in the station. A new file overwrites the oldest, when the
number of files exceeds the configured maximum number.

4.5.6 Integrated Human Machine Interface

The RTU560 function ’Integrated HMI’ is an easy possibility to realized specific
monitoring and control applications. For this function no additional SCADA product is
required.

4.5.7 Routing of SPA bus Protocol Telegrams

The RTU560 supports the transmission of SPA bus telegrams which are encapsulated
in transparent mode in the IEC 60870-5-101 or –104 protocol. A certain data type in the
private range of the protocol is defined therefore. In that case the interpretation and handling
of the SPA telegram is done by the subordinated SPA bus unit and the SPA bus master which
is e.g. a Micro SCADA Pro system of ABB. The RTU560 operates as a passive router.

4.6 Telecontrol Functions

The communication units and the I/O boards share the processing of the telecontrol
functions. The I/O boards take over the essential tasks of scanning and output of process
signals, and the communication unit the communication with the NCCs as well as the
organization and management of the process image in the data base. All time critical
functions are concentrated on the I/O boards. The I/O boards transmit process value changes
or status changes as events. The I/O bus (IOC) of the communication unit detects and
transmits the events to the communication unit (CMU) of the communication unit. To control
the data flow, each I/O board has a FIFO buffer for the temporary storage of up to 50 events.
All events are time stamped.

The telecontrol functions are divided in:

i. Monitoring direction
¾ Indication processing
¾ Analog measured value processing
¾ Digital measured value processing
¾ Integrated total processing
ii. Command direction
¾ Object command output

49
 ¾ Regulation command output
¾ Setpoint message output

Monitoring Direction
4.6.1 Indication Processing
There are two types of indications:

i. Single point input (SPI)

ii. Double point input (DPI)

Figure 4.5 shows the signal definition for SPI and DPI. Double indications are
represented by two sequential bits. The normal state of a DPI is an antivalent bit combination
(10 or 01). The two intermediate positions 11 or 00 are handled different within the RTU560.
An intermediate state is given during the runtime of a unit from one position to the other (e.g.
an isolator switching from OFF to ON).

Figure 4.5 Indication type definitions

4.6.2 Analog Measured Value Processing

Each analog value is converted by the analog digital converter (ADC) into a signed
integer presentation.

4.6.3 Digital Measured Value Processing

There are two types of digital measured values (DMV):

50
 i. Digital measured value (DMI)
ii. Step position value (STI)

The RTU560 can handle different bit patterns to read them and convert them into a
digital measured value:

¾ 8 bit digital measured value (DMI8)

¾ 16 bit digital measured value (DMI16)
¾ 8 bit step position value (STI)

The RTU can handle conversions for:

¾ binary data (BIN)

¾ binary coded decimals (BCD)
¾ Gray code (GRAY)

4.6.4 Integrated Total Processing

There are two types of integrated total values (ITI) defined in the RTU560:

i. End of period reading counters (EPR)

ii. Intermediate reading counters (IR)

4.6.5 Direct Interfacing to Current/Voltage Transmitters

The Current/Voltage-Transformer Interface 560CVT01 is used for monitoring input
signals from three independent phases with 3 or 4 wire connections. For each phase voltage,
current and power are measured directly, and a number of other parameters derived from
these in software. The results are transmitted to the RTU560.

Command Processing
The communication unit accepts and checks the received command telegrams from
the central system and releases them for execution if the check has been positive. Depending
on the command type the central control unit processes the commands like data base update
or checks and if the tests are positive, it prepares the command-specific output procedures.
Then the command is transmitted to the output board via the I/O bus.

51
4.6.6 Object Commands
This command type is used for the switching commands, e.g. for circuit breakers or
isolators. Object commands are always configured as impulse double commands with two
independent output relays (ON / OFF).

4.6.7 Regulation Step Command Output

These commands ensure the continuous fine tolerance adjustment of plant equipment,
e.g. earth-fault neutralizers. Regulation commands are pulse double commands with two
separated output relays.

4.7 Communication
The communication of the RTU560 may be divided into two parts

i. Internal communication with a neutral process data point presentation

ii. External communication to NCCs, IEDs, Sub-RTUs, etc.

4.6.1 Internal Communication

The internal communication has to handle

¾ process data point information

¾ organizational information
¾ RTU560 system information

Information form external connected communication lines with their protocols will be
converted into an internal presentation by the HCI and SCI modules. The internal protocol is
based on the IEC60870-5-101 data presentation.

Once a process data point information from external protocol as well from the
RTU560 IO-boards coming via the RTU560 Peripheral bus is converted into the internal data
presentation, it is used by all other modules. Each HCI or SCI module converts only from
internal presentation to external presentation and vice versa.

