Namibias Außenpolitik PDF

Namibia is neither geographically nor politically an island or otherwise
isolated, but rather an integral part of the southern African region, an

active member of the African Union, and a sovereign member state
within the international community. Namibia has always been embedded
in social, historic, economic and political relations and interactions with
Namibia’s Foreign Relations

its neighbours in the region and beyond. Due to the small size of
its population and its economy, Namibia has always depended on its
vital bonds with other countries in the region, but also in the global
community. Namibia’s foreign relations and their prudent formulation
and management determine the sustainability of the country and the
economic perspectives of its people. Foreign affairs have an impact on
every person’s life.
Namibia’s
After more than two decades of statehood,and given the transformations
of the geopolitical order since then, but also considering the grave
impact of the globalisation dynamics on the degree of political and
economic interdependencies and vulnerabilities, it is relevant to ask
how Namibia has been managing these foreign and international
Foreign Relations
relations. Such an assessment is essential for reflecting on the country’s
foreign relations and adjusting them, where necessary, in order to gain Historic contexts, current dimensions,
a perspective of prosperity for the 21st Century.
and perspectives for the 21st Century
In 20 chapters, Namibia’s main bilateral and multilateral relationships,
the historic and normative foundations of those bonds, their strategic
objectives and interests, and their interface with other policy fields are
critically discussed. The collective effort of this book brings together,
for the first time, academicians, diplomats and policymakers from
within and beyond Namibia with the purpose of offering a systematic
understanding of some of the most significant dimensions of the
Edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani and Dennis U Zaire

country’s foreign relations.
It is envisaged that this scholarly publication will deepen the

understanding of Namibia’s international and foreign relations, stimulate
research, and open up the broad public discourse in order to promote
Namibia’s contribution to the global common good and the country’s
role in the world.
MACMILLAN
EDUCATION NAMIBIA
This publication would not have been possible without the generous financial support of
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
Please note that the views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation or of the editors.
Konrad Konrad Adenauer Foundation

PO Box 1145
Adenauer Windhoek
info.namibia@kas.de
Stiftung www.kas.de/namibia
© Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the authors, 2014
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made
without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied
or transmitted save with written permission. Any person who does any unauthorised act in
relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
Cover design: Red Sky and Anton Bösl

Content editors: Anton Bösl, André du Pisani and Dennis U Zaire
Language editor: Sandie Fitchat
Layout: The Word Factory
Printing: John Meinert Printing (Pty) Ltd
Publisher
Macmillan Education Namibia
PO Box 22830
Windhoek
Namibia
Tel. (+264 61) 232 165
ISBN: 978 99916 2610 9

Historic contexts, current dimensions,
Edited by
Anton Bösl, André du Pisani and Dennis U Zaire
Macmillan Education Namibia
2014
i
ii
Contents
List of abbreviations........................................................................................................ v
About the contributors...................................................................................................vii
INTRODUCTION
Namibia’s foreign relations in a changing world – An appraisal..................................... 3
Anton Bösl
SECTION I
HISTORIC AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS
Namibian diplomacy before Independence................................................................... 27
Chris Saunders
Namibia and the United Nations until 1990.................................................................. 37
Dennis U Zaire
Germany’s role in Namibia’s independence.................................................................. 51
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Principles and principals of Namibia’s foreign relations............................................... 59
Peya Mushelenga
SECTION II
NAMIBIA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS
Namibia and Angola: Analysis of a symbiotic relationship........................................... 81
Hidipo Hamutenya
Namibia and China: Profile and appraisal of a relationship........................................ 111
André du Pisani
Namibia’s bilateral relations with Germany: A crucial relationship............................ 135
Peter H Katjavivi
Unequal but intertwined: Namibia’s bilateral relationship with South Africa............. 169
Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari and Chris Saunders
From confrontation to pragmatic cooperation: United States of America–
Namibia relations.............................................................................................. 181
iii
Contents
William A Lindeke
SECTION III
NAMIBIA’S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS
Namibia and the Southern African Customs Union..................................................... 211
Gerhard Erasmus
Namibia and the Southern African Development Community.................................... 231
Kaire M Mbuende
Namibia and the African Union................................................................................... 253
Bience Gawanas
The European Union: Relations with Namibia............................................................ 281
Raúl Fuentes Milani
The United Nations and Namibia since 1990.............................................................. 293
Kari Egge
SECTION IV
NAMIBIA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
The legal dimension of Namibia’s foreign relations.................................................... 317
Sacky Shanghala
The parliamentary dimension of Namibia’s foreign relations..................................... 343
Nora Schimming-Chase
Namibia’s foreign relations and security policy: Exploration of a critical nexus........ 367
André du Pisani
Beyond economic diplomacy: The interface of Namibia’s foreign relations
and economic cooperation........................................................................................... 393
Lesley Blaauw
Namibia’s attitudes towards pan-Africanism............................................................... 413
Joseph Diescho
Namibia: Global governance matters........................................................................... 435
Henning Melber
iv
List of abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)

AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
ANC African National Congress
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
AU African Union
BCLME Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem
BLNS Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland
CARMMA Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa
CBNRM community-based natural resource management
CET common external tariff
CIF Construction Industries Federation of Namibia
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora
CPC Communist Party of China
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDF European Development Fund
EEAS European External Action Service
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
EU European Union
FAPLA Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (People’s Armed
Forces for the Liberation of Angola)
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FDI foreign direct investment
FLS Frontline States
FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation
of Angola)
FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
FTA Free Trade Area
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HOSEB Heads of State Economic Bilateral Meeting
ICC International Criminal Court
ICJ International Court of Justice
ISRI Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais (Higher Institute for
International Relations)
JCC Joint Commission of Cooperation
JTC Joint Technical Commission
MCA Millennium Challenge Account
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MFN most favoured nation
v
List of abbreviations
MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPLA Movimiento Popular para la Liberacão de Angola (Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola)
NAM Non-aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDF Namibian Defence Force
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGSIP Namibian–German Special Initiative Programme
NPC National Planning Commission
OAU Organisation of African Unity
ODA official development assistance/aid
OPDS Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Peace and Security Council
REC regional economic community
RPRP Rural Poverty Reduction Programme
SADC Southern African Development Community
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SPTTP Special Preferential Tariff Treatment Programme
SWANU South West African National Union
SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation
TDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
TEU Treaty of European Union
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US(A) United States (of America)
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization
WWII World War II/Second World War
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About the contributors
Lesley Blaauw
Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Political and Administrative Studies,
University of Namibia; lectures in International Relations, Political Economy and
African Politics; Dr Blaauw is the recipient of the 2011 meritorious award for the Faculty
of Economic and Management Sciences, University of Namibia
Academic qualifications: Undergraduate studies, University of Namibia; postgraduate
degrees in International Studies, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa
Last/recent publications: Blaauw, L. 2012. “Accountability and democracy”. In Sims,
B & M Koep (Eds). Unfinished business: Democracy in Namibia. Pretoria: Institute for
Democracy in Africa; Blaauw, L. 2012. The political economy of Angola: The state, civil
society and democratization process in the post-war period. Gaborone: The Southern
Africa Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organizations.
lblaauw@unam.com
Anton Bösl
Former Resident Representative for Namibia and Angola, Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
Windhoek (2006–2011)
Academic qualifications: PhD in Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich,
Germany; PhD in Theology, Albert Ludwig University, Freiburg, Germany
Latest publications: Bösl, A. 2010. Africa in transition: A plea for a new direction in
Germany’s Africa policy. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Bösl, Anton, Nico Horn &
André du Pisani (Eds). 2010. Constitutional democracy in Namibia. A critical analysis
after two decades. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia; Co-editor of the 2006
to 2010 issues of the Monitoring regional integration in southern Africa Yearbook.
Stellenbosch: Trade law Centre for Southern Africa.
anton_boesl@hotmail.com
Joseph Brian Diescho

Chief Executive Officer, Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management
Academic qualifications: BA (Law), BA (Hons), MA, DLit et Phil (all Fort Hare
University, South Africa); MA, MPhil, PhD (all Columbia University, USA)
Last/latest publication: Diescho, JB. 2008. “The paradigm of an independent judiciary:
Its history, implications and limitations in Africa”. In Horn, N & A Bösl (Eds). The
independence of the judiciary in Namibia. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia;
Diescho, JB. 2010. “The concepts of rights and constitutionalism in Africa”. In Bösl,
Anton, Nico Horn & André du Pisani (Eds). Constitutional democracy in Namibia: A
critical analysis after two decades. Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
joseph.diescho@opm.gov.na
vii
André du Pisani
Professor of Politics, University of Namibia; Director in Namibia of the Southern
African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) since 1990; author,
editor, or co-editor of several books and numerous articles on Namibian politics and
security issues in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region.
Academic qualifications: BA, BA Hons and MA, University of Stellenbosch, South
Africa; PhD, University of Cape Town, South Africa
Last/latest publication: Du Pisani, André, Reinhard Koessler & William A Lindeke (Eds).
2010. The long aftermath of war – Reconciliation and transition in Namibia. Freiburg:
Arnold Bergstraesser Institut; Du Pisani, André & William A Lindeke. 2010. “Political
party life in Namibia: Dominant party with consolidating democracy”. In Lawson, Kay,
Luc Sindjoun & Marian Simms (Eds). Political parties and democracy: Vol. IV, Africa
and Oceania. Santa Barbara: Praeger; Du Pisani, A. 2013. “The politics and resource
endowment of party dominance in Namibia: The past as the present and the future?”.
In De Jager, Nicola & Peirre du Toit (Eds). Friend or foe? Dominant party systems in
southern Africa: Insights from the developing world. Cape Town: University of Cape
Town Press; Du Pisani, A. 2013. “Crafting policy for the Namibian security system”.
In Van Niekerk, Anthoni & Katharina Hoffman (Eds). Broadening security in southern
Africa: Challenges and opportunities. Johannesburg: Centre for Defence and Security
Management, University of the Witwatersrand/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Mozambique Office.
adupisani@unam.na
Kari Egge
Retired senior-level international development professional (Norwegian); formerly
United Nations Development Programme Resident Representative in Namibia, and
United Nations Resident Coordinator for Namibia (2009–2011); Senior Advisor at the
United Nations Children’s Fund, New York
Gerhard Erasmus
Emeritus Professor (Law Faculty), University of Stellenbosch, and a founder and
associate of the Trade Law Centre (tralac) in South Africa
Academic qualifications: BIuris and LLB, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein,
South Africa; Master’s Degree, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
Medford/Somerville, USA; LLD, Leiden University, The Netherlands
Prof. Erasmus has consulted for governments, the private sector and regional
organisations in southern Africa. He was also involved in the drafting of the South
African and Namibian Constitutions. He grew up in Namibia.
Last/latest publication: Erasmus, G. 2011. “Tripartite FTA: Requirements for effective
dispute resolution”. In Trade law Centre for Southern Africa (Eds). Cape to Cairo –
Making the tripartite Free Trade Area work. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern
Africa; Erasmus, Gerhard. 2012. “The domestic status of international agreements: Has
the South African Constitutional Court chartered a new approach and could regional
integration benefit?”. In Du Pisani, André, Trudi Hartzenberg & Gerhard Erasmus (Eds).
viii
Monitoring regional integration in southern Africa Yearbook, Stellenbosch: Trade Law

Centre for Southern Africa.
gerhard@tralac.org

Born in 1964 in Salamanca (Spain); joined the Spanish diplomatic service in 1991;
served in Angola, Colombia and Israel, and at the Spanish Permanent Representation to
the European Union (EU). He held the positions of Deputy Director General for Central
and Southern Europe, and Deputy Director General for General Affairs of the EU in
the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. When the European External
Action Service was established, he was recruited as a temporary agent. Since January
2011, he has being serving as the Head of the European Union Delegation to Namibia.
raul.fuentes-milani@eeas.europa.eu
Bience Gawanas
Special Advisor on Social Issues to the Minister of Health and Social Services of
Namibia; previously Commissioner for Social Affairs, African Union, Addis Ababa,
2003–2012; Advocate; former Ombudsperson for Namibia
Academic qualifications: LLB (Hons), University of Warwick, United Kingdom; Utter
Barrister Degree, Inns of Court School of Law; called to the English and Irish Bar as a
Barrister, and as an Advocate to the Namibian High Court; Executive MBA, University
of Cape Town, South Africa
Last/latest publication: Gawanas, B. 2008. “African Union and healthcare challenges
in Africa: Strategies and initiatives on healthcare delivery”. In Akukwe, Chinua (Ed.).
Healthcare services in Africa: Overcoming challenges and improving outcomes. London:
Adonis & Abbey Publishers; Gawanas, B. 2009. “The African Union: Concepts and
implementation mechanisms relating to human rights”. In Bösl, Anton & Joseph Diescho
(Eds). Human rights in Africa: Legal perspectives on their protection and promotion.
Windhoek: Macmillan Education.
bgawanas@mhss.gov.na
Born 21 March 1927 in Reideburg/Saalkreis, Germany. Called up by the army in 1945,
Genscher was first in American and then in British captivity. He did his A-levels in 1946.
and studied law in Halle and Leipzig from 1946 to 1949. In 1952 he left the German
Democratic Republic and moved to Bremen. In 1954 he passed the second state exam
in law in Hamburg. He worked as a lawyer assessor and attorney in Bremen before
becoming an active member of the Free Democratic Party parliamentary group. In 1962
he became the Federal General Manager of the FDP. He was a continuous member of
the German Bundestag from 1965 to 1998, and Federal Minister of the Interior in the
Cabinet of the social-liberal coalition under Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt. From 1974
to 1992, Genscher was the Federal Foreign Minister, initially under Federal Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, and later under Helmut Kohl. From 1974 to 1985 he served as Federal
ix
Chairperson of the FDP and Honorary Chairperson following his voluntary resignation
from government in 1992. Since then he has, amongst other activities, served as an
Honorary Professor at the Free University of Berlin, and become an active lawyer again.
He has received countless international awards, amongst them Honorary Doctorates of
the Universities of Stettin and Leipzig.
Hidipo Hamutenya
President, Rally for Democracy and Progress; former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Namibia, and Member of the Namibian Cabinet, 1990–2004
Academic qualifications: BA (Political Science), Lincoln University, USA; MA, McGill
University, Quebec, Canada
Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari

Senior Research Fellow, South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme
at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA); former Guest Lecturer,
Geopolitics (Europe in the World), Rouen Business School Rouen, France
Academic qualifications: BA (Political Science and Sociology), University of Namibia;
MA (International Studies), University of Stellenbosch, South Africa; M Phil (Political
Science – International Relations), Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, France; PhD
(Political Science – International Relations) (Doctorate under review), Université Paris
I Panthéon-Sorbonne, France
Last/latest publications: Mr Hengari has published widely on various issues in and around
southern Africa. His latest publication is Hengari, AT. 2012. “The European Union and
emerging powers in Africa: Implications for policy-making in Africa”. South African
Journal of International Affairs, April.
alfredo.hengari@wits.ac.za
Peter H Katjavivi
Governing Party’s Chief Whip, National Assembly; previously Director-General of
the National Planning Commission, Government of the Republic of Namibia; former
Ambassador to the European Union and to Germany; founding Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Namibia
Academic qualifications: MA (Political Sociology), University of Warwick, United
Kingdom (UK); Doctorate in Philosophy, St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford, UK
Eminent publication: Katjavivi, P. 1988. A history of resistance in Namibia. Paris/
London: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation/James Currey.
William A Lindeke
Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Public Policy Research, Namibia; Professor
(retired), University of Massachusetts Lowell, USA; former Professor of Political
Studies, University of Namibia; Co-National Investigator, 4th and 5th Rounds of the
Afrobarometer Survey, Namibia, 2008/9 and 2012/13
x
Academic qualifications: BA and MA, San Diego State University, USA; PhD, Claremont
Graduate School, California, USA
Prof. Lindeke has published widely on Namibian and southern African politics, among
other issues.
blindeke@ippr.org.na
Kaire Mbuende
Retired diplomat; formerly Namibia’s Ambassador to the United Nations (2006–2010),
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Namibia (2002–2004), and SADC Secretary
General (1994–1999)
Academic qualifications: BA (Hons) (Economic History and Sociology); PhD (Economic
Sociology), University of Lund, Sweden
Henning Melber
Senior Advisor/Director Emeritus, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden,
which Dr Melber headed from 2006 to 2012; Director, Namibian Economic Policy
Research Unit (NEPRU), Windhoek, 1992–2000; Research Director of the Nordic
Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, 2000–2006; Extraordinary Professor, Department of
Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, and Centre for Africa Studies, University of
the Free State, Bloemfontein, both South Africa. Dr Melber joined the South West Africa
People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in 1974.
Last/latest publication: Melber, H. 2010. “The impact of the Constitution on state- and
nation-building”. In Bösl, Anton, Nico Horn & André du Pisani (Eds). Constitutional
democracy in Namibia: A critical analysis after two decades. Windhoek: Macmillan
Education Namibia; Melber, H. 2013. “Liberation movements in power: The case of
SWAPO Party of Namibia”. Basler Afrika Bibliographien Occasional Paper, Basel: BAB.
henning.melber@dhf.uu.se
Peya Mushelenga
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Namibia
Academic qualifications: BA (History and Political Studies) and BJuris, University of
Namibia; Hons (International Politics) and MA (International Politics), University of
South Africa, Pretoria
Last/latest publication: Mushelenga, P. 1996. Nando na li toke [an anthology of poetry in
Oshindonga]. Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan.
pmushelenga@mfa.gov.na
Chris Saunders
Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town, where he taught for many years in the
Department of Historical Studies. He has long been interested in Namibian history and
has published widely on many aspects of the history and historiography of South Africa.
chris.saunders@uct.ac.za
xi
Semi-retired; former Member of Parliament, Republic of Namibia, and former
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Namibia to the Federal
Republic of Germany
Academic qualifications: Diploma in Education, University of Cape Town, South Africa;
MA (Political Science, English Linguistics and African Literature), Free University of
Berlin, Germany
Last/latest publication: Various publications on education, the role of women in Namibia’s
liberation struggle, the role of the churches in the struggle, and various aspects of politics
in the struggle
Sacky Shanghala
Chairman, Law Reform and Development Commission, Ministry of Justice, Republic
of Namibia
Academic qualifications: LLB, University of Namibia
Last/latest publication: Shanghala, S. 2010. “Amendments to the Namibian Constitution:
Objectives, motivations and implications”. In Bösl, Anton, Nico Horn & André du Pisani
(Eds). Constitutional democracy in Namibia: A critical analysis after two decades.
Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia.
Dennis U Zaire
Programme Manager, Konrad Adenauer Foundation – Namibia and Angola Office,
Windhoek
Academic qualifications: LLB (Hons) and LLM (International Business Law), University
of Hull, United Kingdom; LLM (International Trade Law), University of Nottingham
Trent, UK
Last/latest publications: Haibach, H & D Zaire. 2012. “The Midgard Process”. Namibia
Law Journal, 4(1), January; Zaire, D & Kathrin Schneider. 2013. “The SADC Tribunal:
Exclusive excess?”. Namibia Law Journal, 5(1), August; Zaire, D. 2013. “The SADC
Parliamentary Forum transformation into a Regional Parliament: Too big too soon?”,
SADC Law Journal, 3(1); Zaire, D. [Forthcoming]. “Lack of accountability in the
Namibian public sector”. Namibia Law Journal, 5(2).
dennis.zaire@kas.de
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Introduction
1
2
Namibia’s foreign relations in a changing world –
An appraisal
Anton Bösl*
If a man does not know to what port he is steering, no wind is favourable to him.1
Seneca
This introductory appraisal discusses, in its first part, the concepts of foreign affairs and
international relations and their changing environment in general, but also specifically
as regards Namibia. The appraisal informs the reader about historic contexts that have
shaped and the current dimensions that continue to mould Namibia’s foreign relations,
and outlines some perspectives and recommendations for the way forward.
In its second part, the appraisal provides abstracts of the 20 chapters of the publication
at hand.
Introduction
Namibia is neither geographically nor politically an island or otherwise isolated, but

rather an integral part of the southern African region, an active member of the African
Union, and a sovereign member state within the international community. Namibia
has always been embedded in social, historic, economic and political relations and
interactions with its neighbours in the region and beyond. Due to the small size of its
population and its economy, Namibia has always depended on its vital bonds with other
countries in the region, but also in the global community. Namibia’s foreign relations and
their prudent formulation and management determine the sustainability of the country
and the economic perspectives of its people. Foreign affairs have an impact on every
person’s life.
After more than two decades of statehood, and given the transformations of the
geopolitical order since then but also considering the grave impact of the globalisation
dynamics on the degree of political and economic interdependencies and vulnerabilities,
it is relevant to ask how Namibia has been managing these foreign and international
relations. Such an assessment is essential for reflecting on the country’s foreign relations
and adjusting them, where necessary, in order to gain a perspective of prosperity for the
21st Century.
* Former Resident Representative for Namibia and Angola, Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
Windhoek (2006–2011).
1 Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, VIII, LXXI, 3.
3
Anton Bösl
This publication intends to inform the reader about the history, the status and the
management of Namibia’s foreign affairs and international relations, its norms and
values, its national interests, and its strategic objectives. The implicit key premise is the
concept of a nation state, represented by a government with authority over a territory and
its population, with the capacity to enter into and maintain relations with other sovereign
states and supranational organisations aiming to pursue the realisation of the interests
of its people.2 Another key premise is the existence of an international order that was
mainly shaped after World War II, with rules and institutions that have developed since
1945 in a quest to ensure countries enjoy peaceful relations among themselves.
Based on these premises, the 20 chapters in this volume provide relevant information
about several facets of Namibia’s foreign relations. Although they are part of a unified
anthology, the chapters differ in academic approach, methodology, style, genre and
semantics. Due to the lack of distinct and internationally agreed definitions, the concepts
and phrases of foreign affairs and international relations are often used synonymously
– not only colloquially, but also, at times, by the scholars in this publication. Hence, it
is appropriate to briefly refer to the terms’ commonalities, similarities and differences.
There is a broad consensus in academia, particularly among political scientists, that the
concepts of foreign affairs and international relations share the fact that they define the
role of the actors, interests, strategies and transboundary activities on a bi- or multilateral
level, based on international law.
The term foreign affairs, on the other hand, which is also used as a synonym of foreign
policy, describes the relationships between and among states or countries and their
national governments as well as supranational organisations. The term international
relations, however, also takes into account the heterogeneous interactions of the
peoples of different states and countries from a bird’s eye view. Due to the increasing
political importance of international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), of
multinational corporations and of informal political processes, their role is at times also
considered part of what constitutes foreign affairs.3 Although both dimensions – foreign
relations and international relations – are discussed in an interdisciplinary manner in the
contributions to this publication, foreign relations has deliberately been chosen for its
title for the sake of brevity.
The publication does not and cannot cover all facets of Namibia’s foreign relations and,
in this respect, therefore, is not comprehensive. The selection of contributions for this
publication follows the criteria of relevance of content and of the availability of authors
at hand. Thus, only five countries in respect of which Namibia maintains bilateral
relations are available; in alphabetical order, these are Angola, China, Germany, South
2 Krasner (1993:235–264).
3 Mingst (2007).
4
Namibia’s foreign relations in a changing world – An appraisal
Africa and the United States of America, whereas the publication covers Namibia’s most
important multilateral relations. In the six remaining chapters, several obvious interfaces
with other policy fields – beyond the classic foreign affairs’ distinction between bilateral
and multilateral relations – are discussed.
Historic contexts
Namibia’s foreign relations, and the principles, policies and formulations on which
those relations depend, have been shaped significantly by the diplomatic and the armed
liberation struggle to achieve independence.4 The experience of the struggle was also
indisputably formative in respect of the country’s post-independence foreign relations,
and is very obvious in Namibia: some aspects are immediately visible by way of physical
structures, e.g. official state buildings (e.g. the new State House, the Independence
Memorial Museum) as well as various buildings for its executive branch, legislative
branch (e.g. the National Council) and judiciary (e.g. Supreme Court). These buildings
not only display the architectonic style and quality of construction of countries like
China and North Korea, who provided assistance during the struggle, but also symbolise
an ongoing – albeit not always transparent – political influence: they are a metaphor for
solidarity politics and for the comradeship of the like-minded.
The diplomatic and armed liberation struggle contributed to the national identity of
Namibia and is – after more than two decades – still a perceptible element of political
continuity and an influential element of the country’s post-colonial international
relations. It should be emphasised, however, that during the struggle era and after
Namibia’s independence in 1990, grave geopolitical changes have taken place that have
significantly influenced its foreign relations.
The détente between East and West, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold
War with its bipolar rivalry, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact made it necessary
for many states to reflect the changing geopolitical realities in their foreign policies. In
particular, African states that had enjoyed and cherished relations with Warsaw Pact
states had to reconfigure their foreign relations accordingly. Namibia’s being freed from
colonial oppression at a time of rapid political transformations and on the eve of a new
multipolar world order influenced the Constituent Assembly’s drafting of the Namibian
Constitution and its foreign relations principles.5
The ideological and political vacuum resulting from the end of this bipolar rivalry for
global hegemony after 1990 enabled China, as a leading international player, to increase
4 Several chapters in this publication highlight this connection, e.g. Chris Saunders’ “Namibia’s
diplomacy before Independence”, and Peter Katjavivi’s “Namibia’s bilateral relations with
Germany: A crucial relationship”.
5 See also Bösl et al. (2010).
5
Anton Bösl
its influence on the African continent, prompting many African – including Namibian –
leaders to ‘look East’ by opening up and redirecting their foreign policies towards the
Asian superpower.6
The geopolitical caesura of the 1990s and Namibia’s independence also changed the
country’s strategic environment significantly. For the southern African region, it
heralded the imminent demise of the era of apartheid and confrontation, and paved the
way for more or, in some cases, nascent political and economic cooperation. It renewed
scholarly interest in the concept of region and the political concern regarding regional
multilateralism emerging as building block of a new international economic order.
Namibia gained its sovereignty during a global epoch when hardly any challenge
could be resolved anymore by countries acting unilaterally. The political and economic
interdependencies between and among countries – especially in the case of Namibia –
run very deep, while new dependencies are becoming visible. Cognisant of this fact,
Namibia has always actively cooperated with many multilateral and international
institutions.
Current dimensions
Like any other country in the world, Namibia is also currently influenced strongly
by the inevitable and dynamic process of globalisation.7 This process is causing an
unprecedented degree of interdependence, with profound consequences for nation states
as regards not only their economies, but also their foreign relations, foreign policies, and
the role of diplomacy and diplomats.8
The political, economic and social networks that globalisation has generated span the
planet. They have created individual liberties and political space and have opened up
unexpected opportunities for growth, cooperation and development; but they have also
led to several challenges and windows of vulnerability.9
The globalisation process has both revolutionised global trade and commerce and
expedited it by way of major technical innovation, especially in the communications
6 See André du Pisani’s chapter entitled “Namibia and China: Profile and appraisal of a
relationship” in this publication.
7 With his critique of globalisation and the negative impacts which he identifies, especially
for developing countries, Nobel laureate Joseph E Stiglitz has provoked very controversial
responses; see e.g. Stiglitz (2003, 2006). The impact of the globalisation process on foreign and
security relations is exemplarily discussed for the case of Germany in SWP & GMF (2013).
8 As a consequence of the globalisation process, the new role of diplomacy and of diplomats is
discussed by Slaughter (2009) for the context of the USA, and by Bagger (2013) in the case of Germany.
9 Goldstein & Keohane (1993:3–30).
6
sector. However, new technologies and the rapid digitisation of communications have
an ambivalent impact on interpersonal relations and on state power. Previously isolated
societies are now immediately connected with global markets, rural villagers with their
urban relatives. New technologies not only imbue state executives with new capabilities,
they also potentially empower and equip violent non-state actors, and abet the leaking
and distribution of confidential information affecting international relations.
Triggered by the accelerated process of globalisation and digitisation, the diffusion

of power and authority within and between states has progressed.10 This diffusion has
diminished the role of sovereign states and of the existing international order and,
consequently, has transformed the role of foreign relations and their stakeholders. New
actors and international NGOs are gaining worldwide publicity and, hence, political
importance. They inform discourses about and influence the national and international
shaping of global governance policies and regimes.11 Foreign relations are also influenced
by the electronic transfers of huge volumes of money within milliseconds and by foreign
direct investments, increasing the interdependency and vulnerability of countries and
economies. Decision-makers in trade, industry and the banking sector also influence –
willy-nilly – international relations.
Having pegged its national currency to South Africa’s legal tender, Namibia is a model
of how vulnerable and susceptible one economy can be to the effects of disturbances
of its large neighbour’s economy. Receiving a large part of the national budget from
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenue pool adds yet another significant
aspect of Namibia’s economic interdependency.
Economic interdependency increases the relevance of economic diplomacy as part of

foreign relations conduct.12 Economic diplomacy is cognisant of a country’s strategic
economic environment, of the rules and regulations of regional economic communities,
and of the world trade order. Economic diplomacy also acknowledges the importance of
globalised markets and investment destinies, and applies the appropriate rhetoric aiming
to attract investors to explore the potential of economic cooperation with a country. In the
case of Namibia, its economic diplomacy must always be guided by the constitutional
objective of “securing growth, prosperity and a life of human dignity for all Namibians”.13
However, public statements by decision-makers about economic emancipation can easily
be misunderstood if they are conducted in the spirit and rhetoric of an unfinished struggle
for the total – now economic – liberation of a country. Given the global interdependencies
10 See Nye (2011), who describes the changing nature of power and denotes the current, diffused
form of power as ‘soft power’.
11 See McGuire (2013).
12 See Keohane & Nye (2011), who, in their landmark publication, analyse the complex forms of
power politics and interdependence, and the economic interests of state and non-state actors.
13 Article 98, Namibian Constitution.
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Anton Bösl
of economies and of international and national investment protection treaties, insensitive

statements on economic emancipation may have unforeseeable negative consequences
on a country and the majority of people.
Considering Namibia’s strong dependency on the export of few resources, raw materials
and goods, and given the significant fluctuation of their demand and prices on world
markets – with immediate effects also on domestic prices, economic diplomacy has
become the cornerstone of Namibia’s foreign relations. Namibia, being one of the richest
sources of uranium in the world, is significantly dependent on the export of uranium oxide
and, hence, on the effects of unforeseeable global events like the disaster of Fukushima
in 2011. This event has been sensitising or shifting the opinion of many in the world on
uranium, evoking an increasing number of calls for a ban on nuclear plants and even
causing the drastic revision of Germany’s national politics on nuclear energy supply.
Unpredictable events like the one in Fukushima or the global financial and economic
crisis of 2007/8 and their economic shocks14 can only be cushioned by diversifying the
country’s economy, trade and industry and venturing into smart economic cooperation
aiming to minimise dependencies.
International relations are influenced by local politics since politicians always consider
the concerns of those who vote them into office. The prosperity of the citizen and the
economic welfare of the country are imperative, therefore, also for the management of a
state’s foreign relations. The citizens, civil societies and media of a country should not
only be well informed, but should also increasingly play the role of a critical watchdog –
including as regards the realm of international politics. Debates about country’s foreign
affairs can, hence, not be restricted to parliaments or particular committees or expert
circles. Neither should the increasing interest from all corners of society as regards
public participation be underestimated; the same can be said for the potential of digital
technology and media to swiftly organise mass events with unforeseeable consequences
to national governments and regional stability – as exemplarily seen in the Arab world
since the end of 2010. Governments should, therefore, adequately communicate their
foreign policy goals and concerns – not only to convince their own citizens at home, but
also to influence the perceptions and opinions of the international public.
Perspectives for the 21st Century
Geopolitical orders have never been static: they have undergone constant processes of
transformation and reform. The current dynamics of globalisation and technical innovation
are affecting states and their policies. Indeed, policies that are designed to manage a country’s
international relations with other states and international organisations are particularly
exposed to these dynamics. Namibia and its foreign relations are no exception in this regard.
14 See Greenspan (2013).
8
Times of transition and great change often lead to individual and collective uncertainties;
nonetheless, they usually evoke discourses on the foundations of our individual and
common good; on the principles, norms and values that not only guide us as individuals,
but also govern our ideological and political framework as well as our constitutions; and
on effective conducting of our foreign relations. Although Namibia’s foreign relations
principles, as embodied in Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution, have remained as
originally prescribed, the interests, norms and values they represented may by now have
been transformed.
More than two decades after the Constitution was drafted, an assessment of the new
strategic environment governing the principles, norms and values and formulations of
Namibia’s foreign relations is warranted. A decade after the first – and, so far, only
– comprehensive account of Namibia’s foreign policy and diplomacy management,15
a reconsideration of its important findings is justified in order to adjust them to the
contemporary environment.
Identifying the strategic interests that will guide foreign relations in a changing global
environment is a complex effort; nonetheless, it is also a prerequisite for defining the
strategic relevance of partners and relations – and a sufficient condition for possibly
reorienting foreign policy.
The appraisal and reorientation of Namibia’s foreign relations has to be guided by the
paramount strategic goal to ensure that the international order remains peaceful, free,
rule-based and cooperative as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.16 The
principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all,17 upon which Namibia’s
Constitution is founded and on which its legitimacy is based, are not negotiable. As a
member of multilateral organisations and as a signatory to their numerous international
conventions, treaties and legal instruments, Namibia is embedded within their normative
and political networks, resulting in several obligations and also shaping its foreign
relations as a result.
Within this given framework Namibia can – as a true child of the United Nations –
advocate for reforming the institutions of the international order, and contribute ideas
for and assist in making the UN system more effective and legitimate. The increasing
importance of global public goods paves the way for the rising paradigm of global
governance aiming to solve international or global problems by integrating transnational
stakeholders. New global fora with informal governance structures subsequently affect
the architecture of the international order. Having benefited from the solidarity, sympathy
and support of the international community, Namibia can now contribute towards the
15 Republic of Namibia (2004).

16 See Article 1, Chapter 1, Charter of the United Nations.
17 Article 1, Namibian Constitution.
9
Anton Bösl
adaptation and regulation of international conventions and protocols in general, and to

protecting the global common good in particular.
Namibia has the potential of a strategic and important player. This role is not the sole
domain of hegemonic, regional or emerging powers, but can also be assumed by small
and less powerful countries.18 Namibia could achieve further strategic importance
by enhancing its ability and strengthening its determination to bring – via its foreign
relations – political, economic or cultural influence to bear on strategic markets and at
regional or global fora. This requires a realistic self-assessment and the determination
to assume leadership in reaching common goals with others, and to shape global and
regional affairs – at least in specific sectors.19 Given the positive experiences of over two
decades in respect of multilateral cooperation on an international and regional level, and
having achieved an outstanding reputation in climate change and global environmental
governance matters, Namibia might be well advised to strengthen its multilateral relations
respectively, and play a model role.
Consequently, since 1990, Namibia has intensified and diversified its bilateral relations.
Whilst the country has generally proved to be a reliable and predictable partner, there
are cases when many of its citizens have not supported the conduct of relations with
some countries. Indeed, as information about government officials’ being found guilty
of conflicts of interest becomes increasingly more public, there has been a concomitant
rise in the number of citizens questioning their country’s management of relations with
specific countries. Thus, nation states always need to consider the opportunity costs and
potential compromises to their reputation in their conduct of international relations.
Bilateral relations are never a one-way street: they are based on mutual benefits and/
or dependencies. Indeed, Namibia’s international partners have an interest in multi-
dimensional relations, which include goods, investments, technology transfer, training,
and resolving regional conflicts. If Namibia further explores and uses its potential and
collaborates with like-minded, strategic partners and neighbours, it can develop sustainable
long-term partnerships and credible foreign relations, contributing to peace, freedom,
security and prosperity in the world. To this end, Namibia has still to live up to its potential.
A critical review of foreign affairs, and the values, interests, objectives and strategies
associated with such international bonds, requires a steadfast commitment on the part
18 The difficulties experienced by less-important countries striving for influence are identified by
Kahler (2013).
19 Three factors inhibiting a country’s ability to translate its international ambitions into foreign
policy achievements are identified – for the case of South Africa – by Alden & Schoeman
(2013). These factors are the unresolved issue of identity, a host of domestic constraints linked
to material capabilities and internal politics, and the divisive continental reaction to South
African leadership.
10
of policymakers to allow inspirational ideas to flow freely. Such process is ideally also
informed by –
• a society’s broad understanding of itself and of the values and ideals that drive it
• opinion polls that explore and collate interesting information about the attitudes
and aspirations of a country’s citizens, and
• comparative studies that learn from the debates in and experiences of other
countries.
Thus, the critical review contained in this publication, Namibia’s foreign relations:
Historic contexts, current dimensions, and perspectives for the 21st Century, is presented
with the intention of informing and inspiring the discourse on the strategic outlook of the
country’s international relations. The abstracts that follow portray each of 20 selected
authors’ views on these aspects.
Abstracts of the chapters

Section I: Historic and normative aspects of Namibia’s foreign relations
The first Section of this publication outlines the historic and normative context of
Namibia’s foreign relations. It informs the reader about the international and domestic
diplomacy leading to Namibia’s independence, and discusses the principles, policies,
key stakeholders and institutions of Namibia’s foreign relations.
In his chapter entitled “Namibian diplomacy before Independence”, Chris Saunders,

a widely published South African historian, sketches key aspects of pre-Independence
diplomacy, focusing on formal diplomatic activity by Namibians between 1945 until
Independence in 1990. Saunders also reminds the reader of petitioning by Namibian
traditional leaders before 1945 at the League of Nations, the forerunner to the United
Nations (UN), in Geneva. After the establishment of the UN in 1945, the Herero Chief
Council drafted the first petition by Namibia to the UN, followed by petitions from
the liberation movements the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) and the
Ovamboland People’s Organisation, the forerunner of the South West Africa People’s
Organisation (SWAPO). In the end, SWAPO overtook SWANU in the competition for
recognition as sole and authentic representation of the Namibian people by foreign
governments and multilateral organisations – mainly the UN. SWAPO’s intensive
lobbying led the UN General Assembly to adopt resolutions to put the Namibia issue on
the international agenda as far back as 1966. By opening offices in different countries
and establishing political relations with governments of the West as well as with socialist
countries, SWAPO managed the delicate balance of interacting with the opposing sides
during the Cold War era. The persistent diplomatic efforts by SWAPO leaders finally
led to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978, which, through the
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), paved the way to Namibia’s
independence in 1990. Saunders concludes that pre-Independence diplomacy was
11
Anton Bösl
formative for Namibia’s foreign policy as well as for foreign relations in the post-
Independence period, by providing an identity, an element of political continuity, and a
firm foundation for its international standing.
The chapter “Namibia and the United Nations until 1990” is contributed by Dennis
U Zaire, a Namibian lawyer working at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Namibia
Office. His chapter covers the time of the struggle for liberation from South Africa’s
occupation and from the apartheid system. The author sketches the international
community’s involvement in Namibia’s attainment of independence, and focuses on
the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and various other stakeholders.
The chapter provides an overview of the various means deployed by the UN to help
the Namibian people to achieve self-determination, which include the persistent
consultation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the opportunity for citizens
to file petitions. The UN petitioners and the UN’s support for them, as well as the 1966
ICJ judgment on Namibia and its implications, are elaborated. The author argues that,
with the fateful 1966 ICJ verdict, a turning point in the struggle was reached, since it
made SWAPO recognise that, besides the UN, they would need to deploy their own
means as well, for example establishing a military wing. Hence, the chapter concludes
that the goal of independence would not have been reached without the UN and the
international community, but that the UN was not solely responsible for it. The period of
44 years in which the UN was involved, which includes the time of the struggle as well
as its engagement in the transition to independence by way of UNTAG, constitutes the
foundation for the multifaceted collaboration and friendly relationship between the UN
and Namibia that we find today.
In his address entitled “Germany’s role in Namibia’s independence”, Hans-

Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s long-term Foreign Minister (1974–1992), describes
not only Germany’s role but also his personal contribution to Namibia’s transition to
independence. He first sketches the framework conditions of German foreign politics (the
Western Alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/NATO, the Eastern Policy, the
Hallstein Doctrine) and of international politics (anti-colonialism and the Non-aligned
Movement). He critiques that, whilst the issue of self-determination and human rights
in Europe (Helsinki Final Act) and in Germany (German Unification) was intensively
debated, many Western countries took an indifferent attitude towards the decolonisation
process and towards apartheid. Genscher explains the formation and joint efforts of the
Group of Five – the five Western states represented in the UN Security Council in 1976,
and highlights a dinner with the five Foreign Ministers and then President PW Botha
of South Africa, which Genscher remembers as “one of the most interesting moments
of my time as foreign minister”. Genscher argues that the process leading to Namibia’s
independence was influenced not only by the developments in South Africa, but also by
the changing conditions in the East/West divide. For Genscher, Namibia’s process to
independence became a model case of new thinking. Based on a lesson he draws from
Germany’s history, he argues that a stable and fair order can only be created if ‘big’ and
‘little’ people (and countries) negotiate at eye level.
12
Peya Mushelenga, serving as Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the

time of this publication going to print, in his chapter on “Principles and principals of
Namibia’s foreign relations” sets out the five fundamental beliefs governing Namibia’s
foreign relations as enshrined in Article 96 of the Constitution. Thus, Namibia should
strive to –
• adopt and maintain a policy of non-alignment
• promote international cooperation, peace and security
• create and maintain just and mutually beneficial relations among nations
• foster respect for international law treaty obligations, and
• encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
The author presents not only the Constituent Assembly’s reasoning for drafting these five
principles, but also portrays the impact they have since had in respect of foreign policy.
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the key drivers of Namibia’s foreign relations and the
different political styles espoused in implementing and augmenting Namibia’s foreign
affairs principles, namely by Namibia’s Presidents, Sam Nujoma and Hifikepunye
Pohamba, but also her Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Theo-Ben Gurirab (1990–2002),
Hidipo Hamutenya (2002–2004), Marco Hausiku (2004–2010), and Utoni Nujoma
(2010–2012).20 The author also refers to the role of the Deputy Ministers and institutions
involved in foreign policy formulation, primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
whose White Paper entitled Namibia’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management
was published in 2004. The author concludes that neither the Parliament’s Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security nor the opposition parties or civil
society have had a significant impact on foreign policy formulation to date.
Section II: Namibia’s bilateral relations
This section explores Namibia’s bilateral relations with some selected countries, namely
– in alphabetical order – Angola, China, Germany, South Africa and the United States
of America.
Hidipo Hamutenya, former Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–2004), in

his chapter entitled “Namibia and Angola: Analysis of a symbiotic relationship”,
describes the historic, political and economic ties between the two neighbouring
countries. The chapter explains the interwoven process leading to the independence of
both countries. It elaborates why the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, in the
beginning had strong ties with the Angolan liberation movement, UNITA (União Nacional
para a Independência Total de Angola/National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola) and only after Angola’s independence in 1975 became an ally of the MPLA
20 The incumbent Foreign Minister, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah (2012 to date), is not included in
the discussion since her appointment occurred after the content of the text had been finalised for
the editing and publishing process.
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Anton Bösl
(Movimiento Popular para la Liberacão de Angola/Popular Movement for the Liberation

of Angola), which has ruled the country since then. The chapter informs the reader about
the important role played by Cuba and the Soviet Union in favour of the MPLA, and
the UN’s role in the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The discussion includes
the civil war between UNITA and the forces of the MPLA Government after Namibia’s
independence in 1990, which delayed the normalisation and formalisation of relations
between the two countries. Therefore, the Angolan–Namibian Joint Commission of
Co-operation (ANJCC), which was established in 1990, could only conclude bilateral
agreements after the end of warfare in Angola in 2002. Thus, in 2003, the Agreement
on Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investment was concluded, and in 2004, the
Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation. Other bilateral agreements that have
been signed and the challenges especially on trade are mentioned. The chapter informs
the reader about international cooperation frameworks such as the Benguela Current
Commission, the collaboration on establishing the Trans-Cunene Corridor as a road and
rail network between the two countries’ main ports, and the joint management – and silent
tensions – entailed by the shared Okavango and Cunene River Basins. Hamutenya also
discusses the issue of Angolan refugees in Namibia and their repatriation. He concludes
that relations have generally been steady and cordial, trade ties have been growing, and
the symbiotic connection has been very positive overall.
The chapter “Namibia and China: Profile and appraisal of a relationship” explores
the genesis of the Afro-Sino relationship and the historic relations between Namibia
(and the SWAPO Party) and the People’s Republic of China (and its Communist Party).
The author, André du Pisani, Professor of Politics at the University of Namibia, sheds
light on the political contexts of and ideological rationale for the relationship from
both points of view – especially until the end of the Cold War. The chapter informs the
reader about the cornerstones of China’s policy on Africa and the fora of cooperation
between China and Africa (especially the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation/FOCAC,
and the Africa–China Young Leaders Forum/ACYLF) as well as Chinese commitments
regarding preferential loans, development aid, investment, and scholarships to different
African countries, including Namibia. For the author, China appears to see globalisation
as a way to establish more cooperative forms of state-based as well as non-state
relations with a growing number of African countries. He sketches the political and
diplomatic relations between Namibia and China and their key areas of cooperation:
trade, investment, construction (especially of politically and symbolically important
public buildings), education (including scholarships for children of Namibia’s ruling
elite), culture, development assistance, defence and security. The chapter elaborates that
China’s interest in Namibia is mainly based on its growing appetite for natural resources.
It concludes with the critical comment that the perpetuation of the historic pattern of
commodity extraction and the utilisation of Namibia as a ‘dumping ground’ for lower-
quality consumer goods would neither be adequate nor – in the long run – acceptable
to Namibians. Given China’s global economic importance, with its new-mercantilist
and developmental approach, its relationship with Namibia needs to be strategically
managed in the long-term interest of both countries.
14
Peter Katjavivi, who served as Namibia’s Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
(2006–2008), in his essay entitled “Namibia’s bilateral relations with Germany”,
describes what he calls “a crucial relationship” since the establishment of diplomatic ties
between the two countries in 1990. The author emphasises that the genesis of Namibia’s
foreign policy was essentially influenced by the country’s struggle to free itself from
the bondage of apartheid and colonialism. He refers to the close cooperation between
the SWAPO leadership in exile and politicians from the Federal Republic of Germany
before Namibia’s independence. The close bonds with the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR), however, are not the subject of the chapter. Katjavivi appreciates
the role of Federal Germany as a member of the Western Contact Group and of Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, Federal Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time, in paving the way
for Namibia’s independence. The author informs the reader about the Resolution in the
German Bundestag (Parliament) in 1989 that acknowledged a “special responsibility” for
Namibia and its citizens, leading to the use of the term special relations – as expressed
by both Presidents Sam Nujoma and Roman Herzog during the Namibian premier’s first
state visit to Germany in 1996. The chapter offers a list of important reciprocal visits
by government officials and parliamentarians, and comments that the high-level visits
in evidence by Germany since Namibia’s Independence have dwindled in recent years.
For the author, the reasons appear to be the expected acknowledgement of atrocities
committed during the German colonial era as genocide, and the quest for associated
reparations. The chapter also lists profiles of German NGOs providing assistance to
Namibia, informs the reader about the official development cooperation between the
two countries as well as other non-official collaboration, and critiques the increasingly
unbalanced ratio of loans vis-à-vis grants by the German Government in development
aid to Namibia. The chapter then discusses the official apology by German Minister
Wieczorek-Zeul during her visit to Namibia in 2004 and the subsequently introduced
Special Initiative, which has caused several challenges. The author discusses a motion
in Namibia’s Parliament in 2005 and its unanimously adopted associated resolution in
2007 which Namibia’s Prime Minister transmitted to the German Foreign Minister,
reinforcing the demand for reparations from the German Government. The author also
provides his views on the highly disputed repatriation of skulls in 2011 of Namibian
ancestors who had been victims of German atrocities. Katjavivi expresses his hope that
the Namibian–German Parliamentary Friendship Group formed in 2012 will promote
well-structured dialogue in helping Germany to deal openly with the unresolved issues
relating to its colonial past in Namibia.
In their chapter entitled “Uneven but intertwined: Namibia’s bilateral relationship

with South Africa”, the respectively Namibian and South African academics Tjiurimo
Alfredo Hengari and Chris Saunders analyse the relations between their two countries
since 1990. They identify two dominant facts, one being that Namibia’s large neighbour
had ruled it as a colonised territory for 75 years (1915–1990), and had left behind an
extensive legacy in many respects. The second fact identified Namibia having remained
intertwined with South Africa economically as well as in many other ways – leading
to a sense of ambivalence in the relations between the two countries since Namibia’s
15
Anton Bösl
independence in 1990. These relations are categorised into three distinct phases. The first
(1990–1994) represents an interregnum: the transition from apartheid to democracy in
South Africa. For the authors, this first phase – subtitled “Engaging the former colonial
oppressor”, is characterised by an emancipatory foreign policy on Namibia’s part, one
that was based on the desire for territorial integrity and, hence, the reintegration of
Walvis Bay and the Offshore Islands which South Africa had not relinquished when it
loosed its colonial grip in 1990. Other characteristics of this first phase are the prevailing
optimism as regards the prospects of a majority-ruled South Africa, and economic
pragmatism resulting from decades of dependency. The first decade of South Africa’s
democratisation (1994–2005) is delineated as a second phase of Namibian-South African
relations, described by the subheading “Fraternal engagement, economic dependence,
differences on regional policy”. A defining element of this phase was the unrest that
erupted in the DRC (1998–2002): since South Africa preferred a diplomatic solution,
Namibia’s military intervention in the DRC led to tensions and sporadic acrimony in
the neighbourly relations. A third phase, spanning from 2005 to the time of printing, is
marked by the Pohamba presidency and closer relations with South Africa, especially
since President Zuma took office in 2009. The authors argue that whilst South Africa’s
hegemonic attitude in the Southern African region and in Africa under the Mbeki
Administration was not always welcomed by the Namibian Government, bilateral
relations were strengthened after Zuma became president in 2009. More reciprocal visits
by state officials – including by the heads of state; common positions on, for example,
the suspension of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal; and
increased cooperation in bi-national commissions are evidence of this closer bond. The
chapter concludes with the future prospect of inequality in the bilateral ties, and a shift
in both countries’ geostrategic positions as Angola’s importance in the region increases.
In his chapter, “From confrontation to pragmatic cooperation: United States of

America–Namibia relations”, Bill Lindeke, an American academic with a long history
in Namibia, provides a historic perspective of the relationship between the two unequal
partners, and discusses their current cooperation. During the early stages of Namibia’s
diplomatic activity, the USA was not an important actor, considering the case of Namibia
rather an international, not an American issue. Only Kennedy’s presidency (1961–1963)
turned the perception of Namibia’s strive for independence. Later, in 1966 the USA
supported the UN General Assembly Resolution (2145) to strip South Africa of the Mandate
over Namibia. However, the Cold War with the Soviet Union and US hegemonic politics
under the influence of Henry Kissinger dominated the US African policy, including a tilt
towards Southern Africa’s white regimes as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. Lindeke
argues that the emergence of Afro-Marxist regimes and the deployment of Cuban troops
to Angola and Ethiopia in the 1970s sharpened the US’s security focus on regional
conflict zones in Africa, and economic concerns took second place. Carter’s presidency
(1977–1981) created a short window of opportunity for negotiations, and the success of
the Western Contact Group. Lindeke also elaborates on the US policy of “constructive
engagement”. He considers how the Reagan Administration (1981–1989) delayed the
16
Namibian solution by introducing a “linkage” with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola, and explains the turning points of US politics towards Namibia on the road
to independence. The author also informs the reader about the US’s cooperation with
Namibia after Independence, focusing on development assistance, the African Growth
and Opportunity Act, the security sector cooperation and the Millennium Challenge
Account. Despite good official government relations, Lindeke notes that older Namibians
still harbour some suspicion as regards the US’s intentions, as America was perceived
by them as an imperialist superpower that supported South Africa’s apartheid system. In
contrast to this pre-Independence and partly current attitude, recent surveys show a very
positive attitude towards America, since a pragmatic convergence of cooperation has
emerged as the dominant post-Independence interaction.
Section III: Namibia’s multilateral relations
This Section discusses Namibia’s participation in international fora and multilateral

institutions since Independence, such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU),
the European Union (EU) and the UN – with all the respective repercussions of such
participation evidenced in the country’s foreign relations.
The chapter “Namibia and the Southern African Customs Union” by Gerhard Erasmus
introduces SACU as a very specific regional organisation. The author – a Namibian
citizen, Law Professor Emeritus at Stellenbosch University, and an internationally
renowned specialist on SACU – explains the basic features of the world’s oldest customs
union (established 1910). He also sheds light on the 1910 and 1969 Agreements with
their colonial origins and historic development, in-built economic asymmetry, and
operational difficulties. Erasmus reflects the adoption of the 2002 SACU Agreement
as a response to the regional political and economic changes during the 1990s and
the unsuccessful attempt to limit the dominance of South Africa’s institutions which
characterised the functioning of SACU under the 1969 Agreement. The chapter provides
an insight into SACU’s technical and formal aspects as well as the problems it has
experienced, and informs the reader about the establishment of a Summit of Heads
of State and Government as a new and permanent SACU institution. The author also
relates that SACU’s new institutional framework provides for a Tariff Board and an
Ad Hoc Tribunal, and explains their need for additional legal instruments in order to
become operational. Whilst the new SACU Agreement provides for the development
of common policies concerning industrial development, agriculture, competition and
unfair trade practices for the five SACU member countries, the vague language in the
Agreement does not offer essential guidelines and contents for enforcement. The chapter
identifies the inconsistencies of the 2002 SACU Agreement and SACU architecture,
and explains why, in many important aspects, SACU currently does not function as a
common mechanism. Erasmus explains the Common Revenue Pool as a central aspect
of SACU, and notes that Namibia’s share amounted to 26.6% of the country’s total
17
Anton Bösl
revenue in 2011/12. This indicates that trade diplomacy is a very important foreign
policy dimension, especially for members of a customs union. Hence, Namibia’s
membership in SACU has also shaped its bilateral relationship with South Africa – an
economically and politically dominant SACU member, whilst the fact that Namibia was
integral part of South Africa for seven decades had lasting effects on Namibia’s economy
and currency. The chapter also mentions Namibia’s economic diplomacy regarding the
conclusion of the SADC Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU, the negotiations
for which, for practical purposes, were conducted via SACU. The author also feels the
SADC integration record is rather unimpressive, he points out that SACU still has to
unlock its potential to establish effective and sound common governance. Instead, the
SACU member states have demonstrated little preparedness to grant regional institutions
more independent powers and jurisdiction for fear of losing sovereign policy space. For
Erasmus, however, Namibia needs to reinforce its regional and multilateral efforts in
order to develop further. As a smaller nation, Namibia benefits from strong regional
bodies like SACU, which have already generated a high degree of stability in the region.
To further this course of stability, Namibia should champion the cause of strengthening
SACU and deepening regional integration.
Kaire Mbuende, former SADC Secretary General (1994–1999), understands the

relationship between “Namibia and the Southern African Development Community”,
on the basis not only of SADC’s history and trajectories, but also of Namibia’s
developmental objectives. For Mbuende, Namibia’s participation in SADC contributes
positively to regional integration and shapes the country’s policies, especially in foreign
affairs, defence and security matters (e.g. the DRC and Zimbabwe). The author reasons
that, besides hosting the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek since its establishment
in 1997, Namibia was also instrumental in setting up the Forum as an inter-parliamentary
body and autonomous SADC institution. Mbuende argues that, for small countries like
Namibia, regional integration is not optional but crucial. He singles out eight sectors to
underscore the importance of functional SADC cooperation to Namibia: fisheries and
marine resources, legal affairs, transport, communication, agriculture, natural resources,
shared watercourses, and energy. For Mbuende, regional integration needs strong
institutions and drivers; nonetheless, SADC continues to be challenged by political
instabilities in various countries.
In her chapter on “Namibia and the African Union”, Bience Gawanas, former
Commissioner for Social Affairs at the AU (2003–2012), describes Namibia’s
relationship with the multilateral body OAU/AU as multifaceted. She first looks at the
historic dimensions of Namibia’s pre-Independence relationship with the OAU and the
support that the country and its liberation movement SWAPO received before 1990.
She then highlights Namibia’s role in the founding and in the institutional outlook of
the AU. Gawanas also informs the reader about the four pillars of the AU’s Strategic
Plan, namely peace and security; development, integration, cooperation; shared values;
and institution- and capacity-building. The chapter mentions Namibia’s participation
in the AU Commission’s Secretariat, the Pan-African Parliament, the Anti-Corruption
18
Advisory Board, the Peace and Security Council, the Committee of Intelligence Services
in Africa, and the Committee on UN Reform. The author elaborates on the AU Peace
and Security Council and its new principle of non-indifference, which supersedes the
OAU principle of non-intervention and paves the way for AU-mandated peace support
operations and Namibia’s participation in them. Gawanas then addresses the AU’s shared
values – governance, gender, culture and civil society – and points out Namibia’s low
rate of signing and ratifying AU legal instruments. The chapter describes Namibia’s lack
of conviction as regards the effectiveness of the AU’s development programme, the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), but mentions NEPAD’s contribution to
strengthen the capacity of the AU to achieve regional integration on, and the economic
independence of, the continent. By promoting the pan-African spirit through the adoption
and display of AU symbols and celebrating Africa Day as a public holiday, Namibia
sets an example for other AU member states to follow. The chapter concludes with a
critical look at the future of the AU and the changing roles of its members – particularly
Namibia’s.
In his chapter, “The European Union: Relations with Namibia”, Raúl Fuentes Milani,
currently serving as Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of
Namibia, describes the three complementary angles of the relationship between the EU
and Namibia – political, trade and development cooperation – from an EU perspective.
In his first part (political relations), the author informs the reader about the legal and
institutional framework of the relationship: namely the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and
the EU–ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) Partnership, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the
establishment of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy (2009) and of the European External Action Service (2010). Whilst
the EU delegations abroad assume the representation of the EU as supranational
organisation, its 28 member states retain full capacity to run their bilateral affairs. For
the EU, Namibia is a very important partner and a reference for good governance in
the SADC region. In the second part, the author sketches trade relations between the
two entities, and describes the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive and mutually
beneficial Economic Partnership Agreement. In the third part, the chapter sketches the
extent of development cooperation with Namibia under the ACP–EU Partnership and its
consecutive and multi-annual European Development Funds. The EU and its member
states have provided around 70% of the total development assistance to Namibia to date,
mainly in the areas of rural development and education, tourism, trade and investment,
human resource development, and governance. The European Investment Bank has
provided soft loans to Namibia, and has contributed to the Global Fund to fight HIV
and AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. For the author, the relations between the EU and
Namibia are deep and strong, and breathe the spirit of mutual respect. He also postulates
that EU cooperation with Namibia as an upper-middle-income country may shift to new
sectors linked to productivity, jobs and growth.
In her chapter headed “The United Nations and Namibia since 1990”, Kari Egge, who
was the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Namibia (2009–2011) at the time of
19
Anton Bösl
its writing, reminds us of the sustained UN support during Namibia’s fight for freedom,
and calls the country “a child of the UN”. Egge outlines Namibia’s involvement in the
three pillars of the UN system – peace and security, development, and human rights – by
which the country demonstrates its commitment to international stability. Regarding the
pillar of peace and security, the chapter gives an overview of Namibia’s engagement in
UN peacekeeping missions and informs the reader about its domestic policy decisions on
peacekeeping and security. With respect to the development pillar, the author discusses
mutual involvement, i.e. Namibia’s contribution to the current UN Development
Assistance Framework and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but also
the UN’s multifaceted engagement in Namibia. As regards the human rights pillar,
the chapter informs the reader about Namibia having signed and ratified most of the
core international human rights treaties, although it faces considerable challenges with
respect to their domestic implementation and the reporting obligations associated with
them. The author concludes with an outlook on the UN’s future role, also in Namibia,
in facilitating, advising and assisting governments to fill the three UN pillars with life
worldwide. Since the author submitted her manuscript in 2011 when she left Namibia
and the UN, the chapter does not cover the influential developments in 2013 around the
United Nations Partnership Framework (UNPAF) signed with Namibia for the period
2014–2018.
Section IV: Namibia’s foreign relations in perspective
The last Section of the publication captures some of the interfaces of foreign relations
and several other important policy areas, and their mutual influence. This section is rather
inconclusive, but it portrays the legal, parliamentary, security and economic dimensions
of foreign relations and discusses Namibia’s pan-Africanism as well as its involvement
in global governance matters.
Sacky Shanghala, Chairman of Namibia’s Law Reform and Development Commission,

in his chapter entitled “The legal dimension of Namibia’s foreign relations”, argues
that the interaction between and among states is defined by the rules of international law,
and that the policies of state that drive the interests of one state as it relates to others
is foreign policy. International law and foreign relations are inextricably intertwined,
however. Since international law and agreements are binding on Namibia under Article
144 of its Constitution, and since the UN, AU and SADC continuously produce new or
revised legal instruments, international law affects not only Namibia’s domestic laws and
their implementation, but also its foreign policy. For Shanghala, Namibia’s interactions
in the international sphere and the attainment of its political, trade and economic interests
are inevitably linked. As a constitutional democracy, Namibia’s international actions
ought to be justifiable in law; state action is obliged to be sound in law, although it will
always remain politics.
20
André du Pisani, Professor of Politics at the University of Namibia, in his chapter titled
“Namibia’s foreign relations and security policy: Exploration of a critical nexus”,
explores the interface between the complex but crucial interface of Namibia’s foreign
relations and security policy since the country’s Independence in 1990. Select case
studies such as the reintegration of Walvis Bay and the offshore islands, participation in
various peacekeeping operations in the SADC region and beyond, the peaceful resolution
of disputes, Namibia’s military engagement in the DRC (1998–2001), and accession
to various international legal instruments on aspects of political life with security
implications are evidence that Namibia values the primacy of different forms of security,
both classic (state-based) and new forms of human security, and their relationship to
foreign policy and national development. The chapter shows that Namibia’s foreign
policy has at times not been consistent where aspects of human rights and security have
been threatened (e.g. in the conflicts in the DRC and Zimbabwe) and rather reflected
older forms of solidarity politics, undermining the constitutional ‘peace through law’
approach. For Du Pisani, Namibia’s positive record in Africa is enviable in respect of
new forms of security such as the environment, inclusive of the marine environment; the
safeguarding of biodiversity; measures taken to address global warming; and other forms
of security, such as peacekeeping or maintaining Africa as a nuclear-free continent. Du
Pisani pleads that Namibia should reignite its role as ‘norm entrepreneur’ in SADC and
beyond, and for additional policy-focused research on the country’s foreign relations,
particularly since these are often poorly communicated to the public.
In his chapter, “Beyond economic diplomacy: The interface of Namibia’s foreign

relations and economic cooperation”, Lesley Blaauw, political scientist at the
University of Namibia, argues that the end of the Cold War and its bipolar rivalry in
globalisation processes reduced the importance of sovereign states in foreign policy
formulation and, consequently, led to a growing importance of ‘regions’ and ‘economic
regionalism’, besides opening up new space for the participation of non-state actors in
international affairs. Blaauw’s new regionalism acknowledges that engagement with the
world economy is unavoidable, but makes a case for developmental regionalism in respect
of building new regional economic capacity, focusing on national developmental needs
and the engagement of the international community. Blaauw demands a developmental
foreign policy for Namibia, articulating a clear developmental macroeconomic framework
that aims to restore the economic sovereignty of Namibia and of the developing world.
Nora Schimming-Chase, a semi-retired Namibian diplomat and former Member of
Namibia’s National Assembly, in her chapter entitled “The parliamentary role of
Namibia’s foreign relations” discusses the roles defined for Parliament under the
Namibian Constitution and the White Paper on Foreign Policy, Defence and Security.
She informs the reader about Parliament’s oversight function in respect of foreign
relations by explaining the role of the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, Defence
and Security. The author also analyses Parliament’s legislative role by illustrating
how international agreements are ratified. The chapter outlines the role of Namibia’s
21
Anton Bösl
Parliament and/or its members in regional (SADC Parliamentary Forum), continental

(Pan-African Parliament) and international parliamentary bodies (Inter-parliamentary
Union, ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly) and refers to some policy statements
by Parliament on current issues and crises. The special role of former Foreign Minister
Theo-Ben Gurirab as former President of the UN General Assembly (1999–2000) and as
President of the Inter-parliamentary Union (2008–2010) is also elaborated. The author
concludes with critical comments on the question of whether Namibia’s Parliament
indeed plays its designated role, or has, de facto, very little – if any – say on foreign
policy in general or in particular.
“Namibia’s attitudes towards pan-Africanism” is the title of an exploration of this

theme by Joseph Diescho, a widely published intellectual and currently the Chief
Executive Officer of the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management.
For Diescho, pan-Africanism is the intellectual preoccupation of individuals concerned
about Africa and her inhabitants in the context of what was inflicted on them by other
nations. Due to Namibia’s disdain for intellectual thought, neither pan-Africanism nor
the country’s diplomatic services could thrive – although Namibia is a child of pan-
Africanism and of internationalism. As the first success story born of the international
community, Namibia has turned out to be more a member rather than an active participant
of its fora, in Diescho’s view, and Namibia’s foreign policy towards the international
community (and Africa) has been more reactive than proactive. Diescho also explores
some areas of influence for Namibia in relation to pan-Africanism, namely human rights,
national interest, regional integration, peaceful conflict resolution, national reconciliation,
internationalism, race relations, corruption, and the land question. Diescho critiques
that Namibia is a member of the – albeit questionable – Pan-African Parliament, and
yet refuses to participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is
considered as the jewel of NEPAD. For Diescho, the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia
(PACON), despite the noble intentions evident at its establishment in 1999, has become a
mini-cultural mouthpiece of the ruling party instead of a true pan-Africanist movement.
In his contribution titled “Namibia: Global governance matters”, Henning Melber,

internationally published expert on African politics, argues that a country’s international
credibility relies on a trustworthy foreign policy that is in line with the global normative
frameworks adopted by UN member states. Although civil society and NGOs play a
critical role in the general understanding and conceptualisation of global governance,
Melber deliberately homes in on the government as an actor through its state policy.
The chapter elaborates on the decisive impact made by the UN as a multi-level broker in
Namibia’s decolonisation process, e.g. its Resolutions on Namibia, the creation of the UN
Council for Namibia, the UN Institute for Namibia, and UNTAG. The author questions
whether, in return, the country has consistently complied with the normative frameworks,
the values and the principles relating to global and good governance as spearheaded by
the UN. The chapter reminds the reader that Namibia has not only gained international
respect with regard to combating climate change, its environmental policies, and its
22
protection of the common global good. Namibia is also a signatory to most international
conventions and agreements, and Namibian presidents and top officials have on several
occasions repeated their commitment to the principles of democracy and the rule of law.
Against this background, Melber mentions official initiatives which seem to indicate a
divergent thinking, such as Nujoma’s state visit to Nigeria’s former President Abacha
in 1995, the state visit by Indonesia’s former President Suharto to Namibia in 1997,
the lasting friendship with Zimbabwe’s incumbent President Robert Mugabe, Namibia’s
defence of the former Milošević regime, and Namibia’s military intervention in the DRC
(1998–2001). At the AU Summit in 2009, Namibia also endorsed the dismissal of the
extradition order by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Sudan’s President Al-
Bashir, despite having ratified the Treaty of Rome which established the ICC. In 2011,
President Pohamba criticised NATO’s intervention in Libya, which was sanctioned by
the UN Security Council. Moreover, contrary to its constitutional commitment to the rule
of law, Namibia played an active role in the suspension of the SADC Tribunal. In the
case of the Caprivi treason trial, Melber argues that Namibia delays and, hence, denies
justice to the accused, who have been waiting for a verdict for more than 12 years now.
The chapter concludes that Namibia has squandered its chances to establish a lasting
international reputation, and could have done better in upholding global governance matters.
Conclusion
The collective effort of this publication with its 20 chapters brings together academicians,
diplomats and policymakers both from within and beyond Namibia, with the purpose of
offering a systematic understanding of some of the most significant dimensions of the
country’s foreign relations. The book does not claim to be comprehensive, but intends to
provide a systematic understanding of Namibia’s international and foreign relations. If
it deepens understanding, stimulates research and a broad public discourse, and guides
the shaping of the country’s foreign relations formulation and management, then the
publication will have served its envisaged, noble purpose.
References
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search for leadership in a transforming global order”. International Affairs, 89(1).
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Bagger, Thomas. 2013. “The Networked Diplomat: To suit the changing world, the role
of the Foreign Office must be rethought”. IP Journal (English version), available
at https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/networked-diplomat, last acces-
sed 23 November 2013.
Bösl, Anton, Nico Horn & André du Pisani (Eds). 2010. Constitutional democracy in
Namibia: A critical analysis after two decades. Windhoek: Macmillan Education
Namibia.
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Goldstein, Judith & Robert Keohane. 1993. “Ideas and foreign policy: An analytical
framework”. In Goldstein, Judith & Robert Keohane (Eds). Ideas and foreign
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by surprise”. Foreign Affairs, 92(6), November/December. Available at http://
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of powers, 89(3):711–729.
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Keohane (Eds). Ideas and foreign policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mingst, Karen A. 2007. Essentials of international relations (Fourth Edition). New York/
London: WW Norton & Company.
Nye, Joseph S. 2011. The future of power. New York: PublicAffairs.
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security policy for a changing world. Berlin: SWP & GMF.
24
SECTION I
HISTORIC AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS
25
26
Namibian diplomacy before Independence
Chris Saunders*
Before a country gains its independence, it cannot have a foreign policy of its own. Under
South African occupation from 1915 to March 1990, Namibia featured prominently in the
foreign policy of the occupying power, South Africa, and many South African diplomats
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs spent much of their time in diplomatic activity relating
to the question of the future of South West Africa/Namibia. Namibia was RF (Pik)
Botha’s prime diplomatic preoccupation from when he became South Africa’s Minister
of Foreign Affairs in 1977 until Namibia’s Independence 13 years later.1 At the United
Nations (UN) in New York, more time was spent on the Namibian issue than on any
other in the 1970s and 1980s. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is now a large volume
of literature on international diplomacy concerning Namibia in those decades.2 This
chapter is not, however, concerned with either international or specifically South African
diplomacy relating to Namibia, but instead with diplomacy engaged in by Namibians
before the country gained its independence from South Africa. Too many of the accounts
of international diplomacy on the issue of Namibia play down – if not altogether ignore
– the role played by Namibians themselves.
There is a long history of such diplomacy by Namibians. People living in what is now
Namibia engaged in forms of diplomacy among themselves and with others before
German colonisation began in 1884,3 and once the Germans had arrived, Hendrik
Witbooi, the leader of the Nama, and others engaged them diplomatically as well as
militarily.4 Then, from soon after South African occupation, people in Namibia began
engaging in international diplomacy by sending petitions to the League of Nations in
Geneva, for from 1920 South West Africa was a mandate under the League and the
mandatory power, South Africa, was supposed to be concerned with the interests of the
indigenous people. The Rehoboth Basters in particular complained to the League about
the nature of South African rule, and it has recently been argued that their petitioning had
some marginal success in alleviating a few of the harsher effects of that rule.5
* Prof. Chris Saunders is Emeritus Professor at the University of Cape Town, where he taught for
many years in the Department of Historical Studies.
1 See e.g. Wolvaardt et al. (2010:Ch. 14): one of the most influential South African diplomats to
be stationed in Namibia was Sean Cleary, who was Chief Director in Windhoek from 1983 to
1985.
2 For example, the Western Contact Group’s diplomacy in the late 1970s has been the subject of
a number of books and articles, including, say, Karns (1987:93–123).
3 See e.g. Lau (1987).
4 Though the title of his classic book emphasised armed resistance, there are brilliant passages
about Witbooi’s diplomacy in the second chapter of Drechsler (1986).
5 Dedering (2009:785–801).
27
Chris Saunders
The rest of this chapter will be concerned with diplomatic activity by Namibians after
the Second World War (WWII), and the focus will be on formal diplomatic activity,
rather than on, say, the contacts that took place between Namibians within the country
and those in exile, which, it could be argued, were a form of diplomacy for those on
both sides of the divide that existed at that time.6 The more formal diplomatic activity
in which Namibians engaged in the years of the struggle for independence – the subject
of this chapter – is a topic that remains under-researched. We can expect to learn much
about it when the memoirs are published of one of the key figures in that diplomacy,
Theo-Ben Gurirab, who was the leading diplomat for the South West Africa People’s
Organisation (SWAPO) at the UN from 1972 to 1986, as well as SWAPO’s Secretary
of Foreign Affairs and Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs at Independence. This
chapter sketches some aspects of pre-Independence diplomacy.7
From Chiefs to organised diplomacy

After WWII, it was the Herero who took the lead in petitioning the newly established UN
against the territory’s incorporation into South Africa. When Chief Frederick Maherero
met the Reverend Michael Scott in what is now Botswana in 1947, he suggested that
Scott visit Chief Hosea Kutako in South West Africa. There, Scott helped members of the
Herero Chiefs’ Council draft a petition to be presented to the UN, calling for the territory
to become a UN trust territory.8 A decade later, in 1957, Chief Kutako asked Mburumba
Kerina, then a student at Lincoln University in the United States of America (USA), to
lobby at the UN in New York for the termination of South Africa’s mandate over South
West Africa. Kerina duly appeared before the relevant sub-committee of the General
Assembly, and towards the end of the 1950s he pressed for a case to be brought before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether South Africa was violating the spirit
of the mandate through applying apartheid policies in South West Africa. Those who sent
petitions to the UN in the late 1950s from the territory included Hermann (Andimba)
Toivo ya Toivo, a leading figure in the Ovamboland People’s Organisation, the forerunner
of SWAPO. In 1958, Toivo asked the UN to terminate the mandate and take over the
administration of the territory. When Kerina asked the Herero Chiefs’ Council to send
another representative to join him in New York, Fanuel Jariretundu Kozonguizi went;
and while Kozonguizi was at the UN, he was elected President of the newly established
6 For example, the Stockholm meeting organised by Anton Lubowski in June 1988, which
brought together leading white Namibians and the SWAPO leadership.
7 There is, unfortunately, no equivalent yet for Namibia of Scott Thomas’s (1996) book on the
diplomacy of the African National Congress in South Africa. In a sense, the book that comes
closest to it is Founding President Sam Nujoma’s (2001) memoir, Where others wavered. The
present chapter draws heavily on the fullest scholarly study to date, namely Mushelenga (2008).
See also Wa Nyembo (2002).
8 Saunders (2007:25–40); see also Chapter 10, “The Herero connection”, in Yates & Chester
(2006).
28
South West African National Union (SWANU). After the establishment of SWAPO the
following year, its founder-President, Sam Nujoma, travelled to New York to appear
before the UN, as did a number of other Namibians – members of both SWANU and
SWAPO.9
In the early 1960s, both SWANU and SWAPO, through their diplomatic activity,
“contributed to the further internationalization of the South West Africa issue”.10 Once
SWAPO’s provisional headquarters were established in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika
(now Tanzania), SWAPO began to place representatives in a number of other countries.
In 1962, it opened a mission in Cairo, Egypt, with the Egyptian Government assisting
with the costs. SWANU was then part of the South African United Front, which also
opened an office in Cairo. When the Front collapsed, SWANU kept an office there on its
own, also receiving funding for it from the Egyptian Government. But SWAPO took its
international diplomacy more seriously than did SWANU, and gradually won out in the
competition between the two for recognition by foreign governments. SWAPO was able
to establish itself as the dominant Namibian nationalist organisation because SWANU
did not launch an armed struggle, and began to fall apart in exile, but also because of
the support that SWAPO’s diplomats received at the UN and from the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU).11
SWAPO’s international diplomacy

In 1964, the SWAPO leadership appointed Hage Geingob to be its Chief Representative
to the Americas and the UN. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Hidipo Hamutenya and Geingob, all then
studying at American universities, took time off from their studies to petition at the UN,
where the informal Africa Group of ambassadors helped introduce them to the ways of
the organisation. Thanks in part to the work of the Namibians, the UN General Assembly
in 1966 adopted Resolution 2145 of 1966, which terminated the mandate. The General
Assembly then established, in 1967, a Council for South West Africa to administer the
territory and make the necessary arrangements for a transition to independence. From
1974, the UN provided SWAPO with funding for its New York office. SWAPO gained the
coveted status of Permanent Observer, the first liberation movement in southern Africa
to acquire it.12 With that status, SWAPO was able to participate in key discussions at the
UN, where leading members of the international community converged in September
each year for the annual General Assembly sessions.
9 See Nujoma (2001:102–103, 113, 118–119).

10 Du Pisani (1985:159).
11 For two very useful accounts of the way in which support swung from SWANU to SWAPO in
the international community, see Sellström (1999:262ff) and Shubin (2008:Ch. 15).
12 The Palestine Liberation Organisation led the way in this. SWAPO first gained such status from
the Committee of Twenty-four in 1972 (Thomas 1996:118, 123).
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Chris Saunders
SWAPO meanwhile opened offices in Algeria in 1963 and in Zambia the following
year, after that country became independent. In 1965, Nickey Iyambo, then studying
in Finland, was appointed SWAPO’s Chief Representative to the Nordic countries.
He and later representatives to those countries, such as Ben Amathila in Sweden, had
some difficulty in justifying SWAPO’s adoption of the armed struggle to people not
sympathetic to the use of violence. But in the Nordic countries, and in Sweden in
particular, Namibian representatives found widespread support for the campaign to oust
South Africa from South West Africa, and they were given opportunities to speak to
a wide range of people, from Prime Ministers to factory workers, about the situation
in Namibia.13 In 1968, SWAPO opened a mission in London, where Peter Katjavivi
was appointed the first Chief Representative, and this became one of the organisation’s
most important missions: leading SWAPO personnel often passed through London and,
although successive British Governments were not sympathetic to SWAPO, Britain was
home to what became the largest and most effective Namibian solidarity organisation,
with which a succession of SWAPO diplomats and other personnel interacted in a variety
of ways.14 After SWAPO established its Department of Foreign Affairs, more missions
were opened in Africa and Europe in order to gain further support in the international
community for Namibia’s liberation struggle. In the context of the Cold War, SWAPO
had to pull off an intricate balancing act with respect to its interactions with those in
the West and in the socialist countries, and it was remarkably successful in doing so.
It meant playing a skilful diplomatic game and not alienating either camp. While the
SWAPO delegation that visited Beijing in June 1973 could not persuade the Chinese that
SWAPO were not pro-Soviet,15 the liberation movement was able to maintain missions
in both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic at the
same time. SWAPO developed close ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
and Nujoma frequently visited Moscow; but SWAPO – perhaps to avoid alienating the
USA before the Cold War began to wind down – only opened a diplomatic mission there
in 1987.16
SWAPO also established relations with the Commonwealth, which indicated as early as
1975, at its meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, that Namibia would be welcome to join it after
its independence, even though it was not a former British colony. The Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1989 confirmed the invitation, when
independence finally seemed imminent.17 The Indian Government supported SWAPO
13 The definitive account of this for Sweden is to be found in two volumes by Sellström (1999,
2002).
14 These interactions were not always positive; see especially Saunders (2009:437–454).
15 Shubin (2008:209).
16 (ibid.) for details of Nujoma’s visits. Oddly, Shubin does not write about the SWAPO mission.
17 Anyaoku (2004:84–85). By the time independence came, over 8,500 Namibians had been
trained under Commonwealth programmes (ibid.:85). For example, in 1984, Nahas Angula
went on a Commonwealth mission to India and Sri Lanka to see training facilities there; cf. “J
Houston to E Reddy, 20 July 1984”, ES Reddy Papers, University of Cape Town Library.
30
long before a mission was opened in New Delhi in 1982, which, three years later, was
accorded full diplomatic status. This meant that SWAPO enjoyed all the privileges
accorded to diplomatic missions of independent sovereign states to India, its Chief
Representative was called Ambassador, and Nujoma was accorded an official state visit
to India in May 1986.18 By then, SWAPO’s standing internationally had grown to such
an extent that some regarded it as virtually a government-in-exile.
Participating actively in international organisations was an important aspect of SWAPO’s

diplomacy in the years in which it sought to build support in the international community
for Namibian independence. In 1961, Nujoma was at the founding of the Non-aligned
Movement (NAM) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and after that he regularly attended NAM
meetings. At its fourth summit in Algiers in 1973, NAM recognised SWAPO as the
legitimate representative of the Namibian people.19 SWAPO become a full member of
NAM in 1978. Nujoma was present at the OAU’s inaugural meeting in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, in 1963, and he attended many later annual OAU summits, while SWAPO was
given invaluable financial and material support by the OAU’s Liberation Committee.20
Issues that SWAPO wanted to bring to the attention of the international community were
often first discussed at OAU and NAM Foreign Ministers’ meetings before being raised
in the UN General Assembly, in order to gain the maximum possible support.
From the early 1970s, a series of international conferences was held on the question of
Namibia’s independence, and SWAPO personnel played key roles in most of these.21
After SWANU’s President Kozonguizi criticised African leaders as puppets of imperialist
countries in 1966 at the Afro-Asian–Latin American People’s Solidarity Conference,22
the OAU withdrew its recognition of SWANU, and an OAU summit in 1972 in Rabat,
Morocco, recognised SWAPO as the sole authentic representative of the people of
Namibia.23 In 1975, the OAU Council of Ministers passed a resolution reaffirming this,
and the following year the UN General Assembly in turn recognised SWAPO as “the
sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”. This recognition for SWAPO,
claims Nujoma, –24
18 See e.g. SWAPO Information Bulletin, June 1986.

19 Singham & Hune (1986:22).
20 On this, see Dube (1967) and Neidhardt [n.d.].
21 They included the International Conference on Namibia held in Brussels in May 1972 and a
number of conferences held in Paris in the early and mid-1980s. One of the most important
was that which commemorated a hundred years of colonial rule of Namibia: held in London in
1984, and organised by the Namibia Support Committee, it was the only conference of its kind
to produce a very substantial volume of papers (Wood 1988).
22 Emmett (1999:335).
23 Mushelenga (2008:52). Only two other liberation movements received such recognition: Frente
de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, Mozambique Liberation Front) and the Partido
Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC, African Party for the Independence
of Guinea and Cape Verde).
24 Nujoma (2001:257).
31
Chris Saunders
… raised the status of Namibian representatives at every international conference as well as at

national level.
From 1975, SWAPO worked closely with the Movimiento Popular para la Liberacão
de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola),25 and later in
that decade, moved its headquarters from Lusaka, Zambia, to Luanda. Over the years,
SWAPO forged close ties with a number of other liberation movements, including the
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front),
the African National Congress (ANC), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
drawing strength from the knowledge that others were engaged in similar struggles
elsewhere.26
Diplomacy in the Cold War era

In 1971 and on a number of later occasions, Nujoma was invited to address the UN
Security Council when the issue of Namibia came before it. In 1976, SWAPO’s lobbying
at the UN helped persuade the Security Council to adopt, unanimously, Resolution 385,
which called for a UN presence to lead Namibia to independence. In September that
year, Nujoma met Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, in New York, more than
a decade before the President of the ANC had his first meeting with a Secretary of State
(then George Schultz). In 1977 and 1978, Nujoma led the SWAPO diplomatic team in
the negotiations with the Western Contact Group, made up of the five countries which
then had seats in the UN Security Council. After SWAPO accepted the Western Plan
for a transition to independence in July 1978, the Plan was embodied in UN Security
Council Resolution 435 of September 1978, which provided for the establishment of a
UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia.
Nujoma attended key meetings of the Frontline States (FLS) in 1978 and, subsequently,
meetings that coordinated policy against South Africa. It was the FLS that persuaded
SWAPO to accept the Western Plan, despite what SWAPO saw to be its many limitations.
Nujoma led the SWAPO delegation to the abortive UN ‘pre-implementation’ meeting in
Geneva in 1981, and in 1984, he held discussions in Lusaka, Zambia, with representatives
of the South African Government and leaders of internal parties in Namibia. Various
internal groupings, including the Multi-party Conference and then, from 1985, the
Transitional Government of National Unity, engaged in their own forms of diplomatic
activity in the 1980s, almost all of it effectively fruitless, for they tried to persuade the
outside world that they were not puppets of the South African Government and should
receive international support. No significant support was forthcoming.27
25 SWAPO previously had ties to the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
(UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
26 The PLO Chair, Yassar Arafat, was to be a special guest at Namibia’s Independence celebrations.
27 In 1984, for example, Dirk Mudge and other members of the Multi-party Conference visited
32
In the 1980s, SWAPO diplomats spent much of their time challenging the Reagan
Administration’s policy on Namibia, promoted especially by Chester Crocker, the
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. From 1981, the US argued that Namibian
independence should be linked to the total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
Naturally, SWAPO responded that the two issues should not be linked, and that the
Reagan Administration, by arguing for linkage, was in effect supporting South Africa in
its desire to continue occupying the territory and refusing to allow the UN to organise
an election and lead the country to independence. Crocker would never agree to meet
SWAPO, but the organisation continued to increase its international support, even as
some of its diplomats began to be questioned about the reports that SWAPO members
had disappeared in dungeons in Angola. In February 1986, Gurirab and Hamutenya had
to call a press conference to admit that 100 people had been detained under suspicion
of being spies of the South African Government.28 Though SWAPO was excluded from
the 1988 negotiations – mediated by Crocker – between the Governments of Angola,
Cuba and South Africa, its diplomats were active on the fringes of the negotiations.29 By
then, SWAPO had diplomatic representation in almost 30 countries, with 12 missions in
Africa,30 14 in Europe,31 2 in Asia,32 2 in the Americas,33 and 1 in Australia, besides its
representation at the UN.
The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in late 1989 came as a shock to
SWAPO, and its personnel had to be evacuated from the German Democratic Republic,
along with a number of Namibian children being educated there, and from Romania.
But the overall success of SWAPO’s diplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s was symbolised
during the Independence ceremonies at the Windhoek Stadium on 21 March 1990, when
Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, administered the presidential oath to
Nujoma before a gathering of diplomats and politicians representing a large proportion
of the countries of the world.34 After Independence, the new government could build
on the diplomacy of the pre-Independence period. Namibian involvement in such
organisations as the UN and the NAM continued, and the newly independent country
joined the Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference
Europe and the US to put their case to the international community; see e.g. Van Wyk (1999).
28 The Namibian, 21 February 1986. For the Swedish reaction, see Sellström (2002:336–337). On
the so-called spy scandal, see especially Trewhela (2009).
29 See Crocker (1992).
30 In Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
31 In the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic,
Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and
Yugoslavia.
32 In India and Iran.
33 In Cuba and the USA.
34 See e.g. Perez de Cuellar (1997:Ch. 11).
33
Chris Saunders
– soon to be transformed into the Southern African Development Community – and other
international organisations, and extended its diplomatic activity in other new directions.
Conclusion
That diplomatic efforts by Namibians can be traced to well before the more active and
formal diplomacy of the 1970s and 1980s may have had some impact on the diplomacy
of those decades, but it cannot begin to explain the successes achieved. Hardly any of
the Namibians active in those decades had any formal training in diplomacy,35 but a
number proved to be highly skilled at it, and were able to make significant contributions
to, say, SWAPO’s recognition as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian
people, and obtaining Permanent Observer status at the UN. These achievements
boosted SWAPO’s image in the international community – and the much older and
more established ANC was never able to acquire similar recognition. Some international
diplomats were to remain scornful of Sam Nujoma’s diplomatic skills,36 but his tireless
travelling from meeting to meeting37 and his presence at numerous key international
events put SWAPO and Namibia on the international map. He was, of course, assisted
by other diplomats and members of SWAPO’s Central Committee and Politburo on
delegations to the UN and at the many international conferences that were held to discuss
the independence of Namibia. Theo-Ben Gurirab at the UN and Peter Katjavivi in London
both did much to boost SWAPO’s credibility in international circles, for they combined
shrewd intelligence with an ability to present themselves well in international diplomatic
circles. Hage Geingob, the Director of the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN)
in Lusaka, acted in a diplomatic capacity on many occasions, meeting foreign dignitaries
at UNIN and participating in international meetings. As we have noted, SWAPO was
able in the 1970s and 1980s to engage both sides of the Cold War, which enabled it to
acquire military training and equipment, including weapons, from socialist countries,
along with humanitarian assistance and other forms of educational and training support
from Scandinavian and other Western countries.
SWAPO’s diplomatic activity in the 1970s and 1980s was, then, a substantial achievement.
Though in part the product of skilful diplomacy, this achievement was also, of course,
due to Namibia’s international status and the growing consensus in the international
community that South Africa should withdraw from the territory and grant Namibia its
independence. Nonetheless, although SWAPO was much helped by the fact that Namibia
35 Gurirab was the only one to do advanced studies in international relations, namely at Temple
University.
36 For example, in the memoirs of two UN officials, namely Brian Urquhart (Urquhart 1987) and
Marrack Goulding (Goulding 2002).
37 In a few weeks in May and June 1986, for example, in one whirlwind trip, Nujoma visited
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, India, Iran, China, Korea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Congo
(Brazzaville) and Gabon; SWAPO Information Bulletin, June 1986.
34
came to be seen as a UN responsibility, its diplomacy was arguably more successful than
that of the ANC and at least as important as the armed struggle that SWAPO waged in
the decades leading to independence.38 The diplomatic successes of Namibians before
Independence boded well for the country’s foreign relations after Independence, for they
could build on what had already been achieved.
References
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Crocker, Chester. 1992. High Noon in southern Africa. New York: Oxford University
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Dedering, Tilman. 2009. “Petitioning Geneva: Transnational aspects of protest and
resistance in South West Africa/Namibia after the First World War”. Journal of
Southern African Studies, 35(4):785–801.
Drechsler, Horst. 1986. Let us die fighting. The struggle of the Herero and Nama against
German imperialism (1884–1915). Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
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Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.
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Goulding, Marrack. 2002. Peacemonger. London: John Murray.
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Unpublished research paper, University of Toronto.
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the Liberation Struggle of Namibia. London: Panaf.
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New York: St Martin’s.
38 Nujoma (2001:282) emphasises the complementarity between the two.
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Saunders, Chris. 2007. “Michael Scott and Namibia”. African Historical Review,
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36
Namibia and the United Nations until 1990
Dennis U Zaire*
Introduction
The United Nations (UN) has for many years established and maintained a relationship
with Namibia, both as a colonised and occupied (mandated) territory and an independent
country. This relationship grew into a strong bond that extended over many decades,
and entails much in terms of content, events and the agenda of issues that defined and
drove it over the years. The passing of time may have changed the agenda to reflect the
needs of either party, but what has certainly not changed, especially after Namibia’s
Independence, is the endurance of the relationship, with a renewed emphasis on stronger
ties and cooperation on many issues of mutual interest. This is crucial for the UN as a
body dedicated to the maintenance of world peace and security. It is equally important
to Namibia as a country that sought and achieved its independence through the UN.
This may partly explain Namibia’s strong positive record of contributing to UN peace
and security efforts, a trend set since Independence. Moreover, the country cooperates
closely with the UN on a number of developmental and other strategic areas 22 years
since Independence, which bears testimony of a flourishing relationship.
However, the UN–Namibia relationship prior to Independence, which is the primary

focus of this article, was at times complex because of the difficulty in dealing adequately
with a host of issues on the question of Namibia. The difficult interaction between the
UN, Namibia and South Africa and other role players was the main contributor to this
complexity. Nonetheless, the relationship was also exciting, because it was built on the
premise of hope – and that hope was turned into real freedom in 1990.
Reviewing such a relationship is a delicate task. Firstly, it covers important events

over the years, all of which compete for attention. Secondly, the question of Namibia
was one of the most long-standing and difficult issues on the UN agenda. Finally and
unfortunately, time and space do not allow for a deeper and critical investigation of all
important issues flowing from that as this paper constitutes a small addition only.1
This article provides a short overview of the Namibia–UN relationship prior to

independence from five angles. After the introduction and brief background, the paper
first looks at Namibia as a UN petitioner, and then at UN support to petitioners. Thirdly,
* Dennis U Zaire is the Programme Manager at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Namibia and
Angola office in Windhoek.
1 A publication on this subject by the speaker of the Namibian Parliament, Hon. Dr Theo-Ben
Gurirab, is forthcoming.
37
Dennis U Zaire
it considers the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), its important judgement
on Namibia from 1966, and the implications of that judgement. Fourthly, it highlights
the involvement and intensified efforts of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and UN
Security Council (UNSC) in the final push for independence. And lastly, the article
concludes with a section on independence being a destination within reach.
A brief background
South Africa’s mandate to rule Namibia stems from the terms of Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and a mandate2 agreement by the League’s Council.
The League’s authority on the question of South West Africa which Part 1 of Article 22
of the Treaty of Versailles articulates is a result of marathon negotiations that ended with
the signing of the Treaty of Versailles – a peace settlement agreed on after the First World
War (WWI) had ended.3 The mandate under this treaty governed by the League allowed
South Africa to officially take over the administration of the then South West Africa on
17 December 1920. With the supersession of the League by the United Nations in 1946,
South Africa refused to surrender its earlier mandate to be replaced by a UN trusteeship
agreement requiring closer international monitoring of the territory’s administration.
Kerina reports on this as follows:4
In view of the wishes of the majority of European inhabitants of South West Africa, [South
Africa] could not act in accordance with the recommendation that South West Africa be placed
under international trusteeship; nor did it consider itself under any legal obligation to propose
a trusteeship agreement.
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, South Africa asserted that the League of Nations
mandate had lapsed upon that body’s dissolution, meaning that it no longer had any
international obligations in regard to South West Africa. From that point forward,
South Africa administered Namibia as a de facto fifth province, but failed to officially
incorporate it. Under this arrangement, the white minority were represented in the whites-
only Parliament of South Africa, and could elect their own local administration – the
South West Africa Legislative Assembly. South Africa also appointed an Administrator
of SWA with extensive power. In 1949, South Africa made constitutional changes, which
included the quasi-incorporation of South West Africa.
By UNGA Resolution 338 (IV), the ICJ was requested to give an opinion on the current
international status of South West Africa. The request for advisory opinion was submitted
2 A League of Nations mandate was a legal status for certain territories to be transferred from
the control of one country to another after WWI; see “Legal consequences for the state of
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970)”, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5595.pdf);
last accessed 9 August 2011.
3 Signed at the Palace of Versailles near Paris on 28 June 1919.
4 Kerina (1981:116).
38
on 27 December 1949.5 At the same time, Reverend Michael Scott6 petitioned the ICJ in
support of the UNGA submission in order to lend more weight to the arguments before
the court on the question of Namibia.
In July 1950, the ICJ found that the old League of Nations mandate was still in force.7
Subsequently, the UNGA repeated its application that the territory should fall under UN
trusteeship. In October 1966, the UNGA resolved to revoke South Africa’s mandate,
declaring as follows:8
The mandate conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the
Government of the Union of South Africa is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no
other right to administer the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes under the
direct responsibility of the United Nations.
However, South Africa opposed and ignored this Resolution and continued to rule South
West Africa. Therefore, the controversy surrounding South Africa’s refusal to allow
Namibia to be placed under UN trusteeship brought the UN and Namibia closer, and
marked the beginning of Namibia’s long ties with the international body.
The UN petitioners
The refusal by South Africa in 1946 to allow Namibia to be placed under UN trusteeship
sparked a wave of petitions from the international community and Namibians alike,
declaring that Namibians preferred to be placed under UN trusteeship rather than be
incorporated into the Union of South Africa. The late Herero Chief, Hosea Kutako,
through Rev. Michael Scott, petitioned the UN in 1946,9 becoming one of the first
Namibians to do so. In one such petition, he made the following declaration:10
We shall be destroyed if we are incorporated. We shall never want the Union Government.
5 Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=30&case=10&code=ssw
a&p3=0; last accessed 8 August 2011.
6 Michael Scott was a Scottish Anglican cleric and anti-racism activist who worked in South
Africa and lobbied for a free South West Africa. He was mandated by the indigenous people
of South West Africa to speak on their behalf at the UN. He petitioned the UN in his personal
capacity as a cleric and as an authentic representative of native South West Africans.
7 “International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion”, ICJ Reports (1950).
8 General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966, adopted at the 1454th Plenary Meeting
of the General Assembly on 27 October 1966; available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/004/48/IMG/NR000448.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 9 August
2011.
9 For extracts of statements and petitions from various African leaders in Namibia, see Kerina
(1981:79–97).
10 (ibid.).
39
Dennis U Zaire
Others subsequently petitioned the UNGA, although Rev. Scott campaigned fiercely
during those early years to petition both the UN and the ICJ. His efforts yielded a historic
breakthrough in 1949, when the UN Trusteeship Committee allowed him to speak on
behalf of the “tribes” of South West Africa. This was also the first time that petitioning
from Namibians received prominence at the UN.
The main purpose of the petitions was to alert the UN – and the world – about the desperate
plight and ill-treatment of the black majority by the apartheid South African regime.
Besides highlighting these gross human rights violations, the petitions also conveyed the
Namibian people’s genuine desire for independence, and served to strengthen support
for those – including the South West Africa People’s Organisation, SWAPO11 – involved
in the military struggle and in diplomatic and lobbying efforts to advance the case for
Namibia at the UN and beyond.
The petitions, diplomacy and lobbying bore fruit in that Namibian leaders were invited
to advance their cause to the UNGA in 1951. This significant achievement offered a rare
window of opportunity to Namibian leaders to address the UN and world leaders from a
vital platform. In November 1953, the UNGA12 established a Committee on South West
Africa. Three years later, in 1956, the ICJ advised the UNGA on how to deal with the
case of South West Africa, and reaffirmed the UNGA’s capacity to adopt resolutions and
to hear petitions on the mandated territory.13
Also in 1956, Mburumba Kerina was sent to New York to petition the UNGA on behalf
of the Herero Chiefs’ Council. He was followed in 1959 by Hans Beukes and Jariretundu
Kozonguizi, also sent by the Herero Chiefs’ Council, with the aim of becoming
representatives of the future independent Namibia at the UN. In 1960, they were joined
by Sam Nujoma, who had gone into exile through Bechuanaland (today’s Botswana)
on 1 March 1960 as a response to the December 1959 massacre in the so-called Old
Location14 and who, in June 1960 became the first person to petition the Subcommittee
of the Fourth Committee of the UNGA. Until 1960, various petitioners acted on behalf of
the Namibian people, all united by a single factor: the desire to be freed from the Union
Government and its discriminatory and racist policies. The petitioners included Chief
Hosea Kutako, accompanied by the leader of the Nama, Hendrik Samuel Witbooi, and
11 Today, the ruling SWAPO Party of Namibia.

12 Resolution 749 A (VIII) of 28 November 1953.
13 ICJ Pleadings, South West Africa (Hearing of Petitioners), Vol. 152; available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/31/9099.pdf; last accessed 9 August 2011.
14 More than 11 people died when the police opened fire indiscriminately against protestors who
opposed their forced removal from their ‘location’ – or racially segregated residential area (the
suburb of Hochland Park today) to Katutura, some 15 km away. Katutura is an Otjiherero word
meaning “we have no place of our own”.
40
his nephew, Hendrik Witbooi, in 1958; Andimba Toivo ya Toivo15 in December 1958;
and Simon Kaukungua in 1959.
For the petitioners, the UN was one of the few alternatives that offered some hope of
salvation from the Union Government. Nonetheless, South Africa refused to bow to the
pressure being exerted by a combined international and domestic effort to place the issue
of South West Africa under UN trusteeship. This fight continued for many years.
UN support for the petitioners
In 1960, with the independence of a number of colonies, the UNGA adopted Resolution
1514, namely the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples,16 which held as follows:
All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of
equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all states, and respect for the sovereign right
of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
This Resolution enabled the petitioners to plead their cause through means other than
petitions. The UNGA also endorsed and accepted the ICJ opinion of June 1956,17 which
concerned the admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West
Africa, and authorised the said Committee to grant them oral hearing.
In 1961, shortly after the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and People, the UNGA declared that the situation in South West Africa was a
threat to international peace. Both Namibian parties – SWAPO and the South West Africa
National Union, SWANU – demanded that the UN urge South Africa to leave South West
Africa. By way of Resolution 1702, the UNGA established the UN Special Committee
for South West Africa, which became the UN Special Committee on the Situation with
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and People, and reiterated its commitment to the independence of
South West Africa, which was also mentioned in Resolution 1514.
The petitioners worked under extremely difficult circumstances, including having to

endure censorship and spying by the South African Government. They were also not
allowed to leave the country, so their only way out was to escape. Despite these hardships,
15 Founding member of the Ovamboland People’s Congress (OPC) in 1957, a forerunner of the
Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) and, ultimately, SWAPO.
16 Resolution adopted on 14 December 1960; see http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/15/ares15.
htm and http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/152/88/IMG/NR015288.
pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 10 August 2011.
17 See ICJ Reports (1956:23).
41
Dennis U Zaire
they kept the home fire burning by ensuring the UN continued to be informed about
developments in the country and by soliciting the UN’s support. At times, they were faced
with hostile conditions and receptions at the UN as well. This was the case especially
during the UN’s early days and when they began petitioning. Among the reasons was
that the UN was still in its infancy, and petitioning was a new tool. Furthermore, there
was only a small representation of African countries at the UN, namely Egypt, Ethiopia
and Liberia. The latter two independent African states later engaged the ICJ by virtue of
Article 66 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which allows entitled states
to request an advisory opinion.18 The two countries argued, among other things, that
South Africa had violated its mandate by adopting and practising the repressive racial
policy of apartheid that violated the human rights of the territory’s inhabitants. Another
reason for the difficulties experienced by petitioners in the early days was that certain
permanent members of the UNSC, who had veto powers, were South Africa’s trading
partners and allies: they protected their ally’s interests both in the UNGA and UNSC.
In subsequent years of engagement on the question of Namibia, more African countries

had become UN members and offered the petitioners their support through, for example,
the Africa Group. In addition, African countries and sympathisers lobbied for and
provided advice and diplomatic assistance to the petitioners.
Thus, the increase in UN members had an immediate impact that was felt and appreciated
by the petitioners. The new members had also opened up the UNGA from a very narrow
base of representation to reflect more accurately the cultural diversity of the world
community at large. Furthermore, despite the challenges they encountered, especially
in the early days, the petitioners persevered and became pioneers and heroes who
contributed significantly to the liberation of Namibia. The UN’s support through the
UNGA and UNSC immensely helped their cause. Indeed, those who began as petitioners
ended up as UN diplomats – an achievement of note.
In addition, the question of Namibia was considered by the UNSC each year, such that,
by the time of independence in 1990, more than 40 years of petitioning by Namibians
and the international community had passed, along with 20 UN Resolutions on the issue.
The 1966 ICJ judgement on Namibia and its implications

In December 1962, the ICJ decided against South Africa’s claims, and pronounced that
the latter had no jurisdiction over South West Africa. The case submitted by Ethiopia and
Liberia, which demanded that the ICJ rule against South Africa on the grounds that they
had constantly violated the regulations of the mandate, was still pending at that stage. In
18 For the court statute, see http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#

CHAPTER_IV; last accessed 12 August 2011.
42
1965, Sam Nujoma, Jacob Kuhangua, and Emil Appolus gained observer status at the
ICJ. A year later, on 18 July 1966, the ICJ delivered an important decision that would
have profound implications for Namibia.
The ICJ President, Sir Percy Spender, cast the deciding vote and declared that the
applicants, Liberia and Ethiopia, could not be considered to have established any legal
right or interest appertaining to them in the subject matter before it.19 Although the two
countries were parties to the Covenant of the League of Nations under which the mandate
had been established, they were not parties to the mandate agreement struck between the
Union of South Africa and the League. The court’s statement read as follows:20
To generate legal rights and obligations, it [interest in sacred trust] must be given judicial
expression and be clothed in legal form.
In addition, the ICJ condoned South Africa’s mandate. This decision came as a surprise to
many. A victory would possibly have allowed an appeal to the UN that may have resulted
in sanctions being imposed on South Africa; but this decision was a severe setback for
those who had campaigned and lobbied for Namibia’s independence. Furthermore, the
decision shook SWAPO’s trust and confidence in the UN. From that point on, SWAPO
began to doubt whether the UN system alone was enough to achieve its ultimate goal
of independence. Soon after the court decision, SWAPO decided to take up its armed
struggle in addition to other liberation strategies, such as diplomacy, the education front,
and political mobilisation at home. This decision marked the birth of SWAPO’s military
wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The first clash took place at
Omugulugwombashe on 26 August 1968, marking the beginning of a new chapter in the
struggle for Namibia’s independence.
Diplomatic efforts and engagements continued, but were slow in yielding results.
Furthermore, for many years, diplomacy had been ineffective in the face of South
Africa’s intransigence. Among the reasons for these setbacks was that South Africa
was a big trading partner of many Western countries, especially the United States of
America. Secondly, these trading partners were also members of the UNGA and UNSC,
and employed specific tactics to delay or derail the discussions and resolutions on the
question of Namibia. Thirdly, they would also cause the UN to delay its response to
the Namibians’ plight. Thus, South Africa’s trading partners in the West ensured that
its interests were preserved, and this contributed to the late achievement of Namibia’s
independence. However, this does not in any way imply that diplomacy, as a method,
was a failure; in fact, the contrary is true.
19 See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/46/4931.pdf; last accessed 12 August 2011. Cases

cited as South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa); Second
Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 18 July 1966, also available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/4023a9414.html; last accessed 12 August 2011.
20 (ibid.:34).
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Dennis U Zaire
Moreover, in its Resolution 2145 (1966),21 the UN stated that South West Africa had
a right to nationhood and independence. In the same year, in Resolution 2145 (XXI),
the UN revoked South Africa’s mandate. The following year, 1967, saw a confirmation
of the Resolution, with the UNGA discussing steps on the way to independence and
sovereignty for 1968.
The UNGA’s Resolutions are testimony to the fact that the UN also constantly engaged
the ICJ on the issue of Namibia. Over the years, the UN engaged the ICJ on six different
occasions for both advisory and binding decisions. Interestingly, the UN’s engagement
with the ICJ on this question and the controversy emanating from the latter’s decisions
encouraged scholarly writings and kept academics and other analysts engaged with the
implications of the court’s decision on the question of Namibia in particular, and on
international law in general. A significant amount of jurisprudence emanated from this,
and now serves as good reference and case study materials for other countries.
The above account indicates that the UN had significant internal weaknesses. These
included South African’s power in lobbying its allies and being able to undermine the
UN system from within, which frustrated and undermined diplomacy and resulted in
slow progress. The 1966 ICJ decision was, therefore, a wake-up call for SWAPO to
review its strategy and find ways to complement its diplomatic and other approaches
in campaigning for Namibia’s independence. The battle for Namibia was now fought
on two complementary fronts, with SWAPO employing diplomatic strategies as well as
the military route through armed struggle. Thus, the 1966 ICJ decision marked a turning
point in the fight for the freedom of Namibia, and had prompted SWAPO to rethink its
strategy.
The involvement of the UNGA and UNSC

By the late 1960s, a new international actor had begun to get involved in Namibia’s
struggle for independence. With Resolution 245 of 1968,22 the UNSC made its first
statement regarding the issue of South West Africa. In the following years, various
Resolutions followed, with the UNSC becoming deeply involved and playing a sizeable
role in Namibia’s struggle for independence. Also, in 1968, the UN officially changed
its policy in order to enable South West Africa to be referred to as Namibia from then
on. Despite this, the South African Government continued to refer to the country as
South West Africa. Furthermore, also in 1968, for the first time the UN acknowledged
as legitimate the fight of oppressed Namibians against the illegal occupation of their
country. In 1969, the UNSC adopted UNGA Resolution 2145,23 with UNSC Resolution
21 See http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares21.htm; last accessed 11 August 2011.

