PAFLU Vs Cloribel
PAFLU Vs Cloribel
PAFLU Vs Cloribel
Judge Cloribel CFI Manila; Wellington Investment and Manufacturing Corporation; and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
G.R. No. L-25878, March 28, 1969
Facts:
This is a case wherein picketed by {AFLU was Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, located at the ground
floor of the Wellington Building.
Wellington complained
o That the picketers were annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building
Wellington commenced a litigation in court for the picketing of PAFLU and some 24 named individuals and
25 John Does, who were employees of neither the corporation nor any of its tenant occupying the second to
the sixth floors of the building of undue interference not only with its enjoyment of its property and business
of leasing and administering the same but also with the businesses of said neutral tenants – Injunction
granted
Immediately thereafter, PAFLU filed the present petition
o Alleging that the respondent Judge Cloribel acted with GADALEJ in issuing the injunction, in
violation of the strict jurisdictional requirements on labor injunctions
o And neither was there a bond filed by Wellington sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any
loss, expense, or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of the same order
o Such omissions, coupled with grave injustice occasioned by said restraining order allegedly
prohibiting, in effect the union’s right to picket Metrobank’s premises
o A case for ULP had already been filed in the CIR
Picketed by PAFLU was Metropolitans Bank and Trust Company (METBANK for brevity) located at the
ground floor of the Wellington Building. Wellington complained, however, that the picketers were annoyingly blocking
the common passageway of the building.
Wellington commenced a litigation charging in court the picketing of PAFLU of undue interference not only
with its enjoyment of its property and business but also with the business of the neutral tenants. And as prayed for by
Wellington, Judge Cloribel issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants.
ISSUE: Does the writ of injunction violates the worker’s right to picket as a means of communicating labor dispute
guaranteed by the constitution? NO
RULING:
No. The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the constitution is not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the
demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments
or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right
may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between
them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.