4.6.2 External Communication

The external communication of RTU with IED’s, sub RTU’s, local control centre and
network control center (NCC) is discussed in chapter 5. Along with external communication,
protocols are also discussed in the same chapter.

52
 CHAPTER 5

SCADA Communication and Protocols

In this chapter, communication among different components of SCADA is discussed.

In the first portion, communication of IED is taken into account. Different communication
possibilities in IED and the protocols used to carry out communication are discussed.

In the second portion, external communication of RTU is overviewed.

Communication of RTU with IED’s, sub RTU’s, local control center and network control
center (NCC) is discussed. The basic communication scheme in SCADA can be best
understood with the help of following diagram.

Figure 5.1 Basic communication scheme in SCADA

53
5.1 IED Station Communication
Each IED is provided with a communication interface, enabling it to connect to one or
many substation level systems or equipment, either on the Substation Automation (SA) bus or
Substation Monitoring (SM) bus.

Following communication protocols are available:

¾ IEC 61850-8-1 communication protocol

¾ LON communication protocol
¾ SPA or IEC 60870-5-103 communication protocol
¾ DNP3.0 communication protocol

These protocols are discussed below:

5.1.1 IEC 61850-8-1 Communication Protocol

IEC 61850–8–1 allows two or more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) from one or
several vendors to exchange information and to use it in the performance of their functions
and for correct co-operation.

GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event), which is a part of IEC 61850–
8–1 standard, allows the IEDs to communicate state and control information amongst
themselves, using a publish-subscribe mechanism. That is, upon detecting an event, the
IED(s) use a multi-cast transmission to notify those devices that have registered to receive the
data. An IED can, by publishing a GOOSE message, report its status. It can also request a
control action to be directed at any device in the network.

5.1.2 LON Communication Protocol

An optical network can be used within the Substation Automation system. This
enables communication with the IED 670s through the LON bus from the operator’s
workplace, from the control center and also from other IEDs via bay-to-bay horizontal
communication.

The hardware needed for applying LON communication depends on the application,
but one very central unit needed is the LON Star Coupler and optical fibers connecting the
star coupler to the IEDs.

54
 Figure 5.2 Example of LON communication structure

5.1.3 SPA Communication Protocol

The SPA communication is mainly used for the Station Monitoring System. It can
include different numerical relays/terminals/IEDs with remote communication possibilities.
Connection to a personal computer (PC) can be made directly (if the PC is located in the
substation) or by telephone modem through a telephone network via a LAN/WAN
connection.

Hardware required for a local monitoring system is:

¾ Optical fibers for the SPA bus loop

¾ Optical/electrical converter for the PC
¾ PC

A remote monitoring system for communication over the public telephone network
also requires telephone modems and a remote PC. The software required for a local
monitoring system is PCM 600, and for a remote monitoring system it is PCM 600 in the
remote PC only.

55
 Figure 5.3 SPA communication structure for a monitoring system

5.1.4 Single Command, 16 Signals (CD)

The IEDs may be provided with a function to receive commands either from a
substation automation system or from the local human-machine interface, HMI. That
receiving function block has outputs that can be used, for example, to control high voltage
apparatuses in switchyards. For local control functions, the local HMI can also be used.
Together with the configuration logic circuits, the user can govern pulses or steady output
signals for control purposes within the IED or via binary outputs.

5.1.5 Multiple Command (CM) and Multiple Transmit (MT)

The IED may be provided with a function to send and receive signals to and from
other IEDs via inter bay bus. The send and receive function blocks has 16 outputs/ inputs that
can be used, together with the configuration logic circuits, for control purposes within the
IED or via binary outputs. When it is used to communicate with other IEDs, these IEDs have
a corresponding Multiple transmit function block with 16 outputs to send the information
received by the command block.

5.2 IED Remote Communication

IED 670s can be equipped with communication devices for line differential
communication and/or communication of binary signals between IEDs. The same
communication hardware is used for both purposes.

Communication between two IEDs geographically on different locations is a

fundamental part of the line differential function. Sending of binary signals between two
IEDs, one in each end of a power line is used in teleprotection schemes and for direct transfer

56
trips. In addition to this, there are application possibilities like e.g. blocking/enabling
functionality in the remote substation, changing setting group in the remote IED depending
on the switching situation in the local substation etc.