22 Adopted on 25 January 1968.
23 Adopted on 27 October 1966; see http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares21.htm; last
accessed 11 August 2011.
44
264 calling on South Africa to leave Namibia before October 1969. The UNSC reiterated
its request by way of Resolution 26924 in August 1968, which –25
… condemn[ed] the Government of South Africa for its refusal to comply with resolution 264
(1969) and for its persistent defiance of the authority of the United Nations; … .
With South Africa not having left, as Resolution 264 demanded, the UNSC reiterated
through Resolution 27626 that –27
[t]he continued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal.
In 1970, in Resolution 28428 the UNSC asked the ICJ for legal advice on the issue of
Namibia. The ICJ ruled in 1971 that South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia
was illegal.29 The ICJ also declared that adherence to the decision would make a great
contribution –30
To the course of international peace and security and, more, to the course of friendly relations
amongst not only the nations but amongst all men.
The UNSC stayed tuned to the case of Namibia, declaring it had a right to independence.
In 1973, the UNSC broke off all negotiations with the South African Government and the
UNGA acknowledged SWAPO by Resolution 311131 as the authentic representative of
the Namibian people. This led to the withdrawal of South Africa from the UN Trusteeship
Committee in protest.
In 1976, three years after the acknowledgement, the UNGA confirmed SWAPO as
“the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”.32 This recognition is
unsurprising as, by this time, newly independent African and Asian countries were being
24 Adopted on 12 August 1969; see http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1969/scres69.htm; last

25 See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,UNSC,RESOLUTION,NAM,3b00f2322b,0.
html; last accessed 13 August 2011.
26 Adopted on 30 January 1970; see http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1970/scres70.htm; last
27 See http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,UNSC,,NAM,3b00f2112b,0.html; last accessed
13 August 2011.
28 Adopted on 29 July 1970; see http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1970/scres70.htm; last
29 See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf; last accessed 12 August 2011. Case cited
as Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1070), Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports (1971:16).
30 (ibid.:66).
31 Passed on 12 December 1973.
32 UNGA Resolution 146 (XXXI).
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Dennis U Zaire
represented at the UN. The same year, UNSC Resolution 38533 was passed, reiterating
the UNSC’s demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to affect withdrawal and
transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the UN by 1976. Once
again, the appeal fell on deaf ears.
In March 1977, the Turnhalle Conference adopted an Interim Constitution for what was
then termed South West Africa/Namibia. The document was roundly rejected by the wider
international community, including the UN Council for Namibia. The UN continued to
pressurise South Africa to adhere to UN Resolutions on Namibia. The year 1977 also
marked the opening of the UN Institute for Namibia (UNIN) in Lusaka, whose main
purpose was to train Namibians to administer the country once it gained independence.
The UNIN was initiated by Sean McBride, the UN Commissioner for Namibia, and was
headed by Hage Geingob34 as its first Director.
The UNSC eventually passed a Resolution35 in November 1977 which provided for a
mandatory and extensive arms embargo against South Africa. The delay in passing this
resolution and other sanctions on South Africa was a result of inside work done by South
Africa’s allies in the UN. Nonetheless, the combined efforts of the UNGA and UNSC, no
matter how slow their response, had added great impetus to the question of Namibia and
helped to keep it in the UN and international community’s spotlight.
Intensified UNSC efforts in the final push for independence

Negotiations between SWAPO and South Africa in the UNSC began in April 1978.36
A month later, following South Africa’s invasion of Angola in May and its attack on
Cassinga, SWAPO broke off all negotiations. In July that year, SWAPO accepted the
proposals by the Five Western Powers,37 which the UNSC had ratified in its Resolution
431. That same month, the UNSC adopted Resolution 432, declaring that the territorial
integrity and unity of Namibia had to be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay,
and that, pending the attainment of this objective, South Africa was not permitted to use
Walvis Bay in any manner prejudicial to Namibia.
In September 1978, the UNSC passed Resolution 435. This Resolution, which replaced
its Resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) and was based on the so-called
33 Adopted on 30 January 1976 at the UNSC’s 1885th Meeting; see http://www.unhcr.org/

refworld/type,RESOLUTION,,NAM,3b00f1732c,0.html; last accessed 13 August 2011.
34 He later became the first Prime Minister of an independent Namibia.
35 UNSC Resolution 418; see http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/297/01/IMG/NR029701.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 13 August 2011.
36 For their proposal, see UNSC S/12363.
37 Canada, England, France, Germany, and the United States of America; also referred to as the
Western Contact Group.
46
Waldheim Plan, demanded that free elections pave the way to Namibia’s independence.
The Plan included an honourable settlement designed to ensure that the people of Namibia
would exercise their right to self-determination and independence. It provided for free
and fair elections under the joint supervision and control of the UN and South Africa.
The Settlement Proposal, as it became known, was a result of intensive negotiations and
collaborations between SWAPO, South Africa, the Western Contact Group, the Frontline
States38 and UN officials. Later on, South Africa used the removal of Cuban troops from
Angola as a precondition for the implementation of Resolution 435. In its Resolution
539, the UNSC Council condemned South Africa’s obstruction of the implementation
of Resolution 435.
In 1981, the UN intensified its efforts to achieve independence for Namibia and organised
negotiations between SWAPO, the South African Government, and the Western Contact
Group. Negotiations failed because South Africa declined to sign a declaration of intent.
Instead, it continued its military advance into Angola. A year later, the Western Contact
Group established the principles for a Constituent Assembly and Constitution for an
independent Namibia. The constitutional guarantees included a multi-party democracy, a
bill of rights, and an independent judiciary. By 1984, a ceasefire was reached in Angola.
Angola guaranteed not to let SWAPO or Cuban troops enter Namibia. In return, all South
African troops would leave Angola by April 1985.
In January 1989, the first group of 450 Cuban troops withdrew from Angola, and, by
1 March 1989, the UNGA had accepted the Namibia Peace Plan. On 19 March 1989,
the ceasefire agreement was signed. On 1 April 1989, the implementation of UNSC
Resolution 435 commenced, initiating the holding of UN-supervised free and fair
elections for a Constituent Assembly. On that date, the ceasefire between SWAPO and
South Africa also came into effect. Finally, with the help of the UN, the international
community and all stakeholders, independence for Namibia had finally become a
destination within reach.
Independence: A destination within reach

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group
The final days of preparing for independence were marked by an atmosphere of political
uncertainty in the country. Accusations by the South African Government and SWAPO
were rife, with each claiming the other was violating the ceasefire agreement. Tensions
were high – and so was the level of expectation and excitement. Namibia was at a
crossroads: the fight for its independence had taken many years and many lives. The UN
38 Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
47
Dennis U Zaire
had been occupied by the question of Namibia for decades. The international community
was concerned and could not allow the process of independence to fail: too much was
at stake. For this reason, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was
sanctioned to rescue the process of independence from either derailing or collapsing, to
restore some dignity to it by ensuring that peace in the country prevailed, and to ensure
its successful conclusion.
UNTAG was a political creation given a wide mandate to specifically ensure that an
atmosphere that was conducive to free and fair election campaigning could prevail and
that free and fair elections could take place. UNTAG also had to monitor the reduction
and final exit of the South African Defence Force in Namibia. Most importantly, UNTAG
was responsible for overseeing the full implementation of the Namibia Peace Plan. With
the uncertain political atmosphere in the country at the time, UNTAG operated under
extremely difficult conditions. This was in addition to its own internal challenges, such
as logistical shortages and delays, a lack of human resources, and a lack of consensus
between South Africa and the UN on technicalities.
Despite all the challenges and shortcomings, however, one needs to acknowledge that
UNTAG did a fairly good job under difficult circumstances in preserving an atmosphere
that allowed Namibians to, freely and willingly, go to the polls, for many for the first
time in their lives, to elect their leaders in a democratic fashion. Apart from a brief border
incident between SWAPO and South African forces at the beginning of the mission, the
UNTAG mission was flawless. This was indeed an achievement for the UN and other
stakeholders in respect of driving the process of independence to a successful conclusion.
The partners and friends of Namibia, the international community, SWAPO and other
Namibian political parties inside and outside the country as well as other stakeholders
involved in the fight for the independence of Namibia must feel pride and should share
the joy of that achievement. In fact, Namibia has been hailed as one of the success stories
of the UN, and rightly so.
However, some may not be happy that, in the end, the UN was widely acknowledged and
praised for its role in helping Namibia achieve its independence. However, one needs
to be realistic and acknowledge the UN for its role, despite the shortcomings that may
have existed, especially with those who closely worked with the body and who may not
always have agreed on important points. It should also be said that every relationship
has its shortcoming, and UN–Namibia had its fair share. Moreover, SWAPO, being
one of the organisations that worked closely with the UN for many years, was happy
with the UN receiving “global recognition and encouragement for its peacemaking and
peacekeeping efforts”.39 Collectively, the various approaches and strategies employed
39 Gurirab (2010:114).
48
by all those involved in the fight for Namibia’s independence contributed in some way,
no matter how small, to its successful achievement.
Conclusions
On 21 March 1990, Namibia became a free country after many years of warfare and
armed struggle, and exactly 44 years since the UN’s inception in 1946. No one could
rightly predict that, when Namibians started petitioning the UN for independence back
in the mid-1940s, the then South West Africa would one day become a free country
called Namibia. Neither could anyone predict that the UN relationship with Namibia in
those difficult times could extend over so many years until the country became a free
nation. The two events together are tremendous achievements for Namibians who paid
the ultimate price for freedom, and for the UN as a body striving for world peace and
security. Indeed, with Namibia’s independence, one problem issue on the UN agenda
could finally be struck off. Significantly, Namibia’s independence also foretold the
demise of the apartheid South African Government. Four years down the line, in 1994,
South Africa, too, became a free and democratic nation. With the end of apartheid, the
world is certainly a better place – especially for the inhabitants of Namibia and South
Africa.
Truth be told, independence would not have been possible without the solidarity and
support of the international community, the people of Namibia who were determined to
gain independence, and of course, the UN through its agencies and the Security Council
together with the General Assembly who kept the question of Namibia for years on
their agendas until its successful conclusion. However, it is important to acknowledge
that the UN had not been solely responsible for the success in attaining Namibia’s
independence. However, it was instrumental and facilitated the processes that led to
the ultimate achievement of that goal. Hence, the work done by the Western Contact
Group, by negotiating with SWAPO and South Africa, and also by coming up with a
constitutional framework must be commented and applauded. The intervention of this
group and others stakeholders while the UN facilitated, ensured success to the process
in the end. Thus, it is in order to state that the UN involvement in the independence
of Namibia was significant but the intervention of players gave those momentum real
opportunities to succeed.
The most poignant of undertakings to Namibia was the personal delivery of an oath by
the then UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, to Sam Nujoma, Namibia’s first elected
President. With that, the Secretary-General successful closed the chapter on Namibia’s
struggle for independence, and opened another on the way forward with the new nation,
still as a partner, but now as a fully-fledged member of the world body.
Today, the UN collaborates with Namibia on a number of crucial issues, including HIV
and AIDS, poverty reduction, gender equality, human rights campaigns and capacity-
49
Dennis U Zaire
building for national development, to mention but a few. In return, Namibia has on many
occasions responded positively to various UN requests, from peace and security issues
to the provisions of highly skilled personnel. The Namibia–UN relationship looks set for
many fruitful years of cooperation.
References
Gurirab, T-B. 2010. “The genesis of the Namibian Constitution: The international
and regional setting”. In Bösl, A, N Horn & A du Pisani (Eds). Constitutional
democracy in Namibia: A critical analysis after two decades. Windhoek:
Macmillan Education Namibia.
Hopwood, Graham. 2006. Guide to Namibian politics. Windhoek: Namibia Institute for
Democracy.
Kerina, Mburumba. 1981. Namibia: The making of a nation. New York: Books in Focus.
Saunders, Christopher 2007. “The history of the United Nations in the independence of
Namibia”. History Compass, 5(3):737–744.
Time Magazine, “A cry for humanity”, 5 December 1949.
Tötemeyer, Gerhard, Vezera Kandetu & Wolfgang Werner (Eds). 1987. Namibia in
perspective. Döbra: Angelus Printing.
50
Germany’s role in Namibia’s independence
Hans-Dietrich Genscher*
This contribution is a translated transcript of an oral presentation made by Hans-

Dietrich Genscher on 13 April 2010 at the Humboldt University of Berlin.1
My personal relationship to Namibia was and is explicitly manifold: It was my concern

to help Namibia on her way to independence. I have my birthday on the same day as
Namibia, on March 21st. My sympathy for Namibia is so immense that I would have
wished Namibia to be born in the same year as I – instead of 1990.
Framework conditions of German foreign politics

On May 16th, 1974 I became the federal foreign minister and, hence, also responsible for
Germany’s Africa politics. In order to understand the framework conditions of politics
then, especially foreign politics, one has to recall that time.
Retrospectively, one can say that German post-World War II foreign politics were divided
into several time components. The first 20 years were mainly dedicated to the integration
of the Federal Republic of Germany into the western communities. We belonged to the
founding members of the European Community, we became a member of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the European Council. We were fully concentrating
on the Western Alliance, whilst having a deferring and critical position towards the
development taking place east of us. The West had developed a real guarantee concept
for its security against the threat coming from the East, but it had no concept to deal with
the East.
This is why individual events in the power sphere of the Soviet Union were criticised,
for example, suppression of the rebellion in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in
1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and permanent repression measures
in Poland. However, a political concept of the West towards the East was missing with the
aim ... – well, with which aim, actually? It was our objective as Germans, as envisaged
in our constitution, the Basic Law, to reach a stage which enabled peaceful reunification.
In 1967, at the end of these initial 20 years, NATO finally developed a political concept
under the chairmanship of Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel, with the intention to
* Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German Federal Foreign Minister, initially under Federal
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982), and later under Helmut Kohl (1982–1992).
1 Translation by Margaretha Rumpf, Windhoek. The translation is presented in its approved
original form.
51
strengthen NATO as a permanent peace factor in Europe and securing defence through
adequate military strength and as a foundation for the creation of permanent relations
with the East in order to solve fundamental political issues. Military security and a
policy of détente were no contradiction in the so-called Harmel Report, but mutually
complementary. Security was understood as the sum of defence and détente. I wish
NATO would have such a political concept of cooperation today with the aim of ensuring
a blueprint for peace everywhere in Europe. The main obstacle of this blueprint for peace
continued to be the division of Germany.
Based on this fundamental concept, the German contract policy of the Brandt/Scheel
government was developed, and of which I was part insofar as it could be envisaged
that the Eastern Treaties (Ostverträge) of the CDU/CSU opposition were focusing on
the creation of German unity because of the issue of compatibility, especially in the
Preamble of our Basic Law to be submitted to the federal constitutional court. In my
capacity as minister of the interior and, hence, constitutional minister, I had to monitor
that this process would not be lost.
What was the link of this to Africa and German African politics? The answer is clear:
During the time until the creation of Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) no Africa politics in
an actual sense had been developed because German foreign politics were caught up
in what came to be called the Hallstein Doctrine. Since 1955, the Federal Republic of
Germany had insisted in the following: Those who have relations with the GDR, cannot
be a partner for us. Politics towards the entire Developing World aimed at encouraging
countries which had existing relations with the GDR, to cancel them, and to discourage
countries, which had no relations with the GDR yet, from forging them. This should be
mentioned since countries outside Europe were no spectators but victims of the East-
West-Conflict. This East-West-Conflict was not limited to Europe, but affecting the
whole world. Africa, too, was a victim in this power struggle for zones of influence.
In 1961, German foreign politics had created a new instrument of cooperation with states
in the Developing World: The newly founded federal ministry for economic cooperation
and development. The first development minister was Walter Scheel who later became the
foreign minister and federal president. He had experience as a German parliamentarian
and member of the Bundestag, and as a member of the European Parliament which was
vested with very few rights then. He was the Chairperson of the Committee on Overseas
Territories, which dealt with the overseas areas of member states of the European
community, i.e. Africa, the Pacific and Caribbean, in short, where the former colonial
powers still had their relations.
The anti-colonialism of the non-aligned movement

When I became foreign minister in 1974, I was free of all burdens of the Hallstein
52
Doctrine. At this point in time, the Eastern Treaties (Ostverträge) had been concluded
as well as the Basic Treaty with the GDR. Our political activity in Africa, hence, did not
have to focus any longer on inhibiting countries to maintain or assume relations with
the GDR. Moreover, we could interact normally with African states and other parts of
the Developing World. This opened up chances for new cooperation partners. Another
possibility of influence was our admission to the United Nations, enabled by the Basic
Treaty. We could take part in shaping international relations as a UN member and, of
course, also in our neighbouring continent Africa.
There was an additional third phenomenon in which Germany played a very active
role: The relationship to the non-aligned movement. Reading newspapers of the 1960s
and early 1970s, one realizes that the non-aligned movement was mainly regarded as
Moscow’s fifth pillar. One suspected that this group of states was acting directly or
indirectly under Moscow’s influence. However, one had not understood that the non-
aligned movement had, in reality, been formed as an anti-colonialist movement acting in
favour of independence and participation of developing countries. It was important for
us as Europeans that, with former Yugoslav president Tito, a European was part of this
non-aligned movement and that it could not be perceived as an anti-European movement
neither by itself. I really tried very hard then to enter into discussions with non-aligned
states and I gradually succeeded.
Indifference towards the last decolonization movements and

apartheid
Moreover, Europe including the Federal Republic of Germany, took an indifferent attitude
towards the decolonization process, especially, towards the remaining four decolonization
tasks in southern Africa. On the one hand, there were the direct independence movements
in the colonies of Portugal, which had to finally accept Mozambique’s and Angola’s
independence. On the other hand there were quasi-decolonization developments in
Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South West Africa/Namibia. I use the word
“quasi” because the colonial powers there were not European powers which had
received these colonies. It was mainly South Africa raising domination claims under
non-transparent pretexts.
Indifference was also the position taken in many western states on apartheid in South
Africa. This led to a situation in which many resolutions taken by the United Nations
were only supported by the Warsaw Pact States. This is how the false image of the anti-
apartheid movement being a socialist movement was created. In reality, it had completely
different objectives, namely the principles of human rights and self-determination.
Here in Europe these issues of peoples’ self-determination and human rights were the
theme of a current Europe-wide discussion forum - the consultations on the Helsinki
53
Final Act – signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. In addition to questions regarding the
peaceful shift of borders also issues of human rights and the right of self-determination
were central points of discussion with the Soviet Union and her partners. In the end, a
concept reached the final act of which one can say today that it had a system-changing
and even a system-overcoming function regarding Europe.
In domestic political discussions on Namibia’s independence and on overcoming apartheid

in the Republic of South Africa I could make use of arguments we had used in the dispute
and discussion with the Soviet Union. We claimed the right of self-determination for
us Germans in order to reunite peacefully. How could we have denied the right of self-
determination to the Namibian people? Many opponents of Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) as
well as our newly developed Africa politics got into vivid argumentation trouble.
The “Group of the Five”

In 1974, I spoke at the United Nations for the first time, underlining the need of change
in politics in Africa. Later, I severely criticised South Africa’s apartheid politics and dealt
with Namibia’s decolonization.
Then and today, Germany was no permanent member of the UN Security Council (this
will also not be the case in future even though some people in Germany believe that it
would be necessary. In the future, I rather see a European base than a German base, and
it would be closer to reality.) In 1976, the Federal Republic of Germany was elected
as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for two years. Five western states
were represented in the Security Council at the time: beside the permanent members,
the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom, it was Canada and the
Federal Republic of Germany.
We were thinking alike regarding Namibia’s independence. Based on this accord and
the close cooperation of the staff at our UN missions, the “Group of the Five” was
consolidated, called the “gang of the five”, named after the “gang of the four” in China.
The Preamble of our constitution/the Basic Law committed us Germans “to serve the
peace in the world” and the same applied to the United Nations Charter. This is why we
had and wanted to take this position in Africa, jointly with our partners. Cooperation in
the “Group of the Five” unfolded in an extraordinarily positive way. However, it found no
broad-based support in political bodies, neither in the Federal Republic nor in the global
public. We had emphasised very soon that the question of Namibia’s independence was
not only a claim for national independence, but also a demand to overcome apartheid.
The reason why South Africa was against Namibia’s independence as much as possible
was because an independent Namibia was perceived as a danger where people would
live together peacefully and regardless of their skin colour as citizens of that state. This
54
freedom could have had a contagious effect on the Republic of South Africa. Insofar, also
on our side, there was an inseparable link between the refusal and denial of apartheid and
the claim of self-determination for the Namibian people.
We tried step-by-step to overcome the mistrust of our partner states in Africa. Germany
had a particular handicap in this: Many years ago already, the Federal Republic of
Germany had opened a consulate in Windhoek with the explanation that the Germans
living in Namibia needed consular support. This consulate, however, could only be
implemented under the prerequisite - according to the conditions imposed by the Pretoria
government - that it would be part of the German embassy in the Republic of South
Africa. Pretoria saw this position as a confirmation that the Federal Republic of Germany
would consider Namibia as being under the sphere of influence of South Africa. In
reality, it was interpreted as the acknowledgement of ongoing South African dominion
in Namibia.
This is why it was urgently necessary to take courageous steps to dissolve this consulate.
The decision on its closure was taken at the end of October 1977 by the SPD and FDP
coalition. At this point I would like to mention that in this question and with all resistance
existing in my own party and in the SPD, I had a fantastic co-fighter from the ranks of the
social democrats: former development minister Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, who had been
state minister of foreign affairs from 1974 to 1976. With his support we could in the end
reach a decision with the federal government - with muttering in government circles and
very strong resistance in the opposition. Closure of the German consulate in Windhoek
in 1977 was a decisive step in German Africa politics and mainly in its credibility vis-à-
vis states still waiting for their independence and the abolition of apartheid.
How does one interact with independence movements?
Closure of the consulate was one step and another one was the question: How does
one interact with liberation movements? In almost all my speeches at the United
Nations I claimed freedom for Nelson Mandela, and I discovered that I was enormously
misunderstood and criticised. People who had otherwise fully supported my foreign
politics always said: “I agree to everything you do, but this matter will not be possible.”
And also: “One man, One vote- will never work”.
Whenever I have to talk about these issues I think of the short-story “Kassandra” by
Christa Wolf, which has deeply impressed me. Christa Wolf states: “One knows exactly
when war starts. But when will the pre-war start?” And one can add a question to this,
namely: WHERE does the pre-war start? It starts in the heart of people, in their heads,
where the poison of prejudice, the poison of imagined self-supremacy and higher
55
intelligence poisons people’s thinking. We all know what this means in German history.
This is why it was extraordinarily important for me to tell these peoples that persons who
advocate their freedom are our respected and accepted discussion partners.
On an Africa trip which took me to Zambia in 1975 I spoke to President Kenneth Kaunda
and I had first contacts with a SWAPO representative there. Later, I made contact with
Sam Nujoma, first at the United Nations and then in official talks in Bonn.
These changes and formulations of Germany’s Africa politics had a positive impact on
the position of African states and efforts of the “Group of the Five”. Of course, it was
helpful that American President Jimmy Carter had nominated a UN ambassador who
had been a co-fighter of Martin Luther King who embodied a very particular affection
for Africa and in whom we had found a great promoter of our efforts: Andrew Young.
However, things became very difficult during Ronald Reagan’s term of government. The
Reagan Administration suddenly made a link between progress in the Namibia issue and
civil war in Angola where, in addition to the Angolans themselves, also Cuban military
units and camouflaged military units of the Republic of South Africa were opposed to
one another. The Reagan Administration said that only Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola
could free the way for Namibia’s independence. Otherwise, the South Africans at
Namibia’s northern border would have to defend South Africa’s independence which, in
reality, also meant that they were operating from there.
Looking back, today one can say that eight precious years were lost that way for
Namibia’s independence. As important as Ronald Reagan’s later contribution to nuclear
disarmament and middle distance agreement may have been, as regards Namibia, the
United States’ involvement was inhibitive.
South Africa’s pursuit of an “internal solution”
In 1979 and in a critical phase of our negotiations, I suggested to my four colleagues to

go on a trip together to the Republic of South Africa. These four colleagues were Jimmy
Carter’s foreign minister Cyrus Vance, British foreign minister David Owen of the
Labour Party, a permanent secretary from France as well as Canadian foreign minister
Don Jamieson, a liberal like myself.
The memories of this visit are one of the most interesting moments of my time as foreign
minister. There was a dinner, and only prime minister and later president P.W. Botha2 and
foreign minister Pik Botha, not related - only having the same name - were at the same
table as well as we, the four foreign ministers and a French permanent secretary. P.W.
2 South Africa only introduced a strong executive presidential office in a constitutional reform in
1984, which was held by P.W. Botha until 1989.
56
Botha started his welcoming speech at the table as follows: “Gentlemen, I am delighted
that you have come here, but there is no point in talking to you since all your governments
will be voted out in very short time.” I have to say that the man was right in four out of
five cases. It was really like that: Jimmy Carter was not re-elected in America, the labour
government of James Callaghan was voted out and replaced by Margaret Thatcher, there
was a government change in Canada and later also in France.
Thank goodness P.W. Botha picked me last in his table speech which was linked to the
fact that he had close relations to a rather regionally active party in Germany, which
had developed a true human image of me. When he addressed me I said: “ Before you
continue to talk, I would like to inform you that I have decided to stay in office for as
long as you are in office. I want to survive you politically.” This ended the matter for me
and I stood up and went outside. Both Bothas followed me saying: “This is not what it
was intended to mean. Do return to the table.” I said: “No. But if you want to sit with me
now, we can talk about the matter.” This finally led to a factual discussion in which I had
the feeling that foreign minister Pik Botha had read the signs of the times much better
than his Prime Minister P.W. Botha had.
South Africa could feel that something had to happen and one tried now to achieve
something called the “internal solution”. This meant that one wanted to enter into
discussion with groups inside Namibia and to show-case SWAPO outside. SWAPO was
considered as a group acting from outside and one did not want to involve SWAPO
inside. This was the meaning of the term “internal solution”. This “internal solution”
could be taken back step-by-step and in the end it was still possible for Namibia to reach
its independence from South Africa – albeit years after that dinner.
The question is: Has over-coming of the East-West-Conflict played a role in this respect?
Yes, I think so. Détente between West and East in the northern hemisphere and, in
particular, the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze enabled that
disturbing influences were no longer feared.
It is symbolic for me that the first substantial discussion on the preparation of the Two-
Plus-Four Talks at the beginning of February 1990, which dealt with external aspects
of German reunification, between Eduard Shevardnadze and myself, took place in
Windhoek. We were also both in Windhoek on the occasion of Namibia’s independence
day. In the middle of the German embassy’s garden there was an umbrella and we were
sitting under it. However, we did not talk about Namibia, but about Germany. This shows
how deeply integrated the history of our peoples is.
Namibia’s independence process as a model case
It is worth studying the historical process leading to Namibia’s independence in detail.

I will spare you that at this point, but you can take one thing with you politically and
57
historically: You can only solve issues if you approach them with the willingness to
solve them peacefully. You can only solve them if you take your contracting partner,
whom you can also call your negotiation partner, seriously and if you get a picture of
the situation and of what moves this man or this woman? What are their motives? To
which constraints are they exposed? The third matter is that their approach to their basic
attitude is not selective, in other words, that they don’t say to the Soviet Union: “You
must introduce human rights in your sphere of power!”, but close both eyes when human
rights in the Republic of South Africa are violated. You cannot claim independence
and self-determination for Germans if you look at the issue of self-determination of
Namibia’s people only with a twinkle in your eye. You must acknowledge that politics
that aims solely at creating zones of influence cannot last forever.
We have experienced wars in Europe over centuries and always around the question:
Who is the strongest? Who is the number one in Europe? Until World War I. Hitler’s war
of extermination was of a completely different quality, but previously it was like that in
the classic European war scene and war motivation. Europeans have drawn lessons from
that and they have learnt that a stable order, which is perceived as fair, can only be created
if “Big” and “Small” people can negotiate at eye level. It may be a mood of history, a gift
given to us by history, but founding of the European Community by six countries was
originally based on a community of three larger countries - Italy, France and Germany –
and three smaller countries – Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. “Big people”
have learnt what it meant to deal equally with partners. This also includes our thinking
on the new world order of today.
Matters regarding Namibia then also meant the protection of vested rights for many
countries in the northern hemisphere. If one has a look today at how the G8 is composed
and how some refuse to include other parts of the world - not the German federal
government, also other member states - then one can see that this protection of vested
rights of the North has not been overcome yet. We can learn a lot from the European
unification process after World War II and from having overcome the East–West Divide.
The message for Europe is: We have to try and put ourselves in the shoes of others.
Why did liberation movements in Africa rather go to Moscow than any other capital in
the West? It was because the West was not on their side, because the West had not said in
absolute clarity: Africans are entitled to independence as much as we are!
Only when we had shown with regard to Namibia that it was a matter of self-determination
and human rights, saying at the same time that this must and will have an effect on South
Africa, only then did we find the broad-based support and trust needed.
I believe that Namibia’s process leading towards independence became a model case of
new thinking. One could also say: for a new culture of conviviality in the world. For this
reason it is so important that we remember it. A good method always calls for imitation,
and much still has to be done also here before we achieve a world based on equal rights
58
Principles and principals of Namibia’s foreign relations
Peya Mushelenga*
Introduction
Countries formulate and adopt policies that govern their relations with other states and/or
within multilateral institutions. Policies are adopted through a process of consultations,
debates and consensus. Addressing the Constituent Assembly that drafted the Namibian
Constitution, the then Minister-Designate of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, made
the following statement:1
I would expect the formulation of the foreign policy of our country to be the product of a process
that will involve the executive and the legislature, indeed the public out there, all branches of
the government and the public.
The process of foreign policy formulation needs to be driven, in most cases, by the
custodians of the given policies to be pursued, such as the chief foreign policymaker,
who is a head of state and/or government, and the minister(s) responsible for foreign
relations. Foreign policies, by their very nature, are motivated by trends, both national
and international, and seek to maximise the interests of their respective countries.
Foreign policies are not static – they respond to issues in the global political system.
Nevertheless, it is important that there should be ground rules on which a foreign policy
of a country on a given issue will be conceived.
Namibia’s foreign relations are governed primarily by the principles enshrined in Article
96 of the Constitution. These serve as guiding values and an operational framework
not only for those who are tasked with the formulation of the country’s foreign policy,
but also diplomats, who are tasked with implementing such policy. This chapter
looks at Namibia’s foreign relations in the context of its policies and their underlying
fundamentals. The chapter will further discuss the principals who are catalysts of
Namibia’s foreign policy.
The historiography of foreign policy formulation in Namibia:

An international perspective
The founding of a Namibian state has a long history of international solidarity for the
struggle of the Namibian people. Following the partitioning of African countries among
the European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884, Namibia was given to Germany
* Peya Mushelenga is currently Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1 Republic of Namibia (1990a:315).
59
Peya Mushelenga
and became known as German South West Africa. Following the outbreak of the First
World War (WWI), Germany was defeated by the Allied Powers and subsequently lost
her colonies which she obtained from the Berlin Conference. German South West Africa
became South West Africa and was given to His Britannic Majesty to be administered as
a “C” Mandate territory of the newly formed League of Nations. Britain entrusted the
administration of the territory to South Africa, which violated the terms of the mandate
by introducing discriminatory and oppressive laws in the territory.2
The League of Nations was founded to prevent future war and maintain world peace.
This follows a presentation by the United States (US) President, Woodrow Wilson, to
the Conference of Versailles in 1919 calling for disarmament and an end to secretive
diplomacy. President Wilson advocated a community of nations based on the values
of democracy and cooperation in order to preserve peace within the international
community.3 Thus, the League of Nations, which he helped to found, anchored its aims
and objectives in liberalism as a theory of international relations. This theory developed
after WWI, advocating that human nature is not inherently war-inclined, but that –4
… people and the countries that represent them are capable of finding mutual interests and
cooperating to achieve them, at least in part by working through international organizations and
according to international law.
Almost 100 years after the formation of the League of Nations, its values and liberalist
perspectives in general would be fundamental to the foreign policy of an independent
Namibia, as will be discussed later in this Chapter.
The outbreak of the Second World War (WWII) in 1939 led to the collapse of the League of
Nations. It was succeeded by a new organisation, the United Nations (UN), founded in 1945,
to –5
… maintain international peace and security ... [and to] settle international disputes by peaceful
means.
The UN assumed the responsibility of the League of Nations and, hence, the administration
of South West Africa fell under the UN’s Trusteeship Council. South Africa informed the
UN that she had been administering the territory of South West Africa on behalf of the
League of Nations, which had collapsed, and that, therefore, South Africa would not
recognise the UN’s authority over South West Africa.6 The South West Africa People’s
2 Geingob (2004:33–35); Mbuende (1986:69–72).

3 Rourke (2008:23).
4 (ibid.:22).
5 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, p 3. Available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
CTC/uncharter.pdf; last accessed 15 November 2013.
6 Geingob (2004:41).
60
Organisation (SWAPO) was formed in 1960,7 and from that date on, its leaders petitioned
the UN on the question of South West Africa’s – later, Namibia’s – independence. In
1966, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2145, terminating South Africa’s
mandate over the territory.8 In 1973, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 3111,
stating inter alia that it –9
[r]ecognizes that the national liberation movement of Namibia, the South West Africa People’s
Organization, is the authentic representative of the Namibian people, and supports the efforts of
the movement to strengthen national unity; … .
In 1976 by way of Resolution 31/152, the UN General Assembly reiterated the recognition
of SWAPO as the authentic representative of the Namibian people, and granted SWAPO
Observer status in the UN General Assembly.10
Thus, the struggle for Namibia’s liberation has been a matter of international solidarity
and support. Accordingly, the UN’s aims and objectives cited earlier in this Chapter have
had, and continue to have, an impact on the formulation of Namibia’s foreign policy. The
disjuncture between the UN objectives stated in the UN Charter and Namibia’s foreign
policy principles embodied in Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution are illustrated by
the values of striving for international peace and security.11
The UN’s preoccupation with Namibia’s independence resulted in the adoption of

Resolution 385 of 1976 condemning South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia. The
next years witnessed UN-led talks and negotiations culminating in the implementation of
the UN Security Council’s Resolution 435 of 1978,12 which provided a peaceful transition
to Namibia’s independence through free and fair elections supervised by the UN.13 Thus,
when the Namibian Constitution was drafted, the foreign policy principles were largely
influenced by the values and principles of the UN as embodied in its Charter.
7 Its precursor, the Ovamboland People’s Congress (OPC), was formed in 1957, and renamed the
Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) in 1959.
8 Text available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gares1.htm; last accessed 7 February
2011.
9 UN General Assembly Resolution 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973. Available at http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm; last accessed 15 November 2013
10 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/31/152 of 20 December 1976. Available at http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm; last accessed 15 November 2013.
11 UN Charter, 1945, p 3 (available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf;
last accessed 15 November 2013); Republic of Namibia (1990b:52–53).
12 Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html; last accessed 15 November
2013.
13 Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html; last accessed 15 November
2013. See also Resolution 385 of 1976 (available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_
resolutions.html; last accessed 7 February 2011).
61
Peya Mushelenga
In 1963, in the formative years of Namibia’s liberation struggle, independent African states
founded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Its principles are, among others,14 to
promote –
• the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration, and
• the affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.
The OAU’s aims included the eradication of colonialism in Africa and the fostering
of economic cooperation.15 SWAPO had attended OAU Summits before Namibia’s
Independence; indeed, it was at an OAU Heads of State Summit that the resolution
was taken in 1972 to recognise SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the
Namibian people.16 This paved the way for the UN’s similar recognition, as stated earlier.
At Namibia’s independence, the OAU’s principles and purposes cited above would
become evident in the foreign policy principles embodied in the Namibian Constitution,
as will be discussed in the next sections.
In 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

SWAPO was admitted as one of its members in 1978. NAM was formed to guard
against the polarisation of the international political system, namely the Eastern Bloc
led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v the Western Bloc led by the US. In the
history of world politics, this polarisation came to be known as the Cold War. Therefore,
the preparatory meeting held in Egypt at the beginning of 1961, which preceded the
formation of NAM, adopted the following shared values:17
• Commitment to the coexistence of states with different political or social systems
• Support for movements fighting for independence
• Non-membership of the multilateral military alliance concluded under the
framework of conflicts between the Great Powers
• In the event of bilateral military agreements and regional defence pacts, such
agreements should not be for the purposes of conflicts between the Great Powers,
and
• No conceding of military bases to a foreign power for the purpose of advancing
conflicts between the Great Powers.
Regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Coordination
14 OAU Charter, 1963, p 4. Available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/

text/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf; last accessed 7 February 2011.
15 (ibid.:3).
16 The available resolutions for the OAU Summit in 1972 show nothing on the recognition of
SWAPO, but Resolution 433 of 1975 “reaffirms that SWAPO is the sole representative of the
people of Namibia”. The word reaffirms points out that there was an earlier decision to that
effect. Furthermore, former SWAPO Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, recounts
that the 1972 Summit in Rabat, Morocco, resolved to recognise SWAPO (Mushelenga 2008:52).
17 Republic of South Africa (2001).
62
Conference (SADCC) – later the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

– have also played a role in Namibia’s independence, e.g. through the Frontline States.
In 1977, five Western countries who were members of the UN Security Council initiated
negotiations for Namibia’s independence. When President Ronald Reagan assumed
power in 1981, he resolved to discuss the Namibian question with states and not liberation
movements such as SWAPO. As a result, SWAPO entrusted the Frontline States and
Nigeria with the negotiations for Namibia’s independence with the Western Contact
Group.18 Furthermore, since SADCC’s formation in 1980, SWAPO had been invited to
its Heads of State Summits and other conferences as an Observer.19
Foreign policy principles

Overview of the principles
Namibia’s foreign policy principles, as embodied in Article 96 of the Namibian

Constitution, are that the country should strive to –
• foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, and
During the drafting of the Namibian Constitution, members of the Constituent Assembly
debated the non-alignment principle at length. In fact, it was the only foreign policy
principle that was a subject of discussion. The essence of the principle was that Namibia
should stand above conflict and intense disagreement among states within the international
political system. Such differences mostly come as a result of political competition and
ideological differences and, in some instances, can escalate to a level of war.
Namibia’s upholding of the principle of maintaining international peace is manifested

in her contribution to peacekeeping operations and missions. This started with her
contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1993. The principle is
aimed to ensure that peace prevails in the region – as argued by liberalism as a theory of
international relations when it states that countries’ foreign policy should be formulated
to embody the values of cooperation.20
Namibia’s efforts to contribute to peace in the southern African region are commendable.
Former President Sam Nujoma took it upon himself to campaign for a peaceful
18 Mushelenga (2008:52).
20 Rourke (2008:24).
63
Peya Mushelenga
and democratic South Africa and made this issue a trademark of his speeches at all
international fora that he attended as well as during his bilateral engagements with
foreign dignitaries.21 Namibia further campaigned for peace to come to Angola. In 1993,
Namibia’s Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab joined his Angolan and Zimbabwean
counterparts and addressed the UN Security Council on the question of Angola, urging
the UN to continue playing a meaningful role in respect of re-establishing peace in
Angola. In 2001, Namibia’s Deputy Head of Mission to the UN, Gerhard Theron,
expressed concern over countries that assisted the União Nacional para a Independência
Total de Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) during
the Security Council discussions on the sanctions against the rebel movement.22 The
Namibian Government further extended an invitation to the UNITA leader, Jonas
Savimbi, to visit Namibia for discussions aimed at promoting a peaceful settlement to
the Angolan conflict.23
The maintenance of mutual beneficial relations is required so that both Namibia and
her friends and allies benefit gainfully from their respective relations. For example, if
Namibia has a commodity which another country does not have, then the two countries
could exchange resources and skills. Namibia does not want her resources to be exploited
for nothing in return. Similarly, she does not want to be dependent on other states. Thus,
during the luncheon hosted by the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Azar, in 1996,
the then Namibian President, Sam Nujoma, stated that Namibia could not depend on aid
over the long term. He further stressed the importance of using Namibian resources to
generate the required number of jobs by processing more fish onshore as opposed to on
board factory ships.24
The foreign policy principle of fostering respect for international law and treaty obligations
is boosted by Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution, which makes international law
and agreements binding on Namibia and part of Namibian law. Namibia is the only
country in SADC to have such a provision in its Constitution. As a country that has
codified international laws, it is appropriate that Namibia should make the respect of
such laws a policy principle engraved in the country’s Supreme Law.
It is common for neighbouring countries, for example, to have disputes over territory
or the use of resources found at their borders. Stansfield,25 for example, writes that
President Nasser of Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal, leading to conflicts with Israel,
France and the US in 1956. If the four countries involved in the Suez Canal crisis had
subscribed to the principle of settling disputes by peaceful means, the situation would
22 UN (2001).
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994).
24 Republic of Namibia (1999b:141).
25 Stansfield (2008:288).
64
not have been exacerbated to the level of conflict that it has reached. The principle of
peaceful settlement of international disputes therefore safeguards Namibia against war
with other countries.
There are reasons why Namibia adopted the afore-mentioned foreign policy principles.
The first principle, for example, should be understood in the context of both historical
and contemporary trends in world politics that were unfolding at the time of SWAPO,
which was the majority party in the Constituent Assembly, had been a member of the
Non-aligned Movement (NAM).
The founding fathers and mothers of the Namibian Constitution wanted their country
to stand above the global conflicts, because they need to interact with all states and
institutions in the world. Thus, the principles in the Constitution are meant to ensure that
Namibia does not provoke anyone in the international community, so that she does not
endure any consequences of global conflicts. Thus, there were even proposals to add to
the principle the words “permanent neutrality and peaceful co-existence”.26
Furthermore, the non-alignment principle is also a principle espoused by the OAU. The
SWAPO Party of Namibia, as it became known at Independence, was the majority party
in the Constituent Assembly, which drafted and adopted the Namibian Constitution.
The Party had participated in OAU meetings and summits since the formation of the
continental body, and was conversant with the latter’s principles – which it had also
come to appreciate over the years. Also, the new Namibian state needed to win new
friends in addition to its old ones. This is conceivably attainable when a state remains
above ideological divisions within the international political system.
Namibia has a moral obligation to promote international peace and security, particularly
since her own independence was brought about through international peace efforts. By
adopting the policy of promoting international cooperation, peace and security, Namibia
wanted to consolidate her own peace and ensure her security. She further wanted to
cooperate with other states in ensuring that peace came to areas where there were
conflicts, just as other states had strived for independence and peace to come to Namibia.
The principle of mutually beneficial relations was formulated to serve the pursuance of
economic diplomacy. This was stated by the first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
who told Parliament in 1993 that –27
[s]ince its inception, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has committed itself to practise economic
diplomacy, and therefore the principle of preoccupation of our diplomacy is to increase
mutually beneficial cooperation with the international community[,] especially in the fields of
investment, trade, tourism and development co-operation.

27 Republic of Namibia (1992:33).
65
Peya Mushelenga
The period of foreign policy formulation coincided with a turning point in world history,
namely the end of the Cold War, and this boosted the issue of economic diplomacy as the
driver of the principle on mutually beneficial relations. Since –28
Namibia’s foreign policy was conceived in an environment where the bipolarity of the
international political structure ceased to exist[,] …
it became imperative for the country to reach out to both old and new friends in an effort
to augment its economic development. Namibia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-
Ben Gurirab, stated that Namibia’s foreign policy should target smart partnerships and
business deals that yielded benefits to both Namibia and the outside world.29
Also according to the Minister, Namibia’s foreign policy was inspired by, inter alia,
a North–South partnership.30 Countries of the South such as Namibia realised that the
North had skills and exploited the South’s resources for its exclusive benefit. The South
had subsequently insisted that the partnership be mutually beneficial. Thus, Namibia
wanted its resources to be traded by way of joint ventures and technology transfer. This
was aimed at boosting value addition and would change the country from being an
exporter of raw materials to an exporter of added value, and would create employment
at home and in other countries.
Namibia adopted a policy that advocates respect of international law and treaty
obligations because she is a small state. Theories regarding small states suggest that such
states have a high level of the international legal system.31 It should further be noted that
the domestic principle of Namibia, embodied in the Constitution, advocates respect for
the rule of law, since that is also the foundation of the Namibian state.32 Small states tend
to benefit more from multilateralism. The then Minister of Education, Nahas Angula,
told Parliament in 1990 that Namibia stands to benefit from membership of multilateral
organisations such as the United Nations Education and Scientific Organisation
(UNESCO), the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the Commonwealth of Learning. He
cautioned that, if Namibia were to isolate itself, it would not profit from the benefits that
could be yielded from the international community.33 It follows logic that, when small
states embrace international institutions, they should simultaneously embrace treaties
and laws that govern such institutions.
The principle of settling international disputes by peaceful means is inspired by the

Preamble to the Namibian Constitution, which declares the “unity and integrity of a
29 Gurirab (1998:2).
30 (ibid.:4).
31 McCraw (1994:7–8).
32 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.
66
nation in association with other nations of the world”. There can be no unity with other
nations if the Namibian nation is not inclined to resolving disputes with others through
peaceful means. Secondly, the principle is also inspired by the OAU. Article III therein
states that the organisation will be committed to the principle of peaceful settlement of
disputes. This will be done through mediation, conciliation, arbitration and negotiation.34
SWAPO’s ties with the OAU before independence, as discussed earlier, led to the
principles of the latter inspiring the movement’s orientation and, ultimately, those of the
Namibian Constitution, in whose drafting SWAPO played a major part.
Impacts of the principles on formulating foreign policy
The principle of non-alignment impacted on Namibia’s formulation of her foreign

policy in respect of South–South cooperation. South–South cooperation is one the major
themes of Namibia’s foreign policy.35 The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Management,36 too, places a special emphasis on the South–South cooperation issue.
Accordingly, Namibia forges strong ties with the countries of Latin America and Asia,
particularly Brazil, China, Cuba and India. This is significant because countries like
India have been actively involved in NAM. Developing countries unite through NAM
and support each other on the positions that they take in international organisations.
Namibia benefits from this solidarity as well as from technology transfer.
The impact of the principle of promoting peace, cooperation and security is evident
from Namibia’s participation in a number of peacekeeping missions. Within two decades
of her independence, Namibia’s contingent has served in eight UN peacekeeping and/
or observer missions in the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sudan
(two missions). Furthermore, Namibia served in one AU peacekeeping mission in Sudan
(Darfur). This is arguably quite an achievement for a small and young state.37
The principle of mutually beneficial relations has an impact on Namibia’s negotiations

in the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU).
Namibia does not want her products to be traded in the international market without any
meaningful benefit to the country. She wants the origin of such products to be clearly
marked so that buyers will know that they are buying Namibian products. She also
wants her products to be processed at home, as the value addition will create jobs among
unemployed Namibians. Furthermore, Namibia wants to trade with each of her partners
independently, without pegging any customer to the trade packages of others.38
34 OAU Charter, 1963, p 4. Available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/

text/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf; last accessed 7 February 2011.
35 Mushelenga (2008:86–87).
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:72,78,81).
38 Ministry of Trade and Industry (2009).
67
Peya Mushelenga
Evidence of how the principle of respecting international law and treaty obligations
impacts the formulation of foreign policy in Namibia is apparent in the manner in
which the country complies with such obligations. A case in point was when the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1929 of 2010 prohibiting other states from, among
other things, enabling Iran to acquire commercial interests in uranium mining or from
buying nuclear materials or technology. Iran has interests in the Namibian mine, Rössing
Uranium Limited. Namibia reported to the UN that she had complied with the provisions
of the Resolution, namely that Iran would not acquire further shares.39 The transparent
manner in which Namibia has dealt with and continues to deal with the UN in this case,
such as seeking clarification on the Resolution in order to comply rigorously with it,
attests to the fact that the country upholds the foreign policy principles provided in her
Constitution.
The principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes was realised during the
disputes between Namibia and Botswana over Kasikili Island (called Sedudu Island in
Botswana). Each of the two countries claimed ownership of the island and resolved to
place the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. The ICJ
ruled in favour of Botswana, and Namibia abided by this decision. In a similar scenario,
Nigeria and Cameroon had a dispute over ownership of the Bakasi Peninsula. In 1994,
the Cameroonian Government filed a case at the ICJ in this regard.40 In 2002, the ICJ
ruled in favour of Cameroon. Nigeria did not easily accept the verdict and the UN had
to convene Summits in 2002 and 2004 with the Presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon to
underline the significance of the ICJ’s decision. It was only in 2006 that Nigeria started
withdrawing her troops from the Peninsula.41
Principals
Individuals
There is a universal consensus that the chief formulator of foreign policy in any given
country is the head of state, and in the case of ceremonial heads of state, the chief
formulator of such policy is the head of government. Hill42 states that, in many instances,
the level of interest that a particular head of state and/or government has as regards
39 Republic of Namibia (2010).

40 Application instituting proceedings, land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) (available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7201.pdf; last
accessed 7 February 2011); Case concerning land and maritime boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) (available at http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf; last accessed 7 February 2011).
41 ICJ (1994,2002); Mushelenga (2008:116,164).
42 Hill (2003:53).
68
foreign policy issues determines his/her role in formulating foreign policy. Barston43
states that, when a head of state is stronger on foreign policy, his/her influence can easily
be observed. Some heads of state become more involved by adopting what is called
personal diplomacy, i.e. making use of personal emissaries in the conduct of diplomacy.
Namibia’s first President, Sam Nujoma, was a key formulator of foreign policy as
SWAPO’s President prior to the country’s independence. He represented the organisation
at numerous international meetings of multilateral institutions such as NAM, SADC,
the OAU and the UN. After Independence, President Nujoma continued to be the chief
formulator of foreign policy. He and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben
Gurirab enjoyed mutual respect of and confidence in each other. The Minister was
naturally mindful of the fact that the Head of State simultaneously served as the chief of
foreign relations. He, therefore, consulted the President and kept him abreast of important
international issues. At the same time, the President had recognised his Minister’s
skills and abilities, and allowed him ample latitude in handling foreign affairs.44 In the
following statement, Minister Gurirab highlighted the prime importance of the President
in making foreign policy:45
[I]t is the head of state, the President of the Republic of Namibia, who is empowered to
negotiate and sign international agreements and to delegate such power, and in this instance,
to the Foreign Minister. The President … is also the one who welcomes foreign envoys and
receives their letters of credence.
The roles of the President and Foreign Minister in formulating foreign policy are
illustrated in the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management. The
White Paper states that President Nujoma set Namibia’s foreign policy objectives in
1990, namely the preservation of the national security interest and the promotion of
social and economic progress. The Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, echoed these
sentiments, affirming the linkage between foreign policy and domestic policy and, thus,
the realisation of the aspirations of national priorities, which are, among others, national
and security interests.46
Discussing the agency/structure debate, Carlsnaes states that there are structures that
impact decisively on the actors in the foreign policy decision-making process.47 In the
case of President Nujoma, however, he was an agent who influenced institutions, rather
than the other way around. He is a persistent maker of foreign policy who is decisive in
his actions, providing leadership during predicaments. For example, it was his decision to
deploy the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) to the DRC. He was subsequently criticised
43 Barston (2006:9,17).
46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:44–45).
47 Carlsnaes (2008:86).
69
Peya Mushelenga
by the opposition and media for taking a unilateral decision. President Nujoma defended
his decision that emergency situations need decisive actions and he accordingly took
one.48 He did not shy away from responsibility, but firmly stated his case to guide the
public and its structures.
President Nujoma also took the lead in shaping Namibia’s foreign policy on pan-
Africanism. In 1998, at a public meeting, he issued a directive that the OAU anthem
would be sung together with the Namibian national anthem, and that the OAU flag
would be hoisted alongside Namibia’s. These two practices have become an entrenched
culture of pan-Africanism in the country ever since, and President Nujoma also adopted
this doctrine in his foreign policy.49
President Nujoma’s successor, Hifikepunye Pohamba, has a different approach to

formulating foreign policy. Arguably, President Pohamba’s foreign policy trademark is
reservation and hesitation.50 In the agency/structure debate, President Pohamba would
be an actor whose actions are guided by the relevant structures. For example, he would
consult the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for advice on issues related to international
relations, and usually prefers Cabinet consensus before government takes a position on a
major foreign policy issue. Thus, President Pohamba matches the description of a single
group policymaker when it comes to Namibia’s foreign relations.51 Single group refers
to a scenario where there is no single leader capable of exclusively taking a decision on
a particular foreign issue. Leaders will be reluctant to take positions, unless all those
who matter agree. This state of affairs sometimes presents a predicament for officers in
the foreign service, especially in times when the government needs to pronounce itself
expediently on a given issue.
The foreign policy principles enshrined in Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution and
the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management are major guidelines
to the formulation of foreign policy. Thus, there should not be too much of a time lapse
before the government pronounces itself on the events unfolding in the international
political system. While the government took positions on issues with clarity and guidance
in its formative years by way of the adopted foreign policy principles, in later years it has
been criticised for waiting in the wings while other countries or regional and continental
organisations take positions for it to follow.
Ministers of foreign affairs are generally second only to heads of state in the formulation
of foreign policy. They are also the custodians of foreign policy: they, more than any other
government leader, argue, articulate and defend the country’s foreign policy both at home

49 Mushelenga (2008:176–177).
50 (ibid.:209).
51 Hermann et al. (1991:313–318).
70
and abroad. The Foreign Minister advises the head of state and the entire government
on the position that a country should take on given regional and international issues.
These Ministers coordinate with other ministries, often taking the lead in pursuing given
policies that have an impact on international relations.52
Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab was at the helm of Namibia’s foreign relations,
driving the country’s foreign policy with a sterling stewardship. Minister Gurirab is a
respected guru of international relations who spent more than two decades walking the
corridors of the UN headquarters and articulating the Namibian cause in its boardrooms.
He served as Associate Representative and Petitioner to the UN from 1964 to 1972, and
as Chief Representative from 1972 to 1986, when he became SWAPO Secretary for
Foreign Affairs. It was during Gurirab’s tenure at the UN and as a result of is diplomatic
efforts that the OAU recognised SWAPO in 1972 as the sole and authentic representative
of the Namibian people. The UN took a similar position in 1976, after which Gurirab
became Permanent Observer to the UN, as SWAPO had Observer status in the UN
General Assembly. 53
Gurirab’s successor as Foreign Minister, Hidipo Hamutenya, too, was in charge of

the Foreign Ministry. He tabled the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Management in Parliament, underscoring the importance of economic diplomacy. The
concept was first introduced by the first Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Netumbo
Nandi-Ndaitwah,54 and articulated by Minister Gurirab when he addressed the Instituto
Superior de Relações Internacionais (ISRI, Higher Institute for International Relations).55
Namibia’s third Minister of Foreign Affairs was Marco Hausiku. He took a reserved
approach to foreign policy. Like President Pohamba, he did not publicly pronounce
himself on some foreign relations issues, leading to criticism from different quarters
about the dormancy of Namibian foreign policy. Hausiku defended this state of affairs,
arguing that his personality was such that he operated quietly and did not like generating
publicity about his government work.56
Minister Hausiku’s successor, Utoni Nujoma, endeavoured to stamp his authority on

foreign policy formulation within the first year of his tenure. He undertook a number
of bilateral visits to Asia, Europe, and countries in the SADC region. He also addressed
52 This information can be vouched for by the author, who has served both as an official and
as Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It should be noted that the incumbent
Foreign Minister, Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah (2012 to date), is not included in the discussion
since her appointment occurred after the content of the text had been finalised for the editing
and publishing process.
55 Gurirab (1998).
71
Peya Mushelenga
Parliament to state the government’s position on topical issues such as the post-elections
impasse in the Ivory Coast and the popular uprisings in the Middle East. Minister Nujoma
recognises the authority of the President on foreign policy, and regularly consults him
before making pronouncements on issues pertaining to foreign and international relations.
The President and Foreign Minister are assisted by the government bureaucracy in
shaping and implementing Namibia’s foreign policy. Officials that are mostly involved
in foreign policy formulation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters are those
in the Departments of Bilateral and Multilateral Affairs headed by their respective
Under-Secretaries. Having worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both as a Foreign
Relations Officer (also referred to as Desk Officer) and Deputy Minister, the researcher
of this chapter recounts that Desk Officers receive information, analyse it and draft a
write-up on it for the Minister and Deputy Minister’s consumption. Write-ups are
delivered through the Permanent Secretary, who is the accounting officer of the Ministry
and is responsible for the deployment of its staff. Desk Officers channel their work to the
Permanent Secretary through their supervisors in the following ascending order: Deputy
Director, Director, Under-Secretary and Deputy Permanent Secretary.
In diplomatic missions abroad, the duties of gathering and analysing information rest
with the First Secretaries. They channel their work to the Head of Mission, who is the
Ambassador or High Commissioner through their supervisors, namely the Counsellor
and Minister-Counsellor. The full structure is usually only found in Namibia’s diplomatic
mission to the UN in New York. In other missions, where there are no Counsellors or
Minister-Counsellors, the First Secretary reports directly to the Head of Mission. This is
because the positions of Minister-Counsellors are customary filled by Directors. Thus,
when persons below that rank are posted to missions, they occupy the positions of
Counsellor or First Secretary. The Head of Mission reports to the Windhoek headquarters
through the Permanent Secretary. When there are urgent and sensitive matters, they
sometimes call the Minister or Deputy Minister, or even the Head of State directly,
following up with the written communication later.
The personality and style of foreign policy agents have an impact on the foreign policy
formulation process in the country. Where there are consultations, there is some form
of domestic consensus on foreign policy. Domestic disagreement on foreign policy
arises when the key policymakers do not accommodate public participation. Such a
trend of hesitations may create a vacuum that many other stakeholders would try to fill.
For example, during the xenophobic attacks in South Africa and in the absence of the
Namibian Government’s comment the youth wing of the ruling party made comments
leading to a diplomatic fracas with a South African diplomat in Windhoek.57
The first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, states the country’s position
on foreign policy when there is delay from the Namibian Government in commenting.
57 Maletsky (2008).
72
For example, in the case of the mass protests in Libya, he stated that Namibia would
maintain relations with Libya, irrespective of the Libyan Government’s response to the
protesters in the form of the use of force.
Institutions
There are other actors that are involved in the process of making foreign policy. Hill58
states that foreign ministers face encroachment from other government ministers in their
line of duty. The essence and relevance of such ‘encroachment’ is recognised by many
policymakers. Immediately after Namibia’s independence in 1990, Foreign Minister
Gurirab addressed Parliament during the Budget Debate regarding the actors involved in
the process of making foreign policy, saying that –59
[t]he formulation, interpretation, analysis, co-ordination and implementation of the foreign
policy of the Republic of Namibia is the responsibility of the Presidency and the Foreign
Ministry, but I recognize also – according to the Constitution again – that Article 63 of the
Constitution empowers the Parliament with watchdog and oversee [sic] functions.
Later, Foreign Minister Hamutenya shared the view that the formulation of foreign policy
was a process that involved a number of stakeholders. In his foreword to the White Paper
on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, he states that the exchange of ideas in
the form of questions and debates on important issues in the Legislature is crucial to the
making of foreign policy: it underscores the importance of Parliament in that process.60
More recently, in a contribution to the 2010 Budget Debate in Parliament as Deputy

Minister of Foreign Affairs, the author made the following statement:61
Yours truly does not subscribe to the trend of going solo in foreign relations and diplomatic
undertakings … The world is moving away from the traditional diplomacy of Ministries of
Foreign Affairs being the exclusive domains of foreign policy-making. Many entities within
states, both state and non-state actors alike, have something to offer to bilateral interactions,
with a view to achieving economic rewards and other profitable harvests. There should,
therefore, be a synergy of cooperation among stakeholders … .
The three positions expressed above correspond to pluralism as a perspective of

International Relations studies, which asserts that public interest groups bring about
decision-making in foreign policy.62 However, with regard to the issue of choices, the
process of formulating foreign policy in Namibia departs from the one that is advocated
by liberalism, namely that states have choices. Whilst other actors have a role to play, the
ultimate decision and advice at the end of the act rests with the Foreign Ministry.
58 Hill (2003:53).
60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:iii).
61 Mushelenga (2010).
62 Mingst (2008:127–128).
73
Peya Mushelenga
Webber and Smith63 also opine that, although the political leadership of a ministry of
foreign affairs and its attendant bureaucracy constitute the machinery of foreign policy,
this machinery does not dominate the domain exclusively: it is merely continuously
involved in the formulation of foreign policy, whereas other stakeholders are involved
ad hoc. In Namibia, for example, the Ministry of Trade and Industry plays an important
role in such policymaking, as it is the focal point for Namibia’s relations with and
membership of major multilateral institutions such as SADC and the EU. Furthermore,
the latter Ministry also plays a role in bilateral relations, especially in the area of
economic diplomacy. Thus, whenever the President undertakes official visits abroad,
or when he hosts other heads of state on official visits, the Minister or Deputy Minister
of Trade and Industry is always part of the delegation. This is because political and
economic diplomacy need to be coordinated together. Indeed, it would be inconceivable
for Namibia to engage in bilateral relations with other countries if it excluded trade
issues.
Other ministries, too, are involved on devising foreign policy, but on a more need-
based, ad hoc basis. The Ministry of Defence, for instance, needs to be consulted on
peacekeeping and security issues, as the Ministry of Environment and Tourism would
be on issues related to climate change or the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). A number of institutions
comprise the Namibian Government delegations that attend meetings of various Joint
Commissions of Cooperation between Namibia and other countries. The author of this
Chapter has led such delegations from time to time as the Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
Similarly, Parliament is a stakeholder in shaping foreign policy, especially through its

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, on which the author of this
Chapter served from 2005 to 2010. However, the role of Parliament is somewhat limited
to the inspection of diplomatic missions and ratifying treaties. To date, Parliament has not
made any major impacts on the process of devising foreign policy. Parliament has also
not influenced the Namibian Government in terms of taking a stance on a given foreign
policy issue, or in following a given voting trend at international forums. In this regard,
there is perhaps a lack of interest or, rather, understanding by Members of Parliament
on foreign policy issues, as only a few participate in the debates on foreign relations
motions or policy documents such as the White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Management.64 Motions that were introduced by the opposition in Parliament on foreign
policy issues were never taken into consideration as they were voted down by the ruling
party. This is usually the only time when the opposition parties air their views on foreign
affairs. Comparative analysis reveals that, in some other countries, parliaments do not
play an effective role in making foreign policy. For example, Parliaments in China, India
63 Webber & Smith (2002:39).

74
and Singapore play a minimal role and do not stamp their authority on their countries’
foreign policy formulation process. It is only in countries like Japan where Parliament
has a major impact on this process, as the legislative scrutiny is intensive.65
Other agents in terms of shaping foreign policy generally comprise opposition parties,
the media and civic organisations. These agents have been vocal on some foreign policy
issues, such as the deployment of NDF personnel in the DRC war that began in 1998,
and Namibia’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe in the face of reports of human
rights abuses in that country. These opposing views had no effect, however, because the
Namibian Government kept its defence personnel stationed in the DRC. It maintained
its position that the DRC had been invaded by aggressors, and that its government had
sought help from its neighbours.66 The author recalls that, in 2007, on one of many
occasions that the opposition parties voiced their concern on Zimbabwe, the ruling party
opposed the motion put forward by opposition Member of Parliament, Ben Ulenga,
before it was even motivated, arguing that, by allowing him to motivate the motion, it
would pollute the minds of the listeners. The complaints and criticism of the opposition
parties on Namibia’s foreign policy are rendered irrelevant by the fact that foreign policy
issues do not count in local politics, and do not impact on elections.
Conclusion
Namibia’s foreign policy is anchored on the Constitution, the Supreme Law of the land.
The White Paper on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management is another major policy
document serving the formulation of foreign policy. Other documents that are relevant to
this policymaking process include statements by government leaders. Such statements,
too, are often based on the foreign policy principles laid down in the Namibian
Constitution. Furthermore, the provision in the Constitution of the principles of state
policy as regards foreign relations has a bearing on their adherence. Namibia has, over
the years, lived up to the expectations of such policies and their objectives.
The makers of foreign policy in Namibia comprise the political leadership and
bureaucracy. Government leaders exert much influence on this policymaking process.
The style and approach of various agents in Namibia differs. The first President, Sam
Nujoma, decisively pursued particular polices, taking a leading role and providing
guidance to institutions and other government leaders. This corresponds to one scholarly
view in the agency/structure debate in International Relations studies, which argues that
actors are “the prime cause of policy actions”.67 President Nujoma’s successor, President
Hifikepunye Pohamba, adopted a different approach. For him, institutions prominently
drive the process of foreign policy formulation. This is compatible with the opposing
65 Rana (2007:200).
67 Carlsnaes (2008:96).
75
Peya Mushelenga
view in the agency/structure debate, namely that structures are the main cause for policy
actions.68
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the formulation of

foreign policy in the country, but this is not its exclusive domain. Other government
institutions, the opposition, the media and civic organisations play their parts as well.
The role of the Legislature in this process has not been fully explored, and there is a need
for this branch of government to play a greater part. The opposition and other groups
outside the government structure have no significant impact on Namibia’s foreign policy
formulation.
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McGraw-Hill.
Stansfield, G. 2008. “Israeli–Egypt (in)security: The Yom Kippur War”. In Smith, S,
A Hadfield & T Dunne (Eds). Foreign policy: Theories, actors, cases. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp 285–298.
The Namibian, Vol. 25, No. 36, 22 February 2011, “Namibia–Libya relations remain
unchanged”.
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Peya Mushelenga
UN/United Nations. 2001. “Thirty speakers address Security Council on Angolan

sanctions violations”. Press Release SC 7018. Available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2001/sc7018.doc.htm; last accessed 16 February 2011.
Webber, M & M Smith. 2002. “The foreign policy arena”. In Webber, M & M Smith
(Eds). Foreign policy in a transformed world. Harlow: Pearson Education, pp
29–48.
78
SECTION II
NAMIBIA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS
79
80
Namibia and Angola: Analysis of a symbiotic relationship
Hidipo Hamutenya*
Introduction
Namibia and Angola have much in common, but, at the same time, they differ greatly. For
example, both countries fought colonial oppression and are now independent; however,
one went through civil war, while the other had no such experience. Other similarities
include the fact that the former military groups (Angola’s Movimiento Popular para la
Liberacão de Angola, or MPLA, and Namibia’s South West Africa People’s Organisation,
or SWAPO) are now in power in both countries. At one time, the two political movements
shared a common ideological platform and lent each other support during their respective
liberation struggles. The two countries are also neighbours, with a 1,376-km common
border that extends from the Atlantic Ocean in the east to the Zambezi River in the west.
Families and communities on both sides of the international boundary share resources,
communicate, trade and engage in other types of exchange. All these facts point to a
relationship between the two countries that goes back many decades, and continues
strongly today. What defines this relationship and what are the crucial elements that keep
it going?
Angola lies on the Atlantic coast of south-western Africa. It is richly endowed with
natural resources and measures approximately 1,246,700 km2 in land surface area.
Populated with more than 14 million people, Angola was a former Portuguese colony.
Portuguese explorers first came to Angola in 1483. Their conquest and exploitation
became concrete when Paulo Dias de Novais erected a colonial settlement in Luanda in
1575. The Berlin West Africa Conference (1884–1885) apportioned Angola to Portugal,
since the Portuguese had already established themselves there. The further entrenchment
of Portuguese rule ultimately led to the destruction of traditional kingdoms. This was
partly accomplished by the practice of divide and rule used various European powers
in their conquest of Africa. As a consequence of the Berlin West Africa Conference,
artificial borders were drawn up by colonial powers resulting in the fragmentation of
most African societies – Angola being no exception.
The indigenous groups launched a brave resistance against the Portuguese from the
1500s to the 1900s, when the Portuguese finally gained full military control of the whole
of Angola, thus effectively imposing and enforcing their colonial policy.1
* Hidipo Hamutenya served as Namibia’s Foreign Minister (2002–2004). Currently he is the

President of The Rally for Democracy & Progress (RDP), a Namibian political party.
1 Birmingham (1966); Heywood (1987); Malaquias (2007); Pitcher (2012).
81
Hidipo Hamutenya
Angola finally gained its independence in 1975, after 500 years of colonialism and
14 years of armed struggle between the Portuguese and three Angolan nationalist
movements, namely the MPLA mentioned earlier, as well as the Frente Nacional
para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA, or National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA, or National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola). However, the three national movements
could not reconcile their aspirations for national power, and plunged the country into
war. Eventually, in the early 1990s, due to the end of the Cold War and the changing
geopolitical landscape, the MPLA and UNITA signed a peace agreement that paved
the way for the 1992 elections. Although the international observers pronounced the
elections as generally free and fair, UNITA did not accept the results and launched a final
but more destructive phase of the civil war. Only after their leader Jonas Savimbi died in
combat in February 2002 did UNITA return to the peace process laid out in 1994 under
the Lusaka Protocol. The war came to an official end in November 2002, after the Lusaka
Protocol was fully implemented and UNITA was demilitarised. During the 27 years of
civil strife, however, over a million people had been killed, and had generated extremely
bad social and economic conditions.2
As regards Angola’s relationship with Namibia, it has always been one of peace.
Nonetheless, it needs to be noted that peacemaking is necessitated by conflict. Although
economic ties have existed between Angola and Namibia, it does not mean a lack of
communication about inherent corruption, illegal deals and other inconvenient events.
Political and military cooperation between the two countries has always been there,
but it existed alongside diplomatic misunderstandings and disagreements – especially
during the Angolan civil war. This leads us to understand the position that prevails in the
world today: that conflict has become a frequent word in most reports on contemporary
challenges facing the African continent. Indeed, this is certainly the case for the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Region. Put differently, the SADC Region is
no stranger to symbiotic relationships. The Region has witnessed conflicts of the worst
kind, which have left negative footprints in the family and public life of its inhabitants.
It is for the same reason that, when SADC was established in 1992 as a successor to the
Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), the promotion of
peace was one of the key considerations in formulating its mandate.3
This paper constitutes a first attempt to construct the relationship between Namibia and
Angola. It also acknowledges from the outset that many important issues that maintain
this relationship happen outside the public realm. However, this will not frustrate our
effort to do justice to the relationship. The paper argues that the bonds between Namibia
and Angola are not being exploited effectively, i.e. in a way that can fully benefit the two
parties in the longer term. The discussion further contends that the lack of initiative in
2 See Von Krosigk & Bösl (2006:29f).

3 Nathan (2006).
82
respect of taking the relationship to a new level frustrates its progress. As a result, cracks
in some elements of the relationship, such as commerce and trade, are slowly becoming
visible.
The paper’s main focus is on bilateral and party-political cooperation. Firstly, the paper
looks specifically at the pre-Independence relationship between SWAPO and Angolan
political parties. Secondly, it considers the international environment, with particular
emphasis on the situation in Angola and the efforts of the United Nations (UN). Thirdly,
the paper elaborates on the post-Independence relationship with particular focus on
trade matters. Fourthly, the challenges facing trade between Namibia and Angola are
considered, after which alternative cooperation frameworks between the two countries
are examined in a fifth section. A sixth section looks at Angolan refugees in Namibia
who were recently repatriated, while a seventh and concluding section offers some
recommendations on the way forward.
Historical ties
General
The political relationship between Namibia and Angola became very intense during the
Angolan conflict. Namibia’s peacemaking efforts in Angola underlined its belief that
peacemaking was fundamental to maintaining security in the SADC Region. Indeed, for
any regional community, peacemaking is a necessity, a common good, and an ingredient
for maintaining, sustaining and guaranteeing security in such a community.4 Peacemaking
is also a reactive measure that seeks to create an enabling environment for conflict
settlement and post-conflict reconstruction.5 Studies on contemporary peacemaking call
for a need to rethink and generate a proper understanding of the phenomenon and of
peace processes because peacemaking is a means to an end and not an end in itself.6
Indeed, peacemaking needs to be studied and researched if rethinking and addressing
current challenges is the focus.
Namibia itself suffered more than 100 years of brutal colonialism and apartheid. Thus, it
is a post-conflict reconstruction society that is of interest to those concerned with issues
of peace, conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Founding President Sam Nujoma put
it as follows:7
4 Nathan (2004).
5 Du Pisani (2010).
6 One example in Africa are the ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes region, especially as regards
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
7 Nujoma (2009).
83
Hidipo Hamutenya
At the same time hundreds of Angolans were maimed by bombs and landmines, numerous
others were displaced because of the war, but the Angolan people and the MPLA government
were not cowed down by this brutality and stood firm in solidarity with Namibian political
and military figures who fought for independence until final victory was achieved on 21st March
1990.
The above describes the extent of sacrifice by the Angolan people for their Namibian
neighbours and Namibians’ appreciation of the ultimate price that many Angolans paid
in order for Namibia to gain its independence. This underlines the deep-rooted trust
between the two nations.
The above statement also symbolises the spirit of African brotherhood that developed
and prevailed strongly during most of the liberation years.8 This brotherhood and quest
for independence was accelerated by Ghana’s independence in 1957, as it broke the
backbone of colonialism and galvanised Africa and others to realise that independence
was near. Among these was Albert Einstein:9
Today we must abandon competition and secure cooperation. This must be the central fact in
all our considerations of international affairs; otherwise we face certain disaster. Past thinking
and methods did not prevent world wars. Future thinking must prevent wars … The stakes are
immense, the task colossal, the time is short. But we may hope – we must hope – that man’s
own creation, man’s own genius, will not destroy him.
For Angola, the spirit of African brotherhood was realised when, after her independence
in 1975, she offered to host the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO),10 and
allowed the movement – through its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of
Namibia (PLAN) – to use Angola as a base from which to launch its guerrilla war against
the apartheid11 South African regime. This was in addition to the provision of political
8 Prominent African personalities concurred. These included Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah, who
made the following statement at the first conference of independent African states on 15 April
1958: “Today we are one. If the past the Sahara divided us, today it unites us and an injury to
one is an injury to all” (see http://libyadiary.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/46691356-axioms-
kwame-nkrumah.pdf, last accessed 14 November 2013). Similarly, Patrice Lumumba (1961:19–
21), the late Prime Minister of the Congo (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo), said the
following at the opening of the All-African conference in Leopoldville: “An independent and
united Africa will make a positive contribution to world peace”.
9 Albert Einstein (1879–1955), see http://www.refspace.com/quotes/The_New_York_Times, last
accessed 16 February 2012.
10 SWAPO was a mass political movement that came into being on 19 April 1960. It took over
from its forerunner, the Ovamboland People’s Organisation (OPO) formed in 1958 by Andimba
Toivo ya Toivo.
11 Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning “separateness” or “separation”. A racist ideology
underlay the apartheid policy introduced by the National Party-led government in South Africa
in 1948. In 1966, via UN General Assembly Resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966,
apartheid was defined as a crime against humanity. In 1984, the UN Security Council endorsed
84
and material support to SWAPO as assistance towards the attainment of Namibia’s

independence, which was finally achieved in 1990.
Furthermore, Angola and Namibia have deep-rooted cultural,12 political,13 economic,

social and historical ties dating back many years. Angola is geographically strategic
to Namibia, and vice versa. The political parties in power in both countries are seen as
long-time allies who, at one point, shared an ideological platform and approach to their
respective liberation struggles. With Namibia finally gaining its independence in 1990,
the two states established diplomatic representations and improved mutual relations.
Emerging from decades of war, Angola is now the biggest market for any trade in southern
Africa because of its reconstruction programmes, and offers Namibia many opportunities
for export. Today, Angola makes up 10% of Namibia’s total exports, although this figure
is growing as more opportunities open up and the two governments improve areas of
bilateral cooperation.14 Current agreements between Angola and Namibia include the
areas of trade,15 health16 and crime prevention.17 Angola also registers as the third-largest
export destination for Namibia after South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK).18
Moreover, Angola and Namibia are both members of the same regional and international
bodies, such as SADC and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This demonstrates a
vision of working together towards achieving common objectives via regional and global
platforms. Such objectives includes the development of a better regional infrastructure –
the aforementioned declaration via Resolution 556 (1984) of 23 October 1984. Apartheid ended
in 1994 when South Africa gained its freedom from white control and domination.
12 Some families and communities living on either side of the border share certain cultural and
traditional practices.
13 SWAPO’s alliances and cooperation with the MPLA and UNITA, respectively, will be discussed
later herein.
14 Post-Independence Namibia has seen an increase in economic activities with Angola. By 2010,
Angola represented 10% of Namibia’s total exports (http://www.trademarksa.org/node/1052,
last accessed 7 August 2013). Angola remains the third biggest export destination for Namibia’s
products, totalling N$3 billion in 2012, after South Africa with N$7 billion and the UK with
N$5 billion (Annual Trade Statistics Bulletin 2012, pp 10–11; available at http://www.nsa.org.
na/files/downloads/9ae_Annual%20Trade%20Statistics%20Bulletin%202012.pdf, last accessed
6 August 2013.
15 Bilateral Agreement on Trade and Economics (BATE, 2005) and Bilateral Agreement on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (BARPPI, 2006).
16 Both countries are part of the subregional initiative to eliminate malaria (known as Elimination
8), as well as being part of the Trans-Kunene Malaria Initiative (TKMI). The initiative is an
alliance between Namibia and Angola to work on malaria control along their common border
17 See the Angola–Namibia Joint Commission on Defence and Security. The Commission
discusses matters that concern safety and security, the free movement of people across the
border – especially border residents, and the prevention of crime.
18 See http://www.nsa.org.na/files/downloads/9ae_Annual%20Trade%20Statistics%20Bulletin%20
2012.pdf, last accessed 6 August 2013.
85
Hidipo Hamutenya
which Angola desperately needs; regional economic integration; and, most importantly,
regional peace and security – if regional stability and economic growth are to be
achieved. Hence, the relationship between the two countries is a strategically important
one, characterised by friendship and cooperation.
The pre-Independence relationship between SWAPO and Angola’s

political parties
After SWAPO was founded in 1960, it used its first years to consolidate support within
Namibian society and to strategise on how to gain independence for the country. This
strategy soon contained four parts:
• Political mobilisation at home
• The diplomatic front
• The education front, and
• The military front.
The military front was the one that gave rise to most of Namibia’s connections to
Angola.19
In the beginning, SWAPO sent its combatants to Algeria, Egypt and Ghana to be trained.
To gain further expertise, some combatants went to what was then the Soviet Union and
to the People’s Republic of China. Upon their return, the combatants trained others in
turn in Tanzania. In 1966, the first military base was established in Namibia’s north-west.
In 1968, another was opened in the Caprivi in the east. However, due to the geopolitical
position of the country, it was not possible to sustain the liberation struggle in north-
western Namibia because it was cut off from all supply routes and was located between
hostile and unliberated neighbours.
After the military coup in Portugal on 15 April 1974, which led to a Portuguese withdrawal
from their colony, Angola, there was a fundamental shift in the realm of possibilities.
Now Namibians could leave the country in significant numbers through Angola to
join the movement there and in Zambia. Thus, it became possible not only to augment
SWAPO’s military operations, arms supplies and, most importantly, PLAN itself, but it
also offered SWAPO members the opportunity of furthering their academic, military and
professional training in China, Cuba, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the United States of
America (USA).20 Another consequence was that the Namibian liberation struggle and
the civil war that broke out in Angola became closely interwoven and, in some senses,
tangled.
19 SWAPO Party of Namibia ([n.d.]b).

20 (ibid.).
86
However, even before Angola’s independence, SWAPO had established contact with
UNITA, the main political movement fighting the Portuguese. Their relationship was
described as fraternal, despite SWAPO having pro-Soviet tendencies. The bond was
allegedly a natural one: rather than being based on political, social and economic aspects
of a fundamental ideology, it rested on common regional and ethnic affinity, culture, and
history. For example, some SWAPO members had also been part of the Union of the
Peoples of Angola, which was the first political organisation established in that country,
and vice versa, as their members were also part of SWAPO.
UNITA’s former Secretary-General, Miguel N’Zau Puna, in 1996 described the bond
between themselves and SWAPO as a tactical alliance between the two parties prior
to 1976. Indeed, it was through SWAPO’s assistance that Jonas Savimbi – UNITA’s
subsequent supreme leader – returned to Angola from Cairo, Egypt, in July 1968.21 In the
late 1960s and 1970s, exiled Namibians in refugee camps were also heard singing songs
about UNITA and Jonas Savimbi in a show of support. From time to time, SWAPO also
helped UNITA receive weapons because, unlike SWAPO, Savimbi’s movement was not
recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at the time. SWAPO veteran
Helao Shityuwete remembered SWAPO’s very close relationship with UNITA, recalling
that, prior to the Namibians’ armed struggle, UNITA members were accommodated by
SWAPO in Tanzania, wore SWAPO military uniforms there, and underwent military
training with them.22
Retired Namibian Police Commissioner for Northern Namibia, Nghiyalasha Haulyondjaba,

declared in an interview that he was SWAPO’s adviser to PLAN Commanders Matias
Ndakolo and Fellep Nandenga, who operated from UNITA’s headquarters in Moxico
Province from 1973. At the time, SWAPO sent Haulyondjaba with a small group of
supporters to establish a new front in northern Namibia, through Angola. Cooperation
between UNITA and SWAPO began because of their close proximity and, in 1974,
Haulyondjaba became SWAPO’s representative in respect of communications with
UNITA. During this time, PLAN members fought together with UNITA against the
Portuguese, but not against the MPLA, because SWAPO’s soldiers had been instructed
not to interfere in the relations among the three Angolan rebel movements. However,
SWAPO weapons were often stored at UNITA bases, so it is possible that UNITA troops
made use of them23 against the MPLA.24
Upon Angola’s independence in 1975, the situation changed radically. The Cold War era
still reigned, and its participants lost no time in backing the different Angolan parties to
21 On his return to Angola, Savimbi was armed with a “Soviet-made Tokarev pistol given to [him]
in Dar es Salaam by Sam Nujoma” (Brikland 1986:35). On Swedish contacts with UNITA and
on Savimbi’s return, see Sellström (2002:248).
22 Lush (2011a).
23 (ibid.).
24 Mietzner (2011).
87
Hidipo Hamutenya
pursue their own quests for power. Thus, UNITA began to be supported by SWAPO’s
adversary, South Africa’s apartheid regime. By 1976, people like Haulyondjaba, who
were located at UNITA bases, gradually became aware of the life-threatening presence
of UNITA’s new ally. Still under the protection of Jonas Savimbi, the SWAPO group
played one side against the other25 and managed to escape to SWAPO bases in Angola’s
Cunene Province during 1976, after still having served as SWAPO representatives to
UNITA despite their own increasing contacts with the MPLA. However, after UNITA
attacked a SWAPO Land Rover near Ondjiva, the battle lines were drawn between these
two movements as well.26
It is also alleged that it was not only UNITA’s alliance to South Africa that led to the
breakdown of relationships, but also that, during the chaotic phase of transition in Angola
before the MPLA’s coming to power in November 1975, –27
SWAPO hedged its bets at first. Its ultimate change of allegiance to the MPLA was not just
a result of UNITA’s siding with South Africa, but also the MPLA’s rapid ascendancy once it
received military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba.
So the feeling of betrayal after 1976 was mutual, as SWAPO then sided with UNITA’s
foes, namely the MPLA, the Soviet Union and Cuba, and, thus, became UNITA’s fourth
enemy.28
Even before SWAPO’s shift in allegiance to the MPLA, however, the situation within
Namibia’s liberation party had itself become more complex. The young Namibians who
had been going into exile since 1974 had a more socialist – even communist – attitude,
since they had received military training in the Soviet Union; this was another reason
why SWAPO began to favour the MPLA above UNITA.29
In 1976, there were also mostly young PLAN fighters who demanded more democracy
and accountability from the movement’s leadership, and opposed its cooperation with
UNITA. Their protests caused them to be detained or even killed. Ironically, this was the
fate of those who had been first to call for an alliance with MPLA – a move which was
in fact made soon afterwards. Today, even those who were young and, often, radicalised
during the political unrest in Namibia claim that the current SWAPO leadership should
occupy itself with and clarify these past events.
25 In other words, they were manipulated by their enemies and they started to compete against each
other although they were ‘friends’. This benefited their enemies, such as the South Africans and
the MPLA.
26 Lush (2011b).
27 (ibid.).
28 (ibid.).
29 (ibid.).
88
In 1976, the OAU recognised Angola’s new MPLA-led government. Zambia closed
all UNITA bases on their soil, while SWAPO moved its headquarters from Lusaka to
Luanda. There, SWAPO adopted the Marxist line of its new allies.30
During the SWAPO–MPLA alliance, SWAPO was provided with material support and
shelter as the Angolan Government had offered its protection. SWAPO’s headquarters
were in Luanda, but it also had some camps in southern Angola. PLAN maintained
command centres in Luanda and Lubango, as well as training camps in the Benguela,
Cuanza Sul and Uilah Provinces. During this time, the MPLA’s military wing did not
conduct pre-emptive attacks south of the Angolan border. South Africa, on the other
hand, in order to ensure UNITA’s success, combat SWAPO and prevent the influence of
the Soviet Union and Cuba from driving further south, repeatedly invaded and intervened
in Angola, e.g. by attacking SWAPO camps there.
SWAPO recruits were also provided with military training at Angolan and Cuban
facilities, and were engaged in battle with UNITA and South Africa from bases in Angola
and Namibia. In the late 1980s many exiled Namibians, being refugees in Angola,
backed the MPLA’s military wing and, later, its official defence force, namely the Forças
Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA, People’s Armed Forces for the
Liberation of Angola).
Thus, some of the non-ideological reasons for the MPLA’s support of SWAPO were
allegedly to gain a friendly next-door neighbour – not only to prevent UNITA from using
Namibian territory for their purposes,31 but also to remove the threat of the South African
apartheid regime at its southern border with Namibia.
The international environment

The situation in Angola
As stated previously, although South Africa’s border war against SWAPO raged from
1966 to 1989, it was not until Angola’s independence in 1975 which followed the military
coup in Portugal and the resultant withdrawal of the colonising powers from Angola that
a change in South African policies took place. The emergent chaos of three independence
movements struggling for power – especially the discovery of Cuban forces in Angola,
posing the threat of a communist neighbouring state – persuaded South Africa to take
action against the MPLA and SWAPO and in collaboration with UNITA, the FNLA and
30 (ibid.).
31 (ibid.:195).
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Hidipo Hamutenya
their allies, with the support of the USA.32 But there is also an argument to the contrary
– at least in respect of the USA’s involvement:33
Cuba decided to send troops to Angola on November 4, 1975, in response to the South African
invasion of that country, rather than vice versa as the Ford administration persistently claimed.
… The first Cuban military advisers did not arrive in Angola until late August 1975, and the
Cubans did not participate in the fighting until late October, after South Africa had invaded.
Although it was claimed that the Cubans just began arriving in 1975 to fight against
South Africa, as far back as 1966, Angola had received instructions to continue fighting
the South Africans because of an old relationship between the then leader of the MPLA,
Agostinho Neto, and the then President of Cuba, Fidel Castro.34 From 1975 to 1976,
therefore, Cuba sent 30,000 of its nationals to Angola as military support.35 In addition,
Cuba supplied Angola with civilian workers for construction, agriculture, and industry,
as well as several thousand teachers and physicians.36 The two anti-MPLA movements
received material and military support from their Western allies. Thus, UNITA was able
to build a self-reliance structure that was unparalleled in Africa. Furthermore, South
Africa acted as a conduit to the outside world for trade in Angola’s natural resources,
including diamonds, ivory and timber. By the mid-1980s, South Africa’s military
intelligence was already supporting UNITA by way of an annual budget of R400 million
(roughly US$200 million).37
After the military coup in Portugal in 1974, the MPLA and the FNLA had an estimated
10,000 guerrillas each, and UNITA had about 2,000. By November 1975, the MPLA
and the FNLA had increased their military numbers to 27,000 and 22,000, respectively,
while UNITA had some 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers by then. Furthermore, some 2,000–
3,000 Cubans had arrived in immediate support of the MPLA, while 4,000–5,000 South
African troops had intervened on behalf of UNITA. After that, the MPLA was heavily
supported, especially by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries. Between
1982 and 1986, they delivered military equipment worth US$4.9 billion in today’s terms,
which represented 90% of Angola’s arms imports. Cuba’s assistance constituted mostly
technical and human resources, such as pilots and engineers, but they also provided
combat support and training advisory services. In addition, albeit only to a limited
extent, after 1976 the Cuban nationals participated in ground and air combat, although
most were deployed in the motorised infantry, air defence and artillery units rather than
being engaged in direct combat.
32 See http://www.saairforce.co.za/the-airforce/history/saaf/the-border-war, last accessed 3

November 2011.
33 Kornbluh (2011).
34 Steenkamp (1989).
35 Kornbluh (2011).
36 Smaldone (1989:199).
37 Potgieter (2000:260); in today’s terms, this figure could be around US$265 million.
90
Furthermore, Cuban experts also provided SWAPO and South Africa’s African National
Congress (ANC) with operational and technical support within Angola:38
By 1982 there were 35,000 Cubans in Angola, of which about 27,000 were combat troops and
the remainder advisers, instructors, and technicians. In 1985 their strength increased to 40,000,
in 1986 to 45,000, and in 1988 to nearly 50,000. All told, more than 300,000 Cuban soldiers had
served in Angola since 1975. Angola paid for the services of the Cubans at an estimated rate of
US$300 million to US$600 million annually.39
By mid-1988, one fifth of Cuba’s entire military were deployed in Angola.40
UN involvement
Before SWAPO’s call to arms in 1966, the international community had already begun
to engage itself with southern Africa. In 1966, the UN General Assembly had terminated
South Africa’s mandate over the territory, and had established the United Nations
Council for South West Africa in 1967 (renamed UN Council for Namibia a year later),
but South Africa refused to accept the UN decision. In 1970, the UN Security Council
declared all actions taken by South Africa concerning Namibia after the termination of
its mandate illegal and invalid, and demanded that elections be held for the territory in
1976. In that same year. the UN General Assembly also decided that all discussions were
to be held with SWAPO, which the UN officially recognised as the sole and authentic
representative of the people of Namibia. In 1978, a proposal was issued to the Security
Council according to which elections for a Constituent Assembly under the auspices of
the UN should take place. A decision was taken in this regard, recorded as Resolution
435, which also established a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to aid Namibia
in its eventual emergence as a fledgling democracy. At first, South Africa accepted
the proposed plan and took part in a pre-implementation meeting in Geneva in 1981.
However, South Africa did not agree to a ceasefire – which was one of the fundamental
conditions imposed by the UN for the implementation of Resolution 435. On the other
hand, the conditions set by South Africa were not accepted by the UN, especially those
making the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola a prerequisite for Namibia’s
independence.41
With the rising pressure on South Africa to resolve the ‘Namibian issue’, a withdrawal
from Angola and a possible independence were negotiated, and an initial ceasefire was
set for 31 March 1984. However, because SWAPO and UNITA were not represented
at the negotiations and had not signed any ceasefire agreement or truce, accusations of
ceasefire violations against SWAPO and UNITA by South Africa and Angola remained.
38 Smaldone (1989:210, 224ff).

39 (ibid:226).
40 (ibid.).
41 UN (2011).
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Hidipo Hamutenya
South Africa accused Angola of not being able to control UNITA, and Angola accused
South Africa of not being able to control SWAPO. After two South African soldiers
were killed and one was captured on 22 May 1985, negotiations on a troop withdrawal
and Namibia’s independence in terms of Resolution 435 were suspended. Nonetheless,
by 1987, all the outstanding issues concerning the UN peace plan had been resolved –
except for the troop withdrawal.42
In November 1987, after South Africa’s enormous renewed deployment of militarily-

oriented infrastructure and logistics in northern Namibia, constituting the most ambitious
offensive since 1975, Cuba decided to reinforce its troops in Angola to counter South
Africa’s commitment. The subsequent defeat of South African troops at the battle of Cuito
Cuanavale in March 1988 led to a crisis within South Africa. By May 1988, Pretoria was
back at the negotiation table in London, trying to cover up the retreat of their defeated
troops in Angola, and showing itself willing to grant Namibia its independence under the
terms of Resolution 435.43 South Africa had finally begun to show it was serious about
resolution of an intractable conflict.
In December 1988, a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa was
achieved, conciliated by the USA. Furthermore, Cuba also signed an agreement with
Angola on the withdrawal of all its troops, a process which was controlled by the UN
Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). These events opened the gates to peace and
to Namibia’s transition to independence through free and fair elections in March 1990.44
The post-Independence relationship: A look at economic trends

and cooperation
By the time of Namibia’s independence in 1990, Angola was still at war. The civil war
between UNITA and now MPLA government forces continued throughout the 1990s. It
was not until 2002 that a real opportunity for peace arose in Angola. In February that
year, when Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the UNITA movement, was killed, the war ended
after more than 27 years, marking the beginning of political stability, peace and a return
to normalcy for Angola. Since 2002, the country has been peaceful. In 2008, Angola
held its first elections. The MPLA won, with 82% of the votes, with the rest going to
opposition parties. UNITA’s share of power was reduced to only 16 parliamentary seats
– from the 70 seats it had won in the 2008 elections.45
42 Potgieter (2000:260).
43 Brittain (1988:119–122).
44 UN (2011).
45 In the latest legislative elections in Angola, which took place on 31 August 2012, the MPLA
won 71.84% of the vote (175 seats), and UNITA 18.66% (32 seats). As with the previous two
elections in Angola’s troubled history, at this one, too, observers raised their concerns about
alleged irregularities; see http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/africa/current-projects/
92
The delay of peace in Angola for almost 12 years after Namibia’s independence in 1990
also delayed the formalisation of relations between the two countries at the diplomatic,
economic and social level. Nonetheless, in September 1990, steps had been taken to
establish a Joint Commission of Cooperation (JCC) with the aim of looking at areas of
economic interest to both countries. The JCC laid down the foundation for and considered
instruments which later translated into joint agreements on trade and economic issues.
The JCC’s wide focus also resulted in formal bilateral cooperation on areas such as
tourism and energy.
However, due to a number of factors, it took long to conclude and sign bilateral
agreements after the JCC’s establishment. These factors included the following:
• Angola was emerging from a long and devastating war and, therefore, faced
competing priorities and challenges
• Economic and other challenges in Angola after the return of peace in 2002
demanded urgent attention, leaving little time to consider less pressing bilateral
economic agreements
• A lack of infrastructure such as telecommunications in Angola posed significant
challenges and caused delays in communication, and
• The language barrier and other technicalities played a part in prolonging the
conclusion of bilateral agreements.
Despite these shortcomings, in May 2003, Namibia and Angola concluded an Agreement
on Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, which was ratified in 2005. The
Agreement seeks to protect investments, and create favourable conditions for businesses
in both countries.
In March 2004, the two countries signed an Agreement on Trade and Economic
Cooperation, also ratified in 2005. The agreement was necessitated by Namibia’s
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), whose 2002 Agreement
prohibits its members from entering into bilateral trade agreements with third parties
if such agreements have implications on SACU’s common external tariff.46 The
bilateral agreement is a most-favoured-nation (MFN) type of cooperation, but it does
not automatically grant any preferential treatment to products traded between the two
countries.47 The MFN clause affects the following:
• Customs duties and other charges or taxes of any kind imposed on or in connection
with the importation or exportation of goods or the international transfer of
payments in connection with such importation or exportation
• The methods of levying such duties, charges or taxes
angolas-2012-election, last accessed 20 August 2013.

46 Article 31, Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation.
47 Such treatment is to be negotiated and agreed among the parties within the context of their
cooperation framework.
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Hidipo Hamutenya
• Legal provisions pertaining to customs clearance, transit and storage

• Internal taxes and other levies of any kind applicable to imported goods
• Legal provisions pertaining to the sale, purchase, transport, distribution or use of
goods in the domestic market, and
• Matters relating to the issue of import or export licences.
In the above matters, any advantage, concession or exemption granted by a contracting

party to any product originating in, or destined for, any third country has to be accorded
to a similar product originating in, or destined for, the territory of the other contracting
party. Furthermore, Article 10 of the Agreement provides for the establishment of a Joint
Trade Committee, with the primary objective of dealing with matters of mutual interest
with regard to trade and investment. The Committee was officially inaugurated in
December 2006 by the two countries’ commerce, trade and industry Ministers, who also
launched its terms of reference. The Committee meets twice a year on a rotational basis
between the two countries. Its terms of reference are currently under review, following
a request by Angola in 2008.
Moreover, the Namibia Investment Centre and the Angolan National Agency for
Investment established a Joint Cooperation Agreement in 2008 and are working on giving
it more substance. This Agreement will enable the two respective national investment
arms to identify as well as implement joint programmes and projects.
In 2009, Namibia and Angola also concluded an Economic Partnership Agreement. This
agreement will promote and facilitate bilateral cross-border trade. Furthermore, Namibia
and Angola are working on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the promotion
of small- and medium-scale enterprise development.
The objective of all of the above agreements and bodies is to ease trade between the two
neighbours, but technical hitches and other problems that hamper progress on them are
taking painfully long to address.
Challenges to trade between Namibia and Angola

Angola continues to be a significant trade partner for Namibia. However, Namibian
products entering the Angolan market are subjected to tariff peaks as well as non-tariff
barriers.48 These barriers include undue administrative procedures at border points,
48 This goes against the spirit of trade liberalisation efforts in the SADC Region and negatively
affects intra-SADC trade. Article 6 of the SADC Protocol on Trade stipulates that members are
to adopt measures to eliminate non-tariff barriers and to refrain from imposing new ones. The
same Article stipulates the following: “Except as provided for in this Protocol, Member States
shall, in relation to intra-SADC trade: Adopt policies and implement measures to eliminate all
existing non-tariff barriers and refrain from imposing any new non-tariff barriers”.
94
the introduction of new trade measures, import bans, and other bottlenecks.49 Also, in
2012, Angola introduced an import control measure on various goods which negatively
affected Namibia’s cement exports, among others, to Angola. The ban on cement imports
took effect in June 2011 and caught the Namibian Government and many Namibian
businesses by surprise.50 The Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry referred to
the Angolan Government’s decisions as –51
… a step backward in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) push for regional
integration.
Of concern is that Angola unilaterally introduces these measures which affect Namibia’s
products.
Furthermore, for Namibian companies, Angola is a tough market. For example, Telecom
Namibia established a joint venture with an Angolan company, but pulled out of the
agreement in mid-2011 after having made significant losses, i.e. close to N$2.3 million in
total during the period 2009–2010. This is not a unique case: many Namibian businesses
in Angola complain about the difficulty of doing business there for the following reasons:
• Corruption is rife – especially at border posts, where officials demand whatever
they please to clear goods
• Bribes are the order of the day for any progress in business matters
• Illegal businesses proliferate
• Inadequate infrastructure, such as poorly maintained roads and poor
telecommunications
• Payment for completed work is slow or it never comes, and
• If one is not conversant in Portuguese, one encounters problems.
The above all have a negative effect on trade between the two countries. Moreover,
some of the agreements and MOUs have not yet been signed, and where an agreement
formed a Joint Commission, such Commissions have not been established. Hence, there
is no formal structure that governs economic and social matters between Namibia and
Angola. Moreover, on a bilateral level, Angola remains a difficult trading partner as
it takes unilateral decisions that affect Namibia negatively. However, despite all the
49 For example, port clearance takes several months, and importers are faced with additional
delays which result from capacity constraints at the Port of Luanda. Furthermore, importation
on certain goods requires an import licence. Also, certain goods require specific authorisation
from various government ministries, which often leads to bureaucratic bottlenecks.
50 The Angolan Government has now begun issuing licences to local companies to import
cement from Namibia; see http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=92356&no_cache=1, last accessed 25 November 2012.
51 http://www.cemnet.com/News/story/127599/namibia-cement-sector-wants-protection.html,
95
Hidipo Hamutenya
shortcomings highlighted here, Angola remains a crucial market for Namibian products,
with exports totalling N$3 billion in 2012.52
Other cooperation frameworks

The Benguela Current Commission
The Benguela Current Commission is a tripartite body representing Angola, Namibia

and South Africa. It is a multi-sectoral inter-governmental initiative aimed at promoting
the integrated management, sustainable development and protection of the Benguela
Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME). The BCLME spans the continental shelf
between the Angola Benguela frontal zone and the (South African) Agulhas Retroflection
Area, typically between 36°S and 37°S.
An Interim Agreement was signed in 2006 by four ministers from the Namibian and
South African Governments. Angola signed the accord in early 2007. This cooperative
arrangement between the three states was meant to be a forward-looking initiative that
strove to avoid conflict between the parties insofar as the management of the BCLME
resources were concerned. For example, Article 3 of the Interim Agreement applies to
the BCLME insofar as it falls within the internal waters, territorial seas or exclusive
economic zones of the contracting parties. It also applies to all human activities, aircraft
and vessels under the jurisdiction or control of a contracting party to the extent that
such activities or the operation of such aircraft or vessels result or are likely to result in
adverse impacts on the marine ecology of the BCLME.
The underlying foreign policy position is that there should be no conflict between
the states with respect to the BCLME marine resources – and, in the specific context
of this paper, between Angola and Namibia in particular. As Article 4 of the Interim
Agreement stipulates, the contracting parties are compelled to cooperate in good faith in
its implementation, including cooperating in building the capacity of the Management
Board, the Secretariat, the Ecosystem Advisory Committee, and any other subsidiary
bodies established in accordance with the Interim Agreement. Secondly, the parties are
required to cooperate in implementing a Strategic Action Programme and in negotiating,
agreeing, and bringing into force a more comprehensive legal instrument, in accordance
with Article 10. In terms of the latter Article, the contracting parties are enjoined to use
their best endeavours to bring into force by no later than 31 December 2012 a binding
legal instrument that will establish a comprehensive framework to facilitate their
implementation of an ecosystem approach to the conservation and development of the
52 As stated earlier, Angola is Namibia’s third largest trading partner after South Africa (N$7
billion in 2012) and the UK (N$5 billion in 2012) (Annual Trade Statistics Bulletin 2012,
pp 10–11; available at http://www.nsa.org.na/files/downloads/9ae_Annual%20Trade%20
Statistics%20Bulletin%202012.pdf, last accessed 6 August 2013.
96
BCLME. Although the Interim Agreement is not yet in force, it is expected to augment
the existing cooperative relations between Namibia and Angola.
Angola, Namibia and South Africa have also addressed transboundary issues by
conducting a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis53 and implementing a Strategic Action
Programme, both of which are aimed at promoting cooperation on the utilisation of
natural resources and avoiding the so-called tragedy of the commons.
The Olubido Railway and the Trans-Cunene Corridor
In 1997, Namibia and Angola formally agreed to improve the transport system in
the Trans-Cunene Corridor by building the Olubindo Railway. The new railway line
between Tsumeb and Oshikango is an extension of the existing Namibian railway
system, while the new line will allow Namibia to link up with the Angolan railway
system near Cassinga/Chamutete in Angola. This inter-regional rail connectivity will
promote trade among various countries within the SADC Region, but especially between
Angola, Namibia and South Africa.
This railway line forms part of the Trans-Cunene Corridor, which is a transport route
between Namibia and Angola aimed at promoting development, economic growth,
poverty eradication and job creation possibilities in southern Angola and north-central
Namibia. The Corridor links the Port of Walvis Bay with southern Angola up to Lubango
– a distance of some 1,600 km. The road infrastructure of the Corridor is supported by
the Northern Railway Line, which presently extends from the Port of Walvis Bay to the
Nehale Station at Ondangwa. The construction of the line from Ondangwa to Oshikango
was scheduled to be completed by 2008, but after some delays, the inauguration finally
took place on 1 July 2012.
The Angolan Government has been rehabilitating the Lubango–Santa Clara leg of the
Trans-Cunene Corridor road network in Angola with development assistance from
the European Union (EU).54 The border posts at Oshikango–Santa Clara serve as the
principal conduit for road-based imports from Namibia and South Africa into Angola.
Imports from outside the SADC Region come through Walvis Bay, then via the Trans-
Cunene Corridor into Lubango, and then into southern Angola.55
The Trans-Cunene Corridor has proved to be one of the busiest in the SADC Region,
with volumes having increased by more than 76.7% during 2007/8 alone, because it
53 Bakun & Nelson (1991:1815–1834); Shannon (1985:105–182); Shelton & Hutchings

(1990:323–338).
54 Tjønneland (2011:17).
55 (ibid.).
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Hidipo Hamutenya
accommodates Angola’s imports via the Port of Walvis Bay.56 The growth in trade volumes
has shown that interest in utilising the Corridor, especially in terms of transporting
vehicles, can be ascribed to its being a more efficient alternative for importers as well as
exporters through the Port of Walvis Bay.57
Namibia and Angola still have to create a one-stop border post at Oshikango/Santa
Clara. Planning is under way, but progress is slow. In 2007, for example, Japan funded
a feasibility study for such a border post, but financial constraints have hampered its
subsequent establishment.58 SADC also identified this border post as a top priority, along
with a railway line from Santa Clara, but not much has been done about it to date. It
is probably reasonable to expect that domestic priorities in Angola – in particular the
development of the Namib–Lubango Corridor – will take precedence and may, therefore,
reduce the volume of goods coming through Walvis Bay. One the other hand, imports from
Namibia and South Africa may increase, which would entail fewer trade restrictions and
increased access to goods owing to more flexible transportation regulations. However,
at the same time, local markets are threatened as they may not be as competitive as their
South African counterparts.
Water cooperation
In the world in general, water arrangements, access to water, or the allocation of water
to the citizenry have been a source of silent tensions within and among countries, a tool
during conflicts that start for other reasons, and a target during wars.59 In this respect, and
as the following quotation shows, Namibia saw the imperative of concluding the above-
mentioned cross-border water agreements because it wants to tap the Okavango River to
meet the country’s needs:60
Demands on water and land in Namibia are increasing steadily as the population and the
economy grow. Although only a few households can survive on subsistence agriculture alone,
access to agricultural land remains central to livelihoods [sic] strategies particularly in the non-
freehold or communal areas of Namibia. The importance of agriculture is not only likely to
remain, but will increase to the extent that population growth continues to exceed the creation
of employment opportunities.
56 WBCG (2012).
57 (ibid.).
58 The Namibian Cabinet approved the construction of a one-stop border post at Oshikango. See
Cabinet Decision 26/26.10.10.005. At present, the Trans-Kalahari Mamuno border post with
Botswana is being developed. Upon its completion, Angola and Namibia will move on to the
construction of the next one-stop border post.
59 Gleick (1993:79).
60 Werner (2009:1).
98
Namibia’s plan, which has already created some hydropolitics with Botswana, may be
jeopardised by Angola’s plans to develop massive irrigation projects in the watershed
of the Okavango and Cunene Rivers.61 Angola has not developed the Okavango –
or Cubango, as it is known in Angola – River and it is seen as a ‘sleeping giant’: if
programmes to irrigate or build reservoirs are implemented, they will affect water flow
downstream to Angola’s two co-riparian neighbours, Botswana and Namibia.62
The above situation shows potential conflict in the management of water resources in
the Okavango and Kunene River Basins, which will, in turn, affect other cooperative
arrangements between Angola, Botswana and Namibia. Being the most arid of the three
countries connected to these two Basins, Namibia would be forced to ensure that a
mechanism was instituted to minimise the potential of such conflict. Botswana, on the
other hand, considering the negative impact on its ecology, would be encouraged to
sign an agreement to bind the states concerned to consult each other whenever a water
development project was proposed by one of the parties.63 Angola would also be well
advised to get to the negotiating table because not only may any water development
downstream affect it negatively as an upstream riparian state, but it also foresees potential
opposition to its long-term plans to develop the Cubango River within its territory. In
other words, there is a need for hydrosolidarity among these nations, which will then
create the need for water and environmental security.64 This brief point will be clarified
later herein.
The Okavango River Basin
A cooperation agreement between Angola, Botswana and Namibia also exists in

regard to the utilisation of the Okavango River. In September 1994, the three parties
signed an agreement to create a trilateral permanent water commission known as the
Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) in order to provide advice on
the environmentally and socially sustainable development of Okavango River waters.
OKACOM’s role is to anticipate and reduce any unintended, unacceptable and, often,
unnecessary impacts that occur due to uncoordinated resource development. To achieve
these goals, OKACOM approach is to apply the principles of equitable allocation,
sustainable utilisation, sound environmental management and the sharing of benefits.
The treaty, entitled Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Angola, the
Republic of Botswana and the Republic of Namibia on the Establishment of a Permanent
Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM Agreement), is very general. In
its Preamble, it highlights the need for cooperation between and among its member
61 Mapaure [Forthcoming].
62 (ibid.).
63 (ibid.).
64 For an explanation of hydrosolidarity as water security, see, in general, Davidsen (2010).
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Hidipo Hamutenya
states. It also calls into consideration the concept of the equitable utilisation of shared
watercourses as a guiding principle in respect of the Okavango River Basin. Furthermore,
it incorporates the principles applicable to shared watercourses as enshrined in the 1966
Helsinki Rules65 as well as in Agenda 2166 of the UN Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro (the so-called Earth Summit), June 1992. With this, it
seems OKACOM may significantly enhance integrated regional sustainable development
by facilitating the necessary coordination and mutually beneficial cooperation among
Angola, Botswana and Namibia, which share the natural resources of the Okavango
River Basin.
However, the OKACOM agreement evidently fails to recognise the institutional conflicts
that exist among its members. Furthermore, the national institutions typically devote most
of their attention to large-scale, centralised forms of supply management. Small-scale,
decentralised or traditional options tend to be neglected or left to the communities.67 Yet,
as Hinz68 asserts, these institutions and their customary laws have great implications
for ecosystems.69 This justifies an investigation on the extent to which the agreement
recognises traditional water institutions in the Okavango River Basin, and what the
implications are of that extent of recognition on the equitability of water allocation.
Since no research has been done to determine the successes or failures of OKACOM,
it is difficult to ascertain its true value. In consideration of the available literature,70
however, for such cooperation to be fruitful and to yield results, there is a need for
adequate capacity and institutional strength. Traditionally, transboundary water equity
remains dispersed and fragmented in most countries. As Brooks71 asserts, international
agreements and, indeed, national institutions tend to be insensitive to indigenous
practices, gender concerns, ethnic groups and the environmental impacts of institutional
actions. Such organisations merely reflect the concerns of the governments that create
them; hence, it is not surprising that the OKACOM agreement is oblivious to these social
and environmental issues as well.
65 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers offer an international
guideline to regulate how rivers and their connected groundwaters that cross national boundaries
may be used, The Rules were adopted by the International Law Association in Helsinki, Finland,
in August 1966.
66 Agenda 21 is a non-binding, voluntarily implemented UN action plan with regard to sustainable
development. It is a product of the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. It is an action agenda for the UN, other multilateral organisations
and individual governments around the world that can be executed at local, national, and global
levels. The “21” in Agenda 21 refers to the 21st Century. Agenda 21 has been affirmed and
modified at subsequent UN conferences.
67 Brooks (2010).
68 Hinz (1995).
69 Hinz & Mapaure (2010:195–199).
70 (ibid.).
71 Brooks (2010).
100
OKACOM was not really able to make much progress in its first decade. Southern
Angola, and the Okavango River Basin in particular, was fundamentally a war zone.
In 2007, after the resumption of peace in Angola, OKACOM was able to establish a
Secretariat in Maun, Botswana. However, this Secretariat is not fully functional because
it is hampered by many constraints. These include personnel and finances, but also the
underlying politics or diplomacy between the countries concerned. In the same vein,
Angola seems not to be too involved – as evidenced by there being no major Angolan
regional projects on the Okavango. Nonetheless, the World Bank is providing funding
to a major Water Sector Institutional Development Project being implemented by the
Angolan Ministry of Energy and Water. This is mainly focused on providing water and
sanitation to major cities, but it also has major components on institutional strengthening
and management, including management of the Okavango River.
The Kunene River Basin
A cooperative arrangement also exists between Angola and Namibia regarding

the management of resources in the Kunene River Basin. The arrangement stems
from historic agreements concluded by the administrative powers of the two former
colonies before the two countries gained their independence. An agreement dating to
1969 initiated the construction of the proposed Kunene River Scheme. This agreement
established a Permanent Joint Technical Commission and made provision for Namibia
to abstract water at Calueque for diversion to the Cuvelai Basin in northern Namibia.
The project included several water infrastructural developments, including the Gove and
Calueque Dams. It also included the construction of a pump station for the diversion of
water into Namibia, the Ruacana Weir for the diversion of water into the Ruacana Power
Station, and the hydropower station itself. These projects were largely there to benefit
Namibia, being the driest country south of the Sahara, whereas Angola is a country with
a water surplus. However, of these infrastructure projects, the Calueque Dam was never
completed due to the war in Angola at the time. The total development of the Kunene
River includes the multi-purpose Hydropower and Irrigation Scheme at Matala, Angola.
Today, Namibia diverts water from the Kunene River at Calueque across the catchment
to the Cuvelai drainage basin for domestic water supply.
Contrary to the arrangement in the Okavango River Basin, the two riparian countries
Angola and Namibia have not yet established any joint management structure for the
Kunene River Basin, although, as mentioned previously, a Permanent Joint Technical
Commission bringing together officials from both countries is in place. The Commission
builds on three previous water usage agreements between South Africa and Portugal,
entered into between 1926 and 1969. It seems that Namibia and Angola are happy with the
arrangement and do not see the need for a new Commission based on a new agreement.
Angola has been described as ‘the sleeping giant’ in the sense that water resources in that
country are relatively unexploited. Future developments, however, could have serious
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Hidipo Hamutenya
consequences to the availability of water for countries downstream in both the Okavango
and the Kunene River Basins.72
Angolan refugees in Namibia and their recent repatriation
The issue of refugees from Angola has remained a sensitive one to date. The majority are
indeed Angolans who fled to Namibia as a result of the long years of war in that country.
The next highest number is from the Great Lakes.
At the height of the Angolan crisis leading to the 2002 refugee crisis in Namibia, the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Namibian Government were caring
for approximately 25,000 refugees. Since then, there has been a significant decrease in
these numbers through voluntary repatriation and ‘spontaneous settlement’ by Angolans,
with the operation now at approximately 8,000 persons, including Angolans.
Refugees began coming to Namibia in the early 1990s. Most resided at Osire, a refugee
camp whose establishment was necessitated as the number of asylum seekers grew.
Osire is located in the Otjozondjupa Region and the nearest town, Otjiwarongo, is 120
km away. The population at the camp is now estimated at 8,550. Around 75% of these
refugees come from Angola, while 19% constitute asylum seekers and refugees from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The rest come from Burundi and Rwanda.73
Most of the displaced persons from Angola left their homeland between 1992 and 2001.
The year 1999 witnessed the highest number of new arrivals due to the intensified war
in Angola. There were also a few individuals who arrived earlier than 1992. A survey
done in 2007 showed that a total of 387 individuals (87%) said that none of their family
members or relatives had returned to Angola.74 Only 22 individuals (10 female, 12 male),
representing 4% of the respondents in the survey,75 indicated their willingness to return
to Angola. Nine respondents indicated that they would return to Huambo; three said they
would go back to Bie, while three would return to Cuando Cubango, two to Huila, and
five to other Provinces. Five individuals (3 female, 2 male) indicated that they would
return in 2009. Of the remaining respondents, an overwhelming 96% of them (421 in
total, of which 231 were female and 190 male) indicated that they did not intend to return
to Angola and planned to settle in Namibia either in or outside Osire – mainly in Rundu
or Otjiwarongo.
The overall finding of the survey was that the majority of Angolans at Osire did not
intend to return to Angola. Their unwillingness to return no longer appears to be linked
72 Pinheiro et al. (2003:105–118).

