TOPIC PLEADINGS – Detail in a pleading

CASE NO. G.R. No. 169548

CASE NAME Arceo v. Oliveros, 134 SCRA 308 (1985)
MEMBER Tim Ebuengan

DOCTRINE
Pendency of another suit between the same parties to be a ground for dismissal requires: 1) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the identity in both cases is such that the
judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.

RECIT-READY DIGEST
In the civil case still pending before the CFI of Quezon (Civil Case No. 435-G), the question of compulsory
redemption under Section 119 of the Public Land Act was invoked by Pablo Arceo as defendant therein by
way of compulsory counterclaim in his answer whereas the very same issue was asserted in the instant
appealed case by way of cause of action by plaintiff-appellant. (There was, therefore, merely a change of
the position of the parties from plaintiff to defendant and vice-versa in said two civil cases although the
existence of the same principal issue remains unaltered.)

ISSUE: W/N Lis Pendens lies – YES

RULE: Pendency of another suit between the same parties to be a ground for dismissal requires: 1) identity
of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the identity in both cases is such that the
judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.

APPLICATION:
In C-105: The Oliveros spouses as plaintiffs, impugn the extrajudicial settlement between Sixta and Pablo
wherein the Sixta renounced her right over the disputed lot in favor of the latter and seek to annul the
transfer certificate of title issued to Pablo Arceo over the said lot. Said spouses based their action upon a
claim of ownership over the land pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale whereby Sixta Arceo sold to them
her definite or specific share in the homestead she and her brother inherited from their father
In 435-G: Arceo’s Answer, as defendant, sets up by way of counterclaim his right of compulsory
redemption over the same lot pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, claiming further that the property
has never been partitioned between him and her sister Sixta.

In both civil cases, the parties herein are litigating over the same subject matter (the lot inherited by the
Arceos from their father) and on the same issues — validity of the sale made by Sixta Arceo to the Oliveros
spouses; and Pablo Arceo’s right of compulsory redemption under Section 119 of the Public Land Act as a
co-heir of his sister Sixta. The only difference being, that in Civil Case No. C-105, Pablo Arceo asserts
this right of compulsory redemption as a cause of action in his complaint; whereas, in Case No. 435-
G he asserts said claim by way of counterclaim, which makes no difference anyway. For while lis
pendens is normally interposed as a defense when another case is pending upon the same cause of action
between the same parties in two complaints, it may also be interposed even if said claim is set forth by way
of a counterclaim since the latter partakes the nature of a complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff.
Hence, it has been held that to interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again advanced the same
in a complaint against the same party, as in the case at bar, would be violative of the rule against splitting
a single cause of action which is prohibited by the Rules of Court.

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FACTS
• Plaintiff-appellant Pablo Arceo filed a complaint with the defunct CFI of Quezon, against defendants-
appellees, spouses Jose Oliveros and Rufina Cabangon. In his complaint, Pablo alleged that Sixta
Arceo, his sister and co-heir, sold to defendants-appellees on July 10, 1958 at Alabat, Quezon, her
undivided interest in the parcel of land they have inherited from their deceased father for P2,500.00
without his (Pablo’s) consent. Pablo averred that being a co-owner and co-heir of said Sixta Arceo, he
should be allowed to redeem and repurchase the property subject of the sale in accordance with Section
119 of the Public Land Act, the land being covered by a free patent title.
• On July 22, 1963 Oliveros moved to dismiss the complaint.
• In their answer, Oliveros alleged that Sixta Arceo sold her definite share of one and one-half (1 1/2)
hectares of the land subject of the litigation in favor of the defendants for the sum of P2,500.00; that
there was already a definite partition of said realty between plaintiff Pablo and his sister Sixta long
before the sale; that the conveyance was made only after Pablo manifested his unwillingness and
inability to buy the parcel in question, which was first offered to him; and that defendants have
introduced numerous improvements on the land in dispute. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants
reiterated the grounds set forth and relied upon by them in their motion to dismiss earlier filed.
• In a decision rendered on September 7, 1965, the then Court of First Instance of Quezon dismissed
plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S and HELD

W/N lis pendens lies in this case– YES

RATIO
RULE: Pendency of another suit between the same parties to be a ground for dismissal requires: 1) identity
of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the identity in both cases is such that the
judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.

APPLICATION: Civil Case No. 435-G, pending between plaintiff-appellant Pablo Arceo and defendants-
appellees Jose Oliveros and Rufina Cabangon and Civil Case No. C-105 involve the same parcel of land
and similar issues.
In C-105: The Oliveros spouses as plaintiffs, impugn the extrajudicial settlement between Sixta and Pablo
wherein the former renounced her right over the disputed lot in favor of the latter and seek to annul the
transfer certificate of title issued to Pablo Arceo over the said lot. Said spouses based their action upon a
claim of ownership over the land pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale whereby Sixta Arceo sold to them
her definite or specific share in the homestead she and her brother inherited from their father
In 435-G: In Arceo’s Answer, as defendant, sets up by way of counterclaim his right of compulsory
redemption over the same lot pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, claiming further that the property
has never been partitioned between him and her sister Sixta.

In both civil cases, the parties herein are litigating over the same subject matter (the lot inherited by the
Arceos from their father) and on the same issues — validity of the sale made by Sixta Arceo to the Oliveros
spouses; and Pablo Arceo’s right of compulsory redemption under Section 119 of the Public Land Act as a
co-heir of his sister Sixta. The only difference being, that in Civil Case No. C-105, Pablo Arceo asserts
this right of compulsory redemption as a cause of action in his complaint; whereas, in Case No. 435-
G he asserts said claim by way of counterclaim, which makes no difference anyway. For while lis
pendens is normally interposed as a defense when another case is pending upon the same cause of action
between the same parties in two complaints, it may also be interposed even if said claim is set forth by way
of a counterclaim since the latter partakes the nature of a complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff.

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Hence, it has been held that to interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again advanced the same
in a complaint against the same party, as in the case at bar, would be violative of the rule against splitting
a single cause of action which is prohibited by the Rules of Court.

It is precisely for this reason that We cannot give our imprimatur to plaintiff-appellant’s contention that "if
the first litigation does not prosper and the disputed sale is voided, then this second case will become useless
and moot, but in the contrary result whereby the same sale is upheld, then the legal redemption sought in
the subsequent case may be." For even on the assumption that the sale by Sixta in favor of the Oliveros
spouses is upheld still the second case, Civil Case No. C-105, will be useless because plaintiff-appellant is
not deprived of litigating against the Oliveros on the issue of his claimed compulsory counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 435-G by reason of having set it up in his counterclaim in the said case.

The principle upon which a "plea of another action pending" is sustained is that the latter action is deemed
unnecessary and vexatious. We find no circumstance whatsoever that will preclude the applicability of said
philosophy to the instant case.

DISPOSTIVE PORTION
Wherefore the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against Appellant.

SO ORDERED.