5.3 RTU External Communication

5.3.1 Telecontrol Protocols

The telecontrol protocols can be defined into two groups.

i. Host Communication Interfaces (HCI)

The Protocols between a Network Control Center (NCC), Substation Control System
(SCS) (e.g. MicroSCADA Pro of ABB) and the RTU. In this case the NCC is master and the
RTU560 is Slave.

ii. Sub-device Communication Interfaces (SCI)

The Protocols between the RTU560 and a subordinated unit, like an IED in the
stations itself or another subordinated RTU unit (e.g. a station with an RTU560E). In this
case the RTU560 is master and the sub-device is slave.

5.3.2 Host Communication Interfaces

i. Command Direction
NCCs or SCS as host can send commands to the RTU560. The HCI checks the
command as much as possible and distributes it via the internal communication to all other
modules. The responsible module (e.g. the PDP) checks the command for formal correctness
and can acknowledge the command for the host. The acknowledgement is send to the host by
the HCI module.

A command addressed to a sub-device is routed by the SCI module to the addressed

sub-device, which has to acknowledge the command. This method secures, that the unit
responsible for the execution of the command confirms, that it is possible to do the command
task.

ii. General Interrogation

A general interrogation command from the host is answered by the HCI directly. This
is possible, because the HCI has the complete and valid process signal image in its process

57
DB. All SCI and PDP modules are responsible to force a complete process signal image after
start up or when a sub-device fails becomes online again. The HCI are informed about any
changes by internal communication. This method secures, that the process data bases in all
modules is kept actual.

5.3.3 Sub-Device Communication Interfaces

i. Command Direction
The SCI handles commands distributed via internal communication which are
addressed to a sub-device, connected to one of the communication lines managed by the SCI.
These commands can come from a host or from a PLC module.

ii. General Interrogation

The SCI will generate a General Interrogation Command for all connected devices
after startup, or if an IED becomes normal again. Via internal communication all other
modules can update their process data base. This ensures that all modules have the actual
complete process signal image.

5.3.4 Redundant Communication

The RTU560 has the possibility to handle some versions of redundant
communication.

¾ Redundant line (for Host- and subordinated devices)

¾ Multi host (in the sense of redundant communication)
¾ Both for serial lines or Ethernet connections

58
 Chapter 6

Protection and control IED Manager PCM600

Protection and Control IED Manager PCM 600 is an easy-to-handle tool for con
figuration and communication engineering, parameter setting, and monitoring. It provides
versatile functionalities required throughout the life cycle of protection and control IEDs in
transmission and distribution applications. It features functionality for creating and editing
single line diagram for the IED HMI, and supports the efficient configuration of I/O signals.

6.1 Features
¾ Flexible tool architecture
¾ Easy to adapt IEDs to power system requirements
¾ Support of ANSI units and symbols
¾ Scheduled polling of disturbance files
¾ Automatic disturbance reporting
¾ Graphical on-line monitoring of internal binary signals
¾ Forcing of input and output signals
¾ On-line monitoring of LED indications
¾ Full control of all parameter setting updates

6.2 Engineering
PCM 600 is compliant with IEC 61850, which simplifies IED engineering and
enables information exchange with other IEC 61850 compliant tools. PCM 600 enables us to
modify the attached template based on a default plant structure including all IEDs in a power
plant or substation. This structure reflects the substation topology.

PCM 600 can graphically adapt the configuration or create new configurations to
meet the specific needs. Furthermore, this tool secures the downloading of formally correct

59
configuration through extended syntax checking and guided error tracking. Signal status can
also be monitored online, which is extremely useful for troubleshooting.

Additionally, PCM 600 features a powerful IED import-export and copy-paste

functionalities which enables to efficiently reuse existing IEDs, bays or substations. All data
associated to the IEDs, bays or substation, such as settings, graphical configuration or
bay/substation topology, can be exported and used as IED template or copied to the new plant
structure.

6.3 Connection of signals

After the IEDs have been configured and parameterized, configure, for instance the
bay-to-bay communication for station-wide interlocking and send the complete IED
description to a system engineering tool. In an IEC 61850 based system GOOSE (Generic
Object Oriented System-Wide Events) messaging is used for time critical messages.

The graphical signal matrix tool (SMT) of PCM 600 can efficiently connect CTs, VTs
and binary input and output signals without changing the configuration. This is especially
helpful during commissioning in case the connection from the process termination to the IED
terminal blocks needs to be changed. The SMT is also used for connecting the LEDs on the
IED as well as for connection of the GOOSE signals between the IEDs.

Furthermore, PCM 600 supports effective commissioning and testing of physical

connections by allowing user to activate both analog and binary signals from the signal
monitoring tool.

6.4 Parameter setting

PCM 600 features advanced Filtering for handling parameter settings. A normal mode
allows the relay engineer to quickly view and change the most important parameters, whereas
an advanced mode presents all parameters. Parameter settings can be stored in the PCM 600
as primary quantities, which will simplify the setting calculations.