73 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Local Integration, No. 104 (LVI) – 2005.
74 See Conteh et al. (2009).
75 (ibid.).
102
to the political divides that reigned before the resumption of peace in that country, but to
Angola no longer being familiar to them: they said they felt they would no longer have
a social support system in Angola due to their protracted stay in Namibia. As a result,
most of them seemed to have established themselves at the camp with a – not necessarily
family-related – social support system that gave them a sense of belonging. The main
challenge, however, is that most of these refugees have not managed to establish a self-
reliance mechanism, thereby making the majority of them dependent on humanitarian
assistance. Thus, the dependency syndrome which characterises most refugees worldwide
is also evident among Angolan refugees in Namibia.
Following the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 and the establishment of peace
and stability in Angola that followed, the number of new arrivals at Osire reportedly
reduced significantly. In 2003–2004, a voluntary repatriation process was undertaken
after the signing of the Tripartite Agreement between the UNHCR and the Namibian and
Angolan Governments, in which 6,200 refugees and asylum seekers, inclusive of some
non-Angolans, participated. Today, the Namibian Refugees Committee in the Namibian
Government’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration (MHAI) is wholly responsible
for refugee assistance domestically.76 This Committee also has the mandate of granting
refugee status, shelter, protection and other related services.
The Namibian Government has ratified the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and made reservation to Article 26 of the Convention,
which deals with the freedom of movement of refugees and asylum seekers within
Namibia. Transgression of this provision can lead to the offender’s arrest, detention and
prosecution. As regards the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, although Namibia is not a signatory to it, its provisions have
been incorporated into domestic legislation by way of the Refugee (Recognition and
Control) Act, 1999 (No. 2 of 1999).
In early 2012, the UNHCR77 recommended another process of voluntary repatriation

for refugees.78 The principal reason for this was that conditions in Angola had improved
to such an extent that Angolans could no longer qualify as refugees. The Namibian
Government then decreed that all Angolan refugees would lose their status as from 30
76 See Refugee (Recognition and Control) Act, 1999 (No. 2 of 1999).

77 Between November 2011 and 2 June 2012, the UNHCR had repatriated 14,000 Angolan
refugees – including those from Namibia; see http://www.unhcr.org/4fd1f16e9.html, last
accessed 12 January 2012.
78 According to Nkrumah Mushelenga, a Refugee Commissioner at the Ministry of Home Affairs
in Namibia, 3,000 Angolan refugees returned to their homeland as part of the UNHCR voluntary
repatriation programme from 30 June 2012, whereas 1,000 Angolan refugees opted for local
integration. During January 2013, 30 more refugees returned home. The process for those who
have opted for local integration is ongoing (pers. comm., 24 February 2013).
103
Hidipo Hamutenya
June 2012. The Angolan Government cooperated on the issue, and the UNHCR bore the
mandate to carry out the repatriation. The UNHCR reported as follows in May 2012:79
The convoy with 108 Angolan refugees on board departed from the Osire refugee settlement in
Northern Namibia on Tuesday. Many of them had been living in Namibia for some 20 years.
Some of the returnees had been born in Namibia and had never been to Angola before. They
arrived in Angola yesterday, after travelling for three days.
The arrangement reportedly was that the UNHCR would provide repatriating refugees
with a cash grant80 before their departure from Namibia, while the World Food Programme
allocated each individual with a three-month food ration. The Namibian Government
also donated trucks to transport the repatriating refugees’ belongings back to Angola.
Once in their homeland, the returnees received identity documents and reintegration
packages from the Angolan Government.
Regarding refugees in general, if the Commissioner in Namibia believes that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a person has ceased to be a refugee, such Commissioner
is required to refer the matter to the Namibian Refugees Committee for consideration.
‘Global cessations’ are invoked for particular groups because reasons for granting them
refugee status have ceased, especially with reference to certain nationals, such as those
from Angola. Indeed, this is exactly what happened in the case of Angolan refugees – as
described earlier herein.
Other existing and future multilateral cooperation

Angola, as a significant economic and political power in southern Africa, has committed
itself to a number of regional and international engagements over the past few years.
Since 1979, it has also been a member of the African Union and has had some steady
economic growth: some have called it the “sleeping giant”81 because of its expected
economic vitality. As an African country, it ranks amongst those with the highest amount
of foreign direct investment (FDI); in 2009, for example, FDI in Angola totalled US$13
billion.
Angola as a state has great significance in economic and military terms with respect to
stability in the SADC Region – which also depends partly on stability in Namibia. In
addition, Angola’s commitment to the process of a united Africa has been demonstrated
by the many treaties and charters it has already signed to this effect. However, although
79 See http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Angolan-refugees-return-to-unsure-future-20120626,
80 The cash grant has since been increased to U$$350 (about N$3,150, from a mere N$100). This
certainly served as an incentive. In addition, the Angolan Government gave the returnees a plot
of land, 6-m sheets of corrugated iron and timber to build temporary houses for themselves.
81 Pinheiro et al. (2003:105–118).
104
Angola has ratified some international treaties on human rights, its ratification of other
fundamental instruments for such rights is outstanding. Furthermore, it has signed the
treaty establishing the African Economic Community and the African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, for example, but has not ratified either.
In 1999, Angola became a full member of the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS), joining Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the
DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
Angola also signed the Mutual Assistance Pact between ECCAS Member States, proving
its dedication to promoting regional economic cooperation in central Africa.
Furthermore, Angola is committed to regional integration. In 1980, together with

Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe,
Angola founded the Southern African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC), which, in 1992, became the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). However, Angola still has to implement the 1996 SADC Trade Protocol to
which it acceded in 2003. The Protocol calls for enhanced cooperation in cross-border
trade, the elimination of all forms of non-tariff barriers, and forbids quantitative import
restrictions. In August 2011, Namibia’s President Hifikepunye Pohamba handed over the
SADC Chair to Angola’s President José Eduardo dos Santos for a year to discuss matters
that included the implementation of SADC Protocols.
Conclusions
The relationship between Angola and Namibia has grown from the liberation struggle
assistance and comradeship to bilateral cooperation, touching on several domains, which
further include, water and energy, tourism, security and defence and transportation.82
These areas are important to both countries and show their willingness and political will
to address matters of common interest. However, the relationship has a lot to improve
on and leaves a lot to be desired, if the two countries are to build robust economic and
social networks and systems that will lead to the achievement of Angola’s Vision 2025
and Namibia’s Vision 2030 and beyond.
This paper has covered how the relationship between Namibia and Angola has evolved.
Specifically, the paper addressed the pre-Independence bonds between SWAPO and the
Angolan political parties UNITA and the MPLA. The discussion also dealt with the
international environment, with particular emphasis on the situation in Angola, but
also on the UN’s efforts and involvement in the military conflict that rocked Angola
and affected Namibia’s security. It interrogated the turns and twists in Angola to which
82 The Trans-Cunene Corridor, operated by the Walvis Bay Corridor Group, links the Port of
Walvis Bay to southern Angola.
105
Hidipo Hamutenya
Namibia had to react; whether supporting the opposition or the ruling party and the see-
saw of the SWAPO Party of Namibia has been shown and illuminated in the general
understanding that Namibian politicians were at times somehow confused by the
developments in Angola and their allies who also participated in the conflict.
This paper also elaborated on the Namibian post-Independence relationship with Angola
and a special focus was put on matters related to trade between the two countries and
references have also been made to other countries in the SADC region. In this regard,
shortcomings negatively affecting trade between Namibia and Angola were covered
but the general conclusion is that trade relations between the two countries have been
steady and the relations on this aspect have been cordial and have seen the graph of trade
volumes going up, especially after the civil war of Angola. The paper concluded with
consideration of the other cooperative regimes, being the events in the Okavango and
Cunene river Basins as well as the cooperation of the two countries in the war in DRC
and the Angolan refugee situation in Namibia. The paper concludes that in general, the
relationship has been very positive but largely symbiotic.
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Namibia and China: Profile and appraisal
of a relationship
André du Pisani*
Introduction
Any sound analysis of Namibia–China relations in both the pre- and post-Independence
period needs to start with a brief historical exploration of how such relations evolved
and transformed. It is also important to locate the analysis within the corset of older
Sino-African relations that go back considerably longer, and that have proven to be
remarkably resilient – at least since 1955, with the Bandung Conference and the birth of
the Non-aligned Movement. Over the last decade in particular, it is impossible to discuss
Namibia–China relations outside of an analysis of some salient aspect of globalisation,
more particularly of new-mercantilist impulses that permeate globalisation.1
Historically, the relationship between Africa and China is old, dating back several
centuries.2 In the 1960s and 1970s, the period of Africa’s First Development Decade,
* Prof. André du Pisani, Professor of Politics at the University of Namibia, also serves as Director
in Namibia of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network.
1 New mercantilism is characterised by government attempts to manipulate economic
arrangements in order to maximise their own interests, whether or not this is at the expense
of others. These interests may be related to domestic concerns (high employment and price
stability, for example) or to foreign policy concerns (security and complex interdependence).
Thus, the construct of new mercantilism is far broader than its 18th-century association with
trade and the balance of payments surplus, and takes as a first priority the national economic
and political objectives of the state over considerations of global economic competitiveness.
Robert Gilpin (1992) argues that the new-mercantilist impulse supports the desire for a balance
of payments surplus (based on a positive trade balance with other countries), the export of
employment, inflation, or both, and the imposition of import and export controls to protect
the home industry. Moreover, states will further the expansion of their world market share
and stimulate advanced technology within the state. Gilpin (ibid.:293) opines as follows:
“Each nation will pursue economic policies that reflect domestic economic needs and external
political ambitions without much concern for the effects of these policies on other countries or
on the international economic system as a whole”.
2 By the 1st century BC, Arab, Chinese, Indian and Indonesian mariners knew far more about
tropical Africa than their counterparts in the West, from whom there is little further mention
of the continent until the beginning of the Roman Empire. Merchants from China traded with
the states along the east coast of Africa, particularly during the years of the Tang Dynasty (AD
618–907). In the 9th century, the scholar Tuan Ch’eng-Shih reported on the Masai of present-
day Kenya and Tanzania. Chinese traders engaged with their African and Arab counterparts
throughout the 11th and 12th centuries and, by 1500, Chinese and Indian merchants had
extensive trade relations with the Bantu-speaking peoples along the east coast, namely
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André du Pisani
ideological considerations weighed heavily on Sino-African relations. Internationally,

the bipolarity of the Cold War accorded an additional attraction to China, as that country
offered an alternative development model for Africa to that of the West. By the late
1980s, the focus shifted more strongly to economic cooperation in areas of common
concern – with China emerging as an active economic and development partner, as
well as a political ally on major international issues such as trade, finance, development
assistance, and the reform of the United Nations (UN).
Historically also, the relations between China and Africa had their ebb and flow. As
will be argued shortly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)3 increasingly reasserted
itself in Africa in the 1980s, and with the deepening of globalisation and the end of the
Cold War in the 1990s, China became a formidable actor in the economic and political
life of a select number of African countries, particularly those with sizeable energy and
mineral economies. Thus, China perpetuated the history of commodity extraction from
African countries with rich mineral endowments, even if Beijing provided other forms
of economic and development assistance to such countries.
Today, given the global importance and size of its economy, China’s relationship is
powerfully anchored on commercial considerations – there are 1,600 Chinese companies
doing business in Africa4 – with the objectives of sustaining rapid industrialisation
and high economic growth rates in China and securing markets for that country’s
manufacturers.5 With its economic muscle, China is capable of backing its trade relations
with Africa (and Namibia) with aid, development assistance, debt relief, scholarships
for students and government officials, training for civil servants and the security sector
(defence, public safety and security and intelligence personnel), construction, and
technical support. At the time of writing, for example, China accounts for 8% of Africa’s
military hardware imports. In 2009, in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), Chinese
investments in Africa accounted for 3% of total FDI outflows.6
In the aftermath of considerable domestic dislocation resulting from the death in 1976
of Chairman Mao Zedong, Head of State of the PRC from 1949 to 1959 and Chairman
of the Communist Party from 1935 to 1976, and the turmoil of his cultural revolution,
the Chinese Government became decidedly more inward-looking; as a result, the Sino-
African relationship lay dormant throughout much of the 1980s. By the late 1990s, PRC
Premier Deng Xiaoping’s gradualist market-driven socialism began to show results. The
Madagascar, Mozambique, Pemba, Reunion, Tanzania and Zanzibar. See Rotberg (1965:25–
26); see also Freeman-Grenville (1960:34–35).
3 The full name – People’s Republic of China/PRC (instead of just China) – will be used if there
is a specific reference to the political administration after the proclamation of the PRC on 1
October 1949 by Mao Zedong.
4 Gu (2011).
5 Zhao (2007:35).
6 CCR (2007:12).
112
Namibia and China: Profile and appraisal of a relationship
PRC has, since Xiaoping’s carefully-controlled economic reforms, had an annualised

economic growth rate of between 9% and 11%, as well as a 400% increase in real per
capita income. Since then, the country has become the second largest economy in the
world (after the United States of America/US), accounting for more than 12% of the
world’s gross domestic product, 8% of global manufacturing production, and 1.35 billion
consumers. The PRC’s state-capitalist economy has brought about transformations in
trade and industry that have made it the largest energy consumer – even ahead of the US;
and it needs, energy (oil), strategic minerals (cobalt, coltan, magnesium, platinum, iron
ore, tin), food and agricultural inputs, and forestry resources to sustain its exceptionally
high growth rate.7
Chinese trade and economic assistance to Africa accelerated markedly at the end of the
Cold War and has grown exponentially over the 20-year period spanning 1990 to 2010.
Sino-African trade increased from only US$12 million in 1950 to US$250 million in
1965. After several reforms and the PRC’s ‘Open Up’ policy in the 1980s, Sino-African
trade significantly increased. The trade volume exceeded US$10 billion in 2000 for
the first time. In 2006, it stood at US$56 billion,8 and in 2008, it hit a record high of
US$106.8 billion.9 As a result, a number of resource-rich African economies such as
Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia have experienced balance of payment surpluses,
notably due to their substantial oil and mineral resources.
Sino-African relations took a bold step forward with the founding of the Forum on China–
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, with the first Ministerial Conference taking place
that year in Beijing. FOCAC was China’s largest-ever multilateral undertaking, with
44 African states, including Namibia, participating in it. Since then, FOCAC has been
the locus of important policy developments, such as China’s Special Preferential Tariff
Treatment Programme (SPTTP), which removed import duties on 190 different items
from 25 African countries when it was implemented in January 2005.10
In November 2006, FOCAC further consolidated Sino-African relations when China

made additional far-reaching pledges to Africa with a development package that included
the following:11
7 Alden (2005); CCR (2007:12); Du Pisani (2008:8–9); Goldstein et al. (2006); Naidu (2010:25–
38); Melber (2010:6).
8 Servant (2005).
9 See Brown & Chun (2009:4). Similar figures are provided by www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2010-10/14/content_11412120.htm; last accessed 5 May 2011.
10 While not explicitly acknowledged by the Chinese at the time, the SPTTP was partly launched
as an alternative to the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and other tariff
reduction agreements between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the
European Union (EU).
11 Hu (2006:6–10).
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André du Pisani
• US$3 billion in preferential loans and US$2 billion in preferential buyer’s credits
over the next three years (2007–2009)
• The doubling of China’s 2006 aid assistance to Africa by 2009
• A China–Africa Development Fund of US$5 billion to encourage Chinese
companies to invest in Africa, increasing the preferential Zero-tariff Treatment
Programme from 190 to more than 440 products
• The establishment of ten Chinese agricultural technology demonstration centres
on the continent between 2006 and 2009, and
• An increase in the number of Chinese Government scholarships from 2,000 to
4,000 by 2009 enabling Africans to study in China.
Earlier, in 1996, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that the five
cornerstones of China’s Africa policy were “sincere friendship, unity and co-operation;
common development, and looking to the future”.12 This articulation contained elements
of new mercantilism, namely the promotion of mutual development and the primacy
placed on political unity between Africa and China in international arenas.
This foundation was strengthened under the current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, in his
“six pillars” of Sino-African relations:13
• Non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states
• African ownership in dealing with problems (African solutions for African problems)
• Mutual trust and cooperation
• The increase of economic assistance with limited political conditions
• Lobbying the international community to pay more attention to Africa, and
• The promotion of an international environment more conducive to Africa’s
development.
Not surprisingly, China’s pre-eminent focus on commercial relations and economic

development in Africa has been met with some concern by other states, notably the
US and the European Union (EU). These sentiments were expressed more especially
by France and the United Kingdom, both of whom have extensive and long-standing
interests in Africa. Accordingly, the US and EU have had to recast their relations with
the continent.
Namibia–China relations: Transcending old solidarities –

building new relations
Historically, relations between Namibia and the PRC were spawned with the former
liberation movement, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) during
12 Holslag (2006:145).
13 (ibid.:146).
114
the protracted liberation struggle in the mid-1960s, which ran until the end of the 1980s.
Notwithstanding the solidarity galvanised between the Communist Party of China
(CPC) and SWAPO – a relationship that persists to the present day, it is instructive to
note that SWAPO did not open a diplomatic mission in that country prior to Namibia’s
Independence.14 Throughout the liberation period, however, the PRC provided material
assistance in the form of military hardware and political support. The then President of
SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, also visited the PRC seven times in the 1970s and 1980s, with
a further five official visits after he was sworn in as the first President of an independent
Namibia.
A close reading of the evolving relations between China and Namibia shows that these
largely mirror the pattern that has come to characterise that country’s relations with
other states in Africa and in the developing world in general. As in the case with many
other African countries, the PRC entered into relations with Namibia a long time ago. As
pointed out earlier, Namibia’s liberation struggle afforded the opportunity for the PRC
to cement complex relations with SWAPO. At the time, the PRC, taking its cue from
the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU, the antecedent of the African Union/
AU) and the UN General Assembly, recognised SWAPO as the “sole and authentic
representative of the people of Namibia”.15 This was done at the expense of the South
West African National Union (SWANU), the country’s oldest political party.16
Against the canvas of the Sino-Soviet split, the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity
Organisation itself split in the period 1964–1967. At its 1967, Nicosia conference, which
the PRC boycotted, SWANU found itself expelled and SWAPO was admitted – largely
with Soviet support.
In an article published in 1972, SWAPO leaders Hidipo Hamutenya and Hage Geingob
claimed that it was SWAPO’s decision to launch the armed struggle. The decision, they
maintained, was taken in 1962 and put into effect in 1966, demonstrating the party’s
superior commitment to the liberation of Namibia, and distinguishing it from SWANU
in the eyes of international supporters.17
Nonetheless, as Sherbourne (2007) puts it, –18

… there is no doubt that China consistently supported Namibia’s claim for independence, and
it was expressly thanked (along with many other countries and organisations) at SWAPO’s
watershed Tanga Conference in Tanzania in 1969 for the moral and material support it had
given the movement.
14 See also the article by Chris Saunders on Namibian diplomacy before Independence in this
volume.
15 (ibid.).
16 Sherbourne (2007:161).
17 Hamutenya & Geingob (1972:85–94); also quoted by Dobell (1998:181).
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André du Pisani
By that stage, SWAPO had already been sending recruits to its camps to China for further
military training.
Shortly after Namibia’s Independence on 21 March 1990, formal diplomatic ties were
established between the new democracy and China (PRC).19 By March 2005, when
President Hifikepunye Pohamba assumed office, Namibia had established an embassy in
China with concurrent accreditation for Cambodia, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan and Vietnam. Visits by senior
Namibian politicians and officials to China and by Chinese representatives to Namibia
have taken place on a regular basis since 1990. Founding President Dr Nujoma visited
China on five occasions: in 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000, and 2004. The current Namibian
President has visited China three times since taking office in March 2005. The former
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Namibia in 1996, while Chinese Foreign Minister
Tang Jiaxuan visited in 2000. The former Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a two-
day state visit to Namibia in February 2007 as part of a 12-day tour to eight African
countries.20
Coming in the wake of the formative 2006 FOCAC, the February 2007 visit to Namibia
by Chinese President Hu Jintao was accompanied by high expectations on the Namibian
side. For example, the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Andrew Ndishishi, stated in an interview with local print media that Namibia was looking
for market access for its products, especially to China. He was also of the view that
the Chinese would benefit “from the highly developed infrastructure in Namibia, which
makes doing business in the country relatively hassle-free”.21 In the same interview, the
Permanent Secretary referred to two agreements entered into between the two countries
that would greatly facilitate bilateral trade, namely the Trade and Economic Development
Agreement, and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments Agreement.
Based on these two bilateral agreements, a Joint Trade and Economic Development
Committee was established, co-chaired by the Chinese and Namibian Ministers of Trade.
An annex to one of the two trade agreements included a list of 12 products the Namibian
Ministry was encouraging Namibian businesses to export to China.22
19 Agreement on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Namibia and China, signed
on 22 March 1990.
20 See, among other sources, media reports in New Era (7 February 2007, p 10); The Namibian (6
February 2007, pp 1–2); The Namibian (7 February 2007, pp 1–2); and New Era (5 February
2007, pp 1–2).
21 Ngavirue (2007:1–2). For more critical readings of the relations between the two countries, see
Melber (2008:6–7) and Hengari (2007:6).
22 The list details the following 12 products: Meat and meat products (beef, mutton, goat, game);
leather and leather products (bovine, small stock, game); processed hides and skin; dairy and
dairy products (ultra-high-temperature/UHT milk, cheese); beer and beverages; processed and
semi-precious stones; processed marble, granite and other dimension stone; automotive parts
116
Subsequently, however, in 2008–2009, when Namibian meat producers wanted to export

to China, particularly when that country hosted the Olympic Games, they found it very
difficult to penetrate the market. Nonetheless, the Chinese Premier’s 2007 visit resulted
in the signing of various ancillary bilateral agreements with Namibia. In terms of one of
these, China gave Namibia a N$30-million grant for specific projects set out in the Third
National Development Plan (NDP3), while the two states also agreed to an interest-free
loan of a further N$30 million for unspecified purposes.23
Like his predecessor, President Pohamba has actively promoted cooperation between
the two countries and, according to unconfirmed reports, bilateral trade in the first 11
months of 2006 reached US$240 million (about N$1.73 billion). This figure represented
an increase of 103% over the previous year.
At the same visit in February 2007, the Namibian Ministry of Youth, National Service,
Sport and Culture (YNSSC) also entered into a bilateral agreement with China in terms
of which the latter would support, by means of a grant, the establishment of a youth
centre at Berg Aukas, near Grootfontein. Apart from all the other bilateral agreements
signed between the two states and the provision of grants from China, the solidarity
seam was very much in evidence when President Pohamba lauded China’s long-standing
support for Namibia’s liberation war. He was reported in the local media to have said the
following:24
We will always be grateful to China for the support extended to our struggle and for standing
firmly with us in our current efforts towards economic and social development.
In October 2007, when the Chinese Ambassador to Namibia, Liang Yinzhu, left the
country after his four-year term, he indicated his personal satisfaction with the progress
made in the bilateral relations between the two countries in an interview with a New Era
journalist. In a wide-ranging interview, the Ambassador highlighted as a key achievement
the pledge by Chinese President Hu Jintao during his visit to Namibia in 2007 to deliver
on the following:
• I billion Yuan (N$1.7 billion) in concessionary loans
• US$100 million (N$107 million) in preferential export buyer’s credit
• 30 million Yuan (N$37 million) in grants
• 30 million Yuan (N$37 million) in interest-free loans
• The building of two rural schools (a third was subsequently also built), and
• The building of a hospital.
and spares; table grapes; agro-processed goods; natural oils, and fish and fish products.
23 Weidlich (2007a:1–2).
24 Weidlich (2007a:2).
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Apart from a rise in trade between the two countries, bilateral cooperation extended to
judicial matters, education, health, cultural exchange, and tourism.25
In the following sections of this chapter, the bilateral relations between the two states will
be examined in respect of trade in the last decade, investment, construction, education
and culture, development assistance, defence and security, and diplomacy and politics.
Trade in the last decade

Bilateral trade between Namibia and China is recorded by China Customs.26 Its records
for 2003 show that total trade in goods (not services) amounted to N$74.6 million – up
from N$49.1 million the previous year. Trade has risen significantly since then. By 2004,
it had doubled to N$99.1 million, and in 2011 it had exceeded N$130 million in total on
annualised figures.27
Since 2003, Chinese exports to Namibia have consisted almost entirely of manufactured
goods, namely automobiles, machinery, electronic equipment, machine tools, information
technology, and road-building and construction machinery. Namibia’s exports to China,
on the other hand, include processed food and live animals, fish, and metal products
(primarily non-ferrous metals). In recent years, Namibia’s exports to its bilateral partner
have increased, particularly in the period 2004–2009, as high rates of growth in China and
a vibrant and expanding manufacturing sector in that country have pushed up demands
for raw materials. In 2006, for example, all the output of the Ongopolo Copper Mine in
Tsumeb was exported to China.28
The trade agreements with China referred to above confirm the Namibian Government’s
resolve to achieve meaningful market and product diversification. In this policy frame,
China – in addition to deepening regional economic integration – is an important player.
Since 1999, the country’s international trade sector has grown exponentially from a
mere N$17 billion (1.1 x gross domestic product/GDP) to N$77 billion by 2008 again
representing almost 1.1 x GDP of N$73 billion in the same year.29 On a visit to Namibia
at the time of writing, Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National
25 In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the implementation plan

for organised group travel by Chinese citizens to Namibia, signed during Chinese President
Jintao’s February 2007 visit. The MOU was meant to be activated as of 15 October 2007, but it
has not yet been. See Sibeene (2007:22–23).
26 See www.China-Customs.com; last accessed 8 May 2011.
27 Bilateral trade increased from US$74.57 million in 2003, to US$255.5 million in 2006. By
the end of 2007, the value of bilateral trade had reached US$400 million. While important for
Namibia, this amounted to about 5% of China’s global trade, which reached US$2,000 billion
in 2007. See Jauch & Iipumbu (2009:258), who cite a former Chinese diplomat to Namibia.
118
People’s Congress of the PRC, Wu Bangguo, announced that bilateral trade between the
two countries had increased from US$11 million in 2000 to US$730 million by 2011.
Despite growing local opposition to Chinese business practices in Namibia, the two
countries’ bilateral trade reached N$2.7 billion in 2013, being a healthy increase of 33%
compared with the same period in 2012. Namibian exports to China increased by 114%
to N$ 1.16 bn from February to August 2013.
According to the Chinese Ambassador to Namibia, Xin Shukang, Namibia exports both
beef and fish to China. In response to unacceptable business practices by some Chinese
firms in this country, the Chinese Business Chamber drafted a code of conduct for every
Chinese businessperson in Namibia. At the same time, Namibia’s revised Labour Act30
has been translated into Chinese.
Investment
As pointed out above, a Joint Trade and Economic Development Committee was
established between the two countries, and by June 2009, two sessions had been
convened. This resulted in an increasing number of Chinese enterprises having invested
in Namibia over the past decade.31 Most Chinese investments seem to involve setting
up small retail outlets to sell relatively cheap consumer goods imported from China.
Earlier, in 2007, the Chinese Embassy in Windhoek said there were 100 private Chinese
enterprises in Namibia, with a total investment of about $30 million in the areas of
construction, manufacturing, food, health, and real estate. As Sherbourne remarked in
2007 –32
[t]hey have given rise to a certain amount of concern among Namibians for the poor quality of
the goods they sell and the low wages they pay their workers, issues that have prompted letters
to newspapers.
Three recent studies,33 in particular, have analysed the impact of Chinese entrepreneurs
and investors, especially in the Export Processing Zones in Walvis Bay and Helao Nafidi
(formerly Oshikango) along the border with Angola. Writing graphically on the Chinese
presence in Helao Nafidi, Gregor Dobler says the following:34
There is, for example, a Chinese firm producing duvets for export in the otherwise more or
less manufacturing-deserted Oshikango Export Processing Zone (EPZ) park. Nothing could
30 Labour Act, 2007 (No. 11 of 2007).

31 Jauch & Iipumbu (2009:257).
33 Dobler (2007); Jauch & Iipumbu (2009); Niikondo & Coetzee (2009).
34 Dobler (2007:105).
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be more welcome to Namibia, even if the cotton, the textiles and the sewing machines are
imported from China. I was at first puzzled why anyone should care to sew duvets in Namibia
instead of importing them from China at lower costs. The answer, at least according to the
general consensus of Chinese pavement radio, is simple: the main outcome of the venture is
not duvets, but work permits. “With such a workshop, you will get work permits for maybe 20
or 30 technicians. Two or three of them actually work there, the rest is working somewhere in
a shop.”
On the balance, Chinese investment in the Namibian retail sector, however, benefits
the Namibian economy and Namibians. In the short run, the presence of Chinese shops
makes some goods accessible to the average consumer. Clothing, blankets, mattresses,
shoes, watches, cigarettes, and toys have become significantly cheaper. In addition,
Chinese businesses create employment for Namibians, even if most are employed in
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. There have, though, been numerous complaints about
the ill-treatment of Namibian workers.35
‘China shops’ have become a permanent feature across Namibia. In 2009, there were more
than 500 Chinese shops registered on the database of the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Some of these companies, such as LIN’s Investments and Rainbow Import and Export,
both owned by the same person, have invested over N$33.1 million (US$3.3 million) in
Namibia’s retail sector over the past seven years (2004–2010). These companies have
employed about 150 Namibians in different towns and Grade 1 municipalities in the
country.36
Although Namibian exports rely heavily on primary sector commodities, direct Chinese
investment in the mineral economy of the country has not been very significant till now.
While Chinese firms enter into agreements with commodity exporters in many other
African countries, no major contracts have been negotiated with Namibian producers yet.
This is partly due to the regulation of Namibia’s mineral production through established
distribution networks and long-term contracts.
As there are no confirmed oil reserves in Namibia, Chinese interests in this field have
so far been confined to neighbouring Angola. One of the most significant Namibian
exploration deals of recent years, however, included a Chinese contractor. In February
2005, Circle Oil (an oil company based in Limerick, Ireland, and listed on the London
Stock Exchange Alternative Investment Market) announced an agreement by which
China Shine HF, a Chinese state-owned company, was said to take over 72% of Circle
Oil’s prospecting licence (later upgraded to an exploration licence), covering most of
35 (ibid.:106). See also Jauch & Iipumbu (2009:277–285) and Niikondo & Coetzee (2009).
120
northern Namibia. In terms of this deal, Circle Oil was to retain 18% and the Namibian
Petroleum Corporation (Pty) Ltd (NAMCOR) 10%.37
Construction
Construction is on par with retail in terms of important areas of Chinese investments in
Namibia. The Construction Industries Federation of Namibia (CIF) estimated that 60–
70% of the country’s large construction projects were awarded to Chinese construction
companies.38 These included several major public construction projects. For instance, in
Windhoek, China Jiansu International Namibia Ltd was responsible for the construction
of the Supreme Court, a new police station and prison training college, as well as
the Magistrate’s Court in Katutura. The China Beijing Corporation for International
Economic Co-operation built 102 houses in Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi Region in
1999. The Northern Tannery in Ondangwa in northern Namibia was built by China
Nanjing International Namibian Construction.39
The private Chinese firm New Era Investment was responsible for, among other public
projects, the new Town Council building in Helao Nafidi. The most symbolic and political
public construction project with Chinese involvement to date has been the palatial State
House that nestles in the undulating hills of the Auasblick suburb of the capital city.
As with Heroes’ Acre, the main contractors were North Korean firms, but China also
became involved in its construction following a Chinese Government donation of N$55
million to this end in 2002. A Chinese company was given a share in the prestigious
project, apparently without public tender.40 In April 2006, during the budget debate in
Parliament, it surfaced that the presidential residence adjacent to State House was to be
wholly donated by the Chinese Government and built by Chinese companies. It was also
announced that the Chinese Government would tender for the construction in China.41
While Chinese construction companies entered the Namibian market late by tendering
for public projects often underwritten by Chinese Government money, they have since
entered the private sector and are making life difficult for local contractors. According
37 High expectations were dampened when it became apparent that China Shine would pay its
share not in cash but by drilling at least three wells and acquiring seismic data. The company’s
budget was said to be in excess of $1 billion, and 2,000 workers were expected to start work in
late 2005. At the time of writing, however, the deal had not been finalised and no jobs have been
created. See Dobler (2007:98).
39 Dobler (2007:100). The Northern Tannery is no longer a going concern. Chinese companies
also built the National Council building in Windhoek, and two Regional Council buildings in
Outapi and Rundu, respectively. In the period 2009–2010, a Chinese company constructed the
new Engineering Faculty of the University of Namibia (UNAM) in Ongwediva.
40 Dobler (2007:100–101).
41 The Namibian, 21 April 2006, p 1.
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to one report, Chinese companies’ market share is estimated to be “anywhere between a

third and two thirds of the construction market”,42 and is growing.
Local construction companies have accused the more than 30 Chinese-Government-

owned firms in the country of unfair competition. Industry representatives such as the
CIF have claimed that Chinese firms have profited from preferential treatment in the
allocation of tenders, and that the Namibian Government was reluctant to force such
firms to comply with local labour laws. All in all, –43
[w]hile Chinese competition makes life difficult for the Namibian construction industry, such
competition seems to have had a favourable effect on productivity and efficiency in the sector,
and has lowered construction costs in the country.
However, some claim that this achievement was made at the expense of quality – as
can be seen in the substandard construction of several buildings in the country, notably
extensions to existing hospitals or the construction of new ones, such as those at Rundu
in the Kavango West Region, and Ononjokwe in the Omusati Region.
Education and culture

Education and culture is another field in which the two countries cooperate. Since 2007,
the Chinese Government has provided five full scholarships a year to Namibian students,
and sends Chinese academics to teach at higher education institutions in Namibia. In
2009, it was disclosed that Chinese scholarships had benefitted the children of government
ministers, including President Pohamba’s daughter and relatives of Namibia’s Founding
Father, former President Dr Sam Nujoma. Since these scholarships were not awarded in
the usual transparent manner via the Ministry of Education, it resulted in public criticism
within Namibia44 and was even reported in the New York Times.45 The University of
Namibia has been offering courses in Mandarin since 2006, and the PRC has been
supporting the Faculties of Science and Engineering by way of scientific equipment and
lecturing staff. In addition, according to an agreement entered into between the Chinese
and Namibian Governments, the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (nbc) has been
transmitting the English-language programmes of China Central Television (CCTV)
42 “Solving a Chinese puzzle: Chinese companies are changing the face of the Namibian
construction industry but are they doing anything wrong?”; Insight Namibia, April:19-20; see
also Amupadhi (2009:16–18).
43 Dobler (2007:101).
44 “More questions than answers on bursaries”; The Namibian, 27 October 2009; available at
http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=61073&no_
cache=1; last accessed 8 May 2011.
45 “Uneasy engagement: China helps the powerful in Namibia”; New York Times, 19 November
2009; available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/asia/20namibia.html; last
accessed 8 May 2011.
122
three times a week. Each broadcast lasts an hour. For some time the NBC has broadcast
a Chinese cooking programme.
In 1999, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government donated a pavilion in Windhoek’s

Zoo Park. Twinning agreements have been signed between Chinese and Namibian towns
and cities, among these being Windhoek (with Shanghai), Mariental (with Zhengzhou)
and Okahandja (with Maqiao). The Chinese-language edition of Founding President Dr
Nujoma’s autobiography Where others wavered was published in Beijing in July 2004
and launched shortly afterwards, while President Nujoma was on a state visit there.
In the field of sport, former national soccer player for the Brave Warriors, Eliphas ‘Safille’
Shivute, signed a lucrative three-year contract with Chinese First Division champions
Dalian Wanda Football Club in February 1999. More recently, Chinese acrobats and
kung fu wrestling teams have visited Namibia. In May 2011, Namibia hosted the China–
Africa Youth Forum (CAYF), an event attended by 60 young people from China and
18 from African countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
Development assistance
By any standards, the PRC’s aid programme to Namibia is modest. According to figures
taken from the development cooperation database at the National Planning Commission,
the total disbursement to Namibia by China amounted to N$66 million between 1998 and
2003, placing China 15th in terms of total disbursements to Namibia, i.e. 5%, which is
significantly below the EU, the US, individual European countries, and Egypt. In terms
of development assistance, China ranked 15th in 2003 – below Iceland – contributing
less than 1% of total commitments in aid.46
In 1999, China extended an N$8.6 million interest-free loan to the National Housing
Enterprise, which was used to construct 102 houses in Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi
Region. At the time, the former Chinese Ambassador to Namibia said that China had
built and handed over 663 low-cost housing units in Namibia.47
Chinese medical personnel have been working at the Katutura State Hospital under a
health cooperation agreement between the two countries since 2005.
Since then, however, Chinese aid to Namibia has been elevated to a new level. Apart
from the 2002 interest-free loan of N$55 million for building the new State House (as
stated earlier), in June 2005, the then Minister of Works and Transport, Joel Kaapanda,
47 (ibid.).
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announced that the Chinese would foot the entire bill for the new State House, but he
declined to give figures.48
According to local media reports, a further 20-year loan of N$21.5 million was agreed
to by the Namibian Government in March 2005. This loan was not reflected in national
budget documents. By September 2009, Namibia had received more than N$2 billion in
so-called soft loans from China.49
China has also been involved in upgrading the country’s railway network and rolling
stock. To this end, it sent six experts to work with TransNamib in early 2004. TransNamib
went on to take delivery of four diesel locomotives and 30 oil tankers built by China
South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry Corporation, at a total estimated cost
of N$36.6 million. The delivery of a luxury train from China followed in February
2005. TransNamib has admitted that the new locomotives have proven to be unreliable.
Government subsequently announced that it would borrow N$204 million from the
Export-Import Bank of China to finance the purchase of 16 Chinese locomotives for
TransNamib.50
Defence and security

During the liberation struggle, SWAPO enjoyed diplomatic, material and political
support from the PRC, especially after SWANU fell out of favour with the Afro-Asian
Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). The 5 July 2003 issue of The Windhoek
Observer, a local weekly, reported the arrival of 2,600 tons of military material at the
Port of Walvis Bay on board the An Shun Jiang. The material was ostensibly destined for
Zimbabwe. The local media were quick to dub the Chinese vessel the ‘ship of shame’ for
being willing to contravene the UN sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in this respect since
2008.51 Under considerable pressure from organised labour in South Africa and a number
of civil society actors in the Southern African Development (SADC) Region, the An
Shun Jiang was unable to offload its lethal cargo at Walvis Bay in Namibia or Luanda in
Angola. Unconfirmed reports had it that the cargo was eventually flown to and offloaded
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from where it made its way to Zimbabwe –
albeit not necessarily for a defence and security application in the classic sense.
A more recent set of events underlined the risks associated with soft loans from the PRC.
When a Chinese company was awarded the task of constructing the railway line between
Ondangwa and Helao Nafidi in northern Namibia. A Namibian company, Teko Trading
– a local company owned by Teckla Nandjila Lameck (a member of the Public Service
Commission) and Kongo Mokaxwa – was hired by the Chinese to influence the awarding
48 The Namibian, 22 June 2005, p 1.

49 Amupadhi (2009:16).
50 Weidlich (2005:1–2).
51 Maletsky (2008).
124
of the tender. Based on the initial price quotation for the contract by China National
Machinery and Equipment Import (CMEG), Teko Trading could have earned N$100
million for supposedly influencing the Namibian Government to ensure CMEG was
awarded the tender. CMEG has since dropped the price from more than N$1 billion to
N$750 million and, finally, to N$450 million, after the Ministry of Works and Transport
questioned why the price was that high for a 60-km track. In 2006, the Ministry had
completed a 250-km track from Tsumeb to Ondangwa for about N$860 million.52
At the same time, an agreement was struck between the Teko Trading and Nuctech,
a Chinese state-owned company supplying Chinese-made X-ray scanners for use by
Namibian customs and excise officers at key local airports and border/customs posts.
Teko Trading was to be paid a commission that was reported to be more than 20%
(US$12 million) of the scanners’ purchase price of US$55 million.53
In August 2009, the then Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Calle Schlettwein,
warned that Namibia should insist on conditions that benefited its development agenda
when dealing with development partners such as China. “If not,” he said, “the country
should have the courage to say no.” Using the example of the multimillion Namibia
Dollar scanner transaction between the Namibian Government and Nuctech, Schlettwein
was reported as having said that the incident could have been avoided if government had
demanded that the deal be put out on tender.54
Since Independence, Namibia has procured military equipment in the form of light
fighter aircraft (K-8s) from China. Senior officers of the Namibia Defence Force (NDF)
underwent advanced professional training at a military academy in Shanghai, and
Chinese contractors built a Military Museum in Okahandja in central Namibia. They
will also construct a new Military Academy for the NDF in Okahandja. On the African
continent, Namibian peacekeepers have served on missions under a UN mandate in
Sudan (African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur/UNAMID) and elsewhere,
together with troops from China. In 2007, the UN appointed the first Chinese special
envoy, Liu Guijin, to Darfur. Some Chinese companies are building an 85-km water
project in South Darfur, and 315 Chinese engineers were deployed to Darfur in October
2007 to take part in UNAMID.55
At the international level, even if it largely amounted to ‘a dialogue of the deaf’, the PRC
has been supporting the AU – and, by extension, Namibia – in its efforts to reform the
UN Security Council, as well as in the Non-aligned Movement.56
52 Amupadhi (2009:16).
53 What is not yet clear is whether Lameck or Mokaxwa, who were arrested with their Chinese
partner Yang Fan, actually did influence the Namibian Government to take up the Chinese soft
loan. Namibia received a N$350-million soft loan for the X-ray scanning equipment.
54 Duddy (2009:1–2).
55 Assogbavi (2010:194–212).
56 Adebajo & Scanlon (2006).
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Diplomacy and politics

FOCAC’s 2006 Beijing Declaration was not only formative for bilateral relations
between China and Namibia, but has since shaped the contours of China’s international
profile, particularly in Africa. The Declaration, among other issues, spoke of “the dawn
of a new century”, but equally recognised the “economic and social factors at the root of
political instability in Africa”. The text continued as follows:57
Moreover, the scourge of HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and other communicable diseases is taking
a heavy toll on the human and economic resources of African countries, and the aggravated
poverty is seriously hindering the development of Africa.
The Declaration also reiterated that the primacy of –58

… the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other universally recognised principles
governing relations among States must be respected. All countries should have the right to
participate in international affairs, on an equal footing. No country or group of countries has
the right to impose its will on others, to interfere, under whatever pretext, in other countries’
internal affairs, or to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others. The North and
the South should strengthen their dialogue and co-operation on the basis of equality.
The Declaration called for recognition of “the legitimate place due to Africa in the
Security Council and the organisations and specialised agencies of the United Nations
system”. Similarly, the rise of subregional cooperation in Africa and the establishment
of the AU were welcomed and supported by China. The Declaration concluded with the
resolve to –59
… further consolidate and expand China–Africa cooperation at all levels and in all fields and
to establish, within the framework of South–South co-operation, a new type of long-term and
stable relationship based on equality and mutual benefit. We will deepen dialogue, broaden
consensus, continue to harmonise our positions on international affairs (in multilateral fora)
and enhance mutual support so as to uphold the legitimate rights and interests of China and
African countries and to expand and deepen this new type of partnership between China and
African countries.
The China–Africa policy, however, notwithstanding its redeeming features, is

characterised by several ambiguities. On the analysis of Melber (2009) and others, –60
… in theory, too, favourable market conditions and the Chinese arrival should work to the
benefit of ordinary African people. However, that presumes that the African elites benefiting
from unequal structures of trade and investment are willing to put the public interest before
57 Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, 2006; full text published in
Die Republikein, 7 November 2006, pp 6–7.
58 (ibid.).
59 Melber (2009:73); see also Mbaye (2010:39–54).
60 Melber (2009:75).
126
their own. Yet it is here that the moral and political thrust of Chinese policy falls down, for
the foundation of Chinese foreign policy in Africa is one that emphasises the sovereignty of
governments and commits Beijing to non-interference. It was precisely the abandonment of
such principles that characterised the evolution of the OAU into the AU, pointing the way
towards an era of greater democracy, transparency and accountability by rulers. In contrast,
however, the reality is that the Chinese gospel of non-interventionism is warmly welcomed by
the autocratic leaders and oligarchies that continue to rule the roost in the majority of African
countries, especially those in possession of vast natural resources.
Even if, in the words of Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana, former Minister of Justice and Secretary-
General of the SWAPO Party of Namibia, China is a “super-friend of Africa”,61 and
even if it offers an alternative to the ‘Washington Consensus’, it is debatable whether
such engagement by China is antithetical to Africa’s long-term interests.62 China’s
ability to compete effectively with other extra-regional actors certainly provides new
opportunities and options for African governments; but to take advantage of these will
require significant changes in the African style of governance, including much-improved
institutional and economic management on the part of its leadership.63
Most of those who speak strongly in support of Namibia’s long-standing relations

with the PRC do so from an instrumental perspective, arguing that such a relationship
significantly benefits Namibia in terms of soft loans with minimal conditions attached to
them, provides Namibia with a large market for its raw materials and renders political
support to Namibia and Africa in multinational fora. Moreover, Chinese investment in
the local economy creates employment and reduces the cost of some consumer goods.64
The youth, too, stand to learn much from the discipline and work ethic of the Chinese.65
The most recent political collaboration between the two countries came in May 2011
in the form of the Africa–China Young Leaders Forum (ACYLF), which was jointly
hosted by the SWAPO Party of Namibia and the Communist Party of China. The Forum
took place in Windhoek and was attended by 60 young (and not so young) leaders
from China, an equal number from Namibia, and youth leaders from 18 other African
countries. The Forum was opened by Namibia’s President Pohamba. At its conclusion, a
statement was released that emphasised the importance of cooperation between African
and Chinese youth in the domains of education, health, peace, security, business, and
human development. The Forum also called on the governments of Africa and China to
institutionalise the Forum and to hold regular meetings, particularly before the FOCAC
– the most important policy framing meeting on Sino-African relations.66
61 See Smit (2011).

62 Thompson (2005); see also Mbaye (2010:39–54); Tjonneland et al. (2006:48).
63 McLaughlin (2005).
64 Kashuupulwa (2008:12).
65 Ngurare (2011:4).
66 The Declaration of the ACYLF was covered live on nbc TV and radio on 22 May 2011. Most
of the proceedings were also covered on nbc TV and radio.
127
André du Pisani
A Chinese delegation under the leadership of Abulaiti Abudurexiti, Vice-President of

the Chinese Political Advisory Conference (CPPCC) and President of the China–Africa
Friendship Association, visited Namibia in April 2011 at the invitation of the Minister
of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development. The purpose of
the visit was to deliberate on the theme of “Improved Cities through Cooperation”. The
Chinese delegation also paid a visit to former President Dr Sam Nujoma.
China and Namibia also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in May 2011
for further Chinese assistance to Namibia. The MOU was signed by the Director-General
of the National Planning Commission, Tom Alweendo, and the Chinese Vice-Minister
of Commerce, Fu Ziyzing. At the same occasion, the Chinese Government donated
electronic office equipment worth N$1.1 million to the Namibian Parliament. The
Chinese Government has further agreed to provide Namibia with medical equipment
and materials, and to sponsor an economic seminar to be held for Namibian Government
officials in China later in 2011. In addition, the Chinese Government donated US$500,000
(N$3.5 million) towards flood relief efforts in northern Namibia in the first half of 2011.67
Conclusions
China’s advance from the economic periphery into the core group of the global economy
means that, in virtue of its economic size and dynamism, its foreign policy has little
choice but to assume an ever greater role in shaping the course of current world events.
We are witnessing a shift towards a more flexible, differentiated and proactive foreign
policy, also on Africa in general and on Namibia in particular. It is evident in China’s
diverse spectrum of interests, ranging from energy, trade, investment, education, culture,
peace and security to the transformation of global multilateral institutions.
In common with other global economies, China’s foreign relations, supported by a

vibrant economy, show dynastic tendencies,68 but these are based on ‘soft’ as opposed to
‘hard’ power.69 China uses a combination of diplomacy, soft loans, credit, development
support, trade, investment and political support in its relations with Africa overall and
Namibia in particular.
67 New Era, 24 May 2011, p 6.

68 In terms of historical precedent, Africa is to China today what Australia and Argentina were to the
United States and Continental Europe in the late 19th century: a resource-rich region supplying a
resource-short region going through its most resource-intensive stage of economic development,
namely industrialisation and the massive urbanisation associated with it. Africa, whose own
dynasty of economic development is far closer to that of China, now has a unique opportunity
“to hitch its resource-rich wagon to that rising eastern star” (Stephan et al. 2006:27).
69 The construct of soft power comes from the work of Keohane (1984), and was developed in his
seminal study titled After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy.
128
One of China’s key foreign policy objectives is to service the needs of its dramatic
economic modernisation and industrialisation, and its economy’s growing appetite for
natural resources and access to export markets. As far as Namibia is concerned, the local
retail market and political support in multilateral arenas outweigh China’s engagement
in the mineral economy of the country. For political and infrastructural reasons, Namibia
offers China access to the much larger SADC regional economy. Energy security, in
particular, has emerged as a key element in the modernisation and industrialisation of
China. For now, China has not invested much in the Namibian energy sector, but may
do so once the country becomes one of the most significant uranium producers in the
world.70
While the US’s hegemony and how to manage it has remained an overriding concern
for Beijing, China sees globalisation as a way of transforming great power politics and
establish more cooperative forms of state- and non-state-based relations with a growing
number of African states, inclusive of Namibia. Consequently, Africa occupies an
increasingly important space in China’s foreign relations. As pointed out earlier in this
contribution, in January 2006, China made public its first major policy document on its
relations with Africa. It lists 30 initiatives in the political field; in the economic field; in
education, science, culture, health and social development; and in peace and security.
This policy frame also emphasises cooperation within a multilateral framework, calls
for UN reform, and appeals to the international community to accord more attention
to Africa and to peace and development on the continent. Chinese support for regional
bodies such as SADC is also highlighted.
Since 2000, when China initiated FOCAC, the Forum emerged as the principal
mechanism for dialogue and cooperation between Africa (specifically Namibia) and
China. Since 2006, with the comprehensive FOCAC policy framing on Africa, relations
between Namibia and China – although these have a longer lineage – mirrored this
policy framing.
Consistent with the objectives and undertakings provided for in the 2006 FOCAC policy
statement, China has also emerged as a significant development partner for Namibia.
Chinese assistance worldwide is concentrated on three principal areas:
• The provision of physical infrastructure such as telecommunications, roads and
railways
• Capacity-building in the social sector, especially related to health, science,
education and culture, and management training for the public service, and
• Funding for the construction of politically and symbolically important public
buildings such as stadiums, state houses, buildings housing parliaments, court
buildings, and military infrastructure.
70 Of late, Chinese companies have signalled an interest in the nascent energy economy of
Namibia, especially in uranium mining.
129
André du Pisani
Chinese companies using Chinese labour are also winning tenders for the construction of
a number of public and a growing number of private buildings in Africa.
Peace and security have emerged as an increasingly important dimension of Sino-

African relations. Not only have more than 1,310 Chinese peacekeepers participated in
UN-mandated operations in Africa, China has also been providing professional training
to senior military officers in the NDF, while Namibia has procured military hardware
from China since Independence in 1990.
As a relatively small but expanding donor, China provides Namibia with interest-free
loans for low-cost housing, while Namibia has borrowed at a nominal interest rate of 1%
from the Export-Import Bank of China for the purchase of locomotives and to meet other
transport requirements.
How should Namibia manage this expanding relationship with China? What implications
could the relationship have for Namibia and its foreign and development policies? It is
clear that the relationship with China will and does have implications for Namibia’s
relations with other African countries and with the EU, the country’s most important
trade and development partner. Over time, the relationship with China will influence
Namibia’s multilateral agenda in the UN, the AU, and other multinational fora. The
nature of the bilateral relationship between Namibia and China may also undergo further
amplification, especially if China were to become a major player in Namibia’s nascent
energy-based economy.
Based on the history of the relationship between China and Namibia, it may become
ever more imperative for Namibia to develop its capacity in trade negotiations and
economic diplomacy in order to collaborate with other SADC member states in respect
of negotiating and cooperating more effectively with China. Namibia stands to gain by
supporting initiatives that stimulate China’s participation in multilateral institutions such
as the UN and donor fora, and by developing and engaging in bilateral relations with
China in areas of mutual benefit.
Finally, while relations with China do indeed offer benefits to Namibia, such relations
should not be entered into and sustained if they undermine potentially productive and
more egalitarian relations with India, the EU and the US.71 China may indeed rely on
‘soft power’, and in this sense, may not be a ‘hard’ hegemon; but the achievement of
its core foreign relations and development objectives may not always be in Namibia’s
interests. In 1944, an Austrian scholar, Karl Polanyi, wrote a seminal book with the
evocative title, The Great Transformation,72 in which he pleaded passionately for “the
primacy of society, the inclusive coherent unity of human interdependence as a means
to transcend the perplexities and the contradictions of our times”. Polanyi resonates
71 For an excellent analysis of the changing nature of India–China relations, see Singh (2011:1–14).
72 Polanyi (1944).
130
powerfully when it comes to the evolution and deepening of relations between Namibia
and China. It is in this context that the latter will have to ensure its foreign policy towards
Africa in general and Namibia in particular has a normative foundation that provides for
the meaningful recognition of Africans’ – i.e. including Namibians’ – hard-won human
rights and freedoms. Simply to perpetuate the historic pattern of commodity extraction
and to use Namibia as a ‘dumping ground’ for lower-quality consumer goods would not
be adequate and might in the long run turn out not to be acceptable to Namibians.
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Namibia’s bilateral relations with Germany:
A crucial relationship
Peter H Katjavivi*
Introduction
Namibia has traversed a long and bitter road towards independence through a struggle
to free itself from the bondage of apartheid and colonialism and accept the challenges of
nationhood. It reminds me of the following quotation cited by my friend and colleague,
Prof. Keto Mshigeni, who writes that, when an Egyptian King asked Euclid, the famous
Greek mathematician of Alexandria in 3 BC, how one could learn his theorems of
geometry in a more expeditious manner, the answer given was, “there is no royal road to
geometry”.1 What we know for certain is that, as David Jessop states, –2
[e]very nation and culture has a knowledge of where it has come from, an awareness of shared
experience and a sense of its place in the world.
We have not only willingly accepted the challenges of nationhood, but have also used
our experience acquired during the course of the struggle to chart the way forward with
regard to all aspects of life, including crafting our foreign policy, as we took our place
amongst the nations of the world. As David Jessop continues to write, –3
[h]istory and smallness together have distilled and elevated this into an often intense requirement
for ownership and a constant and passionate defence of national identity and sovereignty.
This should certainly be seen against the events as described by Dr Henry Kissinger in
The new world order:4
In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach
to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its
ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain elaborated the concept of balance of
power, which dominated European diplomacy for the next 200 years. In the nineteenth century,
* Prof. Peter Katjavivi served as Namibia’s Ambassador to the European Union and, later, to
Germany and was also the Founding Vice Chancellor of the University of Namibia. Currently
he is the Governing Party’s Chief Whip in the National Assembly.
1 See Taylor (2000:52).
2 Jessop (2008:1).
3 (ibid.). He is referring to the Caribbean experience, but it applies equally to Namibia, except
that the territory of Namibia is large despite the population being small.
4 Kissinger (1994).
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Peter H Katjavivi
Metternich’s Austria reconstructed the Concept of Europe and Bismarck’s Germany dismantled
it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics.
Not surprisingly, this was the period in world history when Africa and greater parts of
the world were held in colonial bondage by Western powers. In this respect, there was a
time when it seemed almost impossible to escape from that bondage. However, between
the 1940s and 1960s, a great number of African colonies and other dependent territories
around the globe achieved their freedom and independence in the long run. Since then,
many of these developing countries have made great progress in a number of human
endeavours as full members of the United Nations (UN). Many of those countries, as
UN members, subscribe to the recommendations made by former Australian Foreign
Minister Gareth Evans and his team, published in a book entitled Cooperating for peace:
The Global Agenda for the 1990s and beyond.5 They point out the following:6
We believe that even if the world can never be made absolutely safe for all its peoples, we are
beginning to learn how to make it very much safer than it has been. … [The] phenomenon
of economic and cultural community [has implied that] nations are finding it progressively
easier to talk together, build processes and institutions together, advance common interests and
resolve common problems. They are beginning to learn that their best interests are advanced not
by a culture of conflict, but by a culture of cooperation.
Truly, today, two decades after Namibia’s independence, it should be acknowledged

that our people have made steady strides in advancing their national development and
reconstruction in a number of areas.
Namibia’s approach to making foreign policy

Before dealing with the detail of Namibia’s bilateral relations with Germany, it is
essential to understand the genesis of Namibia’s foreign policy and its application.
It is evident that Namibia’s foreign policy has been shaped by its liberation struggle.
Importantly, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) – as the country’s
main liberation movement – achieved a great deal of recognition from the international
community, led by the UN. It was this recognition that contributed to SWAPO working
as a non-state actor on the future of Namibia with the UN for a considerable period
before Independence. This no doubt helped the SWAPO movement to develop a
foreign policy framework that helped to maintain and run SWAPO’s external structures,
including its missions around the world. Of course, this policy framework was revisited
and transformed after the country’s independence in 1990 in order to reflect the changing
5 Evans (1993).
6 (ibid.:182).
136
Namibia’s bilateral relations with Germany: A crucial relationship
circumstances. As the now retired Maj. Gen. Charles Namoloh, then Minister of Defence,
has stated, –7
[t]he end of the Cold War ushered in a period of peaceful co-existence among nations. The
independence of Namibia on 21st March 1990 brought new opportunities for the people of
the country who suffered colonial oppression for over a century. The national independence
brought to an end a bitter liberation war which claimed many lives of Namibians.
As former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt8 stressed in his book, People and
politics, there is a need for nations to face up to change and adapt in order to meet the
new requirements. In 1990, it was Namibia’s turn to do likewise. Namibia’s first Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab, described the objectives of the country’s
foreign policy thus:9
… the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to position itself to address changes in both the domestic
and external environment in which it has to fulfil its two primary functions. These functions
are namely: to positively portray the relations of Namibia internationally, and to continuously
analyse and interpret the world around us with a view to ensure the security and prosperity of
our country and its people.
The above-mentioned objectives have been the main focus of Namibia’s approach to its
foreign relations. As can be seen from various initiatives, Namibia’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs also embarked on a number of reforms of the country’s foreign policy. These
involved training and general workshops aimed at the sensitisation of staff and officials
engaged in foreign affairs. This point was equally highlighted by HE Dr Sam Nujoma,
founding President of the Republic of Namibia, who stated the following:10
I am sure that the recently concluded Workshop on Economic Diplomacy, which was organized
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has further provided you and other Namibian Diplomats
with the required tools and skills to effectively promote investment and trade opportunities
as well as joint ventures which are available to investors from Malaysia and other parts of the
world.
It is in this context that I agree with Ambassador George C McGhee of the United States
(US) when he says the following:11
I hold a strong belief in the importance of effective diplomacy in improving relations between
nations. … I use the word diplomacy here in its broadest sense. I do not wish to confine it just
7 See the presentation by Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Charles Namoloh, Minister of Defence, to Namibia’s
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, in a Workshop
conducted from 1 to 11 August 2011.
8 Brandt (1978:494-502).
9 GRN (2000:65).
10 GRN (2004).
11 McGhee (1987:vii, 13, 49).
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Peter H Katjavivi
to ambassadors making speeches or giving dinner parties or negotiating treaties. I would define
it to include all negotiations and exchanges of information and views across national borders,
whether in the private or public sector, for the purpose of lessening tensions and effecting
international agreements.
A major reinforcement to Namibia’s foreign policy was the adoption of the White
Paper on Namibia’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, published in March
2004. This document clearly emphasises economic diplomacy, calling for economic
development within the context of economic diplomacy. This shift was necessitated
by the government’s desire to increase investment and economic growth in post-
Independence Namibia.
This policy framework was implemented through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its
various foreign missions. For instance, the following internal discussion that I conducted
at the Namibian Embassy in Brussels illustrates how the Namibian missions abroad
implemented the policy. I identified the following areas as crucial to the conduct of a
successful economic diplomacy:12
• Carrying the banner of economic diplomacy
• Transforming the concept of economic diplomacy into a working tool in order
for the Namibian Government to execute its diplomatic functions in the most
effective manner
• Constant renewal of efforts in order to be on top of issues, and
• Concentration on issues which would allow embassy or mission staff to move an
extra mile in task accomplishment.
Most ambassadors compete with each other as they represent the interests of their
various countries in a given host country. Here, we are reminded by the former British
Ambassador to the US, Christopher Meyer, when he says that –13
[s]peed and technologies are certainly powerful weapons in the diplomat’s armoury; but without
quality and context, information delivered fast is without merit.
I particularly enjoyed reading his book, which deals with his ambassadorial work in
the US and his amusing reference to leading personalities in the host country as the Big
Beasts. In applying this approach, Ambassador Meyer states –14
I wanted everybody at the Embassy, at their different levels, to develop their own contacts
across the US administration and Congress. Sometimes the first intimation of a policy decision
would come from a relatively junior source.
12 Staff meeting chaired by Ambassador Peter H Katjavivi at the Namibian Embassy in Brussels,
March 2004.
13 Meyer (2005:63).
14 (ibid.:210).
138
My own contribution to this process was to deal with the ‘Big Beasts’, their deputies and their
closest advisors. This meant the National Security Adviser to the President; Vice-President;
the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the chairman and senior members of key
committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives; and the top newspaper columnists.
I recall, during staff meetings at the Namibian Embassies in both Brussels and Berlin,
having encouraged our diplomats to intensify wide-ranging contacts in the areas of trade
and investment, among others.
Just before I arrived in Berlin as Ambassador, I was reliably informed that our Trade
Attaché there was a very competent officer who stood out as a voice for all other trade
attachés from other developing nations with embassies in Berlin. She was so competent
that, when she left, the gap created was so big that we almost failed to fill it with another
equally competent officer. However, after a long search, we managed to find another
competent person. This illustrates how diplomats have a key role to front the development
needs of their nations.
John Coles, a leading British diplomat, had this to say on the subject:15
I detect a need to reassert the role of officials in policy-making, to make a plan that they are
looked to as the primary source of advice, but are equally expected to be open to ideas from all
sources, inside and outside government, and to channel the best possible advice to ministers
regardless of its source.
He further underscores the range of training made available to British civil servants,
revealing that “more specialized training is given to civil servants nowadays”. He adds
that, “in the Foreign Office, many of us spent time at the London Business School on
management courses”. In this context, it is essential that we stress the importance of
training and retraining our civil servants. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Namibia
Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) established in 2011 will
team up with the relevant tertiary institutions in Namibia to provide the necessary
training that will embrace policymaking courses, and innovations that could contribute
towards making our overall ‘civil service machine’ more efficient in the long run. Most
importantly, it is a worthwhile effort to internationally benchmark Namibia’s training
certification so that our graduates can be suitable for jobs anywhere across the globe.
Furthermore, it is hoped that the establishment of this training institution will help
“revalue public service and rekindle the enthusiasm that made people become public
servants in the first place”. No doubt it is hoped that the new institution will reinforce
the culture of thinking and acting: the need to ensure civil servants do follow-ups, to the
extent that they might ask themselves some of the following questions posed by John
Coles:16
15 Coles (2000:159).
16 (ibid.:161).
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Peter H Katjavivi
We needed to ask ourselves searching questions about policy. Did we devote enough time to
developing new policies? Did we know enough about how other countries were tackling the
same problems? Did we think sufficiently long-term, sufficiently strategically? Did ministers
always act in such a way to get the best out of the civil service machine?
These and many more questions are the kinds of issues that are being debated amongst
our civil servants and diplomats nowadays.
John Coles compliments Foreign Minister Gareth Evans on his admirable initiative
regarding the Australian experience in foreign policy formulation.17 Evans refers to his
studies undertaken in 1987, with particular reference to that country’s relationship to
an Asian Pacific region. This interesting period marked a policy shift when Australia
moved towards promoting “more effective economic co-operation in their region and
inter-government dialogue to advance common interests”.18
Coles argues that –
[t]he concept of national interests necessitates the starting point in making decisions, although
the elements that constitute national interest are not necessarily self-evident. … I group
Australia’s interests in three categories – geopolitical or strategic, economic and trade, and
‘being a good international citizen’.
He adds another vital point, namely that “capacity to influence must be assessed”. He
stresses that –19
[e]ffective management of foreign affairs depends not just on being able to recognize
opportunities for influence but also on developing and constantly refining priorities …
Coles commends, in terms of the substance and process, the manner in which Foreign
Minister Evans crafted Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s.20 In
this respect, our policymakers and intellectuals need to pay far more attention to the
experiences of other countries if we are to remedy our own shortcomings. It is clear
when reviewing Namibia’s foreign policy that there is a need to reinforce economic
diplomacy with a view to advancing the struggle for economic emancipation.
One important aspect determining Namibia’s foreign policy has been the work of the
Namibian Defence Force (NDF) through the establishment of joint commissions on
defence and security with all its neighbouring countries. Such joint commissions are
17 (ibid.:167–168).
18 (ibid.:169).
19 (ibid.:205).
20 See Coles (2000).
140
there to promote harmony and apply conflict resolutions to potential problems and
challenges that might arise.
Former Minister of Defence Namoloh commented as follows on the progress made since
Namibia’s independence in this regard:21
We have moved from the era of confrontation that characterized Southern Africa, since the
1960s to the end of the 1980s, to cooperation among the defence forces in the region and
elsewhere.
The NDF has been an active participant in a number of peacekeeping operations organised
by the UN around the globe. The role played by the NDF in this regard is in keeping with
Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution.
Overall, Namibia’s foreign policy can be characterised as proactive and reactive, based
on circumstances; but the general trend displayed has been a proactive one. Examples of
this latter stance include the following:
• Intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo war in 2000–2001
• Namibia’s strong position on the negotiations for a fair deal under the Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) of the European Union (EU) to allow protection
of its infant industries
• Namibia’s in support of the African Union’s concern about foreign intervention in
the Libyan crisis in 2011
• Its continued advocacy for the need to reform the UN Security Council in order to
ensure equal continental representation, and
• Its continued advocacy for the need to strengthen the voice and representation
of the developing countries, especially those in Africa, in the ‘Bretton Woods’
institutions (i.e. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).
For a small country like Namibia – that is, small in terms of population – it has done
well on the world stage in raising its voice to the necessary heights where there has been
a need.
Namibian–German diplomacy since Independence

Namibia’s diplomatic relations with Germany have had their own challenges and
opportunities. Soon after Namibia’s independence in 1990, the country established
diplomatic relations with Germany. With Germany having colonised Namibia from 1884
21 See the presentation by Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Charles Namoloh, Minister of Defence, to Namibia’s
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, in a Workshop
conducted from 1 to 11 August 2011.
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Peter H Katjavivi
to 1915, the relationship between the countries marked the beginning of a new era.22
However, while we acknowledge the process where Namibia and Germany started a
new chapter in their relations, it is pertinent that we appreciate the efforts of those who
laid the groundwork which led to these successful relations. The SWAPO leadership
in exile worked closely with leading personalities of the Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD/Social Democratic Party of Germany), the Green Party, and the long-
serving German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. This relationship extended
to working with churches, student/youth and solidarity organisations, foundations and
other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Herr Genscher and leading personalities
within the SPD, in particular, played a vital role in facilitating meetings between SWAPO
and German leaders and institutions in that country.23 Equally important to note is that
Genscher was anxious that the German-speaking community in Namibia be given the
truth and reality about SWAPO and the UN’s agenda.24 Understandably, they did not
want the white community in the then South West Africa to be blinded by the South
African Government’s negative propaganda about SWAPO’s efforts. Genscher’s even-
handed approach in this regard was much appreciated by SWAPO.
Namibian–German bilateral relations were established against the background of a

resolution passed in the German Parliament, which stated the following:25
Since Namibia’s independence in March 1990, friendly and comprehensive relations have
developed between Namibia and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic
of Germany acknowledges a ‘special responsibility’ for Namibia, expressed officially in the
parliamentary resolution of March 1989, entitled “The Special Responsibility of the Federal
Republic of Germany for Namibia and all its Citizens”, in which the German Bundestag
[German Parliament] called on the government to develop and cultivate special relations with
the independent Namibia. In that Germany took into account its responsibility for the country’s
colonial past as well as the government’s commitment to the independence process, especially
as part of the Western Contact Group.
This was subsequently endorsed by both Presidents Sam Nujoma and Roman Herzog,
of Namibia and Germany, respectively. This happened during President Nujoma’s first
state visit to Germany in 1996.
22 For historical background, see Katjavivi (1988, 2008).

23 In 1973, a SWAPO delegation which included its President Sam Nujoma, Bishop Colin Winter
of the Anglican Church, Ewald Katjivena, Ben Amathila and the author visited Bonn. During
the visit, the delegation met Erhard Eppler, by then Minister for Economic Cooperation (1968–
1974) and Chairman of the SPD in Baden-Württemberg (1973–1981), as well as Chairperson of
the Committee on Basic Values. Notably, it was during Eppler’s time as Minister for Economic
Cooperation that the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, today the Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) was founded. The delegation was also scheduled to
meet President Gustav Heinemann, but the meeting did not take place for technical reasons.
24 Vergau (2010).
25 German Parliamentary Resolution on the eve of Namibia’s Independence, 1989.
142
Since then, a number of agreements dealing with their bilateral relations have been
signed between the two countries. The two nations have also witnessed the exchange of
high-level reciprocal visits, reflecting the special relations that had developed between
them.
Official visits – Germany to Namibia
• 1995, September: Chancellor Dr Helmuth Kohl (1982–1998; member of the

Christian Democratic Union, CDU)
• 1998, March: Official state visit by President Dr Roman Herzog (1994–1999;
CDU)
• 2003, April: President of the Bundestag (Speaker of Parliament), Wolfgang
Thierse (SPD)
• 2003, October: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer (Alliance 90/The
Greens)
• 2004, August: Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie
Wieczorek-Zeul (SPD) attended the centenary commemorations of the 1904–
1908 uprising
• 2006, October: Hartwig Fischer, MP (CDU), headed a delegation of German MPs
to Namibia
• 2008, April: President of the Bundestag, Prof. Norbert Lammert (CDU)
• 2008, January: Delegation of MPs comprising members of the Parliamentary
Budget Committee, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Defence
• 2008, February: Minister of Education and Research, Dr Annette Schavan (CDU)
• 2008, February: 20-person business delegation visited to inform themselves on
investment opportunities
• 2010, February: Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, Mr Dirk
Niebel (Free Democratic Party, FDP), attended the topping-off ceremony for the
Ohorongo Cement Factory in Otavi, which is Germany’s biggest investment in
Namibia
• 2011, August: Minister Niebel’s visit was specially designed to help develop
cooperation in vocational training and resource management
• 2012, February: Ambassador Walter Lindner, the Director-General of African
Affairs at the Foreign Ministry
• 2012, February: Members of the German Budget Committee – Herbert
Frankenhauser (CDU/Christian Social Union, CSU), Klaus Branden (SPD) and
Heinz-Peter Haustein (FDP) – informed themselves about the effectiveness of
equipment assistance to Namibia
• 2012, April: Prof. Annette Schavan, Minister of Education and Research (CDU)
and her delegation held talks with senior government officials and visited German-
supported projects
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Peter H Katjavivi
• 2012, 24 August–1 September: Niema Movassat, MP (Left Party),26 paid courtesy

calls on the Namibian Government, Parliament and other institutions, and
• 2013, January: Former Minister Heide-Marie Wieczorek-Zeul met members of the
Namibian–German Parliamentary Friendship Group and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, besides visiting some of the communities in Otjimbingwe, Erongo
Region, benefiting from the Namibian–German Special Initiative Programme.
Official visits – Namibia to Germany
• 1996, June: Official state visit by President Dr Sam Nujoma to Germany

• 1997, October: Prime Minister Dr Hage G Geingob (Berlin, Bonn, Dusseldorf)
• 1998, February: Speaker of Parliament Dr Mosé P Tjitendero (Berlin, Bonn,
Bremen, Dresden)
• 1999, June: SWAPO Party of Namibia Secretary-General, Hifikepunye Pohamba,
and delegation (Berlin, Bonn, Rostock, Schwerin)
• 2000, July: Prime Minister Geingob (Expo 2000, Hanover)
• 2000, August: President Nujoma (Expo 2000, Hanover)
• 2000, November: Prime Minister Geingob (Berlin)
• 2002, June: Official working visit by President Nujoma to Germany
• 2005, November: Official state visit by President Hifikepunye Pohamba (Berlin,
Hamburg, Stuttgart)
• 2006, December: Speaker of Parliament Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab (Africa Forum
2006 entitled “Fostering Entrepreneurial Spirit”, within the programme “Building
Global Cooperation – New Alliances with Africa”, Wittenburg)
• 2007, March: Minister of Environment and Tourism Willem Konjore and his
delegation participated in the annual International Tourism Bourse in Berlin
• 2007, July: Official visit by Speaker of Parliament Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab and a
multiparty parliamentary delegation to the Bundestag, which concluded with an
agreement that dialogue should be the key focus for resolution of issues, and the
need to form inter-parliamentary friendship groups
• 2010, August: Official visit by Minister of Youth, National Service, Sport and
Culture, Kazenambo Kazenambo, MP
• 2010, November: Working visit to the Munich Airport by Deputy Minister of
Home Affairs and Immigration, Elia G Kaiyamo, MP
• 2010, November: Namibian Governing Party Chief Whip and former Ambassador
of Namibia to Germany, Prof. Peter Katjavivi, MP (guest speaker at an International
Conference on the Joint Africa–EU Strategy to assess whether the Strategy has
26 It should be noted that Hon. Movassat and his Left Party (Die Linke) colleagues were
particularly instrumental in calling for justice to prevail in terms of the wrongs done to Namibian
communities during the colonial occupation by German forces. Likewise, the SPD and Alliance
90/The Greens have presented a number of motions on Namibia in the Bundestag. The most
recent of these was tabled on 20 March 2012.
144
met Africa’s expectations; the Conference attracted great interest and presented a
high-profile platform for Namibia)
• 2011, March: Prime Minister Nahas Angula (keynote address entitled “The future
of the Namibian nation”, Berlin International Economics Congress)
• 2011, October: Minister of Education Dr Abraham Iyambo visited to discuss
bilateral cooperation to strengthen vocational education and training in Namibia
• 2011, October: A high-level delegation led by Minister of Youth, National Service,
Sport and Culture Kazenambo Kazenambo, MP, which included traditional leaders
of communities affected by atrocities committed by German colonial troops, went
to Berlin to collect human remains for repatriation to Namibia
• 2012, January: Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forestry, John Mutorwa, invited
by his German counterpart, Ilse Aigner, attended and participated in the Fourth
Berlin Agricultural Ministers’ Summit
• 2012, March: Members of the Namibian Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security – Paulus Kapia, Anton von Wietersheim,
Ignatius Shixwameni and Lucia Witbooi – visited to promote open dialogue
between the two Parliaments
• 2012, June: Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr Hage G Geingob, attended the
Conference on Sustainable Raw Materials Industry and Development Policy in
Berlin
• 2012, June: Managing Director of NamPower, Paulinus Shilamba, and his
delegation including the Chief Executive Officer of the Electricity Control Board,
Siseho Simasiku (attendance of the Africa Energy Forum in Berlin)
• 2012, October: Official visit by the Chairperson of the National Assembly Standing
Committee on Economics, Natural Resources and Public Administration, Ben
Amathila, MP, and his delegation at the invitation of the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, and
• 2013, March: Members of the Namibian–German Parliamentary Friendship
Group (PFG), headed by Prof. Peter H Katjavivi, visited as guests of the German
Parliament at the invitation by the German–SADC Parliamentary Friendship Group
and meet the President of the Bundestag, Prof. Norbert Lammert; and Secretary
of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr Emily Haber, accompanied by
the Regional Adviser for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel Zone in the Foreign
Office, Ambassador Egon Kochanke.
Namibian Government officials also regularly attend the annual International Tourism
Bourse Expo in Berlin.
The above list is not exhaustive.
It is noticeable that the inaugural visits following Independence were both at high level
and frequent. However, visits have dwindled from the German side in subsequent years.
This is particularly the case with respect to the positions of head of state (President) and
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Peter H Katjavivi
head of government (Chancellor). Indeed, in his characteristic style, Willy Brandt once
observed the following in reference to such state visits:27
I sometimes wonder – and this applied in part to my time as Chancellor – if these trips bore a
sensible relationship to the results obtained.
He went on as follows:28
Personal contact between leading politicians can often be beneficial, of course, because they
genuinely do represent an international version of the extended family.
Besides, in interpersonal relations, non-verbal communication (body language) is

instrumental in winning hearts and creating a consensus on sensitive and/or critical matters
such as those that characterise the Namibian–German past. Therefore, technological
communication alone minus personal visits cannot be an option for high-level relations
between Namibia and Germany.
Considerable efforts were in fact made by Namibia to invite the former President of
the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr Horst Kohler, to visit Namibia during his term
in office, and those efforts were renewed with regard to his successors. So far, these
efforts have been to no avail. This issue preoccupies the Namibian Embassy in Berlin,
which continues to lobby for such a visit to take place. Several factors are at play in
this hesitation to oblige the invitations. The most important is reference to the subject
of the atrocities committed against Namibians during the German colonial era (1904–
1908), which Namibians demand be officially acknowledged as genocide by the German
Government, together with reparations for the crimes committed during that time. These
two topics continue to be a thorn in the side of high-ranking German officials.
Notably, too, on 10 May 2010, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and the
Regional Office for the Berlin-Brandenburg in Berlin hosted a major national event in
Berlin whose major theme was to celebrate 20 years of partnership between Germany
and Namibia. As the famous saying goes, –29
[i]t is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness.
Former President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, has commented thus on
parliamentary contact between countries:30
27 Brandt (1978:153).
28 (ibid.).
29 Eleanor Roosevelt (1930s).
30 Gorbachev (1987).
146
I think the new style in international foreign relations implies extending their framework far
beyond the limits of diplomatic process. Parliaments along with governments are becoming
increasingly active participants in international contacts, and this is an encouraging development.
German official development aid to Namibia

Bilateral aid via the German Government
As can be seen from the above, early interactions between Namibia and Germany were
marked by high-profile visits. Likewise, it is also noteworthy that both governments
acknowledged and emphasised the shared special relationship based on our common
past. In this respect, the heads of state of both countries have often spoken at state
occasions and characterised the ties between Namibia and Germany as being close
and special. These sentiments are very much in line with the resolution adopted by the
German Parliament prior to Namibia’s independence, namely one that welcomed such
independence and pledged Germany’s special obligation towards Namibia.31
There is no doubt that Namibia continues to benefit from the substantial bilateral
development assistance programme provided by Germany. This programme started soon
after Independence, and targeted the following three broad focal areas:
• The sustainable development and management of natural resources
• Ensuring sustainable economic development, and
• The development of transport infrastructure.
Notably, the total volume of official development aid (ODA) via German bilateral
technical and financial cooperation commitments to Namibia since 1990 – including
the former German Development Service, the former InWEnt (Capacity Building
International), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ),
the Centre for International Migration (CIM), humanitarian assistance, civil society
organisations and political foundations – amounts to some N$7 billion as at 2013.
Furthermore, German development assistance emphasises issues relating to poverty

reduction, the creation of employment, the promotion of good governance, gender
equity, land reform, and the fight against HIV and AIDS.
The Namibian–German development assistance programme is subjected to biennial

review. The author has participated in these review meetings in the past in his capacity
as Namibia’s Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, and later as the Director-
General of the NPC. This exercise is essential to both governments to ensure that such
assistance is being implemented according to the expectations of both countries, and the
31 Handover Report by Prof. Peter H Katjavivi, the then outgoing Namibian Ambassador in Berlin
to Germany, to the Namibian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2008.
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Peter H Katjavivi
meetings provide an excellent opportunity to view progress in various projects being

implemented as well as serving as an occasion for further strengthening the ties between
the two countries.
The most recent bilateral negotiations were held in Germany during May 2011. On that
occasion, both governments reaffirmed their commitment to work towards strengthening
their cooperation. During the meeting, Dirk Niebel, the Federal Minister for Economic
Cooperation and Development, met his Namibian counterpart, Mr Tom Alweendo, my
successor as Director-General of the NPC, and “pledged his country’s commitment to
continue implementing a policy of friendly development between the two countries”.32
During these negotiations, Germany committed to provide N$1.27 billion in ODA to
Namibia over a period of two years, namely 2011–2012. Of this amount, about 40%
consisted of concessional loans – mainly for the Lower Orange Hydro-electric Power
Scheme Project. About 60% will be grants in the form of technical and financial
cooperation, such as €8.5 million devoted to enhancing the transport network, and
supporting land reform and land management in Namibia’s communal areas, and €8
million to the University of Namibia’s Faculty of Engineering on the Ongwediva Campus.
The outcome of the 2011 negotiations are interesting if one looks at the amount of
ODA provided in terms of the breakdown between grants and loans. During the 2011
negotiations, the grant component was more than its loan counterpart, which is a
departure from the pattern of the previous three to four years. Moreover, if one looks at
Germany’s Development Cooperation Policy and the views of Minister Niebel – which
were strongly geared towards private sector development, economic development, trade
and investment, and ODA that supports Germany’s economic interests – the outcome
of the 2011 negotiations was quite unique. During the biennial negotiations covering
2009–2010, loan funding amounted to €85 million vis-à-vis grant funds, which totalled
some €35.5 million. Furthermore, Minister Niebel visited Namibia in September 2011
and toured the country to familiarise himself with the various projects being funded
under German ODA and, in particular, the Ohorongo Cement Company in Otavi.
ODA as grants and/or loans
An area where concern has been expressed in recent years is in relation to the size of
grants vis-à-vis the loans made available by the German Government to its Namibian
counterpart. There is a perception within Namibian Government circles that loans have
overtaken grants from the available resources that are currently being made available by
Germany to Namibia. This point has been disputed by the German development partners.
In my opinion, this issue of grants vis-à-vis loans needs to be seen from a wider
perspective, namely the ODA ‘landscape’ in which Namibia currently finds itself. As an
32 Personal communication.
148
upper-middle-income country, Namibia’s pure grant funding has become increasingly

scarce and very few donors continue to provide grant assistance; those who do so, provide
aid on a limited scale only or offer it as ‘seed money’ to facilitate trade cooperation or
partnerships (notably Sweden and Finland). Furthermore, it is important to note that
ODA is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and others as grants or loans undertaken by the official sector for the promotion
of economic development and welfare as the main objective. To qualify as ODA, loans
need to have a grant element of at least 25%.33 The Namibian Government often only
placed emphasis on the grant part, and did not see the loans as part of ODA. The German
Government, however, views such loans as an important contribution to ODA, given the
concessional terms upon which they are provided. One of the challenges experienced
was that the German Government would in good faith announce some concessional
loan packages and proposals, which in some cases were not taken up by the Namibian
Government, since the Ministry of Finance – which has the mandate to approve loans –
is required to endorse the taking up of such loans. Thus, if one views the commitment
and disbursement figures of Germany’s ODA to Namibia, disbursements have not
been that good for precisely this reason: the amount of loans announced at the bilateral
negotiations as part of the ODA package is not always taken up by the Namibian side for
various reasons.
Nonetheless, Namibia’s German partners maintain that the ODA they provide to Namibia
through grants is still higher than the loans they have offered. Arguments over this matter
continue, with both sides holding on to their respective positions.
It should be stated here that both Namibia and Germany are committed to the principles
set out in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action on Aid Effectiveness, and
there are opportunities for revisiting this and other related issues during the course of
their biennial negotiations. As most good partners, it is important for both governments
to utilise established forums and thereby maintain dialogue for the purpose of finding
solutions to whatever challenges might arise from time to time. The Paris Declaration
and Accra Agenda for Action stressed the need for a new paradigm that focused on
partnership in development cooperation based on the principles of inclusive ownership,
transparency, predictability and mutual accountability. Thus, it goes without saying that
the stakeholders within the Namibian–German partnership should become aware of each
other’s perspectives and be ready to deal with any emerging challenges.
Implementing partners
Germany’s development aid is provided in the form of financial and technical cooperation
and is administered by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
33 See the OECD definition of ODA; available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf,

last accessed 21 September 2013.
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Peter H Katjavivi
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/BMZ).

On behalf of the BMZ, German organisations cooperate with their Namibian partners
in various programmes and projects. A case in point is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the new agency formed after the merger of the
following:
• German Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/
GTZ)
• German Development Service (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst/DED), and
• InWEnt – Capacity Building International, Germany.
Another government-related body is the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), which

is responsible for Germany’s financial aid programmes on a bilateral, multilateral and
private level. Also, the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources
(Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe/BGR), the Centre for International
Migration and Development (CIM), and the German Investment and Development
Company (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft/DEG) are examples of
similar German organisations which are active in Namibia.
Aid via German NGOs34
Some of the German Government’s development aid is channelled through German

NGOs, international organisations and multilateral institutions. The German public
strongly supports the agenda for social, health and environmental issues in Germany
and abroad.
The German NGO community can be more or less grouped together in four categories:
• Political foundations
• Church-based organisations (CBOs), and
• Local organisations.
Political foundations are affiliated to major German political parties. They are involved
in political lobbying and awareness-raising and provide assistance to NGO development
projects.
CBOs were the first to receive public funding in the early 1960s. Since then, collaboration
with the German Government has increased and procedures adapted to allow for the
funding of projects and programmes. Some examples of CBOs are Brot für die Welt
(“Bread for the World”), which works in close cooperation with the Evangelical Lutheran
34 See also NID (2009), which includes some Namibian NGOs working closely with those in
Germany to provide humanitarian assistance within Namibia.
150
Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN), Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland

(Evangelical Church in Germany), Johanniter Hilfswerk (Knights of St John), and
Miserior (Catholic Central Office).
Of the large number of other development organisations, many have grant programmes
for supporting development and environmental NGOs in Namibia. They obtain their
finances from various sources, including the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development. Other sources of revenue include public donations and contributions,
legacies, sale of products, and consultancy services.
The following are some examples of German NGOs that collaborate with Namibia at
some level.
Senior Experten Service (SES)
Senior Experten Service (SES), a non-profit organisation, is the Foundation of

German Industry for International Cooperation (Stiftung der deutschen Wirtschaft für
internationale Zusammenarbeit). The SES offers interested retirees the opportunity to
pass on their skills and knowledge to others, both within Germany and abroad. They
work in a voluntary capacity as Senior Experts, helping to train both specialist workers
and management staff.
Solidarity Service International (SODI)
Solidarity Service International (SODI) campaigns for solidarity and a just and peaceful
world in which a natural way of life is preserved. SODI is also a non-profit association,
and is independent of particular political and ideological views. SODI was founded
in 1990, and succeeded the former Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic
Republic. Significant in its constitution and development was its participation in the East
German ‘round table for development policy, as well as the strong will of its members
and donors to advocate international solidarity in a united Germany.
Presently, the association has more than 300 members. Furthermore, it is supported
by volunteers, grass-roots initiatives and donor groups. SODI is funded by donations,
membership fees and public funds. Since 1994 they have received yearly accreditation
from the German Central Institute for Social Issues (Stiftung Deutsches Zentralinstitut
für soziale Fragen/DZI). SODI is a member of civil society networks and participates in
national and international campaigns to reach its goals. SODI and its Namibian partner,
the Clay House Project, constructed 600 dry toilets in Otjiwarongo and in rural areas in
northern Namibia. These facilities serve over 4,500 people, who actively took part in the
construction of the toilets and who learned how to maintain them themselves.
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Peter H Katjavivi
Weltfriedensdienst eV (WFD)
The WFD was founded in 1959 in Berlin. Together with other organisations and initiatives
in southern and northern Germany, the WFD advocates and works for social justice, the
observation and implementation of human rights, equal support of both women and men
in development processes, and sustainable economic and agricultural activities which
preserve natural resources. The WFD runs several projects in Namibia, including a crisis
management fund for orphans, and a project for children living in Katutura.
Ombili Stiftung eV
Supported largely by the Lions’ Club of Mosbach in Germany, Ombili was founded in
1989. The Ombili Foundation and School, located in northern Namibia, is dedicated
to providing education and training to the San people of Namibia. From 1990 to 1997,
projects such as a 4-ha vegetable garden under irrigation were established. Traditional
and other handicrafts are encouraged and taught, and the products are bought by the
Foundation to be sold locally or they are exported. A community centre, a school, a
workshop, a kindergarten, a hostel, classrooms, and staff housing for teachers and
employees at the Foundation have been constructed with the sponsorships of financial
contributions by German NGOs as well as donations by private individuals.
Freundeskreis Gesundheit für Ombili Berlin-Brandenburg eV
This medical association is very helpful in assisting with San community project
activities in Namibia. For several years, they have organised a biannual concert in Berlin
for the benefit of the San.
Bürgersinn Stiftung/Baumgartsbrunn Farm School
The Bürgersinn Foundation supports the Baumgartsbrunn Farm School project in

Namibia in particular. The project is committed to helping young women and children
to help themselves. A primary school and a guest farm belong to the project as well.
The principal goal for Baumgartsbrunn is to secure the existence of this model project
of North–South cooperation beyond the death of its founder, Helmut Bleks, and to
sustainably develop the project for the future. The project is run by the Helmut Bleks
Foundation in Germany in collaboration with the Bürgersinn Foundation.
Deutsch-Namibische-Entwicklungsgesellschaft eV/German–Namibian Development

Society
Since the formation of the German-Namibian Development Society in 1983, it has

worked towards improving living conditions in Namibia and has been supporting long-
152
term as well as sustainable and effective development projects in Namibia, especially in

rural areas. The Society is active in the fields of medical care, education and vocational
training, scholarships, student exchanges, the establishment of community centres,
support of cultural and science-related institutions, and sustainable agriculture projects.
Deutsch-Namibischer Hilfsfonds Quandt eV/Quandt Development Trust Fund
The Quandt Development Trust Fund was founded after the German Honorary Consul
for Namibia, Georg Quandt, who supported projects for the poor in Namibia for 30 years
as a private initiative in order to increase the effectiveness of development assistance.
The main goals of this initiative are fighting poverty; anti-AIDS programmes; support
of women’s cooperatives; supervision of kindergartens, nursing homes and orphanages;
care for bush hospitals; school buildings and equipment for communities and universities;
and cultural exchanges. Specific assistance from the Fund has arrived during periods of
natural catastrophes such as floods or drought, when they have donated containers of
new clothes, blankets and medical equipment to Namibia.
NGOs that help children
• Hilfe für Namibia eV/Help for Namibia
This association was established in 1988. Since then, it has a partner association in
Windhoek who assists in identifying projects in need of help. Several institutions in
Namibia are supported by Help for Namibia, including the hostel in Rietoog, Association
for Children with Language, Speech and Hearing Impairments of Namibia (CLaSH), the
Gobabis Kindergarten, the Rakutuka Primary School, the retirement home in Rehoboth,
the Kombat Primary School, and the Khoandawes Primary School.
• Kinderhilfe in Namibia eV/Help for Children in Namibia
This NGO supports self-help projects in local communities regarding the construction,
enlargement and improvement of day-care centres, pre-primary schools (kindergartens)
and schools. Kinderhilfe also provides secondary school learners with scholarships. The
organisation realised the need for classrooms, pre-primary schools, kindergartens and
school equipment. Institutions that are involved in the education process are supported
by way of building materials for -
• the construction and renovation of classrooms and of pre-primary schools
• the construction, upgrading and renovation of kindergartens
• the maintenance, renovation and upgrading of hostels, and
• the improvement of infrastructure, e.g. storerooms, sports facilities and toilets, as
well as educational equipment.
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Peter H Katjavivi
For some big projects, Kinderhilfe has received funding from Sternstunden – a benefit
programme run by the Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation, the Irma Pfeifer Foundation,
and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
• Other NGOs that help children
Some smaller German NGOs committed to the support of children in Namibia in

respect of similar projects include LionKids Namibia eV, Deutsch-Namibischer
Partnerschaftsverein eV, Namibiakids eV, and Fahrräder für Afrika eV/Bicycles for
Africa, which cooperates closely with the Bicycle Empowering Network (BEN)
Namibia. BEN Namibia aims to empower disadvantaged Namibians through provision
of sustainable transport and bicycle-related income generation opportunities.
Support Ulm eV
Support Ulm eV is a non-profit organisation whose goal is support of a medical nature.

The organisation was founded in 2005 by voluntary citizens in various occupations of
the town of Ulm in Germany. Examples of projects they support are the Otavi Health
Clinic, the Albino Corner, several anti-AIDS campaigns, and a medical station to provide
medical assistance in the Otavi area.
The Namibian response to NGO assistance
On the Namibian side, the NGO desk in the National Planning Commission (NPC) and
NANGOF, the Namibian NGO Forum, need to be strengthened in their liaison with
international NGOs, specifically German NGOs. They need to undertake properly
focused and well-coordinated approaches to channelling donor assistance to needy
communities in Namibia.
Other important factors that influence bilateral relations

Other factors that should be looked at while reviewing the bilateral relations between
Namibia and Germany are the two countries’ mutual membership of certain groupings.
For instance, on the UN front, both Namibia and Germany call for the world body to
undergo major reform. However, it should be noted that actions by one country through
other membership groupings can have an impact on the other country. Similarly, whereas
it is accepted that Namibian–German bilateral relations were built on shared values, it
is nevertheless expected that these relations can face particular challenges from time to
time. In the late 1990s, for instance, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo faced an imminent danger of collapsing after it had been attacked by external
forces. In the light of this situation, the leadership of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), which included Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, combined their
154
forces and played a decisive role in helping to prevent President Desiré Laurent Kabila’s
government from falling during that critical time. However, the military intervention by
these three SADC countries did not go down well with some of Namibia’s development
partners, including Germany. This development directly affected German official
development assistance to Namibia, which was reduced during the period in question.
Nevertheless, relations were later salvaged.
Furthermore, the relations between the African continent and the EU have undergone
significant changes in recent years. African–EU relations are transforming from a
partnership relating to the Cotonou Agreement to the Lisbon Treaty. This has produced
a great deal of uncertainty among the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
On the trade front, the greatest concern being expressed by ACP countries, including
Namibia, has revolved around EPAs with the EU. Negotiations concerning the EPAs
have so far not produced agreements acceptable to Namibia and some other countries. As
a publication from the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
points out, –35
[t]he EPA negotiation process has placed a heavy burden on the EU–Africa relationship, and it
has also put pressure on the inner coherence of the ACP.
Another issue that has placed a burden on Namibian–German relations is the

implementation of the Schengen visa regime by the EU. This development has placed
Germany in a position where they do not reciprocate Namibia’s granting of a ‘no visa’
requirement to German citizens visiting the country. However, the German Government
has now exempted Namibian diplomatic passport holders from requiring visas to enter
Germany.
Dealing with the pain of the past

Just as Namibia’s foreign policy has been shaped by its past and by the liberation struggle,
it could also be argued that the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany has
its origin in the foreign policy of West Germany. Ultimately, Germany’s current foreign
policy can be traced to a number of steps taken within the former West Germany’s
foreign policy.36 Maull, one of the renowned commentators on German foreign policy,
has elaborated on this aspect, explaining that the country wants –37
… to be perceived as a reliable ally and a fair partner, and it rests importantly on leadership by
example.
35 See various ECDPM publications on the EPAs, as well as Katjavivi (2012).

36 Maull (2011:148–161).
37 (ibid.).
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Peter H Katjavivi
Furthermore, Maull, in a 2011 article on globalisation and German foreign policy, asks
how the policy should position itself.38 He suggests several guidelines that would serve
Germany well, summing these up as the task of steering the country along a course that
would maintain and enhance public welfare in a sustainable way, to benefit not only the
society at home, but also in the rest of the world. Maull constantly refers to the world
going through a number of difficult foreign policy challenges, including crises that affect
international relations in general, and, in particular, the North–South collaboration.39
Judt and Snyder have it that, until recently, it was not fashionable in Germany to try
to promote the concept of caring for the needy for the purpose of promoting equity
within societies.40 Furthermore, the authors claim, until recently, it was not politically
fashionable to discuss and emphasise suffering within German societies, including
the suffering of German citizens during the Allied Forces’ bombings in World War II,
because this would reignite the debate of National Socialist German atrocities against
others, and would probably relativise Germany’s crimes vis-à-vis atrocities by others
against Germans.41 This thinking has continued to shape the entire political debate on
addressing war and colonial atrocities in some sections of German society and, to a
larger extent, all former imperial powers to date. It is easier to try to brush facts related
to colonial oppression under the carpet than to face and appropriately address them.
Despite this, however, there has been a re-examination of the past:42
Today, Germans and others engage their past in terms closely comparable to those familiar to
us from historiography elsewhere. Since this shift in perspective occurred in exactly the decade
when victimhood was taking centre stage in historical and political debates across the West, we
should not be surprised that questions of comparative suffering, apology and commemoration
– familiar from American identity politics to the South African truth commissions – have their
place in German conversations as well.
According to Frank Chikane, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) was perceived as “a historic task”.43 And according to Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, the South African TRC was regarded as the most ambitious, “a kind of benchmark
against which the rest are measured”.44 Material compensation is, as Tötemeyer points
out, a component of restorative justice for atrocities committed in the past.45
38 (ibid.).
39 (ibid.).
40 Judt & Snyder (2012).
41 (ibid.:44–45).
42 (ibid.).
43 Chikane (2013:305).
44 (ibid.:306).
45 Tötemeyer (2013:80).
156
Despite the warm relations that have developed between the Namibian and German
Governments since 1990, there has been a continuous wave of demands for dialogue
over the bloody conflict that characterised the history of both countries. For this reason,
the affected Namibian communities believe successive German Governments have not
addressed the painful realities of the genocide. This has led them to petition the German
authorities through various forums to have their grievances heard. These communities
have also resorted to taking the German Government to court in the United States of
America. The court case in the USA ended inconclusively, but other form of actions
continued, including the motion on reparations introduced in the Namibian National
Assembly and unanimously adopted in October 2005.
I have written elsewhere about the plight of the Namibian people under German colonial
rule:46
The ordeal suffered by Namibians during this period is well captured in the Blue Book of 1918,
produced by the British Government. In 2003, Dr Zephania Kameeta, Bishop of the Lutheran
Church in Namibia, has written a preface for the re-published version of the Blue Book, saying
that the book reveals “one long nightmare of suffering, bloodshed, tears, humiliation and death”.
It is indeed a sensitive and emotional issue for us in Namibia. As the title of the re-
published Blue Book states, ‘words cannot be found’ to fully describe how people felt
about their suffering. In an interview, the South African Judge and international war
crime prosecutor Richard J Goldstone once said:47
It really is a natural cry in every human being on every continent: when you’ve been victimized,
you want justice. … where those cries are unheeded, that causes cycles of violence, cycles of
unhappiness … There is this anger that builds up from generation to generation.
We are therefore reminded that, in order to heal the wounds of the past, it is essential
to implement a process of justice or reach out to the victims. It is also important for
us to take note of the work done by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in its
efforts “to establish a material and moral basis for the crusade for reparations”. Both
Prof. Ali Mazrui48 and Ambassador Dudley Thompson49 have made powerful statements
of encouragement in respect of establishing –
… Regional Committees on reparations in all regions of the world, in which Africans and
people of African descent are to be found.
46 Katjavivi (2008:91).
47 (ibid.).
48 Mazrui (1993:58–72).
49 Thompson (1993:21–27).
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Peter H Katjavivi
The Minister’s apology
It is important to appreciate the courageous apology in the words of the Lord’s Prayer,
“Forgive us our trespasses”, made by Ms Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, then German
Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, during her visit to
Namibia to mark the August 2004 Centennial Remembrance of the atrocities committed
by the German colonial troops in Namibia. This event was held near Okakarara, not far
from where some of the most bloody battles had taken place.
In the eyes of many observers, as I have written elsewhere, this was –
… an apology that is rooted in acknowledging the historic injustice and human damages that
were caused. Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab, who was the Prime Minister of Namibia at that time, later
pointed out that “those words reverberated across the entire country, and our people said ‘Yes,
at long last.’”
I went further and quoted Judge Goldstone:50
The public and official exposure of truth … is itself an important form of justice … Common
to all forms of justice is public acknowledgement for the victims. I witnessed time and again
in South Africa, Bosnia and Rwanda the importance of that acknowledgement to victims. It is
frequently the beginning of their healing process.
Thus, the affected Namibian communities are still of the opinion that an apology can
only be the first step towards serving justice in this particular matter. Since the adoption
of the motion in the National Assembly in 2005, the affected communities have
embarked on a constant consultation process with the Namibian Government, which
in turn has taken on a facilitation role. It is in this context that, in December 2007,
Prime Minister Nahas Angula, on behalf of the Namibian Government, transmitted the
unanimously adopted resolution in support of the claims for reparations to Dr Frank-
Walter Steinmeier, then Foreign Minister and Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany for consideration of the matter. However, the German authorities indicated
that the Namibian Government had not stated its own position and, therefore, it was not
a government-to-government matter. Since then, however, the Namibian President has
formally taken up the issue with the German authorities.
The Namibian–German Special Initiative Programme
Minister Wieczorek-Zeul’s visit to Namibia in 2004 was followed by the introduction

of the Namibian–German Special Initiative Programme (NGSIP), with a pledge of a
€20-million grant from the German Government. However, we are told that the project
50 Katjavivi (2008:91).
158
originally had a different name. Minister Wieczorek-Zeul reportedly spoke in Dusseldorf

in 2005, having –51
… presented what she called a Reconciliation Initiative: development aid amounting to 20

million euro for the descendents of the population groups affected by the genocide in Namibia.
The aid was to be spent on community-based projects in those communities in central

and southern Namibia – the Herero, Nama and Damara – who were affected by the
genocide.
The German Government decision to provide €20 million was initially regarded by many
observers as having been unilateral on their part. However, the initiative was followed
up, presented and discussed between the two governments. In this connection, President
Pohamba was approached by the German authorities during his state visit to Germany
in 2005, and presented with a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Special
Initiative project. It was reported that this move took the Namibian President by surprise.
For this reason, he declined to sign the said document at the time, and suggested that
further consultations were needed.
After having consulted with all necessary stakeholders, President Pohamba appointed
Deputy Prime Minister Dr Libertina Amathila to consult the traditional leaders of the
affected communities. Accordingly, Dr Amathila produced a report which eventually
formed the basis for the implementation of the NGSIP. The process to undertake this
task took a long time. This was due to various logistic constraints and the necessary
consultations that had taken place between Namibian and German authorities. For these
reasons, the actual implementation only took place in November 2007. The Namibian
Government’s implementing agency was the National Planning Commission (NPC).52
It must be acknowledged, however, that the various traditional leaders were displeased
with the manner in which projects were being implemented. They had complained
repeatedly about the lack of transparency and poor coordination with the would-be
beneficiaries. This challenge faced the staff of the NPC, and the reigning mood when
the author became the Director-General of the NPC in 2008 was despondent. In the light
of the complaints by traditional leaders, the Namibian and German authorities stepped
up their efforts to deal with the specific points that had been raised. Firstly, the relevant
implementation committee structures were reorganised and additional people with
appropriate expertise were appointed. Secondly, it became essential to appoint a new
coordinator for the programme. These changes assisted the programme’s implementation
process, and made it more accountable to stakeholders.
51 (ibid.).
52 See debates in the Namibia National Assembly, 17 February–12 March 2009, in Parliament of
the Republic of Namibia (2009:300).
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Peter H Katjavivi
The grant of €20 million pledged by Minister Wieczorek-Zeul unleashed a torrent of

debate and confusion which had to be managed by both governments, who explained
that the NGSIP was not a reparations programme per se. From the Namibian side, this
assistance was applied to benefit all people in the targeted regions in order not to cause
ethnic division or tension. Indeed, the Namibian Government’s take on the issue is to
develop infrastructure that benefits the wider community within the identified regions.
German authorities had to regularly clarify to Namibian authorities that this funding was
not for reparations. Due to different interpretations and expectations of what the NGSIP
was intended to deliver, it has received extensive media coverage and attention both in
Namibia and in Germany.
The NGSIP is quite unique. Despite the complaints, it is one of the few programmes
where communities have had the opportunity to identify their needs and projects directly.
Consultations were held with regional councillors, the various traditional leaders,
constituencies, and with central ministries in order to have a coordinated approach and to
integrate the programme within Namibia’s structures and institutions as far as possible.
This was done to make use of local capacities to implement and sustain the relevant
projects in the future.
However, the implementation of the NGSIP has been very slow for a number of reasons.
Some of these reasons were lengthy and bureaucratic procedures on both sides, protracted
community consultations, and the reviewing of priority needs. Indeed, implementation
is still under way. The serious delays experienced have triggered renewed attention on
the NGSIP as well as renewed calls for reparations.53 This led to a number of visits
from Germany to Namibia, notably by Ambassador Walter Lindner. The last time he
came, in February 2012, was in order to see what the problems were in terms of the
NGSIP and how its implementation could be accelerated. During these discussions, the
NPC sensitised the Ambassador and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and
Development about the need for additional funding for the NGSIP in order to honour the
original commitments Germany made to the relevant communities in Namibia. This was
necessary because the NGSIP had experienced a shortfall following the implementation
delays, which had not been foreseen: no price escalation or inflation index had been
included in the budget. It is understood that, furthermore, the 2007 Feasibility Report
produced by Namibia’s NPC had underestimated the design and supervision consultancy
costs, and had made no budgetary provision for capacity-building to support beneficiaries
to obtain maximum and sustainable benefits from project investments. As a result, the
total funds required to fund the original projects were 70% above the 2007 budget.
The NPC officially approached the German Government in March 2012 and requested
additional funding amounting to N$104 million, being the NGSIP investment cost to
implement the projects originally agreed with the communities concerned. Germany
responded positively to this request, and granted the additional funds.
53 NPC (2013).
160
It may be fair to say that the NGSIP drew attention to more serious and unresolved
matters, such as the reparations issue and, as such, escalated the urgency to try to deal
with them. It is important for Germany – but also for Namibia – to ensure that the NGSIP
works. Some believe that the NGSIP has the potential to assist the communities affected,
and that a number of useful lessons can be drawn from how this programme was prepared
and is implemented.
Many people in both Namibia and Germany regarded a description of the ‘reconciliation
initiative’ to be more appropriate than the ‘Special Initiative’ label when viewed against
the issue of genocide that had moved Minister Wieczorek-Zeul to tears when she
addressed the 2004 event at Okakarara. No wonder her preferred words were those of a
“reconciliation initiative”.54 This explains her symbolic gesture of goodwill, expressed in
the form of €20 million towards those she regarded as victims of bloody colonial war. It
appears that Minister Wieczorek-Zeul perhaps did not win the game of words regarding
the finalisation of the NGSIP, but she certainly won the hearts of many Namibians for
her courage to stand before them and say, “We are sorry for what we did here!” Even
more remarkable is that she represented the same political tradition of those German
parliamentarians who had been opposed to colonial wars in Namibia at the turn of the
20th Century.55 However, this framing of the NGSIP as a reconciliation initiative was not
acceptable to the German authorities overall. This is not surprising, given the German
Government’s sensitivity when it came to its history in Namibia, including the issue
relating to the demand for reparations.
This subject was further emphasised by the Speaker of the Namibian National Assembly,
Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab, during his visit to Germany in July 2007 as the head of an all-
party delegation of MPs invited by Bundestag President Dr Norbert Lammert.56 While
in Germany, Dr Gurirab and his delegation had the opportunity to exchange views with
their German counterparts on a number of issues, including the question of reparations.
Equally, German MPs were interested in seeking the views of their Namibian
counterparts with regard to the motion adopted by the Namibian National Assembly to
ascertain whether that was the majority view. In that respect, it could be said that both
the Namibian and German MPs were interested in having a structured form of dialogue,
dealing with matters of mutual interest – including the said motion. This willingness
was observed on both sides, as was their readiness to engage in dialogue that aimed at
finding a lasting solution to the Namibian–German conflict of the past. There is no doubt
that such a move should be encouraged and supported both in Namibia and in Germany.
Ideally, such an initiative might hold promise for a better understanding of each other’s
54 Refer to the inception of the NGSIP.

55 For the duration of the period 1904–1908, the precursor of the SPD was the opposition party in
the Bundestag, and it had pronounced itself against the German colonial wars in Africa.
56 This meeting marked a greatly renewed interest in Namibian–German relations. For more
detail, see Parliament Journal, 6(1), January–April 2008.
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Peter H Katjavivi
positions as well as contributing towards the strengthening of the Namibian–German

relations. Dr Gurirab spoke on the possible way forward in optimistic terms, but also
sounded a word of caution:57
My own view is that all tracks should be kept open and an all-inclusive dialogue, which seeks
consensus and satisfactory outcome, must guide all the parties concerned. But a dialogue,
while avoiding a rush, must, however, be time-bound. A dialogue which does not find a lasting
solution would unhappily be a waste of time. By default, that would yet again end up as a
betrayal of trust. Neither the German Government nor the Namibian Government can stand
up in the face of such an indictment. I know that we can and we want to do better to close this
ominous chapter of the brutal colonial history.
If we look at the relations and cooperation – historically, politically, economically and

culturally – between the two countries, it is evident that both sides have more to lose
than to gain if these issues are not resolved. In this respect it has also become clear that
the amount of ODA given by Germany, albeit high, and the NGSIP should be viewed
separately and cannot act as a substitute for dealing with the real issues at hand.
The repatriation of human remains
During my time as Namibia’s Ambassador to Berlin, word got to me that several skulls
of Namibian ancestors who had been victims of German atrocities were being kept in
medical and other research institutions in Germany, having been taken there in the early
20th Century to facilitate an unfounded anthropological research theory which assumed
that black Africans were inferior to persons of European descent. I then initiated talks
on the need to have these human remains returned to their homeland. The German and
Namibian Governments engaged in detailed talks on the subject, leading to the first
return of 20 skulls of Herero and Nama ancestors, in October 2011.
However, the return of these remains was not as smooth as had been expected. The
Namibian Government had sent a high-level delegation to Germany, comprising
traditional leaders of the affected communities, led by Hon. Kazenambo Kazenambo,
Namibia’s Minister of Youth, National Service, Sport and Culture. The German side
was represented by a lower-ranking Minister, Cornelia Pieper, who was then Minister
of State in the German Foreign Office. In terms of protocol, the Namibian Government
viewed the German Government’s decision to send a Minister of State instead of a
full Cabinet Minister to represent them as an attempt to downgrade the event and an
apparent denial of responsibility for the actions of the German colonial occupation
forces. Certainly, the lukewarm approach on the part of the German authorities to the
entire subject of the return of the human remains cast serious doubt on the sincerity of the
German Government about the subject of reconciliation. Initially, the German authorities
preferred to use the term regret rather than apologise to refer to the genocide actions of
57 Katjavivi (2008:91).
162
their occupation forces at the time. As illustrated by Yonas Endrias, the spokesperson of
the German NGO Alliance, –58
[t]he German Government uses the term regret instead of apologize. One regrets a minor crime,
but genocide is the worst of all crimes, a crime against humanity.
Minister Kazenambo urged Germany to embrace openness in their future dealings

with Namibian communities. Furthermore, on the occasion of the requiem mass held
in Windhoek for the fallen souls to whom the skulls belonged, Namibian President
Pohamba said the following:59
We will continue to work with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to strengthen
the ties of bilateral cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit of our two
peoples. We also trust that our two countries will continue working together to complete the
repatriation of the remains that are still in Germany.
At Namibia’s national commemoration for the 20 Namibian skulls returned from

Germany, German Ambassador to Namibia at the time, HE Egon Kochanke, said –60
… the return of the skulls reminds us of a dark chapter in history, which still causes tremendous
grief.
In his own words, he said:61
Allow me to mourn with you and to bow my head in deep regret.
Notably, there are still more human skulls of Namibian ancestors in Germany that are yet
to be returned to their motherland. The first shipment of skulls returned from the Charité
Hospital in the Berlin Medical Historical Museum comprised 20 skulls, i.e. 11 from
Nama and 9 from Ovaherero communities. There are several other skulls still housed at
the Freiburg University research facility.
Notably, although Minister Pieper acknowledged that Germany accepted its heavy
moral and historical responsibility towards Namibia she left the venue before hearing
the statement by the Namibian Minister who had led the Namibia delegation. This was
perceived by the Namibian delegation as a show of disrespect.
Ambassador Kochanke, while speaking at the signing of a N$660-million cooperation

and financing agreement between his government and Namibia in 2011, soon after the
58 Namibia Review, 19(4), Sept/Oct 2011:9.

59 (ibid.:10–11).
60 “Namibian skulls’ return prompts new demands”, The Local, German Television News in
English, broadcast. 6 October 2011, 06:40 CET.
61 (ibid.).
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Peter H Katjavivi
return of the Namibian skulls, described it as a “sensitive topic”, which had had a negative
influence on bilateral relations between the two countries.62
In an effort to cool or defuse the tensions that had developed around the issue of the
skulls in particular, the German Government dispatched Ambassador Walter Lindner,
Director-General for African Affairs in the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
to Namibia towards the end of January 2012. The purpose of Lindner’s visit was to meet
Namibian stakeholders who included the Prime Minister, MPs,63 and traditional leaders
from the affected communities, on the main issues below:
• Strengthening of bilateral cooperation between Namibia and Germany
• Identifying the obstacles and challenges in implementing the NGSIP with a view
to managing these challenges, and
• Addressing issues relating to the repatriation of the other existing human remains
from Germany to Namibia.
In terms of civil society, more than 100 German NGOs have signed a “No Amnesty to
Genocide” appeal to the German Parliament, joining the demand for a formal apology
for the genocide and reparations. The alliance demands a prompt, official apology
from the Bundestag itself, as well as the initiation of a “respectful dialogue” with the
communities concerned in Namibia as regards “symbolic and material reparations”. In
addition, the alliance has called for the establishment of a German foundation that would
dedicate itself to the “critical” reappraisal of German history, with a particular focus on
colonialism and the genocide committed in Namibia.
The way forward

What is the way forward in Namibian–German relations? As I have indicated before,
these bilateral relations have gone through their ups and downs, but, as we have learnt,
the relationship is one that is built on common interests.
It is important to continue to emphasise Namibia’s high potential to Germany and other

parts of the world in respect of being an investment destination. In recognition of this
important role, the Namibian Government should ensure that appropriate ministries and
institutions intensify and, where necessary, revise and refine existing strategies with a
view to broadening the landscape that would continue its drive to bring in the private
sector and civil society role players. This could be done through constantly emphasising
Namibia’s national vision – Vision 2030 and its five-year National Development Plans
62 “Collectors of skulls had hidden agenda – German Ambassador”, The Namibian, 17 November
2011. For further details on the significance of the repatriation of Namibian human skulls, see
Katjavivi (2011).
63 The author, speaking on behalf of Namibian MPs, briefed Ambassador Lindner on 2 February
2012 on the subject in a Windhoek meeting.
164
– on the basis of a well-built system of coordination and structures linked to an efficient

evaluation mechanism. For example, before the NGSIP can be utilised as a platform
for a larger strategy to solve the needs of Namibia’s needy communities, it should be
evaluated in its entirety so as to take into account the lessons learnt, challenges met, and
further opportunities that have accrued through its very existence.
Namibia should also utilise its parliamentary and other strategic partnerships to continue
to speak out on issues it considers to be of a strategic nature, including the needs and
expectations of the people of Namibia. For instance, Namibia faces particular challenges
with regard to the impact of climate change on its fragile ecosystems. In this connection,
Namibia could make a strong and compelling argument to its international development
partners, including Germany, by emphasising the direct connection between healthy
ecosystems and securing food and fresh water, a healthy economy, and healthy people.
Knowing the Federal Republic of Germany’s interest and commitment towards
environmental challenges in general and to climate change in particular, Namibia might
have a win-win situation on that score!
From everything that we have observed in the above discussion or have known beyond
it with regard to relations between the two countries, it is clear that both Namibia and
Germany have managed to maintain mutually beneficial ties over the years. However,
there is unfinished business. Namibians still regard Germany’s apology for the genocide
as partial: one that can only be complete if accompanied by meaningful compensation
for the wrongs committed in the past,64 and aimed at bettering the livelihood of the
communities originally affected, as part of the process of healing the wounds. Notably, to
date, Germany has ruled out reparation and maintains that its €600 million in development
aid since Namibia’s Independence has been “for the benefit of all Namibians”.65
How can Germany deal with the past in relation to Namibia? For this to happen
successfully, both the Namibian and German Governments and their respective national
Parliaments need to promote dialogue at the appropriate levels of society. It is worth
noting that both the Namibian President and his counterpart, the German Chancellor,
have begun engaging each other on these issues through direct communication between
Windhoek and Berlin. The Namibian–German Parliamentary Friendship Group was
encouraged during its visit to Germany in March 2013 to hear that the German–SADC
Parliamentary Friendship Group had embraced the concept of engagement through
dialogue to deal with the unresolved issues between Germany and Namibia, within the
German Parliament. All parties represented within the Bundestag have agreed to address
these issues. What is now required is a well-structured dialogue with a given time frame.
64 For details, see Olusoga & Erichsen (2010); Sarkin (2011).

65 “Namibian skulls’ return prompts new demands”, The Local, German Television News in
English, broadcast. 6 October 2011, 06:40 CET.
165
Peter H Katjavivi
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168
Unequal but intertwined:
Namibia’s bilateral relationship with South Africa
Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari* and Chris Saunders**
Namibia’s post-Independence bilateral relations with South Africa were shaped in large
part by two dominant facts: that its large neighbour to the south had ruled Namibia for
75 years (1915–1990) and left behind an extensive legacy, and that Namibia remained
economically very closely intertwined with South Africa, which had Africa’s largest
economy. Initial relations with South Africa were also significantly influenced by the
particular global context in which Namibia gained its independence, namely the end of the
Cold War. At the same time, apartheid South Africa began to emerge from international
isolation, in large part because it finally agreed in 1988, under great pressure, that Namibia
should become independent via a process involving the United Nations (UN). It was not
until 1994, however, that Namibia’s relations with South Africa changed significantly,
with the incorporation of Walvis Bay and then the advent of a democratically-elected
government in South Africa a few months later. Relations between the two countries
have not always been close since 1994, however, partly because of the past relationship
between the two liberation movements that became the ruling parties in the two countries.
Relations between Namibia and South Africa since Namibia’s independence in 1990 are,
then, the product of history, of geographical continuity, of economic interdependence and
integration, of culture, and of politics. As the last coloniser of Namibia, South Africa has
a continuing influence on numerous aspects of the post-colony, including its economy,
its social structure, its criminal justice system, its tourism sector, and its foreign relations.
This legacy is much in evidence in Namibia’s macroeconomic performance, particularly
in the fiscal and monetary policies of the new state, as well as in its trade relations.
Twenty-three years after Independence, Namibia’s economy remains closely linked to
South Africa’s. Back in 1992, President Sam Nujoma complained that Namibia imported
everything from South Africa and had no significant exports to that country.1 In 2011,
Namibia imported R35.4 billion worth of goods from South Africa, accounting for 66%
of the country’s exports, while 30% of Namibia’s exports, valued at R8.3 billion, were
destined for the South African market. In 2012, South African investments in Namibia
were estimated at R58.47 billion.2 Moreover, Namibia’s retail and commercial sectors
have, since Independence, been dominated by South African corporates, including Pick
n Pay, Shoprite, Standard Bank, and First National Bank – to mention but a few.
* Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari is a Senior Research Fellow at the South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIIA).
** Prof. Chris Saunders is Emeritus Professor at the University of Cape Town, where he taught for
many years in the Department of Historical Studies.
1 Republic of Namibia ([n.d.]:180).
2 South African High Commission ([n.d.]).
169
Namibia has viewed democratic South Africa since 1994 as the centrepiece of its
economic diplomacy, yet has continued to be uneasy about its relations with its bigger
neighbour. The two liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and
the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), did not always work closely
together during their years of struggle against apartheid, despite having the apartheid
regime as a common enemy. In the 1960s, SWAPO – founded almost 50 years after the
ANC – continued its earlier campaigns against the incorporation of Namibia into South
Africa. SWAPO’s liberation politics were initially largely Sino-inspired, at a time when
Soviet influence became a dominant ideological anchor for the ANC. While SWAPO’s
military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), fought impressively
in what it saw as a war for liberation against apartheid colonialism, the ANC, seeking
the inclusion of the black majority in a non-racial South Africa, waged a much less
successful guerrilla campaign. While some in SWAPO had thought the ANC not serious
enough in the struggle against apartheid, some in the ANC had looked down on the
Namibian nationalists as latecomers, lacking in sophistication.3
Namibia’s post-Independence ‘high politics’ relations with its southern neighbour can
best be termed ambivalent. Namibia appreciated President Nelson Mandela’s declaration
that South Africa would cancel the debt Namibia owed that country at independence.
But Namibia’s desire to be independent of its big neighbour in some instances lent
towards overconfidence and overreach, particularly under the presidency of Sam
Nujoma from 1990 to 2005.4 While Namibia’s post-Independence political leadership
accepted that South Africa was indispensable to its economic survival, by virtue of the
close intertwining of the two countries’ economies, that leadership has sought to pursue
an ‘emancipatory’ foreign policy based on a desire to assert its sovereignty, wishing to
avoid domination by its larger neighbour, and on anti-imperialism. However, leadership
changes in both countries have impacted on the texture of bilateral relations. In order
to better understand the complex nature of these relations, we propose to examine post-
Independence Namibia’s foreign relations with South Africa in three phases. The first,
from 1990 to 1994, represents an interregnum because of the transition then taking place
in South Africa from apartheid to democracy. The second and third phases (1994 to
the present) cover the presidencies of Sam Nujoma and Hifikepunye Pohamba. These
represent different avenues of consolidation in Namibia’s relations with post-apartheid
South Africa.
Phase 1: Engaging the former colonial oppressor, 1990–1994

Once installed in office, the new Namibian Government realised that it had to work
closely with its former colonial power, despite all that had happened in the past, and
3 Cf. Southall (2013), especially Ch. 2–3.

4 Cf. Cooper & Shaw (2009).
170
Unequal but intertwined: Namibia’s bilateral relationship with South Africa
despite the natural enmity of a liberation movement towards its former oppressor. From
an economic perspective. there was no alternative, and pragmatism dictated a working
relationship on other issues. Fortunately, then President FW de Klerk had already opened
the door to a negotiated settlement in South Africa the month before he went to Windhoek
in March 1990 for Namibia’s Independence celebrations, which the recently released
Nelson Mandela also attended.5 After 1990, relations with the De Klerk Government
were naturally not close, for De Klerk was associated with all that apartheid had meant
for Namibia. While diplomatic relations were then established between the two states,
the ANC – by then unbanned in South Africa – was allowed to operate a representative
office in Windhoek on an equal footing with the South African High Commission.6
Namibia continued to call on the international community to put pressure on South
Africa to end apartheid, and, in 1991, Oliver Tambo, then President of the ANC, was
welcomed in Windhoek.7
While independent Namibia became a member of the UN, the Commonwealth, the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Southern African Development Co-
Ordinating Conference, which in 1992 became the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), until 1994 South Africa remained outside these organisations.
Namibia did, however, become in 1990 a formal member of the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU), which had been established in 1910 and was dominated by
South Africa. In SACU, Namibia soon argued for greater revenues from the common
customs pool, and that was to become and remain a cause of friction between the two
governments.8
Two years after Independence, in 1992, Namibia also became a member of the Common
Monetary Area (CMA), along with Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. Namibia
withdrew from this arrangement in September 1993, however, when it introduced its
own currency. But the Namibia dollar continued to be pegged to the South African
rand, and at the official launch of the new currency, President Nujoma expressed his
appreciation to the South African Government “for allowing us to use the Rand as legal
tender … for the foreseeable future”, calling the concession “a commendable sign of
regional co-operation”.9
5 President De Klerk used his visit for Namibia’s Independence ceremony for extensive meetings
with various international leaders, including UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
and the Presidents of Angola, Egypt, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Yugoslavia and Zambia; the
Prime Minister of Cape Verde; the Foreign Ministers of Finland, Ireland, the Soviet Union,
Spain, Sweden and West Germany; and officials from France, Italy and Norway (Wren 1990).
7 (ibid.:95, 109).
8 See e.g. Gibb (2006).
9 (ibid.:324).
171
Despite notable advances in the economic relationship, the legacy of apartheid and its
impact on the territorial integrity of Namibia left unresolved issues. UN Security Council
Resolution 432 of 1978 had made it clear that Walvis Bay should be integrated into an
independent Namibia.10 The first Article of the Namibian Constitution drawn up in late
1989/early 1990 stated the following:11
The national territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory recognised by the
international community through the organs of the United Nations as Namibia, including the
enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as well as the off-shore islands of Namibia, and its
southern boundary shall extend to the middle of the Orange River.
But, in 1990, South Africa continued to claim legal possession of Walvis Bay, Namibia’s
only significant port, which had become part of the new Union of South Africa in 1910,12
as well as title to both banks of the Orange13 and to the Penguin Islands, which provided
South Africa with a foothold inside the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone that
Namibia declared at Independence.
The newly formed Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Windhoek was conscious that Namibia
was a small, weak state compared to its large and powerful neighbour, and that the only
card it could play was an appeal to the international community. But Namibia chose
not to refer its claims to Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands to the UN or any other
body. It appreciated that the De Klerk Government could not easily be seen by the white
electorate to make concessions, especially when some in South Africa saw the retention
of Walvis Bay as a way to guarantee post-Independence ‘good behaviour’ by the new
SWAPO14 Government. The new Namibian Government was pragmatic, therefore, which
eased the process of negotiation, as did the obvious ability and reasonableness shown by
Namibia’s first Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, who had acquired much experience
of diplomacy from his many years at the UN. There was also no significant external
assistance in the negotiation process that the two countries began in March 1991.15
10 Berat (1990).
11 Namibian Constitution, Article 1(4).
12 Walvis Bay was administered as part of South West Africa from 1922 until 1977; from 1978 to
1990 it was governed directly by South Africa.
13 South Africa claimed, on the basis of an 1890 treaty, that the border ran along the north bank of
the Orange River.
14 Now SWAPO Party of Namibia.
15 Shortly after Independence, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Fisheries and Marine
Resources reached an agreement with Angola and South Africa on Namibia’s territorial seas
and Exclusive Economic Zone. But Namibia appealed to the European Community, the UN and
the International Conference on South East Atlantic Fisheries for aid in dealing with the plunder
of marine resources by South African and Spanish fleets.
172
South Africa’s initial position on Walvis Bay was based on the non-negotiability
of its sovereignty. It suggested that Namibia could use the harbour within a bilateral
framework. Namibia, on the other hand, argued for the inclusion of the disputed territory.
After the South African Government declared that the Walvis Bay dispute could only
be resolved in the context of a post-apartheid Constitution, which he realised would
mean years of delay, President Nujoma, speaking at the October 1991 Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting in Harare, accused the South African Government of
“calculated and sinister foot dragging”.16 The following year, the two countries agreed to
set up a Joint Administration as an interim arrangement for Walvis Bay and the Penguin
Islands, and a Joint Technical Committee to report on where the Orange River boundary
between them should be.17 That Nujoma blamed the De Klerk Government for Chris
Hani’s18 assassination in April 1993 did not help the negotiations on Walvis Bay;19 but,
as South Africa, at its multiparty negotiating forum later that year, itself moved towards
a negotiated settlement, providing for the first democratic elections in that country in
April 1994, the Walvis Bay and Penguin Islands issue was resolved, with South Africa
agreeing to transfer both to Namibia on 28 February 1994. President Nujoma hailed
this as constituting a “second independence” and as a diplomatic triumph for Namibia,
although he continued to say that the arms embargo and the ban on nuclear technology
transmission should remain until a democratic South Africa was born.20
In the early 1990s, Namibia was careful not to escalate tension with South Africa as that
country moved towards majority rule, but was nonetheless keen that its relations with
apartheid South Africa should not compromise its desire to see majority rule come about
there. Namibia’s policy vis-à-vis South Africa in this period was, as a consequence,
a mixture of optimism, looking forward to a new, majority-ruled South Africa, on the
one hand, and, on the other, economic pragmatism as a result of Namibia’s import
dependency on South Africa. As one commentator wrote, Namibia proceeded –21
… cautiously and patiently, mindful of the fact that South Africa’s preoccupation with internal
developments presented both an opportunity and risk to the new state.
That independent Namibia adopted a policy of national reconciliation and a free market
economy helped persuade Pretoria to agree to the handover of Walvis Bay.

17 See e.g. (ibid.:85).
18 Leader of the South African Communist Party and chief of staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the
ANC’s armed wing.
19 Republic of Namibia ([n.d.]: 158, 279); Alden & Soko (2005).
20 Republic of Namibia ([n.d.]:333, 368, 380).
21 Evans (1993:135).
173
The Nujoma presidency and a democratic South Africa: Fraternal

engagement, economic dependence, differences on regional policy
Namibia established formal diplomatic relations with South Africa soon after Mandela
became the first black South African President, opening in that country what was, and
remains – especially from an economic point of view – its most crucial diplomatic
mission.22 While the bilateral relationship is strategic for Namibia, both from a fiscal
and import/export perspective, the economic nature of the relationship is largely one of
dependence on South Africa. Understandably, the two countries do not have the same
perception of the relationship between them. South Africa sought to play an important
role on the world stage, and its transition from apartheid to democracy helped enable it
to become a member of the world’s leading international groupings, including, in recent
years, the Group of Twenty (G20),23 and, in 2010, the group of major emerging markets
– Brazil, Russia, India and China.24 South Africa served as a Non-permanent Member
of the UN Security Council in 2007–2009 and again in 2010–2012. Moreover, South
Africa’s economy – the largest on the continent – is more than three times the size of the
rest of the southern African regional economies combined. Thus, South Africa has seen
Namibia, a small and not very important country in global terms, from the perspective of
its wish to play a leadership role in Africa and around the globe. Namibia, on the other
hand, has been lukewarm towards Pretoria’s pretentions to leadership in Africa and the
SADC region.
Notwithstanding the change in SACU’s revenue-sharing formula agreed in 2002, which

had taken several years to negotiate among the five member states, Namibia’s portion of
this revenue varied between 25% and 37% during the 20-year period of the last decade
of the 20th Century and the first of the 21st.25 This degree of fiscal dependence has
made it difficult for the Namibian Government to contemplate fundamental reform of
SACU; also, the fact that Namibia is bound within a South-Africa-led institutionalised
framework of trade, financial and other non-economic links has limited any scope for it
to act independently in SACU.26
Although Namibia adopted a liberal democratic Constitution four years before South
Africa did, it did not have the necessary institutions or culture to give effect to that

23 The premier forum for international cooperation on the most important issues of the global
economic and financial agenda; see http://www.g20.org/docs/about/about_G20.html, last
accessed 25 September 2013.
24 With South Africa’s membership, the acronym became BRICS.
25 In the 2012–2014 Medium-term Expenditure Review, the Namibian Government’s budget
framework, SACU revenue is expected to account for 34% of total state revenue (Ministry of
Finance 2012).
26 See e.g. Alden & Soko (2005).
174
democracy in its early years. When South Africa, with its more highly developed
institutions and civil society, adopted its own democratic Constitution, it could have
become a role model for Namibia. Instead, under President Nujoma, Namibia continued
to be a relatively closed society – one which had a free press, but where little open
debate occurred in government. Despite the human rights abuses that had occurred in
SWAPO’s camps in Angola, Namibia refused to follow the South African example and
appoint a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a way to start healing the wounds
of war. Furthermore, while Namibia’s constitutional framework posits a democratic
dispensation, the country’s leadership has not grounded the country’s foreign policy in
democratic values and has vacillated on human rights. SWAPO has continued to act
like a liberation movement, with strong authoritarian and ideological tendencies. While
Nelson Mandela, the first President of a democratic South Africa, said he would adopt
a foreign policy that sought the advancement of human rights and democracy, Nujoma
made no such declaration for Namibia; indeed, under the Nujoma presidency, Namibia’s
bilateral relationship with South Africa was marked by sporadic acrimony, with the two
countries taking different positions on several regional challenges.
The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998 was a major source of
tension between Namibia and South Africa. Namibia intervened alongside Angola and
Zimbabwe in the war to save President Laurent Kabila from almost certain defeat, while
South Africa, backed by Botswana and Tanzania, worked for a diplomatic solution.27
Namibia chose to follow Zimbabwe, which, as Chair of the Organ on Defence, Politics
and Security, had a very antagonistic relationship with South Africa under President
Nelson Mandela, who held the rotating chair of SADC. The formalisation of a mutual
defence pact in 2000 between Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe signalled that
Namibia wished to try to pursue an independent foreign policy not necessarily driven by
economic considerations, but by its own assessments of opportunities and risks in the
region.28
While Namibia did not always appreciate the ambitious and aggressive African policy
of President Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s successor, which tended to stress a focus on the
continent as a whole rather than the region,29 Namibia and South Africa did cooperate
in the domain of security, including maritime security. A Permanent Joint Commission
on Defence and Security was set up to meet annually under a rotational chair to discuss
security-related issues, such as transnational crime, money laundering and public safety,
and from 1997 bilateral relations were conducted through a Heads of State Economic
Bilateral Meeting (HOSEB), which discussed, inter alia, such issues as joint economic
cooperation and environment, in particular transfrontier parks, marine and coastal
management, transport, energy, science and technology, trade and industry, spatial
27 Nathan (2012b).
28 Hengari (2012).
29 See e.g. Landsberg (2010:Part 4).
175
development initiatives and regional integration. Of the numerous initiatives to promote

regional integration in which the two countries participated, among the most important
were the following:30
• The Trans-Kalahari Railway Line, to link Botswana, Namibia and South Africa
• The Trans-Kunene Corridor, to link Angola, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa,
and
• The establishment of a SADC Standby Force.
The Pohamba presidency: Closer relations with South Africa

under Jacob Zuma
After Hifikepunye Pohamba took over from Sam Nujoma as President of Namibia in
2005, and especially after Jacob Zuma succeeded to the South African presidency in
2009, relations between the two countries became closer. Not only was there more
cooperation on matters of mutual concern, there were also more frequent visits by senior
officials, including the two heads of state. In his opening remarks at the HOSEB meeting
held in Windhoek in November 2010, President Zuma said he wished to convey “warm
and fraternal greetings to the government and people of the sister Republic of Namibia”.31
This was, he said –32
… another occasion to cement the close bonds of solidarity and cooperation that our people
have enjoyed over the years, dating back from the days of the liberation struggle against
apartheid … [I]n addressing the future of our countries, we must, among other things, focus
on the fundamental issues of development, namely the alleviation of poverty, inequality,
unemployment and other social ills that continue to afflict our societies.
When President Pohamba made a state visit to South Africa from 5 to 7 November 2012,
he addressed a joint session of Parliament. The most important agreement signed during
that visit, which was primarily to attend the Eleventh Session of HOSEB, transformed
that body into a Bi-national Commission which was to meet annually, alternating
between the two countries.33
In 2012, Namibia gave strong support to the candidacy of the South African Minister
of Home Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the position of Chairperson of the
African Union (AU) Commission. Furthermore, since 2009, Namibia had backed
President Zuma’s role as SADC facilitator on Zimbabwe. When South Africa’s Minister
30 See e.g. South African Government News Agency (2009).

31 http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=14319&tid=23833, last accessed
14 September 2013.
32 (ibid.).
33 Two Memoranda of Understanding were also signed: see www.mfa.gov.na (Department of
Bilateral Affairs), last accessed 26 September 2013.
176
of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, visited Namibia

in April 2013, she emphasised a relationship of brotherhood and sisterhood between
Namibia and South Africa. After mentioning that 52 bilateral agreements had been
signed between the two countries, she did, however, add that –34
… it was important to start implementation of some of these agreements in order for the people
to continue to find meaning in these relations.
In the area of trade negotiations and access to markets in the European Union (EU),
Namibia and South Africa have not always found common ground in concerns about
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) the EU wished to sign with southern
African states. When these negotiations were launched in July 2004 in Windhoek, EPAs
were expected to take effect by 2008, but problems soon became apparent and Namibia
initialled (but did not sign) an Interim EPA “with reservations” at the end of 2007 to
secure Namibia’s trade preferences until such time as a full EPA could be agreed to.
The issues of Most-Favoured-Nation status, a definition of the parties and the protection
of infant industries then bedevilled the process, but Namibia and South Africa worked
together in SACU to come up with a common position. Nonetheless, by mid-2013, the
two countries had still not signed an EPA with the EU.
Namibia and South Africa have also worked together on such SADC projects as the
Western Power Corridor and the Benguela Current Convention signed in April 2013.35
The latter seeks to protect and manage the maritime resources of the Benguela Current.
In recent years, South Africa has tended to join Namibia and other countries in SADC in
not upholding human rights and the rule of law. This was seen clearly in both countries
agreeing with SADC’s decision in 2010–2011 to suspend and then dissolve its own
Tribunal, which had been housed in Windhoek.36 Instead of accepting and implementing
norms and values codified in the various regional (SADC) and continental (AU)
protocols to which the two countries are signatories, Namibia and South Africa have
instead emphasised stability and security in the region. They have failed to condemn
the absolute monarchy in Swaziland. In August 2013, the leaders of both Namibia and
South Africa congratulated Robert Mugabe on his re-election as President of Zimbabwe,
ignoring clear evidence of election rigging and the blatant non-observance of SADC’s
34 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/asianet/130409/bilateral-relations-between-namibia-
and-sa-discussed/, last accessed 22 September 2013.
35 See http://www.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/newscentre/articles/2013/04/30/angola-namibia-
and-south-africa-sign-world-s-first-large-marine-ecosystem-legal-framework/, last accessed
14 September 2013. A bilateral agreement was drawn up between the Karas Region in southern
Namibia and the Northern Cape Province in South Africa, in part to promote tourism, but after
a decade very little has been achieved; see The Namibian, 29 May 2012, “Karas and Northern
Cape twinning struggles”.
36 Nathan (2012a).
177
own electoral guidelines. They also supported his election as the new Deputy Chair and
prospective Chair of SADC.37 In this respect, the foreign policies of the two countries
have become more closely aligned in recent years. Whether this will continue under the
successors to Presidents Pohamba and Zuma remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Both Namibia and South Africa have remained relatively stable in the two decades
since apartheid rule ended and they adopted liberal democratic Constitutions. South
Africa, however, not only has a population well over 20 times that of Namibia’s, but also
possesses the resources to project itself onto the global and African stages in a way that
Namibia cannot begin to emulate. Relations between the two countries will, therefore,
continue to be unequal. Although this will remain the case, the geostrategic context of
the two countries will shift. South Africa’s economy may decline relative to others, while
Angola, which lies across Namibia’s northern border, is likely to become increasingly
important in southern Africa, both politically and economically.
South Africa is now behind a push to link SADC with the Common Market for Southern
and Eastern Africa and the East African Community, and another to make SACU a
larger organisation.38 Whatever developments may take place in this regard, Namibia
and South Africa will remain tied together: not only by being contiguous, but also by
their liberation histories – even when the liberation movements now in government do
eventually lose power – as well as by their intertwined economies. It is in both countries’
interests that their future relations remain as friendly and close as possible.
References
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38 Cf. Hichert et al. (2010); Salomão (2012).
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179
180
From confrontation to pragmatic cooperation:
United States of America–Namibia relations
William A Lindeke*
Introduction
The United States of America (USA) and the territory and people of present-day
Namibia have been in contact for centuries, but not always in a balanced or cooperative
fashion. Early contact involved American1 businesses exploiting the natural resources
off the Namibian coast, while the 20th Century was dominated by the global interplay
of colonial and mandatory business activities and Cold War politics on the one hand,
and resistance diplomacy on the other. America was seen by Namibian leaders as the
reviled imperialist superpower somehow pulling strings from behind the scenes. Only
after Namibia’s independence from South Africa in 1990 did the relationship change to a
more balanced one emphasising development, democracy, and sovereign equality. This
chapter focuses primarily on the US’s contributions to the relationship.
Early history of relations

The US has interacted with the territory and population of Namibia for centuries –
indeed, since the time of the American Revolution.2 Even before the beginning of the
German colonial occupation of German South West Africa, American whaling ships
were sailing the waters off Walvis Bay and trading with people at the coast. Later, major
US companies were active investors in the fishing (Del Monte and Starkist in pilchards
at Walvis Bay) and mining industries (e.g. AMAX and Newmont Mining at Tsumeb
Copper, the largest copper mine in Africa at the time).
The US was a minor trading and investment partner during German colonial times,3
accounting for perhaps 7% of exports. After the Union of South Africa assumed control
of Namibia under the Class C mandate of Article 22 of the League of Nations Statute,
trade increased. The US economy had become the world’s largest after the turn of the
20th Century, and British imperial majesty began to wane. Britain declined as both
the global hegemon and the dominant economic interest in South Africa, opening new
* Prof. William A Lindeke is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)
in Windhoek, having retired as Professor in African Studies at the University of Massachusetts,
Lowell, in the United States of America, and as Professor of Political Studies at the University
of Namibia.
1 Reference to America and the United States (US) herein implies the USA.
2 1770s and after (Cooper 1988).
3 1884–1915.
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William A Lindeke
opportunities in finance, trade and investment for other countries. American economic
interests became more important in South Africa and Namibia, but never the dominant
interests.
The mandate period

American imports to Namibia over the decades following 1919 grew in capital equipment
for mining and fish processing, and in consumer goods, which became widely available
in the transport and other sectors for those who could afford them. Trade was direct to
Namibia in part with shipping lines between New York and Walvis Bay, but mostly trade
and investments took place through the South African market, as they do to this day.
US diplomatic and economic interests were coordinated through the Consular Office in
Cape Town. Even so, the US was never a major economic partner with the colony, nor
was the colony vital to the US economy in any way. Deference to the Commonwealth
influenced much of America’s relations with anglophone Africa and, particularly, the
Commonwealth countries.
Similarly, in the early stages of diplomatic activity, America was not an important player
in the international issues involving Namibia. Although the US was instrumental and
inspirational at the Versailles Peace Treaty Meetings ending World War I and in the
setting up of the League of Nations and its mandate system, under which the then South
West Africa was governed, a minority of the US Senate (the so-called Isolationists)
blocked the ratification of the League of Nations Treaty and America’s membership in
the international body. The desire of that group of senators and their supporters was
to settle in behind the protective oceans and not become embroiled in other countries’
conflicts. Thus, despite President Woodrow Wilson’s being the originator of the ‘right to
self-determination’ vision during the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, America had
a muted global role, especially in the legal and political disputes over the next decades
under the League of Nations.
Bryan O’Linn,4 an important Namibian jurist, quotes Wilson on the mandate system:
The whole theory of mandates is not the theory of permanent subordination. It is the theory of
development, of putting upon the mandatory the duty of assisting in the development of the
country under mandate, in order that it may be brought to a capacity for self-government and
self-dependence, which for the time being it has not reached and that therefore the countries
under mandate are candidates, so to speak, for full members in the family of nations.
It was clearly not the understanding that Jan Smuts and other South African leaders
held. For them, the Class C mandate giving the Union of South Africa supervision of the
former German territory was all but the formal annexation of the South West as a fifth
4 O’Linn ([n.d.]:2).
182
From confrontation to pragmatic cooperation: USA–Namibia relations
province. White party politics in Namibia was greatly vexed by this issue over the next
several decades.5 The scene was set for prolonged conflict locally and internationally.
For the most part, the early years of the South African mandate were conducted in relative
isolation. After extending control into the north-central Oshiwambo-speaking areas in
1919, South African leaders tried to incorporate South West Africa as a fifth province in
the then Union of South Africa. This was done, in part, through extending various laws
and policies, including pass requirements and the contract labour system. US companies
in South West Africa cooperated and benefited from the South African schemes. Also,
some limited local control by the white settler community was granted in the 1920s.
International interactions were constrained on a global basis during the Great Depression
of the 1930s and World War II (WWII) in the 1940s. A lack of infrastructure, markets
and regular trade isolated Namibia further from the outside world, particularly from her
neighbours, reinforcing the dependence on South Africa for nearly everything (over 80%
of imports).
At this time, the most significant linkage with US interests was the Wall Street financing
connection for Ernest Oppenheimer’s takeover of the German-owned Namibian diamond
claims, incorporating the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa Ltd (CDM)
in Namibia as part of the dominant mining conglomerate Anglo American Corporation.
Other mining interests were also owned or financed by US companies.
After WWII, the US became the leading international force as a hegemonic power in
the West. The United Nations (UN) was established to provide for international peace,
stability and prosperity. The legal status of the South African mandate over Namibia – now
a trusteeship under the UN – was continuously explored and debated in that international
body and its subsidiaries such as the International Court of Justice. However, the centre
of diplomatic activity was in New York, at the UN, rather than in Washington, DC: it was
an international, not an American issue. For the most part, America treated the Namibia
case within the context of South Africa and the Cold War, although some concern for the
legal and humanitarian issues was expressed at times.
Over the next few decades, a consistency emerged in the general relations of the US
with Africa, with slight variations depending on the political party in power. America,
in part, deferred most issues on the African continent to the former colonial powers –
France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Occasionally, the US Government was seen
as a welcomed alternative to the former colonial powers, who continued neo-mercantilist
policies which favoured the former colonial metropole. Then-dominant US multinational
corporations sought entrance to the continent’s riches and markets, when and where they
could. American companies were sometimes seen as alternative competitors to those of
5 Du Pisani (1985); Henrichsen et al. (2010).
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William A Lindeke
the former colonial masters, and they gained access to markets and commodities in the
new countries.6
President John F Kennedy (1961–1963) was more knowledgeable and interested in

Africa and developing world issues and battlegrounds than his predecessors. He briefly
led the US to see Namibia in a different light. Legal issues became more important
around the mandate/trusteeship and international responsibilities toward Namibia. In
1966, the US supported UN General Assembly Resolution 2145 to strip South Africa of
the mandate over Namibia. The US also gave overt support to the UN voluntary arms
embargo against South Africa, at least in general.7
In 1967, during the height of America’s Civil Rights Movement, a US warship docking
in Simonstown, South Africa, refused to comply with apartheid rules in a dramatic
showdown regarding its multiracial crew being allowed to go ashore.8 That confrontation
ended South Africa’s role in protecting the southern sea lanes for Western powers after
more than 160 years. However, the Cold War confrontational issues surrounding the
Vietnam War soon overshadowed any positive sentiment from American leaders toward
nationalist movements in Africa.
Cold War dominance

During the 1970s, under the influence of Henry Kissinger, the Cold War and superpower
politics dominated the thinking around African policy. Access to strategic minerals in a
zero-sum conflict with the Soviet Union linked economic, political and military concerns
in the US. The deployment of tens of thousands of Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia
toward the middle of the decade sharpened the focus on regional conflict zones in Africa.
Increasingly, America supported the settler governments and remaining colonies in
southern Africa, especially under National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39),
the famous Kissinger Memorandum linking future policy indefinitely to the continuing
rule of white minorities in that subregion.
Overall, after the early independence movements’ successes, Africa, for the most part,
settled into a backburner position in the Cold War concerns that dominated international
relations. The emergence of Afro-Marxist regimes in the mid-1970s and the deployment
of Cuban military forces sharpened the issue for the next decade. From 1975 until
the Soviet Union reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, these and other
subregional conflicts occupied the superpowers’ peripheral attention.
6 As still happens occasionally today.

7 Unlike with France and Japan
8 Baines & Vale (2008:27).
184
Indeed, Afro-pessimism, debt crises, and the Western withdrawal of economic

engagement markedly characterised the next decades. Africa was in the doldrums both
economically (with negative gross domestic product growth) and politically (with
presidents-for-life and coups dominating the landscape). Southern Africa featured armed
struggles in several countries; this, and the formation of the Frontline States and the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference,9 positioned the subregion for
an increasing focus on directly confronting apartheid.
US relations with southern Africa in particular were dominated by security issues, with
economic concerns in second place. America had just over 1% of foreign investments
and bank loans in South Africa and another US$7.6 billion in share ownership – not a
great amount by global measures.10 Africa’s resources, however, were seen as important
strategic materials during the Cold War, especially chromium, cobalt, titanium and
uranium. The two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union – struggled for advantage
and leverage in military and political dimensions in the subregion. The Soviet Union could
easily side with national liberation movements, even those without Marxist-Leninist
ideologies or policies. America befriended an assortment of dictators, such as Mobutu
Sese Seko of the then Zaire,11 while at the same time it saw the anti-colonial nationalists
as threats, and defended the settler regimes at the southern tip of the continent.
Henry Kissinger and, later, President Ronald Reagan (1981–1988) cemented the
defence of minority rule in the subregion as a bulwark against Soviet expansion – or
‘total onslaught’, from the apartheid regime’s perspective. Economic interests in mining
and petroleum were also vital concerns in Africa which coexisted with security ones,
sometimes in complex ways such as in Angola.12 The arrival of Cuban troops in Angola in
1975 solidified the ties between the US Government and the apartheid regime, especially
after rebels launched an attack from Angola a few years later on Shaba Province, a
mining centre in Zaire.
A brief interlude during the Jimmy Carter Administration (1977–1980) negotiations

was sandwiched between hard-line Cold War policies toward the subregion. Portugal
had been permitted to bypass its North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments by
diverting military spending in its attempts to hold on to its African colonies – until
the shocking coup in Lisbon in April 1974. President Carter’s African policy team of
Andrew Young and Donald McHenry helped to create a brief period of international
negotiation and progress both at the UN and through the creation in April 1977 of the
9 SADCC, now the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

10 Rich (1990:311).
11 Now the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
12 American oil companies had active economic interests in the north of the country, while tens of
thousands of Cuban troops defended in the south against South African incursions aimed against
the Movimiento Popular para la Liberacão de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola) Government and their allies, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO).
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William A Lindeke
Western Contact Group13 that undertook leadership toward a solution to the subregion’s
conflicts with the apartheid regime.14 International pressure from public protests and
diplomatic efforts culminated in UN Security Council Resolutions 432 and 435 as a
framework for Namibian independence.15 For once, the US did not veto the Resolutions
– as had so often happened on southern African issues. In 1977, the UN Security Council
passed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. By the end of the Carter years,
a negotiated solution seemed near for Namibian independence and for some other
international trouble spots.
Constructive engagement during the Reagan Administration

The election of Ronald Reagan scuppered the hoped-for Namibian solution as South
Africa hardened its position, bolstered by the US Republican Party’s insertion of a
second issue: the prior removal of the Cuban troops from Angola as a prerequisite to a
Namibian settlement – known as linkage. By 1980, conflict had escalated in a number
of regional theatres from Central America to Afghanistan and Indochina. The old
notion of rolling back Soviet influence was now a multifaceted policy priority of the
new administration in Washington. Low-intensity counter-insurgency warfare restored
the Central Intelligence Agency to a more active presence around the globe, including
its support for Jonas Savimbi’s União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
(UNITA)16 rebel forces in Angola. The South African troops invading Angola were
ignored in the grander scheme of the Cold War. Development agendas declined and
negotiations were set back.
A remarkable convergence of long-lasting conservative governments among developed

countries dominated economic and international policy in the 1980s in Britain,
Canada, Germany and the US. Other countries were also caught up in this neoliberal
policy convergence sometimes referred to as the Washington Consensus – as much for
the Bretton Woods institutions headquartered there as for the American Government
policies. Southern African issues were not always subject to the grand consensus, as
different interests and public pressures interfered with a single-minded approach, such
as the October 1983 UN Security Council rejection of linkage, which saw other Western
Contact Group countries agree and the US abstain.17
13 Or Group of Five, namely Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the US.
14 Weiland & Braham (1994:20).
15 An earlier UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 385), which had given the UN agencies
direct control over the election process, was not acceptable to South Africa. UNSCR 435
(and 432) gave the UN a supervision role, while the internal South African Administration in
Namibia under the Pretoria-appointed Administrator-General conducted the election in 1989;
the Electoral Commission of Namibia conducted the Special Election in Walvis Bay in 1994).
16 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
17 Singham & Hune (1986:13).
186
On the US side, Chester Crocker became the new Under Secretary of State for African
Affairs. He introduced the concept of constructive engagement with the apartheid
regime. For the next eight years, this was the dominant theme toward South Africa. The
Reagan Administration did its best to assist the white minority regime internationally
on diplomatic, economic and military fronts.18 Of course, they were not alone, as the
other conservative governments shared, to a greater or lesser extent, the overall policy
direction. South Africa facilitated an internal political process in Namibia through the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), essentially relaxing (slightly) the notion of
separate development, which later became the core of an Interim Government.19 In many
ways Namibia served as a trial case for alternative apartheid scenarios.
Under these new circumstances, discussions did take place with various stakeholders,
including the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO). These culminated
in the first place with ‘proximity talks’ and the Constitutional Principles document
offered by SWAPO in 1982, which became the basis for the Constituent Assembly’s
Constitution-writing efforts in 1989–1990. To his credit, Crocker engaged multiple
parties in shuttle diplomacy across multiple global locations. For the most part, however,
Namibian participants were left on the outside of this global power negotiation. The
Reagan Administration kept further pressure on negotiations by giving UNITA assistance
through the Central Intelligence Agency. The main issue was agreement on the removal
of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia and Angola. The
Namibian solution, in the Regan Administration’s view, could follow easily under the
international consensus and support for UNSCR 435.
Earlier near-agreements had been undermined by the massacre of Namibians by the

South African Defence Force at Cassinga, Angola; the incursion into Shaba Province
in then Zaire by Congolese rebel forces based in Angola; the unilateral internal election
in so-called SWA/Namibia in 1978 to form an internal government; and the election of
Ronald Reagan in the US. However, Namibia’s allies and friends, through UN diplomatic
circles, kept negotiations alive, and unrelenting pressure from the UN General Assembly
pushed the process further.
An additional issue for South Africa that was pressed by the US and others was the
idea of the impartiality of the UN. South Africa argued that the UN was too biased
toward SWAPO20 and required agreement on the UN distancing itself from the process,
18 For example, the Reagan Administration opposed 33 of 39 UN Resolutions between 1981 and
1983, and abstained from others (Chan 1990:324).
19 Wallace (2011:287).
20 For example, through the adoption of the name Namibia, the recognition of SWAPO, and the
declaration of SWAPO as the “sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people” in
1973. South African officials did not remain neutral when it came to their preferred party,
pouring over a R100 million into the campaign and other disinformation projects (Dobell
1998:90; Tonchi et al. 2012:37).
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William A Lindeke
before they would agree on a settlement.21 Crocker engaged in multiple rounds of shuttle
diplomacy in New York and elsewhere with the priority of solving the linkage problem
first. Other major contributions to a convergence of positions were soon to fall into place.
Robert Rotberg22 summed up the impact of the new Reagan Administration’s approach
to South Africa as follows:
The United States eased its commercial embargo, reaffirmed intelligence links, moderated
public criticism at home and abroad, and affirmed closer relations with South Africa. But
the biggest carrot of all was the Cuban issue. To have made the Cubans hostage for Namibia
reversed the entire drift of negotiations, permitted South Africa to relax, and has delayed
Namibian independence indefinitely.
South Africa, in Rotberg’s view,23 saw no impending pressure from inside the US or
South Africa, and no external pressure that would accelerate negotiations over the
medium term at mid-decade (around 1985). This view would be proven completely
wrong less than a year later: not only did protest heat up in the US and South Africa, but
the battlefield also quickly reached an untenable impasse.
Turning points
Mass protest and solidarity movements were gaining strength in opposition to apartheid
across the globe as well as at home in Namibia. After Zimbabwe attained independence
in the first half of 1980, South Africa in particular came under attack for domestic
racial policies and cross-border attacks that were deemed unacceptable by international
standards. Namibia and South Africa became the prime focal point of global attention.
Political pressure intensified in legislatures and at the ballot box. The US Congress,
led by the Congressional Black Caucus, forced sanctions on a very reluctant Reagan
Administration in 1986 by overturning a presidential veto of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act.24
In corporate America and elsewhere, the divestment movement brought pressure to

bear on major public entities beginning with the City of Wisconsin and spreading to
university endowments, government pension funds, and churches to act against business
as usual. Bank loans and other business contracts with the apartheid regime put business
with these other larger economic entities at risk (e.g. with California or New York state
governments) leading to accelerating divestment. Citibank was the last American bank
21 Weiland & Braham (1994:23–24, 49–50).

22 Rotberg (1985:107).
23 (ibid.).
24 Wallace (2011:299).
188
to pull out of South Africa in the 1980s. Thus, public pressure played an important part
in the official turnaround in American and other countries’ official actions.
The Solidarity with Namibia movement in America was relatively small, being subsumed
under the overall anti-apartheid movement, although it is mentioned as early as the Tanga
SWAPO Congress in 1970.25 It also had to compete for attention and active followers
with the opposition to Euromissiles as well as Central American policies and conflicts.
Nonetheless, some church and other groups did draw attention and add support to the
divestment movement that kept pressure on the South African regime. Most of the focus
in the US centred on the UN agencies and the international diplomacy taking place there.
Most of the key SWAPO leadership, such as Sam Nujoma, Hage Geingob, Theo-Ben
Gurirab, and Hidipo Hamutenya, spent years in New York promoting Namibia’s cause at
the international agency and in its diplomatic milieu.
Senator Edward Kennedy, Rev. Jesse Jackson and the Congressional Black Caucus,
among other prominent political figures and groups, championed the cause of Namibia’s
independence at this crucial time in the 1980s. Church groups and activists such as the
TransAfrica Forum, the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights under Law, musicians,
and university communities – all mobilised around the struggle against apartheid. The
shift from President Reagan to President George W Bush signalled a relative weakening
in the ability of the US Government to assist the South African regime to resist change.
Moreover, the then South African President PW Botha’s ‘Rubicon’ speech did little to
assist the apartheid cause in global sentiment.
At the same time, a dramatic turnaround took place in the Soviet Union. Domestic reforms
and what was known as New Thinking in foreign policy under the new Soviet leader,
Mikhail Gorbachev, brought additional pressure on his allies to negotiate regional, Cold-
War-related conflicts to an end. Gorbachev’s vision was to reduce regional confrontations
leading to a reduced superpower confrontation and arms race. This would be followed
by reductions in nuclear arms and military expenditure, which would free up resources
to modernise the Soviet economy. A settlement of the Namibian issue, as well as others,
became more feasible after this change in Soviet foreign policy.26
The prolonged conflict at Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, the largest conventional battle up
to that time in Africa, similarly impacted the direct participants and opened settlement
possibilities. South African leaders faced a higher cost27 stalemate far from their borders,
increasing dissent in the townships at home, and accelerated economic divestment by
25 Dobell (1998:40).
26 Landsberg (1994:279–280). Afghanistan, Central America, and Cambodia were other regional
conflicts impacted.
27 Estimates from the mid-1980s placed the overall expenditure at around US$2 billion (Dobell
1998; Rotberg 1985).
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the rest of the world. Apartheid became the mass-culture target, depicted as the new film
‘enemy’ in Hollywood. The moment was ripe for a deal under the UNSCR 435 terms.
Active diplomacy for the settlement included multiple players from the Western Contact
Group, other American officials, South African leaders, the Frontline States and Nigeria,
Cuban leaders, and their Soviet counterparts as observers. SWAPO leaders and other
African allies were also active in meeting with internal, Namibian role players and the
various solidarity movements that could influence home governments and the UN, but
were not party to the settlement. Beginning in July 1988, talks among Angola, Cuba
and South Africa eventually produced an agreement on 20 December 1988. This led to
the end of fighting in Angola and the beginning of the UNSCR 435 process on 1 April
1989, and to the accompanying demobilisation of Cuban and South African armed forces
and their scheduled, phased withdrawal from Angola and, in South Africa’s case, from
Namibia as well. These so-called New York Accords ended decades of armed conflict
over Namibia.
Despite the decades of armed conflict and Cold War hostilities, the UNSCR 435 process
and the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops proceeded with remarkable
smoothness and international cooperation. The Namibian domestic transition also proved
notably smooth and conflict-free.28
Independence and after

SWAPO’s victory in the 1989 elections, and its adherence to the spirit of democracy, a
mixed economy, and reconciliation during the early independence period, continued to
receive strong support from old allies and assisted in gaining new ones. Customers of
Rössing Uranium, such as Japan and the US, went from being considered outlaws in
defiance of Decree No. 1 (banning mineral exports) to being encouraged to buy more
by Namibia’s Founding President, Sam Nujoma. Diplomatic and commercial contacts
were actively sought across the political and geographical spectrums. Former imperialist
exploiters were now desirable foreign direct investors in the transformed rhetorical
universe of independence. Opposition parties were invited into Cabinet and shared the
international stage with government in ongoing gestures of national reconciliation.
High-level contacts were established around the Independence Day events for the transfer
of sovereignty on 21 March 1990. This event offered the world an important opportunity
for international diplomatic exchanges with Namibian and South African players under
the new conditions of emerging majority rule. American Secretary of State James Baker III
28 The events of 1 April 1989 and the assassination of Anton Lubowski just before elections that
year did not prove fatal to the overall process.
190
attended Namibia’s Independence celebrations, and opened a new US Embassy in the

capital, Windhoek.
On 2 February 1990, at the opening of the South African Parliament in Cape Town,
the new President, FW de Klerk, announced the unbanning of the African National
Congress and the imminent release of its leader, Nelson Mandela, and others, opening
a new chapter in that country’s history. Just as Namibia’s UNSCR 435 elections were
overshadowed by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Soviet domination of
Eastern and Central Europe, the Independence events were more important in terms
of international diplomacy around South African developments than for Namibian
sovereignty – at least for the international community and media. Namibia, however,
began its formal statehood with over 100 diplomatic recognition agreements amid its
own joyous celebrations.
The US responded to the openness and reconciliation process of the new Namibian
Constitution and Namibian Government along with others. Positive responses were seen
from Freedom House evaluations of Namibia’s governance and freedom, the successful
1990 New York Donors’ Conference fundraising meeting, and the Houston, Texas, G7
meeting in 1992.29 Sanctions and other restrictions were gradually removed in the context
of establishing good relations with the new SWAPO Government and leading toward the
end of apartheid in South Africa.
Early efforts included no-strings-attached funding for primary education, and bringing
an average of around 100 Peace Corps volunteers to the country each year. American
companies continued to supply goods to the Namibian economy as the boycotts were
lifted and the expectations for majority rule in South Africa brightened. Of course,
America was also a major final destination for many of the gem-quality diamonds
produced by Namibia. Around 60% of Namibia’s diamond exports eventually go to the
Japanese and US markets.
The George HW Bush Administration (1989–1992) was generous toward the National
Party transition process in South Africa by easing restrictions and sanctions before actual
changes had taken place, rather than keeping the pressure on for rapid change. The
easing of restrictions benefited Namibia in any case. Some degree of suspicion continued
in the official bilateral and multilateral relationships, particularly among certain
Cabinet members, older cadres of the ruling party,30 and the remnant struggle ideology
29 Du Pisani (2000:305). The G7, or Group of Seven, was a forum which brought together the
heads of the richest industrialised countries at the time, namely Canada, France, West
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, and the President of the European Commission
to discuss global economic issues and coordinate policy; see http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/16th_G7_summit, last accessed 19 November 2013.
30 Renamed SWAPO Party of Namibia for the 1989 election.
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William A Lindeke
adherents.31 America continued to be the superpower that everyone loved to hate, and
generic attacks on ‘imperialism’ continued to be an important part of the ruling party’s
political discourse. However, generally good and pragmatic relations have characterised
both the bilateral and multilateral experiences between the US and Namibia.
American support for Namibian democracy centred especially on election assistance and
parliamentary assistance through the National Democratic Institute and US Agency for
International Development (USAID) offices. Other domestic assistance for Namibia was
mostly channelled through USAID and the Ambassador’s Office. Additionally, America
supported Namibia’s efforts to join multiple international organisations as a full member
of the global community.
Namibia pursued the same strategy of ‘active non-alignment’ inspired by Kwame

Nkrumah and rooted in the Namibian Constitution32 by joining dozens of international
organisations, hosting dozens of foreign embassies, and ratifying a large number of
international agreements. Indeed, Namibia pursued an aggressive and widely inclusive
diplomacy after Independence, which included previously distrusted players such as the
US. As a country with a small population, Namibia punched well above its weight in
international relations for nearly two decades after Independence. Having good bilateral
relations with so many countries, including the remaining superpower, the US, was an
important part of that success. Namibia became a sought-after international partner for
many countries within and beyond the subregion.
Notwithstanding the good relations that have been developing since the beginning
of Namibia’s independence, there is also recognition that Namibia has interests and
principles that are not likely to be compromised through routine diplomacy. This was
seen in the period of Namibia’s serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council in 1999–2000 and in its continuing support for former allies in its struggle for
independence, such as China, Cuba, Libya, North Korea and Palestine.
Perhaps Namibia’s support for Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe from around
2000 since his confrontation with Western powers has embodied the triumph of first
principles of solidarity over subsequent commitments to democracy, lawfulness, and
non-violent policies. America may not like these continuing commitments, but it respects
the authenticity of the differences.
Official relations between the two countries started off well in the early 1990s, and
continue on a high plane. Both President Nujoma and President Pohamba have accepted
31 The liberation struggle discourse of anti-colonial nationalism has largely been displaced with
a discourse of national unity, reconciliation and development (Du Pisani 2010), occasional
outbursts and “wannabe” youthful revolutionaries notwithstanding.
192
invitations to visit the White House as part of African delegations. Vice-President Dan
Quayle came to Namibia as a private visitor during the George W Bush Administration,
and Vice-President Al Gore visited Namibia during the Clinton period. Congressional
delegations were frequent visitors as were certain business personalities – from Michael
Jackson to Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie. Several Hollywood production companies have
made use of Namibia’s landscape for filming, and Namibia enlisted Hollywood figures
for the Nujoma biographical film of the liberation struggle.
The US was also home to over 100 Namibian students before and after Independence.
Many of Namibia’s top political leaders in SWAPO and the opposition parties hold
degrees from American universities. At Independence, a list of bursaries for Namibian
and South African university students ran over eight single-spaced pages. Some of the
awards were UN-based, while others originated with government programmes, civil
society organisations and churches, especially the Lutheran ones. After Independence,
a number of US Government bursaries and training programmes were still available to
Namibian students in priority fields. Also, a number of universities have given honorary
degrees to Namibian leaders over the years, especially to Founding President Sam
Nujoma.
Over the years, the US has created a number of investment policies to encourage American
firms to engage with Africa. Except for mining and petroleum extraction industries, these
programmes were always undersubscribed. Afro-pessimism and the emerging debt crisis
informally banished African investments for the most part. Sub-Saharan Africa became
a case fit only for high-risk adventurers and multilateral agencies acting as charities. A
few islands of investment did exist on the continent, including in South Africa, but the
divestment movement started gaining steam in the mid-1970s to constrain that market, too.
Only after 1990 did the continent begin to see renewed business interest and governments’
increasing democratic and economic reforms swept the continent, creating better
governance structures and policies. From this stronger base, African countries were able
to take advantage of the boom in commodity prices and to weather the storm of the
global financial crisis to achieve high economic growth rates. African optimism became
infectious.
Namibia continued to attract US products and investment, primarily through South

African subsidiaries. In July 2008, the Southern African Customs Union signed a Trade,
Investment and Development Cooperation Agreement with the US. The recent case of
Wal-Mart’s buying a majority share in Massmart South Africa is a prime example. In this
case, both Namibia and South Africa sought to negotiate a better deal for their national
economies than the private sector arrangement would have created. Half of Namibia’s
imports derive from South Africa, and more than half the rest transit through South
Africa. America has provided about 10% or less of the country’s imports for over a
century.
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William A Lindeke
Private American investments in debt instruments, stock shares, and other assets in
Namibia and South Africa are conducted outside the official relations and, thus, are not
well known. The largest single private investment was in Tsumeb Copper in the 1970s
and 1980s, until it was sold to Gold Fields’ South African interests prior to Independence.
America’s support for Namibia has been multifaceted, highlighting security support,
economic support, democracy support, and social support. The lead development work
over the years since Independence (1990–2013) has been conducted through USAID.33
This organisation began with several sub-programmes: democracy and governance, basic
education, environment and conservation, employment creation and small enterprise
development, and support for tuberculosis, and HIV and AIDS. Together with funds
from the Ambassador’s Office, these efforts constitute the main ongoing developmental
support by the US to Namibia.
The US has been one of the top few bilateral donor partners for Namibia since
Independence, along with the European Union and Germany. Both direct service delivery
and technical assistance are included from the US efforts. Assistance is also provided
through the operations of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
in water, food, and sanitation. Routine development assistance has been in decline in
the past few years – as it has from other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development countries. The biggest grant programmes – the US President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) – will
wind down in the years ahead as well.
The democracy and governance initiatives from 1995 to 2009 were primarily directed
toward electoral and parliamentary support to both houses, in terms of community
outreach through the donation of a large mobile vehicle to bring parliament to the people
during inter-sessions. Additional parliamentary assistance was focused on computer
training for staff and members. Excellent relations were maintained with the early
parliamentary leaders, Mosé Tjitendero (National Assembly Speaker) and Kandinima
Nehova (National Assembly Chairman), providing strong institutional leadership.
Additional aid to the anti-corruption efforts and to civil society constitutes further valued
efforts. By the 20th anniversary of Independence in 2010, USAID’s separate Democracy
and Governance Section was closed down, after having been extended for a few extra
years early in the 21st Century.
33 See www.usaid.gov/namibia, last accessed 19 September 2013. The following paragraphs draw
heavily from this summary and its details.
194
US assistance to small-scale businesses has paralleled the efforts of other donors and
organisations. Many of the returning SWAPO exiles had their training and experience
in the Eastern Bloc or other countries lacking a strong business culture. With
Namibia’s commitment to maintaining a mixed economy and uplifting the previously
disadvantaged, bringing capacity to smaller participants in the economy has received a
lot of attention in the efforts inside and outside government to expand the informal and
small-scale business sector after Independence. Various US programmes have assisted
many businesses to begin or expand operations, and have featured cooperation with the
Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as other business groups. American
efforts also seek to link Namibian partners with US markets and investors as an important
extension of the general African policy and the activities of the Import-Export Bank. The
recent establishment of a small business bank and other government efforts in the sector
illustrate the continuing need for expansion in this part of the economy.
Another focus that resonates with planned successes from the Namibian side are nature
conservation and biodiversity programmes such as the Living in a Finite Environment
(LIFE) Project, which was active from 1992 to 2008. Community-based natural resource
management (CBNRM) organisations in Namibia have implemented award-winning
projects to link tourism, conservation of natural resources, and local empowerment.
Early and continuing USAID support over 15 years has been helpful in creating and
expanding the network to over 80 conservancies at present. This support aligns well
with the rural development, poverty reduction, and anti-poaching agendas of Namibia’s
five-year National Development Plans. Conservancies have been rather successful, and
now generate tens of millions of dollars in revenue for the participating communities to
distribute.
Gender empowerment is another sector that resonates with Namibian Government

priorities. US assistance was given to gender-based non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and to other sectors to support legal and institutional efforts to redress past
imbalances and outdated laws. These efforts were both in line with official policy and
in support of private initiatives. Other donor countries and NGOs are also active in
these areas, so coordination efforts have been made to complement rather than duplicate
activities in this area, as in other assistance dimensions.
The bulk of America’s assistance has gone to the Basic Education Systems Project since
1991. This aid has been offered in line with government priorities, as indicated in the
annual budget allocations to this sector, and with World Bank thinking on the contribution
of basic education to economic and social development. Support to the formal education
sector, orphans and vulnerable children, out-of-school youth (through the Katutura
Youth Enterprise Centre, and higher education bursaries have been particular success
stories for American assistance. This is a sector with many cooperating partners through
the Education and Training Sector Improvement Programme and other government
programmes.
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The HIV and AIDS health sector grew suddenly in Namibia after the first case of
HIV was identified in 1986. Behaviour patterns as well as population vulnerabilities
associated with poverty and rapid societal transformation catapulted Namibia into the
very top international ranks of the pandemic’s infection rate. A variety of programmes,
from promoting abstinence to supporting anti-retroviral and mother-to-child protection
roll-outs, have been assisted by USAID and others. The long-term net effect has been
to stall the disease near its plateau at sentinel sites at around a 19% infection rate (an
estimated 13% for the population at large) and reverse the death rate and life expectancy
declines due to the disease. A more comprehensive approach with much greater funding
came from President George W Bush’s (2001–2008) US$15 billion global PEPFAR
initiative, discussed below.
African Growth and Opportunity Act

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was initiated by the Administration
of President Bill Clinton (1993–2000), but only implemented in 2002. The policy links
into the ideas of Aid for Trade and the New Partnership for African Development, and
became important at around the same time. AGOA was an outgrowth of older policies
such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the North American Free Trade Area, which
had, in part, the motivation of shifting some trade and investment from a successful
Asia to a less-developed part of the world (Central America, the Caribbean Islands, and
Mexico). Over 4,000 items became exempt from customs restrictions if they had been
imported to America from African countries.
As with other US–Africa programmes in the past, AGOA has had some limited benefits
for a few countries and product lines, but it has failed to dramatically alter the lack of
development in Africa. The vast majority of imports under the programme (86% by
2012) are oil- and gas- related, and impact on only a handful of countries. Except for
South Africa, little manufacturing development has taken place under AGOA terms.
The major benefit initially for Africa and for Namibia (Ramatex) was in textiles and
garments, where tens of thousands of jobs were created. Unfortunately, the expiration
of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement34 in 2004 displaced many of these jobs and factories to
China and India, where 60–80% of such global production is now expected to take place.
Some smaller factories still produce garments for export in Namibia, and an American–
Namibian replacement firm to Ramatex is readying its launch.
34 This agreement held sway outside the World Trade Organisation/GATT rules from 1974 to
2004, by allowing the restriction of imports of yarn, fabric, and garments into North America
and Europe from developing countries in order to protect domestic manufacturers from lower-
cost competitors. Due to the economies of scale and low wages, China and India are set to be the
main beneficiaries of the expiration of the agreement. Thousands of workers in several African
countries have lost employment as companies closed down or relocated – as with Ramatex.
196
However, Namibian trade to the US market under AGOA is only about US$8 million at
last count, after growing to over US$200 million in 2004.35 Much of the benefit of AGOA
for Namibia is the growth it affords to neighbouring countries and the potential use of
Walvis Bay for transport logistics in line with national development plans, rather than the
opportunities for direct investment or trade. In early 2013, the US fell below the top ten
trading partners with Namibia – its lowest point in over a century. A restart to the textile
and garment facilities at the former Ramatex factories would restore the objective and
impact of AGOA as well as general trade for Namibia.
Nonetheless, AGOA will be extended again before its 2015 expiration date and does offer
some additional opportunities for investment, growth, employment and diversification to
Namibia and other qualified countries.36 Because American customs duties are relatively
low to begin with, the gains from participation require targeted efforts from both sides
of the Atlantic. Namibia is still an attractive investment destination and AGOA skirts the
problem of a small market, although the US may be too large a market to serve in some
cases, as was discovered in the now defunct ostrich industry.37
PEPFAR, and HIV and AIDS

If AGOA was the main contribution to Africa and Namibia by the Clinton Administration,38
the second Bush Administration under George W Bush featured an important contribution
to southern Africa and especially to Namibia in the form of PEPFAR: a multi-billion US
Dollar, multi-year, multifaceted expenditure to halt and reverse the spread of HIV and
AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Namibia was a major recipient of this programme and
other sources.
In fact, Namibia receives 1% of the total global assistance for HIV and AIDS.39 In
recent years, the US has provided sub-Saharan Africa with over 60% of the international
funding for HIV and AIDS, 26% for malaria, and 21% for tuberculosis. Together, the US
and the Global Fund – one third of which is funded by the US – have supplied over 80%
of the donations toward HIV and AIDS funding in recent years, with over 100 countries
35 Jauch (2006:218).
36 Negotiations to launch a free trade agreement between the US and the five members of the
Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland)
began on 3 June 2003. In April 2006, the parties suspended the negotiations, launching a new
work programme on intensifying the trade and investment relationship instead, with the free
trade agreement now a long-term goal.
37 Some Namibian business people arranged to supply ostrich feathers for polishing new cars
for an American manufacturer, only to find that they could not supply sufficient quantities.
Eventually, the budding ostrich industry in Namibia failed, along with its specialised abattoir.
38 By some calculations, his family outing to Africa cost more than the official development
assistance programmes.
39 Kaiser Family Foundation (2013).
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receiving some assistance from the two.40 The US has supported Namibia from 2006, and
up to 2010 the latter had received US$456.6 million (N$3 billion) for preventive health
care in the domain of HIV and AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.41
Education, treatment, and institutional support featured strongly in the expenditures. As

such, PEPFAR allowed much greater coverage and service delivery than the Namibian
Government was prepared to deliver at that time. Namibia has been a leader in meeting
international standards for anti-retroviral roll-outs and other success measures. Since
the World Bank’s designation of Namibia as an upper-middle-income country, however,
donor partners have begun a slow withdrawal of support funds. Nonetheless, the
extensive efforts under PEPFAR and others have created an awareness of what works in
Namibia and what helps the government to sharpen the focus of its own efforts.42
Security sector cooperation

Despite the long history of antagonism and suspicion between SWAPO leaders and the
US Government before Namibia’s independence, bilateral and multilateral cooperation
has included the security sector. Several of the SADC military exercises, such as “Blue
Hungwe” and “Blue Eagle”, have included US military assistance, most recently involving
harmonising communication technologies across the multiple-origin equipment that
different countries have purchased. The ‘interoperability’ dimension of these SADC/
African Union/UN forces is a very complex challenge, and requires external assistance
for the forces to be effective. Although the US is not the most important partner in this
policy space, it has been active in ways that are well received by local governments and
militaries, including Namibia’s.
Beyond the multilateral dimension, America and Namibia have also developed bilateral
assistance in two important areas. The extremely important HIV and AIDS issue threatens
‘force readiness’ in ways that can undermine their availability and effectiveness for
both peacekeeping and defence purposes. American policymakers want African forces
to have the major role in African peacekeeping to help maintain continental stability.
Thus, assistance in training and preparedness has been an important part of regional and
subregional cooperation.
40 To his credit, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, among others, pushed donors to include
malaria and tuberculosis in the Global Fund. From 2002 to 2010, funding for these two diseases
increased 15-fold, while HIV and AIDS funding doubled.
41 Interview with Ms Wanda Nesbitt, current US Ambassador to Namibia, Die Republikein, 8 June
2011, p 9.
42 For example, the University of Namibia only had one health counsellor for its thousands of
students – clearly under-servicing an important demographic group with a very high infection
rate.
198
Namibian Defence Force deployments often leave them separated from their families
for long periods of time, and, as with other militaries, this makes them vulnerable to
infection from casual sexual activity. The US cooperated with both the Defence Ministry
and the Health and Social Services Ministry in Namibia to address this risk with policy,
education and action. The results of these efforts were shared with the International HIV/
AIDS Conference in Canada in 2006.
Additionally, the US military provided important training for Namibian forces before
they were deployed for UN peacekeeping duties. Since these deployments are usually
into multinational force arrangements, it is helpful to share experiences and successful
practices. Although most training for the Namibian Defence Force has been conducted
by Commonwealth countries, beginning with the Kenyan detachment remaining from
the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployment and the British
Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT) in 1990, peacekeeping duties have become
an increasingly important part of Namibian Defence Force activities, and US assistance
has been valuable for their professional development.
Furthermore, Namibia’s Windhoeker Maschinenfabrik, the nation’s only military

manufacturing business, has participated (by invitation) in US military technical shows
with their mine protection vehicle and armoured personnel carrier. Cooperation, thus,
takes place both at high political level and at technical levels in the security sector. Over
the past five years of the Barack Obama Administration (2009–2013), security assistance
to Namibia has averaged between US$100,000 and US$200,000 per year – a modest
amount.43
Millennium Challenge Account

Another major development programme from the George W Bush Administration, and
continued under President Obama, was the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, which
established a new format for development assistance. It created a Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) to administer grants to eligible countries. The first round of grants
focused on lower-income countries, but Namibia was eligible in the second round, and
the National Planning Commission (NPC) negotiated a major, multi-year grant. This
assistance was only available to countries that were deemed to meet certain governance
criteria such as the following:44
... demonstrated a commitment to –

(1) just and democratic governance, including a demonstrated commitment to –
(A) promote political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law;
43 See www.usaid.gov/namibia, last accessed 19 September 2013.

44 See http://www.cfr.org/poverty/millennium-challenge-act-2003/p16232 accessed 10 September
2013)
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(B) respect human and civil rights, including the rights of people with disabilities;
(C) protect private property rights;
(D) encourage transparency and accountability of government; and
(E) combat corruption;
(2) economic freedom, including a demonstrated commitment to economic policies that –
(A) encourage citizens and firms to participate in global trade and international capital
markets;
(B) promote private sector growth and the sustainable management of natural
resources;
(C) trengthen market forces in the economy; and
(D) respect worker rights, including the right to form labor unions; and
(3) investments in the people of such country, particularly women and children, including
programs that –
(A) promote broad-based primary education; and
(B) strengthen and build capacity to provide quality public health and reduce child
mortality.
After prolonged negotiations, an agreement was signed between the two countries on 28
July 2008 for a five-year programme, entailing a sum of US$304.5 million (approximately
N$2.5–3 billion). An administrative unit known as the Millennium Challenge Account –
Namibia Compact (MCA-N) was set up in the NPC to oversee and administer contracts
and spending in three key areas:45
The Compact aims to reduce poverty through economic growth and funds development projects
in the sectors of education, tourism and agriculture.
NPC Director General Helmut Angula negotiated the agreement with Namibia’s
American counterparts at the Millennium Challenge Corporation. A brief, immature
intervention by members of the SWAPO Party Youth League nearly put at risk the largest
single development funding in the country’s history. Senior officials in the SWAPO Party
and the Namibian Government succeeded in smoothing over the intra-party skirmish and
the programme launched in 2009 with the first contracts.
Among the major accomplishments thus far are the donation and distribution of
thousands of school textbooks across the country, meeting a significant shortfall in the
education process over recent years. Additional classrooms and schools have also been
constructed in different Regions of the country, especially in poorer rural areas. Staff
housing, libraries, school laboratories, and other infrastructure have been constructed in
the education sector.
CBNRM training and assistance under MCA-N have extended earlier US contributions
in that field, and tourism development and training also have benefited. Just as the
CBNRM contributions have helped rural populations, agricultural inputs have benefited
45 MCA-N (2013:1).
200
communal farmers with livestock breeding projects, among others. By December 2012,
MCA-N claimed that most of the projects would be completed on time by the September
2014 deadline – an optimistic assessment for implementation in Namibia. Although the
total expenditure will probably not be completed by the negotiated deadline, prospects
are good that most items will be completed and reasonable extensions can be expected.
Namibia’s relations with the US

Overall, Namibian leaders have not engaged much in direct bilateral relations with
the US. America was always the imperialist superpower that supported South Africa’s
oppressive apartheid system. Rather, Namibians were engaging through multilateral
channels such as the UN, the Non-aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), and the Frontline States. As a small country, these larger bodies amplified the
diplomatic impact of Namibian efforts. The OAU’s Liberation Support Committee was
particularly helpful after the oil price increases of the 1970s boosted Nigeria’s importance
on the world stage.
SWAPO leaders in particular had multiple discourses depending on the audience. A

Marxist-Leninist one for the Eastern Bloc assisted in securing their material aid (estimated
to be around 90% of military supplies);46 the Scandinavian socialist one assisted with
humanitarian aid from more moderate audiences; and a democratic moderate one for
Western audiences were all utilised during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, SWAPO
leader Sam Nujoma launched the reconciliation policy in May 1988 from Washington,
DC, for maximum effect with the Western powers.47
In the words of Lauren Dobell’s dissertation:48
The only constant in the documents and statements produced during this period [1970s] is
the demand for independence – all else was negotiable, it seems, and the language employed
depended mostly on the intended audience.
Although New York was the centre of attention from the early days of independence
diplomacy, the attention and diplomacy was clearly directed toward the UN rather than a
domestic US audience – whether governmental or popular. Many of the political elite of
Namibian independence activists gave testimony at the UN in the early days of the 1950s
and 1960s, along with religious leaders who spoke on behalf of Namibians.49 Such figures
as Mburumba Kerina, Fanuel Kozonguizi, Michael Scott, Bishop Colin Winter and, later,
Sam Nujoma were among the early presenters speaking for Namibians, including Chief
46 Dobell (1998:64).
47 Dierks (2002:296).
48 Dobell (1998:22).
49 Wallace (2011:247).
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William A Lindeke
Hosea Kutako and Andimba Toivo ya Toivo. Over 120 separate petitions had been filed in
1960.50 These same elites often attended university in the US on bursaries either through
the UN, the African American Institute in New York, or churches. Their interaction was
often through UN diplomatic contacts rather than Washington-based officials.
However, the formal and informal interactions over the years included Henry Kissinger,
Cyrus Vance, Donald McHenry, Andrew Young, Chester Crocker, and Herman Cohen –
all the Africa policy heavyweights of American Administrations. Significant negotiations
included the Constitutional Principles of 1982, which became the basis for the Namibian
Constitution and other important steps toward independence. The ultimate negotiations
over the 1988 settlement (the New York Accords) excluded the Namibian participants,
but also took place in New York.
In the grand overview of of pre-Independence SWAPO’s relations with the US, as well
as the now governing SWAPO Party of Namibia’s post-Independence relations with the
US, nothing quite covers the topic as does a quote from founding Foreign Affairs Minister
Theo-Ben Gurirab at a 1992 conference looking back at the UNSCR 435 process:51
SWAPO did not really trust anybody in the 435 framework – the Contact Group, the UN, the
Frontline States, Nigeria, South Africa or the internal parties.
Twenty years later, an African analyst could still make the same claim with respect to all
of the liberation movements that had come to power in the region:52
An aspect of US relations with southern Africa that is often ignored is the effect of historical
memory on the way that the region views the USA. Given the historical nature of US
involvement, the suspicion with which the region constantly views the USA should come as
no surprise.
This aspect of the relationship between Namibia and the US recurs during the past decade
and more since 2000 in the tensions over the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. Namibia
established its official position to support President Mugabe regardless of Zimbabwean
or Western opposition, as declared by Founding President Sam Nujoma, and no official
has dared to deviate from the steadfast defence of Mugabe, even if they wished to. This
supportive stance is a given in the relationship, regardless of conditions or actions taken
in that country.
In other forums, such as the UN, the Namibian position supporting pre-Independence
allies such as Cuba, Libya, the Palestinian cause, and others has been understood
and respected. The US has attempted to find common ground in what the Namibian
50 Ruth First (1963, quoted in Dobell 1998:27n).

51 Gurirab (2010:109ff); Weiland & Braham (1994:45).
52 Ngwenya (2012:264).
202
leadership called “the second liberation struggle”, that is, economic development. Indeed
“economic diplomacy” was the most important aspect of Namibia’s foreign policy
from the beginning of independence.53 In that respect, the prior approach of SWAPO’s
leadership to a policy of ‘proactive positive non-alignment’ in global affairs continued
in the economic diplomacy sphere, and that included actively engaging with the US
Government on many different levels.
To quote Founding President Nujoma at the first SWAPO Party Congress after Independence:
The policies of SWAPO in this regard [foreign policy] have always been aimed at securing
friends who sympathise with and support our objectives of democracy and social justice …
The central approach in SWAPO’s foreign policy in post-independent Namibia is to promote
economic democracy. This means attracting investment, diversifying trade opportunities and
promoting joint-ventures both with foreign governments and companies as well as with the
local private sector.
In 1995, Namibia enacted an Investment Protection Agreement with the US in order

to attract investment.54 Similarly, Namibia signed on to the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agreement with the World Bank to improve assurances for investor certainty.
Some of the older Namibian leadership has continued to be suspicious of the US and,
as Cabinet members, have distanced themselves from cooperation. Periodically, anti-
imperialist rhetoric is uttered against some usually vague and abstract threat.55 Cabinet
continues to show some distrust in its steadfast refusal to borrow money from the
Bretton Woods institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
However, the official Namibian Government stance has been cooperation, and several
ministries and institutions actively engage their American counterparts, who have always
been among the top bilateral donor partners.
Public opinion concerning the US

In 2008, the 4th Round of the Afrobarometer Public Opinion Survey56 sought popular
attitudes of Namibians toward a number of countries, including the US. The survey was
conducted in Namibia just after the first election of President Barack Obama, the first
African-American to hold this position. Therefore, there could be a bit of an ‘Obama
bounce’ to the results. Nonetheless, America ranks highly in the opinion of ordinary
Namibians, as shown in Figure 1.

54 Du Pisani (2000:308).
55 For example, around Libya and UNSCR 1974.
56 IPPR (2009).
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William A Lindeke
60
50
50
African Union
40
40 SADC
34 35
33 UN
31 31
29 29 29 South Af rica
30 26 27 27 26
24 24
China
20 USA
Germany
10 EU
0
Help somewhat Help a lot
Q98I. How much does each of the following do to help your country: the United States? [etc.]
Figure 1: How much does the United States help Namibia?
The US ranks third, at 64% positive, behind the UN (79%) and SADC (71%). This
is quite a contrast from the pre-independence official attitude toward America. Urban
respondents were somewhat more positive (67%) than were rural ones (61%), yet there
was no difference along gender lines. Caprivians were the least supportive of American
efforts, while Oshiwambo-speakers showed slightly above-average support. Those with
no or little formal education (less than 10%) were the lowest positives, whereas those
respondents with at least primary education completed and more were above average in
their positive responses. The age group 30–64 years had the highest positive opinions in
respect of US help for Namibia.
Round 5 of the Afrobarometer Survey in 201257 showed Namibians giving the US the
highest marks (28%) for being a complete democracy out of the six countries with which
it was compared.58 Urban respondents were again more positive (by 3%) than their rural
counterparts.
Negative attitudes toward the US seem to be mostly among a minority of believers in the
pre-independence, anti-colonial nationalist ideology, mostly within the ruling party, but
57 IPPR (2013).
58 Also considered were China, Germany, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
204
not necessarily at the grass roots.59 The 2012 Libya crisis and intervention illustrated the
hold of such sentiments within government, but Namibia was separated from its African
peers in not recognising the new Libyan Government and in its strong condemnation of
the US’s role in the international intervention. The SWAPO Party of Namibia faction
taking the hardest ideological stance on this and similar issues did not prevail at the
party’s Congress in November 2012. The more technocratic and pragmatic leadership
won strong endorsement at the Congress. This is not to say that other leaders are not
critical of American policies on the world stage; but a more realistic and pragmatic
policy approach has always prevailed within the government since independence.
Conclusion
America bounced up against the Namibia Question over the past century in several
different ways. First, private economic interests continued to seek opportunities through
the German and South African colonial periods. These were not the dominant economic
players of the time, however. Similarly, American ideals influenced the League of
Nations mandate system and the intricacies involved, yet they were not the major players
in those diplomatic dramas. Finally, the US did play a decisive part in the Cold War
strategic issues that kept Namibia captive to the will and interests of others. Yet the US
was also instrumental in the negotiations through the Western Contact Group that finally
led to Namibia’s independence.
Namibian leaders, especially those in SWAPO, saw America as the great imperial force
behind the scenes on both a global and a local scale, frustrating the country’s liberation.
Nonetheless, the main enemy – and the direct conflict – was with apartheid South Africa.
This direct conflict overshadowed all others. In the end, Namibian leaders inside and
outside the country acquiesced in the UNSCR 435 negotiations that finally ended the
external control over Namibia.
Since Independence in 1990, the policies of Namibia and the US have largely converged
on the shared values of democracy and development cooperation between the two
countries. The US has been a large donor partner since Independence in education, health
care (especially HIV and AIDS), and conservation among others. Major programmes
from the US such as PEPFAR, AGOA, and the MCA-N have made a significant direct
and indirect impact.
Political and diplomatic relations have been generally favourable and friendly, with a
few notable exceptions carried over from earlier differences. A pragmatic convergence
of cooperation has emerged as the dominant post-Independence interaction.
59 Although American churches were not important in Namibia over the past 150 years, music,
fashion and culture have been popular with the general public.
205
William A Lindeke
References
Baines, Gary & Peter Vale (Eds). 2008. Beyond the Border War: New perspectives on
southern Africa’s Late-Cold War conflicts. Pretoria: University of South Africa
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Chan, Stephen (Ed.). 1990. Exporting apartheid: Foreign policies in southern Africa,
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Cooper, Allan (Ed.). 1988. Allies in apartheid: Western capitalism in occupied Namibia.
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Dierks, Klaus. 2002. Chronology of Namibian history: From pre-historical times to
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Dobell, Lauren. 1998. SWAPO’s struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991: War by other means.
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Du Pisani, André. 1985. SWA/Namibia: The politics of continuity and change.
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Henrichsen, Dag, Naomi Jacobson & Karen Marshall (Eds). 2010. Israel Goldblatt
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207
208
SECTION III
NAMIBIA’S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS
209
210
Namibia and the Southern African Customs Union
Gerhard Erasmus*
Introduction
When the Republic of Namibia was born into sovereign statehood in 1990, it joined the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as its fifth member state.1 It had, however,
already been a de facto part of that arrangement for a considerable period of time.
As the former German colony of South West Africa it became an integral part of the
administration of the Union of South Africa after the First World War in 1919, when the
League of Nations was formed. The colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire were
then put under the League’s Mandate System. Namibia was a Class C mandate, bringing
it under the internal administration of South Africa. After the Second World War, when
the United Nations was established, the Trusteeship Council replaced the Mandate
System and became the international supervisory institution for these territories. South
Africa refused to accept this new arrangement and a protracted struggle and several
international court cases on the status of Namibia and the nature of South Africa’s
obligations followed. The final outcome was the gaining of independence by Namibia
in 1990.
SACU has seen its own share of change since 1990. This process coincided with the
demise of apartheid rule in South Africa and the arrival of democracy in 1994. It was in
fact during the negotiations for the Namibian Constitution, in February 1990, that the
dramatic announcement was made in the South African Parliament that the South African
liberation movements would be unbanned and their leaders released from Robben Island.
This chapter provides an overview of SACU as a specific kind of regional trade

organisation and will clarify certain aspects of the present Agreement. SACU has, from
its inception, been a sui generis arrangement with its own historical context, while
functioning under specific multilateral trade rules.2 This general background is discussed
and the difficulties which subsequently arose around aspects such as revenue-sharing
and the adoption of common policies are explained.
* Prof. Gerhard Erasmus is Emeritus Professor (Law Faculty) at the University of Stellenbosch,
a founder and associate of the Trade Law Centre (tralac) in South Africa.
1 The other members of SACU are Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland.
2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into existence in 1947. It prohibits
discriminatory trade practices, but does allow for the formation of free trade areas and customs
unions – provided certain requirements (e.g. the liberalisation of substantially all trade among
the member states and adherence to a common external tariff, or CET) are met.
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Gerhard Erasmus
South Africa is the dominant economy in SACU. Its interests and policy needs
are of a specific kind and order; they tend to dictate what policies are adopted via
SACU structures. This is reflected in the practices of SACU, which has not become a
“democratic” organisation, as the 2002 Agreement promises. The adoption of common
policies has remained an elusive goal. The smaller member states are, as a consequence,
confronted with particular trade and foreign policy challenges and constraints. At the
same time, membership of SACU brings important benefits, the most obvious of which
is the revenue from the Common Revenue Pool, collected as part of the common external
tariff (CET). The bulk of these imports is generated by South African imports.3 It should
also be noted that SACU is both a customs as well as an excise union.4
In addition, SACU members – with the exception of Botswana – belong to a common

monetary arrangement which does not form part of SACU. The Common Monetary Area
was enacted in July 1986; it originated from the Rand Monetary Area. The latter was
established in 1974 and the signatories besides South Africa were Lesotho and Swaziland.
The Common Monetary Area was replaced by the present Multilateral Monetary Area as
of February 1992, when Namibia formally joined the arrangement.
Basic features of customs unions
A customs union provides for preferential trade between its members. This constitutes
discrimination with regard to goods originating in third states outside the arrangement,
but also enjoying, on the multilateral level, the protection of the most-favoured-nation
principle, which forbids discrimination. Nevertheless, customs unions (and free trade
areas5) will be allowed under the applicable rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)6 if substantially all trade among the members of the union is liberalised,
and no new restrictions on trade with other World Trade Organization (WTO) members
are introduced. A customs union is also obliged to have a CET and a single customs
territory.
The administration of the CET requires specific joint policies and measures by the
member states. They are required to act jointly in trade negotiations with third parties
and they are not free to unilaterally impose tariff changes, safeguard measures or trade
3 See also the discussion below on revenue-sharing in SACU.

4 The excise component of the revenue-sharing formula is explained in Article 34(4) of the
SACU Agreement. Each member state’s share of the excise component is calculated from the
value of its gross domestic product. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to provisions in
the SACU Agreement refer to the 2002 SACU Agreement.
5 In a free trade area, the level of integration is lower and there is no CET. Members retain a
larger degree of policy freedom to determine their trade policy and tariffs with respect to third
states.
6 As embodied in Article XXIV, GATT.
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Namibia and SACU
remedies in order to protect their domestic industries. Their policy space for independent
action in these areas is, as a consequence, curtailed.
Similar considerations apply with regard to the single customs territory aspect of
a customs union. Trade between the members has to be tariff-free with respect to
substantially all trade between them. Thus, there are no customs controls at the internal
borders with respect to such goods. This does not mean that internal border controls will
disappear: in SACU, different national fiscal regimes are maintained, which requires
certain types of border controls. The same applies to sanitary and phytosanitary matters,
immigration, health and standards. Nevertheless, the members of a customs union are
obliged to eliminate substantially all other restrictive regulations of commerce between them.7
All the regional economic communities in southern Africa strive to become customs
unions. They have adopted a ‘linear’ approach with regard to their deeper regional
integration plans, moving from free trade areas to customs unions, common markets
and, eventually, monetary unions at particular dates which are normally announced in
advance.8 This has proved to be an arduous road. Customs unions and common markets
are sophisticated arrangements whose members have to be prepared to sacrifice a large
degree of autonomy over trade and economic policies – as the experience in the European
Union has demonstrated. Supranational institutions and firm legal rules are required to
ensure coherence and to prevent fragmentation. African states have not succeeded in
implementing their ambitious plans on deeper integration.9
SACU is in a different category and is a functional customs union. The reason has to
do with its long and special history – as the next section will show. At present, SACU
members do not entertain formal plans to move to a higher level of integration, although
they are committed to the adoption of certain common policies.
SACU’s historical development and the 1910 and 1969 Agreements

The history of SACU is at the same time also the storyline of the special economic
relationship between its members. SACU has been around since 1910 – it is in fact
the world’s oldest functioning customs union – and has been the formal embodiment
of economic interdependence in the region. The importance for Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia and Swaziland (the BLNS countries) of revenue from SACU’s revenue-sharing
arrangement, the strength of the South African economy, and the dominant position of
South Africa in economic policy matters constitute essential features of the relationship
between the member states. These factors impact directly on the foreign policy space of
the smaller countries in particular.
7 GATT Article XXIV (8).

8 McCarthy (2011).
9 For a further discussion, see WTO (2011).
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Gerhard Erasmus
At the time of writing this chapter, important changes are under discussion in SACU.
These include possible changes to the revenue-sharing formula, formalising the Summit
of Heads of State and Government, and the conclusion of new trade agreements with
third parties. These developments will be mentioned and their political consequences, as
well as the foreign policy implications for Namibia, will be discussed.
SACU dates back to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Colin McCarthy
has written extensively about this history and the technical aspects of SACU.10 This part
of the present chapter borrows directly from his writings. He has emphasised the colonial
foundations of the original arrangement, and has explained the technical and political
difficulties under the 1969 SACU Agreement. These difficulties resulted mainly from
the dominance of the South African economy and the manner in which Pretoria used
SACU’s CET as an instrument to promote its own industrial and trade policies.
The 1910 SACU Agreement provided the first formal framework for the operation of
this customs union, which then included the former British Protectorates of Basutoland,
Bechuanaland and Swaziland. When they became independent in the 1960s, a
reassessment of the SACU Agreement was required. This resulted in the adoption of the
1969 SACU Agreement, concluded on 11 December 1969 and becoming operational
on 1 March 1970. Revenue-sharing was, from the outset, the principal issue. Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland were concerned that they were not getting a fair share of customs
union revenue, basing their views on the argument that the fixed percentage shares in
revenue which came their way under the 1910 Agreement did not compensate for the
effects of trade diversion that arose from the protective tariff designed to serve South
African industrial interests.
The 1969 Agreement provided for free trade among the members, while administering
a CET for trade with third parties. However, it was envisaged that free trade within
the common customs territory would, in terms of the preamble to this Agreement, be
managed in a way that was to –11
… ensure the continued economic development of the customs area as a whole, and to ensure in
particular that these arrangements encourage the development of the less advanced members of
the customs union and the diversification of their economies, and afford to all parties equitable
benefits arising from trade among themselves and with other countries.
Asymmetry was, in McCarthy’s words,12 built into the arrangement from the beginning,
with industrial development being concentrated in the high-growth metropolitan areas of
South Africa as a result of economic agglomeration.
10 McCarthy (2006).
11 See Republic of South Africa (1969:9).
12 McCarthy (2006:11).
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Namibia and SACU
SACU experienced many practical difficulties under the 1969 Agreement, such as
operational problems with regard to time lags in the distribution of customs union
revenue, and inadequate customs procedures and control measures. The management
of the technical aspects of the customs union gave rise to further friction. South Africa
managed the CET primarily in the interest of its own economy. Although Article 5(1) of
the1969 Agreement specified that South Africa had to give the other contracting parties
“adequate opportunity for consultations before imposing, amending or abrogating any
customs duty”, consent of the other parties was in fact not sought. The actual practice
showed that implementation was not dependent on concurrence from the BLNS
countries. Article 5(2) dispensed with the need to consult where interim measures were
implemented to protect an industry, pending a full investigation of such measures by the
South African authorities. South Africa could, in fact, change tariff levels unilaterally.
This state of affairs went to the heart of the criticism that SACU was undemocratic.
McCarthy, quoting Schiff and Winters, notes that –13
[i]n the most hegemonic of customs unions, SACU, South Africa simply decided trade policy
and compensated the smaller countries for the costs it imposed on them.
Since a customs union is obliged to have a CET, it follows that it also needs to have a
trade policy that is common in all material aspects. This feature ironically enabled South
Africa to adopt SACU tariff policies to be in line with its own national development
objectives.
There were efforts to address these obvious inequalities. Certain practical arrangements
and a special revenue-sharing formula – which guaranteed the BLNS states a minimum
revenue rate of 17% on import values and excisable consumption and production – were
adopted. The adequacy of the compensation built into the revenue-distribution formula
and the effectiveness of the special provisions to encourage BLNS infant industries were
questioned, but SACU did provide these countries with a reliable source of revenue.
The 1969 Agreement was premised on an understanding that the BLNS countries would
sacrifice important elements of their control over fiscal and trade policy. South Africa
managed these affairs as if they were all part of the South African economy. In exchange,
and as compensation for the polarisation effect inherent in being part of a single customs
territory dominated by a much larger member, BLNS countries received the payments
provided for in the revenue-distribution formula. This system of customs union
management had evolved historically and was embedded in the colonial experience of
the region.
13 Schiff & Winters (2003:85, cited in McCarthy 2006:8).
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Gerhard Erasmus
This was not a durable arrangement. South Africa’s domestic political order of apartheid
meant additional tensions and international isolation. All of this came to an end in 1994
with the election of a new government under a democratic dispensation. The newly
elected African National Congress Government soon announced its preparedness to
renegotiate the SACU Agreement.
The 2002 SACU Agreement

The adoption of the 2002 SACU Agreement was a response to the organisation’s historical
legacy and regional political and economic changes during the 1990s. Namibia became
independent in 1990 and joined SACU as a full member. The announcement, in the same
year, that apartheid would be abolished, heralded the end of South Africa’s international
isolation. The outcome of GATT’s Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
took effect in 1995, and on 1 January that year, the WTO came into existence. The WTO
constituted a rules-based international trade regime, to which all the SACU states belong.
Certain changes and some degree of innovation within SACU followed, but essential
features of the previous regime such as the strong focus on tariff revenue-sharing were
retained. The Common Revenue Pool and the transfer of revenue to the BLNS states
remained the essential raison d’être of SACU. The new Agreement still covers only trade
in goods: it does not mention trade in services. SACU did not evolve into a true regional
integration mechanism or an instrument for promoting trade beyond the exchange of
goods. A number of new building blocks and institutions14 are mentioned in the 2002
Agreement and, when they become operational, there might be a new impetus towards
deeper integration. This has not yet happened.
Nonetheless, the new SACU Agreement does alter the organisation’s structure and
some of its operational aspects. The 2002 Agreement now provides for an international
organisation with legal personality,15 specific institutions, rules on decision-making, the
development of common policies, and the possibility of formal dispute resolution.16 The
1969 Agreement noted that differences between the members had to be resolved through
consultation. There was no provision for a regional court or tribunal.
The 1969 Agreement listed the free interchange of goods, the application of the same
tariffs on goods imported from outside the common customs area, the amendment
of customs duties, excise, the right to impose import and export prohibitions and
14 The SACU Tariff Board, the ad hoc Tribunal and the Common Negotiating Mechanism are the
most important ones.
15 2002 SACU Agreement, Article 4.
16 The settlement of disputes will require an operational Tribunal, but this has not yet been
instituted.
216
Namibia and SACU
restrictions, the marketing of agricultural products, and the “pool of customs, excise,
sales and additional duties”.17
The new Agreement, on the other hand, purports to create a typical international
organisation, while maintaining – and, in some instances, repeating – provisions in the
1969 Agreement.18 The Preamble and Article 2 are both new in the sense that they spell
out the inadequacies of the former arrangement, especially measured against the need to
integrate the member states’ economies into the global economy and in dealing with the
different levels of the economic development of the member states. The importance of
tariffs as instruments for the implementation of industrial development is emphasised,19
as is the need now for a –20
… dispute settlement mechanism [to] provide a mutually acceptable solution to problems that
may rise [sic] between Member States.
Article 2 of the new Agreement deals with the Union’s objectives and emphasises the
need for a technically sound customs union and to integrate the national economies into
the global economy through enhanced trade and investment. Equitable sharing from
the Common Revenue Pool is stressed, and there is a call to develop common policies
and strategies. The same provision emphasises “conditions of fair competition in the
Common Customs Area”, and the need to –
… create effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure equitable trade
benefits to Member States.
This particular aspect is significant: the members wanted to establish a dynamic and
properly empowered SACU and to move away from the dominance of South Africa’s
national institutions which characterised the functioning of SACU under the 1969
Agreement. They have not really succeeded in this particular endeavour, although they
have benefitted substantially from the sharing of customs revenue. As long as the SACU
Tariff Board and Tribunal are not established, South Africa will retain control over the
administration of SACU’s CET and compliance with obligations will to be tested by an
independent judicial forum.
The second part of the 2002 Agreement formalises SACU’s status as one based in the legal
personality of the organisation. It provides for a permanent Secretariat to deal with the
day-to-day administration of the whole organisation, as well as permanent headquarters
in Windhoek, Namibia. Article 7 provides for the establishment of a Council of Ministers,
17 1969 SACU Agreement, Article 13.