This tool provides full control over the updated parameters. Upload the current
settings from the IED to PCM 600 while the IED is in service. After changing the desired
parameters the Filtering functionality of PCM 600 compare them easily with the uploaded
settings. This way it can be ensured that the intended settings have been modified and that the

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values are correct before the new IED settings are downloaded. This also reduces the time
needed for commissioning and maintenance. PCM 600 permits the restoring of verified
default settings to the IED anytime after the IED has been taken into operation.

6.5 Disturbance handling

Disturbance handling is vital through the entire life cycle of a substation. PCM 600
takes the first step towards a new era in disturbance handling. It processes data. The signal
monitoring function gives online information about the measured quantities and status of
binary input and output signals for understanding the cause of the disturbance, for fast
corrective actions. The report layout and contents can be easily adapted to meet the needs of
different subscribers. This feature significantly reduces the time required for the handling of
disturbance reports and allows the subscriber to spend more time on complicated disturbances
demanding special attention.

The disturbance files are stored in IEDs in COMTRADE, the de-facto standard
format. Disturbances stored in the IED can be uploaded using a scheduler. After the upload,
PCM 600 automatically creates a disturbance report, which will be immediately sent to
subscribers by e-mail. Such a notification shortens the time from disturbance detection to
corrective actions.

6.6 Communication management Tool

A new communication management tool has been implemented in PCM 600 Ver. 1.5
SP1. It can be used to configure 670 IEDs featuring support for the DNP 3.0 Level 2
protocol. By means of the communication management tool the user can configure the IED to
interface with one or several DNP 3.0 Level 2 masters. The communication management tool
allows the user to select the signals to be included in the DNP 3.0 Level 2 communication
and to modify signal related attributes.

6.7 How to Use the IED in Conjunction with PCM 600 Toolbox

Procedure
¾ Select the IED configuration. The IED is available with four alternative
configurations as described above.

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¾ Select and order the IED which best suits the application. There are a number of
templates including options for use. Check which one is the most suitable for required
application.
¾ Adjust the configuration if required by adjusting the input and outputs with the Signal
Matrix Tool (SMT) in PCM 600.
¾ Select the number of setting groups on the Activate setting group function block.
¾ Save the IED, compile and download to the relay.
¾ Set the IED with use of the PCM 600 Parameter Setting Tool PST.
¾ Adjust the setting to the values suitable for application. General setting values have
only one set and are the basic parameters such as CT and VT ratios etc.
¾ Download to the IED.

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 Conclusion and Suggestions

In the present project, various aspects of power system protection are considered for
the implementation of SCADA. Main purpose of SCADA is monitoring and control and it is
possible with the help of understanding of power system protection because in modern
SCADA, implemented in power system, data is collected with the help of protective relays.
In the present project, numerical relays called IEDs are used for protection and collection of
data. This collected data from IEDs and the previous data or history becomes the basis for
decision of control and decides weather the specific station would remain in system or not.
Due to vastness of SCADA, only the implementation in power plant is taken into account,
however the communication of power plant with network control center, for example NPCC
in Pakistan, should also be considered and the control and monitoring from the remote
control center (NPCC) should also be taken into account. Due to lack of facilities and security
reasons, limited number of visits are made for the study of SCADA in power plants. Yet, the
project can be a very good starting point for understanding of SCADA and further
consideration of SCADA in power plants.

If further work is carried out on SCADA, a complete training session must be

arranged. So that the basic relay functions, their uses, their configuration and programming
along with their implementation can be better understood. In the same session testing of
relays should also be learned. Related software’s should also be learned for SCADA
implementation like MicroSCADA simulator and most importantly, software for relay
testing. “Freja” is the software for relay testing and is very important from power system
view point. So the future work can be carried on the commissioning of SCADA in power
plants.

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 References

• Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions (SCADA) and Industrial

Control System Security by Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco and Karen Kent.

• Practical SCADA for Industry by David Bailey, Edwin Wright

• Securing SCADA Systems by Ronald L. Krutz

• SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition by Stuart A. Boyer

• SCADA System by Allen Bradley

• Practical Modern SCADA Protocols by Gordon Clarke and Deon Reynders

• A Guide to utility automation: SCADA systems for Electric power by Michael

Wiebe

• UCI’s specification of the SCADA and its Communication System, Utility Consulting
International, Cupertino, California, USA

• Sandia National Laboratories, Sandia Corporation

• AREVA’s Functional Specification Design Documents and user’s manuals. AREVA,

France

• http://www.efarabi.com

• http://www.tech-faq.com/SCADA.html

• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCADA

• http://www.ABB.com

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