18 The right of members to impose import and export restrictions is, for example, retained in
Article 25 of the 2002 Agreement.
19 Preamble, SACU Agreement, para. 4.
20 (ibid.:final para.).
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Gerhard Erasmus
a Customs Union Commission, the Secretariat, a Tariff Board, Technical Liaison

Committees, and an ad hoc Tribunal. The member states are represented by the Council
of Ministers – still SACU’s highest decision-making body – and the Commission, both
on ministerial and senior official level. The Technical Liaison Committees will bring
together officials from the various member states to deal with agriculture, customs, trade
and industry, and transport. Exactly how this will happen will depend on the common
policies to be adopted under Part Eight, the interaction with third parties, and agreements
concluded with them.
An important development occurred with the decision taken at the SACU centenary
celebrations of 2010 to establish a Summit of Heads of State and Government as
a new and permanent SACU institution. This will require amendments to the SACU
Agreement and a demarcation of powers so that the roles of the Council and Summit
are clear. The present indications are that the Summit will provide political guidance to
the organisation. Whether this will lead to a new kind of Summit diplomacy in SACU
is to be awaited. If it does happen, the BLNS states may start to enjoy fresh scope for
foreign and regional policy initiatives. The real test will come when individual member
governments have to decide whether they will put vital issues on the Summit agenda and
whether Summit decisions will be binding. Will national officials be under an obligation
to implement them? Who will monitor implementation and compliance?
SACU has also adopted its own Vision and Mission, which provide as follows:21
The Governments of the Republic of Botswana, Kingdom of Lesotho, Republic of Namibia,

Republic of South Africa and Kingdom of Swaziland
Acknowledging the positive role which the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has
played in the past one hundred years and the important role it can play in promoting regional
integration and the economic development of all its Member States;
Mindful of the different levels of economic development of the SACU Member States and the
need for their integration into the regional and global economy;
Recognising the challenges presented by developments at the regional and global level and the
need to position SACU to respond to these;
Convinced that SACU can be a vehicle for deeper development integration both within itself
and within the Southern African region;
Hereby commit to the following:
Vision
An economic community with equitable and sustainable development, dedicated to the welfare
of its people for a common future.
Mission
To serve as an engine for regional integration and development, industrial and economic
diversification, the expansion of intra-regional trade and investment, and global competitiveness.
21 Available at http://www.sacu.int/about.php?id=395; last accessed 12 November 2013.
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Namibia and SACU
To build economic policy coherence, harmonization and convergence to meet the development
needs of the region.
To promote sustainable economic growth and development for employment creation and
poverty reduction.
To serve as a building block of an ever closer community among the peoples of Southern Africa.
To develop common policies and strategies for areas such as trade facilitation; effective customs
controls; and competition.
To develop effective, transparent and democratic institutions and processes.
SACU’s new institutional framework provides for a Tariff Board and ad hoc Tribunal.
They are in fact ‘established’ since they are expressly provided for in the text of the
Agreement. However, they cannot become operational unless specific decisions are
taken and additional legal instruments are adopted. This has not happened and present
indications are that SACU may in fact never have these two institutions. If established
and properly empowered, they could move SACU to a new level of rules-based trade
and governance. The organisation will then enjoy effective powers and will decide over
customs matters, trade remedies, rebates, refunds, and duty drawbacks. The ad hoc
Tribunal will be an independent court and will exercise jurisdiction over “any dispute
regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement”.22 This will allow for
remedies when legal obligations are not complied with, a rather essential feature in a
trade arrangement based on predictability and certainty of rights – including the rights of
private parties, traders and investors. SACU lacks this important dimension.
Part Eight of the Agreement provides for the development of common policies over
industrial development, agriculture, competition, and unfair trade practices. A regional
organisation which has the aim of integrating the national economies of its members into
the global economy cannot afford fragmented national approaches in these important
areas. The use of tariffs with respect to industrial development, trade remedies and
related customs matters should, for example, be coordinated in a real and effective
manner. The SACU Tariff Board will eventually play an important role in this regard – if
it is established. SACU constitutes a single market which requires regulation in terms
of the same standards and policies in several commercial areas and in respect of trade-
related policies.
Part Eight of the Agreement lists industrial development, agriculture, competition,

and unfair trade practices as areas of future cooperation, but does not provide for any
essential guidelines. The members will have to take deliberate steps to activate a process
for developing and adopting the common policies listed in Part Eight.
These challenges remain on the SACU agenda. Part of the reason why no new policies
have been adopted has to do with the vague language in the Agreement. The four areas
– industrial development, agriculture, competition, and unfair trade practices – aim at
22 SACU Agreement, Article 13(1).
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Gerhard Erasmus
outcomes which require specific negotiations and outcomes for each area. In the case of
industrial policy “member states agree to develop common policies and strategies with
respect to industrial development”,23 but nothing is said about the content or enforcement
of such common policies. In the case of agriculture, the Agreement requires only that
member states must “cooperate on agricultural policies in order to ensure the coordinated
development of the agricultural sector within the common customs area”.24 The five
member states often follow different domestic approaches with regard to agriculture. In the
case of South Africa, agriculture is a deregulated sector – while the opposite is true in the
other member states.25 With respect to competition policy, the members “shall cooperate
with each other with respect to the enforcement of competition laws and regulations”.26
This seems to suggest that each and every country will have its own competition laws
and institutions: national authorities will only cooperate with respect to the enforcement
of their domestic competition-related decisions. This will not be sufficient to deal with
the extraterritorial challenges of uncompetitive commercial practices.
On unfair trade practices, Article 41 provides that the Council –
… shall, on the advice of the Commission, develop policies and instruments to address unfair
trade practices between member states. These polices shall be annexed to this Agreement.
This provision differs from the other three in Part Eight, and goes further in terms of
enforceability, implementation and adoption. The ultimate SACU policy on unfair trade
practices will have to be adopted by the Council, after which it will become an annex to
the SACU Agreement. Annexes to the Agreement are binding and, in terms of Article 42,
an integral part of the Agreement. The adoption of annexes will presumably expand the
legal obligations of members and may provide for additional mechanisms.
It is not entirely clear how competition policy, unfair trade practices and trade remedies
will be coordinated. SACU’s Competition Policy will be a loose arrangement about
national powers and national laws, while in the case of unfair practices there should
ideally be a single legal instrument – in the form of an annex. The Tariff Board should
have jurisdiction over trade remedies, while the national bodies will initially vet
applications for trade remedies, tariff changes, duty drawbacks or rebates.27
The operations of the Tariff Board will require a new institutional framework consisting
of a detailed arrangement: national bodies in the member states, the Tariff Board as
a SACU institution, and the SACU Council. Up till now, South Africa’s International
Trade Administration Commission has been responsible for all decisions with respect

24 (ibid.:Article 39(2)).
25 See McCarthy (2006:10).
27 SACU Agreement, Article 11.
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Namibia and SACU
to trade remedies, rebates, refunds or duty drawbacks. It functions in terms of the South
African Trade Administration Act,28 which provides for the necessary powers and
procedures. The Act also incorporates the respective WTO disciplines on trade remedies
as part of South Africa’s domestic legislation, and implements decisions with respect to
the common customs territory.
The BLNS states do not decide over or implement trade remedies. They are nevertheless
duty-bound to give effect to International Trade Administration Commission decisions
and to protect the existence of the CET. Article 22 of the Agreement provides that
“member states shall apply similar legislation with regard to customs and excise duties”.
Article 23 stipulates that member states –
… shall take appropriate measures, including arrangements regarding customs cooperation, to

ensure that provisions of this Agreement are effectively and harmoniously applied.
These outstanding building blocks in the SACU architecture have a number of

implications. One is that the original plan adopted as part of the 2002 Agreement remains
incomplete. As long as this state of affairs prevails SACU will, in many important aspects,
not function as a common mechanism. South Africa will retain essential powers which
will impact on the operations and policies of the customs union and, by implication, on
all the member states.
There are several inconsistencies in the 2002 Agreement, such as that it still allows
individual members to impose import and export prohibitions and restrictions,29 exactly
as the 1969 SACU Agreement did. As long as this remains possible, fragmented outcomes
will follow. A SACU Tribunal could deal with some of the complications by developing
a binding jurisprudence, but it does not exist. One of the challenges for the Tribunal will
be to interpret the SACU Agreement in a coherent manner and ensure that a rules-based
regime comes about.
Revenue-sharing
The operation of the Common Revenue Pool is at the heart of the 2002 Agreement,
as it was under the 1969 Agreement. A detailed annex provides for the collection and
payment of tariffs into this Pool and for the distribution and sharing of customs and
excise revenue.
The GATT rules do not determine how customs revenue in a customs union should be
divided among member states: they are free to decide whether to link tariff revenue to
the state of final destination of imported goods, or follow another type of arrangement.
28 No. 71 of 2002.
221
Gerhard Erasmus
In SACU a special revenue-sharing formula applies. Members’ shares are calculated

from a customs component, an excise component and a development component.30 Each
member state’s share of the excise component is calculated from its value of the gross
domestic product (GDP) in a specific year as a percentage of total SACU GDP in such
year.31 The customs component consists of the gross amount of customs duties and other
specific and ad valorem duties levied on imports from outside the union. A member’s
share of the customs component is calculated on the basis of an unrelated consideration:
the value of goods imported from all other SACU member states, on which no customs
duties are levied. The destination of goods imported from outside the union is not taken
into account for the purpose of this calculation.
For the 2011/12 tax year, the SACU revenue pool total contributions amounted to
R61,437 million, of which South Africa contributed R60,135 million (97.9%). This
figure includes revenue collections by South Africa on behalf of the BLNS countries.
Namibia contributed R571 million – excluding revenues on Namibian imports collected
by South Africa.32 Namibia received N$7,137 in 2011/12 (11.6% of the total revenue
pool). This amounted to 26.6% of total Namibian revenue in 2011/12 and 7.7% of GDP
in that year.33 For Swaziland and Lesotho this figure was more than 60%.
It is generally known that South Africa is unhappy with the present revenue-sharing
arrangement. Some officials have complained that South African imports generate
revenue which ‘subsidises’ the BLNS countries. The BLNS countries, on the other hand,
point out the high costs for them which result from South Africa’s domestic industrial
and tariff policies.
There has always been a unique arrangement in terms of which customs administration
has been undertaken according to the approach adopted in the applicable South African
legislation. South Africa administers the CET and its International Trade Administration
Commission is responsible for matters such as trade remedies and tariff changes.
Trade data disputes will be decided by the Council,34 and the management of the Pool is
still undertaken by South Africa, although this provision can be revisited in order to come
30 (ibid.:Article 34).
31 (ibid.:Article 34(4).
32 See South African National Treasury/South African Revenue Service 2012 tax statistics, pp
7–8; available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/tax%20statistics/2012/2012%20
Tax%20Statistics.pdf, last accessed 21 August 2013. The 2009 WTO Trade Policy Review for
SACU (WTO 2009) mentions South Africa contributing approximately 80% of the customs
component (for 1998/99) and that this proportion was likely to remain relatively stable over the
coming years.
33 See SACU (2012:41).
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Namibia and SACU
to a new arrangement.35 It has not yet happened. At the time of writing there were some
serious deliberations afoot to change the existing revenue-sharing arrangement. A special
study called for in 2010 proposed far-reaching changes, including the establishment of
a regional development fund, with conditionalities. The BLNS countries are strongly
opposed to these proposals. This matter remains unresolved.
Assessing the promises of the 2002 SACU Agreement

Where does the new Agreement leave SACU with respect to the new philosophy of the
2002 Agreement, the commitment to common policies, and future regional integration?
The message is a mixed one. The most optimistic reading suggests that the new Agreement
– through the express provision for common policies and new annexes, and by mentioning
independent institutions such as the Tariff Board and the Tribunal – contains a promise to
bring about a truly new dispensation and to adopt joint policies. SACU’s future depends
on a common commitment and the quality of its political leadership.
That brings one to an important institutional deficit in the organisation: SACU lacks
a collective voice. The Council of Ministers, which is the highest decision-making
body (decisions are taken on the basis of consensus), is essentially a platform for the
articulation of national interests. The Secretariat could become a more proactive body
in promoting joint policymaking. This could happen via joint projects. However, it is
not permitted to undertake its own policy initiatives: Article 10(4) of the Agreement
limits its policy role to assistance regarding “the harmonization of national policies and
strategies of member states in so far as they relate to SACU”. It remains, as a result,
an institution responsible for the day-to-day administration of SACU and the related
activities of its members.
Article 31 of the SACU Agreement is important since it provides for the establishment
of –
… a common negotiating mechanism … for the purpose of undertaking negotiations with third
parties.
Once in place, this common arrangement can make a real contribution to the development
of joint trade and related policies. This will also provide scope for the development of
foreign policy strategies by SACU members and their translation into joint agreements.
The fact that this common mechanism does not exist results in a serious lacuna. It means
that trade negotiations with third parties, such as the Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA) negotiations with the European Union,36 will inevitably be influenced by South
35 (ibid.:Article 33(4)).
36 See the chapter by Raúl Fuentes Milani in this volume.
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Gerhard Erasmus
African preferences and its complicated tariff regime. A few trade agreements with third
parties have been concluded,37 and they will also require specific technical measures and
new tariffs. More needs to be done in this area.
Trade diplomacy is a very important foreign policy dimension for members of a customs
union and needs to be channelled through joint structures with the necessary powers. The
absence of a common negotiating mechanism leaves the BLNS countries without such
an instrumentality.
SACU and Namibia’s foreign policy

Namibia’s membership of SACU brings foreign policy constraints as well as benefits. It
is between these diverging tendencies that Namibia has to steer its foreign policy boat – at
least with respect to trade issues and matters covered by the SACU Agreement. The other
major consideration is Namibia’s bilateral relationship with South Africa. Relations with
South Africa, its biggest trading partner38 and a SACU member, are a priority concern
for Namibia. This is not a relationship which permits unfettered unilateral action: for a
substantial part it has to be conducted via the structures of SACU and in terms of the
limited policy space permitted under that arrangement. It is also a difficult relationship,
given the differences in economic and political power.
Namibia’s foreign policy is historically and geographically determined to focus quite

directly on southern Africa, and on South Africa in particular. The fact that Namibia
was administered as an integral part of South Africa for seven decades39 had lasting
effects on the nature of its national economy, which is intrinsically linked to that of South
Africa. After Independence in 1990, the Namibian Government continued to recognise
and promote these ties. It also benefitted from SACU arrangements such as the revenue
accruing from the Common Revenue Pool.
When the present chapter looks at the role of SACU in the shaping of Namibia’s foreign
policy, it requires an assessment of SACU’s practices – in addition to specific Namibian
initiatives. What does the SACU record tell us about common policies and strategies
undertaken as joint commitments of the SACU member states? What policy space do
37 For example, with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Mercado Común del Sur
(MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market).
38 Imports from South Africa amount to about 73% of Namibia’s total imports, while exports
to South Africa account for about 22% of the total. The United Kingdom is its second most
important export destination, at 16%. See Namibia’s Aid for Trade Framework and Strategy,
adopted in 2011 and prepared by the Namibian Ministry for Trade and Industry and the United
Nations Development Programme in Namibia.
39 This happened under the mandate system of the League of Nations and then, controversially,
also when the United Nations took over the international supervision of the mandated territories
after 1945. Namibia became independent in 1990.
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Namibia and SACU
individual SACU members enjoy which will allow them to steer SACU policies in a
particular direction in order to promote individual national interests?
Intra-SACU business is not plain sailing. The BLNS countries often complain that South
Africa acts without due regard to the impact on the smaller SACU member states when
adopting changes to the CET. They maintain that these changes mainly address South
African industrial and commercial concerns, while they are locked into a position where
they inevitably have to bear many of the import costs resulting from such decisions.
The other side of the coin concerns South Africa’s own developmental needs at home,
where it faces major unemployment and poverty alleviation challenges. South Africa is
the dominant economy in Southern Africa, but is not a typical first world country which
happens to have developing countries or least developed states as neighbours.
When Namibia joined SACU in 1990 as an independent state, the 1969 Agreement was
still in place. The new South African Government, elected in 1994, soon announced its
intention to renegotiate the Agreement and to adopt a new framework for interaction
with its neighbours. South Africa was also then invited to join the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). The negotiations to adopt a new SACU Agreement
took much longer than initially expected, and the new Agreement was only signed, in
Gaborone, Botswana, on 21 October 2002. It entered into force in July 2004.40 This is
SACU’s present legal foundation, and it contains the principles and structures in terms of
which the members have agreed to promote their trade and related interests and to adopt
policies with respect to third parties. This had to take place in a spirit of ‘democratisation’.
Under the 2002 Agreement, SACU had to provide a forum for practising a different style
of decision-making, while generating common policies and functioning through new
SACU institutions. The achievement of these goals and the implementation of Article
2 of the Agreement (listing the objectives of SACU) have not been easy. The member
states have to manage a complicated regional relationship where one specific member,
South Africa, plays a dominant role. Regional integration is never easy when the needs
of a single hegemon often deviate from those of the smaller members. It may turn out
that the former often dictates matters.
At times, Namibia has demonstrated a resolve to voice its concerns when unilateral
South African actions have impacted on SACU affairs. When the European Union and
South Africa in 2002 concluded their bilateral Trade, Development and Cooperation
Agreement (the TDCA), which covers trade relations, development cooperation,
economic cooperation and numerous other fields such as socio-cultural cooperation and
political dialogue, Namibia withheld its concurrence. The 1969 SACU Agreement did
not contain any provision on a common negotiating mechanism. When trade agreements
40 Article 46 of the SACU Agreement provides that entry into force of the new text would happen
30 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by all the member states.
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Gerhard Erasmus
with third parties were concluded, the concurrence of the other member states had to
be obtained. The TDCA is a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in its own right and has had
direct implications for SACU’s CET.41 The correct approach would have been to involve
the BLNS countries in those negotiations. Namibia’s refusal to grant concurrence
subsequently demonstrated its unhappiness with the approach adopted by South Africa.
This decision did not, however, result in the derailing of the implementation of the
TDCA. Namibia learned to live with those consequences.
A customs union has a CET and this factor precludes members from pursuing unilateral
trade policies vis-à-vis third parties. It means that joint tariff offers have to be developed
when new trade agreements – such as the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement42 – are
negotiated. This often requires compromises. Most of the time, the BLNS states have
to live with the realities and implications flowing from the South African tariff policy,
which is anchored on the use of the import tariff as a strategic instrument for promoting
its national industrial development.
As an organisation, SACU is a mixture of both the old and the new. It has not fully moved
away from the 1969 model. It is still primarily an organisation which focuses on trade
in goods and a unique customs revenue arrangement. Some commentators believe that
this particular aspect – the emphasis on customs revenue as a source of public revenue
– contributes to the lack of forward movement and deeper integration. There is no real
incentive to alter the present modus operandi or to enlarge SACU.
This does not mean that the organisation cannot become a more effective vehicle in
the pursuit of deeper integration. However, the SACU members still act as independent
nations, not as a common structure. In this regard, the new SACU did not change state
behaviour in a fundamental way and it has not succeeded in generating supranational
institutions.
The explanation for this state of affairs lies, to some extent, in SACU’s limited mandate.
For example, the SACU Agreement contains no provisions on trade in services or
taxation. Common competition, agricultural and industrial policies have to be developed
through new negotiations, but no additional commitments have been adopted. The list of
formal objectives mentioned in Article 2 of the SACU Agreement does not mention the
deeper integration of SACU expressly. This aspect may be implied in, for example, the
41 Goods imported into South Africa under the TDCA will circulate freely within the SACU
customs territory. There will also be a loss of customs revenue.
42 The member states of SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
and the East African Community (EAC) decided, at a summit in Kampala in 2008, to form one
joint free trade area between the 26 members. These negotiations are under way and have
proved to be quite complicated. See also Erasmus (2013).
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Namibia and SACU
reference to the “development of common policies and strategies”. The recently adopted
SACU Mission Statement recognises that the organisation has to –
… serve as an engine for regional integration and development, industrial and economic
diversification, the expansion of intra-regional trade and investment, and global competitiveness.
It remains to be seen whether this statement will result in tangible outcomes.
The adoption of the Mission Statement does seem to indicate that SACU members will
not pursue unilateral initiatives which will undermine their SACU agenda. It remains to
be seen whether South Africa in particular will consider this to be a binding commitment.
It has in the meantime become a member of BRICS, a loose arrangement between Brazil,
Russia, India, China and – for the past two years – South Africa. Membership of this
configuration suggests a special and higher status and a unique role in international affairs.
The inaugural meeting of the BRICS Business Council took place in Johannesburg on 19
and 20 August 2013. It focused on identifying areas of potential cooperation, including
the promotion of public–private partnerships, information exchange, and harmonisation
of technical standards. These are matters which should also be canvassed at SACU
meetings.
It might be argued that deeper integration efforts can be pursued through the initiatives
adopted in SADC, to which all the SACU members belong. However, SADC’s integration
record is rather unimpressive. Its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
(RISDP) is many years behind schedule, while several members have not implemented
their Free Trade Area obligations. The suspension of the SADC Tribunal in 2011 was
a retrogressive step which will seriously undermine efforts to transform SADC into a
rules-based arrangement. SADC does not offer an exciting prospect for deeper regional
integration. SACU is a smaller community of states: its members will be better served by
adopting their own plans of action to deepen integration and then to endeavour to initiate
larger regional initiatives.
The achievement of the new SACU objectives depends, for a major part, on how the
organisation’s institutional and policymaking potential will be unlocked in order
to bring about effective common governance. This will only happen once focused
policies are developed, and deliberate steps are taken to do what the Preamble and the
new Mission Statement require, namely to have an organisation that will cater for the
needs of the 21st Century. Strengthening of the collective institutional voice is vital.
Successful implementation will depend on firm commitments and effective monitoring
of compliance. The SACU Tribunal will be a critical element in the achievement of a
rules-based arrangement. This promise is yet to be fulfilled. This task falls squarely on
the shoulders of the political leadership, but there are few indications that the member
states want a properly empowered SACU with an effective collective voice. Would
Namibia be prepared to champion these causes?
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Gerhard Erasmus
Regional integration in southern Africa and on the African continent could be undergoing
important changes with the new Tripartite Free Trade Area being negotiated.43 SACU
has entered these negotiations by developing a joint tariff offer. The aim is for this
integration initiative to evolve into a continent-wide free trade arrangement. For this to
come about, a more serious commitment to legal certainty, predictability and effective
regional institutions will be required. SACU should get its own house in order and
actively support the correct efforts.
All African regional economic communities have, on paper, embarked on the road
towards deeper integration. Attaining this objective has proven rather difficult and
holds serious implications for traditional notions about state sovereignty. Most African
governments have demonstrated little preparedness to grant regional institutions
effective and independent powers or to accept the jurisdiction of regional courts. They
claim that they will lose their sovereign policy space. This approach to sovereignty is
problematical. The conclusion of most international agreements flows from the fact that
they are necessary in order to protect and promote national interests: states cannot prosper
in isolation. It is an act of sovereignty to conclude such agreements and to found regional
and multilateral trade arrangements. These agreements cannot bind particular states
unless ratification or accession has occurred. Compliance with international obligations
freely entered into cannot subsequently be denied by invoking national sovereignty or
domestic constitutions or laws. If that were possible, no international agreements would
be implemented.
What are the direct implications of SACU membership for Namibia’s foreign policy?
The most immediate concern is the future of the revenue-sharing arrangement and the
management of the Common Revenue Pool. Namibia, together with the other BLNS
states, will have to steer discussions about possible changes to the present formula in a
direction which will account for the broader regional implications. Namibia and Botswana
are not as dependent on SACU revenue as Swaziland and Lesotho are. However, the
more than 20% of public revenue annually flowing into the fiscus in Windhoek is a
vital contribution. Serious political instability could follow if abrupt changes to SACU’s
revenue-sharing arrangement are introduced and the smaller SACU members, which
have become dependent on the revenue from the Pool, are left stranded. SACU has
generated regional realities and a degree of stability which cannot be altered in an abrupt
manner. Regional instability will not be to South Africa’s advantage. A well-informed
and joint BLNS strategy about this matter is called for. Namibia could be a champion of
such efforts.
Another important concern involves the conclusion of the SADC EPA with the European
Union. SACU is not the official counterpart of the European Commission in these
43 The member states of SADC, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
and the East African Community (EAC) are involved in these negotiations.
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Namibia and SACU
negotiations,44 but the negotiations are, for all practical purposes, conducted with SACU.
Pretoria has become the major player on behalf of SACU and this has complicated
matters. South Africa wants, via the SADC EPA, an improvement of the market access
conditions provided for South African goods under its bilateral free trade agreement, the
TDCA, with the European Union. Namibia has specific needs with regard to quota-free
and duty-free European Union access for its beef and table grapes. It stands to lose these
important trade preferences if an agreement is not concluded in time. The European
Commission has indicated that quota-free and duty-free access will be discontinued by
the end of 2014 in those instances where EPAs have not been finalised. Windhoek’s
policy choices are difficult ones and require a balancing of regional solidarity concerns
against real economic and trade benefits. It should, however, push for the successful
conclusion of these negotiations. The whole SACU region stands to benefit from a sound
and balanced deal.
Namibia is the host of the SACU Secretariat, which may allow it to develop a special
relationship with this SACU institution. This will require a clear strategy in favour
of the membership as a whole, especially since the chair of the Council of Ministers
rotates every six months. The need for enhancing the Secretariat’s technical capacity is
rather obvious: the organisation needs a well-functioning Secretariat while the smaller
members can benefit from Secretarial support with regard to customs procedures, the
implementation of trade obligations, and complying with international standards, and in
order to avoid duplication of institutions.
SACU’s institutional strengthening will benefit Namibia and the other BLNS members in
particular. The establishment of the SACU Tribunal and Tariff Board should be a priority
concern and Namibia could play a constructive role in ensuring that the necessary is
done as a matter of urgency. Without these institutions the SACU structures will remain
seriously deficient, while operations will be fragmented and without a proper rules-based
component.
Not all of Namibia’s developmental needs can be addressed via SACU. Windhoek needs
strong regional and multilateral ties in order to accelerate its infrastructural development
and trade facilitation programmes. These priorities are recognised, but they can only be
implemented as part of sound regional integration initiatives. Namibia stands to benefit
quite directly by deliberately working for the improvement of regional governance and
deeper integration. Apart from South Africa, Namibia is the only SACU member with its
own ports. Walvis Bay is linked to many other African states within the SADC region via
a good transportation and corridor network, which is a vital aspect of trade in goods and
services. The Namibian Government is pursuing the benefits to be gained from deeper
44 Angola and Mozambique are also involved, but will probably opt for a future trade relationship
with Brussels based on the ‘Everything but Arms’ arrangement in favour of least developed
countries.
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Gerhard Erasmus
integration and from using the existing transportation network optimally. Transportation
and trade facilitation are SACU and SADC concerns too, and a higher level of integration
and commitment is needed.
Is there a particular principle which could guide these Namibian policy decisions? The
pursuit of sound regional governance is an obvious candidate. Namibia’s domestic
governance is anchored in a constitution which proclaims these values and the rule
of law. This constitution has been respected. As a smaller nation it will benefit from
regional relationships which will reflect the same approach. This will also lead to the
strengthening of SACU in a much-needed manner.
References
Erasmus G. 2013. “Redirecting the Tripartite FTA negotiations?”. Unpublished paper,
www.tralac.org.
McCarthy, C. 2006. “The Southern African Customs Union – A review of critical
elements in the development of the world’s oldest customs union”. Journal of
Law and Economics in International Trade, 2(2), July.
McCarthy, C. 2011. “African regional economic integration: Is the paradigm relevant and
appropriate?”. In Herrmann, Christoph & Jörg Philipp Terhechte (Eds). European
Yearbook of International Economic Law. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Republic of South Africa. 1969. “Customs Union Agreement between the Governments
of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland”. Government Gazette, No.
1212, 12 December 1969, p 9.
SACU/Southern African Customs Union. 2012. SACU Annual Report 2012. Available
at http://sacu.int/publications/reports/annual/2012/annualreport2012.pdf, last
WTO/World Trade Organization. 2009. World Trade Policy Review: Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/tpr_e/tp322_e.htm, last accessed 12 November 2013.
WTO/World Trade Organization. 2011. World Trade Report 2011. The WTO and
Preferential Trade Agreements: From co-existence to coherence. Available
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr11-2a_e.pdf, last
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Namibia and the Southern African
Development Community
Kaire M Mbuende*
Introduction
The relationship between Namibia and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) can be understood on the basis of the history and trajectories of the community
on the one hand, and Namibia’s developmental objectives – of which its foreign policy is
an instrument – on the other. This paper aims to shed light on SADC’s integration agenda
and Namibia’s participation in it. At the same time, the discussion intends to contribute
to an understanding of Namibia’s foreign policy as exemplified by its participation in the
SADC regional integration scheme.
SADC is a product of the unique historical circumstances of southern Africa. The

countries1 of the region cemented their cooperation in pursuing the political agenda of
liberating themselves from the yoke of colonialism through the Frontline States (FLS).
In 1980, an economic dimension was added to the political cooperation through a
different entity, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),2
with broader membership than the FLS. The agenda for economic cooperation and
development aimed at complementing the political strategy. SADCC’s primary objective
was to reduce the region’s economic dependency on apartheid South Africa, and to
enable them to effectively support the struggle for the independence of Namibia and the
democratisation of South Africa. With the independence of Namibia and the imminent
demise of apartheid in South Africa, SADCC was reconstituted as SADC3 in 1992. The
new body aimed at attaining a higher level of cooperation that –4
… would enable the countries of the region to address problems of national development, and
cope with the challenges posed by a changing, and increasingly complex, regional and global
environment more effectively.
* Dr Kaire Mbuende, formerly served as the Southern African Development Community’s

Executive Secretary, as Namibian Ambassador to the United Nations and as Namibia’s Deputy
Foreign Affairs Minister.
1 The FLS consisted of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and, from
1980, Zimbabwe. Nigeria also participated in FLS meetings.
2 Founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined after its independence in 1990.
3 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.
4 SADC (1993a:3).
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Kaire M Mbuende
Namibia formally acceded to SADCC in 1990 as its tenth member state. However,
the relationship between Namibia and SADCC dates back to the organisation’s
establishment in 1980. Over the years, Namibia had been represented by its national
liberation movement, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO). SWAPO
was recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN),
and a significant number of governments as the sole and authentic representative of the
people of Namibia. It virtually acquired the status of a government in exile and, thus,
had an observer status in virtually all continental and most international organisations.
SWAPO’s – and, for that matter, Namibia’s – participation in SADCC was initially based
on two considerations, namely geopolitics, and long-term development. SADCC was
regarded as complementing the efforts by national liberation movements and the FLS to
expedite the independence of Namibia, and the democratisation of South Africa. Namibia,
as a coastal state, was to play an important role in reducing the region’s dependence on
the South African transport system for their exports and imports. The Namibian port of
Walvis Bay was to form a strategic nexus with Angolan ports along the west coast of
Africa, while the Mozambican and Tanzanian ports would serve the east coast of the
region. This was part of the backdrop against which South Africa’s attempts to hold onto
Walvis Bay after Namibia’s Independence should be seen.
The Government of the Republic of Namibia was part of the ongoing process of
transformation in the region, therefore, and positioned itself to meet its obligations and
assumed responsibilities within the broad SADC programme. Thus, Namibia’s policy on
SADC has evolved through the process of negotiating the various SADC instruments,
starting with the Treaty Establishing SADC and the various protocols.
The SADC integration process did not follow the conventional linear approach to market
integration, starting with a Preferential Trade Area (PTA), graduating to a Free Trade
Area (FTA), followed by the establishment of a Customs Union, then a Common Market,
and ultimately, an Economic Union. Instead, SADC committed itself to what it called
“development integration”.5 The regional body developed a complex agenda from the
very outset that rested on three pillars, namely politics, peace and security; functional
cooperation; and trade and investments or market integration. SADC’s approach was,
thus, a ‘big bang’ that was made possible by pre-existing elements of cooperation in the
realm of politics through the FLS, functional cooperation through SADCC, and market
integration.
This complex agenda makes it difficult to measure progress: one has to look at various
sectors without a clear notion of what the determining factors are in the process.
For instance, in the case of trade integration, an economist would ask whether the
arrangements were trade-creating or trade-diverting. In short, they would have a set of
5 SADC (1993:8).
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Namibia and SADC
indicators and benchmarks by which progress or lack thereof could be measured. The
SADC experiment cannot be judged on the basis of a single economic activity or sector,
however, but rather in terms of the three broad areas of political cooperation, functional
cooperation, and market integration.
Indeed, it is in relation to these broad areas that the relationship between Namibia and
SADC can be understood in terms of the country’s contribution to and benefits from
the regional grouping. Thus, this study will look at Namibia’s role in SADC in terms
of how the country benefits or could potentially derive greater benefits from regional
cooperation and integration, on the one hand, and how it can contribute to the global
common good in the process, on the other. This will be done through an analysis of the
three broad areas that have characterised SADC efforts for integration and development,
namely –
• cooperation in the area of politics, defence and security
• functional cooperation for the development of infrastructure and the management
of natural resources, among other things, and
• trade and investments.
Namibia and cooperation in the areas of politics, defence and

security
Regional integration by its very nature requires some degree of political cooperation
to create a framework within which specific political and or economic objectives are
pursued. Here I am not referring to the facilitating role of politics, but rather to politics
itself as an object of cooperation. I will first outline briefly the objective of cooperation in
the area of politics, defence and security. Secondly, I will discuss the process that led to
the establishment of the institutional mechanism for cooperation in the areas of politics,
defence and security within SADC. Lastly, I will analyse SADC’s effectiveness and
capacity to deal with conflicts within the region.
Objective of cooperation
The Treaty establishing SADC made provisions for cooperation in the areas of politics,
defence and security with the view to developing –6
… common economic, political, social values and systems, … democracy and good governance,
respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights.
6 A Declaration by the Heads of State or Governments of Southern Africa: Towards the Southern
African Development Community; cited in Mandaza & Tostensen (1994:153).
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Kaire M Mbuende
Cooperation in the areas of politics, defence and security was viewed as a prerequisite
for the success of regional integration in southern Africa. The experience of instability
in the region – which emanated from the political subjugation of the region’s peoples by
colonial regimes, the destabilisation of independent states by the South African regime,
and the struggle for national liberation – was something that the region did not want to
see repeated after the end of apartheid. Political instability in southern Africa had caused
untold suffering and loss of life. Infrastructure had been destroyed and there was a lack
of economic and social progress. With the end of apartheid, there was a commitment to
ensure that the region’s peoples reaped the peace dividend. Mechanisms had to be put in
place to ensure that peace in the region was sustained. To achieve this would require the
institution of democratic bodies, good governance, popular participation, and respect for
the rule of law.
The region had a tradition of cooperation in the areas of politics, defence and security
before the adoption of the SADC Treaty, primarily through the FLS, prior to the
democratisation of South Africa.7 The FLS provided an opportunity for the leaders of
the region to work together on complex political issues through an informal structure
that was deemed to have been successful. The cooperation through the FLS imbued a
measure of mutual trust among its members. However, the fact that not all members of
SADC were members of the FLS created tensions and mistrust that had to be overcome
by inclusive regional mechanisms for cooperation in the areas of politics, defence and
security.
Establishment of an institutional mechanism
When the process for the development of mechanisms for cooperation in the areas of
politics, defence and security started as per the SADC Treaty, there was a parallel process
to look at the future of the FLS in a post-apartheid southern Africa. Namibia had initially
participated in FLS activities as an observer through SWAPO; after independence, it
participated as a fully fledged member. Thus, Namibia was part of the political culture
of the FLS. More often than not, Namibia took a similar position to that of the other
FLS member countries. Namibia was also engaged in the discussion on the prospects
for creating a successor organisation to the FLS, as well as on activating the provisions
of the SADC Treaty to create an institutional mechanism for cooperation in these areas.
Some member states favoured the creation of a successor organisation to the FLS
that would be independent from SADC, namely the Association of Southern African
States (ASAS), on the basis that the issues of politics, defence and security could
not be coordinated in the same fashion as other areas of cooperation within SADC.
After protracted negotiations at ministerial level, the SADC Summit that took place in
Gaborone in August 1995 resolved that the initiatives to create a successor organisation
7 See Mbuende (2012:40–42).
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Namibia and SADC
to the FLS and that of creating an institutional mechanism within SADC, respectively,
be synchronised. Ultimately, a compromise was reached to create a semi-autonomous
structure within SADC in the form of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.
However, the complex structure of the Organ quickly proved impractical. Subsequently,
a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was signed, which put the SADC Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security on a sound footing.
The region’s capacity to deal with conflicts
The ability and resolve of the region to deal with conflict situations was put to test a
number of times. SADC was involved in the process of the democratisation of South
Africa; the civil war in Mozambique, which ended in 1994; and the situation in Angola.
SADC has also been involved in the situation in Lesotho over many years. For example,
SADC was instrumental in restoring the democratically elected government of Lesotho
after what was termed a Palace Coup.8
A situation that gravely tested the resolve and capacity of the region to deal with conflicts
within a member state was that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Euphoria
had reigned as regards the DRC after the fall of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Southern
African states – especially Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe –
were keen to develop close relations with the DRC for a variety of reasons ranging
from romantic pan-Africanism to military, strategic and economic motivations. Angola,
which shares borders with the DRC, wanted to make sure that the new government
would not support the rebel movement, União Nacional para a Independência Total de
Angola (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). There was also
a belief that southern Africa, as a stable region, would in turn help to stabilise the DRC,
and thereby extend the frontiers of stability and democracy. Some SADC member states
encouraged the DRC to apply for SADC membership and ensured its admission.9 Not
all SADC member states were enthusiastic about the inclusion of the DRC as they were
not sure about the impact that a country with a long history of instability would have on
the Community.
Shortly after the DRC had become a member of the regional body, the country was
plunged into conflict. Its new President, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, asked fellow SADC
member states to quash a rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda against his
government. At a meeting in Harare, the Ministers of Defence of the various SADC
member states considered the request of the Government of the DRC for military
assistance and resolved that whichever member wished to intervene militarily should do
so. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe decided to send in their troops. Other member states
decided not to send troops to the DRC.
8 See (ibid.:45).
9 SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 1997.
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Kaire M Mbuende
Academics such as Laurie Nathan10 viewed the different approaches to the political
situation in the DRC as a reflection of division within SADC, based on a lack of common
values. He attributed this division to his characterisation of southern African states as
being either more authoritarian or more democratic in terms of their domestic policies.
He also distinguished between states with a militarist and those with a pacific approach
in their foreign policies.11
Committing or not committing troops to the DRC by SADC Member States did not
necessarily reflect a division within the organisation. It is common practice in international
organisations, i.e. that not all member states send troops to particular conflict areas. The
deployment of troops in a multilateral context has always been a voluntary exercise.
SADC allies have argued that their intervention was based on Article 4 of the SADC
Treaty, read together with the objectives of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security in response to foreign invasion. In fact, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognises
individual and collective self-defence against an aggressor state or non-state actor.
The distinction between the militarist and pacific approaches to foreign policy is not
consistent with the practices of SADC member states in dealing with conflict situations
in the region and beyond. There is much more to the decision by a particular member
state to deploy or not to deploy troops in a specific situation. With regard to the DRC,
some member states did not mind seeing the DRC Government fall because they did
not see eye to eye with President Laurent Kabila. Some member states were indifferent
to what was happening in the DRC at the time that Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe
decided to send troops. Furthermore, those member states who took a pacific approach
in the case of the DRC took a militarist approach in the case of Lesotho – and vice versa.
SADC member states might have had their differences in terms of dealing with the
situation in the DRC, but those differences were not articulated at SADC meetings. The
SADC Summit held in Mauritius on 13–14 September 1998 welcomed the intervention
in the DRC by its SADC allies. The question of the legality of the intervention has not
been an issue as the principle of consent applied. Military intervention in the territory of
the consenting state is an accepted principle and is an alternative to UN Security Council
authorisation, whether states act unilaterally or as part of regional arrangements.
The shared experience of the three countries in the DRC brought them closer to each
other to the point of virtually becoming a sub-military group within SADC. On 8 April
1999, Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe signed a Mutual Defence Treaty among
themselves in Luanda. The Protocol read, inter alia, that –12
10 Nathan (2004:7).
11 (ibid.).
12 Article 4, Angola, DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe Mutual Defence Treaty.
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Namibia and SADC
[a]n armed attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against the other and that in
the event of such an attack each of them will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith in
collaboration with other parties, such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed
force, to repel such attack and restore peace and security in the territory of the Party so attacked.
A joint decision-making body calling itself the Angola–DRC–Namibia–Zimbabwe

Cooperation Committee was established to ensure the smooth implementation of the
Treaty.
The signing of a defence treaty by these four countries raised eyebrows among academics,
and was interpreted in the same fashion as being division within the Community.
However, SADC has always adhered to the principle of variable geometry where a
group of countries can forge ahead with cooperation in a particular area. The signing
of the defence pact between the four countries in question offered an incentive for the
expeditious conclusion of a similar agreement embracing all member states – as indeed
provided for in the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. In fact, the SADC Mutual
Defence Pact made similar provisions to those encompassed in the Mutual Defence
Treaty between the four countries. Article 6 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact reads as
follows:
1. An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and
security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action.
2. Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the recommendation of the Organ.
3. Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems
appropriate.
4. Any such armed attack and response thereto shall immediately be reported to the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United
Nations.
While the three SADC countries were involved in military operations, the regional
body itself was not found wanting in terms of trying to find a peaceful solution to the
conflict. After months of fighting, civil society organisations approached the Executive
Secretary of SADC, requesting him to explore the possibility of initiating consultations
with the rebels with a view to bringing them to a negotiating table with the government.
The Executive Secretary took up the matter with the SADC leadership and asked for
permission to meet with the rebel leadership. He was authorised to talk to the rebels, and
their first meeting took place in Zambia. He submitted a report to the SADC Chairperson
on the rebels’ willingness to talk to the DRC Government.
A mediation process under the chairmanship of the late former President of Zambia,
Frederick Chiluba, was set up at the SADC Summit in Mauritius in 1998. The DRC
Government initially refused to occupy the same room as the rebels, so ‘proximity
talks’ and shuttle diplomacy were conducted by a committee consisting of South Africa,
Tanzania, Zambia, the SADC Secretariat, the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) and
the UN. The group facilitated the Lusaka Accord, which was signed on 10 July 1999 in
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Lusaka, Zambia. Apart from the two warring parties and the countries that had troops
there, the Accord was also signed by President Chiluba, the SADC Executive Secretary,
the OAU Secretary General, and a Representative of the UN Secretary General. The
implementation of the Accord brought new players onto the scene and, subsequently,
the UN assumed responsibility for overseeing the peace process. Namibia was the first
country to withdraw its troops from the DRC after UN peacekeeping troops had been
deployed.
SADC has also been seized with the situation in Zimbabwe. Former South African
President Thabo Mbeki was assigned the responsibility of mediating between the
Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC) to find an amicable solution to the political crisis in that
country. Mbeki – and SADC, for that matter – pursued what was termed quiet diplomacy,
that is, a non-confrontational approach where controversial issues are discussed behind
closed doors. The approach was criticised by non-state actors in the region as well as a
number of Western governments, who believe that South Africa had the capacity to force
Zimbabwe into a desired course of action through sanctions and other punitive measures.13
Serving President Jacob Zuma has subsequently assumed the role of mediator, but the
issue remains unresolved. Namibia has been an ardent supporter of quiet diplomacy in
the case of Zimbabwe.
Indeed, Namibia has been an active participant in the arena of maintaining international
peace and security through SADC. It has consistently pursued an independent policy –
even at the risk of being isolated on some controversial issues. A case in point was the
proposed imposition of sanctions against Nigeria following the execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights activists. At a SADC Extra-ordinary Summit
held in Pretoria at the request of Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s President at the time,
to consider the possibility of imposing sanctions against Nigeria, Namibia was vocal
against such a move. As a result, the idea was aborted, and a decision was taken to allow
the Commonwealth Committee of Eight – of which two SADC member states, South
Africa and Zimbabwe – time to deal with the issue instead.14
Namibia placed a high premium on its international relations from the time that the
country attained its independence. Namibia attached great importance to African
solidarity, cooperation with other developing countries, and North–South cooperation.
This is partially because there had always been a significant international relations and
multilateral component to the struggle for national independence through the UN. The
13 See Fowale (2001); Dugger (2008).

14 Communiqué of the Extraordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Summit on Nigeria,
Pretoria, 11 December 1995.
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Namibia and SADC
first generation of Namibian leaders spent years in the corridors of the OAU and the UN
during the struggle for independence and, thus, further deepened those relations after the
country attained its independence. The country has also expended substantial resources
in the maintenance of international peace and security through the regional mechanism
of SADC, as well as via the African Union (AU) and the UN. Namibia was among the
first countries to put its forces in place for the SADC Brigade, which is now part of the
AU’s Standby Force.
Namibia and the SADC Parliamentary Forum
A discussion on Namibia’s contribution to SADC, especially in the area of democracy

and good governance, would be incomplete without reference to its involvement in the
SADC Parliamentary Forum. This is not because Namibia hosts the Forum, but because
of the catalytic role played by the late Dr Mosé Tjitendero, former Speaker of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Namibia. The Forum would have been unthinkable without
Dr Tjitendero’s pioneering work and personal input. He convened a meeting in Windhoek
in October 1993 to map out a strategy for the region’s parliaments to contribute to
regional integration. This resulted in what came to be known as the Windhoek Initiative.
There were at least two broad aspects to these initial discussions. The first was how
parliaments, as representatives of the people, could help disseminate knowledge to the
people on regional integration and catalyse their involvement in the process. The second
aspect related to parliaments’ role in contributing to regional integration through their
deliberative and legislative functions. Most regional and international instruments are
ratified by parliaments; thus, a greater appreciation of regional integration issues by
members of parliament will help to speed up the ratification of such instruments.
Options were also considered as to whether the SADC Parliamentary Forum would
constitute the nucleus of a fully fledged regional parliament or simply serve as a
parliamentary association. For some reason, the SADC Treaty did not provide for the
establishment of a regional parliament. However, Article 9(2) of the Treaty provided for
the creation of other institutions upon the decision of the Council of Ministers and/or the
Summit of Heads of State or Government. The Forum was, thus, created in accordance
with Article 9(2) of the Treaty.
It was clear from the outset that the Executive, the Council of Ministers and the
Summit did not wish to create a legislative body with oversight functions. Instead, the
SADC Parliamentary Forum was to become a parliamentary association rather than
a regional parliament – even though the Forum’s Constitution includes the aspiration
of transforming the Forum into a regional legislature. Thus, the SADC Parliamentary
Forum was established in 1997 as an inter-parliamentary body and an autonomous SADC
institution, as per the provision of Article 9(2). Ten years later, the late former President
of Zambia, Levy Mwanawasa, was the only SADC head of state or government to call
for the transformation of the Forum into a fully-fledged legislature, along the lines of the
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East African Legislative Assembly and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) Parliament.15
The establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum as an association rather than a

parliament has been a blessing in disguise. The Forum has been quite dynamic and
proactive in many areas. It has established itself as a moral and political authority whose
views are taken seriously by the people of the region and internationally. It has set up
committees dealing with important issues such as HIV and AIDS, regional integration,
gender, democracy, conflict resolution, and inter-parliamentary cooperation. The most
notable achievement is in the area of elections observation and the development of the
Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, that were adopted by the SADC
Parliamentary Forum Plenary Assembly in Windhoek on 25 March 2001.
Namibia and functional cooperation in SADC

Functional cooperation has been the most successful pillar of SADC’s efforts towards
cooperation in terms of directly impacting on the lives of the people of the region.
Indeed, functional cooperation is a central tenet of the development integration model
pursued by SADC and not an add-on – as is the case in the market integration approach.
Development integrationists would argue that one has to produce before one trades. Trade
integrationists, on the other hand, maintain that the market stimulates investments – and
production, for that matter. These aspects, namely functional cooperation and market
integration, are not mutually exclusive; however, the level of economic development
will, to a certain extent, dictate the approach to integration.
I will single out seven sectors to underscore the importance of functional cooperation to
Namibia in the context of SADC. This is not to say that other sectors are not important, of
course. The brief discussion will demonstrate to some extent how indispensable regional
economic cooperation and integration are to Namibia. SADC is viewed as a ‘talk shop’
by the uninformed. The analysis below will hopefully illustrate that regional integration
affects the life of individual citizens in a positive way, and could do more in the future.
Fisheries and marine resources
Namibia joined SADC at a time when the organisation was concentrating on development
cooperation. The SADC Programme of Action, which represented cooperation in the
various sectors, was managed through the sector-coordinating system according to
which every member state was given the responsibility of coordinating cooperation in
a specified area. Namibia believed that it had a comparative advantage in the fisheries
sector. However, fisheries were being coordinated by Malawi at the time that Namibia
15 Lusaka Times, 26 June 2007.
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Namibia and SADC
joined SADC. Malawi was keen to continue with its coordination role in view of its
huge resources in Lake Malawi and the investments that they had made in the sector
coordination unit. However, Malawi’s efforts were primarily concentrated on freshwater
fisheries, so there was a gap in terms of marine fisheries. A compromise was reached to
split the fisheries sector into Inland Fisheries on the one hand, and Marine Fisheries and
Resources on the other. Namibia was thus given the responsibility of coordinating the
latter subsector.
Namibia developed a sound policy in the fisheries sector with the assistance of the
Government of Norway. In fact, Namibia’s management of the sector was rated by
experts as one of the most well-managed on a global scale. Thus, Namibia was able to
use its own experience to provide regional leadership in the management of fisheries and
marine resources.
A SADC Protocol on Fisheries was adopted in August 2001, which inter alia provided
for the management of shared resources, law enforcement, access agreements, high sea
fishing, artisanal fisheries, aquaculture, protection of the environment, human resource
development, trade and investment, and information exchange.
Legal affairs
Another area for which Namibia assumed coordinating responsibility on behalf of the
region was in legal affairs. It was through its coordination of the legal sector that Namibia
ultimately came to host the SADC Tribunal.
The Tribunal was initially viewed as a dispute settlement mechanism within SADC.
Article 16(1) of the SADC Treaty reads as follows:
The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the
provisions of the Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as
may be referred to it.
However, further details relating to powers, functions, procedures and other related
matters were to be prescribed in a Protocol. This refers primarily to SADC instruments
such as the Treaty, Protocols and other SADC agreements. It is the Protocol on Tribunal
of SADC that broadened the Tribunal’s mandate to cover SADC law. This Protocol
provides the Tribunal with jurisdiction over disputes between member states, and
between natural or legal persons and member states. The Tribunal was to develop its
own jurisprudence –16
… having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public international and
any rules and principles of the law of States.
16 Article 16(4).
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In fact, SADC law virtually covers everything under the sun: the principles and
objectives of the organisation range from development to the promotion of democracy,
good governance and the rule of law.
On 18 August 2005, before the Protocol on Tribunal was ratified, the SADC Summit
in Gaborone appointed members to the Tribunal in accordance with Article 4(4) of
the Protocol. The members were sworn in on 18 November 2005 in Windhoek, and
subsequently started to operate. Article 38 of the Protocol provides that it enters into
force 30 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the member
states. That has not yet happened, even though the Tribunal has been operational since
then and has heard a number of cases. It has been argued that the amendment of the
SADC Treaty in 2001 made the Tribunal an integral part of the Treaty and, therefore,
obviated the need for the Protocol on Tribunal to be ratified. By implication, if one
ratified the Treaty, then the Protocol – as part of the Treaty – was automatically ratified.
Citizens of the region have started to make use of the Tribunal’s services. One such
group is Zimbabwean farmers, who claimed that the country’s land reform programme
was discriminatory and that they had been denied justice. The Tribunal ruled in favour
of the farmers, but the Zimbabwean Government has refused to abide by the Tribunal’s
ruling.
According the Treaty, a decision by the Tribunal is final, without the possibility of
appeal. Once a party refuses to abide by the decisions of the Tribunal the aggrieved party
has the right to approach the Tribunal again to enquire about the circumstances relating
to non-compliance. If no progress is made on the issue at hand, the Tribunal reports the
matter to the Summit for a final decision. The matter between the Zimbabwean farmers
and the Zimbabwean Government had in fact reached this stage before the Extraordinary
Summit in May 2011.
The Government of Zimbabwe’s argument is that the Tribunal is not properly constituted
as its Protocol has not been ratified. Zimbabwe’s Minister of Justice, Patrick Chinamasa,
said the following in this regard:17
We hereby advise that, henceforth, we will not appear before the Tribunal and neither will we
respond to any action or suit instituted or pending against the Republic of Zimbabwe.
The SADC Summit of 20 August 2010 directed the Committee of Ministers of Justice
and Attorneys General to review the role, responsibilities and terms of reference of the
SADC Tribunal. The SADC Secretariat itself commissioned a study in September 2010,
the outcome of which was submitted and discussed during a Committee of Ministers
of Justice meeting on 14–15 April 2011 in Swakopmund, Namibia. Whilst the study
17 AllAfrica.com, 13 May 2011; last accessed 19 October 2013.
242
Namibia and SADC
and recommendations by the expert consultant seemed to support the competence of

the Tribunal, in many respects the Committee expressed concern about the scope of
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the law it was expected to apply. The Extraordinary
Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government on 20 May 2011 in Windhoek
received and considered the Committee’s own report and recommendations on the study.
The Extraordinary Summit subsequently decided not to reappoint or replace members
(judges) of the Tribunal, and upheld the moratorium on the Tribunal receiving or hearing
new cases until the Protocol on the Tribunal had been reviewed and approved. A progress
report in this respect is to be submitted by August 2011, and a final report by August
2012.18
Transport and communications
The realm of transport and communications is another area in which Namibia, along with
other coastal nations, is well-positioned to make a significant contribution to regional
integration as well as derive benefits from it. Regional integration is inconceivable
without a well-developed transport infrastructure to facilitate the movement of persons,
goods and services. SADC therefore identified the field of transport and communications
as a priority sector.
Cooperation in transport and communication has been particularly important to the

landlocked countries in SADC, who depend on access to other member states’ ports for
their exports and imports. Other areas of cooperation such as trade and investments as
well as tourism cannot be pursued effectively without transport and communications.
Thus, SADC started coordinating investments into developing and rehabilitating
transport and communications infrastructure, and has advanced to the level of policy
harmonisation and the adoption of common standards in the region.
Namibia has turned its potential as one of SADC’s coastal states into an opportunity
for regional integration in the transport and communications sector by way of investing
substantial resources in a regional transport network. In this respect Namibia created
the Walvis Bay Corridor Group, a public–private partnership designed to promote the
optimal utilisation of four regional road networks, known as transport corridors. These
are as follows:
• The Trans-Kalahari Corridor connecting the port of Walvis Bay to Botswana and
the Gauteng Province in South Africa
• The Trans-Caprivi Corridor connecting Namibian port of Walvis Bay to Zambia
and Lubumbashi in the DRC
• The Trans-Kunene Corridor that links Namibia with Angola, and
• The Trans-Oranje Corridor that links Namibia to South Africa.
18 Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government,

Windhoek, 20 May 2011.
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Kaire M Mbuende
The Walvis Bay Corridor Group functions as a one-stop shop, bringing together transport
regulators and transport operators, among others.
Through its investment in transport networks, Namibia continues to contribute towards

the attainment of the regional integration objective targeting the efficient movement of
persons, goods and services. At the same time, Namibia benefits from transit trade and
tourism generated by these transport networks.
Agriculture and natural resources
Another area of crucial importance to Namibia is that of agriculture and food security.
The importance of this sector lies in the fact that around 70% of the nation depends
directly or indirectly on agriculture. Furthermore, this sector is vulnerable because of
precarious weather conditions and a predominantly arid to semi-arid landscape. The
country is a net food importer, and vulnerable to development beyond its borders in
respect of food security, food availability, and food access because of pricing. Namibia
stands to benefit from cooperation in the area of agriculture, therefore.
While production takes place at the national level, the sector lends itself to cooperation
in the areas of agricultural training and research. Another area in which cooperation
in the sector has benefited Namibia is that of early warning systems. SADC has set a
Regional Early Warning System for food security that operates as an integrated entity
comprising a unit based in Harare and autonomous national early warning units in
each of the countries. The regional unit feeds information into the national units, and
vice versa. This enables each country to be aware of the situation at the regional level
and how it could benefit from that through import or export, depending on whether
the country concerned has a deficit or surplus. Through this system, SADC is able to
assess the availability of food in the region and any likely shortfall so that appropriate
measures can be taken. This system has proved effective during regional drought years,
when coordination of imports and transport are important. Under these circumstances,
extensive efforts are made to ensure that there is no congestion at the ports so that food
can be delivered without delay to where it is needed.
Shared watercourses
Management of shared watercourses has also been an important area of cooperation.

Namibia is a water-scarce country with no perennial rivers except those along its borders
with Angola, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia. Thus, the utilisation of this strategic
resource for human consumption, agriculture, and hydroelectric power depends on
Namibia’s cooperation with its neighbours. In fact, about 70% of SADC watercourses
are shared by two or more countries. Instead of being a potential source of conflict if
appropriate action were not taken, water has provided incentives for cooperation. A
Protocol on Shared Watercourses in SADC, which was based on the Helsinki Rules
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Namibia and SADC
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers19 adopted in August 1966, was
initially signed in 1995. It was revised in 1997 to take into account the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,20
and came into force in 2003. The Revised Protocol stresses the importance of taking a
basin-wide approach to water management rather than individual national approaches.
Member states have therefore entered into specific basin-wide agreements such as those
serving the Okavango River Basin, the Kunene River Basin, the Orange-Senqu River
Basin and the Zambezi River Basin.
Energy
Power is another area in which Namibia’s cooperation with its neighbours is of cardinal
importance. Access to a secure and low-cost energy supply is essential for social and
economic development. The cost of energy could also be a disincentive for investment.
Development is unthinkable without energy, and Namibia is far from being self-
sufficient in this resource. The country imports power from its neighbours, principally
South Africa, but also exports power to Botswana and Zambia. Namibia is also part of a
plan to bring power from the DRC through Zambia and into Botswana and South Africa.
In addition, Namibia participates in the Southern African Power Pool formed in 1995
through an inter-governmental Memorandum of Understanding that came into effect on
28 September 1995 and was revised on 23 February 2006. It was the first international
power pool outside North America and Western Europe. The objectives of the Southern
African Power Pool include the development of a world-class, efficient, reliable and
stable interconnected electrical system in southern Africa. It also aims at creating a
more efficient regional electricity market. This is to be achieved, inter alia, through the
harmonisation of relations between member utilities.21
Namibia and trade and investment in SADC

Integration theorists consider trade as the lynchpin of regional integration. The word
integration has virtually become synonymous with trade liberalisation and market
integration. Regional trade agreements facilitate the movement of goods and services
within SADC, thereby creating a competitive market that helps to enhance member
states’ global competitiveness. Furthermore, the existence of a large market allows for
the development of economies of scale, which attract both domestic and foreign direct
investment. While SADC has not adopted a market integration approach per se, trade and
the desire to create a larger market have been important aspects of economic cooperation
19 The Helsinki Rules were superseded by the Berlin Rules of 21 August 2004.
20 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/229.
21 Southern African Power Pool website, www.sapp.co.zw; last accessed 19 October 2013.
245
Kaire M Mbuende
and regional integration in southern Africa. Right from the very onset, a sector on trade
and industry was created to promote intraregional trade and industrial development. The
SADC Framework and Strategy for Building the Community stated that, in addition to
functional cooperation, –22
… there will be an active trade and market integration component, aimed at creating a unified
regional market, by reducing the barriers to cross-border investment, trade in goods and
services, and the eventual free movement of labour.
Foreign direct investment in Namibia and southern Africa as a whole, with a few notable
exceptions, has been of the colonial type, namely investments aimed at exports to
industrialist countries via the extractive industries, including mining, and agriculture.
This pattern of investment and trade does not have the transformative impact on the
region’s economies as investment for the domestic market has. Indeed, it is the existing
pattern of investment that SADC countries would like to transform through regional
integration.
Namibia, as a small market, had a vested interest in being part of a larger economic
space through regional cooperation and integration. For example, Namibia has been
part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) since the establishment of the
South West African Administration in the country by South Africa, following Germany’s
loss of colonies after the First World War. Namibia acceded to SACU immediately after
its independence to avoid any disruption in its economy. SACU membership has been
important to Namibia as it has provided access to the South African market.
Nonetheless, membership of SACU has not been without its challenges, as South
African products have not always been competitive vis-à-vis agricultural products from
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Thus, Namibia needed to diversify its imports. Namibia wanted
to establish closer economic relations through, among other things, preferential trade
arrangements with countries such as Angola and Zambia, where Namibian leaders had
spent years in exile. Its SACU membership has, to a certain extent, limited the pace
at which Namibia could establish closer economic relations through preferential trade
arrangements with any third party, however, as the other SACU members have to concur
with such a proposal. One way of fostering close economic relations with non-SACU
countries in southern Africa was through SADC, where all SACU members were also
represented.
Progress in creating a unified regional trade regime through SADC has been very
slow. Member states have been relying on arrangements other than a SADC regime for
trade among themselves. A number of important bilateral trade agreements have been
struck between the various countries of the region, some of which predated SADC.
22 SADC (1993:8).
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Namibia and SADC
These bilateral agreements are more advanced than the regional trade regime in that
they contribute to the development of local business in terms of taking advantage of
neighbouring markets, and can become building blocks for a common regional trade
regime. The problem, however, is that they are so different from each other. For example, –
• there is SACU, which involves five SADC member states
• there is an FTA between Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe
• there is a Free Trade Agreement between Namibia and Zimbabwe, and
• some members of SADC were also members of the Common Market of Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and, thus, participated in COMESA’s trade
liberalisation scheme.
In fact, trade in the SADC region has been greatly facilitated not by a region-wide
instrument, but by these bilateral and multilateral subsets.23
In addition, there have been commitments to trade liberalisation measures that SADC
member states individually undertook in the context of other initiatives. Some member
states were implementing structural adjustment programmes and trade liberalisation
policies without regard to the regional situation, however. In this regard, they brought
down their tariffs significantly beyond what their counterparts in the region were
prepared to offer one another. There were attempts by some of these countries to urge
other SADC members to bring their tariffs on a par with theirs. The response was that
the pace of trade liberalisation should not be externally induced but based on internal
considerations.
Consequently, members of the SADC region have had an unlevel playing field in terms
of access to each other’s markets. Some countries accessed their neighbours’ liberalised
markets while applying the less liberal regional regime. Moreover, structural adjustment
programmes have not only created an unlevel playing field, they also buttress trade
imbalances in southern Africa.
Thus, member states had no common trade regime before the SADC Trade Protocol
signed in 1996 was adopted. This Protocol aimed to create an FTA within eight years,
i.e. by 2004. A Trade Negotiating Forum was therefore established to allow member
states to negotiate the details of such an enterprise. The signing of the Trade Protocol
also involved considerable behind-the-scene consultations to allay some member states’
fears. Still, more than 17 years later, we are yet to see the FTA envisaged in 1996. Instead,
we have seen the introduction of more ambitious enterprises, such as the decision to
establish a Customs Union. This was not necessarily an incremental process, as the FTA
has not yet been attained.
23 African Development Bank (1993:10–12); SADC (1993a).
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Kaire M Mbuende
From the outset, Namibia has been part of the process of developing a SADC trade
regime. This process culminated in the adoption of the SADC Trade Protocol. Namibia
was one of the member states that signed and ratified the Protocol speedily. Namibia
has also participated in trade negotiations as a member of SACU. In terms of the SACU
agreement, any further agreement with a third party has to be agreed upon by all the
other SACU members. Namibia has been keen to develop a thriving trade with other
SADC members as South African products, especially in the agricultural arena, have not
always been competitive. For example, Namibia negotiated and entered into a bilateral
free trade agreement with Zimbabwe, a move which was agreed to by the other SACU
members. Discussions on a free trade agreement with Zambia were stalled, however,
and subsequently had to be dealt with through a SACU-wide agreement. The idea of
bilateral trade agreements was to allow for trade integration to move at a faster pace than
that prevailing within SADC, while at the same gaining access to duty-free or low-duty
products from the rest of the region.
The sluggishness of trade negotiations in the SADC context was taking place in a
dynamic global context promoting freer trade. Consequently, there was a risk for the
SADC process to be overtaken by developments in the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), thereby rendering the entire SADC endeavour redundant. Regional trading
blocs are usually precursors to global trade liberalisation and competitiveness. Through
integration, a region can prepare itself for global competition. Competitiveness at
regional level would allow for enhanced productivity and efficiency. Fortunately for
SADC’s regional arrangements, the similarly slow pace of the conclusion of the WTO
Doha Round has offered SADC a second chance. It should speedily put into effect the
commitments by member states under its Trade Protocol.
Equally important is the Tripartite Agreement between SADC, the East African
Community and COMESA, which aims to create an FTA. Variable geometry, which
is one of the fundamental principles of this Agreement, allows each of the regional
organisations to implement its own programme without being bogged down by a
potentially slower process because of the large number of players involved. Interestingly
enough, the Tripartite Agreement has not been concluded between regional organisations
but between member states. This means there are no clear mechanisms for harmonising
the three organisations’ programmes except through the actions of member states.
Given the relatively weak intergovernmental processes in the regional organisations
themselves, however, the decision-making process could be painfully slow. Furthermore,
past experience has shown that such an approach is not effective. A good example of this
was the Cross-border Initiative that involved COMESA, the Indian Ocean Commission,
and SADC.24 The decisions taken at tripartite level were not necessarily integrated into
each respective organisation’s programmes. Thus, member states played differential
roles in the arrangements. Nonetheless, although there is no reason why progress should
24 African Development Bank et al. (1995).
248
Namibia and SADC
not be made in the Tripartite Agreement, given the overall trend towards global trade
liberalisation, the bilateral as opposed to a multilateral approach is a cause for concern
and a potential recipe for failure.
Trade liberalisation in itself cannot bring about economic development: only investments
that can generate wealth through the production of various goods and services and create
employment at the same time can achieve that. In fact, trade is an effect of production,
and production is made possible by investments.
Africa’s share of the investment flow is very low, and has not yet reached a level that will
reduce poverty. As to why Africa – including southern Africa – did not attract foreign
direct investment, the reasons given have been political stability, risk of policy reversal,
inefficient physical and technological infrastructures, and the size of the market.
Countries of the SADC region have taken measures to create a favourable environment
for domestic and foreign investment. Most of them have promulgated investment laws
and special incentives for foreign investors such as the repatriation of profits, borrowing
on local markets, grants for training local workers, and arbitration mechanisms in the
event of disputes between investors and the government. Most SADC countries, including
Namibia, have signed investment protection treaties with a number of industrialised
countries. In addition, all SADC member states are simultaneously members of the World
Bank Multilateral Investments Guarantee Agency (MIGA). MIGA promotes foreign
direct investment by providing political risk insurance guarantees against political and
non-commercial risk such as breaches of contract and expropriation.
It is argued that the existence of markets that are larger than what any single SADC
country can offer has the effect of attracting more investment towards them and has the
benefit of the potential to create economies of scale. One should hasten to add that the
response to SADC members’ individual and collective efforts to create a favourable
investment climate was not commensurate with the actual flow of investments: although
there has been a marked growth in export from Africa over the years, this was not
underpinned by an increase in investment flows or improved productivity.
Most SADC countries have also undertaken policy reforms that try to address some of
these impediments to investments. The region has also tried to complement member
states’ efforts in specific areas. For example, a system of themes was introduced, which
allowed the Summit to focus on specific areas in which the region needed to make
progress.
In addition, despite having a policy framework, whether or not to invest depended on the
decisions taken by individual businesspersons and/or companies. Another factor to take
into account is that the SADC region has largely attracted investments in the extractive
sectors and in the production of raw materials for export to industrialised countries.
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Kaire M Mbuende
There is, therefore, a need for investments in value addition so that more jobs can be
created and the economies of the countries of the region can be transformed.
Conclusion
Regional integration is not optional for small countries like Namibia. It has been
important from the point of view of promoting political cooperation as well as peace and
stability in the southern African region. Political cooperation enhances a small country’s
bargaining power in continental and global affairs. In the case of Namibia, the country
has actively participated in the arena of maintenance of peace and security within SADC
and beyond, and has expended substantial resources in so doing. The country also has
not hesitated to articulate an independent position on a vast array of issues – despite its
size.
Regional integration plays an important economic role in terms of functional cooperation,

through which SADC countries work together in a number of areas. The area of transport
and communication has been important to Namibia, as the country has been able to offer
export and import routes to a number of neighbouring countries. The management of
shared resources such as water and energy has been equally important from the point of
view of economic development and resilience.
Being part of a larger economic and political space has been crucial in making the country
attractive to foreign investors. Countries with small markets find it difficult to attract
foreign direct investment in anything but the extractive industries. Such investments do
not necessarily have a transformative impact on the economy of the receiver country.
The greatest benefit of regional integration to Namibia will come through the dynamic
effect of integration, which will result in investment and job creation. This effect often
comes about as a result of confidence by investors that things are working, that is, there
is a reduction of risk premium. In this regard, strong institutions, and commitment to as
well as delivery on a regional integration schedule in the various fields, are vital. It is also
crucial for Namibia to stay the course insofar as the implementation of its commitments
is concerned. Regional integration needs drivers: countries that act while others drag
their feet.
In many respects, southern Africa is a functioning entity in terms of shared knowledge,

joint development of infrastructures, joint management of shared resources, etc.
However, political instability in a few SADC member states has had an adverse effect
on the process of integration and development over the years. After 1994, there was a
great deal of optimism about the region’s future, following the end of apartheid in South
Africa, the end of civil war in Mozambique, and the transition to democracy in Malawi.
However, the region subsequently had to deal with the situation in Lesotho, then the
one in the DRC, and then Angola. Now SADC is confronted with unstable situations in
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Madagascar and Zimbabwe. The situations prevailing in such political hotspots need to
be resolved so that integration and development can proceed apace.
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Namibia and the African Union*
Bience Gawanas**
Introduction
It is fair to state that Namibia’s foreign relations have largely been shaped by the history
of the liberation struggle, the formative years of transition from colonial occupation and
independence, and the relationship between the liberation movements – particularly the
South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and organisations such as the United
Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, later the African Union/AU),
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Commonwealth, the Non-
aligned Movement, and the Frontline States.
There is also no doubt that the post-Cold-War era influenced both the OAU/AU and the
Namibian agenda, moving from a focus on conflicts and security to broader development
goals. Whereas the OAU concentrated on the decolonisation of Africa, the AU’s main
objectives are unity, integration, governance, peace, and development.
Against this background, it can be clearly stated that the OAU played a key role in
Namibia’s fight for freedom and independence. Consequently, it is a very meaningful
task to verify whether Namibia still appreciates these historical bonds and has a special
relationship with the OAU’s successor organisation, the AU. In addition, it is important
to show Namibia’s stance on multilateralism, especially since the AU is at the highest
organisational level within the African context. Last, but not least, the chapter is
meaningful because it will illustrate the principles on which Namibian foreign policy
rests.
The chapter is structured in the following way. First, it looks at the historical background
of Namibia’s relationship with the OAU prior to the country’s independence in 1990. It
then highlights Namibia’s role in the founding and institutional design and building of
the AU. Next, it explains Namibia’s participation in the AU, particularly in respect of the
four pillars upon which the AU’s Strategic Plan is based, namely –
• peace and security
• integration, development and cooperation
• shared values (including governance, gender, culture, and civil society), and
• institution- and capacity-building.
* The author acknowledges the research and other assistance rendered by Dennis Zaire of the
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
** Former AU Commissioner for Social Affairs and currently Special Advisor on Social Issues to
the Minister of Health and Social Services of Namibia.
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Bience Gawanas
The chapter then discusses AU multilateralism and partnerships, before looking at the
future of the AU and the changing roles of its members – especially that of Namibia –
before drawing its conclusions. Finally, an appendix lists the treaties, protocols and other
AU documents Namibia has adopted, signed and ratified to date.
Pre-Independence Namibia’s relations with the OAU

A brief historical overview
The roots of pan-Africanism that shaped the future of Namibia both as a colonised and
an independent country, as well as Africa as a free continent today, can be traced back
to the late 19th Century: years before the Berlin Conference1 which regulated European
colonisation and trade in Africa and before Namibia became a German colony in 1884.
The evolution of pan-Africanism finds its high mark at the Pan-African Congress in
Manchester in 1945, which laid the foundation for the political independence of African
states.2 It demanded –3
[a]n end to colonialism in Africa and urged colonial subjects to use strikes and boycotts to end
the continent’s social, economic and political exploitation by colonial powers.
The Congress stressed that –4
[t]he gain of political power for colonial and subject peoples was a necessary prerequisite for
complete social, economic and political emancipation.
The above shows that the need for political change – the total decolonisation and
political integration of Africa – was raised before the OAU came into being. It was a
process nurtured and advocated for by WEB du Bois, an Afro-American, and others, who
strongly advocated for a free Africa. Leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo
Kenyatta of Kenya, and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, who attended the 1945 Congress,
were inspired and later led their countries to freedom. Most importantly, their influence
galvanised the formation of the OAU.
Some 18 years after the Manchester meeting, in May 1963, the OAU became a reality5 as
an association of free and independent African states, with a focus on the decolonisation
and integration of the continent, the promotion of unity and solidarity among African
states, territorial integrity, and the independence of its members. Its formation provided
1 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885.

2 The other Pan-African Congress meetings took place in 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1927.
3 Resolution of the 1945 Pan-Africanism Congress in Manchester.
4 (ibid.).
5 Founded on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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Namibia and the African Union
much-needed political platform for free African countries and those still fighting for
freedom to promote inter-African solidarity and gain support from their fellow African
member states. The OAU’s formation was, therefore, a necessary tool that filled a
political vacuum. It signalled a major search for an African identity. However, despite its
good achievements over the years, the OAU – and, later, even the AU – became distant
from ordinary Africans on the street, as the Afrobarometer surveys indicate.6 This is
because the OAU was viewed as an organisation for African leaders rather than one for
the African people.
The Namibian liberation struggle and the OAU Liberation Committee
A good way to begin this topic is to refer to the relationship between Namibia and the OAU.
Before June 1990, as a colonised country, Namibia did not have any kind of relationship
with the OAU as such, although it occupied the minds of the international community
and jurists. This is mainly because Namibia was under the illegal occupation of apartheid
South Africa at the time, and only independent states could join as members of the OAU.
In fact, one of the main pillars on which the OAU stood was to fight apartheid, free South
Africa, and achieve Namibia’s independence.7 Under those circumstances, a relationship
between the OAU and Namibia as a country was not feasible at all. In view of this, what
was the alternative route the OAU pursued to help Namibia gain its independence?
By virtue of Article 20(3) of its Charter, the OAU obliged its member states to provide
support to peoples and organisations involved in the struggle for liberation from
European colonisation. In line with this provision, the OAU established the Liberation
Committee based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which organised diplomatic support
and channelled financial, military and logistical aid to the liberation movements – and
SWAPO in particular – to help the fight against apartheid South Africa and end its illegal
occupation of Namibia. It also embarked on a diplomatic mission to alert and influence
world opinion as regards the illegal occupation of Namibia. This resulted in an action at
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1971 which declared that South Africa had no
right to rule Namibia.8
In addition, the ICJ’s declaration complemented and was consistent with a number of
UN resolutions, particularly –
6 This initiative is an African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy and
governance in Africa. Surveys in Botswana (2008), Namibia (2008), South Africa (2008) and
Zimbabwe (2010) asked respondents how much the AU was doing to help their countries: 37%
in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe did not know, while 26% in Namibia thought that the
AU helped Namibia somewhat.
7 In October 1966, South Africa’s security and apartheid laws were extended to Namibia,
retrospective to 1950.
8 ICJ advisory opinion of 21 June 1971; available at http://www.icj.cij.org/docket/files/53/5597.
pdf, last accessed 31 October 2013.
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• UN General Assembly Resolution 385,9 which condemned South Africa’s

presence in Namibia and its apartheid policy, and
• UN General Assembly Resolution 2145,10 by which the General Assembly
terminated South Africa’s mandate over the territory of Namibia.
Following the ICJ’s declaration, the OAU passed a resolution that demanded South
Africa’s immediate withdrawal from Namibia and, thus, the end of its occupation of the
territory.11 The OAU continued to pass resolutions over the years in unreserved support
of the struggle of the people of Namibia.12
Furthermore, through the Africa Group at the UN, the OAU lobbied for and succeeded in
enabling SWAPO and other liberation movements to gain Observer status at UN and OAU
meetings. Through its networks and influence at the UN, the OAU also supported and
lobbied for SWAPO to have access to resources and a political platform at a higher level.
Therefore, the OAU’s formation ensured a constant African representation which formed
a united front at the UN, exercising a strong influence on the UN General Assembly to
support SWAPO and other liberation movements, and having the calculated intention
to disadvantage apartheid South Africa and its illegal occupation of Namibia. In fact,
it is as a result of actions by the same Africa Group at the UN and through information
campaigns that sanctions were imposed on South Africa and, most importantly, that
apartheid was universally declared a crime against humanity.13 Therefore, the work of the
OAU complemented and strengthened the diplomatic effort at the UN, which also led to
SWAPO’s recognition as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia
by the OAU in 1975 and by the UN in 1976. As a consequence, SWAPO embarked on
a rigorous diplomatic campaign and established both multilateral and bilateral relations
with various governments and organisations, and became an observer at their meetings.
The above highlights a number of important points:

• That colonised Namibia could not have had a relationship with the OAU for as
long as it remained under the (illegal) mandate of apartheid South Africa
• That, by contrast, the OAU had a relationship with SWAPO as a liberation
movement
• That SWAPO benefited under Article 20(3) of the OAU Charter, as stated above, and
9 Of 1976, adopted by the Security Council at its 1885th Meeting, on 30 January 1976.
10 (XXX) of 27 October 1966.
11 See http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/assembly_en_21_23_june_1971_assembly_heads_state_
government_eighth_ordinary_session_.pdf, last accessed 31 October 2013.
12 See e.g. the OAU Resolution on Namibia; Assembly of Heads of State and Government
Fifteenth Ordinary Session, Khartoum, Sudan, 18–22 July 1978.
13 Tehran Conference, 22 April–13 May 1968; available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/
fatchr/final_act_of_TehranCon.pdf, last accessed 31 October 2013.
256
• Most importantly, that the OAU succeeded on the diplomatic front through
the Africa Group at the UN to benefit not only SWAPO, but also the people of
Namibia as a whole.
As stated earlier, Namibia, as an independent country, did not officially have any sort of
relationship with the OAU. However, as a colonised territory, Namibia had a relationship
with the OAU in the sense that the OAU supported its struggle for independence through
supporting SWAPO as a liberation movement. Some 27 years after its formation in 1963,
the OAU succeeded in one of its principal objectives: to achieve the decolonisation of
Namibia. The country became an independent state in March 1990, and in June that year,
a fully-fledged member state of the OAU.
From the OAU to the AU
From its founding, the OAU had been built on an unwavering commitment to political
independence for Africa. It was driven by pan-Africanist visionaries that included Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who were able to offer
practical support such as logistics, passports and training for African revolutionaries.
The transformation of the OAU into the AU created a clearer mandate and new objectives
for the AU. The clearest differences between the OAU and the AU, as set out in its
Constitutive Act, are the following:
• A move from non-interference to non-indifference, thus being able to criticise and
even intervene in its members’ affairs
• Explicit recognition of human rights and a clearer commitment to governance
• Promotion of social, economic and cultural development, and
• An approach based on human-centred development.
The AU’s key goal is to achieve integration through the implementation of the Abuja
Treaty establishing an African Economic Community, and the Lagos Plan of Action.
The Union’s objectives in terms of its Constitutive Act include greater unity and
solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa; accelerating political and
socio-economic integration; promoting democratic principles and institutions, popular
participation and good governance; and promoting and protecting human and peoples’
rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other
relevant human rights instruments.
Key AU principles include the peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states, and
non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another. However, the AU
has the right to intervene in a state –
… pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war

crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
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Other AU principles include the condemnation and rejection of political assassination,

acts of terrorism and subversive activities, as well as condemnation and rejection of
unconstitutional changes of governments.
Since our entry into the 21st Century, Africa has remained preoccupied as to why it is
being left behind and even marginalised in world development, particularly since the
establishment of the AU and its New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
programme, which provide a clear direction that allows Africans to take charge of their
own destiny and determine their continent’s development path for the 21st Century. This
includes facing core challenges such as conflicts, poverty reduction, fighting corruption,
reducing the disease burden, and strengthening the capacities of African states.
At the global level, the world’s leaders committed themselves to end poverty with the
adoption of the Millennium Declaration by the UN General Assembly, then under the
watch of Namibia’s Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, who was also serving as
President of the General Assembly. The Millennium Declaration united the world around
generally agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with some concrete measures
of how to lift people out of poverty, fight disease, and improve standards of living among
the poor and marginalised in particular.
It is worth noting that the AU and NEPAD came into being at the same time as the MDGs
were adopted. The AU Commission prepared progress reports on the MDGs in 2005,
while the AU Assembly requested the Commission to coordinate and lead a process of
developing an African Common Position as Africa’s contribution to the Report on the
Review of the Millennium Declaration and MDGs. The Report was considered at a high-
level UN Summit that same year. The review found that several African countries, with
the exception of those in North Africa, were unlikely to meet the MDGs by 2015. The
document also stresses that the attainment of the MDGs is a minimum prerequisite for
sustainable development and poverty reduction.14
Whereas the dream of African unity might have been distant in 1963, we are much closer
today to actualising it with the dedicated participation of many eminent and grass-roots
African activists from all over the world. As in Namibia, however, the AU’s challenge
has shifted its focus on political independence to the urgent need to deliver greater
economic autonomy and improve the lives for hundreds of millions of Africans.
On 25 May 2013, the OAU/AU marked its 50th anniversary. The occasion had African
leaders gathering to celebrate it in Addis Ababa at the 21st Ordinary Session of AU
Assembly. It is worth mentioning that the former President of Namibia and Founding
Father, Dr Sam Nujoma, alongside former Zambian President, Dr Kenneth Kaunda,
attended the jubilee celebrations as Pan-Africanists who had participated in the 1963
OAU Summit.
14 AU (2006).
258
The Assembly adopted a Solemn Declaration and pledged to act together with the African
diaspora to realise the AU’s vision of pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.
In so doing, the AU affirmed its implementation of the integration agenda, as well as
its commitment to working towards greater peace, good governance, and social and
economic development. The occasion was also used for a resolution that set the 2063
Agenda to define Africa’s future with the involvement of all the peoples of Africa. The
focus of the Agenda is to ensure that Africa becomes self-reliant and independent; that
AU institutions such as the African Union Commission are strengthened; that Africa can
take centre stage in world affairs, including in the resolution of conflicts on the continent;
and that intra-African trade is promoted.
Namibia embarked on its commemoration of the jubilee celebrations by launching a

year-long programme of activities to contribute towards the 2063 Agenda. The launch
was attended by President Pohamba and President Nujoma, as well as the Prime Minister,
Ministers, Members of Parliament, members of diplomatic missions, and other important
stakeholders. Since then, a series of workshops and meetings have been held to solicit
input to the AU’s 2063 Agenda from the Namibian public at large. The Agenda offers
Namibia a golden opportunity to make a meaningful contribution towards Africa’s future.
Namibia’s participation in the AU

It is imperative to acknowledge that Namibia participated in the transformation of the
OAU to the AU as an independent state and full member, starting with Sirte (1999), Lomé
(2000), Durban (2002), and Maputo (2003). Indeed, in 2003, with the formalisation of
the AU Commission, Namibia nominated its former Ombudswoman to be elected as the
Commissioner for Social Affairs – a position she held until 2012. Namibia’s membership
of the AU is a culmination of its relationship with the OAU, as discussed earlier. In this
regard, the country has continued to support the strengthening of the AU in the fulfilment
of its mandate.
The Commission is the Secretariat of the AU entrusted with executive functions.

It is composed of ten officials, namely a Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson, eight
Commissioners with portfolios such as economic affairs, social affairs, and peace and
security, and various staff members. The structure represents the AU and protects its
interests under the auspices of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well
as the Executive Committee.
From 2003 to 2012, the portfolio of Commissioner for Social Affairs was held by Adv.
Bience Gawanas, former Ombudswoman of Namibia. She was elected in 2003 and re-
elected in 2007. She was one of five women Commissioners elected to serve on the
Commission, in line with the AU decision to ensure gender balance within its structures.
Namibia and Malawi were the two countries from southern Africa to serve in the AU
Commission during this period.
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Namibia also participates in the following structures:

• The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council and
the Permanent Representative Committee: These are the organs of the AU,
with the Assembly being the highest decision-making body.
• The Pan-African Parliament (PAP): Namibian Members of Parliament actively
participate in PAP debates and have served on various PAP Committees.
• Anti-corruption Advisory Board: Namibia, represented by the Director of the
Namibian Anti-corruption Commission, served as a member of the Board since
its establishment until 2011.
• Peace and Security Council: Namibia served as a Chair for the month of
February 2011.
• Committee of Intelligence Services in Africa: Namibia served as a member
of this Committee until the end of 2012. At the time, Zimbabwe chaired the
Committee, with Namibia as its Deputy Chair. Similar to other AU structures, the
Committee is important in the domain of conflict prevention and resolution. The
security architecture of the AU obliges member states to share their intelligence –
also for purposes of the AU Early Warning System and its situation room.
• Committee on UN Reform: Namibia is one of ten AU member countries that
make up the AU Committee of Heads of State and Government focused on putting
forward a common African position on the need for the UN, including the UN
Security Council, to be democratised. Namibia subscribes to the principles of
democracy, equity, justice and fairness and, hence, it supports the AU’s position
on this issue. Namibia has also served on this Committee. The common position
adopted is known as the Ezulwini Consensus, and speaks to Africa having two
permanent Security Council seats with all privileges, including voting rights.
• High-level Committee of Heads of State and Government15 on the post-2015
MDGs: Namibia is a member of this Committee, which looks at Africa’s post-
2015 development agenda in order to ensure that Africa’s position is incorporated
in the global agenda.
As an AU member state, Namibia has generally participated in various activities and

meetings organised by the AU as well as international conferences to promote Africa’s
common positions. It has also hosted many AU sectoral ministerial meetings and was
the Chairperson of the AU Conference of Ministers of Health, the AU Conference of
Ministers of Social Development, and the Labour and Social Affairs Commission.
In this role, Namibia has been mandated to represent AU ministers and present
African common positions to the UN, such as the African Common Position on Social
Development, and the African Common Position on Universal Access to HIV/AIDS
Prevention, Treatment, Care and Support. The latter was adopted at the AU Conference
of Ministers of Health held in Windhoek on 17–19 April 2011 and presented to the UN
15 This Committee was established at the AU Assembly in May 2012.
260
General Assembly’s Special Session on AIDS in June that year. Namibia is in the process
of organising a Special Session of the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission for
2014 to review the Ouagadougou Plan of Action on Employment and Poverty Alleviation.
Strategic Plan (2007–2012)

The AU’s second Strategic Plan is based on four strategic pillars, namely peace and
security; development, integration and cooperation; shared values; and institution- and
capacity-building. Namibia’s AU participation will be discussed in terms of each of
these pillars below.
Strategic Pillar 1: Peace and security
World peace and security remain the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council.
However, continental bodies such as the AU and regional bodies such as SADC also
have a role to play. In this regard, Africans and the AU have been at the forefront of
avoiding or resolving conflicts with varying degrees of success through the establishment
of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). For example, in early 2005, the
AU swiftly condemned an unconstitutional handover of power in Togo, which was later
replaced by a more democratic process. After five years of trying to resolve the issue of
Madagascar – where the unconstitutional assumption of power by the current government
and caused the country’s AU membership to be suspended – preparations are under way
to hold elections in 2013. Thus, Africans are leading attempts to resolve problems and
build peace in, amongst others, the Egypt, Great Lakes region, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali,
Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. Whilst conflicts are declining, the lack of a rapid response
to conflicts remains a challenge. This which leaves a vacuum for external interventions
to fill – as evidenced in Ivory Coast, Libya and Mali.
• African Peace and Security Architecture
The AU is in the process of operationalising APSA so as to allow Africa to take ownership

of and assume leadership in respect of resolving conflicts on the continent. In this respect,
the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Panel of the Wise are already in place.
Other structures which still need to be put in place are the African Standby Force, the
Special Peace Fund, and the Continental Early Warning System. When fully operational,
APSA will go a long way towards building Africa’s capacity to prevent, resolve and
manage conflicts.
However, a review conducted in 201016 found that there is a huge resource gap, raising
questions of financial sustainability: APSA is dependent on development partners such
as the European Union (EU) for its operations. Another challenge pointed out in the
16 2010 Assessment Study on APSA available at http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-

apsa-assessment-study-conducted-july-october-2010, last accessed 18 November 2013.
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review17 is that, although coordination exists in respect of certain aspects, there is none
between the AU and regional economic communities (RECs), or among the RECs
themselves. As will be discussed later herein, the issue is defining a clear role in terms of
the subsidiarity principle for the AU and the RECs in peace and security matters.
In line with the Namibian Constitution, which stipulates that the country should
promote international peace and security and resolve disputes through peaceful means,
Namibia has actively participated in both the UN and AU peace agendas. Therefore,
Namibia continues to support the AU’s capacity for conflict prevention, resolution and
management in Africa as part of the country’s foreign policy.
• Common African Defence and Security Policy
In February 2004, the AU Heads of State and Government adopted the Common African
Defence and Security Policy. The Policy is based on shared principles and objectives
which range from non-aggression, non-interference in the internal matters of member
states, and mutual respect for national sovereignty, to protecting human rights and
safeguarding human security. These principles, which underpin the Policy, seek to
strengthen the –18
… collective efforts [and responses] to contribute to peace, security, stability, justice and
development in Africa.
Furthermore, the Policy emphasises the interests of the people, thus seeking to intensify
cooperation and integration among AU member states. The Policy’s overall objectives
encompass three concepts that are seen as preconditions for development, namely
defence, security, and the absence of common security threats.
In this regard, the AU’s response to conflict situations might be instructive. For example,
during the Libyan crisis, although the AU sought peaceful means to resolve the issues at
hand, due to the multiplicity of role players and interests, it was not allowed to pursue
this path. For the AU, it was an internal matter; and the sovereignty of Libya as an AU
member state needed to be respected whilst attempts were made to resolve the conflict.
Whilst it may have been possible for the AU to intervene in Libya because of grave human
rights violations, one could also condemn the intervention led by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) as an external one that interfered in Africa’s internal affairs.
This was the position adopted by the PSC, which Namibia, as a member, supported.
However, the main contention is that AU member states should decide between two
17 (ibid.).
18 Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, p 1; available at http://
www.peaceau.org/uploads/declaration-cadsp-en.pdf, last accessed 7 November 2013.
262
crucial options: whether to protect human rights and, therefore, interfere in the internal
affairs of another state – even if it were an internal matter, or to respect state sovereignty
and do nothing, as was the case under the OAU. Given the new AU emphasis on human
rights, it still remains to be seen whether it will adopt the position of non-indifference
and intervene.
Whilst many conflicts in the past were between states, more and more conflicts are now
occurring within states, e.g. in Ivory Coast, Libya and Mali. External military intervention
might not always resolve the conflict, nor may it respect the territorial integrity of the
state; thus, the tools for resolving such conflicts should include dialogue, negotiation
and reconciliation, which can lead to peaceful solutions. In this respect, the AU has
adopted the approach of respecting the sovereignty and unity of the state, and any foreign
interventions should be in conformity with these adopted resolutions. Namibia’s stance
should be seen in this light. Following the NATO-led intervention in Libya, therefore,
Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba declared that Namibia stood by the PSC
resolution that –19
… any foreign invasion in the internal affairs of any African state [should be] ... rejected in the
strongest terms.
Indeed, as a member of the PSC, Namibia took an active part in drafting and adopting
this resolution.
• Peace and Security Council
The PSC was established in July 2002 as the main AU organ concerning matters of
peace and security. According to the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the
PSC should serve as its implementing mechanism. The most interesting and probably
important part of the Protocol establishing the PSC20 is the new principle of non-
indifference, which supersedes the OAU principle of non-intervention.21 Article 4(j) of
the Protocol reads as follows:
… the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly
in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,
in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act; …
Namibia became the 23rd member state to ratify the Protocol, which it accomplished
on 9 December 2003. In April 2010, for the first time, Namibia took a seat on the PSC.
19 See http://www.namibian.com.na/news/full-story/archive/2011/march/article/pohamba-slams-
libya-strikes/, last accessed 7 November 2013.
20 See Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union; available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf,
21 Compare Kioko (2003).
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Bience Gawanas
The seat was held until 31 March 2012. Namibia also chaired the PSC in the turbulence
of February 2011, which saw the crises in Egypt, Ivory Coast and Libya erupt. In its
communiqués, the PSC expressed its deep concern regarding the human rights and human
security situation in these countries, and underscored the importance of democracy and
the focus on the people and their interests in ensuring democracy, justice and peace.
Strikingly, however, the only resolution the PSC, as a decision-making body, was able to
pass in respect of the turmoil facing these countries was “to remain actively seized of the
matter”.22 Even in the case of Ivory Coast, a violent conflict that lasted three months, the
PSC simply expressed its concern without taking any action.
Clearly, as with many policies and legal instruments, despite their effective
implementation, there are always some gaps that remain. This, too, might be the case
with the cited Article 4(j) of the PSC Protocol.
• Namibia’s participation in AU-mandated peace support operations
Despite its relatively small population, Namibia has taken part in several UN interventions,
with the biggest contribution having been made to that in Liberia in 2004,23 followed by
Angola in 1995.24 Namibia also sent a contingent of 3,000 troops to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, which was not a UN- or OAU-mandated mission,
but rather fell within the SADC framework. Thus, two of the three biggest contributions
to foreign interventions were made when Namibia’s own interest was an issue.
However, Namibia’s involvement in Angola and the DRC were severely criticised. The
critics also focused on Parliament having been kept in the dark while the troops were
deployed in the DRC, and pointed to the dominance of Namibia’s President and the
Executive in deciding whether troops should be deployed. Du Pisani, for example, states
that –25
[i]n the case of new States such as Namibia, presidents and the executive often dominate aspects
of their countries’ foreign policy.
Therefore, in comparison with UN-mandated missions, Namibia has sent few personnel
on AU missions. Although one could speculate as to why this is the case, issues of
capacity, the availability of a small number of trained peacekeepers, and limited technical
and financial resources may play a role. One can only guess that the UN missions dealt
with matters that were of greater concern to Namibia.
22 Compare recent AU Communiqués on Egypt, Ivory Coast and Libya; available at http://www.
au.int/, last accessed 7 November 2013.
23 A total of 3,835 personnel to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).
24 A total of 760 personnel to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM).
25 Du Pisani (2003).
264
In respect of the three established AU missions in the Comoros, Darfur and Somalia,
Namibia took part in the first-ever African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), for which 48
personnel were contributed.26 This unit was replaced by the pioneering hybrid operation,
the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).27 Members
of the Namibian Police are currently engaged in Darfur, Sudan, on a hybrid peacekeeping
exercise under a joint UN–AU mandate. It is worth stating that most African peace
support and peacekeeping operations are hybrid missions, meaning that these involve
soldiers, police and civilians (often from non-governmental organisations). As reported
in October 2013,28 Namibia is to dispatch an additional contingent of 27 police officers
to join UNAMID. The deployment is the second for the Namibian Police in the Sudan
region, with 23 officers having already been attached to UNAMID, bringing the total
number of Namibian police officers in that region to 50, 6 of whom are female officers.
The AU is also mindful of the role that RECs play in conflict resolution, as shown by the
involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC
in their respective regions. For example, Namibia participated as the Chairperson of
the SADC Extraordinary Summit on Madagascar, in keeping with the AU’s instruments
on unconstitutional changes of government and policies adopted by SADC. In October
2013, four years since the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, the
latter country held its presidential elections. Because none of the candidates got more
than 50% of the votes, there will be a rerun in December. The elections were declared
free, fair and peaceful by the AU, the EU, SADC, and the UN. Part of the agreement for
the elections was that both the former President and the current incumbent would not
offer themselves as candidates.
In West Africa, it is argued that ECOWAS has been one of the most successful in
undertaking positive action in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and conflict management
in countries such as in Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
• Support to Western Sahara (Saharawi)
Namibia’s own history of colonialism and the struggle for liberation continues to
influence its relations with other states, particularly those still under foreign occupation.
A case in point is Western Sahara. Namibia has been one of the few AU member states
to keep the Saharawi question on the agenda of various AU Summits as well as at the
UN, and continues to call for the effective implementation of the UN Settlement Plan
for Western Sahara as well as UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions
aimed at holding a free and fair referendum in Western Sahara. At the 17th Ordinary
26 Ministry of Defence (2008).

27 See http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=898&ctl=Details&mid=1062&Item
id=8158, last accessed 20 October 2013.
28 New Era, 31 October 2013.
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Session of the AU Executive Council in Kampala, Uganda, in June 2010, Namibia’s

Foreign Affairs Minister Utoni Nujoma stated that –
… it is a matter of condemnation, after a decade since the advent of twenty-first century[, that]
colonialism is still an issue facing the African Union …
He called on AU countries to give more support to the decolonisation of Western Sahara, –
… stressing that the right to self-determination is a fundamental human right enshrined in the
United Nations Charter. … Namibia considers that the AU could do more to enable the people
of Western Sahara to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination. … [Africa] will not be
free unless the people of Western Sahara have their freedom … [and] it is the duty of Africa to
help the people of Western Sahara in its quest for freedom and independence.
Namibian leaders have echoed these views during their recent workshops and meetings
on the AU 2063 Agenda.
Although the APSA is slowly becoming a reality, with an improved leadership structure
and more appropriate policy frameworks, the African Union Mission in Sudan illustrates
how difficult it is to resolve conflicts without the capacity to prevent or respond rapidly
to them, and without effective muscle and leverage. Therefore, how the AU will deal
with conflicts and its peacekeeping mandate will largely depend on domestically inspired
resources to reduce reliance on externally funded operations.
Strategic pillar 2: Development, integration and cooperation
• Promoting sustainable development
One of the major premises upon which the AU was founded is the promotion of socio-
economic development, particularly human and social development on the continent.
The AU’s Constitutive Act recognises the need to, inter alia, –
… promote sustainable development at economic, social and cultural levels … [and] to promote
cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African people.
Notably, in July 2001, NEPAD’s foundation document was adopted as an AU programme

in respect of development issues. Some of NEPAD’s key principles and messages are as
follows:
• African ownership and responsibility for Africa’s development
• Self-reliant development to reduce dependency on aid
• Building capacity in African institutions
• Promoting intra-African trade and investment, and
• Accelerating regional economic integration.
266
The AU has adopted various policy and legal instruments to promote social and
economic development on the continent, and Namibia has actively participated in their
development and adoption. Informed by these instruments, Namibia has itself adopted
five-year National Development Plans and a longer-term Vision 2030, and has developed
national policies in line with them.
Africa faces many challenges, including poverty, unemployment, a high burden of

disease, and climate change. It is generally agreed that Africa is a rich continent – but
with very poor people. Social inequalities abound on the continent, making it imperative
that sound pro-poor economic growth and social policies for effective and sustained
interventions are implemented to save lives. The AU has embraced the MDGs in order
to meet these challenges. The AU’s 2006 report29 clearly states that Africa will have to
accelerate its action in order to achieve the MDGs.
The current discussions on the post-2015 development agenda raise an important issue
about Africa’s role in shaping this agenda. The fact that Africa lags behind in reaching
some of the MDGs necessitates a more proactive and shared role for Africa and the AU.
As noted earlier, in 2012, the AU set up the High-level Committee of ten African Heads
of State and Government30 to come up with a strong African Common Position on the
post-2015 development agenda, which will ensure that Africa’s particular concerns are
on that agenda.31 Africa’s position regarding this development should include –
• inclusive economic growth and structural transformation
• a development paradigm that has to be domestically inspired
• funded initiatives that are grounded in national ownership, social inclusion and
equity
• a focus on vulnerable groups, and
• statistical monitoring.
Health, education and social protection are enablers of economic growth because they
contribute to human capital, labour markets and worker productivity.
With regard to health, the major cause of the high disease burden in Africa remains
HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. However, it has become clear that non-
communicable diseases and neglected tropical diseases also deserve due attention. It
is also well-established that diabetes and cancer have become major concerns, and that
maternal and child mortality remain unacceptably high in Africa.
29 AU (2006).
30 The UN Secretary-General also established the UN High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the
Post-2015 Development Agenda, which President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia co-chaired.
She has now been designated to chair the AU High-level Committee.
31 Available at www.uneca.org/post2015, last accessed 31 October 2013.
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One initiative by the AU to achieve the effective implementation and follow-up of

AU commitments on health has been the AU Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of
Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) launched at continental, regional and national
level. Thus far, 42 AU member states have launched national chapters of CARMMA in
their countries. The focus of CARMMA is to ensure accountability, coordination, and
effective implementation as regards existing plans and strategies that relate to maternal
mortality. Most importantly, CARMMA is an African-led and -owned initiative. It is
also a best practice in respect of how continental policies can motivate and provide an
impetus to national-level action.
Namibia has participated in various AU Extraordinary or Special Summits at which major

policies have been adopted, such as the Abuja Declaration and Plan of Action on HIV,
Malaria and Tuberculosis in 2001, and the Abuja Call. Namibia appears to be on track
in respect of eliminating malaria in that it has exceeded the targets set through the Abuja
Declaration to cut malaria deaths in half by 2010.32 This was partly achieved through
its collaboration with neighbouring countries to combat malaria in the spirit of regional
cooperation, and the AU policy to harmonise continental policies and actions. However,
Namibia has the world’s highest prevalence of HIV associated with tuberculosis.
Whilst Namibia has reduced poverty since Independence, and has already achieved
MDG1’s target for poverty reduction, inequality in the country remains the highest in the
world, as does chronic unemployment.33 Nonetheless, Namibia has done well in reducing
child mortality, although malnutrition and under-nutrition remain high. Maternal
mortality also remains high. Indeed, it was with these grim facts in mind that Namibia
launched CARMMA and put maternal and child health issues high on its agenda.
As regards environmental issues, climate change poses serious threats to humanity and
has become a major issue for the AU and its member states. The AU therefore set up
a Committee on Climate Change at Head of State and Government level, under the
Chairpersonship of the Ethiopian Prime Minister. This Committee’s principal task is
to develop an African common position. Namibia will do well to remain engaged with
climate change issues as environmental matters are of great concern to the country owing
to its fragile ecosystems and consequent vulnerability to such change. For example, 2013
saw Namibia gripped in the throes of a severe drought, with the Kunene Region being
the worst hit. Climate-related events such as these seriously undermine livestock farming
and subsistence agriculture, among other things.
It is worth mentioning that Namibia hosted the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification (UNCCD) Eleventh Conference of the Parties (COP11) in September 2013,
which ended with major agreements. These included the establishment of a mechanism
32 World Bank Group (2013).

33 (ibid.).
268
(the Science–Policy Interface, or SPI) that scientists have long called for to enable them
to communicate scientific findings to policymakers, and an intergovernmental Working
Group to follow up on the outcomes of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development
(Rio +20).
Unemployment, especially among the youth, remains a major challenge. For this reason,
the AU Assembly adopted the Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation and
its Plan of Action in 2004. A ten-year review of the Plan of Action is due in 2014.
The AU’s Social Policy Framework is another important document. The Framework
places great emphasis on harmonised and integrated social policies and social protection.
Namibia can be proud that its social protection policies (old age pensions, child grants,
etc.) are regarded as best practices in Africa, but they should be promoted more
vigorously. Namibia is also among very few countries that have a National Disability
Council Act34 which established a National Disability Council and contains a National
Policy on Disability as a Schedule to the Act.
In respect of food security, the AU adopted the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural

Development Programme. This Programme remains one of the most promising in the
AU stable as regards food security and agriculture. The AU also adopted the Africa
Regional Nutrition Strategy, linking food security with nutrition. Namibia subscribes to
the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy, in addition to being a lead member of the global
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement. Namibia also established the National Alliance
for Improved Nutrition chaired by the former Prime Minister, and has already made
inroads by way of advocating for emergency drought assistance to include nutrition, and
called for a renewed focus on children aged 0–5 to reduce child mortality.
Many other social improvement strategies relate to Africa’s integration being highly
dependent on infrastructural development which promotes connectivity between states
and peoples. The AU’s Programme for the Infrastructural Development of Africa is a
major step in this direction because it aims to promote socio-economic development
and poverty reduction in Africa through improved access to integrated regional and
continental infrastructure networks and services.
With regard to Namibia in particular, the country’s adoption of its fourth five-year
National Development Plan since Independence keeps it on track in respect of focusing
on faster inclusive growth, more jobs, and less income inequality.
Strategic Pillar 3: Shared values
At Independence, Namibia adopted a Constitution with a Bill of Rights regarded as one

of the best in the world. Since then, Namibia has adhered to the rule of law, held peaceful
34 No. 26 of 2004; the Act came into force on 30 October 2009.
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and free elections, has a free press, etc. In these respects, Namibia can serve as a role
model to other AU member states.
• The African cultural renaissance
The AU believes that culture is the foundation for promoting the African identity and
cultural heritage, the pan-African spirit, and inter-African solidarity.
When Namibia gained its independence in 1990, it immediately adopted a decision to

have the OAU flag hoisted alongside the Namibian one, and the OAU anthem sung
together with Namibia’s. It declared 25 May a public holiday, namely Africa Day. This
was done in the spirit of pan-Africanism, as explained by former Namibian President
Sam Nujoma in 2001, as follows:35
Namibia is an African country and as such, our citizens are proud sons and daughters of Africa.
Our destiny is closely tied to the fate of our neighbours and our continent as a whole. We
must, therefore, be proud of our African heritage and our ‘Africanness’. Our children must be
taught the African values of sharing, respect of authority, good neighbourliness and a sense of
belonging to a larger community.
The Commissioner for Social Affairs spearheaded the adoption of the new AU symbols adopted
by the Assembly in 2007. The AU Ministers of Culture adopted a decision in 2010 to urge
the AU Commission to encourage all AU member states to follow the Namibian practice of
honouring and providing visibility to AU symbols. Thus, in a Declaration adopted at the AU
Assembly in January 2013, the AU decided that all member states should do likewise. Whilst
some may argue that mere symbolism such as this does not constitute action that can lead to a
united Africa, it is worth mentioning that symbols have played a major role in African culture
and heritage.
As stated earlier, the AU also celebrated its 50 anniversary in 2013 under the theme
“Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance”.
• Governance and human rights
The AU remains committed to ensuring better governance and accountability are in place
across the continent. In this spirit, the AU adopted the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance on 30 January 2009, which entered into force in February
2012. It has been signed by 45 and ratified by 21 member states. Namibia has signed the
Charter, but has not yet ratified it.
Further building blocks in the AU’s commitment to ensuring enhanced governance and
accountability include strengthening the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),
35 Founding President Sam Nujoma’s State of the Nation Address in Parliament; see Debates of
the National Assembly, 2001, p 127.
270
which remains an important tool in this regard. The main aim of the APRM is to
help governments deliver public services and goods to their citizens more efficiently
and effectively, and to instil confidence in investors – both local and foreign – that
governments will be more stable and sustainable.
The standards, guidelines and procedures of the APRM were approved in 2003. So far, 29
African countries have signed up for the Mechanism, and reviews have been completed
for 15 countries – the first two being Ghana and Rwanda. Interestingly, Namibia is not
part of the peer review exercise although it has high standards of governance and would
probably score relatively well.
As regards human rights, it has been argued that the OAU’s founding in 1963 was in effect
Africa’s search for human rights – albeit at the level of states rather than individuals.36
Even though not expressly provided for in the OAU Charter, the OAU has adopted a
number of instruments to promote human and peoples’ rights on the continent, including
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Nairobi 1981), which later led to the
establishment of the African Human Rights Commission located in Banjul, The Gambia.
The establishment of the AU itself was hailed as a welcome opportunity to put human
rights firmly on the African agenda. Thus, the AU’s Constitutive Act adopted in 2000
marks a major departure from the OAU Charter in giving explicit recognition of human
rights and adopting a human-centred approach to development.
However, despite all these instruments and institutions, the AU’s reluctance to speak out
publicly against its member states that are in violation of human rights or are guilty of
bad governance still seems to be a big challenge for the AU’s new role.
• Elections
More states in Africa are participating in elections than ever before. This is a departure
from the military coups that hampered Africa’s search for democracy and good
governance. A major concern, however, has been post-election violence, e.g. in Kenya.
The AU observes its member states’ elections in an effort to ensure good governance.
Indeed, it dispatched an observer mission at the time of Namibia’s presidential and
National Assembly elections in November 2009, as well as during subsequent elections.
Namibia has also participated in similar missions in respect of its fellow AU member
states. During October 2013, Madagascar held presidential elections four years after an
unconstitutional change of government led to its suspension from the AU. The elections
were guided by SADC instruments, with Namibia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs leading a
SADC observer mission to the country to oversee elections. The elections were declared
free, fair and peaceful by most observers.
36 Murray (2004).
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• Gender
Namibia has signed and ratified the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women and has
adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality. It has also regularly submitted
progress reports on the implementation of these two instruments.
Furthermore, Namibia supports the AU policy on gender balance within the organisation.
The AU Commission is currently served by five women and five men. Unfortunately,
however, gender balance does not apply further down in the organisation or on other AU
organs.
In addition, Namibia has enacted gender-related laws, such as the Married Persons
Equality Act37 and the Combating of Rape Act.38 Regrettably, women’s representation
in the Namibian Government, including Parliament and the country’s missions abroad,
is not very high – unlike countries such as Rwanda, where 60% of the Members of
Parliament are women. The recent adoption by the SWAPO Party to ensure 50/50 gender
representation within party structures should be welcomed and should be adopted as a
government policy.
• Signing and ratification of legal instruments
The OAU/AU has adopted many legal instruments over the years. These require
ratification by member states in order to come into effect. Member states are committed
to domesticating these instruments and ensuring their effective implementation.
Namibia has signed 22 AU documents39 to date, but has only ratified 12 of these.
In order to assess Namibia’s accession to treaties, a comparison is made with three other
southern African states. In order of decreasing magnitude, Zimbabwe has signed 24
documents, of which it has ratified 17; South Africa has signed 19 documents, of which
it has ratified 17; and Botswana has signed 12 documents, of which it has ratified 10.
Thus, Namibia’s ratification of only 12 out of the 22 signed AU documents ranks it lower
in comparison with its three neighbours.
Several reasons could explain this state of affairs, e.g. internal concerns, or needing more
time. For example, the Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
might conflict with Namibia’s Community-based National Resource Management
(CBNRM) Policy. Another example is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
37 No. 1 of 1996.
38 No. 8 of 2000.
39 Documents are defined herein as treaties, conventions, protocols and charters. A complete list of
all 50 documents is available at http://www.au.int/en/treaties, last accessed 20 October 2013.
272
Governance, which Namibia has not yet ratified despite its good record on human rights
and respecting the rule of law. One could also argue that Namibia is a latecomer to
multilateralism, and needs time to study the implications of all these treaties.
Notably, Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution states that –
… the general rules of public international law and international agreements [are] binding upon
Namibia under this Constitution [and] shall form part of the law of Namibia[,]
which might also have a bearing on Namibia’s ratification of treaties.
The AU remains concerned about the slow ratification or non-ratification of treaties

overall as this has a bearing on its credibility. Because its member states differ in respect
of the way treaties are ratified by their respective parliaments, the AU has called for such
processes to be harmonised in a bid to speed up ratification.
On the issue of treaties and their ratification in general, it may be instructive to look at the
recent debate on the relations between Africa and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
A total of 27 African countries have consensually ratified the Rome Treaty establishing
the ICC, whilst countries such as China, Russian and the United States of America have
not joined the ICC.
The relationship between Africa and the ICC has been debated within the AU for a long
time. The indictments of the Kenyan President and Vice President who are accused of
stirring the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 as well as the earlier arrest warrant
which was issued against the Sudanese President by the ICC strengthen the AU’s
position that the court is biased against African leaders. Whilst there was a fear that
the Extraordinary Summit held in Addis Ababa on 12 and 13 October 2013 would call
for the withdrawal of African countries who are party to the ICC, the Summit instead
decided to request the UN Security Council to defer the cases of the Kenyan President
and Vice President. However, divergent views exist in Africa as regards the ICC, and
leaders such as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Nobel Peace Prize winner
Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa have supported the respect and dignity of the
ICC as an important instrument to end the culture of impunity and uphold justice and
the rule of law.
Strategic Pillar 4: Institution- and capacity-building
There are ongoing reforms within the AU to improve internal governance and
accountability and to improve coordination among the various AU organs. This will not
only ensure greater transparency and accountability in the use of resources, but also the
effective implementation of programmes. The Permanent Representatives’ Committee
of the AU, of which Namibia is also an active member, is mandated by the Executive
Council to work with the AU Commission to achieve these objectives.
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The implementation of the Strategic Plan and programmes will depend on the effective
functioning of the various institutions, particularly the AU Commission, which is the
central nerve of the AU as a whole. As pointed out earlier, the AU depends on external
funding for its operations and programmes: this cannot be sustained if Africa is to take
ownership and leadership of its problems and solutions.
AU multilateralism and partnership

In the introduction, it was stated that Namibia’s foreign relations were influenced by
the history of its struggle for liberation as well as by globalisation. Namibia’s overall
foreign policy objective remains building mutually beneficial relations and, in particular,
strengthening the capacity of the AU to achieve regional integration and the economic
independence of the continent. In this regard, it is informed by the AU’s Constitutive Act
as well as Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution and the objectives for Namibia’s post-
Independence foreign policy. The said Article 96 reads as follows:
The State shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it:
(a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment;
(b) promotes international co-operation, peace and security;
(c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations;
(d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
(e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
Namibia has also adopted economic diplomacy as part of its foreign policy, recognising
that promoting Namibia’s economic independence and prosperity is an imperative. In
this regard, the country has established bilateral relations with other AU member states,
Asia, European countries, and the USA – to mention but a few – and promotes economic
development as part of regional integration.
No regional organisation such as the AU, however cohesive, can successfully tackle its
security and developmental challenges without engaging in multilateral partnerships with
other governments and institutions. Thus, the AU has concluded various partnerships
with, amongst others, Brazil, China, the EU, India, South America, and Turkey. As an
AU member state, Namibia not only supports multilateralism, but also establishes and
maintains bilateral relations within the various partnerships established between Africa
(the AU) and countries on the other continents.
It is generally recognised that Namibia’s strength lies in building mutually beneficial

relationships with governments and organisations which have also served to promote
Namibia’s economic development. Namibia has established foreign missions in various
countries as well as at the AU, Commonwealth, the Non-aligned Movement, the UN,
etc. Indeed, the OAU was one of the first organisations that Namibia joined after
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Independence in 1990 and its successor in 2001. Namibia established a mission to the
OAU in 1990, while Namibia’s first Ambassador took office in Addis Ababa in 1992.
The question is this: what does this mean, strategically, for Africa and for Namibia, and
what benefits have countries gained from such partnerships? Have we been proactive or
reactive in our dealings with these partners?
This question is partly answered, for example, by Namibia’s stance on the economic
partnership agreement (EPA) with the EU. As Peter Katjavivi, former Namibian
Ambassador to Brussels, who was quoted in the local daily New Era stated, Namibia is
one of the countries that has found it unacceptable to endorse the EPA in its current form
because it is not favourable to sustainable economic development in Africa in general
and to Namibia in particular.
Given the nature of the emerging challenges of regional development and security, even
bilateral relations increasingly have to be located in multilateral settings. Similarly, as
emerging institutions such as the AU begin to engage in new global challenges like
climate change, energy security, global economic recovery, and terrorism, fractures in
the international system could pose a threat to their very existence; hence, cooperation
and mutually beneficial relationships become essential. What is important, however, is
the promotion of trade among African countries themselves and, in this, way, promote
regional integration. It is maintained that Africa’s trade with the world has increased,
especially with the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa),
which are the continent’s biggest trading partners; and yet, intra-African trade has lagged
behind.
But while multilateralism may be relatively easy and effective in engaging challenging
issues and actors, it has its own fault lines. Multilateralism is generally less useful
for making quick decisions and for building a wide consensus on issues. This can
circumscribe even bilateral initiatives. Multilateralism also carries its own historical
baggage. Often new nations and institutions, such as the AU, feel constrained by dated
yet influential regional and global norms rooted in post-Second World War multilateral
frameworks.
The AU subscribes to the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity. In this regard,

it recognises the important role that RECs play in driving the continental integration
agenda. Improving and harmonising the relationships between the AU and these
communities remains a high priority and will lead to greater complementarity and joint
efforts. Yet, despite the existence of RECs, as stated earlier, intra-Africa trade is still
insignificant.
As a member of SADC, Namibia and its fellow members represent SADC positions at the
AU whilst defending and upholding AU mandates. Unless properly managed, multiple
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memberships such as these and overlapping mandates of the various organisations can
pose problems. A case in point here is the AU and the RECs both having mandates
to resolve conflicts on the continent: some AU member states will side with an REC
position that may be contrary to a stance taken by the AU.
The future of the AU and the changing role of member states in

general and of Namibia in particular
For the years ahead, the AU will be expected to deliver more effectively on its mandate
and to make an impact on some of Africa’s development challenges. A key target is
to raise the resources needed to start achieving the MDGs by 2015 and to put in place
the architecture needed to promote peace, good governance and development, as well
as increase the skills and capacity of government services such as public health and
education.
As detailed earlier herein, the challenges facing the continent include strengthening and
supporting the political leadership and sustaining good governance – which are key to
African nations’ success. Diseases, especially AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, place
huge burdens on Africa: health is a key cause of poverty on the continent. Universal
primary education and equal terms for women and girls are also critical for development.
International institutions need to find ways to fund more infrastructure, particularly
cross-border projects. Africa’s private sector also needs a good environment in order to
flourish.
It is argued that, despite limited resources and a weak mandate at times, the AU
peacekeeping force has performed admirably in assisting with making peace and security
a reality on the continent. However, to achieve some of the objectives and commitments
made by African leaders for peace, security, good governance and development, member
states will have to respect the norms and principles that they themselves have established,
and should commit the required resources as well as secure extensive political and
material support from the international community.
Based on the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, there is also a need for
effective coordination and harmonisation among AU members, the RECs, and civil
society. The existing African institutions need to be rationalised, therefore, particularly
at the level of RECs. This will allow the institutions to function more effectively, and
make better use of scarce resources.
Transformation processes take decades – even generations. Similar regional institutions

in Asia, Europe and Latin America took many years to establish themselves. Thus, the
AU admittedly faces tremendous organisational and financial barriers at the same time
as having to deal with poverty and conflicts on the continent.
276
Despite various obstacles, the AU remains Africa’s hope. In many ways, it is a testimony
to progress – in development, in security, in human rights – the pillars on which the AU’s
Constitutive Act is built. As the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his
address to the Banjul Summit, –40
… the African Union itself is in many ways the most eloquent testimony of that progress, in
development, in security, in human rights -- the three interlinked pillars on which the human
family must build its future.
An institution which was created only six years ago has established itself as a defining voice
in each one of those areas. And Africa as a whole has many success stories to tell in all three.
In order to promote effective programme implementation by and the efficient functioning

of the AU, much depends on political will and financial support to operationalise the
AU’s structures. The operational and programme budget to finance the AU’s operations
that was approved for 2013 is about U$280 million. Yet the AU has received only U$77.3
million of this amount via its member states’ contributions: the remainder is paid from
partner funds. Thus, more than 90% of the budget will be financed by partners. However,
pledges by partners have sometimes not materialised or funds have been disbursed late –
resulting in a shortage of resources and, hence, the non-implementation of programmes.
This is a situation that calls into question Africa’s ownership of its programmes, since
partners can make demands that are not necessarily to Africa’s benefit. Moreover, despite
years of trying to find alternative sources of funding, the AU has not yet adopted the
proposals made in this regard by the High-level Panel led by former President Olusegun
Obasanjo. This leaves the AU in the position of continuing to depend on foreign sources
of funding, which is untenable.
Nonetheless, despite the AU’s limitations, Namibia strongly supports the continental
body and participates in its programmes. It has also been a fully paid-up AU member
state since it joined the OAU.
Conclusion
As an AU member state, Namibia has the responsibility of increasing knowledge of its
role within the organisation. This includes providing information on activities in which
it is involved, such as serving on AU organs and participating in meetings such as the
Assembly, where far-reaching decisions are taken.
Namibia sets a good example as a democratic state, with a model Constitution and Bill
of Rights. It should, therefore, become an ardent advocate for the promotion of good
40 See http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=2117, last accessed 30 September 2013.
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governance, democracy and human rights on the continent. Similarly, it has paved the
way for the promotion of a pan-African spirit through the adoption and display of AU
symbols, and through celebrating Africa Day as a national holiday. This is an example
which can be followed by other AU member states.
The 17th Ordinary Session of the AU took place in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in 2011
against a backdrop of the Libyan crisis and the warrant of arrest issued against Libyan
President Muammar Gaddafi. In his report to the AU Summit, the Chairperson of the AU
Commission pointed out that Africa was marginalised when it came to managing crises
that primarily concerned Africa, and this represented a disturbing trend in international
relations.41 In this regard, it might be important to look at the state of affairs in terms
of Africa’s actions in the management of conflicts, including its reaction to emerging
conflicts, as well as Africa’s relations with international partners. The management
of conflict by Africans will require member states to take leadership and ownership
in matters of peace, security and development on the continent, including speedy
interventions where necessary, and to enable and make use of the AU peace and security
architecture that can react promptly in terms of managing conflicts.
In the final analysis, Namibia’s foreign relations are guided by the principles underlying
its relationship with the AU. It is safe to argue, therefore, that Namibia can only be as
effective in its role as an agent of change in the landscape of foreign relations as the AU is.
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Appendix 1
African Union instruments signed (date of signature in brackets) but not ratified
to date
• Protocol to the Court of Justice of the African Union (9 December 2003)
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment
of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (9 June 1998)
• Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (9
December 2003)
• African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (10 May 2007)
• Convention governing the specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (11
November 2009)
• Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in
Africa (Kampala Convention) (23 October 2009)
• African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) (11 April 1996)
• Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(9 December 2003)
• Constitution for the African Civil Aviation Commission (11 May 2010)
• African Maritime Transport Charter (13 July 1999)
African Union instruments ratified to date

• Constitutive Act of the African Union (53 of 53 members ratified)
• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (53 of 53 members ratified)
• Statute of the African Union Commission on International Law (53 of 53 members
ratified)
• Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (49 of 53 members ratified)
• Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to
the Pan-African Parliament (47 of 53 members ratified)
• African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (46 of 53 members ratified)
• Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union (44 of 53 members ratified)
• African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (31 of 53
members ratified)
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa (30 of 53 members ratified)
• Convention of the African Energy Commission (28 of 53 members ratified)
• Agreement for the Establishment of the African Rehabilitation Institute (25 of 53
members ratified)
• African Youth Charter (20 of 53 members ratified)
280
The European Union: Relations with Namibia
Raúl Fuentes Milani*
Introduction
The signing of the Namibian Declaration of Independence on 21 March 1990, bringing
to life Namibia as a sovereign democratic state, remains a high point in history and an
inspiration for many peoples in the world, regardless of nationality.
The European Union (EU) – the European Community at the time – welcomed the birth
of the new country. Governmental relations were established the day after Independence,
building on the moral and financial support that several EU member states such as
Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and The Netherlands had provided to the
South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)1 during the liberation struggle.
These relations were further consolidated by Namibia’s accession to the Lomé

Convention,2 later succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement,3 which remains a cornerstone
of EU–Namibian relations. As a result, the EU and Namibia are part of a wider EU–ACP
(Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) partnership and enjoy “excellent relations”, in the words
of President Hifikepunye Pohamba, which pertain to various fields such as democratic
governance, human rights, trade, water and sanitation, rural economic growth,
environmental protection, human resources development, science and technology.
The reinforcement of the EU’s capacity to act beyond its frontiers, with the creation
of the European External Action Service, represents an opportunity to upgrade EU–
Namibian relations. Whether we will be able to carry these relations to their full potential
will depend on our capacity to dwell in the values of democracy, freedom and prosperity,
which Namibia and the EU share on the basis of mutual respect.
I have organised this presentation on EU–Namibian relations from three complementary

angles: political relations, trade, and development cooperation. I have tried to focus
on what the relations are today, or what I think they are. In this regard, let me clarify
* Ambassador Raúl Fuentes Milani is Head of the European Union Delegation to Namibia.
1 Today the ruling SWAPO Party of Namibia.
2 For further information, see Gruhn (1976:240–262) as well as an overview provided by the
European Commission (2012).
3 Council Decision of 14 May 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the EU, of the Agreement
amending for the second time the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and
its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as first amended in
Luxembourg on 25 June 2005; OJ L287 of 04/11/2010, p 1.
281
that the lines which follow were written in my personal capacity and do not engage the
institution I currently represent.
Political relations: The European External Action Service

The EU is arguably the most successful and sophisticated supranational organisation
in history. Starting with the creation of the Common Market in 19574 among the six
founding member states, the EU has grown larger and more integrated, extending its
competencies to justice and home affairs, economic and monetary policy, and foreign
and security policy – to name but a few.
In 2009, the EU decided to reinforce its capacity to act beyond its frontiers by concentrating
in a single person5 – the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy,6 Baroness Ashton – the functions which had so far been exercised by the
six-monthly rotating Presidency, the High Representative of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, and the Commissioner for External Relations. The EU also decided to
provide the High Representative with a dedicated service, namely the European External
Action Service (EEAS),7 of which the EU Delegations are an important element.
In practical terms, this means that EU Delegations assume the representation of the
Union in third countries. Contacts with host countries on political issues – i.e. demarches,
which were formerly carried out by a troika chaired by the member state in charge of the
rotating Presidency – are now carried out by the EU Delegation. The Head of Delegation
is obliged to take on the lead on reporting and presenting EU positions to its partners and
the media.
In order to fulfil these tasks, the EU Delegation in Namibia was reinforced with a
Political Section. This Section, together with the existing Operational Sections in charge
4 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS.3, 4 Eur.
YB 412 (EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome).
5 Treaty of Lisbon led to the conferral of a legal persona to the EU. See Art. 47 of the Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union, 30 March 2010, 2010 OJ (C 83).
6 According to Art. 17 Treaty on European Union (TEU), the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is charged with the twofold mission to “conduct the
Common Foreign and Security Policy” and “ensure the consistency of the Union’s external
action”.
7 Art. 27(3) of the TEU constitutes the legal basis for the Council Decision of 26 July 2010
establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (2010/427/EU, OJ L 201, 3 August
2010, pp 30–40). Pursuant to this provision, “the High Representative shall be assisted by a
European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic
services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the
General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from
national diplomatic services of the Member States”.
282
of the cooperation programme, Finance and Contracts, Administration, and a Press and
Information Unit, makes the EU one of the better-staffed diplomatic missions in the
country.
The creation of the EEAS is also an opportunity to ensure greater consistency and
coherence for the EU’s external action, since the end of the rotating Presidency abroad
means that the representation of the Union is no longer subject to the changing capacities
and sensitivities of the member state holding the Presidency for six-monthly periods.
At the same time, it requires that the EU Delegation lends an ever more attentive ear to
member states’ voices. As sovereign states, EU members retain full capacity to run their
bilateral affairs. The EU acts only in exercise of its competences (such as trade or the
running of its development assistance programme) and in those issues where member
states have agreed common positions.
Namibia is a very important partner for the EU as a reference for good governance
in the southern African region. A very young country harbouring vivid memories of
its liberalisation struggle, Namibia has penetrating views on the region’s challenges.
Namibia’s positions on international affairs are respected and influential. At the same
time, the Namibian Government has been successively reinforcing the foundations of the
new nation by gradually putting in place the systems setting up an inclusive, democratic
society with respect for human rights and the rule of law. These are principles which are
also in the foundations of the EU and inspire its external action. The EU is ready to listen
to Namibia and would like to dwell on these shared principles to address, jointly with
Namibia, regional and global challenges – from peace and security to nuclear safety and
climate change.
The key instrument in building a strong political partnership is political dialogue. As

parties to the ACP–EU Partnership, which aims at preparing an interregional association
between the EU and Africa, as enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement, the EU and
Namibia –8
… shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to
commitments on both sides.
Political dialogue is, therefore, a legal obligation. However, such dialogue also needs
to be flexible: a tool to address, in a structured manner, any issue of common interest
in order to contribute to peace, security and stability. Member states are associated with
this dialogue, as may regional and subregional organisations and civil society be, where
appropriate. Namibia and the EU regularly engage in political dialogue, including at the
levels of Head of State and Prime Minister.
8 Article 8, Cotonou Agreement.
283
How can our political partnership work in practice?
In May 2011, together with some other 180 states, Namibia supported a United Nations
(UN) Resolution which adapted the modalities for EU participation in the work of the
UN General Assembly to the institutional structure of the EU established by the Treaty
of Lisbon, namely the creation of the President of the European Council, the High
Representative and the EEAS. This meant that, for the first time, a regional organisation
had been awarded the right to speak and intervene in the work of the General Assembly
alongside national states. Namibia’s support of this ground-breaking move was very
important to the Resolution’s success.
The UN Conferences on Climate Change (Durban 2012) and Desertification (Windhoek

2013) may serve as a further example of EU–Namibian cooperation in the arena
of political relations. Namibia and the EU share an interest in preserving the global
environment and in fighting desertification. They also share advanced legislation and
a sensitised population. But at the same time, they come from distant sides of the
diplomatic spectrum in respect of addressing the issue of climate change, and suffer the
challenge of desertification differently. Only through a respectful and attentive political
dialogue will concurring views come to the surface and allow both Namibia and the EU
to play a constructive role in such Conferences.
Trade: The Economic Partnership Agreement9

EU–Namibia trade amounts to roughly €2 billion, with a strong imbalance in Namibia’s
favour, which exports twice as much to the EU as it imports from there.10
The EU is the principal export destination for Namibian goods (32.2% of total exports,
compared with 31% to South Africa). Minerals and diamonds account for around 65% of
exports to the EU, followed by fish (10%), beef (6%) and grapes (5%), all of which enter
the EU market at very low or zero tariffs under the Market Access Regulation. The EU
awards such market access unilaterally, but the preferential terms expire on 1 October
2014.
The EU and Namibia are currently involved in the negotiation of an Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA), which constitutes a long-standing regional trade arrangement in
association with seven Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.11
9 For more general information on Economic Partnership Agreements, see http://ec.europa.eu/

trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/, last accessed 9 November 2013.
10 For more information on trade relations with ACP countries, see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/africacaribbean-pacific/, last accessed 9
November 2013.
11 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
284
The negotiations have been going on for some time and, in fact, may well be approaching
their successful conclusion.
In order to be compatible with World Trade Organization rules, EPAs will have to be
reciprocal, meaning that both parties agree to give some degree of preferential access
to their market. Taking into account SADC countries’ development needs, the EU has
agreed that this reciprocity will not be symmetrical in scope and time: while the EU will
grant over 95% access to the European market, ACP partners are entitled to grant only
limited access.12
An interim EPA was initialled in December 2007 by five countries13 of the SADC EPA
group but signed by only four countries in June 2009.14 Namibia abstained on the grounds
of some outstanding concerns. South Africa, on the other hand, asked to become part of
the SADC EPA in 2006. The leap from an Interim EPA to a comprehensive EPA that
would include South Africa was perceived as a particular challenge at the time. Firstly,
South Africa is an emerging economy, not a developing one, which calls for greater
ambition in the negotiation. Secondly, South Africa already benefits from a bilateral
Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the EU.15
Despite these technical difficulties, the EU is engaged wholeheartedly in the negotiations

for a comprehensive agreement as the best chance to set EU trade relations with the
southern African region on a sound and mutually beneficial basis. In this context, Namibia
remains crucial for the success of the negotiations. As an upper-middle-income country,16
Namibia cannot benefit from unrestricted access to the EU under the ‘Everything but
Arms’ and the ‘General Scheme of Preferences’ provisions, which are open only to least-
developed and lower-income countries. The establishment of a bilateral or multilateral
legal framework to support EU preferences is paramount for securing Namibia’s trade
flows to the EU.
12 For more information on market access, see Council Regulation (EC) No. 1528/2007 of 20
December 2007, applying the arrangements for products originating in certain states which are
part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States provided for in agreements
establishing, or leading to the establishment of, Economic Partnership Agreements; OJ L 348,
31 December 2007.
13 Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland.
14 Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland; see Council Decision of 5 May 2009 on the
signature and provisional application of the Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic
Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one
part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part; OJ L319, 4 December 2009.
15 Council Decision of 26 April 2004 concerning the conclusion of the Trade, Development and
Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one
part, and the Republic of South Africa, on the other part; OJ L127 of 29 April 2004.
16 According to the World Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies, upper-middle-income
economies are specified at US$3,976 to US$12,275 in gross national income per capita.
285
Until the creation of the EEAS, with its aspiration to bring our political relations to a
new level, development cooperation has been the cornerstone of EU action in Namibia.
Since Namibia’s Independence, the EU and its member states have provided around 70%
of the total development assistance received. Of this, the European Commission’s share
was over 30%.
Cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement
The ACP–EU Partnership Agreement is the main pillar of EU development assistance

in Namibia. Under this framework, all cooperation activities are jointly decided and
managed by the EU and Namibian authorities in a spirit of respect and solidarity.
The main elements of the ACP–EU Partnership Agreement are the consecutive European
Development Fund (EDF)17 – a multiannual financial allocation, and the Country Strategy
Paper and National Indicative Programme, which outline the cooperation strategies
around selected sectors.
Immediately after Namibia’s Independence, the EU mobilised an exceptional support

budget18 of some 33.5 million European Currency Units (ECU), in support of 53 different
projects in 1991 and 1992. Since then, Namibia has benefited from the 7th EDF (50
million ECU, plus 40 million ECU under the SYSMIN19 mechanism), the 8th EDF (52
million ECU), the 9th EDF (€97 million) and the current 10th EDF, which covers the
period 2008–201320 with €105 million. A top-up of some additional €20 million was
awarded in 2011 due to Namibia’s excellent performance in managing its cooperation
programme.
Since Independence, rural development and education have consistently received the
bulk of EU assistance to Namibia. In addition, the 8th EDF incorporated tourism, trade
and investment, while the 9th and 10th EDFs incorporated governance.
17 For general information on the European Development Fund, see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/

how/finance/edf_en.htm, last accessed 9 November 2013.
18 For further information on the annual reports and accounts of the EDF budget, see http://
ec.europa.eu/budget/biblio/documents/FED/fed_en.cfm, last accessed 9 November 2013.
19 A fund aimed at compensating variations of prices of mineral exports.
20 Decision No. 1/2006 of the ACP–EC council of Ministers of 2 June 2006 specifying the
multiannual financial framework for the period 2008 to 2013 and modifying the revised ACP–
EC Partnership Agreement (OJ L247, 9 September 2006).
286
An assessment of the 8th EDF strategy carried out in 200121 concluded that, although the
assistance programme had been successful, it could have benefited from greater support
for the development of comprehensive frameworks to address poverty and public
administration reform. The underlying idea was that assistance would be more efficient
if it moved away from a project-led approach to consider broader strategies.
This revised approach was followed during the 9th EDF22 and, in particular, during the 10th
EDF,23 through the incorporation of sector budget support. This innovative mechanism,
which is characteristic of EU development assistance, consists in channelling funds to the
recipient country’s treasury in support of an agreed sector strategy, concretised in several
benchmarks or indicators with targets to be met within a certain time frame. Sector budget
support, in the view of the European Commission, has the advantage of reinforcing the
recipient country’s ownership of the programme and ensures sustainability through the
use of national systems and procedures.
Priority Area 1: Rural development
From the first National Indicative Programme in 1992 until today, agriculture and rural
development have formed a prominent part of the cooperation between Namibia and the
EU. For example, the Rural Poverty Reduction Programme (RPRP), financed from the
9th EDF (€53 million), was composed of five different components, namely –
• institutional support and capacity-building
• land reform
• rural roads
• rural water supply, and
• decentralised demand-driven actions.
Both sector budget support and traditional projects were used to implement the RPRP,
some of whose achievements are the following:
• Land reform: The implementation of a €3.5 million grant was carried out by the
Ministry of Land Reform and Resettlement. One of the direct results has been
the issuing of 14,306 customary land registration certificates to people living on
communal land, who now have guaranteed security of tenure.
21 Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: Namibia 1996–2000; available at http://ec.europa.eu/

europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/acp/951584_en.pdf, last accessed 9
November 2013.
22 Council Regulation (EC) No. 309/2007 of 19 March 2007 amending the Financial Regulation
of 27 March 2003 applicable to the 9th European Development Fund (OJ L82, 23 March 2007,
pp 1–3.).
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10th
European Development Fund under the ACP–EC Partnership Agreement (OJ L152, 13 June
2007, p 1).
287
• Roads: Funding was granted to the Ministry of Works and Transport to upgrade
and/or build strategic rural access roads, using a labour-intensive approach, which
included the construction of almost 2,000 km of gravel roads to rural communities.
• Water supply: During the period of financial years April 2004–March 2010, the
water sector in Namibia constructed or rehabilitated a total of 1,341 water points,
serving a population of 216,046 persons with increased access to safe and potable
water.
• Decentralised demand-driven actions: These supported a wide range of small-
and medium-sized projects which benefitted 164,760 people and created 4,000
jobs – two thirds of which are permanent.
The 10th EDF Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme,24 which
covers the 2008–2013 period, originally focused on preparing a comprehensive
programme for rural development using the entire budget available for this area
of assistance (€45.2 million). This task proved to involve a highly complex process,
necessitating collaboration from several line ministries. In the course of the Mid-term
Review, the EU Delegation and the Namibian National Planning Commission agreed
that the risk in not having a fundable programme ready for the 10th EDF was too high.
It was then decided to award a reduced amount (€1.4 million) to support the Namibian
Government in the development of a Rural Development Strategy, and to reserve the
rest of the budget for a strong water and sanitation sector programme. According to
this outline, the Namibian Water Supply and Sanitation Sector (NAWASA) Programme
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry receives sector budget support of
around €35 million to contribute to improved access to potable water and to appropriate
sanitation for all Namibians.
Furthermore, it was decided to intensify the EU’s engagement with traditional

communities in communal areas by providing secure land tenure titles, infrastructure and
advisory services in order to help integrate their activity with the mainstream economy.
A call for proposals in support of projects in the fields of climate change adaptation and
mitigation complete our engagement with rural development under EDF10.
Priority Area 2: Human resources development
Vision 203025 calls for economic growth to be accompanied by equitable social

development. These twin goals of growth with equity are to be pursued within a broader
24 Republic of Namibia–European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative

Programme for the period 2008–2013; available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/
repository/scanned_na_csp10_en.pdf, last accessed 9 November 2013.
25 Vision 2030 was published in 2004. A complete overview is available at http://www.npc.gov.
na/vision/vision_2030bgd.htm, last accessed 9 November 2013.
288
strategic objective of transforming Namibia into a knowledge-based economy. However,

Namibia’s authorities are confronted with the fact that the equity and quality of education
remain inadequate. Many learners leave school without the required foundation skills
and competencies, and poor learning at primary level carries over to higher levels,
making repetition (23.2% for Grade 5 in 2009) and drop-out rates (6% in Grade 7) high
throughout the system.
The Namibian Government’s huge investment into education and training since
Independence has led to numerous changes. There have been considerable improvements
in the infrastructure and several reforms have been introduced to improve access, equity,
quality and efficiency in the system. Among these is the Education and Training Sector
Improvement Programme (ETSIP),26 which represents the sector’s response to Vision
2030. This programme, led by the Ministry of Education, is the first fully-fledged
sector-wide approach elaborated in Namibia that coordinates the contributions of all
government offices, ministries and agencies as well as donors involved in the education
sector. To achieve its objectives and deliver its expected results, ETSIP is estimated to
cost about €240 million over five years.
EU support for human resources development has been one of the major areas of
involvement in Namibia, even before Independence. Financial support has constantly
increased, and reached €42 million under EDF10.
The EDF10 allocation of €42 million is crucial for ETSIP’s viability, representing
around 18% of its external funding. The allocation is provided directly to the State
Revenue Fund through budget support. Results to be achieved focus specifically on
activities underpinning equality of opportunity, improvement of the quality of teaching
and learning, and strengthening system management towards greater efficiency and
accountability.
The European Commission contribution will also help in safeguarding contributions

from other development partners. It will provide a stable basis for EU member states
that may consider joining the Programme at a later stage. Especially for those countries
which no longer have a development office in Namibia, the joint assessments through
annual sector reviews provide an excellent avenue through which to channel additional
support.
Other areas of assistance under the EDF
Actions financed under other areas of the Country Strategy Paper for Namibia on the one
hand aim to increase civil service efficiency in areas related to the priority sectors and,
26 ETSIP, approved by Cabinet in February 2005, is a sector-wide programme covering all

education levels and phased in three cycles. The first phase spans from 2006 to 2013.
289
on the other, leverage non-state actors’ contributions to the priority areas as well as to
the governance/democratisation agenda. The contribution to improved governance will
include the following:
• Provision of capacity-building to the National Planning Commission/National
Authorising Office for donor harmonisation
• Support to the Office of the Prime Minister for the roll-out of the Performance
Management System to prepare the ground for civil service reform
• Support to the National Assembly and the National Council for the follow-up of
development programmes
• Support to the Ministry of Finance in the field of public finance management, and
• Support to civil society organisations to leverage existing expertise and resources
to further the objectives of the Country Strategy Paper.
Finally, the EU supports the Ministry of Health and Social Services (through a contribution
agreement with the World Health Organization of €10 million) in implementing the
Ministry’s Road Map on Maternal and Child Health as part of the EU’s efforts to ensure
progress in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals.
Other EU–Namibia cooperation activities
The EDF alone, however, does not give a global view of the EU’s development
cooperation. Other sources of EU engagement with Namibia are the budget lines,27 soft
loans and investment capital made available by the European Investment Bank (EIB),
and the EU contributions to the Global Fund to fight HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria.
A new field of cooperation that the EU is currently exploring refers to how to enhance its
contribution in the case of emergencies such as the floods and drought that have affected
Namibia in recent years. The EU is certainly ready to respond to the calls for emergency
aid that the Namibian Government may issue, but the EU wants to go beyond short-
term measures. The recurrence of the floods requires that the EU reflect on medium-
and long-term measures and improve its disaster-management response capacity. In this
context, the EU has mobilised its EDF B-envelope, which contains a financial reserve
that allows the restoration of smaller units of infrastructure affected by floods, improves
camp management, and explores the involvement of the European Emergency Office.
The future
Over two decades since the establishment of formal relations, the bond between the EU
and Namibia is multi-dimensional and strong. Together, and in a spirit of mutual respect,
27 Named thus because they are financed directly from the EU budget in support, for instance, of
non-state actors and human rights.
290
we have been able to adapt our partnership to changes in the EU, in Namibia, and in
the international environment. The creation of the EEAS is an opportunity to reinforce
our political relations in order to address bilateral, regional and global challenges. The
accession of Namibia to the status of an upper-middle-income country – an auspicious
piece of news in itself – will also have an impact on our cooperation, which may benefit
from a shift to new sectors directly linked to productivity and job creation, thus ensuring
the EU’s contribution is a catalyst for growth.
References
EC/European Commission. 2012. “Development and cooperation – Europeaid”.
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/lome-convention/
lomeitoiv_en.htm#1, last accessed 9 November 2013.
Gruhn, I. 1976. “The Lomé Convention: Inching toward interdependence”. International
Organization, 30, 240–262.
291
292
The United Nations and Namibia since 1990*
Kari Egge**
Introduction
Namibia is a relatively small country in comparison with other members of the United
Nations (UN), especially with regard to its population size and gross domestic product.
However, considering its long fight for liberation; domestic progress on the economic
and political front; and major achievement in building a nation characterised by peace,
democracy and political stability in the post-Independence period, one can confidently
say that Namibia is a small country with a big heart. Despite the existence of significant
challenges, 21 years after Independence, freedom, peace and security still prevail, and
the country is considered a democracy both in legal and political terms.
It is well documented that Namibia’s long fight for freedom may not have been possible
without the support by the UN over many years. In a number of ways, Namibia is
a child of the UN. This is often underscored in conversations with those who either
actively or indirectly participated in the liberation struggle. There are no legal or other
obligations on Namibia to compensate the UN for its tremendous work in helping it
achieve independence. However, the country, its people and its government still show
appreciation to the UN for its role during the liberation struggle as well as in helping it
strive for development and prosperity. Namibia’s appreciation of the UN and the countries
that assisted her in the fight for independence is witnessed by her tight engagement with
the global body and her various contributions in the post-Independence period.
In attempting to describe the relations between Namibia and the UN (and vice versa), this
article will focus on the three pillars of the UN, namely Peace and security, Development,
and Human rights.
With regard to peace and security, Namibia’s engagement in the UN peacekeeping

missions will be highlighted, namely Namibia’s contribution on several occasions by
way of troops, law enforcement, and security personnel and observers to the UN’s
international peacekeeping and security missions.
* Kari Egge was the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Namibia (2009–2011) and also
served as Senior Advisor at the United Nations Children’s Fund in New York. This manuscript
was completed in 2011 and not updated for publication in 2013.
** The author would particularly like to thank Messrs Nico Beckert and Dennis U Zaire for their
helpful assistance, research, drafting and further inspirations. Any errors are the author’s own.
293
Kari Egge
Namibia is not only a close UN development partner, but it also contributed to the
crafting of the UN Millennium Declaration while Theo-Ben Gurirab was President of
the UN General Assembly. The Millennium Declaration notably formed the basis for
the drafting of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which eventually became
the UN and UN member states’ long-term development agenda and strategy for global
change.
Finally, the article will also examine the UN human rights agenda and Namibia’s quest
to promote, respect and fulfil its human rights obligations globally and in the country.
And since Namibia’s relations to the UN are not a one-way street, the article will also
describe the UN’s current role in and contribution to Namibia.
Peace and security

Namibia’s involvement in peacekeeping missions abroad
Namibia’s contributions towards and support of the maintenance of international peace

and security is a result of principle, policy and constitutional consequence and is,
therefore, well founded. The Namibian Constitution states that Namibia, in its conduct
of international relations, is obliged to promote international cooperation, peace and
security;1 and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.2 On
closer analysis, these provisions complement and support the UN vision of maintaining
international peace and security as outlined in the UN Charter.
The provisions also guide the country’s foreign policy, which has as its prime objective
the promotion of national security, peace and prosperity. These help to form the basis of
Namibia’s international engagements and, most importantly, support the UN principles
of peaceful settlement to international disputes. Those constitutional provisions and
principles also guide Namibia’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.
The UN, having no permanent military infrastructure to draw from, relies on the
contributions of its member states to assist in maintaining international peace and
security. By virtue of article 43 of its Charter, the UN can call upon all its members to
contribute towards the maintenance of international peace and security by providing
armed forces, facilities and assistance.3 Since Independence, Namibia has actively and
positively responded to the UN’s calls to contribute forces and other forms of assistance.
1 Article 96(b), Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.

2 (ibid.:Article 96(e)).
3 Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression; Article 43(1–3), UN Charter. Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
chapter7.shtml; last accessed 26 July 2011.
294
The United Nations and Namibia since 1990
As a result, and despite its small army size, the country has taken part in a number of UN
peacekeeping and peace support missions in many countries.
Based on Namibia’s constitutional support and the UN’s need for assistance, the country
has participated in UN peacekeeping missions with full commitment. Namibia’s first
engagement in such operations was as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992–1993,4 to which it contributed a contingent of 43 soldiers
as well as equipment. In total, the country participated in three UNTAC missions.
UNTAC was set up by the UN Security Council to ensure that the Agreements on a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict were implemented.
Namibia also participated in the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III in 1996.
UNAVEM was established to assist the Angolan Government and the União Nacional
de Indepênçia Total de Angola (UNITA) in restoring peace and achieving national
reconciliation against a fragile politico-military background. Namibia continued to serve
with the smaller UN Observer Mission in Angola (Mission d’Observation des Nations
Unies à l’Angola, MONUA), which replaced UNAVEM III in 1997. In 1999, Namibia
was also part of a panel of experts tasked with the responsibility of tracking violations of
UN sanctions against UNITA. Thus, Namibia played an active part in advancing peace
in Angola.
In 2003, Namibia took part in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)5 and initially
contributed a contingent of 855 personnel, which included 844 troops, 6 civilian police
officers, 4 staff officers, and 3 military observers. In the end, Namibia contributed 3,835
personnel to the mission.6 UNMIL was ordered by the UN to replace the 3,250 strong
West African multinational force, in order to help stabilise Liberia and support the
implementation of the ceasefire agreement. UNMIL ended in 2007.
Namibia participated in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)7 as well,

by providing 26 personnel. UNMEE was tasked by the Security Council to prepare the
ground for future peacekeeping missions.
4 Established by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 745 of 28 February

1992. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html; last
accessed 26 July 2011.
5 Established by UNSC Resolution 1509 (2003). Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
missions/unmil/resolutions.shtml; last accessed 26 July 2011.
6 Mushelenga (2008:220). Available at http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/2703/
dissertation_mushelenga_%20s.pdf?sequence=1; last accessed 26 September 2011.
7 Established by UNSC Resolution 1312 (2000), adopted by the UNSC at its 4181st meeting,
31 July 2000. Available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/583/66/PDF/
N0058366.pdf?OpenElement; last accessed 26 July 2011.
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Apart from the above missions, Namibia provided military observers to Burundi, Ivory
Coast, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Timor-Leste.8 Up to September 2010, Namibia
has also been part of seven other UN peacekeeping missions, including the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).9
Domestic policy decisions on peacekeeping and security
By being part of UN peacekeeping missions, Namibia demonstrates a better understanding

of peace and security issues within an international, regional, and domestic context.
Indeed, Namibia’s Defence Policy reflects this position, emphasising that –10
Namibia’s foreign and defence policy is founded on the principles of peaceful co-existence
and co-operation with other countries and in the operation of international law. The day-to-day
guarantee of security lies in the maintenance of international order and, in particular, in the
regional stability.
This underscores Namibia’s understanding that, if it is to be secure and continue to

prosper, it needs to function within a peaceful and secure neighbourhood – regionally
and beyond. This explains Namibia’s contribution to efforts by the UN and other regional
bodies aimed at keeping and bringing peace and security to the southern African region
and elsewhere.
Namibia’s efforts and contributions also need to be understood within the framework of
its history. Namibia is a product of international efforts garnered through the UN. The
UN’s involvement and support for Namibia’s independence can be traced back to 1946,
when the first-ever session of the UN General Assembly attempted to persuade South
Africa to place Namibia under the UN trusteeship system. A milestone was placed in
1978, when the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 435, paving the way
for Namibia’s independence. That journey continued with the successful implementation
of the UNSC Resolution setting up the United Nations Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG), which was then deployed to Namibia to monitor South Africa’s withdrawal
and provide electoral assistance.
Finally, the country’s independence was witnessed by the then UN Secretary General,
Javier Perez de Cuellar,11 who also administered the oath of office to the first-ever
President of an independent Namibia, His Excellency Sam Nujoma. Many countries had
expressed and shown their solidarity with the Namibian cause from the beginning until
its independence; therefore, as a free and independent country, Namibia now supports
8 Ministry of Defence [(n.d.]). Available at http://www.mod.gov.na/; last accessed 10 July 2011.

9 A product of UNSC Resolution 1861 of 14 January 2009. Available at http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/facts.shtml; last accessed 30 August 2011.
10 Ministry of Defence ([n.d.]).
11 Term of service January 1982 to December 1991.
296
peacekeeping missions in other countries by committing troops and observers as part of

its obligations as a member of the international community and the UN.
Namibia has gained a good deal of experience in peacekeeping operations and continues
to build up its military expertise. This is crucial for future operations at home and as
part of the UN. The country has established a name for itself in the UN as a strong
participant in the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, Namibia
has transformed itself from being a security concern prior to its independence, to being
a fully fledged and active member on all fronts today.
By supporting and helping to maintain international peace and security, the country
also helps to reduce human suffering and enhance the protection of vulnerable civilians
in crisis. This helps reduce conflict-related challenges like increasing numbers of
refugees, harassment and abuse of civilians, war crimes and intolerable acts of war, and
humanitarian suffering. If not prevented and managed, these issues can stretch the UN’s
limited resources to its limits.
Today, Namibia takes part in many UN-sponsored workshops and training and capacity-
development programmes aimed at enhancing knowledge, skills and understanding
in peacekeeping and peace support missions. For example, in March 2010, Namibia
participated in the Lessons Learned Workshop on Management of Police Deployment
to Peace Missions, organised by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.12 Namibian officials
also attended a course on combatting sexual and gender-based violence, delivered in
Khartoum to female UN police officers deployed in the Darfur (African Union–United
Nations Mission in Darfur/UNAMID)13 and Sudan (UNAMIS) crises.14 The skills gained
from these training programmes are undoubtedly put to good use, and will have a positive
spill-over effect at home and in future UN peacekeeping missions. Moreover, Namibians
who have participated in many of these missions are being praised and continue to be
recognised for their role and good work. A case in point is when Lieutenant-General
Chikadibia Obiakor of the UN Mission in Liberia decorated the peacekeepers of
the Namibian contingent with UN medals for their effort and contribution towards
maintaining peace and security in that country.15
12 See http://www.peaceoperations.org/index.php/capacity-building-programs/past-projects/pan-
africa/namibia-policy/lang/en/; last accessed 27 July 2011.
13 UN–African Union hybrid operation in Darfur. It was established on 13 July 2007 with
the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1769. Available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/
Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1769%20(2007)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC; last accessed 21 May
2011.
14 UN Missions in the Sudan, established by UNSC Resolution 1590 of 2005. Available at
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1590%20(2005)&Lang=E&Area
=UNDOC; last accessed 21 May 2011.
15 UNMIL [n.d.].
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Namibia was only two years old in 1992 when it first committed troops to UNTAC. To date
Namibia has contributed to more than six missions in total. The country’s contribution
to world order is not only time and money well spent, but is also about the opportunities
that were created by being part of these missions that offered the country a rare chance
to share with the rest of the world its own successful experience and transition from a
conflict-ridden country to a fully independent and sovereign state.
Development
Namibia’s involvement regarding the issue of development at the UN
Shortly after becoming President of the UN General Assembly in September 1999, and
before the issue of terrorism became the most urgent topic in the international community,
Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia stated that poverty –16
… can cause political instability, economic retrogression, social disorder, widespread acts of
terrorism and crime leading inevitably to the breakdown of family cohesion and negation of
human dignity. It is against poverty – the father of all evils – that the international community
must declare war and achieve victory in the interest of protecting our existence and safeguarding
future generations.
These dramatic and evocative words made clear how serious he and Namibia are about
the problem of poverty, and also how important it is for the countries with higher levels
of development and more resources to support the underdeveloped ones.
Namibia’s greatest contribution to the international community so far has been its
assistance in the establishment of the current UN development framework and strategy,
comprising the MDGs. At the end of his term, in September 2000, Theo-Ben Gurirab
submitted a Draft Resolution containing a proposal for the UN Millennium Declaration.
The Draft Resolution was presented at the UN Millennium Summit and was then adopted
by the UN General Assembly in New York in 2000. The Millennium Declaration17 is the
key document on which the MDGs are based. Most of the phrases of the final MDGs
were directly derived from the Draft Resolution, especially sections III and IV therein.
Namibia’s contribution was of great importance as the MDGs are the UN’s and its
member states’ long-term strategy for development.
The attainment of the MDGs is reviewed on a regular basis. Namibia has been active in
this respect as well. At interval MDG Summits, the Namibian Government has regularly
16 Government News, 20 September 1999; “Assembly President says international community

must achieve victory in war against poverty”. Available at http://www.gov-news.org/gov/un/
news/assembly_president_says_international_community/66743.html; last accessed 16 June
2011.
17 UN (2000b),
298
reported on its progress towards the goals. Currently serving President Hifikepunye
Pohamba participated in the last periodic review in New York in September 2010, and
made a strong statement on Namibia’s contributions towards the MDGs. Although
Namibia has introduced a special campaign and efforts on the MDGs, it still lags behind
the targets set for MDG4, 5, and 6, and the indicator on nutrition under MDG1.
Namibia is among the UN member states in sub-Saharan Africa that is hardest hit by
the HIV and AIDS pandemic. In support of the global fight against the pandemic and
the attainment of MDG6, Namibia is collaborating closely with relevant UN bodies at
all levels, particularly with UNAIDS and its ten co-sponsors, by sharing lessons and
experiences in areas like preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV – m a realm in
which Namibia is a success story among UN member states.
Namibia has also actively provided support to the UN reforms introduced in 1996 by
then Secretary General Kofi Annan. A call for reform has since affected the whole UN
system: the Secretariat in New York, the Security Council, and all the UN agencies,
funds and programmes that work at country level at the request of the UN Secretariat
and its various bodies. Namibia volunteered to become a pilot country to the UN reform
when these were identified through a voluntary process in 2006. Cape Verde was instead
chosen in that category.
Similarly, during 2008 and 2009, Namibia co-chaired the Session on System-wide
Coherence in the UN and wanted to become a ‘self-starter’ country in terms of the UN
reforms. At that stage, however, the UN agencies, particularly those at country level,
were not ready to implement the reform agenda in Namibia. However, negotiations
continued, mainly at New York level and through the UN Development Group office. In
April 2010, Namibia’s Prime Minister, Nahas Angula, committed Namibia to becoming
a self-starter country to the UN reform programme during a meeting with the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator, Helen Clark, who is also the Chair of
the UN Development Group. Since then, Namibia has been an even stronger supporter
of UN reform, and has requested that the UN system in Namibia come together around
the “Delivering as One” concept to ensure a more coherent approach to development
assistance, a reduction of overlap and duplication of efforts, more effective utilisation
of resources, and a results-based management approach. The coordinating body for this
long-term process in-country is Namibia’s National Planning Commission.
The UN’s involvement in respect of development in Namibia
Conversely, the UN has also been very active in Namibia since Independence. Various
UN agencies established themselves in the country after its independence at the new
government’s request, and have since then worked closely with most government bodies
through clearly defined country programmes and the UN Development Assistance
Framework (UNDAF) – the overall strategy for the UN system’s support to the Namibian
Government and civil society organisations.
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Non-resident UN agencies also assist the country through technical assistance frameworks
and in areas identified by the government. Today, there are 12 resident and more than 20
non-resident UN agencies and offices supporting Namibia in respect of implementing its
Vision 2030 and goals outlined in respective five-year National Development Plans. The
UN system also supports MDG implementation through policy development, technical
assistance and, in some areas, service delivery.
During the floods in Namibia in the first of 2011, the UN expanded its work to introduce
collaboration on the UN’s Humanitarian Reform programme. This has led to an increase
of agencies that support Namibia’s drive towards the more efficient reduction of disaster
risks and an improved humanitarian assistance framework.
UNDAF (2006–2010)
Quite a number of UN agencies operate in Namibia. Apart from the UNDP already
mentioned, there are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO),
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef),
the World Bank (WB), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Office
of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
the World Health Organisation (WHO).18 These agencies, in collaboration with the
Namibian Government and civil society, developed the UNDAF. Besides international
commitments related to development, the UNDAF –19
… aims to guide integrated programming among the UN Agencies working in Namibia to

support government and civil society to reach Namibia’s economic and social development
goals, outlined in Vision 2030, the Millennium Development Goals, [and] NDP III …
The UNDAF specifies UN support in the areas of HIV and AIDS, livelihoods and food
security, and capacity-building for the governmental and civil society sectors.20 The
UNDAF is based on Namibia’s 2004 MDG report, which coined the term triple thread21
to describe these three areas of support. The UNDAF also identifies the roles of the
respective UN agencies, and how they are to collaborate with the government and civil
society.
Following the introduction of the “Delivering as One” agenda as part of the UN

reform since May 2010, and based on the current UNDAF period (2006–2012) ending
18 See UN ([n.d.]a:1).
19 (ibid.:1).
20 See (ibid:v, 3).
21 GRN (2004:28).
300
on 31 December 2012, a new UNDAF process has started in Namibia by way of the
development of a situation analysis. The aim of this analysis is to lay the foundation
for the UN’s future development assistance to Namibia, and offers a UN perspective on
Namibia’s development. Furthermore, the new process serves as a contribution towards
Namibia’s preparations for its Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4).
The UN agencies working in Namibia provide assistance and technical support in areas
such as the following:
• Health
• Nutrition
• Education
• Food security and livelihoods
• HIV and AIDS, and sustainable financing of the national AIDS response
• Programmes for decent work
• Population issues, and sexual and reproductive health
• Refugee assistance
• School feeding programmes
• Social security and welfare
• Climate change and environment
• Emergency prevention and response
• Civil aviation
• Anti-corruption measures
• Good governance and decentralisation
• Cultural tourism, and
• Human rights and gender.
The above list is far from exhaustive, but it provides an insight into how broad the
collaboration between the Namibian Government and the various UN bodies is.
The United Nations information Centre (UNIC) also collaborates with many government
institutions, the University of Namibia, the Polytechnic of Namibia, public and private
institutions in the country, and the media, in order to provide information on the UN,
globally and locally. In addition, UNIC works closely with a number of school outreach
programmes in the country.
The United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) is another UN
representative at the UN House in Windhoek. The UNDSS provides security and safety
advice to the UN and UN-deployed staff. It also enhances knowledge and collaboration
efforts with the respective government bodies on the importance of safety and security
issues related to UN staff and their various programme operations around the country and
in the region. In addition, the UNDSS provides training to security personnel employed
at the UN to enhance their knowledge and skills.
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Human rights
Human rights constitute the third pillar of the UN system’s work, and represent an area
that has become increasingly important during the world organisation’s 66-year lifespan
to date. With most member states having adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) of 10 December 1948, the Declaration has provided the framework
for the UN’s work in human rights. An increasingly large number of UN Conventions,
Treaties and other instruments have been drafted among member states and adopted by
the UN General Assembly for ratification by member countries. Since its independence,
Namibia has ratified and signed a number of human rights Conventions and Treaties, as
listed below. This has had a critical impact on the country’s legislative work, norms and
standard-setting, as well as its policy development in the respective sectors and with
the bodies responsible. Ratifying human rights Conventions and Treaties means that
national legislation needs to be aligned with their intention and content. Namibia has
taken considerable strides in this direction. Nonetheless, the country has admitted it has
some distance to go before its human rights duties and obligations are fully integrated
into national legislation and policies that reflect the government’s obligations towards
its citizens in this respect. Human rights duties and obligations rest with government,
being the primary duty-bearer in respect of its own citizens. It is important to note that
the international community and the UN have a duty to support and provide resources to
countries like Namibia in its work to fulfil obligations such as these that will help give
effect to each citizen’s human rights.
The basic principles that are set out for the UN’s human rights work are very important,
as they also form the foundation for the UN’s support to Namibia in this area. These
principles entail that, since human rights are individual, no forms of discrimination are
permitted to occur in any country on the basis of race, sex, cultural norms, political views
or belonging, or religious beliefs.
Thus, all citizens have equal rights – whether they are girls or boys, women or men, rich
or poor. Violations of these principles and the various Conventions and Treaties that give
effect to them should be reported to the UN bodies that are responsible for providing
the necessary technical and administrative support to any holder of a right that has been
violated and/or abused.
Besides the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and its
regional office for southern Africa, other UN agencies are instrumental in giving effect
to human rights. These are linked to some of the UN agencies’ mandates and their roles
vis-à-vis national institutions such as government ministries which they assist in abiding
by the expectations of Conventions and Treaties. For example, Unicef, on behalf of the
Global Staff Association, oversees the implementation of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC), while the UNFPA oversees sexual and reproductive health rights.
WHO is responsible for ensuring rights to health are respected, while the Food and
302
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) performs this function in respect of the right to food
and nutrition.
Namibia and UN human rights Conventions and Treaties
From the very beginning, the UN made the promotion, protection and realisation of
human rights its top priority. Since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, the UN and its
member states have established a great number of treaties covering various human rights
topics. Of the nine core international human rights treaties that fall under the umbrella of
the United Nations,22 Namibia has ratified or acceded to seven, as follows:
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
• The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW)
• The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD)
• The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CAT)
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and
• The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
Namibia has not yet signed or ratified the following treaties:

• International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), and
• International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (CPED).
Various human rights institutions within the UN human rights framework oversee the
implementation of UN Conventions, Treaties and other instruments. These are the
UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which superseded the UN Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR) in 2006; the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee;
the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Committee (or Third Committee) of the
General Assembly; and, finally, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR).
After the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, OHCHR Regional Offices were
established with the aim of coordinating human rights issues in the UN system and within
the international community, and promoting human rights at the regional and national
level. The goal of these Regional Offices is to make sure that all civil, political and socio-
economic, and cultural human rights are guaranteed. The Southern Offices, for example,
22 See OHCHR ([n.d.]a).
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Kari Egge
support country governments and civil society actors in strengthening human rights
protection systems such as parliaments, the judiciary, and human rights institutions.
Namibia’s Prime Minister Nahas Angula made a strong statement by declaring

employment a human right.23 This is in line with the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) Convention24 that Namibia has ratified, and helps the government in its efforts
to focus on unemployment as a top priority for the nation’s development. It is of great
interest, therefore, to see how Namibia contributes to the UN’s human rights framework
and whether Namibia complies with the stipulated obligations.
Monitoring and reporting
Each of the above-mentioned Conventions and treaties has a monitoring body to which
all member states have committed themselves to submit regular reports with regard
to progress in implementing the rights that have been agreed upon. In most cases,
the first report has to be submitted a year after the ratification/accession of a treaty,
while subsequent reports are due five years after such ratification/accession. The
Committee examines the reports, discusses its concerns with member states, and makes
recommendations for improvement.
Namibia has written reports to six of these monitoring bodies, but with delays. Delayed
submissions have a considerable impact on a country’s opportunities to surge ahead as
regards implementing its obligations and duties in respect UN instruments. Namibia’s
delayed reporting is a concern that has been brought up with the bodies responsible
during the recent (2011) Universal Periodic Review (UPR), but also during OHCHR
visits to Namibia. Some of these reports were delivered years after they were due.
According to the list, there are at least three outstanding as at May 2010. The records
show the following up to May 2010, which are the last data available:
• The second report to the Committee Against Torture was due in December 1999,
but had not been delivered by May 201025
• The initial report to the Human Rights Committee monitoring implementation of
the ICCPR was due in 1996, but was only submitted in October 200326
• In the case of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Namibia
has not yet submitted a report for the period 1997–200627
• The Committee on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights state that Namibia has
not submitted its core document since acceding to the ICSCR in 1995, and no
report had been submitted by May 201028
23 See Nakale (2011).

24 The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) (C.111);
ratified in 2001.
25 UN (2010c).
26 UN (2009).
27 UN (2007).
28 UN (2010d).
304
• The reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against

Women were submitted with delays of four to eight years, with the last one still
being outstanding by May 201029
• Despite the fact that the initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child
was submitted on time, the submission of the subsequent report was delayed by
12 years,30 and
• In the case of the Committee on the Rights of People with Disabilities, the report
has been due since June 2010.31
Apart from delays in submitting its reports, Namibia still has some way to go before
the international instruments to which it has acceded are fully integrated into national
legislation, policies, development plans and programmes, which are the normal means
for implementing and realising these instruments.
In terms of other issues outstanding, also raised during the recent UPR meeting in
Geneva, is that the Namibian Government has not yet made any of the declarations
referred to in Articles 14 and 22 of the ICERD and CAT, respectively, where it recognises
the competence of the respective treaty bodies to receive complaints from individuals or
groups claiming that their human rights guaranteed in the said treaties have been violated
by Namibia. In addition to this, the Namibian Minister of Justice conceded the following
in Parliament on 21 April 2011:32
Our legislation needs to be reviewed and/or amended in order to make provision for the
domestication of international instruments which we have ratified or acceded to. It serves no
purpose for us to ratify international instruments if our domestic laws are not in line with those
instruments.
It is important to note that Namibia ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in June 2002.33
Universal Periodic Review

The UNHRC, which was established in March 2004 and succeeded the UNCHR,
introduced the UPR as a mechanism to monitor and control the implementation of
human rights agreements. The UPR for Namibia took place in Geneva from 24 January–
4 February 2011.34 Namibia’s national report was submitted35 to the UNHRC. At the
UPR, Namibia reported on a number of human right topics, namely –
29 UN (2006a).
30 OHCHR (2010a).
31 OHCHR ([n.d.]b).
32 Ministry of Justice Budget Presentation, 2011. Hon. Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana, Member of
Parliament and Minister of Justice.
33 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2009).
34 UN (2011).
35 UN (2010a).
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Kari Egge
• affirmative action
• children
• discrimination, racism and xenophobia
• education
• gender
• health care
• non-governmental organisations and civil society
• refugees and asylum seekers
• religious and socio-cultural rights
• the role and independence of the media
• torture
• trafficking, and
• social security.
The country’s report also stated that “Namibia is attentive of its international obligations
to submit the outstanding periodic reports”,36 and mentioned that the country lacked
the human and material resources as well as the internal organisational framework to
coordinate all ministries concerning human rights issues. The UPR Working Group made
27 human-rights-related recommendations, and set a deadline for their examination and/
or implementation.37
The recommendations from the UPR deliberations touch on a number of international

human rights issues, such as child labour and asylum. The recommendations also
demanded an end to the discrimination and marginalisation of indigenous people38 and
minorities.39
Nonetheless, despite the weaknesses highlighted by the UPR, there are also positive
aspects worth mentioning, such as the accreditation of the Office of the Ombudsman
36 (ibid.).
37 The Universal Human Rights Index of UN Documents can be accessed for all recommendations all
observations the UN has made on Namibia. Available at http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.
org/; last accessed 19 September 2011.
38 Compare Namibia’s position on the same topic in the section entitled “Namibia’s participation
in the UN human rights system”.
39 See the Universal Human Rights Index of UN Documents for the 1954 Convention Relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons; the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; the 1990
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families; the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 2006 International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances; and the 2008 Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Available at http://www.
universalhumanrightsindex.org/; last accessed 19 September 2011.
306
with an “A” status,40 meaning that it fully complies with the Principles relating to the
Status of National Institutions, named the Paris Principles.41
Special Procedures
Apart from the UPR, the UN human rights system provides for what are known as Special
Procedures with regard either to a country or to thematic issues. These Procedures –42
… usually call on mandate-holders to examine, monitor, advise and publicly report on human
rights situations in specific countries or territories, known as country mandates, or on major
phenomena of human rights violations worldwide, known as thematic mandates.
There are various Procedures, of which three were conducted for Namibia.43 One such
Procedure was conducted in 2011 by way of a country visit by an independent expert
(mandate-holder) on the topic of water and sanitation,44 which falls under the thematic
mandates.45 In addition, Namibia received at least four letters of allegation and urgent
appeals sent by Special Procedures mandate holders, and it replied to only one.46 In the
period from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010, the country also received 23 questionnaires,
but had responded to none of them.47 A Namibian human rights organisation, Namrights,
points out that Namibia has not extended a standing or open invitation to all HRC
Special Procedures, unlike 82 other UN member states have done.48 An invitation
would demonstrate Namibia’s commitment to human rights issues, since it would allow
mandate holders to visit the country at any time.
Namibia’s participation in the UN human rights system
The UNHRC was established in 2006 and has 20 African members. Namibia is not
yet among these members.49 The UNCHR – the predecessor of the UNHRC – was
40 See UN (2010b).
41 See UN (2010e:8). For the Paris Principles, see OHCHR ([n.d.]e).
42 OHCHR ([n.d.]h).
43 (i) Standing invitation (“A standing invitation is an open invitation extended by a Government
to all thematic special procedures. By extending a standing invitation States announce that
they will always accept requests to visit from all special procedures. As of 31 August 2011,
… 88 States have extended a standing invitation to thematic procedures”; OHCHR [n.d]f); (ii)
“Country and other visits” (OHCHR [n.d.]g); and (iii) “Urgent appeals”, “Allegation letters”
(OHCHR [n.d.]h), and questionnaires on thematic issues.
44 See OHCHR ([n.d.]c).
45 See OHCHR ([n.d.]d).
46 See UN (2010b). Since the document just states “[d]uring the period of review”, but does not
give the exact dates, one cannot say whether Namibia received more than these four letters.
47 (ibid.).
48 Namrights (2011a). Available at http://www.nshr.org.na/index.php?module=News&func=displ
ay&sid=1480; last accessed 26 September 2011.
49 See UNHRC ([n.d.]a).
307
Kari Egge
established in 1947. Even before Namibia became independent, it was not a member
of the UNCHR.50 Similarly, Namibia has not yet become a member of either the current
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee or its predecessor,51 the Sub-commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Namibia has received considerable
support from the OHCHR through its Regional Office, but has so far not taken part in the
various sub-institutions, such as the Treaty-based bodies.52
During its short life as an independent country, Namibia has realised the importance
of human rights instruments, and participates actively in workshops, seminars and
consultations on human rights in the region in particular. At UN level, however, there
is still room for Namibia to engage in the deliberations on human rights – as this will
be of major importance to the country during its efforts to realise Vision 2030 and to
consolidate its position among UN member states as a democratic country that fully
actualises its human rights obligations and duties. While it has proved a solid partner in
respect of fulfilling its obligations towards the CRC and CEDAW, Namibia’s support in
terms of some other treaties in the UN Global Staff Association has surprised a number
of member states. For example, as a member of the UN General Assembly’s Social,
Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Committee (Third Committee) in 2007, by proposing
an amendment on behalf of several other African states,53 Namibia delayed a declaration
on the rights of indigenous peoples which had a history in the UN system as far back as
1985.54 International human rights groups claimed Namibia’s stance was a delaying tactic
as no regular sessions of the General Assembly were scheduled after mid-December
2007, and no budget had been authorised for a special session.55
It is to be understood that the implementation of human rights instruments is always

a work in progress, and it is expected to be supported by the international community.
However, while there is increasing interest and considerable progress in Namibia’s
commitment towards realising its obligations on these instruments, its role in the UN’s
global activities on the promotion, protection and realisation of human rights cannot be
considered as significant at the moment.
Conclusion
Namibia was ‘born’ of the UN and is still one of its youngest member states. The
country’s transition period – which is regarded as the most successful to have taken
place from conflict to peace and development – and maturation over the past 21 years has
50 See OHCHR ([n.d.]i).

51 See OHCHR ([n.d.]j).
52 See UNHRC ([n.d.]b).
53 See UN (2006b).
54 See Converge ([n.d.]).
55 Maletsky (2006).
308
received full support from the UN and its agencies. Similarly, the various agencies that
were established in the country together with the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office very
soon after Independence received full support from the Namibian Government and its
institutions throughout the 21-year period. The country’s commitment and collaboration
with the UN system is consistently strong and constructive; the Government’s committed
support of UN reform is highly regarded; and its strides on the road to development and
progress are widely acknowledged. In addition, while Namibia is still in transition from
being dependent on foreign aid and development assistance to a situation where she will
have to fund most of her own development plans and activities from domestic resources,
the UN system is itself in transition in respect of the way it supports and assists Namibia
in her development efforts.
Through its move from providing considerable support and assistance towards service
delivery to focus increasingly focus on ‘upstream’ work in areas like legislation review,
standard- and norm-setting, policy development, and provision of high-level technical
assistance at the government’s request, the UN system is gradually applying new strategies
in respect of its development assistance to Namibia. The Namibian Government is now
in the driver’s seat. The stage has been reached where equal partners agree on the way
forward and on how the UN system is best positioned to assist its development.
With the UN system adhering to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action,56
the UN’s role in Namibia is increasingly one of providing support to the government’s
national development plans and programmes through the “Delivering as One” drive and
UNDAF, instead of implementing its own priorities and agendas in the country. This
change will be implemented over time, but it is in recognition of Namibia’s increasing
capacity to determine her own route for development and her augmented role in
contributing towards the three pillars of UN work.
While the country’s current record on progress in respect of the three UN pillars may
be somewhat mixed, there is no doubt about the Namibian Government’s political
commitment towards the work and value of the UN as the global governing body. Recent
proof of this was the country’s participation at the MDG Summit in New York,57 its
regular participation in the Global Health Assembly in Geneva, the high-level delegation
that was sent to the UPR by the HRC in Geneva in January 2011, and the UN High-
level Meeting on HIV and AIDS in New York in June 2011. Namibia’s important role
in crafting the Millennium Declaration, which led to the establishment of the MDGs in
2000 will always reflect positively on the country and its commitment to global progress.
56 OECD ([n.d.]).
57 Namibia’s MDG Report is available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
Desk%20Review%202010.pdf; last accessed 30 August 2011
309
Kari Egge
Namibia has, despite its small population, contributed to more than half a dozen UN
peacekeeping missions. This reflects its strong sense of responsibility and commitment
to the cause of peace and security – one of the most important areas requiring action in a
world that is constantly charged with a number of challenging conflicts and crises.
When assessing Namibia’s record on actualising human rights in the country, all
collaborating bodies have agreed that there is room for improvement, and that this should
be implemented through a review of legislation; the development of relevant policies,
instruments and action plans; and, not least, through the increased participation of all
Namibians in the development process – independent of race, sex, and cultural and/or
religious affiliation. Although Namibia has signed and ratified many international human
rights instruments, their domestic implementation poses considerable challenges. Thus,
support for the development of a National Action Plan on Human Rights needs to be high
on the government’s agenda as well as the UN’s. Such a Plan is critical for ensuring all
human rights are gradually actualised in a country that has ratified and adopted many
international human rights instruments.
Development is all about empowering people so that they have the capacity to take
part fully in their country’s development process. The UN system in Namibia has taken
this on board and has adopted strategies and approaches in its work to reflect this. With
the country being on a move towards the attainment of its Vision 203058 and towards
greater independence of foreign assistance and support, the UN system’s future role
may, therefore, increasingly be one of facilitation, advising and assisting the Namibian
Government in ensuring that the three UN pillars are fully understood and reflected in
the country’s development aspirations and programmes. Moving towards a partnership
agenda of this kind has already started in some other middle-income countries, and
Namibia may adopt the same approach in the next few years. Hence, the UN system will
also increasingly have to take regular stock of its country collaboration strategies and its
relevance in the country, and make changes according to the country’s specific needs.
There is no doubt that Namibia needs the UN system; the contributions of Namibia in
the different UN forums are also indispensable. Namibia could easily serve as a role
model for other middle-income countries in areas where they have a lot to learn. Taking
advantage of such a role could function as an entry point to increased trade, South–South
collaboration, and the cross-fertilisation of ideas between countries in the region and
across continents.
It is the UN’s belief that Namibia, being a country with a small population and a solid
income, can attain all the MDGs – and the various UN bodies are ready to support her
efforts on all fronts.
58 Progress in some key areas is very slow and may hamper ultimate achievement of this long-
term development plan.
310
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314
SECTION IV
NAMIBIA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE
315
316
The legal dimension of Namibia’s foreign relations*
Sacky Shanghala**
Introduction
Domestic laws of states regulate the relations of citizens inter se (horizontally) and with
the state (vertically), 1 whereas the relationship of states in their interactions is regulated
by international law.2 Yet there are other activities that take place beyond the national
boundaries – social activities (citizens intermarrying), cultural (peoples sharing common
backgrounds across frontiers), and economic (trade across borders) – which states seek
to regulate out of necessity. While some of the activities are good, there are also bad
activities such as crime (drugs, terrorism and arms trade) which states seek to curb.
States deal with these extraterritorial or cross-frontier activities individually, bilaterally
or through multilateral arrangements.
Namibia, on her own accord, joined the community of nations as an independent country
on 23 April 1990,3 and as such, her interaction with other states is defined by the rules
of international law and the policies of state driving interests of a particular state as it
interacts with other states, i.e. foreign policy.
McGowan and Nel4 define the concept of foreign policy as –5
* This work is intended to provoke deeper examination of positions taken and to be taken, as
well as premises assumed and utilised in the expectation of interaction with foreign non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, multinationals, international
NGOs, foreign governments and their agents, and the general perception of the region and
the world, from a Namibian perspective. Reference to a given set of circumstances involving
any given foreign NGO, international organisation, multinational, international NGO, foreign
government or its agent does not reflect the position of the Government of the Republic of
Namibia or any of its agencies, and along with any errors, are the views of the author in pursuit
of that provocative thinking.
** Sacky Shanghala is the Chairman of the Law Reform and Development Commission in
Namibia’s Ministry of Justice.
1 See Froneman (2006).
2 See Shearer (1994:3) which reads as follows: “[t]hat body of law which is composed for
its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound to
observe”.
3 Namibia became a member of the United Nations (UN) on that day. Dr Hage Geingob, then the
Prime Minister, led the delegation to the UN buildings to witness the hoisting of the Namibian
flag alongside other UN member states’ flags.
4 McGowan & Nel (1999, cited in Akwenye 2003:48). The cited authors distinguish between
high and low politics – a recommended read. The definition has elsewhere been ascribed to Hill
(2005:6).
5 Prof. André du Pisani (pers. comm., 22 February 2012), makes the point that “‘foreign policy’
317
Sacky Shanghala
… the sum total of all activities by which international actors act, react and interact with the
environment beyond their national borders.
Most of the matters that are the subject of foreign relations/policy are, of course,
determined by politics. However, the questions this paper seeks to answer relate to whether
the law(s) – national or international – have a role to play in Namibia’s foreign relations
policy, written or otherwise. If it does, as this paper argues, does such law exclude the
influence and operability of ideological and political viewpoints of Namibians and the
Namibian state in the interaction with other states?
One might quip that these are rhetorical questions or academic jargon at best, embellished
by lexical and syntactic refinement to occupy the elite sophisticated debates of the
well-to-do diplomats, lawyers or the odd commentator! Yet, the relevance of law in
international relations may not necessarily be presumed, despite it being a necessary
medium for the attainment of political and national objectives across the parameters of
state territories – amongst other factors that include economic and political interests and
political influence.
These questions are partially answered by the Foreword to a publication by Namibia’s

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, titled Namibia’s foreign policy and diplomacy management,
in the following text:6
As the world turns and the seasons change, so do the intentions of nations and the behaviour
of world leaders that, in many cases, defy prediction. World politics is about peace, security,
ideas, collective actions, alliances, co-operation, development and power. These are the
essential elements of international co-operation and international conventions and protocols.
Ideally, the objectives of inter-state relations are to promote good order, civilized discourse and
mutual support for a better world. The tools for achieving these objectives are international law,
conferences, [and] bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
is a boundary activity. The term boundary implies that those making foreign policy straddle
two environments: an internal or domestic environment, and an external or global one. Foreign
policy, in this sense, mediates between these two environments”. The time-honoured question
that comes to mind is this: is a country’s boundary an incidence of its national law or does it
come about as a result of international law – or, for that matter, the laws of another state? It
seems irrefutable that the Berlin Conference of 1884 had long-lasting international imperialist
ramifications that persist to today. Closer to home and albeit of redundant academic interest,
one could provokingly ask whether Namibia took over Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, or
whether South Africa gave them over – since both countries legislated on the subject matter. For
Namibia, it was the Walvis Bay and Offshore Islands Act, 1994 (No. 1 of 1994), and for South
Africa it was the Transfer of Walvis Bay to Namibia Act, 1993 (No. 203 of 1993).
6 Foreword by Hon. Hidipo Hamutenya, Member of Parliament (MP), then Minister of Foreign
Affairs (Republic of Namibia 2004:i). Hon. Hamutenya is now the President of the Rally for
Democracy and Progress (RDP), the official opposition as at 2012. The document was adopted
by the National Assembly under the tenure of Minister of Foreign Affairs Marco Hausiku, now
Deputy Prime Minister.
318
The legal dimension of Namibia’s foreign relations
Therefore, this paper departs from the vantage point that international law and foreign
relations are inextricably intertwined, the residue question being centred on the degree of
interrelation as regards Namibia as an actor on the international stage.
A historical setting
Namibia’s presence in the international arena cannot be discussed without taking into
account the context of its historical setting. Some have casually called it “the last colony
in Africa”,7 and that name tag engenders some mystique, which can be clarified.
Apart from occupying terrae nullus and forming states after the decolonisation
of territories, new states will only come about as a result of the diminution and/or
disappearance of existing states.8 It is important, therefore, to underscore the birth of the
Namibian state as one of the United Nations’ success stories.9
Before 21 March 1990,10 the determiners of foreign policy for Namibia were those that
wielded political control over the country. They determined all and sundry, including
matters that related to Namibia’s identity in the world. During the period of German rule,
for example, which began on 8 September 1884, the country was known as the German
Protectorate of South West Africa or German South West Africa.11 From 1920 onwards,
under the period of South African rule – whether as a Union or as a Republic, what
eventually became known as Namibia was termed the Territory of South West Africa
or simply South West Africa at the time,12 in relation to its geographical location. In
7 See e.g. in an article by Christopher Wren (1989) for the New York Times, titled “Last colony in
Africa nearing independence with jitters for all”.
8 Shaw (2008:198).
9 In an article titled “The United Nations’ success story’”, this was the opinion of Jim van de
Water (2005), writing for the San Diego Union Tribune.
10 The date on which the Republic of Namibia was founded as an independent country; see e.g. the
Territorial Waters Act, 1963 (No. 87 of 1963), which applied over the then South West Africa.
11 See e.g. http://www.schudak.de/timelines/germansouthwestafrica1844-1920.html, last accessed
14 September 2011. See also the text of the Council of the League of Nations’ Mandate for
German South West Africa decision, made at Geneva on 17 December 1920, available as
Appendix II to Wellington (1967). Protectorate was defined in the Interpretation of Laws
Proclamation 37 of 1920 which has since applied in Namibia (and is only now being reviewed)
as “the territory of South West Africa lately under the Sovereignty of Germany and at present
under the administration of the Government of the Union of South Africa”. Territory was
defined by the same law as “the Mandated Territory of South West Africa”. These definitions
followed the Treaty of Versailles and the mandatory established under the League of Nations
over the territory. The definitions also become relevant later as we investigate the issue of
Namibia’s borders at independence.
12 See the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act, 1919 (No. 49 of 1919), promulgated
by the Parliament of the Union of South Africa.
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1968,13 members of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolved that the name
Namibia14 would be the official name of the country, in accordance with the desire of its
inhabitants.
South Africa had not only breached its mandate obligations by then (and exposed the
systemic failure of the League of Nations arrangement), but also went further to impose
its racist policy of apartheid,15 despite UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)16 of
14 December 1960, in which the –17
… inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence in an untruncated

territory including Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands and all adjacent offshore islands …
was reaffirmed, and ultimately, the occupation of South Africa was declared illegal and
brutally repressive by the UN General Assembly.
Ultimately, after many UN pronouncements, Resolution 43518 of the UN Security

Council decided that Namibia would become independent through free elections under
the supervision and control of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).19
By far, this is probably the most important resolution of the UN on the subject matter
13 Resolution 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 12 1968.

14 Mburumba Kerina is credited with having coined the name in the 1960s. The name is closely
related to Namib, the name of Namibia’s desert to the west.
15 Expert writings on apartheid are obtainable. However, to Namibians, this policy of ‘divide and
rule’ based on race was introduced by the National Party of South Africa under the Government
of Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, under which the historical owners of Namibia were
subjected to demeaning social, class, economic and other forms of discriminatory treatment.
The use of the term in this work, therefore, is with reference to a historical fact through which
Namibians have emerged.
16 As well as the numerous subsequent relevant resolutions and decisions of the UN General
Assembly and Security Council on the subject.
17 See records of the UN General Assembly Seventh Plenary Meeting of 20 September 1986, on
the theme “Question of Namibia”, Document A/RES/S-14/1, posted on 18 December 1999
by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs; available at file:///Volumes/OFFICE/
A:RES:S-14:1%C2%A0%20Question%20of%20Namibia.html, last accessed 14 September
2011. The UN website is flush with records of discussions on the matter of Namibia and, with
deeper research, the quantum of time spent by UN diplomats, campaigners and the world
community on other deliberations calling for an end to South African imposition over Namibia
can be determined.
18 The text of Resolution 435 is available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/368/80/IMG/NR036880.pdf?OpenElement, last accessed 14 September 2011.
Resolution 435 was preceded by Resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, and 431 (1978)
and 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978 – all equally important decisions to the resolution of the
Namibian matter.
19 Para. 3, UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 29 September 1978.
320
Namibia: UNTAG did indeed come to Namibia and oversee the transition, and in doing
so, the UN also reaffirmed its legal responsibility over Namibia.
Earlier, the UN had established a Council for South West Africa20 with powers and
functions, inter alia, “to be discharged in the Territory”, including –21
… to promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are necessary for the
administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established following elections
conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
The choice and usage of language of the Resolution is important, as territory is the basic
characteristic of a state.22 Over its territory, a state exercises sovereignty. How people
enter and leave its territory is a subject of state power.
In an opinion of the Legal Counsel of the UN Secretariat, at the request of the

Commissioner for South West Africa, the UN reaffirmed that the function of “issuing
of travel documents is one of the functions under international law entrusted to national
Governments”, ordinarily.23 However, while using other examples, the Legal Counsel
justified the issuance of travel documents by the Council for South West Africa to
Namibian citizens who applied for them, as even SWAPO was doing at the time.24
Other administrative functions of governance were being administered by South Africa

directly, and eventually also indirectly through the institutions of Governor-General,
Administrator and Administrator-General, aided by Executive Committees, Cabinets,
Advisory Councils, and Assembly, National Assembly, Native Commissioners and
other functionaries with varying names depending on the whim of the racist apartheid
occupation structures.25
20 On 19 May 1967, the UN General Assembly established the Council and passed Resolution
2248 (S–V).
21 (ibid.:para. II, 1(b)).
22 See Shaw (2008:487). Drawing from Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 23 December
1933 on the Rights and Duties of States, Shearer (1994:85) cites the following qualifications
for statehood: permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter
into relations with other states.
23 See UN (1967:Ch. VI). Selected legal opinions of the Secretariats of the UN and related
intergovernmental organisations are also given (ibid.:309, para. A(1)(5), Ch. VI).
24 (ibid.:311). Hon. Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana, MP since 1990, Minister of Justice until 2012,
and incumbent Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration, revealed that there were friendly
countries to SWAPO such as Sierra Leone that issued its passports to Namibians in the diaspora
(pers. comm., 19 September 2011).
25 See the South West Africa Constitution Act, 1925 (No. 42 of 1925), South West Africa
Legislative and Executive Authority Establishment Proclamation R101 of 1985, and other
statutes to this effect. With regard to the use of the term apartheid, please see Footnote 15
above.
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Sacky Shanghala
When the South African Defence Act26 was promulgated in 1957, the definition of
Republic included the territory of South West Africa. It was not quite clear as to who
legally exercised sovereignty over Namibia at the time.27
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) eventually rendered an Advisory Opinion as

to the “Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia”, confirming that, although that South Africa’s occupation of Namibia was
illegal, such illegality did not include acts of registering births, deaths and marriages
of Namibians. However, South Africa’s economic and other relations on behalf of or
concerning Namibia (which entrenched its authority over Namibia), its diplomatic
activity with regard to Namibia, and its treaty relations with other UN member states
concerning Namibia (save where humanitarian treaties whose non-performance would
affect Namibians) were considered as acts of occupation of the territory without title,
illegal and invalid.28
The UN, the Frontline States/Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

(SADCC) and other individual states contributed immensely to the international debate,
diplomacy and lobbying29 that raged on through the UN, in the ICJ and throughout
academia and other forums, leading to the “settlement of the Namibian situation”.30
The Republic of Namibia is as much a product of international diplomacy within and

beyond the diplomatic channels of these organisations and bodies as it is a product
of bloody battles in southern Angola and northern Namibia with the involvement of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Republic of Cuba,31 the Republic
26 No. 44 of 1957.
27 See e.g. the views of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in one of the opinions in the matter,
namely International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports (1950) at 128;
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/10/1891.pdf, last accessed 14 September 2011.
There are numerous ICJ opinions and many UN General Assembly Resolutions on the matter.
28 Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5597.pdf, last accessed 14 September 2011.
29 Lobbying was not limited to state actors: individuals and organisations – particularly Namibian
individuals and organisations under the instructions of Chief Hosea Kutako – also played a role.
30 Terminology introduced in the UN Security Council by way of a letter addressed to the President
of the Security Council dated 10 April 1978, from the representatives of Canada, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the United States of America (Document S/12636 available at http://www.signonsandiego.
com/uniontrib/20050224/news_lz1e24water.html, last accessed 14 September 2011). Also
refer to the 1985 address by M Evans of the University of Zimbabwe, titled “The Front-Line
[sic] States, South Africa and southern African security: Military prospects and perspectives”,
and his views on Frontline States’ role in blunting South African military dominance in the
region; available at http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20
of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol12n1/juz012001002.pdf, last accessed 14
September 2011.
31 The author is indebted to Jorge Risquet, Cuban Internationalist Forces Commander in the 1960s
and, later on, an official in the Cuban Government. Mr Risquet took part in, among other things,
322
of South Africa, SWAPO’s military wing – the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
(PLAN), and the Republic of Angola.32
So far, it is clear that these historical events have impacted the attitude of Namibia and
its conduct as it relates with the rest of the world in its individual state capacity and as
a member of international and/or regional groupings and organisations. Perhaps there
have been recent events that have put to test Lord Palmerton’s33 dictum that “[t]here are
no permanent allies, no permanent friends, only permanent interests”: we shall broach
some of these events and juxtapose others against the legal obligations that are binding
on Namibia.
The Namibian Constitution

As indicated above, at Independence, the Republic of Namibia succeeded the Mandate
of South West Africa/Namibia, and in the text of the Namibian Constitution’s Preamble,
pronounced that, “in association with the nations of the world”, it would promote the
unity and integrity of the Namibian nation, whose territory was that “recognised by the
international community”.34
The Namibian Constitution, the Supreme Law of the land, not only embraces general
international law, it is “international-law-positive”35 as it made Namibia a monist
country, meaning that international law and national law are one, with some provisos.
the negotiation of Namibia’s independence with the South African Government. He shared his
insight into the processes that culminated in the decision for Cuba to withdraw from southern
Africa (Angola), as well as into other details of the Cold War era during a brief meeting with
the author in Havana, Cuba, on Saturday, 22 October 2011. See also Ramonet (2008:345–374);
Dreyer (1994:173).
32 It should be underscored that only the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola
(FAPLA), which was associated with the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)
sided with SWAPO’s PLAN and the Cuban internationalist forces, on the one hand, against the
South African Defence Forces (SADF), the South West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF) and
the notorious counterinsurgency unit known as Koevoet (“crowbar”), on the other hand. The
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) of Dr. Jonas Savimbi and the
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) of Holden Àlvaro Roberto are not recorded
as being sympathetic to SWAPO’s quest for Namibia’s independence. It should also be recorded
that SWAPO was the only Namibian liberation movement, which consisted of both a political
and military effort.
33 An English statesman and Prime Minister during the 19th Century.
34 See Article 1(4) of the Namibian Constitution: “The national territory of Namibia shall consist
of the whole of the territory recognised by the international community through the organs of
the United Nations as Namibia, including the enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as well
as the off-shore islands of Namibia, and its southern boundary shall extend to the middle of the
Orange River”.
35 Tshosa (2010:3).
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This conclusion is derived from Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution, which states
the following:36
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public
international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this Constitution
shall form part of the law of Namibia.
With specific reference to foreign relations, the Namibian Constitution, under “Principles
of State Policy” contains a similarly titled clause, namely Article 96, which, for the
purposes of this paper, ought to be reproduced:
The State shall endeavour to ensure that in its international relations it:
(a) adopts and maintains a policy of non-alignment;
(b) promotes international co-operation, peace and security;
(c) creates and maintains just and mutually beneficial relations among nations;
(d) fosters respect for international law and treaty obligations;
(e) encourages the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
There may be merit in addressing, albeit briefly, these five pillars of Namibia’s foreign
relations, which are repeated in the Mission Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Namibia, along with the object to –37
• promote security domestically, within our own neighbourhood and in the global arena.
• enhance the international standing of our country and advance its socio-economic,
cultural, technological and scientific interests, with particular emphasis on economic
growth and development.
Duty to adopt and maintain a policy of non-alignment
The duty to adopt and maintain a policy of non-alignment derives its inspiration from
SWAPO’s involvement in the Non-aligned Movement established at the Belgrade
Conference of 1961 by so-called Third World countries, with a view not to be subsumed
into any alignment with or against any bloc or country.38
36 Readers are referred to the work of Yvonne Dausab (2011), who correctly sums up the legal
situation in Namibia while taking issue with it. Emphasis however should be placed on the
usage of the words “binding upon Namibia” from Article 144. Provocatively, it should be asked
whether, for instance, given the other provisions of the Namibian Constitution, the phenomenon
practised of late by some powerful members of the international community of pre-emptive
strikes should be a principle of law binding on Namibia when that provision is juxtaposed
against Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (self-defence)? The same can be asked of
the newly minted principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emanating from the UN General
Assembly 63/308 of 7 October 2009: which interpretation should be applied to scenarios to
trigger R2P? Juxtapose the difference of the Arab Spring events as they unfolded in Libya as
opposed to the events in Egypt.
37 See the Vision and Mission Statement in Republic of Namibia (2004).
38 See the key objectives of the Non-aligned Movement; available at http://www.nonaligned.
324
Duty to promote international cooperation, peace and security
The obligation to promote international cooperation, peace and security reflects the
stated purpose of the UN as articulated under Article 1(1), (2) and (3) of the UN Charter.
Duty to create and maintain just and mutually beneficial relations among
nations
Creating and maintaining just and mutually beneficial relations among nations is a duty
that is also reflected under Article 1(2) and (3) of the UN Charter, which binds Namibia
as a member of the UN.
Duty to foster respect international law and treaty obligations
The duty to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations seems to underscore
the classic international law principle of pacta sunt servanda,39 encapsulated under
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
While treaty40 is defined in the latter Convention, there are many other terms used which
ought to be considered part of this obligation arising out of pacta sunt servanda, such
as Convention, Protocol, Agreement, Arrangement, Proćes-Verbal, Statute, Covenant,
Declaration, Modus Vivendi, Exchange of Notes (or of Letters), and Final Act or General Act.41
Duty to encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful

means
The duty to encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means is

explicit in its language and talks to Chapter VI of the UN Charter as well as Articles 1(1)
and 2(3) thereof.
Namibia’s foreign policy is also impacted by Article 99 (Foreign Investments) of

the Namibian Constitution, which encourages foreign investments within Namibia,
org/2010/06/11/key-objectives-of-the-non-aligned-movement/, last accessed 15 September

2011. Many of the diplomatic ties established by SWAPO are retained by the Namibian
Government to date, with Cuba being a case in point.
39 The actual text reads as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith”. This is the accepted meaning of the Roman maxim. There
are other Articles in the said Vienna Convention that advance this objective.
40 Per Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention, it “means an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”.
41 For a discussion of these terms, see Shearer (1994:401–404).
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subject to an Investment Code.42 For Namibia, foreign direct investment is critical in

stimulating sectors of its development economy. This provision has motivated Namibia’s
membership of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a member of the World
Bank Group, so that the country may attract foreign investors who can have their input
secured with cover from non-commercial risks. Namibia has also signed the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.43
Other duties derived from the Constitution
It is important that Article 10144 of the Namibian Constitution is not overlooked in this
context, however, as it seems to point to the directory rather than obligatory provisions
of Chapter 11 therein. Article 101 reads as follows:45
The principles of state policy contained in this Chapter shall not of and by themselves be legally
enforceable by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide the Government in making and applying
laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of the said principles. The Courts are entitled
to have regard to the said principles in interpreting any laws based on them.
There are further provisions of the Namibian Constitution which impact on Namibia’s
relations on the international plane. One such important provision is the one that treats
existing agreements in the context of state succession. Per Article 143 of the Namibian
Constitution, all existing international agreements at Independence, which are binding
upon Namibia, are to remain in force until the National Assembly decides otherwise,
under Article 63(2)(d).46 Article 63(2)(d) should be read together with Sub-Article (e),
42 That code is the Foreign Investment Act, 1990 (No. 27 of 1990), currently under review.
43 Namibia has not ratified the Convention, however, and neither has she acceded to the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards concluded on 10 June 1958
(New York Convention). Nonetheless, Namibia has participated in arbitrations held under the
auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce and the Permanent Court of Arbitration –
admitting, by participation, to abide by its rules.
44 “Application of the Principles contained in this Chapter”, referring to Chapter 11 of the
Constitution.
45 Curiously, Dausab (2011) takes issue with this constitutional provision! However, the Namibian
Supreme Court, in Government of the Republic of Namibia & 2 Others v Mwilima & 127 Others
(SC) Case No. SA 29/2001, at 40, in a judgment rendered by then Chief Justice Strydom, it
was held that the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were
applicable because, among other things, Namibia had acceded to it and had an obligation to
adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the rights arising from the Covenant. For
a comparison, see The Chairperson of the Immigration Selection Board v Frank & Another
(2001) (NR) 107 (NmSC). Article 101 seems to be Namibia’s indispensable ‘escape clause’ in
legal parlance.
46 Prof. Lazarus Hangula (2011:195), referring to the Namibian/South African territorial borders
along the !Garib/Orange River postulates a serious philosophical query to this principle when
he asks, “but can the inhabitants of such an arid area as what was then Namaland and the Namib
Desert truly now live without access to the waters of their ancestral river, just because two
326
as that constitutional provision empowers the National Assembly to either repudiate or

confirm international agreements concluded by previous administrations, while the latter
empowers the National Assembly to either ratify or accede to international agreements
negotiated by the President or his/her delegates.
Treaties that come into life and become binding on Namibia by ratification become part
of the law of Namibia when the National Assembly ratifies such by resolution, whereas
treaties that become operable by signature are not automatically part of the domestic law
of Namibia and require enabling legislation.47
Mention of agreements concluded by previous administrations prior to Namibia’s

Independence on 21 March 1990 invokes consideration of state succession agreements,
particularly agreements impacting the territorial boundaries of Namibia, as intimated
earlier in the discussion. Article 1(4) of the Namibian Constitution places the southern
boundary in the middle of the Orange River, whereas the English–German Boundary
Treaty of 1 July 1890, also known as the Helgoland Treaty, places the boundary between
Namibia and South Africa as –48
… a line commencing at the mouth of the Orange River and ascending the north bank of that
river to the point of its intersection by 20th degree of east longitude.
It is apt to reproduce Article 1(4) of the Namibian Constitution at this juncture and refer
to previous discussions relating to the definitions of protectorate and territory:
The national territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory recognised by the
international community through the organs of the United Nations as Namibia, including the
enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as well as the off-shore islands of Namibia, and its
southern boundary shall extend to the middle of the Orange River.
The discerning eye would note that Article 1(4) singles out the southern boundary; the
enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay; and the off-shore islands of Namibia, when
there is no explicit linkage in that respect to the period of the takeover from the Germans
by the South Africans during the Mandate System of the League of Nations, as there was
never a question as to the contiguous area which Germany, acting under Article 118 of
the Versailles Peace Treaty, renounced –
… all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her
allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the
Allied and Associated Powers.
foreign colonial powers so decided at a time and in the name of a discredited pre-human-rights
ideological doctrines [sic] of imperialism and colonialism?”.
47 See Tshosa (2010:20); subject, of course, to Article 7 (Full Powers) of the Vienna Convention,
and Articles 32(3)(e) and 63(2)(e) of the Namibian Constitution.
48 Herslet (1899).
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The UN, through its decisions such as that resulting in Resolution 432 of 27 July 1978,
maintained this perspective and declared Walvis Bay an integral part of Namibia.49
South Africa, on the other hand, continued unabated and administered/legislated for
Walvis Bay as part of the Province of the Cape of Good Hope of South Africa from 1
September 197750 as a result of the enabling provisions of the South Africa Constitution
Act,51 which, as of 31 May 1961, defined Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands to form
part thereof. The territory of and sovereignty over Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands
only returned to Namibia in 1994 with both South Africa and Namibia legislating to that
effect.52
One of the achievements of diplomacy after Namibia’s independence which may be

cited as a best practice in the region is indeed how Namibia and South Africa resolved
the matter of Walvis Bay under the leadership of Presidents Sam Nujoma and Nelson
Mandela, when, on 28 February 1994, at midnight, Walvis Bay was reintegrated into
Namibia. Notwithstanding their gentlemen’s agreement of 1998, the !Garib/Orange
River boundary persists hitherto – in keeping with the Helgoland Treaty!53
Notwithstanding the Portuguese–German Lisbon Convention of 3 December 1886

concerning the Kunene River, which forms a boundary between Angola and Namibia
in the north, the two countries entered into their own present-day agreement of 4 June
2002, which demarcates their territorial waters, and have since been cooperating54 under
the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.
With the matter relating to the Kasikili (Sedudu) Islands, arising from the Anglo–German
Agreement of 1 July 1890, in which Namibia and Botswana were able to achieve certainty
through litigation at the ICJ, the two countries have laid the matter to rest.55
49 See Footnote 18. See also paragraph 7 of UN General Assembly Resolution 32/9 D of 4
November 1977, in which the Assembly declares Walvis Bay as an integral part of Namibia.
50 Specifically as a result of Walvis Bay Administration Proclamation R202 of 1977.
51 No. 32 of 1961.
52 The South African legislation was the Transfer of Walvis Bay to Namibia Act, 1993 (No. 203
of 1993) assented to by the South African Parliament on 14 January 1994, while the Namibian
counterpart legislation was the Walvis Bay and Off-shore Islands Act, 1994 (No. 1 of 1994).
53 Hangula (2011:194).
54 (ibid.:192).
55 The two countries requested the ICJ to “determine, on the basis of the Anglo–German Treaty
of 1 July 1890 and the rules and principles of international law, the boundary between Namibia
and Botswana around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the legal status of the island”. The Island
referred to is known as Kasikili in Namibia, and as Sedudu in Botswana. See http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/98/7577.pdf, at 1053, last accessed 25 September 2013. This has displayed
Namibia’s commitment to its constitutional foreign policy object to promote, among other
things, international peace and security and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means as
required under Article 96 of the Namibian Constitution and other international instruments. The
328
Again, this is another exemplary resolution of a territorial dispute. Both governments and
citizens committed to peace, resolved their dispute peacefully, and continue to interact
peacefully.
Hence, there is a need to resolve the Helgoland Treaty disaster as a matter of urgency
as this impacts on the territorial integrity of Namibia, not to mention the interests of
commerce of the citizens of the two countries.56 It is, after all, Article 1(4) of the Namibian
Constitution which expressly states “the middle of the Orange River”.
Facets of Namibia’s multilateral and bilateral activity

Sometimes, Namibia acts only under the aegis of a collective, i.e. multilaterally; yet
sometimes, she acts directly with other nations on her own accord (bilaterally) or with
international institutions. With membership of the UN,57 the African Union (AU), the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) and other multilateral bodies, Namibia commits to act with a collective
objective in mind. These institutions are mostly set up by treaties,58 and under them, a
plethora of protocols59 address specific areas of cooperation.
Signing up has implications for the ability of a country to act contrary to the terms
of the treaty in question.60 There may be limitations imposed on a state by virtue of
such membership to international instruments. Once signed up, a country cannot invoke
national law as an excuse for its inability to carry out its obligations under international
law – even if its government is in compliance with a decision of a judicial organ at
national level.61
case is officially cited as Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) Judgment, ICJ Report

1999, at 1045.
56 A grape grower on the Namibian side may experience nuisance from diamond mining operations
on the South African side, which literally ends on the banks of the river on the Namibian side,
and vice versa.
57 The UN system opens up membership to organs such as the United Nations Food Agricultural
Organisation (FAO); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); and the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), to mention but a few in which Namibia actively participates.
58 For instance, the Consolidated Text of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Treaty as Amended, of 17 August 1992.
59 There are approximately 24 Protocols negotiated under SADC alone; see http://www.sadc.int/
english/key-documents/protocols/, last accessed 16 November 2011.
60 See Articles 18 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
61 See Article 4(1) of the International Labour Commission’s 2001 Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. It states as follows: “The conduct of any State
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in
the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government
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An example of limitations applicable to Namibia and others are the Preferential Trade
Agreements under SACU. A SACU member state cannot conclude such an agreement
without the consent and approval of its fellow SACU members,62 whilst most-favoured-
nation agreements may be concluded without such approval. However, sometimes, even
when having acted in consort with others, Namibia has withdrawn from organisations –
as it did from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 2004,
because it juxtaposes its cost–benefit returns from its memberships.
AU members who are also signatories to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court have recently posed the question of conflicting loyalties for themselves on
the subject of international criminal jurisdiction: should they go with the AU or the
International Criminal Court?63 Namibia is a signatory to the Rome Statute – one of
33 out of the 54 AU member states.64 Ongoing discussions about the jurisdiction of the
SADC Tribunal place Namibia alongside some fellow SADC member states and on
the opposite side to other fellow SADC member states on the critical question – should
citizens of SADC member states have locus standi before the SADC Tribunal or not? 65
Namibia is a member of SADC and in fact, the Tribunal is housed in a historic building
in Windhoek.
or of a territorial unit of the State”; available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/

WrongfulActs.html, last accessed 14 September 2013.
62 See Article 31(3) of the 2002 SACU Agreement: “No Member States shall negotiate and enter
into new preferential trade agreements with third parties or amend existing agreements without
the consent of other Member States”.
63 See Akande et al. (2010:6), where the authors refer to the AU Summits of July 2009 and 2010 held
in Libya and Uganda, respectively, which meetings expressed sentiments on the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and on international criminal justice in general. An interesting must-read,
however, is the work of Tladi (2009:57ff) on the universality of the values of intolerance of
impunity for crimes under international law of the ICC Statute. The indictment of President
Omar Hassan Al Bashir of Sudan (The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09),
for example, saw the AU Summit of February 2009 call on the UN Security Council under
Article 16 of the Rome Statute establishing the ICC to defer the process initiated by the ICC
against President Al Bashir. Some AU members, such as Kenya (through the conduct of its High
Court during August 2011), issued a warrant of arrest pursuant to the ICC indictment, given
that Kenya is a signatory to the ICC’s Rome Statute. Malawi refused to host the AU Summit of
Heads of State and Government. In 2012 if the Sudanese President Al Bashir was to attend; as
a result, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the seat of the AU, had to host the Summit.
64 Namibia deposited her instrument of ratification on 25 June 2002.
65 In the case of Campbell, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007 [2007] SADCT 1, 13 Dec 2007, affected
persons by the Republic of Zimbabwe’s laws on the question of land restitution were able to
receive favourable judgment. The matter has since been overtaken by SADC Summit of Heads
of State and Government decisions to suspend the SADC Tribunal in its current legal status
while the Ministers of Justice/Attorneys-General conduct a study on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
for determination by Summit of SADC during August 2012. Subsequently, the SADC Summit
resolved that a new SADC Tribunal Protocol be negotiated, with the specific instruction that the
jurisdiction over natural persons be excluded. This is the status as at the time of printing.
330
It should be noted that some of Namibia’s membership to international organisations

or commitments are inherited from the apartheid regime.66 For instance, membership to
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is listed as having commenced on
January 25, 1984. SACU membership, albeit widely accepted as having commenced on
March 21, 1990, can arguably be determined to have actually began on December 11,
1969 whilst the Territory was still a Mandate of the United Nations Trusteeship Council.
Some other commitments come as a by-product of membership to some international

bodies. A case in point is the ICJ. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.67 For some agreements and
activities, such as the management of the water resources in the Kunene River Basin,
there is a purely bilateral existence, exercised by the Namibian and Angolan governments
under the Permanent Joint Technical Commission. Thus, the obligations under the Third
Water Use Agreement establishing such Commission, concluded on 21 January 1969 by
and between the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Portugal, continue to the
present day due to state succession.68 It may surprise the inquisitive mind that Namibia
is recorded as having acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) on 28 November 1994, even though its provisions comprise customary
international law – which, by virtue of Article 144 of the Namibian Constitution, forms
part of the law of Namibia.
Perhaps the best visible sign of Namibia’s international interactions is the posting of the
men and women of its diplomatic corps at embassies and high commissions around the
world. The Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1951 (No. 71 of 1951) from the days of South
African rule still applies. However, it should be read in conjunction with the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, the 1992 SADC Protocol on Immunities and Privileges and, indeed, the
Namibian Constitution, as discussed earlier.
A considerable amount of time and effort – not to mention funds – is placed in

Namibia’s direct interaction with other states and organisations via ministers, diplomats
and negotiators in the pursuance of the country’s international law obligations.69 The
66 Article 143 of the Namibian Constitution states that “[a]ll existing international agreements
binding upon Namibia shall remain in force, unless and until the National Assembly acting
under Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise decides”.
67 See Article 93 of the UN Charter. However, Article 95 therein permits the resolution of matters
between members of the UN by other tribunals by agreement of those members involved.
68 See Article 143 of the Namibian Constitution as well as provisions of the 1978 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties.
69 Namibia maintains diplomatic missions in Angola, Austria, Belgium and the EU, Botswana,
Brazil, China, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia and the AU,
France, Germany, India, Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the UN, the United States of America,
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cornerstone for such interaction remains premised in international law, even if political
or policy considerations are central to the positions taken.
In neighbouring South Africa, courts have been able to test how far diplomatic privileges
and immunities may be contrasted with what nationals expect of their governments. In
the case of Samuel Kaunda & Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa &
Others,70 heard in the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the court elaborated rather
extensively on the relationship at an international level between that country and foreign
states in regard to the nature and extent of its obligations towards South Africa citizens
beyond its borders, i.e. the extraterritorial protection of citizens and the extension of
diplomatic protection to them. In a nutshell, the court expressed the view that, in essence,
it was the function of the Executive arm of the state to determine foreign policy and
grant any protection.71 However, in the following words it also opined that that, in itself,
could not be considered an ouster of the courts to have jurisdiction to deal with issues
concerned with diplomatic protection:72
The exercise of all public power is subject to constitutional control. Thus even decisions by
the President to grant a pardon or to appoint a commission of inquiry are justiciable. This also
applies to an allegation that government has failed to respond appropriately to a request for
diplomatic protection.
By so doing, the court has expressed an opinion that seeks to alter the concept of foreign
policy somehow: can a country, in its foreign policy, maintain diplomatic relations with
a country that holds a contrary position to its constitutional position? The death penalty
comes to mind. Of course, the ICCPR does not make capital punishment impermissible
under international law, and neither is it outlawed by the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. So should Namibia cut ties with its neighbour to the East73 because they
maintain the capital punishment on their statute books?
The answer is “Not at all”, because the very essence of international comity is the
difference of opinions of nations and their governments, and how they treat different
subjects differently – even within a country. One might strongly argue that the Namibian
courts are likely to follow the line of argument assumed by the Constitutional Court of
South Africa on the issue of the right to diplomatic protection. The Supreme Court of
South Africa used clearer language in the case of The Government of the Republic of
Zambia and Zimbabwe; see http://www.mfa.gov.na/; last accessed 4 June 2012.

70 Case CCT 23/04 decided on 4 August 2004 in a judgment written by Chaskalson CJ.
71 In Namibia, this role falls to the National Assembly as per Article 63(2)(d) and (e) of the
Namibian Constitution in relation to international agreements.
72 (ibid.:36, para. 78).
73 Article 4(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Botswana provides that “[n]o person shall
be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of an
offence under the law in force in Botswana of which he has been convicted”.
332
South Africa & Others v Crawford Lindsay von Abo,74 when it expressed the following
view:
It is therefore a completely foreign concept that one state would attract liability in terms of
its municipal law (because that is the only law that the respondent could enforce against the
appellants) viz-a-viz [sic] its own national for the wrongs of another state, committed by the
state in another country viz-a-viz [sic] the same individual.
It is, however, an entirely different argument under domestic law as compared with
that between a national and his/her state – i.e. when a national seeks the enforcement
of international law provisions in his/her country’s courts.75 Should a national be an
employee of a UN agency, for example, would that national be entitled to the immunity
enjoyed by (foreign) staff members of the particular UN body?
The Namibian High Court had opportunity to examine this question in the case of Hannu
Shipena v The Government of the Republic of Namibia & Another,76 and the court ruled
in favour of the national, namely that he, too, was subject to the exemption for as long as
he was in the employ of that UN body which was subject to the terms of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.77
However, what about when a Namibian national seeks to enforce judgment against a
foreign government in Namibia?78 Would it be possible for the High Court of Namibia to
attach the property of the embassy or high commission of the government in question?
The South African case of Republic of Zimbabwe v Sheriff Wynberg North & Others79
was an opportunity for the courts to deal with such a situation. Relying on the provisions
of the Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 (No. 87 of 1981), the court was able to rule
that the properties of the Embassy of the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe were
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts unless they were being put to commercial use
or the government had issued its written consent to such jurisdiction.
By merely construing the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, in particular Article 22(3), it is almost guaranteed that a Namibian court may
74 Case No. 283/10, para. 31, at 16, delivered 4 April 2011.

75 See Footnote 45 above for a discussion of the Mwilima case.
76 Case No. A 79/2004, delivered 8 October 2008.
77 Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 February 1946.
78 Under Article 15 of the Protocol on Tribunal in the Southern African Development Community,
now suspended, if a citizen of a SADC member state (or perhaps a natural person in SADC) has
a dispute with a SADC member state, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters
until or unless such jurisdiction (personal jurisdiction) has been recrafted under the Protocol.
See e.g. Bartels (2011:27–30).
79 South Gauteng High Court, Case No. 2009/34015, delivered 22 November 2010. The case is
marked “Not reportable”.
333
Sacky Shanghala
also rule similarly and protect the properties of a diplomatic mission.80 As discussed
earlier, the outcome will be imputed upon the state in the definition of its foreign relations
or otherwise.
Cardinally, foreign relations will require that the territory of another state is respected
and should not be violated.81 Sovereignty has been defined to include exclusive control
over the airspace above a territory.82 Intra-African international air services were
negotiated under the Yamoussoukro Declaration.83 The conclusion of bilateral air service
80 The exact text of Article 22(3) states the following: “The premises of the mission, their
furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune
from search, requisition, attachment or execution”. It is in fact possible that the Foreign States
Immunities Act, 1981 still applies in Namibia, because its definition of Republic was contained
in the Territorial Waters Act, 1963 (No. 87 of 1963), which, by virtue of its section 8, applied to
South West Africa (SWA). In SWA, the Administrator-General promulgated Proclamation AG32
of 1979, which was repealed by the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of Namibia
Act, 1990 (No. 3 of 1990). All matters of SWA with relation to the rest of the world remained
with the Government of the Republic of South Africa during those years. It is common cause
that the definition of Republic since 1957 in the Defence Act, 1957 (No. 44 of 1957) always
included the “territory of South-West Africa”. Even if the Administrator-General promulgated
the Transfer Proclamations Executive Powers Transfer [General Provisions] Proclamation 1977
[AG7/1977]), the South African Supreme Court judgment in James Hamupanda Kauluma &
Others v The Cabinet for the Interim Government of South West Africa & Others (Appellate
Division) delivered on 8 November 1988 and written by Joubert JA, at 16, confirms that,
although there have been three legislative authorities for SWA (South African Parliament, the
President and the Administrator-General), the South African Parliament as supreme legislative
authority never ceased being the supreme legislative authority. I think the Supreme Court may
then inadvertently have omitted to refer to the Legislative Assembly of South West Africa as
a fourth lawmaking body. For a discussion on the subject of the attachability of assets of the
Government of the Republic of Namibia, see Minister of Home Affairs, Minister Jerry Ekandjo
v Johannes Jurie Jacobus Van Der Berg, Namibian Supreme Court Case No. 19/2004. The
case of Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng &
Another, Case CCT 19/07 [2008] ZACC 8, determined the matter in South Africa – section 3
of the State Liabilities Act, 1957 (No. 20 of 1957) – being unconstitutional. See also the case
of Gondo (Case No. SADC (T) 05/2008, 9 December 2010). Quaere: Is it perhaps time for
reform in Namibia of the surviving and corresponding provisions of section 3 of the Repeal of
the Laws of the National Assembly, the Cabinet and the Constitutional Council Proclamation,
1989 (AG16 of 1989)?
81 See Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
82 See Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944; also known
as the Chicago Convention.
83 The purpose of the Yamoussoukrou Decision (YD) is to achieve “the liberalization of intra-
Africa scheduled and non-scheduled air transport services, and its provisions prevail over
incompatible provisions in existing or future bilateral or multilateral air transport agreements
between States Parties to the YD”. The first five Freedoms of the Air are (1) the right of an
airline of a member state to overflight without landing; (2) the right to the airline of a member
state to overflight and conduct a technical stop (e.g. refuel); (3) the right of an airline of one
member state to carry traffic to another member state; (4) similar to the right under Freedom
334
agreements among SADC member states ensures the accessibility of markets as well as
the movement of people and goods, whilst respecting the principle of sovereignty. When
people trade in the markets of the countries to which they have access by virtue of such
agreements, they are liable to tax; in the absence of double taxation agreements, either
they are worse off or the state coffers suffer.84
Furthermore, bilateral investment protection agreements are concluded for the purposes
of protecting the investments of nationals in the jurisdiction of other countries. An
example for Namibia was Ramatex, a textile industry. In a 1994 agreement, Namibia and
Singapore concluded a Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Agreement
protecting the physical and other assets of the investor (in casu Ramatex) in either of the
party countries (in casu Namibia) to the Agreement.
When the citizens of a country conduct themselves in a manner that is injurious to a citizen
of another country, or are condemned in the courts of another country, it is necessary
for judicial cooperation either in the form of mutual legal assistance agreements,85 the
enforcement of foreign civil86 or criminal judgments,87 or agreements and extradition88
agreements to be concluded to facilitate the necessary interaction between the states
in the enforcement of citizens’ rights. Namibia has entered into a number of these
agreements with other countries to underpin her interactions with them as they relate to
the citizens of those countries in Namibia, or to Namibian citizens there. Globalisation
will only ensure that these interactions continue.
In terms of monetary and finance issues, Namibia’s membership of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund since 25 September 1990 recognises the need
to interact with others to ensure global monetary stability in a modern world where
(3) above but back from another SADC state (inbound traffic); (5) the right of an airline of one
member state (A) on a service to another member state (C) to set down or uplift traffic at an
intermediate point (in yet another member state [B]) (this is intermediate 5th- Freedom traffic)
and/or to carry traffic from/to that other member state (C) destined for/coming from a third
State (D), located beyond that other member state (C) (whether or not within the SADC region).
See Haanappel & Razafy (2009:9, 23).
84 The said agreements seek to ensure that a jurisdiction “grants a credit for the taxes of the other
country to reduce the taxes of a resident of the country” otherwise the resident may be taxed by
both countries for the same income.
85 These are necessary for the obtaining of restraint, search and seizure as well as confiscation
orders at the request of foreign states.
86 See the Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act, 1994 (No. 28 of 1994). See also the
Reciprocal Service of Civil Process Act, 1994 (No. 27 of 1994), the Foreign Courts Evidence
Act, 1995 (No. 2 of 1995) and the Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, 1995
(No. 3 of 1995).
87 See the International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act, 2000 (No. 9 of 2000).
88 These agreements are necessary for the surrender of persons who are wanted for prosecution or
imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the requesting state for an extraditable offence.
335
Sacky Shanghala
products – including financial products – are not limited by state boundaries. In this
regard, the African Development Bank interacts directly with its member countries,
but also indirectly through the collective of the regional blocs. In the AU system, these
regional structures are known as regional economic communities. SADC is the relevant
one for Namibia.
Within SADC, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland form what is known as
the Common Monetary Area, a form of currency and monetary union in which the South
African Rand is legal tender.
Also within SADC is the Kavango–Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area,

enjoining Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe to harmonise their
policies, strategies and practices to manage the shared natural resources straddling their
international borders and creating a super-transnational park. The first transfrontier park
in which Namibia was involved was the 2001 |Ai-|Ais–Richtersveld Transfrontier Park
with South Africa. For the purposes of this discussion, environmental protection is both
a legal and policy objective of the Republic of Namibia if regard is had to Article 95(l),
wherein the following is stated:
The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia,
policies aimed at the following: …
(l) maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of
Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit
of all Namibians, both present and future; in particular, the Government shall provide
measures against the dumping or recycling of foreign nuclear and toxic waste89 on
Namibian territory. [Footnote added]
The Atomic Energy and Radiation Protection Act, 2005 (No. 5 of 2005) underscores
this constitutional objective, yet beyond the national laws, there are international
instruments that have a bearing on all matters uranium. Notably, however, the Safeguards
Agreement,90 entered into between Namibia and the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, plays a crucial role in determining activities in this sector.
89 Whilst this political position may have been noble in 1990, it is since being discussed as a
viable commercial activity. The recycling of nuclear waste seems to be possible, if not to be
encouraged. The following was posted on the World Wide Web: “Nuclear waste is recyclable.
Once Uranium fuel is used in a reactor, it can be treated and put into another reactor as fuel. This
cycle can be repeated several times. Once all the energy is finally extracted from the fuel, the
waste that is left over decays to harmlessness within a few hundred years, rather than a million
years as with standard nuclear waste”; see http://www.whatisnuclear.com/articles/recycling.
html; last accessed 4 July 2012.
90 The agreement was signed in Vienna on 19 March 1998.
336
The mention of weapons bears on the subject of defence, armed conflicts and
peacekeeping. Beginning with peacekeeping, Namibia has participated in UN missions
in Angola (United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, UNAVEM III), Cambodia
(United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC), East Timor (United
Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UNMISET), Sierra Leone (United Nations
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, UNOMSIL), and Sudan91 (United Nations Hybrid
Operation in Darfur, UNAMID). In so doing, Namibia can be said to have acted in terms
of Article 2(5) of the UN Charter by giving assistance to the UN.
Within the SADC Region, Namibia – along with Angola and Zimbabwe – intervened in
the insurrection in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which seems to have
had support from some of the neighbouring states to the DRC. Angola was obviously
interested in the stability of its neighbour, whilst Namibia worried about the continued
political stability of its own neighbour, Angola. The relative peace and tranquillity in
Namibia misleads the visitor into not thinking of the terror instilled by UNITA elements
to the residents of the borderline areas of Namibia with Angola. Therefore, the conduct
of the trio – Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe – can be said to conform to Article 5(1)
(c) of the SADC Treaty (as amended). Both the international and regional peacekeeping
interventions were also in conformity with section 32(2) of the Defence Act, 2002 (No.
1 of 2002).
Conclusion
Whether acting as an individual state or in concert with other states, Namibia is bound
to abide by the relevant rules of international law as binding on her. There is a definite
link between the interaction of Namibia in the international sphere and the attainment
of her political, trade or economic interests. The strand that links the two, i.e. the action/
interaction internationally with the objects underlying such action/interaction, is the law:
international or national. As a constitutional democracy, Namibia’s actions internationally
ought to be justifiable in law.
But what happens when a citizen is of the view that Namibia has breached its national
or international law obligation by act or omission? This discussion was broached by the
South African courts in the cases of Samuel Kaunda & Others v The President of the
Republic of South Africa & Others, The Government of the Republic of South Africa
& Others v Crawford Lindsay von Abo and Republic of Zimbabwe v Sheriff Wynberg
North & Others, wherein it was held that “the exercise of all public power is subject to
constitutional control”.92 Arguably, “persons aggrieved”93 may have to come before courts
91 Being jointly conducted with the AU.

92 See Samuel Kaunda and Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others,
Case CCT 23/04 decided on August 4, 2004 in a judgment written by Chaskalson CJ at
paragraph 78 on page 36.
93 See Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution on Administrative Justice which states that
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Sacky Shanghala
to compel the President and/or the Minister of Foreign Affairs to cut off diplomatic ties
with an international actor found to have violated human rights.94 What an interesting
judicial excursion that will be!
It is important that Namibia and South Africa resolve the Helgoland predicament
concerning the !Garib/Orange River. This matter impacts the territorial sovereignty of
the Republic of Namibia recorded under Article 1(4) of the Namibian Constitution, an
important aspect to her interactions internationally as she exercises jurisdiction over
its natural resources as contemplated under Article 10095 therein. If the Governments
of South Africa and Namibia are unable to or do not solve this matter soon, then it
is difficult to perceive better conditions for a basis to set aside colonial agreements.
Hopefully, the two countries will adopt the thalweg96 as a principle in the resolution of
this matter.
Indeed, state action must be sound in law, domestically and internationally. The interests
of socio-political considerations will always interact with the obligation of legality.
Sometimes, this interaction may be manifested in a multilateral setting, such as the AU
situation with the International Criminal Court, or with SADC in relation to the SADC
Tribunal. At other times, such interaction may simply manifest itself bilaterally, as in
the case when Namibia participated in the DRC military campaign, although SADC
eventually sanctioned the intervention. However, the principle of legality persists.
Namibia is a country founded partly by international solidarity; by and large, the foreign
policy pronouncements of Namibia’s leaders have mirrored this historical foundation.97
Namibia’s continued position on the situation in Palestine comes to mind. Article 96
succinctly summarises the basis of Namibia’s international relations:
• Non-alignment
• International cooperation, peace and security
• Just and mutually beneficial relations among nations
“Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act fairly and reasonably and comply
with the requirements imposed upon such bodies and officials by common law and any relevant
legislation, and persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have the right
to seek redress before a competent Court or Tribunal”.
94 For instance, and really with a view to provoke deeper thinking on the theme of human rights,
the SADC Tribunal, and State conduct in relation thereto: should Namibia treat Zimbabwe any
differently, given the SADC Tribunal decision in the matter of Campbell?
95 The said Article 100 of the Namibian Constitution provides as follows: “Land, water and natural
resources below and above the surface of the land and in the continental shelf and within the
territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of Namibia shall belong to the State if they
are not otherwise lawfully owned”.
96 The deepest continuous inline within a valley or watercourse system; see http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Thalweg, last accessed 25 September 2013.
97 It may be interesting to have conflicting public statements from Cabinet Members on matters
affecting foreign policy, and to see how that may define the stance of Namibia.
338
• Respect for international law and treaty obligations, and

• Peaceful settlement of international disputes.
These five principles for international relations may tend towards defining Namibia as a
pacifist state; yet, as discussed above, it is clear that Namibia can act militarily. Having
emerged from a war itself, it is encouraging to note that Namibia, despite the size of her
population and economy, continues to contribute to international peacekeeping missions.
Since Namibia is a monist country, one wonders whether the newly minted Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) principle will be “binding upon Namibia”.98 It seems that the discussion
is yet to be concluded on this issue; however, what is conclusively known is that politics
and law will continue to define Namibia’s foreign relations (and that of many other
countries) for as long as Addis Ababa, Gaborone, Geneva, New York and Vienna continue
to churn out AU-, SADC- and UN-related legal instruments, and politics remain what
they are.99 Nonetheless, whilst Namibia signs these many international agreements, their
implementation is difficult to track, as there seems to be no central electronic and hard-
copy database accessible to the government or the public to assess and interrogate the
text of such international agreements from time to time. This certainly resonates in a
world where access to information is being made a right under law. Deeper examination
and better preparedness for Namibia’s engagement in international forums may very
well produce the exercise of Namibia’s right to enter into reservations – something that
has not yet come to the fore; and if it has, as indicated above, it will be difficult to
determine without a centralised database.
Lastly, civil society organisations, private enterprises and the citizenry are key barometers
when it comes to ensuring that foreign policy indeed serves the interests of their social,
trade and economic objectives. With a foreign policy constitutionally tied to law, these
entities have the right to take part in the national discussion to shape foreign policy, and
more of this discussion should be encouraged.
Postscript
Still, it should be remembered that “No man is an island, No man stands alone”.100
98 Quite interestingly, a former German Bundestag member posed an interesting query in

conversation recently: while Namibia’s position on the R2P is not clear, can it be assumed that
Namibia will overlook matters of sovereignty and non-interference if a body such as the AU,
SADC or UN sanction action is premised on the R2P? In this case, how does that distinguish
the intervention in the DRC of the late 1990s?
99 The time has come for Namibia to post lawyers at these missions so as to facilitate Namibia’s
interaction internationally at the AU, SADC and UN. Lasswell (1948, cited in William
2008:566) defines politics as “who gets what, when, and how”.
100 Line based on prose and later a poem by John Donne from Meditation XVII.
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Sacky Shanghala
Tendencies towards reclusion by individuals cannot be transplanted to foreign policy

for a country that came about as a result of solidarity around the world. Also, Namibia
should become more activist in the region – not the other way around. The relative101
peace and stability Namibia has enjoyed for over two decades since Independence may
have bred amnesia on the part of the older generation. Also, a young generation born
free of political oppression may engage in escapism with respect to problems being
experienced in another African country, as they may feel unaffected by that problem. Yet,
as long as Namibia remains a member of the international community, it will be affected
directly or indirectly by action or inaction on its part or on the part of the international
community in relation to any event occurring in any region or country calling into play
the law in the interactions of international actors.
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101 The adjective is a necessary inclusion for the purposes of including the Caprivi secessionist
attacks of August of 2000 and the UNITA incursions; otherwise, Namibia is a stable, peaceful,
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340
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342
The parliamentary dimension of Namibia’s
foreign relations*
Nora Schimming-Chase**
Introduction
This discussion opens with an investigation of the roles defined for Parliament under
the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia and the White Paper on Foreign Policy,
Defence and Security. The remainder of the article offers an insight into Parliament’s
oversight function in respect of foreign relations, namely by way of explaining the role
of the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, Defence and Security. It will then
analyse Parliament’s legislative role by illustrating how international agreements are
ratified. This will be followed by an outline of Parliament’s role and function in regional,
continental and international parliamentary bodies, and an outline of policy statements
by Parliament on current issues and crises. Next up is a discussion of former Foreign
Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab’s specific role as former President of the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly and of the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU). As a parting shot,
the article looks at whether Parliament indeed plays its designated role, and at whether
that role merely looks good on paper but is in effect negligible.
Parliament’s constitutional and political role in Namibia’s foreign

relations
Role definitions in the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia
In Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 1 states the following:
The Republic of Namibia is hereby established as a sovereign, secular, democratic and

unitary State founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice
for all.
Article 3 declares that –
[t]he main organs of the State shall be the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.
* The author would like to thank Mr Nico Beckert for his research assistance.
** Nora Schimming-Chase, now semi-retired, served as a Member of Parliament in Namibia and
as Namibian Ambassador to Germany.
343
This division of powers among the three organs of state forms the foundation of our
democracy, and the Constitution stipulates clearly what the role of these organs is. Thus,
any discussion of the role of the legislature – Parliament – must of necessity be based
on its constitutional role. Apart from its role as the principal legislative authority in and
over Namibia, exercising its oversight function over the executive and having the power
to make and repeal laws, in a democratic state, Parliament should have input in the
formulation of foreign policy, according to Article 63 of the Constitution.
For the purposes of this paper, Article 63 – specifically Sub-Article (2)(d), (e) and (f) –
forms the basis of Parliament’s legislative role with regard to foreign and international
relations. The Article in question reads as follows:
(2) The National Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject to this
Constitution: …
(d) to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such international
agreements as may have been entered into prior to Independence by
administrations within Namibia in which the majority of the Namibian
people have historically not enjoyed democratic representation and
participation;
(e) to agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which
have been negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32(3)(e) hereof;
(f) to receive reports on the activities of the Executive, ... .
Furthermore, Article 144 of the Constitution contributes to Parliament’s powers in regard

to its legislative role in foreign relations, namely the issue of ratifying international
agreements.1 Article 144 reads as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules
of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under
this Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.
On the other hand, as regards the execution of Parliament’s oversight function, it has a
number of options with regard to the conduct of foreign relations:
• During the debate on the Appropriations Bill, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
can be questioned by all Members of Parliament (MPs) when his/her budget is
being motivated. The Minister, as the steward of monies allocated to the Finance
Ministry, is obliged to account for the way in which funds were expropriated in
a prior financial year, and to inform the House how monies are to be expended
during the next financial year. Members can make use of this opportunity to
question the Minister in respect of international agreements, membership of
international organisations, and the way in which Namibia’s foreign missions
represent the country.
1 For a detailed analysis, see the chapter herein by Sacky Shanghala on international agreements.
344
The parliamentary dimension of Namibia’s foreign relations
• One can ask questions in the House on any matter relevant to the Ministry.
• One can bring motions on any topic with regard to foreign policy.
• One can debate ministerial statements.
• One can introduce legislation through a private members’ bill, and/or
• One can debate any White Paper on Foreign Policy.
Role definitions in the White Paper on Namibia’s Foreign Policy and

Diplomacy Management
When one researches Parliament’s constitutional and political role in Namibia’s foreign
relations, another important document to consult is the White Paper on Namibia’s
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy Management, published in March 2004. The White Paper
highlights the objectives and procedures of the country’s foreign policy.
In its foreword, the policy document highlights that all three branches of government –
the executive, legislature and judiciary – play a role in contributing to Namibia’s foreign
policy. Parliament’s legislative role allows it to function as a forum for –2
… political and legislative intercourse among parliamentarians and political parties … [where]
ideas, questions and answers [are generated and] debate on pertinent issues about world affairs
[takes place], thus enriching the process of foreign policy formulation.
The White Paper further states that such debate strengthens the quality of Namibia’s
foreign policy by building interstate institutions and venting discussion on the ratification
of international agreements.
In addition, the policy document highlights that the sphere of foreign relations needs
to remain “in tune with the aspiration of the nation [and] ... the demands expectations,
anxieties and resourcefulness of the people”3 are to be considered. Thus, one might
conclude that Parliament, as the nexus between the people and the government, and
as the principal representative of the people, is a key player when it comes to defining
foreign policy.
The White Paper also makes general reference to parliamentary foreign affairs
committees, which can influence the making of foreign policy in a meaningful way.4
2 Republic of Namibia (2004:iii).

3 (ibid.).
4 See below for more on the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Security.
345
Regarding Parliament’s oversight function, the White Paper simply states that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs routinely informs Parliament of developments abroad that
affect the country.5
The policy document concludes that, –6
… these days, parliamentarians are extensively involved in international affairs and are thus
duty bound to make their contribution to the projection of good images for their countries.
For this reason, MPs might use international forums to articulate the country’s interests
and to engage in international debates.
All in all, the White Paper does not specify what the National Assembly is tasked with
when it comes to Namibia’s foreign relations, although the reader will get an idea of its
general orientation towards Parliament’s role therein.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Defence and Security
Parliament exercises its option to conduct an oversight function through Parliamentary
Standing Committees, which in fact execute most parliamentary work. With regard to
foreign policy, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security7 has
the right, in terms of its mandate, to involve itself in all discussions of foreign policy
matters. However, the majority of back-benchers and all office-bearers serving on this
Committee are members of the ruling SWAPO Party of Namibia. As is the case with the
House in general, the ruling party members of the Committee have absolutely no interest
in drafting foreign policy, but rather see themselves as unconditionally supporting
whatever policy the executive may decide on. For example, although the Committee
has the right to be informed of selections being made for Heads of Diplomatic Missions
and is entitled to make suggestions in that regard as well, these specific procedures have
not been followed to date because doing so is deemed as being tantamount to interfering
with the powers of the Head of State to make such appointments.
Parliamentary Standing Committees reflect the same ratio of party representation

as that in the House. In other words, SWAPO Party members make up two thirds of
the membership, and invariably the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of such
Committees are elected from within their own ranks. Such positions are decided by
the Party Caucus and serve the political interests of the ruling party: the selections are

6 (ibid.:15).
7 Five of its six members belong to the SWAPO Party of Namibia; cf. Parliament of Namibia
[n.d.].
346
not based on a candidate’s qualifications, experience, or ability. It goes without saying

that this has a serious impact on the Committee’s work. SWAPO party members argue
that such representation is a reflection of the will of the electorate, and elections are
democratic. However, this line of reasoning does not hold if the ultimate goal of the
Committee is for Parliament to exercise its oversight function. With things as they stand,
such attitudes play a crucial role in making Parliament impotent.
From time to time, the Committee receives and reciprocates visits to its sister committees
from countries with whom Namibia enjoys excellent bilateral relations. However, such
visits are more of a familiarisation with another country’s policies and procedures than
an opportunity to deal with foreign relations issues. Nonetheless, it does happen that
a visiting delegation will raise a matter of concern to them; at such times, opposition
members have criticised government policy. One glaring example of the conflict
between ruling and opposition parties is on the issue of Namibia’s foreign relations with
Zimbabwe. Members disagree particularly on the question of Zimbabwe’s elections;
but whatever position the opposition parties may hold, it is overruled. For example, a
Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC–PF) Observer
Mission report opined that Zimbabwe’s elections in 2000 did not conform with the
Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region agreed to by all SADC leaders.8
The report was hailed internationally as one of the most objective. Namibian MPs were
part of that delegation. However, once the SWAPO Party members of the SADC–PF
delegation had returned from Zimbabwe, they supported the position of the SWAPO
Party at home to the effect that the elections were free and fair. Fortunately, history has
absolved the Forum delegation because the report was proof of electoral fraud – even in
subsequent elections in Zimbabwe.
This raises the question as to whether Namibia is a democracy or a one-party state through
democratic elections. This issue is often reflected in the work of Parliamentary Standing
Committees in general, when opposition party representatives differ with their ruling
party counterparts on such Committees. The SWAPO Party’s position is that it is the
President’s constitutional right to appoint an executive of any size. Opposition parties,
however, maintain that such power is subject to the demands of the Constitution. In other
words, in a democracy, the executive should not be put in a position where it is larger
than the legislature and, therefore, exercises oversight over itself. Indeed, for this reason,
members of Cabinet are not allowed to serve on Parliamentary Standing Committees.
This was a mechanism devised in order to facilitate and guarantee oversight, but it has
failed in practice because of the unwillingness of back-benchers to ‘oversee’ Ministers
whom they regard and constantly refer to as their ‘senior leaders’.
As a result, the major thrust of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Security’s work is to pay regular visits to Namibia’s missions abroad, especially
8 SADC–PF [Date unknown].
347
those that are deemed to be ‘hardship’ missions, and to present reports to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Such reports mostly have to do with conditions of service at the
missions, and how to improve the lot of diplomatic staff. Such occasions are also the
only time the Committee makes use of its power to summon the Foreign Affairs Minister
and staff to appear before it.
The practice of paying study and in situ visits to parliaments abroad, and receiving such
visits from others in return, has contributed greatly to broadening Standing Committee
members’ insight into parliamentary policy and procedure. In addition, the constant
problem of being unable to form a quorum in the House applies – and should be a
matter of concern – to all members of the House. However, although Parliament has
the power to change the rules on quorums in order to facilitate its work, after more
than two decades after Independence no concrete steps have been taken in this respect.
Namibia could, for example, take a leaf from Sweden’s book. There, when a Minister
had to answer questions, only s/he, the parliamentary speaker and the relevant minister
are needed for decisions that allow work to proceed. Another fine example to emulate
is presented by the Ghanaian Parliament, where a special day is set aside for all MPs to
put questions to ministers, and all MPs are entitled to ask further questions. In Namibia’s
Parliament, a minister only has to answer questions put by a specific MP, and only that
MP is permitted to ask any additional questions. Indeed, when Standing Committee have
reported back on their return from such visits, they have – irrespective of their political
affiliation – often tried to share their experiences in the House in the hope of introducing
more democratic practices, but to no avail. Their recommendations are usually not even
debated.
Parliament’s engagement with international parliamentary bodies

Since globalisation affects not only economic but also political actors, and since one
cannot nowadays clearly distinguish between national and international topics, the last
few years have shown that there is a serious democratic deficit in foreign relations in
general and among international organisations in particular. The UN articulates this fact
very intelligibly:9
Concerning democracy, a clear paradox is emerging: while the substance of politics is fast
globalizing (in the areas of trade, economics, environment, pandemics, terrorism, etc.), the
process of politics is not; its principal institutions (elections, political parties and parliaments)
remain firmly rooted at the national or local level.
For example, international agreements on human rights, trade and other topics concerning
and influencing the national level are passed “through the House (of Parliament) instead
9 Note by the Secretary-General at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly;
cited in Beetham (2006:157); cf. also Karuuombe (2008:241).
348
of being passed by the House”,10 as Karuuombe descriptively writes. Since Parliament

is the embodiment of participatory democracy and the sole institution which represents
the electorate, it is highly qualified to dismantle the democratic deficit and oversee the
actions of heads of state at the international level. Furthermore, on the international
level, parliaments are able to gain information and experience on recent developments
and best practices, and can in turn exchange these with others.11
Karuuombe outlines a number of functions parliaments can perform with respect to

foreign relations. He mentions their “legislative and democratic oversight function” first,12
followed by the function of domesticating, implementing, conducting national planning
for, and popularising international agreements, thereby accelerating regional integration,
for example.13 Also, national parliaments are (theoretically) able to give feedback to and
from the electorate.14 Focussing on the SADC–PF, he also notes that parliamentarians are
part of highly acknowledged SADC election observations.15 Furthermore, he illustrates
that the SADC–PF offers MPs a platform to deliberatively contribute to the development
and integration of southern Africa.16
All in all, parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs theoretically has the possibility to
increase a state’s accountability and transparency at international level.
The following section presents a discussion of the extent to which the Namibian
Parliament is involved in international parliamentary bodies like the SADC–PF, the
Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the African–
Caribbean–Pacific and European Union Joint Parliamentary Alliance (ACP–EU JPA).
The SADC Parliamentary Forum
The late Dr Mosé Tjitendero was one of the most active members of the SADC–PF,
serving on its Executive Committee and being instrumental in convincing the Namibian
Government to provide the facilities for its headquarters in Windhoek as well as offering
material and moral support to the Forum and its Parliamentary Leadership Centre. He
remained one of the most respected, active and analytical Speakers in the organisation.17
10 Karuuombe (2008:222).
11 (ibid.:235).
12 (ibid.:223).
13 (ibid.:223, 228).
14 (ibid.:233).
15 (ibid.:235).
16 (ibid.:234).
17 The gratitude of SADC–PF member states and individuals was visible not only by their
attendance at his funeral, but also by the fact that any delegation attending a SADC–PF meeting,
workshop or conference always first requested a visit to his grave to show their respect.
349
Namibia hosted the historic summit that transformed the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) in 1992. Namibia also hosted the conference which established the SADC–PF,
despite limited resources at its disposal. These successes show that Namibia’s foreign
policy supports international efforts to strengthen the role of parliamentary institutions
in respect of their contribution to democracy.
The five MPs delegated to serve on the SADC–PF also played a very significant role
in policy formulation and execution within that organisation. The author of this article
held the position of Vice-Chairperson for two years, also participating in the drafting
of the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, which are now used by
the African Union as well as SADC. Other members of the SADC–PF have also served
on the various Parliamentary Standing Committees, and have held leadership positions
from time to time.
A major commitment which received extensive support not only from the members of the
SADC–PF, but also from Namibia’s current President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, was the
SADC–PF’s transformation into a regional parliament, similar to that of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for West Africa and the East African
Legislative Assembly (EALA) for East Africa. Even if the examples of ECOWAS and
EALA show that there is still a long way for them to go before they become fully fledged
parliamentary bodies that are able to exert their oversight and legislative functions,18 it
would be a good start for the SADC–PF to become a regional parliament. Unfortunately,
this transformation has not succeeded as yet and the SADC–PF remains a “parliamentary
deliberative body without legislative powers”.19
In his welcoming remarks on the occasion of the official opening of the 28th SADC–
PF Plenary Assembly, Namibia’s current Speaker in Parliament, Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab,
stated the following:20
It is our view that the SADC Parliamentary Forum has distinguished itself in promoting the
regional parliamentary work over recent years and the time has come for us to be transformed
into a fully-fledged regional parliament. …
Our deliberation at this Assembly must serve as a catalyst in our quest for the establishment of
a SADC Parliament. We must therefore move forward with determination, commitment and a
sense of urgency to realize this worthy vision, whereby SADC–PF will become the institution
that will monitor, scrutinize and evaluate the impact of SADC programmes and its institutions
in our region. …
18 (ibid.:229, 230).
19 (ibid.:229).
20 Gurirab (2010:4).
350
In our efforts to become a regional parliament it is imperative that we continue to promote

alliances with regional, continental and international institutions. In particular I would
like to emphasize the need for closer networking with the SADC Secretariat and the
Pan[-]African Parliament.
These statements and commitments – also at the level of the International Parliamentary
Union – with regard to enhancing the role of parliament are indicative of Namibia’s
decision-makers’ resolve with respect to the role parliaments have to play in a democracy.
However, the issue of establishing a SADC Parliament was not on the agenda of the 30th
SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Windhoek in August 2010.
Indeed, the resolution of its plenary to consider including the matter on the agenda for
the next summit prompts the conclusion that the necessary political will to finalise the
matter is still not there – despite lobbying efforts by the Presidents of Namibia and
Malawi.
SADC–PF plays a very significant part in the training of new MPs by way of workshops
and by sending delegations to other SADC countries to participate in discussing issues
like HIV and AIDS, gender, and peacemaking and peacekeeping. Members are also
involved in election observer missions to all countries in the region. Some of these
missions, especially the one to the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe, have raised international
recognition for the SADC–PF. In this instance, unlike most of the other continental and
international observer missions, the SADC–PF was the only one to declare that the
elections had not conformed with the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC
Region drawn up by the SADC–PF and endorsed by SADC.
The SADC–PF was established with the aim of forging common economic, political and
social values for the region as a whole. The body faces difficulties in implementing its
protocols due to a lack of commitment by member countries. For example, the SADC
Protocol on Gender and Development has not been ratified by some member states,
while others are simply ignoring the SADC–PF guidelines on elections. Even Namibia
does not fully adhere to these guidelines.21
Inter-parliamentary Union
Another international platform where Namibian MPs have played a very significant part
in drawing up foreign policy agreements was within the IPU. Once again, Namibia has
to thank the late Dr Tjitendero and Theo-Ben Gurirab, who were two of the IPU’s most
influential members. Tjitendero served on its Executive for more than four years and was
a candidate in the election for its President. He lost by a very narrow margin because
some delegates from Africa left before the vote was taken. In spite of the loss, Tjitendero
remained the most influential member of the organisation until his passing. Whenever
21 Cf. Tjirera ([forthcoming]:16).
351
there was a stalemate on any issue, especially when the position of the African Group
was crucial, he was the one called upon to mediate.
The Namibian delegation has also played and continues to play a significant part in the
reform of the IPU. Apart from the late Speaker, the Deputy Chairperson of the National
Council, Margreth Mensah-Williams, also served on the Executive Committee, the
Women’s Coordinating Committee, and as Vice-President of the IPU.
IPU Standing Committees deal with foreign affairs in the following areas:
• Sustainable development, finance and trade22
• Peace and security
• Finance, and
• Human rights.
Members of the Namibian delegation have served on all these committees as ordinary
members.
A major thrust of the work in the IPU is to support democracy. When there was a coup
d’état in Thailand, for example, the IPU’s membership was suspended and the conference
that was supposed to be held there was moved to Indonesia.
A considerable amount of work goes into looking after the human rights of detained MPs
as well. From the time that Namibia joined the IPU, it worked towards obtaining associate
membership of the UN – in which it succeeded five years ago. It is important to note that
topics for deliberation at IPU conferences are carefully chosen to correspond with major
items of deliberation at the UN General Assembly. In fact, UN Millennium Development
Goals 3 and 5 were proposed by the IPU at the time that Gurirab was President of the
General Assembly. It is worth noting that Namibia’s associate membership of the IPU at
the UN happened just before he took over the IPU Presidency.
Gurirab served as President of the UN General Assembly between September 1999 and
September 2000, as well as carrying out his national duties as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
He was renowned for his commitment to highlighting Africa. Although he stated that “it
is not parliaments but governments that make decisions”, he played a significant role
as President of the General Assembly, but also later as the IPU President, in respect of
enhancing the role of parliaments in democracies. He also kept the issue of UN Security
Council reform on its agenda.
The late Moses Katjiuongua also played a pioneering role at the IPU and was instrumental
in getting Namibia’s first Speaker elected onto its executive. Because of his extensive
knowledge of international politics as well as the contacts he had built with freedom
22 The author served on this Standing Committee for two terms as Vice-President.
352
fighters from the region, Katjiuongua played a significant part not only in deliberations
from the floor, but also in caucusing with his African and Asian colleagues on order to
find a common platform.
The IPU’s most notable success through its associate membership of the UN was to
ensure that MPs, as the democratically elected representatives of the people, were
granted a say in the UN – thus representing ruling as well as opposition parties.
The Namibian members of the IPU made it their duty to report matters relating to its
work not only to the House, but also, through regular press conferences, to the nation as
a whole.
The IPU has a National Group of Namibia to which parties appoint their representatives.
This is the platform from which decisions regarding participation at IPU meetings are
taken. These decisions would include time slots for regular IPU meetings. The National
Group also serves as a platform for discussing IPU delegations and budgets, and it
prepares regular reports to the IPU. Notably, this is the only National Group to have
elected a member of the opposition as its Vice-President.
The IPU holds two meetings per year. There is one in Geneva, which principally deals
with administrative issues; and then there is the deliberative Annual Assembly, which
is held in a member country. As stated previously herein, it is usual practice to choose
agenda topics in line with those on the UN agenda, and resolutions are passed in a similar
manner. The various IPU Standing Committees deliberate and submit proposals to the
Annual Assembly.
The Pan-African Parliament
At the PAP’s inception, it was decided that, contrary to its statutes, representatives would
not be elected by the peoples of the member states concerned; instead, they would be
appointed by their respective parliaments, according to the ratios of those parliaments,
for a specified term. As a result, the Namibian PAP delegation consists of four members
of the ruling party and one from the opposition. Thus, the ruling party is in effect over-
represented: the SWAPO Party constitutes 80% of the delegation’s membership, despite
it not holding an 80% majority in the House.
Namibia’s foreign policy is based on whatever position the executives of African Union
member states adopt on any foreign policy issue. Predictably, the members of the
Namibian delegation take a view which does not contradict their government’s position
on such issues.
After ten years of PAP’s existence, there has still been no election of its members. In
other words, the members serving on PAP simply continue to be appointed by their
353
respective parliaments. Also, the fact that its members have not been elected may be
one of the reasons why PAP is still a consultative body with no legislative power on the
continent.
According to an interview with Dr Peter Katjavivi, Governing Party Chief Whip and
leader of the Namibian delegation to PAP, Namibia considers PAP as an instrument for
enhancing unity on the continent, in the same vein as the first Pan-African Congress had
done in Paris in 1919. Katjavivi also stated that Namibia saw PAP as a major factor in
promoting parliamentary democracy.
Furthermore, Katjavivi reported on the latest motion brought to PAP by the Namibian
delegation: it proposed a resolution on what he termed “the current crisis” in Libya. The
resolution was adopted and –23
… formed part of the initiative taken by the African Union through the president of South
Africa when he visited Libya recently.
This resolution criticised the action taken by the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to assist the rebels, and pushed for dialogue between the Libyan
actors in order to preserve the country’s national sovereignty. In the interview, Katjavivi
also stated that “Africa should not be involved into [sic] change of government by
force”.24 This shows that Namibian foreign policy tends to adhere to the traditional
notions of state sovereignty and non-interference rather than to the modern notions of
human rights and human security.25
The ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
The ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) is an institution made up of

parliamentarians of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and those of the
European Union (EU). The JPA originates from the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000
by 78 ACP states26 and the states of the EU, and it contains the ACP–EU strategy for
poverty eradication and development and trade issues, such as the incorporation of ACP
states into the world economy.27 According to an interview with the former Namibian
MP Johan de Waal, the JPA concentrates on economic aspects and is a more theme-based
parliament.28 He also stated that two thirds of the members of the Namibian delegation to
the JPA are members of the ruling party, while one third are from the opposition.
23 Radio interview with Peter Katjavivi, Windhoek, Namibia, 1 June 2011.

24 (ibid.).
25 See elsewhere in this volume for the article on Namibia and the AU.
26 Cuba is the only state which has not signed the Agreement.
27 Cf. ACP–EU JPA (2006). See also elsewhere in this volume for the article on Economic
Partnership Agreements.
28 Cf. Hanson & Julian (2008).
354
Since the Cotonou Agreement contributed considerably to the developmental aid

Namibia received, the ACP–EU partnership is of great value to the country. But what
role could Namibia’s Parliament play in the ACP–EU JPA?
De Waal illustrated that the ACP–EU JPA was a valuable platform for lobbying,
networking and discussion, and it could influence EU MPs. For example, at this forum it
was possible to promote Namibia in terms of tourism.
However, when it came to exercising the JPA’s oversight function, major flaws hindered
the delegations from doing so. De Waal stated that there was much room for improvement
in terms of informing the delegations to and preparing them for ACP–EU JPA meetings:
they needed to know about topical issues. Also, because two thirds of the delegation
were members of the ruling party, when it came to voting, the delegation usually voted
in line with government policies. In De Waal’s view, this showed that the delegations
did not comply with the role parliaments ought to play on this international stage. De
Waal concludes that Parliament did not play a big role “on foreign relations as such”,
and that it did not “give an input in the making of our [Namibian] foreign policy”.29
Asked about the most important topic the ACP–EU was concerned with, namely the
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), De Waal could only state that they had been
discussed in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Economics, Natural Resources
and Public Administration, but could not give a statement on whether or how they had
been discussed in the JPA.
Another source highlights that EPAs have been a very important issue in JPA talks.30
A newspaper article about a JPA resolution safeguarding Namibia’s interests confirms
this,31 and indicates the strength of the Namibian delegation. De Waal also concludes
that the Namibian Parliament’s influence in the ACP–EU structure is mostly in terms of
bilateral issues, not foreign affairs.
In another article, Tjirera concludes that –32
… most of the decisions taken in these organisations [PAP, SADC–PF, IPU, ACP–EU JPA] are
not binding, but [are] of advisory importance. In the case of Namibia, reports are compiled based
on the discussions in these forums but, in most cases, are only tabled for note[-]taking and not
for discussion. Due to the excessive dominance of the Namibian parliament by the executive it
is not likely for the Namibian delegation to these forums to take a position that contradicts the
country’s position. Thus the role of [the] Namibian Parliament, as an autonomous organ of the
state, in international relations is very limited.
29 Interview with Johan de Waal, Windhoek, 17 May 2011.

30 See Hanson & Julian (2008).
31 See Duddy (2009).
32 Tjirera ([forthcoming]:16).
355
Despite some shortcomings, through their membership of international parliamentary

bodies, MPs have managed to play a very significant role in the SADC region, on the
continent and internationally. This was possible mainly because Namibian MPs always
presented a united front when issues were discussed. Whilst they would disagree at
home, such disagreements were set aside abroad and colleagues supported each other –
especially when it came to having Namibian delegates elected to serve on the governing
bodies of international parliamentary organisations based on their ability, rather than
their party affiliation.33
International agreements
The Namibian Constitution states the following in Article 144 under Chapter 21:34
Unless otherwise provided for by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules
of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia.
Thus, the Constitution opens up a space for international law to be incorporated into
Namibian municipal law, and provides for a strong role for Parliament. Article 63(2)(e)
of the Constitution strengthens this role of Parliament as follows:
The National Assembly shall further have the power and function, subject to this Constitution: …
(e) to agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements which have been
negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32(3)(e) hereof; … .
In his research into the incorporation of international law into Namibian law, Onkemetse
Tshosa emphasises the role of Parliament as last resort, and states that Article 144
does not harm the “sovereign power of the Namibian legislative authority to transform
treaties”.35 With reference to the Constitution, he adds that it is absolutely possible for
Parliament to democratically control and oversee “the nation’s conduct of its foreign
relations”.36 He concludes that Article 144 does not interfere with Parliament’s power to
decide on international law and international agreements.
But what does this look like in practice? How does Namibia’s National Assembly
actually comply with its constitutional role as legislator when it comes to international
agreements?
33 Compare, for example, the following section on the role of the current Speaker of Parliament,
Theo-Ben Gurirab.
34 For an appraisal of Article 144, see Dausab (2010).
35 Tshosa (2010:20).
36 (ibid.:21).
356
Unfortunately, there are many flaws which prevent Parliament from complying with this
role. International agreements are often not presented to the National Assembly until the
very day they are supposed to be ratified. Cabinet Ministers decide whether and when
to bring a treaty or other document to Parliament for ratification. MPs often do not have
a chance to see the document until the day before such ratification. Once the agreement
has been ratified, there is no follow-up process to domesticate the law, i.e. to review and
amend national law in accordance with such agreement. De Waal and Katjavivi also
confirmed that MPs were often ill-prepared and seldom proactive; that Parliament did
not take control of the ratification process; and that a flawed implementation process had
led to a lack of implementation.37
Policy statements by the National Assembly on current

international issues, crises and conflicts
The National Assembly very rarely makes policy statements on current international
issues, crises and conflicts. In most cases, a Minister will make a ministerial statement in
the House, but it is almost never debated, the Minister cannot be extensively questioned.
Thus, not only are divergent views not articulated, they are also never incorporated – not
even when Namibia is directly involved in international conflicts, such as the wars in
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even though the Constitution makes
provision for such participation by Parliament, it is not involved in the decision-making
process. Indeed, it was a direct order from the Head of State, Sam Nujoma, to intervene
in the latter conflicts: Parliament’s role was reduced to legitimising and justifying a
decision that had already been made.38 There can be no clearer indication of what role
the ruling party is prepared to allow the opposition to play.
When researching the parliamentary dimension of foreign relations, one also has to focus
on the life of Theo-Ben Gurirab, who has been an important figure in Namibian foreign
policy. Besides being an MP and Namibia’s current Parliamentary Speaker, he served as
President of the UN General Assembly between September 1999 and September 2000,
and as President of the IPU from 2008 to 2012.39
When he was elected President of the UN General Assembly – “the world’s greatest
parliament”,40 as he called it – he was highly praised by other diplomats. It was said that
37 Interview with Johan de Waal, Windhoek, 17 May 2011; radio interview with Peter Katjavivi,
Windhoek, Namibia, 1 June 2011.
38 Cf. Melber (2006:8).
39 IPU ([n.d.]a).
40 Government News (1999a); available at http://www.gov-news.org/gov/un/news/my_mind_
heart_devotion_always_close_un_charter/1085.html; last accessed 4 October 2011. Compare
his statement on the General Assembly: “Because of its transparency and representative
character -- it is the most deliberative policy-making organ in the United Nations -- its authority
357
he would ensure the UN did not forget Africa because he saw the continent “as a global
issue and how global issues impact on Africa”.41 Gurirab was also described as “the
right man at the right time”, who brought great advantage to the job when the UN faced
enormous challenges entering the new millennium.42
Despite declaring that “it is not parliaments but governments that make decisions”,43 he
tried his best as President of the General Assembly to keep the issue of reforming the UN
Security Council on the UN’s agenda.44 He stated that –45
… it was high time for Member States, particularly those from the developing countries,
to redress the persistent attacks on and marginalization of the foremost organ of the United
Nations.
Theo-Ben Gurirab also submitted a Draft Resolution containing a proposal for the UN
Millennium Declaration.46 The Declaration was presented to the UN Millennium Summit
held from 6 to 8 September 2000, and was later adopted by the General Assembly. This
Declaration is the key document on which the Millennium Development Goals are
based. He also ensured that the Declaration included a reference of the important role of
parliaments.47
Gurirab called for “globalization with a head, a heart and a human face”, meaning –48
… [developing world] debt cancellation, productive investment, measures to discourage
financial speculation, and firm action to end the tariff and non-tariff barriers that are still
imposed lopsidedly against developing countries that can least afford them.
As President of the IPU, he pronounced that he was not serving as a Namibian, but as
a world representative.49 With this he meant his agenda was not focussed on Namibian
issues only, but on global issues relevant to all parliaments. He also stated that –50
and integrity must be reinforced. It is here, in the General Assembly, where all the nations, big
and small, rich and poor, are represented, that democracy really comes alive. It happens nowhere
else. ... and the mandate of the General Assembly should be restored”; available at http://www.
gov-news.org/gov/un/news/transcript_press_conference_assembly_president/4670.html; last
accessed 4 October 2011.
41 Mwaura (1999).
42 (ibid.). It seems that he delivered on these high expectations. A reporter stated that he knew no
other General Assembly President that had spent so much time at the UN as Gurirab had; see
Government News (2000).
43 New Era (2008:8).
44 Government News (1999b).
45 UNIS (2000).
46 UN (2000).
47 Diplomacy Namibia (2010).
48 UN Forum (2000).
49 New Era (2008:8).
50 (ibid.).
358
Parliaments are not the first movers in a democracy. It is the government that has to do things
first. We [the IPU] will bring the attitude of an inspector of what governments do.
This statement highlights the importance of parliaments in terms of social issues. This
includes their oversight function with regard to the implementation of the Millennium
Development Goals, a task that was adopted by the IPU at its 115th Assembly in Geneva
in 2006.51 At another occasion, Gurirab highlighted the need to improve the accountability
of parliaments.52
Under his presidency, the IPU has provided capacity-building to meet MPs’ information
and knowledge needs, and has sent observers to several elections. The President has also
voiced the IPU’s concern about undemocratic transitions of power on several occasions.53
However, despite Gurirab having stated that he wanted to send election observers
through SADC regional arrangements,54 the IPU database only quotes positive SADC
and AU statements on the Namibian and other elections: even PAP’s critical assessment
is ignored.55 Indeed, after each election, opposition parties go to court to point out
irregularities; one such case is still in court.56
Gurirab was a vocal IPU President, speaking up about a number of regional conflicts
and global crises. For example, he made statements on the global financial crisis, on
Palestine, Zimbabwe, and, more recently, on Egypt and the Ivory Coast.
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that Gurirab represented the Namibian Parliament in

an outstanding way. Through his positions as President of the General Assembly and,
recently, the IPU, he was at least able to try to set the agendas of these institutions.
He definitely was and is a shining example of Namibian diplomacy and influence at
international level.
One also has to look at his domestic role within Parliament to see what he has done
to strengthen the parliamentary dimension of foreign relations. Gurirab has served
as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament. These
three very senior positions affect Parliament’s role. The Speaker has the power to allow
debate; s/he has the power to defend the right of any member in the House to participate
in the affairs of Parliament; and s/he has the power to control MPs’ behaviour. As Prime
Minister, Gurirab was first amongst equals: he had influence over the executive, especially
with regard to their performance in the House and the way they interacted with their
51 Gurirab (2008).
52 Diplomacy Namibia (2010).
53 Mingxin (2009).
54 New Era (2008:8).
55 IPU ([n.d.]b); Shejavali (2009).
56 Sasman (2011).
359
colleagues across the floor. As Foreign Minister, he was at the helm of Namibia’s foreign
relations. He was one of the few Ministers who treated members of the opposition with
respect. But it took years before a White Paper on Foreign Relations was tabled in the
House. He will, therefore, have to account to history – if not today – why Parliament has
absolutely no say in Namibia’s foreign policy. Most of the people interviewed for this
chapter are in agreement that this is indeed the case. In a recent newspaper interview,
for example, the Speaker seems to agree with this criticism by expressing concern about
Parliament’s powerlessness.
Conclusion
During the first five years of the first legislative period, the ruling party did not have a
two thirds majority in the House. As a result, the role of opposition parties in the House
was more significant.
However, after the ruling party had obtained a two thirds majority, the powers of the
legislature diminished. The executive now has the overall majority in the House and,
as such, is not only responsible for making laws, but also for controlling debates in the
House.
The backbenchers of the ruling party never disagree with the Ministers or their Deputies.
In terms of the Standing Rules and Orders of the House, time for debate is allocated
proportionally. As a result, especially during the second reading of a Bill when the
debate is more general, members of the opposition never have enough time to make
contributions.
Furthermore, because of the executive’s size, Ministers – who are responsible for
drafting and presenting Bills – end up talking more than the backbenchers and opposition
combined, and it is obvious that these parties hardly ever criticise each other; and even if
they do, when it comes to the vote, they never vote against a motion or even abstain. As
a result, laws are made that have to be amended on a regular basis.
All of this means that Parliament has very little influence on policymaking. When an MP
asks questions, it sometimes takes weeks – if not months – to receive an answer. Often,
there is no answer forthcoming at all; and if the answer is given, very often it is merely
referred to as the member wanting to score political points. It lies within the Minister’s
discretion as to whether to answer the question at all. A small number of Ministers take
the responsibility of accounting to the House very seriously and, after intensive research,
answer the questions put to them in a very respectful manner. However, the majority treat
the function of answering questions with impunity. It is very unfortunate that, in most
cases, by the time the question is answered, it is no longer relevant.
360
If an MP opts to put forth a motion, s/he will usually not even get a chance to complete
the motivation to do so before the motion is thrown out. It is not surprising, therefore,
that no MP has introduced a private members’ Bill on Foreign Relations.
As stated earlier, despite the right of the legislature to agree to ratify and/or accede
to international agreements, the status quo leaves much to be desired. Very often,
agreements are brought to the House for ratification, but it would be the first time that the
National Assembly had ever seen the agreements. In most cases, Parliament has no input
in the preliminary discussions that take place in respect of international agreements, so
when such agreements are brought to the House for ratification, it is not more than a
rubberstamping exercise. In any event, because of the majority of the executive in the
House, it has no power to deny ratification at any point. Members of the executive attend
international meetings or conferences where agreements are discussed and decided upon,
but there is no practice that obliges the Minister to report on the matter in Parliament in
a manner that would enable it to have an input before agreements are acceded to. In most
cases, when such agreements on foreign policy are made, Namibia’s position is dictated
by whatever SADC or the AU decides. Within SADC, various levels of decision-making
take place. First senior civil servants meet; they in turn advise their Ministers, who then
meet before the Heads of State and Government do. Policies are formulated at a Summit
of Heads of State and Government. When decisions are taken at international meetings,
therefore, all SADC – or, for that matter, AU – member states will vote according to such
decisions.
Thus, a critical assessment of the role of Namibia’s Parliament in the domain of foreign
affairs leads to the conclusion that, because of the majority of the executive in Parliament
and the reluctance of SWAPO Party backbenchers to criticise their Ministers, the role of
Parliament, with its very small opposition – though deemed very important as far as the
Constitution is concerned – is very limited in practice. As indicated herein, it depends
on the individual MPs to map out the role they can play in regional, continental and
international affairs. Experience has shown that the involvement of MPs in Namibia is
much more successful at regional, continental and international organisations because
the delegation is perceived as a unit and not as one divided according to party-political
membership. Members of such delegations are judged according to their ability and
potential with respect to how they can contribute to the organisation in question’s success.
It is common practice within international organisations for MPs to vie for leadership
positions in the executive as well as on committees. Naturally one’s contribution to
debates, motions or other activities within these organisations is noted by one’s peers,
and when vacancies occur, one is known. Very often, some horse-trading takes place as
well, and getting one’s continent’s support is vital. This was evident during Theo-Ben
Gurirab’s election to the IPU Presidency: SADC–PF chose him as its candidate for the
region, while PAP made him their candidate for the continent. From there, everyone
361
worked tirelessly to obtain the support of other geopolitical groups. Without that support,
he would have lost the election.
Because of the efforts by all its MPs, Namibia has gained respect and recognition in
international organisations, where comments have often been made that its representation
on decision-making structures belies the country’s smallness in terms of its population.
Because of Namibia’s MPs’ commitment to participate actively – irrespective of their
party-political affiliations – in the various regional, continental and international
parliamentary organisations, the country has managed to play a major role in discussions
and decisions relating to foreign policy.
This role is facilitated by the fact that, within these organisations, ruling parties scan the
political platform. Whereas one delegation may, because of its composition, follow a
very leftist/socialist line, another with a conservative ruling party may hold exactly the
opposite position. Furthermore, geopolitical groups within the UN–IPU may often have
a united approach to issues. Thus, international parliamentary organisations like these
are more representative of their electorates. Reforms that have taken place within the
UN–IPU relationship as well as those within the IPU itself have enabled parliaments to
be recognised as the elected representatives of their peoples – and as having the right to
participate in their own right and not through the executive alone.
One of the main reforms within the IPU that have become institutionalised is its Associate
Membership of the UN, which has enabled representation of all elected MPs and not just
the Cabinet. The introduction of a gender perspective – in terms of which delegations
had to include democratically elected MPs that included women in particular – allowed
delegations to be disqualified if there was no gender balance. Secondly, the suspension
of parliaments which were not democratically elected, the collapsing of the two annual
IPU meetings into one, the working session held in Geneva, and one deliberative session
held in a member country which offers to hold it, are all examples of reforms that have
been implemented.
Because of these reforms, it has become common practice for MPs – including
opposition MPs – to be included in official delegations from their respective countries.
This includes UN General Assembly sessions as well as all its committees. Moreover,
national delegations to international meetings also include MPs. In this way, Parliament
can be involved in discussion and decisions on foreign policy in deliberations that relate
to international agreements. This involvement has not yet become common practice in
Namibia, but times are changing. The latest demonstrations by citizens on the African
continent who demand the democratisation of their societies make it imperative for the
Namibian Government to practise what it preaches and implement what the Supreme Law
dictates, namely to provide space for Parliament to exercise its oversight and legislative
functions – not as an opposition or enemy, but as an integral part of a democratic system.
362
When this happens, the people of Namibia, through their elected representatives, will
truly own whatever foreign or other policies its government decides on.57
Ben Amathila, the previous leader of the Namibian delegation to PAP, even called for
greater participation by civil society in this continental parliament. Namibia has the
potential to play a much more significant role in international affairs if it were prepared
to use all its human resources at hand. Our Speaker was the President of the IPU; his
predecessor, the late Tjitendero, played a great role in SADC–PF as well as in the
IPU. Their election to various positions of leadership was successful because of their
delegations – and opposition MPs were their most active lobbyists. Namibia is being
sold short: it can only gain by maximising the potential of its MPs to influence foreign
policy and develop beneficial foreign relations with all its international partners. If one
looks at Namibia’s neighbours, or the continent, for that matter, people who have shared
the country’s common history – i.e. Namibia’s struggle comrades, many of whom are
academicians of international repute – hold very important positions in international
bodies. This is not because Namibia’s neighbours are better than us, but because they
support each other as citizens of the same country. For example, if one considers Namibia
was a child of the UN and held its presidency at one point, it is amazing that there are so
few Namibians within the UN system. If one visits UN offices, be it in Austria, Geneva
or New York, you will find even security staff from our sister countries. Where are the
Namibians?
After more than two decades of independence, Namibia needs to remove its “sole and
authentic”58 blinkers and don the cloak of “One Namibia, One Nation”.59 Fortunately,
all is not lost. Ambassador Eddie Amkongo, Chairperson of Namibia’s Public Service
Commission and a long-standing and faithful member of the SWAPO Party, recently
published an opinion piece titled “The paradox of the separation of power”.60 At last,
someone from within the ruling party has opened up a debate in which all should
participate. The following excerpt from his piece deserves quoting here:61
Two decades of our democratic exercise have shown that there are frictions due to either
deliberate [misinterpretation] if not application, regarding some articles of the Constitution, the
practice of which appears inconsistent with the principle of the separation of power. …
57 That being said, it is an open question whether Parliament really represents and is in touch
with its electorate – the people of Namibia. A report by the Institute for Public Policy Research
shows that 96% of respondents had not contacted a member of the National Assembly in 2008
(Parliament of Namibia 2009:9).
58 Reference to the UN’s recognition of SWAPO as being the only credible representatives of the
Namibian nation prior to Independence.
59 One of the official nation-building slogans.
60 Amkongo (2011).
61 (ibid.).
363
Parliamentarians, amongst whom are Cabinet ministers, not only debate it but also vote
it into law, because they are full-time members and, to make things ludicrous all Ministers
are frontbenchers who dominate the august House. Participation by ordinary MPs, including
opposition members of parliament, becomes a facade and oftentimes the debate is punctuated
with bashing, accusations and unnecessary interjections. …
Put into perspective, the Minister initiates, formulates, debates, votes into law and, finally, takes
back his/her finished product to the ministry to implement.
This is the best explanation why Parliament in Namibia has very little, if any, say
in foreign policy, and that is why a paper on the parliamentary dimension of foreign
relations will remain limited in scope. This underlines the absence of debate on key
international events and their impact on our domestic agenda as well as our positioning
as one of the brighter spots on the African continent
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undemocracy.com/A-54-L.89.pdf; last accessed 13 June 2011.
UNIS/United Nations Information Service. 2000. “General Assembly, bringing down
curtain on Fifty-fourth Session, reviews past 12 months, clears unfinished
business”. Available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2000/
ga1676.html; last accessed 28 May 2011.
366
Namibia’s foreign relations and security policy:
Exploration of a critical nexus
André du Pisani*
Introduction
The quintessential statement on the nexus between the foreign relations of a state and
its security comes from classical realism, a tradition of scholarship that has dominated
the study of international relations for several decades. In his seminal study, titled
Politics among nations – The struggle for power and peace, Hans Morgenthau argues
that state-based “collective security”, as provided for in the 1945 Charter of the United
Nations, does not supersede the more foundational principle of “the balance of power”.1
For Morgenthau and other scholars of his persuasion, the balance of power construct
made collective security possible. The historically most significant manifestation of this
‘balance of power’ is to be found in the relations of economic, political and security
alliances involving more than one state.
At the height of the Cold War, the ideas of Morgenthau and his followers essentially
shaped the analysis of the nexus between foreign relations and security, while the arms
race between the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union gave special credence
to such an approach. The end of the Cold War, however, spawned new approaches to the
study of foreign relations and security, as well as to the more restrictive notion of foreign
policy and its complex interface with defence and security policy.
The most salient new understandings of foreign relations (and of foreign policy) and
their complex interrelations with security have been a reconsideration of the classical
realist notion of national power and its elements: geography, natural resources, industrial
capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the
quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government – among others.2 Since classical
realism offers a state-centric account of the world, and because realism takes the state
to be central to international relations, topics such as the study of foreign-policymaking
or the analysis of the components of national power loom large; for the same reason,
interstate ‘war’ is taken to be sui generis, unlike any other form of social conflict. This
state-centricity suggests that realism ought to have a clear theory of the state. As it
* Prof. André du Pisani, Professor of Politics at the University of Namibia, also serves as Director
in Namibia of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network.
1 Morgenthau (1948).
2 (ibid.:106–143).
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happens, this is not the case: the lack of such a theory is an important problem at the heart
of realism – indeed of International relations as an academic discourse.3
However, although theory is missing, realism offers quite an elaborate description of the
state and of its emergence. The state is understood as a territorially based political unit
characterised by a central decision-making and enforcement machinery (a government
and a civil service); the state is legally ‘sovereign’ in the sense that it recognises neither
an exterior superior nor an internal equal; and the state exists in a world composed of
other, similarly characterised, territorial, sovereign political units.
As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War and the implosion of once powerful states
like the former Soviet Union, and alliances such as the Warsaw Pact, challenged many
of the central precepts of the realist understanding of the world and of international
relations. In parallel, new understandings of security emerged in the scholarly literature
and in the conduct of international relations. While national or state security was not
superseded by the widening of the concept of security, new dimensions of security
became progressively more important, as these posed new policy challenges. The most
significant of these included the notions of human security, public security, economic
security and environmental security. All of these notions of security had people, as
opposed to states, as their primary referent. Consequently, human security and national
or state security became to be regarded as complementary, mutually constitutive and,
largely, indivisible.4 Moreover, the trinity of democracy, security and development came
to characterise the literature on the topic of the nexus between foreign relations and the
multi-dimensional construct of security.
Namibia: A fusion of traditional and post-Cold War

understandings of security
Namibia assumed its independence at a historically most significant confluence in world
history – the end of the Cold War. Thus, it is not surprising that the new state articulated
a position on security and its interfaces with foreign relations that fused more traditional
state-centric notions of security with broader understandings of the construct. The Vision
and Mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflect this. The Vision, for example, calls
for the following:5
3 See Brown & Ainley (2005:63).

4 See, among the many influential sources, Buzan (1991); Buzan et al. (1998); Prins (1993); and
United Nations Commission on Human Security (2003).
5 See Office of the President (2004:vii). See also the Third National Development Plan (NPC
2008a:70–79) and Vision 2030 (Office of the President 2004:187–200).
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Namibia’s foreign relations and security policy: Exploration of a critical nexus
A peaceful, safe, stable and prosperity-enhancing world order that is predicated on the principles
of diplomatic persuasion and a multilateral approach to international relations, a world order in
which Namibia is able to become a developed country by the year 2030.
The Ministry’s Mission Statement elaborated this by highlighting “the promotion of

security domestically, within our neighbourhood and in the global arena”.6
Both the Ministry’s Vision and Mission derive their thrust from the principles and
objectives set out in Article 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, which
state that Namibia will –
• foster respect for international law, treaty and obligations, and
While Article 96 reflects some of the post-Cold War values and concerns that have come
to characterise the foreign relations and policies of many new states, it is important to
emphasise that it also provides for tenets that pre-date the independence of the country
in March 1990. Chief among these are the adoption and maintenance of a policy of non-
alignment, and the primacy of national or state security – the latter, based on the classical
notion of sovereignty: a construct that has since undergone important amplification. As a
new state, Namibia prized itself on the sacrosanct principle of ‘domestic sovereignty”7,
as was evidenced in its bilateral negotiations on the reintegration of Walvis Bay and
the Penguin Islands,8 a topic to which this chapter returns. Of equal importance, as
shown in the chapter by Chris Saunders in this volume, has been the imprint of the
foreign policy and diplomacy of the erstwhile liberation movement, the South West
Africa People’s Organisation (now SWAPO Party of Namibia), who subsequently took
power at Namibia’s Independence in March 1990. SWAPO participated actively in
international organisations right after its establishment. For example, in 1961, SWAPO
President Sam Nujoma attended the founding meeting of the Non-aligned Movement
(NAM) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. SWAPO became a full member of NAM in 1978.
Nujoma was present at the inaugural meeting of the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), the antecedent of the African Union (AU), in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May
1963, and he attended many later OAU summits. At the time of Independence, SWAPO
had 27 diplomatic missions abroad. Of these, 12 were in Africa, notably in the former
Frontline States (FLS, the precursor to the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference, which evolved into the Southern African Development Community, SADC),
6 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:vii).

7 See the contribution on the African Union (AU) by Bience Gawanas in this volume: Namibia is
not supportive of the AU principle of non-indifference.
8 Also officially referred to as the Offshore Islands.
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11 in Europe, 1 in Asia (India), 2 in the Americas, and 1 in Australia. SWAPO also had
observer status at the United Nations (UN).9
SWAPO’s pre-Independence diplomacy was formative for the post-Independence

period: many of the politico-security relations entered into at the time formed the basis
for such relations after Namibia’s independence. For example, security-related relations
with the erstwhile FLS and with the OAU made it relatively easy to continue and further
cement such relations with the SADC and the AU. Ties with a number of other liberation
movements – including Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique), the African National Congress (ANC) and, from 1975, the
Movimiento Popular para la Liberacão de Angola (MPLA, Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola) – meant that the post-Independence SWAPO Party could continue
and deepen such relations after 1990.10 Moreover, the complex UN-brokered transition
in Namibia left a most useful institutional legacy for the conduct of security diplomacy,
namely the Joint Permanent Commission (JPC), which has since served both Angola and
Namibia well.
As a liberal democracy, the Republic of Namibia strongly reflects in its Constitution

the values of a liberal democracy. The organs of state and public policy are clearly
subordinate to this fundamental and Supreme Law.11 Thus, post-Independence foreign
policy mirrors the values and principles of the idealist or liberal/pluralist approach to
international relations. Four values are especially deeply imprinted in the country’s
international relations. These are –12
• respect for international law and treaty obligations (and, by implication, for the
sovereignty of states)
• the promotion of international cooperation with the express purpose of fostering
regional and international peace and security
• the peaceful (diplomatic) resolution of conflict, and
• maintaining just and mutually beneficial relations among states – principally
through the instrument of economic diplomacy – and privileging South–South
cooperation.
In the rest of this chapter we will be concerned with a number of selected issues and
agreements between Namibia and other states that illustrate the close nexus between the
country’s foreign relations and security considerations. The analysis will focus on both
bilateral and multilateral relations, without claiming to be comprehensive. The chapter
will culminate in a balanced assessment of the achievements after more than two decades
of independence.
10 See Brown (1995:19–39), Dreyer (1994), and Nujoma (2001:205, 339–364).
11 Naldi (1995:14). See also Du Pisani (2003:19; 2010:3–16).
12 Mushelenga (2008:71–145). See also Vision 2030, Chapter 6 (Office of the President 2004:179–
200) and the Foreign Investment Act, 1993 (No. 24 of 1993).
370
The reintegration of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands

One of the first and most important problems at Independence concerned the territorial
integrity of the Namibian state, which related to a dispute between the newly-independent
state and South Africa over the sovereignty of the then South Africa-controlled enclave
of Walvis Bay and certain offshore islands known as the Penguin Islands. Article 1(4)
of the Constitution proclaims that the national territory of Namibia includes Walvis Bay.
Walvis Bay, which covers an area of 1,124 km2, is the only deep-water port in the country
and is of key importance to Namibia’s economic development, maritime security, and
foreign trade relations.13
Historically, Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands had been occupied by the United
Kingdom in 1878. With German colonisation in 1884, they were annexed to the Colony
of the Cape of Good Hope and were in turn transferred to South Africa at the time of its
Union in 1910. From 1919, they were administered as part of South West Africa, although
they had not been incorporated into the Mandate Agreement of 1920. Subsequently,
from 1977 onwards, the territory was administered as part of the Cape Province. In the
protracted negotiations over the future of Namibia, South Africa stubbornly insisted that
it would not give up sovereignty over Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands although UN
Security Council Resolution 432 (1978) called for the reintegration of Walvis Bay into
Namibia.
The South African claim to sovereignty was based on occupation, inherited from the
colonial power (the United Kingdom), whereas various legal arguments were advanced
on Namibia’s behalf.14 Ironically, however, the Namibian courts have expressed support
for the original South African claim, rejecting the assertions that the Cape Province did
not effectively annex Walvis Bay; that South Africa did not effectively exercise authority
and legislative power over it; and that the Namibian Constitution did not regard Walvis
Bay as having previously been a legal part of South Africa.15
Nevertheless, as has been indicated, under Article 1(4) of the Namibian Constitution
considers Walvis Bay and the offshore islands as part of its national territory. This also
found expression in the judgment by the Supreme Court of Namibia in S v Redondo,
13 Naldi (1995:26). See also Thornberry (2004:5,329) and Halbach (2000:124–5).

14 In her authoritative study, Walvis Bay: Decolonization and international law, Lynn Berat (1990)
advances four main claims based on the right of self-determination to support Namibia’s title to
the land in question: (1) Legal ties between the indigenous peoples, as discussed in the Western
Sahara Case, International Court of Justice [ICJ] Reports 1975; (2) Inter-temporal Law; (3)
Estoppel, as a result of having been administered as part of South West Africa for nearly 60
years; and (4) Its status as a colonial enclave. As Dugard (1973:98–101,111–114) points out,
however, none of these arguments is very convincing.
15 S v Redondo 1992 NR (2) SA 528 (Namibian Supreme Court), 539. See also S v Martinez 1991
(4) SA 741 (Namibia), at 749–750.
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which stated that, as from the date of Namibia’s Independence, Walvis Bay formed part
of Namibia.16
Consequently, in 1991, bilateral negotiations over the future of Walvis Bay and the
Penguin Islands were initiated between Namibia and South Africa. This resulted in
Namibia temporarily accepting joint administration over Walvis Bay in 1992, without
prejudice to Namibia’s claims to sovereignty. In August 1993, South Africa, seemingly
bowing to national calls from within that country – notably from the Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC) – announced that it had agreed
to cede Walvis Bay and the offshore islands to Namibia. Such transfer of sovereignty
becoming effective on 1 March 1994 under the terms of the bilateral Treaty on Walvis
Bay,17 the Walvis Bay and Off-Shore Islands Act,18 and the South African Act to Provide
for the Transfer to Namibia of the Territory of and Sovereignty over Walvis Bay and
Certain Islands.19
It was significant that the reintegration of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands was the
first foreign policy objective among five set by the then Namibian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab.20 The negotiated reintegration of Walvis Bay and the
offshore islands was the first fruit borne of shoring up foreign policy and relations with
a clear articulation of security interests. The reintegration has since formed the basis for
cooperative bilateral relations with South Africa. In retrospect, it was the single most
important process in building confidence between the former coloniser (South Africa)
and the newly independent Namibian state, especially since the negotiations were
successfully concluded before the transition to democracy in that country in April 1994.21
Having briefly explored the peaceful, negotiated resolution of the matter of Walvis Bay
and the Penguin Islands, the focus now shifts towards a consideration of Namibia’s role
in peacekeeping and peace support operations both within SADC and further afield.
Peacekeeping and peace support operations

The establishment and maintenance of a defence capability in Namibia is provided for
in Article 118 of the Constitution. The Article also states that the composition, powers,
16 S v Redondo 1992 NR 133 (SC) at 143.

17 The State President of South Africa already had wide powers to legislate for what was then
South West Africa (and later, South West Africa/Namibia) and Walvis Bay in terms of the South
West Africa Constitution Act, 1968 (No. 39 of 1968), and he exercised these powers in respect
of the 1977 Walvis Bay Administration Proclamation R202.
18 Walvis Bay and Off-Shore Islands Act, 1994 (No. 1 of 1994).
19 Naldi (1995:27).
20 Republic of Namibia (1991:80). Among the other foreign policy objectives were playing a
constructive and active part in peacemaking, and diversifying foreign trade relations.
21 Notwithstanding South Africa bickering over what it believed was infrastructure belonging to it.
372
duties and procedures are to be prescribed for the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) in
order to protect Namibia’s territorial integrity and national interests. Section 2 of the
Defence Act22 makes provision for the composition and organisation of the NDF’s three
Arms of Services, namely the Army, Air Force and Navy.
The 2008 Defence Policy, ratified by Parliament, has as one of its key elements a definition
of the NDF’s principal roles. It further provides for a framework for democratic civil–
military relations and commits Namibia –23
… to secure the region collectively with other Southern African Development Community
(SADC) member states through bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
As a State Party to SADC, Namibia has ratified or signed various legal instruments.
Chief among these are the following:
• SADC Treaty (1992)
• SADC Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Southern African
Region (1996)
• SADC Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof (1999)
• SADC Protocol on Legal Affairs (2000)
• SADC Protocol on Defence and Security Cooperation (2001)
• SADC Mutual Defence Pact (2003)
• Protocol on the SADC Standby Force (2008–2009), and
• SADC Revised Edition Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security Cooperation (2010) – popularly known as the Revised SIPO. It is
important to point out that the Revised SIPO launched in Arusha, Tanzania, in
November 2012, happened when Namibia was the Deputy Chair of the Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. In August 2013, Namibia became the
Chair of the Organ troika.
Further political and legal obligations flow from Namibia’s membership of the AU and
the UN. In the case of the AU, the most important policy and legal frameworks include –
• the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)
• the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of
The African Union (2002), and
• the African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact (2005)
As regards the UN, the Charter of the United Nations (145) (as amended in 1965, 1968
and 1973) is the key legal document.
Apart from the country’s military engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) – a fellow SADC member state – in the period October 1998 to early 2001, which
22 No. 1 of 2002.
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will be separately considered later herein on account of its wider political and security
importance to SADC, Namibia has participated in 11 peacekeeping and multinational
support operations to date under the country’s regional and international obligations.
These deployments have taken place under three different mandates: that of the UN, the
AU, and SADC. In the cases of Angola, Cambodia, East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan [Darfur],24 Namibia deployed peacekeepers that
included staff officers, military observers and civilian police. In the case of Sudan,
Namibian peacekeepers first formed part of the AU-mandated mission (AMIS) and
stayed in the country after the mandate was changed into a joint UN–AU one (UNAMIS).
Namibia has, since early 1993 when she first deployed peacekeepers in Cambodia,
become an important contributor to multinational peace missions under the aegis of the
UN and the AU. As far as SADC is concerned, Namibia has trained both military and
police components for future deployment under the SADC Standby Force (SADCSF)
arrangement. Both the NDF and the Namibian Police (NAMPOL) are engaged in ongoing
training for peace support operations, often in association with external militaries and
police forces. In February 2007, former UN Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of Namibia, Dr Kaire Mbuende, spoke in support of reforms in UN peacekeeping on
the General Assembly Substantive Session of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping
Operations.25
As far as police and policing are concerned, Namibia supports its foreign policy
objectives through membership of the International Police Organisation (IPO) that the
country joined in 1991 and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation
Organisation (SARPCCO) of which Namibia has been a member since its inception in
1995. Members of NAMPOL have been seconded to the INTERPOL Regional Bureau
in Harare, Zimbabwe, including its Deputy Inspector-General for Operations, who, until
2010, served as Head of the Regional Bureau.
Peacekeeping and peace support operations – and, more recently, collective regional
police action on transnational crime syndication such as money laundering, drug
trafficking, violent crimes, illicit diamond buying, cattle hustling, small arms proliferation,
and human trafficking – offer tangible proof of how defence, security, intelligence and
foreign policy are mutually constitutive.
24 NAMPOL contingents or individual members have served in countries such as East Timor,
Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. See Republic of Namibia (2010:245).
25 Training and capacity-building in peacekeeping and peace support have been – and continue
to be – provided by various countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, the United
States of America, the Republic of Malaysia, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For the full
text of Dr Kaire Mbuende’s statement to the UN General Assembly, see Mbuende (2007a:10).
374
Against this brief and incomplete overview of Namibia’s involvement in peacekeeping

and peace support operations over the past two decades, the focus now shifts towards a
consideration of the Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute with neighbouring Botswana.
Kasikili/Sedudu Island dispute

During 1992, Botswana, a fellow SADC member state, claimed sovereignty over
Kasikili Island (called Sedudu) by Botswana, which Namibia regarded as part of its own
territory. Kasikili/Sedudu is a small island, 3.5 km in length, located near the Chobe
River on the north-eastern international border between the two countries. The island has
limited strategic or economic importance to the two countries. Several meetings, some
at the level of SADC Heads of State, mediated by the President of Zimbabwe, Robert
Mugabe, were held between the two countries to resolve the dispute peacefully. The
mediation ended unsuccessfully in 1995, whereupon both governments decided to refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, the Netherlands,
for international arbitration and a binding legal opinion on the matter. Before this issue
is discussed any further, the politico-legal background to the island needs to be briefly
sketched.
Like many border conflicts in Africa, the dispute over ownership had its roots in the
Anglo-German agreement of 1890 that defined the middle of the Chobe River’s main
channel as the boundary between what were then German South West Africa and British
Bechuanaland. Controversy between the two states ensued over legal ownership of the
island, as well as on the related question as to whether the Chobe’s main channel – more
than a century after the original agreement (in addition to the fact that rivers change their
courses in 100 years) – was the one to the north or the south of the island. Namibia, in
its submission to the ICJ, claimed it was the south channel; Botswana claimed it was the
channel north of the island.
In 1995, following President Mugabe’s unsuccessful attempts to mediate, both

governments agreed to refer the dispute to the ICJ, as mentioned above. The ICJ presented
itself as one of the most impartial international bodies to rule on the dispute, and the joint
decision to refer the dispute for arbitration came in the wake of both governments failing
to implement recommendations contained in a report by a Namibia–Botswana Joint
Technical Commission (JTC) established in 1992. Namibia also remembered earlier
rulings of the ICJ, notably that of 1971, which declared South Africa’s presence “illegal”
in the country; hence, it had faith in the impartiality and justice of that body.
The JTC comprised three members from each of the two countries in question. During
its work, the JTC made use of earlier border demarcations contained in the 1890 Anglo-
German Agreement and the subsequent Anglo-German-Portuguese Treaty of 1892, as
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well as of several historical and contemporary political and topographical maps and
aerial photographs.26
Namibia argued that the island belonged to it on the grounds of human settlement and
subsistence, as well as other historical, ethnographic/cultural and oral evidence, besides
its reading of the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty. Invoking the legal principles of description
and of Estoppel, which refer to the continuous use and occupation by people of a specific
territory, Namibia’s legal team under Dr Albert Kawana27 argued that the island was
legally and politically part of the territory of Namibia through long use, as the Subia
people had been exploiting both the water and the grazing of the island for more than
a century without any protest from either the United Kingdom or Botswana. Botswana
based its claim to ownership on the geographic position of the northern channel, as well
as on the 1985 agreement between itself and South Africa. Both parties made extensive
use of maps and expert evidence in support of their legal arguments.
Oral hearings before the ICJ started in February 1999 and were concluded early in March
of the same year. The Chairperson of the Botswana legal team was Deputy Attorney-
General (Prosecutions), Adednigo Tafa. Their Chief Legal Counsel was Prof. Ian
Brownlie, a noted name in constitutional and international law. Brownlie was assisted
by Lady Hazel Fox, QC, formerly associated with the University of Oxford. They were
in turn assisted by Dr Stefan Talmon, a former student of Brownlie. The 14-member
Namibian legal team was headed by Dr Albert Kawana, then Permanent Secretary in
the Ministry of Justice. Prof. Abram Chayes from Harvard University in the US acted as
Leading Counsel. In the end, when the ICJ resolved that the island indeed belonged to
Botswana, Namibia bowed graciously to the decision.28
Subsequent to the ICJ ruling – which, in retrospect, served the bilateral interests of
both countries rather well – Botswana indicated that it was unhappy with the current
boundaries of another small, insignificant island in the Caprivi Region of Namibia –
Situngu. Both countries decided to discuss Botswana’s concern at the bilateral level.
Since the establishment of a Permanent Security Commission between the two SADC
member states, this and other more explicit security concerns have been amicably
discussed and resolved.
The erstwhile dispute over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the manner in which it was
resolved has not only contributed greatly towards improving bilateral relations between
26 See British and German documents respecting the delimitation of their respective spheres of
influence in south-western Africa in the National Archives of Namibia (ZBU: A.I.b.4–A.I.b.5).
See also Dierks (2002:72); Hangula (1993:18–21); and Kangumu (2011) for additional
historical background to the 1890 and 1892 Treaties.
27 Now Minister of Presidential Affairs.
28 Du Pisani (2000:310).
376
both countries over a wide spectrum of areas of common interest and concern such as
tourism, transnational crime, health and environmental management, but it has also,
more importantly, won Namibia respect in the region and beyond, and contributed
towards confidence-building at a time when the region had to contend with two other
fractures – Angola and the DRC. It is to the latter, the DRC, that this chapter next turns.
Military engagement in the DRC, 1998–2001

In late 1998, two years after the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
Cooperation (OPDS) had been established and military interventions had occurred in
the DRC and Lesotho, intraregional relations were under severe stress. Botswana and
South Africa spearheaded the military intervention in Lesotho, ostensibly under SADC
auspices. In the case of the conflict in the DRC, three SADC member states – Angola,
Namibia and Zimbabwe – decided to engage militarily in that country when the new
government under the uncertain tutelage of former President Laurent Kabila faced the
threat of external invasion from armed formations in Rwanda and from internal rebellion.
The 1998 intervention in the DRC conflict brought into sharp relief the challenges facing
the OPDS. That intervention and South Africa’s refusal to join in the military action
highlighted intra-SADC tensions around three principal issues:29
• Autonomy (the relationship between the OPDS and the SADC Secretariat and
Summit)
• The legal and political frameworks in which the OPDS should be operating, and
• The power struggle over regional hegemony in the post-liberation and post-
apartheid era.
Divergent views over the appropriate legal and political frameworks of the OPDS were
further exacerbated by political and economic considerations, most notably between
South Africa, under President Nelson Mandela, and Zimbabwe, under President Robert
Mugabe, the latter having been the Chairperson of the OPDS from its inception in 1996.
The further accusation by some SADC member states – among them Namibia, Swaziland
and Zimbabwe – that South Africa was pursuing selfish and potentially hegemonic
economic and trade policies in the region, as well as a restrictive immigration regime,
added to the tensions. By 1999, SADC reflected these tensions, and there was every
prospect that the region might very well become polarised between a South-African-led
grouping and a Zimbabwe-led one. The latter comprised, apart from Zimbabwe itself,
Angola, the DRC and Namibia.
At the SADC Summit held in Swaziland in 1999, most of the above tensions were
recognised. As the Chair, Swaziland was tasked to review the OPDS and make
29 Baregu & Landsberg (2003:7).
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recommendations for reforming it. Working closely with fellow SADC member states,
Swaziland actively drove the process of revisiting the OPDS and its relationship to the
Summit and the SADC Treaty over the next year. In March 2001, significant progress
was reported under the Chair of Namibia. During the Extraordinary SADC Summit that
took place on 16 March in Windhoek, the heads of state and government decided to
integrate the OPDS tightly into SADC structures. Whereas, since its inception in 1996,
the OPDS had been administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe and
chaired by President Mugabe, SADC leaders decided that, in future, the OPDS would
not be accountable to the Chair country of the structure but to the respective SADC
heads of state and government.30
In retrospect, one of the most significant implications of the military intervention by the
three SADC member states was the restructuring of the OPDS. The Organ not only became
part of the institutional fabric of SADC, but, since 2001, had been coordinated at Summit
level. The principle and practice of a rotating troika – reporting to the Chairperson of the
Summit – was also instituted. Since August 2001, the structure, operations, and functions
of the OPDS have been regulated by the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security
Cooperation. In practice, this meant that SADC had made significant advances in terms
of both the ideas of collective (state-based) security and collective accountability, as
provided for under the troika arrangement.
It came as no surprise, therefore, when the SADC heads of state and government at
the Blantyre, Malawi, Summit held in mid-August 2001 unanimously agreed to ratify
and implement the Windhoek recommendations of March that year. After the Blantyre
Summit, the OPDS was brought firmly under SADC control. In Blantyre, former
President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique became the new Chairperson of the OPDS,
with outgoing Chair President Mugabe and incoming Chair President Benjamin Mkapa
of Tanzania serving as deputies as per the troika arrangement.
Apart from the reintegration of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, the various
peacekeeping and peace support operations, the dispute over Kasikili/Sedudu Island
with Botswana, and the military engagement in the DRC, foreign and security policy
concerns show a confluence in respect of various other aspects of international law as
well. These will now be briefly discussed under the rubric of new forms of security.
New forms of security

After 2004 in particular, with the publication of the White Paper on Namibia’s Foreign
Policy and Diplomacy Management and, later in the same year, Namibia Vision 2030, the
30 (ibid.:8). See also Statement by the Extraordinary SADC Summit, Sandton, 9 November 2008;
available at www.sadc.net; last accessed 3 May 2011.
378
country’s long-term national development framework, there has been growing evidence
of a policy confluence between more traditional forms of security, such as national/
state security, and various dimensions of human security on the one hand, and foreign
policy on the other. The White Paper, for example, discusses various aspects of security
that transcend the more traditional state-based understandings of the construct. Most of
these, it argues, need to be addressed through multilateral diplomacy. The following new
security concerns find a place in the White Paper:31
• The environment
• Marine resources, and
• Economic security, which is to be ensured through regional integration, foreign
direct investment (FDI), and trade diversification.
Namibia Vision 2030 takes the articulation of security to a higher, more comprehensive
level, when it locates it not only in a regional, but also in a global context. Moreover,
Vision 2030 talks of the need to –32
• reduce the prevalence of HIV and AIDS
• enhance economic security – principally through the Common Monetary Area
and the Southern African Customs Union
• gender development, and
• interface national and regional development and security through holistic and
integrated planning and action.
The Third National Development Plan (NDP3) of 2008 for the period 2007/8–2011/12
is even more explicit and coherent on the nexus between peace, security and political
stability and foreign policy objectives. In Chapter 10 of the document, it outlines
“sustained participatory democracy” as a foundation for domestic and regional peace,
security and political stability – and in doing so, forges a link between democracy and
security. NDP3 also emphasises the primacy of the rule of law and social justice as a
further foundation for peace and security. In common with earlier policy articulations,
the document has regional integration – still principally defined in terms of economic,
market and trade integration, rather than as security or development integration – as one
of the core strategies for deepening peace and security in SADC. NDP3 also makes a clear
commitment on the part of government to contribute to peacekeeping and peace support
operations in the region and beyond, and to enhance water management, especially at
the regional level.33
For purposes of balanced and sound analysis, however, it is important to point out
that Namibia had ratified or signed various international legal instruments that have a
direct bearing on new understandings of security, before the above-mentioned policy
31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:79–81).

32 Office of the President (2004:174–192).
33 NPC (2008a:137–158).
379
André du Pisani
frameworks were in place. To its credit, Namibia acted swiftly after Independence
to either sign or ratify a raft of such international agreements.34 What follows is an
incomplete overview of some of the most important of these instruments.
Some prominent international agreements signed or ratified by Namibia

to date
As a newly independent state, Namibia was formally admitted to the UN on 23 April

1990, and that implied the country acceded to the UN Charter, ratified the ICJ Statute,
and endorsed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Namibia signed and ratified the Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000, on 27 October 2000
and 28 February 2000, respectively. The county acceded to SADC when it signed the
Declaration and Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), 1992, on 17 August 1992. Since then, Namibia has signed and ratified various
other important SADC Protocols, including the Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of
Procedure Thereof, 1999 (ratified on 7 March 2001) and the Protocol on Legal Affairs,
2000 (ratified on 7 March 2001). Since the crafting by a South African academic of the
AU’s Common African Defence and Security Policy, AU member states have made no
direct contribution to the policy. The African Peace Facility Fund (APFF) is provided
for in the AU’s peace and security architecture with the specific purpose of supporting
AU-mandated peace support operations and mediation. Namibia has yet to contribute
financially to the APFF.
In respect of armed conflict, Namibia has acceded to a number of UN Conventions,

popularly referred to as the Geneva Conventions.35 More recently, Namibia also
34 Article 32(3)(e) of the Namibian Constitution gives the President power to “negotiate and sign
international agreements, and to delegate such power”. Article 63(2)(e) gives the National
Assembly the power “to agree to the ratification of or accession to international agreements
which have been negotiated and signed in terms of Article 32(3)(e) hereof”. Article 144 states
that, “[u]nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules
of public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia”. Article 143 provides that “[a]ll existing
international agreements binding upon Namibia shall remain in force, unless and until the
National Assembly acting under Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise decides”.
35 The primary UN Conventions that Namibia has acceded to are as follows: Amelioration of
Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 (accession 21 March 1990);
Amelioration of Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, 1949 (accession 21 March 1990); Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 1949 (accession 21 March 1990); Geneva Convention relative to Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (accession 21 March 1990); Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977 (accession 21 March 1990); and the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
380
acceded to various International Conventions on transnational crime. These include the

following:36
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 (signed 27 October 1998)
• Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000 (signed 13 December
2000; not ratified to date)
• Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, 2000 (signed 13 December 2000; not ratified to date)
• Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000 (signed
13 December 2000; not ratified to date), and
• International Convention for the Financing of Terrorism, 1999 (signed 10
November 2001; not ratified to date).
As a UN member state, Namibia has a number of legal and political obligations with
regard to combatting money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Such international
public law obligations also derive from specific provisions of the Constitution. Chief
among these are the following:
• Preamble: “… the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family
is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace”
• Article 13(1): “… national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder
or crime or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others”, and
• Article 21(2): “… in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Namibia,
national security, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence”.
The key UN Conventions that apply are the following:37

• Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(Vienna Convention), 1988 (accession 31 March 1998)
• Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention), 2000
(signed 13 December 2000; not ratified to date)
Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1977 (accession 21 March 1990).
The interesting fact is that all the above UN Conventions were originally acceded to by the UN
Council for Namibia on behalf of Namibia on 18 October 1983, which is another illustration of
how pre-Independence foreign policy and diplomacy impacted on the Republic of Namibia’s
post-colonial foreign relations and policy.
36 The Prevention and Combating of Terrorist Activities Act, 2012 (No. 12 of 2012) requires
Namibia to become a state party to these UN Conventions, particularly the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, with Resolution 3166(XXVIII) of the UN General Assembly, 1973; and the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1998.
37 LAC (2001:7).
381
André du Pisani
• Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999 (signed 10

November 2001; not ratified to date), and
• Convention against Corruption, 2003 (signed 2003; not ratified to date).
In the domain of anti-money laundering policy and legal frameworks, Namibia has
made significant progress. The country acceded to the international provisions of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), originally established by the then G7 Summit in
Paris in 1989. Since then, the FATF has evolved into an international non-governmental
organisation whose purpose is to develop and promote national and international policies
to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Since 1990, the FATF has agreed upon a number of recommendations (also known as
standards) to respond to the evolving global threat of money laundering. At the time
of writing, these recommendations/standards amount to 40 plus 9 (40+9). At SADC
level, the Eastern and Southern African Anti-money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)
was launched in August 1999 in Arusha, Tanzania. Namibia is a member of the
ESAAMLG, and following the events of 11 September 2001 in the US, the ESAAMLG
expanded its scope of work to include the countering of funding for terrorists.38 Based
on a Memorandum of Understanding amongst ESAAMLG member states, Namibia
undertook to systematically adopt and implement the FAFT 40+9 recommendations/
standards. ESAAMLG became an Associate Member of the FATF in June 2010.
Namibia, in common with other member states, has engaged in an internal audit process
as well as being subjected to inspections by the FATF on the status of its legal and policy
frameworks to determine the extent of compliance.
In terms of common law, the High Court of Namibia has an extensive jurisdiction which
can be invoked in a transnational crime or offence, such as money laundering, if a
significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in the country and
if no reasonable objection thereto can be raised in international comity.39 In addition, the
jurisdiction of Namibian courts can be extended by expressly providing for an extended
or concurrent jurisdiction in an Act of Parliament.
In December 2012, the Namibian Government promulgated the Prevention and Combating
of Terrorist Act, 2012.40 With this Act, Namibia acceded to the FATF regulations and
ratified the key UN protocols, mentioned above.
38 Bank of Namibia (2011:7).

39 The following pieces of legislation provide for extended and/or current jurisdiction: Merchant
Shipping Act, 1951 (No. 57 of 1951); Aviation Act, 1962 (No. 74 of 1962); Civil Aviation
Offences Act, 1972 (No. 10 of 1972); Protection of Information Act. 1982 (No. 84 of 1982);
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 2004 (No. 29 of 2004); Anti-corruption Act, 2003 (No. 8
of 2003); and Financial Intelligence Act, 2007 (No. 3 of 2007), as amended in 2012.
40 No. 12 of 2012.
382
Following this brief exploration of the domains of crime, terrorism, drugs, and
peacekeeping, as well as Namibia’s obligations under international law in respect of
these domains, other dimensions of security and their interface with foreign policy
objectives will now be examined. The most important of these include environment,
marine resources, health, human rights, refugees and stateless persons, and trade.
Environment
Since Independence, Namibia has emerged as a shining example to Africa and the world
in terms of environmental protection and security. The country has earned an enviable
status internationally for protecting and securing its biodiversity and for its efforts to
practise integrated natural resource management.
The following is a brief and incomplete presentation of some of the most salient
international protocols and conventions on the environment that Namibia has either
signed or ratified:
• UN Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, 1973 (accession 18 December 1990; effective 18 March 1991)
• Agreement for the Establishment of Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing
(SACIM),41 1991 (in force since 20 June 1991)
• Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985 (accession 20
September 1993)
• Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987 (accession
20 September 1993)
• Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, 1989 (accession 15 May 1995)42
• UN Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, 1971 (Ramsar Convention) (accession 23 December 1995)
• Protocol to amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially Waterfowl Habitat, 1982 (came into force 1 October 1986; accession
23 December 1995)
• UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 (signed 12 June 1992;
ratified 16 May 1997)
• UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 (signed 12 June 1992; ratified 16
May 1997)
• Cartegena Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, 1994
(signed 24 October 2004; ratified 16 May 1997)
41 SACIM was changed to the Southern African Convention for Wildlife Management (SACWM)
in 1996.
42 Namibia did not agree to every amendment to the Basel Convention.
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• Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone

Layer, Adopted at the Second Meeting of the Parties at London on 29 June 1990
(ratified 6 November 1997, with the exception of some amendments)43
• UN Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, 1972 (accession 6 April 2000)44
• UN World Heritage Convention, 1975 (accession 6 April 2000)45
• SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, 1999 (ratified
6 April 2000)
• SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African
Development Community Region, 2000 (ratified 19 June 2001)
• UN International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969
(accession 9 October 2001)
• UN International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1997 (accession 9 October 2001). and
• Copenhagen Climate Conference Declaration, 2009 (signed 2010, but not ratified
to date).
In April 2007, Dr Kaire Mbuende, former Ambassador and Namibia’s Permanent

Representative to the UN, delivered a comprehensive statement on the relationship
between energy, security and climate to the UN Security Council. In his statement,
he highlighted the impact of climate change on health, rainfall, biodiversity, and food
security, among other things.
From the brief overview above of some of the principal international legal conventions
and protocols that Namibia has either signed or ratified, it is clear that the country has
a sound record on environmental security-related issues such as the preservation of
biodiversity. In this respect, considerations of environmental security do in fact support
other developmental (notably tourism) and foreign policy objectives.
Marine resources
Given the economic and strategic importance of the marine environment, it is not
surprising that Namibia has either acceded to or ratified various international conventions
and protocols on the protection of marine resources. What follows is an incomplete
listing of such legal instruments to which Namibia subscribes:
• UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (signed 10 December 1982; ratified
18 April 1983)46
43 LAC (2001:10).
44 See www.epi.freedom.org/whtrty.htm; last accessed 9 May 2011.
45 See www.unesco.org/whc; last accessed 9 May 2011.
46 Namibia was represented by the UN Council for Namibia as stipulated in Article 305, paragraph
1(b) of the Convention.
384
• Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, 1995 (signed 19 April 1996; ratified 8 April 1998)
• Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Seabed Authority,
1998 (signed 24 September 1999; not ratified to date)
• Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 1980
(accession 29 January 2000; not ratified to date), and
• Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources in the
South East Atlantic Ocean (ratified 15 November 2001).
In addition to these international conventions and protocols on marine resources,

Namibia has proclaimed an Exclusive Economic Zone along its coastline with the express
purpose of protecting the sensitive and lucrative marine ecosystems dominated by the
Benguela Current. The Government policy and legal framework that guides sustainable
management of aquatic living fisheries resources, is entitled Towards Responsible
Development of the Fisheries Sector (1991). This framework was reviewed in 2004,
when the monitoring, control and surveillance aspects were strengthened to comply with
international fisheries conservation and management standards.47
Health
Health is a further policy domain where the accession to international regulations and
standards work in support of foreign policy objectives such as human development
and enhancing human security. There are essentially four primary legal and policy
frameworks – in addition to the assistance provided for by other states such as the US48
and agencies of the UN – that guide independent Namibia. These are –
• the International Sanitary Regulations, 1951
• the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO), 1946 [as amended]
(signed 23 April 1990)
• the Commonwealth Regional Health Community for East, Central and Southern
Africa (accession 19 December 1991), and
• the SADC Protocol on Health, 1999 (ratification reported, but date not located).
Human rights
The domain of human rights is the last area of policy and politics that has a direct
influence on the complex nexus between foreign policy behaviour and security in its
different dimensions. As argued at the outset of this chapter, Namibian foreign policy in
the post-Independence period has been profoundly normative: the country started out as a

48 See the chapter by William A Lindeke on Namibia–USA relations in this volume.
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‘norm entrepreneur’,49 basing its foreign policy and relations on considerations of human
rights and development. It is thus to be expected that Namibia would have acceded to,
and ratified, various international public law human rights conventions and covenants. In
retrospect, that has indeed been the case. It is the ratification and systematic adherence
to such frameworks however, that show that more than two decades after Independence,
there is indeed room for improvement.
Of the numerous international human rights conventions and protocols that Namibia
signed or ratified since Independence, the following are especially noteworthy:
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
1966 (accession 11 November 1982; not ratified to date)
• Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (signed 8 September 1990; ratified
30 September 1990)
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
1979 (accession 23 November 1992)
• African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981 (accession 30 July 1992)
• Convention on the Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948
(accession 28 November 1994; not ratified to date)
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (accession
28 November 1994, not ratified to date)
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (accession 28
November 1994)
• Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(accession 28 November 1994)
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1984 (accession 28 November 1994)
• Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 198950 (accession 28
November 1994)
• African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 (signed 13 July
1999)
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women, 2000 (accession 2000, but not to all amendments)
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict (signed 8 September 2000)
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (signed 8 September 2000),
and
49 For another application of the construct of a norm entrepreneur with reference to South Africa’s
foreign policy after isolation and the transition to democracy, see Geldenhuys (2006:93–107).
50 See Namunjepo & Others v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison & Another 1999 NR 271
(SC) at 284Hff; see also LAC (2001:14).
386
• Protocol to African Charter on the Establishment of African Court on Human and

People’s Rights (signed 9 June 1998; ratified 7 November 2000).
Given the constitutional provisions on the protection of human rights and the more
general normative and idealist grounding of the country’s foreign policy and relations
that privilege international cooperation and the peaceful resolution of conflict, human
rights provisions – while clearly important – should have weighed more heavily in respect
of the recent conflict in Zimbabwe and regular violations of human rights (particularly
those of women) in the DRC, for example.51 Namibia should act more systematically as
a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in SADC and beyond. In retrospect, it is clear that Namibia has
found it difficult to act independently on human rights issues in fellow SADC member
states.
The last issue this chapter wishes to address is that of Namibia’s position on UN reform,
particularly as regards the UN Security Council, since it could impact on the nexus
between foreign relations and security.
UN reform
Since 2008, as a member of the AU Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government,
Namibia actively supported UN reform – particularly of the Security Council. In
common with other AU member states, Namibia put forward a proposal for Africa to be
represented on the Security Council. As shown in the chapter in this volume that explores
the country’s relations with the UN,52 Namibia has served in various capacities within
the international body, including having one of the Vice Presidents of the UN Security
Council (2008–2009) as President of the UN General Assembly (2000–2001) when the
Millennium Development Goals were agreed on, and as Chair of the UN Commission
on Narcotic Drugs (2008–2009).
As a new constitutive element and norm in public international law, which was brought
up by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the theme of “Responsibility to Protect”
(R2P) widens the definition of human security and provides a basis for UN member
states to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries in the case of ‘mass atrocity
crimes’. Although there is no official correspondence or policy in existence to this effect,
the Namibian diplomat at the UN spoke in favour of the R2P.
51 For a critical reading of Namibia’s policy on Zimbabwe, see Melber (2008:6). See also Hengari
(2009:7).
52 See the chapter by Kari Egge in this volume.
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André du Pisani
Conclusion
This cursory chapter has explored, with reference to select cases, the complex nexus
between security – in its different dimensions and referents – and the foreign relations
of Namibia since Independence in 1990. The chapter has shown that, in terms of both
policy articulation and constitutional framing, there is an appreciation of the nexus
between security and foreign policy considerations.
Harnessing select case studies such as the reintegration of Walvis Bay and the Penguin
Islands, participation in various peacekeeping and peace support operations in the SADC
region and beyond, the peaceful resolution of the dispute with Botswana over the Kasikili/
Sedudu Island, military engagement in the DRC (1998–2001), and accession to various
international legal instruments on aspects of political life with security implications,
there is compelling evidence that Namibia values the primacy of different forms of
security, both classical (national/state-based and new forms of human security) and their
relationship to foreign policy and national development.
The analysis also showed that Namibia has not acted resolutely and consistently in
respect of every foreign policy case where human rights and other aspects of human
security were threatened. This was so, for example, in the conflicts in the DRC and
Zimbabwe. In both cases, Namibia’s foreign policy behaviour reflected older forms of
solidarity politics emanating from the former liberation struggles in the region, as well
as divisions within SADC. Rarely did Namibia act within a normative corset on these
issues, and in doing so, undermined the idealist seam of its foreign policy that privileges
a ‘peace through law’ approach.
In respect of new forms of security such as the environment, inclusive of the marine
environment and safeguarding of biodiversity and global warming, Namibia’s overall
record in Africa is enviable. The country has emerged as one of the leading voices when
it comes to environmental protection and duly deserves credit for this. When it comes to
other forms of security, such as peacekeeping and peace support operations and keeping
Africa as a nuclear-free continent, Namibia’s record has been admirable. It is within
the normative domain of human rights and their centrality for any conception of human
security, however, that Namibia could have acted more credibly and decisively. There is
a role for Namibia as a new and small state to reignite its role as ‘norm entrepreneur’ in
SADC and beyond. In this respect, various pointers can be found precisely in the way
the country acted constructively in resolving earlier conflicts, such as those over Walvis
Bay and the Penguin Islands, and over Kasikili/Sedudu Island.
Finally, this chapter concludes that there is a need for additional policy-focused
research on the foreign relations of Namibia, particularly since these are often poorly
388
communicated to the public and there may indeed be a need to “democratise our Foreign
Policy”.53 It is with such an understanding that this exploratory chapter was written.
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Republic of Namibia. 1991. Debates of the National Assembly. Windhoek: Government
of the Republic of Namibia.
Republic of Namibia. 2008. Defence Policy. Windhoek: Government of the Republic of
Namibia.
Republic of Namibia. 2010. Namibia: A nation on the move. Windhoek: Office of the
Prime Minister.
SADC/Southern African Development Community. 2008. Statement by the Extra-
Ordinary SADC Summit, Sandton, Republic of South Africa, 9 November 2008.
Johannesburg: SADC.
SADC/Southern African Development Community. 2010. Revised edition: Strategic
Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.
Maputo: SADC.
Thornberry, Cedric 2004. A nation is born: The inside story of Namibia’s Independence.
Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan Publishers.
United Nations Commission on Human Security. 2003. Human security now. New York:
United Nations.
391
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Beyond economic diplomacy: The interface of
Namibia’s foreign relations and economic cooperation
Lesley Blaauw*
Introduction
The end of the Cold War posed a new challenge for both international relations theorists
and foreign policy practitioners. The test which confronted them was how to establish a
new international order that reflected the changing global political landscape no longer
characterised by bipolar rivalry. Regions and regional concerts were seen as the edifice
upon which such a new international order was to be built. Not surprisingly, therefore,
since the end of bipolar rivalry, the idea and organisation of the concept region has
elicited renewed international attention.1 This resurgence in the study of international
regionalism is exemplified by the revival of old regional organisations, the formation of
new ones, and the deepening of existing regional arrangements.
The formative force of regions and the conceptualisation of economic regionalism in the
1990s demanded that states recast their foreign policy positions. In this trajectory, new
approaches to regions and regionalism make allowance for a much broader and more
comprehensive definition of these processes. States’ foreign policies necessarily had to
reflect this changing reality after 1990. The need for states to make these changes was
– and still is – necessary because the edifice of the new world order has regionalism as
one of its main contours. Bjorn Hettne asserts that “regional multilateralism” is one of
the crucial building blocks for a new international economic order.2 Others have argued
that the foreign policy postures of states, like state relations themselves, will have to
be recast to reflect the diminution of the role of the state in economic diplomacy and
foreign policy relations. From this reading, two trends were discernible by the 1990s. Of
importance here are the neoliberal institutionalists, who contended that state relevance
could only be maintained by looking at common forms of governance which were, in
turn, only possible on the basis of formal international regimes and institutions.3 In the
case of Namibia’s foreign policy, this meant it would have to reflect the practice of
governance and coordinated action as exemplified by the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).
* Dr Lesley Blaauw is senior lecturer and currently Head of the Department of Political and
Administrative Studies at the University of Namibia.
1 Concern with regional patterns and with regionalism did not suddenly begin in the 1990s: it
has been the focus of study and political action since the beginning of the 20th Century (Cerny
1999a).
2 Hettne (2003:37).
3 Gilpin (2001:377–403).
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Lesley Blaauw
At Independence on 21 March 1990, Namibia was faced with both opportunities and
constraints in the foreign policy domain. The challenges that the country encountered
related to the profound changes that had occurred at the global level, following the end
of the Cold War. Also, the country had to confront the challenges that small states met in
dealing with the external environment. For André du Pisani, this meant that Namibia had
to deal with a plethora of issues ranging from an increased need to strengthen South–South
cooperation, recasting North–South relations, and dealing with new forms of economic
multilateralism, among other forms of multilateralism.4 This meant that an independent
Namibia’s foreign policy priorities had to be both reflective of its history and the nature of
its global and negotiated transition. While economic regionalism represented one of the
cornerstones of the post-Cold-War world, it is not formed in isolation. Fredrik Söderbaum
posits that “globalization and regionalization are intimately connected and together
shape the emerging order”.5 Because states interact at the interface of the domestic and
international levels, it means that globalisation changes the internal architecture of the
state. By and large, therefore, states’ foreign policy postures are influenced not only
by economic regionalism, but also by the relationship between globalisation and the
state. Not surprisingly, the Namibian Government engaged in a process to project itself
as a facilitator of globalisation by actively courting foreign direct investment through
constitutional provisions, which protect, amongst other things, private property and the
establishment of a favourable climate for foreign investors through regimes such as
export processing zones.
Globalisation and the state

The de-territorialisation of economic and political space has led to a growth in global
forms of governance. This suggests that the state is no longer the key structural agent
that can initiate action and exercise structural power in its own right. Resultantly, states’
foreign policies need to respond in innovative ways to the proclivities of globalisation.
The foreign policy position of the Namibian state seems to take cognisance of this crucial
position, because the Foreign Policy White Paper posits that the formulation of external
relations should be premised on an awareness that, increasingly, the relations of one state
are closely related to those of another.6 Also implicit, therefore, is the recognition that
state behaviour is largely influenced by a fluid process of globalisation.
In response to the diminution of its role as an initiator of global economic action, the
state needs to reposition itself. In doing so, the state at times actively participates in the
process of economic globalisation. This gives the state a particular neoliberal posture.
4 Du Pisani (2003:14–19).
5 Söderbaum (2005:234).
394
Beyond economic diplomacy:
The interface of Namibia’s foreign relations and economic cooperation
The neoliberal state has been viewed as an active promoter of economic globalisation.7
Philip Cerny argues that “the state has always been to some extent viewed as a promoter
of market forces”.8 This implies that globalisation is reconstituting or transforming the
functions and authority of the nation state, with profound implications for its foreign
policy. Mushelenga posits that, at Independence, the Namibian state was compelled
to craft a foreign policy which had, as its foundation, concerns with foreign direct
investment as part of economic diplomacy.9 Cerny suggests that –10
[t]he main task or function of the contemporary state is the promotion of economic activities,
whether at home or abroad, which makes firms and sectors located within the territory of the
state competitive in international markets.
The state, in this context, reproduces itself in the face of domestic and international
challenges. In simple terms, the state is being fundamentally transformed within the
wider structural context of global transformation. To James Mittelman, this suggests that –11
[i]n a globalized division of labour, the state no longer primarily initiates action in, but rather
reacts to[,] worldwide economic forces.
Globalisation involves a complex process of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation

of political authority. The role of the state in this trajectory is, therefore, defensive.
In addition, Cerny contends that neoliberalism actively promotes the “market-state” by

positing that –12
… state structures today are increasingly being transformed into market-oriented and even
market-based organizations themselves, fundamentally altering the way that public and private
goods are produced.
Economic globalisation is transforming the conditions under which state power is

exercised. Robert Cox observes that the above has resulted in “[t]he loss of effective
sovereignty by states in economic policy”.13 Conversely, –14
7 Cerny (2003:214) notes that “Economic globalization contributes not so much to the
supersession of the state by a homogenous global order as to the splintering of the existing
political order”.
8 (ibid.:208).
9 Mushelenga (2008).
10 Cerny (2003:214).
11 Mittelman (1996:189–213).
12 This suggests that “we may be witnessing the transmutation of the state from a civil association
into a more limited form of enterprise association” (Cerny 2003:208).
13 Cox (1997:59).
14 (ibid.).
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Lesley Blaauw
… states have promoted the formation of a web of transnational regimes and other linkages
which have increasingly been developing the capacity to operate autonomously of those states.
This implies that interactions and processes at various levels also shape and change state
responses to globalisation.
From the above, the globalisation process produces a contradiction for states:15
States and intergovernmental organization play a role in enforcing the rules of the global
economy and in enhancing national competitiveness, but their powers of shielding domestic
economies from negative effects of globalization have diminished.
The loss of effective sovereignty by states in economic policy, brought about by economic
globalisation, means that the state is seen as less able to provide for the development
needs of its people. This realisation – that domestic economic challenges can best be
addressed by utilising the opportunities which the rule-based global economy developed
in the 1990s –prompted Namibia to apply for classification among the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) in 1990.16 Its status as an LDC enabled Namibia to export beef duty-
free to the European Union (EU), under the auspices of the Lomé Convention. Arguably,
these favourable terms of trade allowed Namibia to use such export earnings for domestic
developmental needs. The inability of the state to perform its developmental role is made
more pronounced by what Richard Sandbrook terms pragmatic neoliberalism, which
posits that –17
… the state assumes responsibility for providing minimally adequate safety nets for those
individuals who cannot market themselves effectively.
This suggests that the state is here engaging in welfare action instead of development,
which is an effect of globalisation and the neoliberal ideology.
The above, Richard Sandbrook claims, “… purveys a false promise to the poor and
socially excluded”.18 In protest, the poor and socially excluded challenge such exclusion,
brought about by globalisation. This, in turn, gives rise to resistance from social forces.
By and large, such resistance suggests the need for a ‘new’ recognition of the role of non-
state actors. Simply put, it calls for the acknowledgement that international relations are
conducted not only by states, but also by a complex array of non-state actors; formal and
informal political processes; and levels of subnational, national, regional, international,
and transnational polity. All of these have deep-seated consequences for a state’s foreign
policy. Balefi Tsie forcefully argues that states may no longer be seen as the primary unit
of analysis in international relations, since –19
15 Cox (1996a:26–27).
16 Du Pisani (1992:14–19).
17 Sandbrook (2000:1071–1080).
18 (ibid.:1071).
19 Tsie (2001a:114).
396
… there may be other equally important or even more powerful actors in the international
political arena than the state … .
One way of counteracting this is to articulate foreign policy economic interests – by

finding recourse in transnational structures.
Other authors, like David Held et al., contend that globalisation does not, after all, bring
about the end of the state.20 To them, globalisation has also encouraged a more realigned
activist state. Cerny asserts that –21
… state actors and institutions are themselves promoting new forms of complex globalisation
in the attempt to adapt state actions to cope more effectively with what they see as global
‘realities’.
This argument posits that the power of national governments is not necessarily diminished
by globalisation. States remain important actors in national, regional and global politics.
They have been joined, however, by numerous non-state actors that address a multitude
of issues beyond territorial politics.
From the above, the power of national governments is being reconstituted and
restructured in response to the growing complexity of processes of governance in a more
interconnected world. To Cerny, the political response of the state to globalisation –22
… does not lead to a simple decline of the state but may be seen to necessitate the actual
expansion of de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and
marketization. [Italics in original]
The continued calls by former President Nujoma to expand the Namibian economy’s
manufacturing base finds resonance in the aforementioned postulate. The President’s
call suggests that states remain central to shaping international economic relations. In
pursuance of its economic goals under the neoliberal economic rubric, however, states
have to deal with a complex array of economic relations. The various bilateral and
multilateral economic agreements signed by the Namibian Government bear testimony
to the existence of multiple economic agreements, which are all aimed at deepening
economic diplomacy.
The demands of a bilateral and multilateral dimension explain the state’s preoccupation
with market-related economic matters,23 which indirectly promotes civil society formation.
States, in having to reorganise economic space, need to go regional. Simply put, states
20 Held (1990).
21 Cerny (1997:251–274).
22 (ibid.).
23 Implicit is the recognition “that globalisation transforms political and not just economic life”
(Rosow 2000:27–45).
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Lesley Blaauw
respond to the structural pressures of globalisation by turning to regionalism.24 This is

because “regionalism both shields domestic society from and integrates it into the global
division of labour”.25 Seen in this light, the emergence of new approaches to regionalism
takes place against the background of the comprehensive structural transformation of the
global system, characterised by a multi-level pattern of governance. In this trajectory,
globalisation and regionalisation are intimately connected.
Globalisation and regionalisation

As stated earlier, regionalism takes place within the overall context of globalisation. As
such, regions are created and recreated in the process of global transformation. One of
the consequences of such transformation is the internationalisation of the state. Such
internationalisation requires the state to respond to multi-level pressures, ranging from
the local and regional to the international context. In this trajectory, the argument for
regional cooperation26 and integration27 becomes persuasive in terms of being the only
way to deal with the challenges of unbridled market forces spawned by globalisation.
This is the context in which Gibb and Michalak remark that, through regionalism, states
are trying “to control at the regional scale what they increasingly failed to manage at the
national and multilateral levels”.28 In simple terms, therefore, regionalism is the political
response to globalisation. Jean Grugel posits that, as a state-initiated project, “[n]ew
regionalist associations of this sort may also be a way to avoid marginalisation”.29 This
24 To Tom Mertes, this results in a process of what he calls “de-globalisation”, which demands
the building of “strong regional markets within the South that would have some autonomy from
global financial interests” (Mertes 2002:1–8).
25 Mittelman (1996:189–213). Regionalism can, therefore, be a defensive or an offensive state
strategy, or it can combine elements of both. Resultantly, it is a conscious political project.
26 Björn Hettne (2001a:158) notes that “[r]egional cooperation through a formal organisation is
sometimes rather superficial, but at least the framework for cooperation is created”. Hurrel
(1995:331–358) adds that “[r]egional cooperation may involve the creation of formal
institutions, but it can often be based on a much looser structure, involving patterns of regular
meetings with some rules attached, together with mechanisms for preparation and follow-up.
… Unlike some brands of regional integration, such cooperative arrangements are very clearly
statist, designed to protect and enhance the role of the state and the power of the government”.
27 Regional integration, on the other hand, is defined as “the gradual elimination of political and
economic barriers between [and among] participating countries” (Dieter 1997:201). Fredrik
Söderbaum and Björn Hettne (1998:4) contend that “although both processes form an integral
part of the current transformation of the global system, regionalization has a stronger element
of political reaction to the basically market‑driven globalisation process”.
28 Gibb & Michalak (1996:42–56). See also Fawcett (2004:429–446). Gamble and Payne
(1996:16) argue that “nearly all states now seek, as it were, to ride two tigers simultaneously:
they have to respond to the structural power of international capital, which demands the
continuing openness of the world economy, and to the continuing pull of national interests of
various sorts, which requires that they compete for relative advantage in the global economy as
effectively as possible”.
29 Grugel (2000:8).
398
suggests that, for states, globalisation has necessitated the construction of new types of
interstate organisations30 at a regional level. What it allows foreign policy practitioners
to do, therefore, is to exercise some degree of regulation through a process of economic
cooperation. The formulation of foreign policy in this trajectory allows for patterns of
cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence in a particular cross-national
geographical space. Not surprisingly, Namibia formally acceded to SACU in 1990, the
year of its independence, and hosted the formation of the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference31 in 1992.
The above explains why a shift towards regionalism and bloc formation is increasingly
apparent at both the global and regional levels.32 The rise of regionalism not only represents
an attempt to militate against the possible negative consequences of globalism, but also
seeks to influence the form that globalism is taking. Part of this influence is that new
forms of regionalism have to incorporate non-state actors. Contemporary regionalism
differs from its historical counterpart in that the latter was primarily concerned with
interstate relations, in both content and scope.33 The involvement of actors such as the
privately owned Namibia Breweries and the parastatal NamPower suggests an awareness
on the part of the Namibian Government that certain issue areas are not confined to
interstate relations.
Whereas ‘old’ regionalism was either economically or intergovernmentally driven, ‘new’

regionalism is broader and multidimensional. The multifaceted nature of regionalism
and the uncertainty of political phenomena opened up space for actors other than states
to influence global and regional events. In constructing a foreign policy, all states need
to bear in mind the increasing influence of transnational actors on economic cooperation.
30 The above illustrates that states now share governance with societal actors. David Held and
Andrew McGrew (1998:219–243) conclude that, because of these increasingly complex forms
of governance, we now have “a divided authority system – in which states seek to share the
tasks of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, local regional,
transnational and global, representing the emergence of ‘overlapping communities of fate’”.
Needless to say, this poses a new challenge to foreign policy analysis and implementation.
31 Which later became SADC.
32 In this context, Hettne (1993:212) suggests that “[t]he contemporary context of the mercantilist
logic is no longer the nation-state, however, but the international political economy, in which
‘the political’ refers to a transnational framework of economic transactions”. This compels us,
he says, “to see regionalism as a return of the political, the need to control, in a transnational
context” (ibid.). These insights suggest that regionalism and, in particular, economic cooperation
offer small states like Namibia the opportunity to play a more pronounced activist role in
international relations through these transnational structures.
33 Andrew Hurrel (1995:331–358) contends that new regionalism is distinct from older forms of
integration as a result of its multidimensional character: its scope and level of analysis embraces
North–South regionalism, and creates regional consciousness. Economic cooperation and its
relation to foreign policy are not only limited to South–South cooperation, but should also
embrace North–South linkages.
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Lesley Blaauw
Hettne illustrates that global structural transformation was also occasioned by the
addition of “non-state actors [that] are active and manifest themselves at several levels
of the global system”.34 The new regionalism, therefore, embraces a range of issues and
actors which covers a variety of spectrums in the domains of economics and politics. The
developments that have ushered in the rise of new regionalism are informed by a growth
in economic, social and political interdependencies, involving both state and non-state
actors.35 The terms of engagement vary from one region to another, depending on each
region’s structural location and its role in the global economy.36 What the new regionalism
intends to achieve is a change in the terms of engagement for the developing world.
Hettne argues that new regionalism and one of its variants, developmental regionalism,
“imply regional economic regulation without going to the extent of delinking from the
world economy”.37 Thus, –38
[t]here is no doubt that the ‘new regionalism’ represents an attempt by states to forge a form
of governance different from but not necessarily opposed to multilateralism.39 In that sense, it
is a new strategy dealing with rapidly changing conditions in the global political economy and
might lead to a revamped or improved multilateral system.
This suggests the fostering of new forms of governance, which acknowledges the
existence of a multipolar world. Governance, in this context, “is constructed by certain
actors for certain purposes”.40 Regionalism, therefore, is a political response to the
economic consequences of globalisation. The process of regional integration are, thus,
crucial for states: both as an international and as a national development strategy. In the
developing world in general, the resurgence of regionalism also needs to be viewed as a
response to the perceived threat of global marginalisation. In this regard, Louise Fawcett
points out that –41
34 Hettne (1996:161).
35 The genesis of new regionalism is to be located “[a]s a building block of global social theory
… which allows us to … somewhat simplistically speak of a marriage between development
theory and international political economy … Such a merger may ultimately strengthen an
emerging ‘new’ or ‘critical political economy of development’” (Söderbaum 2001:104).
36 This is because “[g]lobalisation had a differential reach and impact reflecting existing
asymmetries in the geometry of global power relations” (Held & McGrew 1993:261–288).
Through foreign policies that actively seek to encourage economic cooperation, small states
like Namibia can challenge the asymmetry in the geometry of global power relations.
37 Hettne (1997:230).
38 Tsie (2001b:12).
39 In a multilateral world, one view is that globalisation and regionalisation are mutually
reinforcing. This suggests that “[r]egionalism is one possible approach to multilateralism”,
ostensibly because “[w]orld regions rather than nation states may in fact constitute basic units
in a future multilateral world order” (Hettne 2001a:156). The foreign policy positions of states
should mirror this crucial consideration.
40 Söderbaum & Taylor (2003:13).
41 Fawcett (2004:429–446). Morten Bøås (2001:28) asserts that “[r]egionalisation, as a political
strategy … is an attempt by nation-states to recuperate governance over a globalised international
400
[f]or weaker states regionalism has provided a point of entry into a western-dominated order in
which their interests are often perceived as marginalized, and also a forum where interaction
and agenda-setting are possible.
Namibia’s active involvement in the negotiations for a SADC-wide Free Trade Area
(FTA) in the 1990s, and its activism in the negotiations for an FTA between SACU and
the United States of America (USA), are but two examples on how the country works
collectively with the rest of the developing world – not only to counteract marginalisation,
but also to be proactive in setting the global economic agenda.
To achieve the above, the state needs to respond in innovative ways to these global and
regional pressures because the state is located at the interface of the international and the
national. Towards this end, the state –42
… looks both inward and outward, and in the process derives considerable power and autonomy,
often playing each spatial dimension off against the other.
This suggests that states’ foreign policy postures should not be detached from either
national or international forces.43 This dual role compels the state “to locate itself within
the globalising order”.44
New approaches to the study of regionalism have shed light on how the region is
constructed in the interplay between states, markets and civil society in various areas.
In the case of Namibia’s business community in particular, the country’s Agricultural
Trade Forum has rallied its members to be assertive on matters pertaining to the ongoing
negotiations between Namibia and the EU on the proposed Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs).
New regionalism and foreign policy

Globalisation and the study of regionalism after the Cold War can be seen as a reflection
of the reconfiguration of economic and political power in the production centres of the
world. Hurrel and Fawcett note that –45
[t]he end of the Cold War has witnessed a further expansion of the normative ambitions of
international society. Order is increasingly held to involve the creation of rules that affect very
deeply the domestic structures and organisation of states, that invest individuals and groups
within states with rights and duties, and which seek to embody some notion of a common
political economy through regional management”. Again, the foreign policy options that states
pursue through economic cooperation should reinforce this important goal.
42 Hopgood (2000:1025).
43 (ibid.).
44 Grugel (2000:6).
45 Hurrell & Fawcett (1995:309).
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Lesley Blaauw
good (human rights, democratisation, the environment, the construction of more elaborate and
intrusive interstate security orders).
One of the ways that is increasingly being seen as contributing to the creation of ‘new’
rules for international society is regionalism, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War.
Since the Cold War, international society has increasingly been restructured along
regional lines. The rise of new forms of regionalism refers to a phenomenon in its infancy
that had its genesis in the mid-1980s.46 As a field of study, new forms of regionalism –47
… reflect the deeper interdependence of today’s global political economy and the intriguing
relationship between globalism and regionalism.
Simply put, new forms of regionalism reflect the proliferation of transnational activity.
This is because, “[e]ven if initiatives are taken within the region, the factors which make
these initiatives necessary are global”.48 New regionalism, therefore, is the study of new
forms of regionalism.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, a second wave of revamped regionalism took off.
Regionalisation, therefore, should be seen against the background of important
transformations of the global political economy. This suggests that the world economy
is not only becoming globalised, it is also becoming regionalised. Conceptually, the new
regionalism refers to “new economic and political processes actually going on in many
parts of the world”.49 While various authors agree that the new regionalism refers to the
second wave of regionalism, –50
… there is as yet no clear definition of the new regionalism which is commonly subscribed to.
There is only some convergence of thinking in emphasizing its difference from the old.
46 For Marchand et al. (1999:897–910), “there is a qualitative difference between the old
regionalism of the Cold War and the one that emerged during the late 1980s”.
47 Hettne & Söderbaum (2000:38–82).
48 Hettne (1997:229). Bøås et al. (1999:1062) remind us that “[t]he globalisation/regionalisation
nexuses have created a whole range of diversified patterns of interactions and responses at
the local, national and regional levels”. These patterns are, arguably, due to the unevenness of
this process of global restructuring. Indeed, “[t]he impact of global restructuring is not only
uneven among countries, but perhaps even more so within them. This means that at the local
as well as the national and regional levels there is a multitude of approaches and responses to
globalisation/regionalisation” (ibid.:1061–1070).
49 Hettne (1999:1).
50 Mistry (1999:123). The most cogent distinction between new regionalism and older forms of
the regionalism concept is that the former allows for “a marriage between development theory
and international political economy. Such a merger may ultimately strengthen an emerging
‘new’ or critical political economy of development” (Söderbaum 2001:104). Critical political
economy deals with historical power structures, emphasising contradictions in them, and points
out changes and transformations expressed in normative terms (Cox 1996b).
402
New regionalism, as a field of study, differs from the old or first wave of regionalism in
important respects.51 Hettne posits that, whereas old regionalism was “[f]ormed in and
shaped by a bipolar cold-war context”, the new regionalism has the following features:52
(1) … the new is taking shape in a multipolar world order[.]

(2) Created ‘from above’ (by the superpowers), the new is a more spontaneous
process from within the region[,] and also [created] ‘from below’ in the sense that
the constituent states themselves, but increasingly also other actors, are the main
proponents for regional integration.
(3) As far as economic integration is concerned, [the old regionalism] was inward-
oriented and protectionist, [while] the new is often described as ‘open’, and thus
compatible with an interdependent world economy[.]
(4) Specific with regard to objectives, some organizations being security-oriented
and others being economically-oriented, the new is a more comprehensive,
multidimensional process. This includes trade and economic integration, but also
environment, social policy, security and democracy, including the whole issue of
accountability and legitimacy[, and]
(5) [While the old only] concerned relations between formally sovereign states, the new
forms part of a global structural transformation in which non-state actors are active
and manifest themselves at several levels of the global system[.]
Theoretically, new forms of regionalism are also an innovative response to the impact of
neoliberalism on state and society. Cox asserts the following in this regard:53
Neo-liberalism is transforming states from being buffers between external economic forces and
the domestic economy into agencies for adapting domestic economies to the exigencies of the
global economy.
Multilateral institutions in a regional setting facilitate this transformation of the state

to the exigencies of the global economy. The new regionalism is, therefore, predicated
on the assumption that engagement with the world economy is unavoidable. For Balefi
Tsie, the process of new regionalism “represents an attempt by states to forge a form
51 Marchand et al. (1999:897–910) observe that, “[i]n the past, the study of regionalisation has
been dominated by functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to, as it was then called,
economic and political integration”. James Mittelman (1999:26) concludes that, in addition to
these two approaches, institutionalism and neo-institutionalism are deficient, ostensibly because
they “understate power relations and fail to offer an explanation of structural transformation”.
Recently, however, “renewed interest has been accompanied by the emergence of new theories
and approaches to regionalisation. In particular, political economy and critical security
studies are shedding new light on processes of regionalisation, as well as on the emergence of
regionalism as a new world order phenomenon” (Marchand et al. 1999:897–910). Ultimately,
new regionalism differs from older types in that the new regionalism approach, “unlike the ‘old’
regional studies[,] also incorporates all three major types of actors in its purview, not just states
but also companies and communities” (Shaw 2000:399–414).
52 Hettne (1999:7–8).
53 Cox (1995:39).
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Lesley Blaauw
of governance different but not necessarily opposed to multilateralism”.54 The latter

contention is closely related to the fact that “the constituent states themselves are main
actors”.55 Seen in this light, new regionalism is arguably a state-initiated political project
to respond to globalisation and to a plurality of actors, with a view to respond, in turn,
to the comprehensiveness and multifaceted nature of contemporary regionalism. The
challenge for foreign policy practitioners is how to respond to these multiple actors and
issues.
For Hettne, the process of “new regionalism is a response to globalisation processes,

including efforts to initiate a counter-process of de-globalisation”. De-globalisation is
“an attempt to bring the globalisation process and transnational transactions under some
political-territorial control”.56 In the face of their reduced autonomy, states are the main
protagonists initiating this process of de-globalisation.57 This initiating role takes place
against the backdrop of the state’s reduced influence as a unitary actor in international
affairs.58
Cox concludes that “[s]tates are, by and large, reduced to the role of adjusting national
economies to the dynamics of an unregulated global economy”.59 Developmental
regionalism, as an integral part of the new regionalism, offers states the opportunity to
craft foreign policies which could not only contribute to regulating the global economy,
but could also accord them the prospects of deepening economic cooperation.
Developmental regionalism and foreign policy

Globalism brings into relief the issue of regionalism as a key development phenomenon
in southern Africa. By similar extension, “[t]he new regionalism may also provide
54 Tsie (2000:11–19).
55 Hettne (1997:229).
56 Hettne (1999:6). Thus, regionalisation must ultimately be viewed as “the political corrective to
globalised market-driven disorder and turbulence, not only on the level of the world but also in
local systems” (ibid.:xxxi). Moreover, de-globalisation results from a desire “to modify, halt or
to reverse the process of globalisation in order to safeguard some degree of territoriality, civil
norms, cultural diversity, and human security” (Hettne 1998:44–59).
57 Indeed, it is intimately related to the current transformation of the world economy into trading
blocs and the process of globalisation. Yet, the new regionalism “is on the one hand seen as an
integral part of the globalisation process, but on the other it can serve as formal (including state-
led) counterforces against this process” (Lee 2003:35). In this sense, the new regionalism is an
important political construct in influencing both the projects of globalism and foreign policy.
58 Accordingly, “[w]ithin each regional project there will be more than one vision, and often
also more than one actor pursuing regionalisation” (Marchand et al. 1999:897–910). This
suggests that, in the context of new regionalism, “[t]he debate has also been widened … [I]t is
beginning to acknowledge that regional interactions and organisations focus not only on states
but on continuing linkages among a heterogeneous set of actors and realms, including states,
economies/companies and societies/civil societies” (ibid.:897).
59 Cox (1996b:528).
404
solutions to development problems”.60 If the dictum that foreign policy is a reflection of

domestic policy holds true, then new regionalism – as an integral part of foreign policy
– offers states the opportunity to build new forms of economic cooperation that would
mirror domestic developmental needs. This is of particular importance to Namibia, which
is struggling with significant development challenges by way of poverty, inequality and
unemployment. For Hettne, development is “one dimension of the new regionalism,
which has many causes and serves many purposes”.61 In the face of marginalisation,
regionalism offers southern African countries the opportunity not only to address
national developmental needs, but also to engage the international community. Bertil
Odén postulates that –62
[t]he marginalization of Southern Africa as well as the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa in the world
economy over the last decades has increased the scope for regionally induced initiatives.
Because of its precarious domestic developmental situation, Namibian policymakers

need to engage the international community in a way that deliberately tries to address its
national condition.
As a normative project, regionalism in southern Africa – as elsewhere in the developing

world – accords states and non-state actors the opportunity to build new regional
economic capacity.63 Louise Fawcett notes the following in this regard:64
Promoting regional cooperation would appear then to be a rational policy choice for developing
countries both in terms of strengthening links with the advanced industrialized countries but
also demonstrating greater independence and self-sufficiency.
However, regionalism in southern Africa should be driven not only economically, but
also politically, since the aim of regionalism should be to reduce the acute disparities
in and among countries of the region.65 A developmental foreign policy lends scope and
provides guidance to this postulate by imbuing the agents of foreign policy with agency
and raising awareness among them that it is as much an economic as a political strategy.
These significant regional inequalities lend support to developmental regionalism that

sets out explicitly to address, by regional economic regulation, the structural and spatial
60 Hettne (2001b:103).
61 Hettne (1996:164).
62 Odén (2001:176). This is with a view to counteract “the global pattern of uneven development
… that … more often than not was reproduced within the region” (Odén 1999:19).
63 This is because globalisation, as a normative project, “is driven not primarily by some
inexorable economic process, but rather by politics: by ideology, by the actions, interactions
and decisions of state actors, their private sector interlocutors and [the] wider public” (Cerny
1999b:147–162).
64 Fawcett (1995:22).
65 Indeed, one of the fundamental aims of the regionalisation process is the “creation of welfare
(in terms of social security and regional balance)” (Hettne 2001b:90).
405
Lesley Blaauw
problems associated with integration amongst unequal partners.66 A developmental

foreign policy for Namibia suggests that we need to position ourselves appropriately and
actively encourage economic cooperation that would facilitate the transfer of resources
to address domestic and regional inequalities. For the aforementioned to materialise,
Namibia’s foreign policy disposition should be orientated towards attracting investment
to itself rather than to South Africa or Zimbabwe, whose manufacturing capacities are
much more developed than hers. In this context, developmental regionalism refers –67
… to concerted efforts from a group of countries within a geographical region to increase the
efficiency of the total regional economy and to improve its position in the world economy.
One way of increasing the efficiency of the total regional economy is through regional
industrial development. Indeed, one of the precepts that underpin developmental
regionalism relates to “efforts to coordinate regional industrial development”.68 This
suggests “a political economy approach to developmental regionalism”.69 Such an
approach compels foreign policy practitioners to set the development priorities for
Namibia in the context of economic cooperation.
A political economy approach to developmental regionalism presupposes that we answer

the question of “what the driving forces of the regional process are”.70 Accordingly, and
to answer the question, we need to ascertain the roles of the state, market forces and
civil society in building new economic capacity.71 Historically, state-led regionalism in
southern Africa has been a politically elite project that has tended to live a life of its own,
often separated from market demands and civil society. Thus, up to now, the interpretation
of what constitutes regional community in southern Africa remains the prerogative
of the narrow interests of regional elites. From this reading, it implies that states in
southern Africa provide the only path to regional community. Regionalism is, however,
as we have seen, a comprehensive and multifaceted process that takes place at various
analytical levels, and involves both state and non-state actors. A developmental foreign
policy presupposes that the Namibian state and other domestic actors work together to
instate and reinstate development in the discourse about economic cooperation.
66 Söderbaum (1998:75–90).
67 Hettne (2001b:104).
68 Gibb (2001:74).
69 Söderbaum (1998:75–90).
70 (ibid.).
71 Writing on state, market and society relations in southern Africa, Söderbaum (2001:111) asserts
that “[t]he private and public economic forces have been reacting faster than have the state
actors to the new postapartheid situation and the changes occurring as the result of the structural
adjustment and economic liberalization reforms in Southern Africa”.
406
Concluding remarks: A developmental foreign policy for Namibia?
This second decade of the new millennium demands principally that Namibia’s foreign
policy becomes increasingly concerned with developmentalism. Developmentalism and
a developmental foreign policy are geared towards engaging the international community.
For Chris Landsberg, a developmental foreign policy is –72
… fundamentally concerned with addressing domestic, continental, and global disparities

and inequalities … [and] policy seeks massive amounts of resources and resource transfers to
engage in redistribution to help inequalities.
As was illustrated elsewhere in this chapter, a compelling argument could be made

that Namibia’s foreign policy has impulses of developmentalism insofar as it is not
only actively outward-oriented, but also geared towards finding solutions to pressing
national problems through being pro-engagement. Namibia’s active involvement in
multilateral structures also points to the degree of developmentalism contained in its
foreign policy and its quest to put developmental issues on the global agenda. This
proactiveness suggests that, like other southern countries, Namibia aims to restore the
economic sovereignty of the developing world. More importantly, through South–South
cooperation, Namibia’s activism on various multilateral fora such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and in its current negotiations with the EU on EPAs, suggests that
the country is at the forefront in setting the development priorities of developing nations.
The developmental nature of Namibia’s foreign policy is also reflected in its interest in
the democratisation of the global economic order. For instance, in June 1998, Namibia’s
Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab called for the use of multilateralism and multilateral
agencies to ensure “growth for poverty alleviation and strengthening of Africa’s
participation in the global economy”.73 Reinforcing the concern with development
requires Namibia’s foreign policy to engage in processes to turn the Millennium
Development Goals into real development strategies. Also, the country will have to strike
a balance between a foreign policy driven by the need and quest for foreign investment
and one that aims to expand market access for its produce and minerals. In the economic
parlance, therefore, there is a need to develop a much more robust developmental foreign
policy that is able to –74
… make the link between issues of democratization and governance, and the issues of poverty
and inequality. A real challenge for a future developmental [foreign] policy is how to encourage
development in a context of democratization.
72 Landsberg (2005:723–756).
73 New Era, 22–25 June 1998.
74 Landsberg (2005:723–756).
407
Lesley Blaauw
To achieve the above, Namibia’s foreign policy should demonstrate a degree of

transparency and predictability by articulating a clear developmental macroeconomic
framework. With a view to attract much-needed foreign direct investment, Namibia
will need to recast its policies on, amongst other things, the land issue in an open and
transparent manner. Furthermore, development in the context of democratisation also
demands that developmental paradigms are articulated at the outset on programmes
with economies and countries that cooperate with Namibia. Simply put, Namibia
should demand transparency from the EU, the WTO and subregional organisations like
SADC and SACU. Finally, Namibia needs to continue building strategic South–South
partnerships and strengthen its inter- and intra-African liaisons.
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Namibia’s attitudes towards pan-Africanism
Joseph Diescho*
Our [Ghana’s] independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of
the African continent!
Kwame Nkrumah; Independence Speech, 5 March 1957
Introduction
Namibia is a child of pan-Africanism and internationalism. To all intents and purposes,
Namibia is both the creation as well as the outcome of a multiplicity of attitudes held
at different times by a number of countries in their own responses to the trajectory of
the history of Africa’s decolonisation. Such countries were on the African continent and
elsewhere as they interacted with one another in international forums.
The Western European adventurism and expansionism by way of colonialism – notably

the German Reich, the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, and, later,
a growing number of countries as members of the United Nations (UN) – all led to
the creation and acceptance of what is today the Republic of Namibia. Hence, these
affirming words came from the first President of Namibia on the occasion of the country’s
Independence on 21 March 1990:1
For the past 43 years or so, this land of our forbearers (sic) has been a bone of contention
between the Namibian people and the international community on the one hand, and South
Africa, on the other. The Namibian problem has been at the centre of bitter international dispute
over the last four decades. The United Nations and other international bodies produced huge
volumes of resolutions in an attempt to resolve this intractable problem … .
This background, and the manner in which Namibia achieved political independence and
membership of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),2
* Prof. Joseph Brian Diescho currently serves as Chief Executive Officer of the Namibia Institute
of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM). He is Honorary Professor of Government
and Political Studies, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elisabeth, South Africa.
1 Sam Nujoma, Inaugural Address at Independence, Windhoek, 21 March 1990.
2 The Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the precursor to the
current Southern African Development Community (SADC), was founded in Lusaka, Zambia,
on 1 April 1980 with the aim of strengthening unity amongst southern African states against
the onslaught of the South African apartheid regime and its machinations aimed at weakening
its neighbour’s economies. SADC had nine members at the time, namely Angola, Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The organisation
was established on 17 August 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia, with an integration agenda that was
413
joseph diescho
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the
Commonwealth, and the UN, placed upon the new nation an onerous expectation not
only to reciprocate the goodwill of others, but also to define new ways to interact and
cooperate as regards international relations in Africa and a world that had been polarised
by the infamous Cold War which formed the curtained divide between nations prior to
the end of 1989. The timing of Namibia’s independence brought with it an existentialist
reality with attendant expectations that African nations hitherto had not held. Namibia,
as the first real success story born of the activities of the international community,
should have generated hope and aspiration from Africa in relation to the foreign policy
orientation and outlook of this, the world’s newest baby. Namibia was not only expected
to, but also had an obligation to, extend its self-definition in the context of its foreign
policy towards the international community in general and to Africa in particular.
After all, it was the African countries which had focused specially on and called world
attention to the plight of the inhabitants of Namibia under foreign rule when Ethiopia
and Liberia took the matter of Namibia’s domination by South Africa to the International
Court of Justice in November 1960, demanding that South Africa had no right to rule the
territory that was placed under UN trusteeship.
After it attained independence in 1990, Namibia, as a country, paid scanty and episodic
attention to what African issues should have been in the new world. Unlike Ghana under
Kwame Nkrumah, Namibia’s foreign policy orientation in general and its attitudes
towards pan-Africanism in particular can best be described as an extension of idioms of
the liberation struggle, thus, based upon past experiences and individual hero-leaders’
memories – not a well-thought-out policy undergirded by a set of fundamental principles
monitored by a hierarchy of self-interests and values.
It would appear that post-independence African countries invariably do not appreciate the
importance of receiving foreign aid beyond general, vague and casual pronouncements
or reactions of leaders in response to a perceived readiness – or lack thereof – of richer
nations to offer them foreign aid. African countries remain in the rut of internalised
dependency on others, and formulate whatever they believe are their attitudes towards
foreign nations, mainly in the context of what material aid they receive or wish to receive.
Namibia had followed the route of African countries – not states – in its tendency to
conflate what ought to have been (their) national interest with historical experiences
through which assistance was given to them during their liberation struggles. In this
sense, they are unable to cast their eyes beyond the politics of being the underdog and
principally economic. The member states of SADC today are Angola, Botswana, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
414
towards the politics of the nation state3 in relation to other nation states, with their own
national and strategic interests. This attitude was confirmed in Namibia’s White Paper on
foreign affairs in 2004 by the following admission:4
Namibia’s bilateral relations can be placed within the historical context of the struggle for
independence. The country attaches high value to the decisions of the United Nations and other
international organisations, particularly the fraternity of the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) (now the African Union), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
as well as the Non-Aligned Movement … .
On account of the last 23 years of self-rule, Namibia’s foreign policy towards the
international community generally and Africa specifically has been more reactive than
proactive. Where it did exist, it was in the heads and/or actions of the President or the
first Minister of Foreign Affairs. As the vibrant experience of Independence celebrations
dissipated, there was less of a discernible orientation that would have influenced the
attitudes of state actors representing the Namibian nation. As a consequence, Namibia’s
attitudes towards pan-Africanism are to be found in actions that are admittedly progressive
– but not as part of an existing policy as such. Today, 23 years after the celebrations of
independence, Namibia remains by and large unclear about its own intrinsic values that
would, in turn, inform strategic and theoretical formulations of what types of relations
it has with the world, and what self-interests it should be pursuing. For instance, there
is no theory that undergirds its main thrusts when it comes to negotiating relations with
countries such as the United States of America on matters affecting precious resources,
such as potentially the second richest source of uranium in the world. Using a healthier
starting point, Namibia could exercise more influence in nuclear negotiations for Africa
and in the world. This is because Namibia founds its self-definition to be in the paradigms
of dependency and powerlessness, instead of self-worth and strength.
It would not be fair to accuse the Namibian political leadership of over 23 years to have
been completely devoid of ideas on how to interact with the world because there have
been interactions that have yielded good results for the country. What is clearly lacking
is a theory or a set of well-thought-through and cogent theories that could assist the
country’s diplomats, Members of Parliament, business representatives and other role
players in planning their interactions on the basis of sufficient knowledge and confidence.
3 African body politics invariably suffer a shortcoming in that they cannot understand the
comprehensiveness of the juridical entity called the state – with the government, the organs
of the government within their jurisdictions, the private sector, religious communities, civil
society, and non-governmental organisations all being part of the state. African political elites
cannot distinguish between the role of the ruling party at a point in time on the one hand, and
the government and the state on the other. For the most part, the ruling elite see themselves as
the government and the state. The state, in its original sense as the Rechtstaat, is more than
the government of the day and more than the party – however popular that party may be. See
Verloren van Themaat & Wiechers (1967:4).
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:63).
415
joseph diescho
A theory is always helpful for purposes of knowledge, consistency, seamlessness and

informed planning. It is also fair to say that Sam Nujoma and the first Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, were in theory and deed the brightest beacons when it came
to the country’s foreign policy over the years. This is because they learned the art during
the years of the liberation struggle – hence the following admission by the SWAPO Party
of Namibia5 leadership in 2004:6
That the struggle was a great school of diplomacy is testified to by the vast international
exposure availed in Namibia’s would-be future foreign policy formulators and executors.
For example, the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, as the foremost champion of the then
evolving Namibian national interest, was able to raise the movement’s international profile,
thereby placing the country’s name on the world map. He trotted the globe, meeting and
winning the support of a wide range of the world’s historic figures, such as, Chou En-Lai of
the People’s Republic of China, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Josip Tito of Yugoslavia, Fidel
Castro of Cuba, Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko of the then Soviet Union, Olof Palme
of Sweden, Indira Ghandi of India, Francois Mitterrand of France, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania,
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Agostinho
Neto of Angola, etc. Meetings with these eminent statesmen, at the level of both bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, were an invaluable apprenticeship for the future conduct of foreign
policy.
This “school of diplomacy” for Namibian political freedom activists, who became the
nation’s leaders after Independence and after the Cold War, essentially prepared them
poorly for navigating the nation in the context of the ‘New World Order’, as (then) US
President George Bush Snr dared to define it. Namibian leaders continued to perceive
themselves as junior diplomats. This background and context explain why Namibian
leaders put on their best democratic behaviour when they interact with European leaders,
and are more ostentatious when with African leaders. In fact, Namibian leaders are
excellent articulators of democratic values when it comes to situations outside of their
own contexts and leadership challenges back home.
Tenets of foreign policy

Successful, effective, transparent foreign policy grows out of a country’s self-definition
and relocation of what its most important or self-evident values are, measured by its
seriousness as well as its success domestically and internationally. Such values may
include human rights, national interests, commerce, the prevention of war, or a historically
informed ideology such as South Africa’s African Renaissance under President Thabo
Mbeki7 and, to a lesser extent, under his predecessor, Nelson Mandela. This agenda
5 Originally the South West Africa People’s Organisation; the name was changed to compete in
Namibia’s first-ever democratic elections in 1989.
7 It is well known that, after Kwame Nkrumah, it is Thabo Mbeki who articulated a clear vision
for the continent. He electrified Africa and the African diaspora to take a different look at
416
was spelled out very clearly barely one month into Mandela’s Administration, when
he appeared as the first-ever South African head of state to address an OAU Meeting
of Heads of State and Government in June 1994, when he declared South Africa’s pan-
African position to be as follows:8
The total liberation of Africa from foreign and white minority rule has now been achieved …
Where South Africa appears on the agenda again, let it be because we want to discuss what its
contributions shall be to the making of the new African Renaissance … .
For clarity’s sake, it is important to offer a general definition of what foreign policy
is. In broad terms, foreign policy is a framework or a pattern of behaviours of actors
within a state while they pursue their interests in relation to other states. A country’s
foreign relations policy is a formulation of a set or a series of self-interest strategies
delineated and articulated by the state to inform, spearhead and guide the various actors
within the state in their attitudes towards other countries’ governments or even non-state
actors with whom they interact or wish to establish relations in the furtherance of their
national interests and world peace. These articulations and enunciations usually come
by way of official pronouncements or declarations employed to define, clarify or guide,
strategically, the various actors within the state when conducting business politically,
commercially or otherwise with other countries or non-governmental organisations in
other countries on matters concerning mutual interests or world peace in the context of
today’s globalising economies.
These official statements become the index of information and knowledge in a given
state, to guide its official representatives in their dealings with the outside world so that
there is confidence on their part and seamlessness of conduct to uphold the good name of
the country. Such policies are evaluated and monitored from time to time to keep abreast
of the present and of changes in the environment as well as the shifts in emphasis by
different office-bearers in the country.
Conventionally, the creation or promotion of foreign policy is the business of the head
of state or government. In addition, foreign policy is conducted through diplomatic
channels, trade and commerce, strategic alliances and, occasionally, through warfare.
themselves as part of the global village that had a proclivity to marginalising Africa. When
he used the words African Renaissance for the first time in Virginia, in the United States of
America, on 21 April 1997, he said: “As Africans, we have a vision, a hope, a prayer that will
come in the end …”. See Mbeki (1998:200).
8 It was made clear that the African Renaissance agenda would influence the post-apartheid South
Africa’s relations and interactions with other African countries. South Africa, under Mbeki –
and, to a lesser extent, under Mandela – was driven by peace on the African continent and the
need to develop African solutions to African problems, with a consciousness on the part of
those representing South Africa to desist being seen as the ‘Big Brother’. See “Statement of the
President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela”, at the OAU Meeting of Heads of
State and Government, Tunis, Tunisia, 13–15 June 1994.
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joseph diescho
All three traditional branches of a democratic state – the Legislature, the Executive and
the Judiciary – contribute to and play significant roles in the development and execution
of a country’s foreign policy. For administrative, practical and implementation purposes,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by its Minister, is responsible for the day-to-day
running and maintenance of foreign policy and foreign relations. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs, or Secretary of State in other systems, is the chief advisor to the Head of State on
foreign and international matters.
Foreign policy is by and large the extension of domestic politics and life. In other words,
a country can only project that which it holds dear within its boundaries, where it wields
complete sovereignty. The Namibian Government gave expression to this reality as
follows, even though there has not been much consistency in this regard:9
Namibia’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives is no different, in this connection, from those
of other nations. Indeed, our foreign policy is the flipside of the domestic order and its national
priorities. In other words, it is the interpretation of internal policies to the outside world.
But the country’s leadership neither drew from the very foundations upon which the
Republic was established, nor made any serious efforts to build on what was indeed its
rightful base as a starting point for meaningful and respectful foreign policy formulations.
For instance, Namibia, by virtue of her healthy start on the basis of the exemplary
manner in which she fashioned her constitutional multiparty democracy, was very well
positioned to champion multipartyism and popular participation in leadership elections
on the African continent. In the first 13 years of self-rule, Namibia excelled in many
ways, gaining the moral high ground and rectitude to influence politics across Africa.
Instead, Namibia saw itself – and, arguably, continues to see itself – as a member of the
international community rather than as a participant. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
vision statement, its articulated goal reads as follows:10
To achieve a peaceful, safe, stable and prosperity-enhancing world order that is predicated on
the principles of diplomatic persuasion and multilateral approaches to interstate relations, a
world order in which Namibia is able to become a developed country by the year 2030, i.e.,
having joined the ranks of high-income (with a GNP per capita of US$7.911) economics.
The areas of influence for Namibia in relation to pan-Africanism ought to have gone
beyond the idioms of liberation and, even, race. These areas of influence, treated in more
detail below, include –
• human rights
• national interest
• regional integration
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004:ii).

10 (ibid.:vii).
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• pan-Africanism
• negotiated (peaceful) resolution of conflict
• national reconciliation
• internationalism
• race relations
• corruption, and
• the land question.
Human rights
During its emergence as a new democracy, the most visible on the African continent
at the time of its independence, and especially before South Africa stole its thunder,
Namibia occupied a unique space availed to it to make an indelible impression on the
minds of the international community. They were waiting for a country, big or small, to
define the world differently, to reframe the role of the international community in general
and Africa’s role in the affairs of the world in particular. It must be added that not even
Nelson Mandela succeeded in doing this beyond his disarming treatment of the white
worlds that expected the worst forms of revenge from black South Africans.11 Thus, in
the years shortly after it had attained its independence, Namibia was responsible for
conducting its foreign affairs in conformity with and for the amplification of international
norms and values in respect of human rights, especially universal rights. For example,
Namibia’s position on human rights issues needed to be clarified and elaborated for the
sake of those still suffering in Africa, by fostering guiding principles on how the new
nation would engage with states that found themselves guilty of abusive human rights
practices. These included Morocco, Nigeria and Western Sahara, to mention but a few.
This would have been consistent with Namibia’s position on apartheid South Africa at
the time, to which President Nujoma sent a very strong message:12
President De Klerk’s proclamation here today that South Africa has reached a final and
irreversible decision to relinquish control over Namibia is an act of statesmanship and realism.
This, we hope, will continue to unfold in South Africa itself.
At this moment, Namibia was under the watchful gaze of the international community
as no African country had previously been, yet she made no mention of the unhappy
state of affairs amongst the millions of inhabitants on the African continent still under
the heavy yoke of oppressive regimes of one-party states. There was also no mention in
this auspicious address of the role of the OAU and other continental or regional bodies
in reorganising affairs on the African continent.
11 See Diescho (1996).

12 Sam Nujoma, Inaugural Address at Independence, Windhoek, 21 March 1990.
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joseph diescho
Here a qualification is necessary. Although Namibia was expected to have expressed itself
on human rights issues in Africa as part of its pan-Africanist posture at Independence, it
was not required to suspend relations with states violating their citizens’ rights. Nor was
the new small state expected to alienate potential allies by adopting hostile measures
against them due to their domestic policies. All that was asked of Namibia, thus, was
a pragmatic yet informed and future-oriented approach with which to influence a new
form of dialogue better suited to deal with such states, and to bring honour to Africa in
the New World Order.
In other words, the timing of Namibia’s independence in March 1990, just after the
discrediting of the so-called Marxist-Socialist rhetoric of the liberation struggle, and
the fundamental changes and reconfiguration of the world order as the Cold War ended,
offered developing nations more room to manoeuvre than ever before in terms of possible
choices of policies and realignments.
National interest
Conventionally, nation states understand that they do not have friends or enemies, but
rather a hierarchy of relations. The levels at which they engage with other nations in
the international system differ and change from time to time in accordance with what
they perceive are in their national interests. Commenting on the kinds of relations that
new, post-apartheid South Africa under Nelson Mandela would pursue in relation to its
neighbours and from the perspective of its national interests, the South African Financial
Mail stated the following:13
Already President Mandela has indicated that he is aware of the need for a policy of “restraint
and sensitivity” towards South African neighbours ... .
It would appear that, at the time of Independence, Namibia had too many friends, and
the new government was uncertain about its own national interests. This was the time to
develop and formulate a sensible policy for dealing with other countries in the southern
Africa region in relation to one another, on the one hand, and to South Africa on the other.
The romantic associations surrounding the liberation struggle-cum-socialist tendencies
needed redefinition and redirection to respond effectively to the post-bipolar world, and
Namibia was the most well-placed country to articulate this reality. There are many parts
of Africa which still have very little to do with Namibia except for being part of the
continent, and it remains an expensive and futile exercise to pretend to share something
in common with a country like The Gambia.
Indirectly, the application by Namibia to be admitted as a member of the Commonwealth

on the basis of the need to be close to other African nations is a positive admission of the
13 “Foreign policy: A matter of interest”; Financial Mail, 27 May 1994, p 23.
420
urgency of belonging to the African family. It must be said, however, that the enthusiasm
to belong to international organisations does not, by any means, demonstrate clarity
about why membership is in the country’s national interests.
What are national interests, then? Jack Spence makes the observation that national
interests derive from “ideas which people have of the place which they would like their
country to occupy in the world”.14 Spence further avers that “[t]hese ideas change in
time, apart from never being unanimous within a country at a given time”.15
Jack Spence16 points out how –

conventional wisdom holds that a country’s foreign policy requires the definition and ranking of
national interests based on the immutable facts of geographic, economic and military capability
together with a flexible and skilful diplomacy … .
In this context, Namibia’s national interests should have been informed by the following
elements:
• At the domestic level, Namibia needed to consolidate its democracy, and develop
an economy with a built-in capacity to create jobs for sustainable economic growth
• A national programme to reduce socio-economic disparities
• A government and business agenda that gave priority to enhancing traditional
links with the states of Europe and North America, and establishing new relations
with the East Asian Tigers as well as Latin America, based on a reconsideration
of Africa’s role in the world
• A redefinition of neighbourliness and regional integration based on a growing
measure of self-reliance – unilaterally at first, then bilaterally, followed by a
regional assertion, and then a continental one
• A redefinition and re-launching of regional infrastructural cooperation to enhance
the movement of goods and people in the region and on the continent, starting
with Angola and South Africa as the pillars of Namibia’s own economic growth
• Building on the high moral ground the country enjoyed at the time of Independence
and elaborating an agenda for self-respect, national reconciliation, and peaceful
settlement of national disputes in order to address the socio-economic inequalities
and other ills left by apartheid and colonialism
• A comprehensive programme towards education reform in the southern African
region to obviate difficulties that impede its regional integration, so that there is
movement towards streamlining education policies to allow for an exchange of
teaching personnel and students, and
• A comprehensive articulation of the importance of the unity of African development
efforts as opposed to the earlier efforts towards liberation.
14 Spence (1995).
15 (ibid.).
16 (ibid.).
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Regional integration
About a year after becoming the first President of a democratic Namibia, Sam Nujoma
addressed SADCC in Windhoek and boldly stated Namibia’s position on regionalism:17
…we of this sub-region[,] including a post-apartheid, democratic, united and non-racial South
Africa[,] are fully committed to pooling our resources for the common good of our countries
and peoples. It is also a further demonstration that the people of this region, even when the
obnoxious system of apartheid is removed, will still have the need to reach out to one another
for regional growth and prosperity. SADCC will, no doubt, provide the right framework for the
community of nations of Southern Africa … we are living in times where countries the world
over are moving towards integrated production and trade areas. In our own sub-region, we have
already made substantial progress in establishing a framework for future closer co-operation and
must now examine more closely the modalities of a truly integrated single SADCC economy.
Yet the follow-up actions were devoid of consistency or the determination to pursue real
goals and strategies. The absence of clear strategies resulted in episodic, not thought-
through actions at the behest of the Head of State, such as the participation in the conflict
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998, the explanations of which left more
questions than answers not only in Namibia, but also beyond its borders.
(Pan-)Africanism?
The spirit of pan-Africanism derives from the restlessness of black people living in the
developed world, but who saw their plight as inextricably tied into the developments
around the inhabitants of the African continent.
The later versions of pan-African sentiments still stemmed from international quarters
such as the UN General Assembly in its commitment to assisting Africa to participate
more meaningfully in international affairs by encouraging the continent to stand together
as a political bloc. One such General Assembly resolution was as follows:18
• Give full support to the political and institution structure of emerging democracies in Africa;
• Encourage and sustain regional and sub-regional mechanisms for preventing conflict and
promoting political stability, and to ensure a reliable flow of resources for peace-keeping
operations on the continent;
• Take special measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable
development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced
official development assistance and increased flows of foreign direct investment as well as
transfers of technology, and
• Help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other
infectious diseases.

18 (ibid.:v).
422
In many ways, Namibia sold itself short in terms of the great strides this small country
had taken to solidify its Africanness. For instance, it has been much more pro-Africa
than South Africa and Angola, its rich neighbours. It is only in Namibia that the state
promoted the singing of the African Union Anthem alongside the national anthem.
Namibia’s lost opportunities in effecting and directing a pan-Africanist agenda are not
due to a lack of interest but mainly to a lack of consistency and intellectual cohesion. For
instance, if Namibia had been as consistent about promoting a pan-Africanist agenda as
it had been over the singing of the African Union Anthem, the political leadership would
have made attempts to enhance its intellectual capacity by employing non-Namibian
scholars and thinkers in its advisory networks. How else would one country push a
continental agenda without the direct input of other Africans, at least at an ideas level?
This is what Kwame Nkrumah did when he employed other Africans in his team to advise
him. Indeed, he even went as far as importing the African-American pan-Africanist Dr
WEB du Bois – the Father of pan-Africanism – who died in Ghana. Similarly, Julius
Nyerere encouraged scholars from the African diaspora, such as Walter Rodney, to go
and work in Tanzania, while Kenneth Kaunda made Zambia home for exiled Namibians
and South Africans for a long period. In this manner, these leaders gave effect to what
they preached. This was never the case in Namibia.
Secondly, the country has done itself a great disservice with its practice of anti-
intellectualism by which it emphasised blind loyalty to the ruling SWAPO Party of
Namibia, instead of embracing Namibians on the basis of the contribution they could
make to the life of the nation. This anti-intellectualism deprived the country’s diplomatic
services of new ideas and thoughts.
Thirdly, before South Africa became liberated with Nelson Mandela at its helm, Africa
looked to Namibia for a new mode of African leadership – an occasion to which Namibia
never rose.
Pan-Africanism, as a concept, has its historical roots in the protest movement of North
American and West Indian ‘Negroes’ who were reasserting their links with Africa and
the achievements of African civilisations. Its precursors were the early ‘Back to Africa’
movements, following on the creation of countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone, as
locations for ‘freed’ slaves who were returned to the African continent to live as free
people. One of the high points of this remarkable spread of blackism was the work of
Marcus Aurelius Garvey who, in the 1920s in the United States, championed what later
became known as Pan-Africanism.19
19 Legum (1962:24–36).
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When the UN was founded in 1946, as the world was licking the wounds from the
Second European Tribal War (often described as the Second World War), Africa was
almost entirely under European colonial rule. Only four countries were self-ruling,
namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South Africa.
Pan-Africanism was, to all intents and purposes, an –20
… expression of resistance by people whose present day reality is the direct consequence of a
history of slavery. From the ghettoes of New York or Detroit to the rural communities of the
Caribbean, individuals and groups have turned their gaze towards Africa as their true homeland,
as the place to which they truly belong … .
Colin Legum,21 in his book entitled Pan-Africanism, gives a relatively full account of this
trajectory. Among these personalities who agitated in America for the return of dignity
to the people of African ancestry were Prince Hall (1735–1807), a minister of a church
in Boston and a Freemason Grand Master. In 1787, Hall petitioned the Massachusetts
Legislative Assembly to allow impoverished black people to return to their African
homelands. The request was ignored. Paul Cuffe (1759–1817), a Quaker merchant and
shipbuilder from Boston, urged fellow Africans to return to Africa. In 1815, in concert
with another 40 fellow African Americans, he set sail for Sierra Leone in a ship he had
built himself. His efforts did not amount to more than establishing a settlement in West
Africa at his own costs. The efforts by children of ex-slaves to emancipate themselves as
Africans were followed by those of white American liberals who founded the American
Colonization Society (ACS) in 1816 with the main aim of financing and arranging for the
relocation of ‘freed’ slaves to Liberia. One of the outcomes was the American Colonial
Society’s establishment of Liberia, the first American colony in Africa, which became
home to repatriated ‘freed’ African slaves.
The same spirit of agitation to return to Africa obtained in the West Indian Islands
and Latin America where Africans were slaves. For instance, the Jamaican journalist
John Russwurm (1799–1857) picked up the freedom mantle there, and supported the
repatriation of Africans. He later moved to Liberia where he set up the Liberia Herald
newspaper. In 1897, Dr Albert Throne launched the African Colonial Enterprise, with the
aim of relocating Africans in the West Indies to Africa.22
Later, following the spread of the theory of the “survival of the fittest” by the European
thinker Charles Darwin (1809–1882), practitioners of white supremacy extended the
theory of Social Darwinism to argue that Africans and other people of colour in the world
were in the lowest ranks of the human pecking order and were, therefore, only fit to be
ruled by white Caucasians, who were claimed to be superior to them. Thus, colonisation
20 Watson & Thompson (2000:10).

21 Legum (1962:13–64).
22 (ibid.).
424
was justified and expanded under the pretext that white settlers in Africa were culturally
superior to those to whom they had the duty to deliver civilisation by way of their
own (European) religious, political and economic systems. Once they had brought this
‘civilisation’ to the ‘heathens’, ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’, they were the harbingers of
the good life. Hence, as late as 1919/20, with the Treaty of Versailles, Article 22 of
the Treaty of the League of Nations argued that, with respect to the inhabitants of “C”
mandate countries such as Namibia, they “were not able to stand by themselves … or
unable to manage their own affairs” and, therefore, were obliged to be governed by and
placed under the tutelage of ‘advanced’ nations such as the white South Africans.23 This
ruling could and did, in fact, apply to Africans as a whole.
The UN became a forum where colonies ruled by other nations could agitate for self-rule
under the umbrella of the right to self-determination. After the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by UN member states on 10 December 1948, it become
increasingly difficult for colonisers to maintain possession of their colonies and still
remain respectable members of the UN.
In this context, African countries would find the pan-African route the best treatment to
undo what Chika Onyeani, in his seminal work entitled Capitalist Nigger, describes as
follows:24
The balkanization of Africa by the six Caucasian nations, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal
and Germany, resulted in the creation of disparate and at best, baseless boundaries, countries
without geographic significance. The fight to gain independence was not so much aggressive
pursuit of the goal of independence by African leaders, as the realization by the Europeans that
they had looted all that they needed to loot from Africa. The leaders of Africa who benefited
from the handout of independence to African countries had no concept of the ideals of rulership
they were inheriting other than their desire to displace the Europeans in their oppression of
masses of the people and their opulent lifestyles with the resources of the people.
In the end, pan-Africanism is in every African country’s national interest!
Negotiated (peaceful) resolution of conflict
Namibia deserves credit for the dexterity with which its leaders managed to reach
common ground before, during, and after the hard negotiations in the Constituent
Assembly, which agreed upon and crafted the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia
at the end of 1989 – within 80 days. Admittedly, the conditions in the international
community and under which the Constitution was negotiated were more favourable than
those which prevailed when previous African constitutions were written. What must be
said, however, is that the Namibian leadership from all political party formations seized
23 Goldblatt (1978:211).
24 Onyeani (1999:98).
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joseph diescho
the moment and put together a peace initiative which provided the blanket of security and
stability under which the Namibian nation has been able to sleep since Independence.
It took the leadership that was in place to deliver such a magnanimous testament to the
coming generations.
What followed later in terms of telling the Namibian story to the international community
in general and to Africa in particular is far below the standards of the Namibian success
story. The Namibian leadership sold the country short by returning to the failed antics
of African politics, whereby leaders in the ruling party degenerated into the psychosis
of African ruling party hubris and paranoia. The same leadership that had ushered in
political liberation in such an exemplary fashion by negotiating a peaceful settlement
with their worst enemies retrogressed by ten steps in introducing a one-party-political
style of rule by fear to such a degree that the country lost its respectability in the region
and on the continent. Sam Nujoma, who presided over Namibia’s independence, is not
one of the elder statesmen called upon to mediate in any resolution on the continent
because he is not regarded as a man of sufficient peace or wisdom to counsel others. In
his latter years as a leader, he became belligerent and punitive towards his own who did
not wish for him to stay permanently in power as the Perfect Man, the Strong Man of
the land.
National reconciliation
Namibia’s policy on national reconciliation is not an outcome, as was the case in South
Africa, of a Sunset Clause25 employed to cajole the white population into accepting
changes so that that they would not leave the country or destabilise it. In Namibia’s
case, the SWAPO leadership decided that, if it came to power, reconciliation with
their historical political foes would be the route to follow. In February 1989, at a party
meeting in Angola, the SWAPO leadership adopted the following resolution on national
reconciliation:26
The Central Committee resolved to adopt a policy of national reconciliation in order to enhance
the chances of peace in Namibia … Communities have been set against each other, tribe against
tribe, race against race, wife against husband, son against father, daughter against mother,
etc. The Swapo policy of national reconciliation was aimed therefore to heal these wounds of
war …
While it is very important to give credit to the SWAPO leadership for this bold and
magnanimous resolution, the point must be made that there have been very few efforts on
25 The Sunset Clause, developed by Joe Slovo as a guide for the African National Congress (ANC)
strategy to negotiate with the white apartheid establishment, recommended that a Government
of National Unity be adopted until the white citizens adapted to it. In five years (when the sun
set), it would then take over all apparatuses of state and government. See Slovo (1992:36–40).
26 Forum for the Future News, No. 2, June 2004, p 2.
426
SWAPO’s part to follow it up in a nation-building programme. There was considerable

gesturing on the part of some quarters of the government towards appeasing white farmers
and businesses when it was convenient for it to do so. However, virtually nothing was
done to heal the wounds that were inflicted in areas of jurisdiction where SWAPO was in
charge, for example, in Lubango in Angola, where many people who were perceived by
the leadership to be difficult were tortured, made to disappear, or reported to have died
of some or other obscure illness.27
Where Namibia did not do so well was in internalising reconciliation as a value for
Namibian society. Because the government did not build on this foundation, it has now
crumbled. Furthermore, the ruling party has adopted a stance that it is more important
than the people. Moreover, the first President has resorted to calling white people who
have an opinion that differs from his or his party’s “foreigners” who are there at the
mercy of the ruling party. Hence, the ruling party has been unable to distinguish between
itself, the government, and the state – so much so that the party leaders have begun to
fantasise that the party is above the government and above the state. In this manner,
Namibia cannot be a promoter of positive pan-Africanism.
Internationalism
The expression of nationalism, in tandem with the logic of states and boundaries left
behind by European colonialism, understandable though it has been, must be seen to be
an artificial situation stemming from one of the main aims of colonialism: to divide and
rule African territories. The long history of this experience and the exploitation of Africa
that accompanied it left African countries individually and collectively underdeveloped.
Liberation can only come through informed and collective action and forward-looking
programmes that start in individual African states.
It is futile for any African country to harbour the illusion that it can develop meaningfully
in a sustainable fashion in the present world by itself. Only through partnership and
commercial and economic solidarity can Africa become a real player on the continent
and in the world. Tajudeen Abdul Rahman expressively observes this as follows:28
The collective African experience is that we can only be ourselves and we need each other to
counter the threat of marginalization, rapacious globalization and the consolidation of whatever
little gains may have been accomplished in a number of African countries. No one country can
be a sustainable miracle if its neighbours are in hell.
27 SWAPO Party of Namibia (1996). This book, produced by the party in response to the calls to
the SWAPO leadership to give an explanation for what happened to countless Namibians in the
so-called dungeons in Lubango, Angola, representing over 80% of the unaccounted-for deaths
or disappearances of people under SWAPO’s jurisdiction, offers “died in combat” as the main
cause of the absence of people.
28 Tajudeen Abdul Rahman, cited by Murithi (2005:8–9).
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joseph diescho
It is not sufficient to think of pan-Africanism only in terms of the contribution which

other African governments have made to the struggle for Namibia’s independence. For
instance, being sandwiched between two giant economies, Angola and South Africa,
offers Namibia great pan-African possibilities. Namibia could have brought about a
new format of dialogue between these countries, not only for trade and commercial
reasons, but also to enhance and harmonise the disparate cultural and other ties that
exist between the citizens of those countries. Namibia could benefit a great deal from
this harmonisation, in the process rendering trade and commercial interaction more
integrated and sustainable. In so doing, the consolidation of peace and democracy could
become people-oriented and less focused on mere government interactions, necessary
though they are.
Race relations
Against the background of apartheid and the worse circumstances that obtained in
Namibia before Independence, Namibia has to be commended as having done extremely
well in the area of race relations. To be sure, these were militarised under apartheid, as
the SWAPO Central Committee statement in February 1989 succinctly noted.29 There
was hardly a family in Namibia that did not have a member working for the South
African Defence Force, whose aim was to prevent the coming into being of true black
majority rule in the country.
Jannie de Wet, the erstwhile Commissioner General of the Indigenous Peoples of

South West Africa, the prefect of white minority rule in the country, acknowledged
his astonishment at the manner in which the SWAPO-led Government had handled
and maintained peaceful race relations in the country. Addressing a packed gala dinner
bidding farewell to the first President and welcoming the second on 20 March 2005,
De Wet expressed his gratitude to the Namibian Government that he had never in his
previous role thought that he would live in a free Namibia where he would be respected
as a white citizen amongst black citizens of the country, and how this was all due to the
policy of reconciliation that recognised all races as equal citizens.30
Across the board, the Namibian people have been more than willing to work together.
For the first 15 years after Independence, race relations were beyond reproach until the
first President failed to secure the presidency for the fourth time and forever. He then
turned to Zimbabwe and made use of unnecessary venom to reassert his leadership in his
party. He became hostile towards white citizens, and party politics became worse since
any critical voice from the white community was now seen as racist, reactionary, and
even imperialist. This is the image that the rest of Africa and the rest of the world now
have of Namibia.
29 Forum for the Future News, Newsletter No. 2, June 2004, p 2.

30 JM de Wet, speech at the gala dinner in honour of President-Elect Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba,
Windhoek, 20 March 2005.
428
This is disappointing, compared with Nkrumah’s truly pan-Africanist stance in 1957,

when he declared that all Africans could enter Ghana without visas, including white
South Africans, as they were citizens of the African continent!
Corruption
Corruption has been a silent destroyer of confidence in the Namibian body politic.
Though it remains hard to pinpoint particular incidents of official corruption, the problem
is so rampant that the second President pronounced his own commitment to stamping
it out in his first address as Head of State on 21 March 2005. The background to his
acknowledgement that corruption was a cancer in Namibian society was, in part, the lack
of action by the state on a number of investigations instigated by the government but with
no outcome. A total of over 14 Presidential Commissions were appointed by the Nujoma-
led Government to investigate incidents of corruption, but none of their outcomes were
announced or followed up on – all due to political interference and influence.31
The land question
From 25 June to 1 July 1991, the Namibian Government convened a National Conference
on Land Reform and the Land Question. This involved discussing the ‘willing seller
31 The list includes the following: Presidential Commission on Higher Education, 1991;
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to Chiefs, Headmen and Other
Traditional or Tribal Leaders and Authorities, 1991; Presidential Commission of Inquiry
into Alleged instances of Irregularities in Respect of Property of the Central Government of
Namibia, 1991; Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Procedures and Practices Applied
in the Allocation and Utilisation of Existing Fishing Rights, 1993; Presidential Commission
of Inquiry into the Cause of Resistance by Certain Members of the Caprivi Community to the
Appointment of Certain Senior Public Servants (Education), 1993; Presidential Commission
of Inquiry into Labour-related Matters Affecting Agricultural Employees and Domestic
Employees, 1995; Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Legislation for the More Effective
Combating of Crime in Namibia, 1996; Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Aviation
Regulatory Practices of the Directorate Civil Aviation in the Ministry of Works, Transport and
Communication, 1997; Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Education, Culture and Training,
1999; Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Activities, Management and Operations of
TransNamib Holdings Limited, 2001; Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Activities,
Management and Operations of Air Namibia, 2001; Presidential Commission of Inquiry into
the Activities, Affairs, Management and Operations of the Social Security Commission, 2002;
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Activities, Affairs, Management and Operations
of the Roads Authority and Road Fund Administration, 2003; and Presidential Commission of
Inquiry into the Activities, Affairs, Management and Operation of the Former Amalgamated
Commercial Holding (Pty) Ltd AMCOM Registration No. 93/261 and the Former Development
Brigade Corporation (DBC) Established under Section 2 of the Development Brigade
Corporation Act, 1992, (Act No. 32 of 1992), 2004.Until the Anti-corruption Commission was
appointed in 2004/5, no outcomes of these Commissions were announced or acted upon.
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joseph diescho
– willing buyer’ principle, and was aimed at promoting the constitutional right of all
citizens to own, purchase or sell land anywhere in the country.32
Other than the ongoing expressions of discontent from the Herero community, there has
not been any major incident regarding the use of land in the country since Independence.
The government has acquitted itself well in allowing the Constitution to run its course
in land affairs, and would do well to maintain the stance of a unitary state with some
allowance for the use of land by and under Traditional Authorities.
The only point that ought to be made is that the government has been inconsistent in
regard to land matters when dealing with the Zimbabwean crisis over the years. Namibia
did not need to denounce President Mugabe ad hominem, but merely, in line with its
own Supreme Law, say to him that the grabbing of land from white Zimbabweans was
incompatible with the laws of Namibia and SADC. The good name of Africa cannot be
sustained when member states behave so wilfully towards their citizens’ rights to land.
Challenges ahead
It must be stated that pan-Africanism as a grand idea was never coherent in any country
in Africa since its inception. Its coherence was within the diaspora where it started –
within the ranks of black people who found themselves away from the Mother Continent
and hankered to be connected to the where their ancestors came from. When the matter
of the unity of Africa was debated amongst the leaders of liberated states, there was a
big division between those who wanted the unity now, and those who preferred it to be
the outcome of a gradual process. Hence, the formation of the OAU was a compromise
between the so-called Monrovia Group who wanted a gradual process, and the Casablanca
Group who were the radical pan-Africanists at the time.
At the centre of this vexing debate was the question of who was going to be the Leader
of leaders. Nkrumah pushed hard for the immediate unification of Africa, a zeal that can
be said to have led to his demise in his country, Ghana. In other words, even though there
has never been national coherence about pan-Africanism as a an ideal, there has, at the
same time, been more consensus about the need to have a pan-African identity than there
has been about forming the United States of Africa.
There seems to be a consensus amongst Africanists that the better route to pan-Africanism
– or even the United States of Africa, as the embodiment of this ideal – is through the
gradual route of regionalism. The major challenge here is whether political leaders of
32 Article 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia pronounces that “[a]ll persons shall
have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable
and movable property individually or in association with others and to bequeath their property
to their heirs or legatees …”.
430
Africa can master enough authority on the one hand, and political will on the other, to
mobilise the disparate nation-state-based identities to move towards a united front of
Africa à la Nkrumah, with, inter alia, a single African currency, one African defence
command, and one mega-constellation of African states. As long as African identities
remain patterned along European linguistic blocs, namely anglophone, francophone
and lusophone, pan-Africanism remains an ideal that is difficult to reach. In addition,
nationalism and national pride stand starkly in the way of each state in Africa’s attempts
towards realising true pan-Africanism – and Namibia is no exception. Xenophobia exists
in each African state even as national leaders pay lip service, at best, to pan-Africanism.
If pan-Africanism was a search for the dignity of African peoples in the 20th century,
can it still remain such a quest in the 21st, in the contexts of nationalisms, sovereignties
and ‘independentisms’ across the African continent that hinder the slightest continental
efforts to settle problems of democratisation, namely the rights of the citizens of
African countries to be themselves – free from dictatorships, free from oppression,
free from ignorance, and free from want? It would appear that pan-Africanism in the
current century means different things to various players at different times, admittedly
for varying purposes. The clearest acclamation to have come from African states in
relation to the commitment to pan-Africanism was the establishment of the Pan-African
Parliament in March 2004, by Article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,
as one of the nine Organs provided for in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic
Community signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1991. The Pan-African Parliament purports to
provide a common platform for African peoples and their grass-roots organisations to
participate more in decision-making processes regarding problems and challenges facing
their countries in particular, and the continent in general.
The existence of such a Pan-African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa, is one of

the hallmarks of contradictions in African politics. Many of the members of this
megaparliament either hold dubious credentials as elected officials, or hail from regimes
that have no serious parliamentary democracy back home. How they would oversee
parliamentary democracy on the continent when they have no such culture is anybody’s
guess. The members of this parliament are undoubtedly grateful to stay in South Africa
where they enjoy so many benefits and trappings – most of these at the expense of South
African taxpayers!
Namibia is a member of this Pan-African Parliament, yet refuses to be part of the African
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is widely considered as the jewel in the crown
of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was adopted by the
African Union (AU) Summit in Lusaka in 2001 as its official development programme
and is considered as a pan-African agenda programme.
The APRM was subsequently launched in 2003 and is regarded by member states as
the most important NEPAD instrument and, as such, a critical AU instrument intended
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joseph diescho
to assist African governments with enhancing the quality of governance on the African
continent by allowing member states, as peers, to review one another, after acceding to
the process on a voluntary basis. The APRM was adopted at NEPAD’s Sixth Summit of
the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, in
March 2003. The instrument would, if respected, truly assist African governments with
monitoring themselves in anticipation of the peer review process so that, in the end,
democratic practices would be shared and strengthened across the continent. This would
be true pan-Africanism in motion.
It is not surprising that Namibia is not one of the signatories to the APRM. When
confronted with the idea of respecting the commitments to good governance and the
process of peer review in NEPAD, Namibia has exhibited a dismissive attitude towards
these AU efforts, arguing that NEPAD was purely concerned with economic issues (a
fundraising arm of the AU for African countries) and not with politics. Namibia’s second
Prime Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, was vocal on the APRM issue, saying it belonged –33
… to the dustbin of history as a sham. I see it as a misleading new name for the old, discredited
structural adjustment fiasco. … Neo-colonialism – which is what the APRM is – is a killer
disease: we must run away from it.
Conclusion
Like the European Renaissance that focused on Europe, pan-Africanism was an
intellectual preoccupation of individuals who were concerned about the future of the
African continent and her inhabitants in the context of what had been inflicted on them by
other nations. The trouble in Africa was that many concepts, including that of the African
Renaissance advocated by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, held that African leaders – or,
rather, the ruling politicians – were the high priests of ideas. In Namibia, where there is
a total disdain for intellectual thought and contribution, pan-Africanism as such could
not thrive, as there was no beginning, no process and no ending to it. Whatever there
was or is of Pan-Africanism in Namibia originated from Sam Nujoma and the disparate
histories of SWAPO.
Attempts under the rubric of the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia (Pacon), established in
1999, are instructive. Its best intentions to revive Africanism in Namibia notwithstanding,
it fell prey to the politics of heroism, becoming a mini-cultural mouthpiece of the ruling
party to such a degree that its biggest accomplishment is the unsuccessful movie,
Where others wavered, on the founding President. Thus, Pacon failed to become a pan-
Africanist movement, and instead became an ethnic entity with the central preoccupation
of winning the favours of the ruling party.
33 Gurirab (2003); cited in Melber (2003:22). In this paper, Melber offers a helpful analysis of the
contradictions of liberation movements in power, inter alia alluding to the fact that they do not
necessarily breed a democratic culture.
432
Pan-Africanism is, in essence, a beckoning of Africans – and yes, including Namibians

– to turn to themselves, to Africa. For too long, Africans have been programmed to start
elsewhere, and end up elsewhere – and hardly ever with themselves. Namibian problems
and opportunities are African in content and character; therefore, thinking about solutions
to the problems of the country must start with Africa, working with and through other
Africans, using Africa as the starting point of development and planning – in order to
arrive at African solutions. As the late Tom Mboya, a Kenyan nationalist during the
struggle for liberation in his country, once opined at the time of the pro-West/pro-East
divide, “Africans are neither pro-West nor pro-Russian – they are pro-African!”34
Namibia cannot succeed in going the route of pan-Africanism by itself: its economy
is too small and leaders with very limited influence. For that matter, no single African
country can drag the rest towards a united front, however willing or resourceful the
others might be. Former Tanzanian President. Benjamin Mkapa perhaps has his finger on
the right button when he makes the following warning:35
This is a shortcoming of both regional and continental organizations. The NEPAD momentum
is slowing down. The Summits have descended into annual parades. Implementation of past
decisions is inadequately reviewed. New development initiatives are not sufficiently backed by
funding, and so become simple resolutions of hope. Our actions do not match the ambitions we
proclaim. Churning out position papers will not fight poverty, illiteracy and disease. Analysis of
our problems must happen concurrently with deliberate capacity to address them … .
And finally, May 2013 marked the 50-year anniversary of not so much the accomplishments
as such towards the African Union agenda aspired to in 1963 with the establishment of
the OAU, but a new call to action to the new crop of African leaders to dream afresh.
This dream might not be about the sovereignty of African states but a new African
Renaissance. This spirit should deconstruct the current state of affairs of the AU, which
by and large is about the goings-on of a trade union of African heads of state – not the
emancipation of the dwellers of the African continent who are in search of a better life.
Thabo Mbeki’s poignant question cannot be overemphasised:36
… what have we done over half-a-century to advance towards the achievement of the objective
of African unity[?]
This is where it is at: not the fight against colonialism, but the march towards the
emancipation of Africa, including the lifting up of the burden of heads of state as ‘Big
Men’.
34 Legum (1962:13).
35 Mkapa (2011).
36 Mbeki (2013).
433
joseph diescho
References
Diescho, Joseph. 1996. The limits of foreign policy making in South Africa. Pretoria:
University of South Africa (UNISA) Press.
Goldblatt, I. 1978. History of South West Africa from the beginning of the twentieth
century. Cape Town: Juta.
Legum, Colin. 1962. Pan-Africanism: A short political guide. New York: Frederick A
Praeger.
Mbeki, Thabo. 1998. Africa – The time has come. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Mbeki, Thabo. 2013. “Africa must unite!”. Available at http://www.thabombekifoundation.
org.za/Pages/Africa-Must-Unite-%E2%80%93-May-2013.aspx; last accessed 8
November 2013.
Melber, Henning. 2003. “Liberation movements in government: Southern African
experiences with special reference to SWAPO and the post-colonial culture in
Namibia”. Unpublished paper presented at the Symposium entitled “Futures for
Southern Africa”, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, 15–17 September
2003.
Mkapa, Benjamin. 2011. “Annual Thabo Mbeki Lecture”. Unpublished presentation,
University of South Africa, Pretoria, 25 May 2011.
Murithi, Timothy. 2005. “From pan-Africanism to the African Union: The invention of
an idea”. In Murithi, T (Ed). The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding
and development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., pp 8–9.
Onyeani, Chika. 1999. Capitalist Nigger: The road to success – A spider web doctrine.
New York: Timbuktu Publishers.
Slovo, Joe. 1992. “Negotiations: What room for compromise?”. African Communist,
Third Quarter:36–40.
Spence, Jack. 1995. “New directions in South African foreign policy”. Unpublished
Seminar Address for the award of International Relations Honours, University of
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.
SWAPO Party of Namibia, 1996. Their blood waters our freedom. Windhoek: SWAPO
Party of Namibia.
Verloren van Themaat, JP & M Wiechers. 1967. Staatsreg. Durban: Butterworth.
Watson, Barrington & Dudley Thompson. 2000. They are Africans. Cape Town: Kwela
Books.
434
Namibia: Global governance matters
Henning Melber*
Direct United Nations (UN) responsibility and intervention was an important factor for
a solution of the dispute concerning the future of Namibia in 1989/1990. The transition
to independence negotiated and implemented for Namibia under the initiative of the UN
was a process of controlled change, which finally resulted in changed control. It remains
a matter of speculation which course Namibia’s decolonisation would have taken without
the international organisation’s facilitation. The fact of the matter is that Namibia, more
than most other sovereign states, has been a result of an active role taken by the UN.
Hence, it is an interesting question what role Namibia plays as an international actor
with regard to normative frameworks and the values and principles relating to global
governance.
This chapter recalls, in a first part, the role played by the UN in the process towards
achieving national sovereignty. It then analyses Namibia’s subsequent role as an
independent member state of the UN with regard to a few aspects of its foreign policy
relating to the respect for global normative frameworks guiding the notion of good
governance. A third and final part offers some concluding thoughts.
A trust betrayed
Most parts of the territory of the Republic of Namibia were declared a Protectorate of
imperial Germany in 1884. What was then known as German South West Africa lasted
for 30 years. During this period, it was transformed into a settler-dominated society under
foreign rule characterised by strict racial segregation. The structures imposed within a
violent subjugation process of the local population had lasting effects far beyond the actual
period of German rule. After World War I, the former German colony was declared a “C”
mandate, with far-reaching authority transferred on the mandatory power. The trusteeship
was executed on behalf of the British Crown by the Union of South Africa. With the end
of the League of Nations – originally in charge of supervising such trusteeships – and the
subsequent establishment of the UN and its Trusteeship Council, a long-lasting dispute
emerged between the world body and one of its founding members, South Africa. The
* Dr Henning Melber is a former Senior Advisor/Director Emeritus of the Dag Hammarskjöld

Foundation in Uppsala, Sweden, and former Director of the Namibian Economic Policy
Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek as well as former Research Director of the Nordic Africa
Institute in Uppsala. He is currently an Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political
Sciences at the University of Pretoria, South African, and at the Centre for Africa Studies at the
University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, also in South Africa.
435
Henning Melber
future of the country, including the administrative and legal responsibilities and its status
in terms of international law and self-determination, became one of the most prominent
and genuine cases of internationally negotiated decolonisation for most of the second
half of the 20th Century.
The “winds of change”1 brought about the decolonisation of most African countries
until the late 1960s. This contributed towards a diversified composition of the family
of sovereign states within the UN, which in turn had an impact on the discourse in the
international policy arena. The emergence of independent African states and both the
establishment of an Organisation of African Unity as well as a Non-aligned Movement
contributed markedly towards shifts in policy issues. These included the change of
perception of unsolved decolonisation conflicts like the case of Namibia. The 1960s,
therefore, brought to an end the silent tolerance of a continued occupation of the territory
by neighbouring South Africa in defiance of the authority and responsibility claimed by
the UN.
The dispute turned into open conflict and demanded recognition – also in terms of
international law.2 In both the General Assembly as well as the Security Council, the UN
assumed full responsibility to remain seized with the matter for more than two decades to
come. Namibia turned into a genuine and singular case of UN concern, manifested also by
the creation of the UN Council for Namibia3 and the UN Institute for Namibia (UNIN).4
The liberation movement – in a process of formation during the 1950s and established
since 1960 as the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO)5 – subsequently
achieved unique status. With the overwhelming support of the non-aligned countries and
the Eastern bloc, as a result of intensive diplomacy Namibia was acknowledged by the
General Assembly as the only legitimate agency of the Namibian people6 and obtained
1 This catchword, characterising the rapid processes of decolonization in many African countries
was coined in a speech by then British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 3 February 1960
whilst addressing the South African Parliament in Cape Town during his tour of African
Commonwealth states. He then said: “The wind of change is blowing through this continent.
Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact”. The most
popular song by the late Jackson Kaujeua (1953–2010) had the same title.
2 With Resolution 2145, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa’s mandate over
South West Africa on 27 October 1966 and subsequently qualified its continued presence as
illegal occupation.
3 Subsequent to Resolution 2145(XXI), on 19 May 1967 the General Assembly resolved to create
an entity representing the interests of the Namibian people within the UN agencies.
4 Its Director, who was employed as a highly ranked UN international civil servant, was Namibia’s
first Prime Minister, Hage G Geingob. Other prominent exiled Namibians serving at UNIN
included the late Mosé Tjitendero, who later served as the Speaker of Namibia’s Parliament.
5 Today the ruling party; later known as SWAPO of Namibia and currently as SWAPO Party of
Namibia.
6 UN General Assembly Resolution 3111 of 12 December 1973 recognised SWAPO as “the
authentic representative of the Namibian people”. This was amended in UN General Assembly
436
formal observer status to the UN bodies.7 Notwithstanding this considerable diplomatic

success, however, the polarised situation of superpower rivalry prolonged the transition
process to Namibian independence despite several far-reaching UN Resolutions and
diplomatic initiatives until the late 1980s, when UN Security Council Resolution 435 of
1978 was finally implemented – more than a decade after its adoption.8
The UN as a multi-level broker

Until Namibia’s independence, the UN played a crucial if not decisive role, culminating
in the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).
UNTAG had supervisory powers in respect of Namibia’s transition to an internationally
accepted sovereign state under UN Security Council Resolution 435.9 Hence, the UN
system can be considered by all standards as a midwife to the Republic of Namibia,
proclaimed on 21 March 1990.
These agencies, however, were in themselves by no means a sign of homogeneity or

uniformity. UN positions and policies on Namibia were represented in different ways,
be it through the most radical support to SWAPO as expressed in the General Assembly
Resolutions, the role assumed by the UN Council for Namibia as an institution acting
on behalf of a generally assumed Namibian interest otherwise not represented, or in the
far more controversial (non-)decisions taken by the Security Council (and, in particular,
the role of its permanent Western member states, who initially all too often blocked
any progress by using their veto rights). The Western Contact Group (WCG) emerged
during 1977 to overcome a stalemate in terms of geo-strategic interests in general and
with regard to southern Africa and Namibia in particular, as an attempt to prevent further
isolation of the Western Security Council members over controversial issues related to
the South African apartheid regime.10 At the same time, the WCG’s institutionalisation
Resolution 31/146 of 20 December 1976 to “sole and authentic”, endorsing an exclusive status
and political monopoly of SWAPO in the negotiations on behalf of the Namibian population.
7 The long-standing SWAPO representative to the UN was the country’s first Foreign Minister,
later Prime Minister and Speaker of the National Assembly, Theo-Ben Gurirab.
8 A wide range of literature has been produced on the Namibian case, much of it characterised by
a preference to one of the parties involved in the conflict and reflecting the bias of the Cold-War
period. Informative, though not necessarily non-partisan, overviews on the different aspects
of the complex issue and the variety of political interests at work are offered by Dore (1985);
Dreyer (1994); Du Pisani (1986:272–460); Kaela (1996); Melber & Saunders (2007:73–94);
Nyangoni (1985:40–93); Rocha (1984); Singham & Hune (1986); UNIN (1987), as well as
numerous UN publications. Many of the above sources offer access to the full text of the
relevant UN documents.
9 For details on the last stages to Namibian independence, see in particular Cliffe et al. (1994);
Hearn (1999); Herbstein & Evenson (1989); Lush (1993); M’Passou (1990); Thornberry
(2004); Weiland & Braham (1994).
10 The WCG (also dubbed The Gang of Five) was composed of the then five Western member
countries of the Security Council: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the
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Henning Melber
was a visible indication of the existing differences on how to approach a lasting and
acceptable solution to the Namibia problem. With intensive shuttle diplomacy, including
proximity talks in decisive stages, the initiative tried to negotiate a compromise between
the direct opponents – SWAPO and South Africa. The immediate result was reflected
in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). But the blueprint was followed by further
negotiations on details as well as on more substantive issues. Consequently, this initiative
failed to achieve implementation for years to come.
The subsequent policies through most of the 1980s were a reflection of continued
negotiated compromise between the different power blocs and their global policy
interests, while the battle over the occupied territory of Namibia continued politically,
diplomatically and militarily. Hence, it would be erroneous to assume that there has been
one binding UN position on the Namibia conflict ever since the issue emerged. Instead,
the UN created the forum to negotiate the decolonisation process and to ultimately
secure its implementation. This process lasted more than a quarter of a century and
finally brought to end more than a hundred years of foreign occupation of the territory.
In its course, it was accompanied by the articulation of different and, at times, conflicting
political approaches from several social forces operating in a local Namibian, a regional
southern African, and a wider global context.
In the light of this complexity, the UN was more of a conflict mediator and power broker
seeking to reconcile the various interests operating also within its own structures. The
overall goal of most if not all parties might have been to correct the existing anachronism
of a trust betrayed towards the end of a century, which, since the 1950s, had witnessed the
era of successive formal independence for the African colonies. But the views on how to
achieve this goal for Namibia differed considerably at times. With Namibian sovereignty
in 1990 and – more or less as a direct result thereof – the subsequent democratic elections
in South Africa during 1994, the era of European colonialism on the African continent
was brought to an end.
SWAPO’s armed liberation struggle, launched in the mid-1960s, as well as the Cuban
engagement with the South African military in southern Angola, had a major impact on the
further course of decolonisation. But Namibian independence was also the achievement
of an international community, which after the Cold-War period managed to end lengthy
and complicated diplomatic negotiations first and foremost dominated by the strategic
interests of the two power blocs. The internationally negotiated settlement ultimately
resulted in a transition towards independence with a decisive degree of UN involvement
based on the – albeit delayed – implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). It paved the
way for a legitimate government led by the previous liberation movement, SWAPO.
United Kingdom and the United States. Interesting accounts on the initiative are offered by
Jabri (1990) and Vergau (2006).
438
The goal of the struggle was political independence in a sovereign state under a
government representing the majority of the previously colonised people so far excluded
from full participation in society. The power of definition concerning the future post-
colonial system was exercised during this process, mainly by the national liberation
movement. It voiced ‘the will of the people’ in interaction with the international players.
The struggle included exile politics and international diplomacy as relevant components.
Dobell proposes that –11
Namibia provides a particularly fascinating case study of the gradual dismantling of a century
of colonial rule, and its ultimate replacement – through democratic means, and monitored by
external powers – by a movement which, some would argue, had in certain respects come to
resemble the forces against which it had originally struggled.
UNTAG was finally established to overlook and implement the transition to independence
between April 1989 and March 1990. It had to maintain a precarious balance throughout,
in order to underline the claim of being a neutral facilitator during the implementation
process. The figures presented by UNTAG at the end of its involvement displayed a
massive investment into maintaining relative stability and an environment conducive
to basically free and fair elections. During the period in question, there were an average
of 6,700 members of UNTAG in Namibia from a total of 109 countries: 4,300 of them
were in the military component; 1,500 were police monitors; and 900 formed the civilian
component. During the actual week of elections, 7–11 November 1989, the UNTAG
presence peaked at 7,900 members. The total cost of the UNTAG operations amounted
to some US$373.4 million. UNTAG had established 42 district centres and 48 police
stations, with the number of UNTAG bases (including military posts) totalling almost
200. Over 43,000 Namibians were repatriated prior to the elections from 40 different
countries by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and 56 laws
categorised as discriminatory were abolished. As part of its voter education campaign,
UNTAG produced and broadcast 32 television and 201 radio programmes, the latter in
13 different local languages. More than 600,000 T-shirts, buttons, stickers, information
brochures and posters were distributed as well.12
Even a more critical approach to the UNTAG enterprise has to register an ultimately at
least satisfactory if not happy end (considering the further costs of human life during
the UNTAG supervision), and to correct many of the originally more pessimistic doubts
as to the possibilities of a success. This conclusion is mainly drawn under the given
circumstances of judging UNTAG as a peacemaking or, rather, peacekeeping mission
11 Dobell (1998:23).
12 UNTAG itself offered a comprehensive and colourful pictorial display of its wide range of
activities during the period, with many illustrated details (cf. UN 1990). It is important to note
in this context that UNTAG did not undertake an election campaign: this was left to the parties
competing for votes. Instead, UNTAG concentrated on providing the necessary information
about the process, its own role, and the elections to come.
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Henning Melber
in the first place: it supervised adherence to agreed democratic principles to ensure an

acceptable result of the decision-making process on the political future of Namibia by the
majority of the Namibian people. Seen in this context, UNTAG received praise mainly
with regard to its efficient role as a peacekeeping force, thereby creating an enabling
environment for relatively free and fair general elections. To this extent, the Namibian
case and experience contributed positively to redefining the UN’s potential role as a
global agency and institution enforcing rules applicable to humanity as a whole.13
Among the many highest-ranking guests of honour witnessing the hoisting of the
Namibian flag during the first minutes of 21 March 1990 was the then UN Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar. He also held the opening speech at the beginning of
the Independence ceremony, and was the first UN Secretary-General ever to swear in an
incoming Head of State: President Sam Nujoma took the oath of office from the highest
international civil servant. This was a final symbolic act underlining the crucial role of
the international organisation in bringing about national sovereignty to the Namibian
people. Not surprisingly, joining the UN as a member state was among the first foreign
policy initiatives implemented by the new Namibian Government executing political
power.14
Namibia, global governance and normative frameworks

This close historical bond between Namibia and the UN, as one of the most important
among several midwives giving birth to the legitimate sovereign state, suggests that
the country’s foreign policy is guided by respect for the role that the international
community can play in bringing about a negotiated solution to conflicts. This would
embrace that the Namibian reference points for governance both at home and abroad
are firmly rooted in and linked to the normative frameworks adopted by the UN since its
establishment after World War II. Indeed, Namibia is a signatory to most international
conventions and agreements. Thereby, it indicates its commitment to uphold the values
and principles considered as substantial ingredients for good governance. These include
domestic policies in respect of the rule of law and human rights as well as contributing
to peace and security internationally through bi- and multilateral relations practising
and supporting the same values. President Hifikepunye Pohamba reassured the august
gathering of world leaders at the opening plenary of the 67th UN General Assembly on
24 September 2012, at which the Declaration on the Rule of Law at the National and
13 Johansen (1990).
14 With Resolution 652 (1990), the UN Security Council unanimously recommended on 17 April
1990 to submit the membership application to the General Assembly, which admitted the
Republic of Namibia as its 160th member state on 23 April 1990 by way of Resolution S-18/1.
The UN Council for Namibia subsequently and logically so decided its own dissolution on 11
September 1990.
440
International Levels15 was adopted, that –16
… his country was founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for
all. It had a Bill of Rights and had acceded to the international treaties and conventions related
to those principles.
Given the process of decolonisation as summarised above, with the particularly close
engagement of the international community in bringing about its independence, and the
wide appraisal of its being the UN’s ultimate success story,17 Namibia was initially able
to punch above its weight in the international arena. For example, that representatives
of 147 countries were in attendance at Namibia’s Independence ceremony speaks to the
worldwide prominence of the event. It is also not surprising, therefore, that, during its
first decade as an independent state, Namibia was able to play a more significant role
than one would expect in relation to its actual relevance (i.e. irrelevance) in terms of the
international power relations.
In 1998, Namibia’s Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab was elected as Chairperson for
the UN General Assembly’s 54th Session 1999/2000, and Namibia was elected as a
non-permanent member of the Security Council for 1999 and 2000. The Millennium
Summit of the Heads of State and Government at the UN from 6 to 8 September 2000
was jointly chaired by the respective Namibian and Finnish Presidents, Sam Nujoma and
Tarja Halonen.
Between 2006 and 2010, Namibia also played a visible role in UN deliberations, mainly
as a result of our proactive ambassador who managed to achieve a high profile and
visibility in the organisation’s headquarters in New York. Kaire Mbuende, first a Deputy
Minister for Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, and then a less fortunate SADC
Executive Secretary18 and, finally, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a near
ubiquitous Permanent Representative to the UN who participated in several initiatives
on behalf of his country and thereby managed to gain much respect for Namibia.19
15 Document A/67/L.1. It “reaffirmed that human rights, the rule of law and democracy were
interlinked and mutually reinforcing, and that they belonged to the universal and indivisible
core values and principles of the United Nations”; UN Department of Public Information, News
and Media Division, New York, General Assembly, GA/11290, 24 September 2012; available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11290.doc.htm, last accessed 16 September 2013.
16 (ibid.:19).
17 This is a rather relative conclusion, given the long battle for independence at the expense of so
many lives and other sacrifices by ordinary people. A more decisive intervention at an earlier
stage by the UN – provided the Western countries had been willing to support this – could have
spared many lives on all sides of the conflict.
18 He resigned under pressure before ending his second term in office.
19 Mbuende’s appointment as Permanent Representative to the UN by President Pohamba came as
a surprise after his earlier dismissal as Deputy Foreign Minister together with Minister Hidipo
Hamutenya by Pohamba’s predecessor as Head of State. Mbuende was regularly accused of
441
Henning Melber
Global policy issues in the Nujoma era
However, Namibia’s track record, in retrospect, was far from being a shining example.
Rather early into its bilateral relations with other states and their leaders, a display of
camaraderie with some of the less reputable autocrats became obvious and began to dent
Namibia’s image. The state visit by President Sam Nujoma to Nigeria’s dictator Sani
Abacha on 14 May 1995 raised eyebrows – also at home: in a rare initiative, people
demonstrated outside the Nigerian High Commission in a failed effort to save the life of
writer and activist Ken Saro Wiwa. Reportedly, Sam Nujoma, in his friendly exchanges
with his Nigerian colleague, never raised the appalling violation of human rights by the
Abacha regime.
Similarly embarrassing was the official state visit by Indonesian Head of State Suharto
to Namibia on 18 November 1997. Already under siege at home by those who revolted
against his tyranny, this was among the autocrat’s last international appearances before he
was toppled by his people. His reception in Namibia was one of a respected leader, while
many were wondering where the judgment of the government had been in embarking on
such dubious signs of friendship. Closer to home, the lasting friendship with Zimbabwe’s
autocrat Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the close ties with the Laurent Desiré Kabila of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reflected a similar mindset.
At a session on 25 March 1999 during its membership in the UN Security Council,

Namibia joined China and Russia in their condemnation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation intervention in the former Yugoslavia, and on several occasions took
positions in defence of the Milosevic regime. This view, declared as solidarity with the
weak on the side of justice, was also propagated in a brochure presenting SWAPO’s
political programme for the parliamentary elections in November 1999. The emphasis
on strict non-intervention as a guiding principle for international policy and peace was,
however, less convincing due to Namibia’s own military intervention in the DRC,
where, in late August 1998, President Nujoma ordered the army to come to the rescue of
President Kabila Senior. This not only cost the lives of several soldiers of the Namibian
Defence Force in an internal conflict threatening to erupt into full-scale civil war in a
country not even bordering on Namibia, but it was also a controversial issue in SADC.
The military support offered to the Kabila regime by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe was
being among the notorious Rally for Democracy and Progress party’s ‘hibernators’ in SWAPO.
After the parliamentary election results at the end of 2009, when the local poll among Namibians
voting at the UN mission in New York did not meet SWAPO’s expectations, Mbuende’s fate
seemed to be a foregone conclusion after the SWAPO Youth League publicly demanded from
the Head of State to replace him for his unpatriotic lack of delivery – as if the diplomat was
supposed to ensure that the ballots had the desired results.
442
not approved by the other members of the SADC Security Organ, and was considered an
unauthorised, unilateral initiative.20
In March 2002, President Nujoma lambasted the Commonwealth decision to suspend

Zimbabwe after its presidential elections, which resulted in Mugabe’s continued hold on
power, provided evidence of having been fraudulent. At the end of his own three terms
in office as Head of State, President Sam Nujoma had established an image of being a
benevolent autocrat himself. His ties with autocrats elsewhere in the world did not help
to counteract such perceptions.
Global policy issues under President Pohamba
While his image was more that of a soft political leader, the foreign policy under Namibia’s
president Hifikepunye Pohamba did not deviate visibly from the country’s earlier track
record. Maybe the country – not least due to the active permanent representative at the
UN in New York – engaged in general matters relating to UN structures and governance
more visibly. A presidential visit to Tanzania on 27–28 May 2006 was used for statements
by both heads of state to strengthen the continent’s position as part of a broader UN
reform. Pohamba also demanded the democratisation of the UN on his return from the
AU Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa in 2006, where has had
addressed local diplomats. He opposed the idea of any veto right. In his speech to the
60th Session of the General Assembly in New York on 17 September 2006, he reiterated
the demands for adequate African representation and the abolition of any privileges for
certain member states.
At the AU Summit in Sirte on 3 July 2009, Namibia was among those countries that
endorsed the dismissal of the ICC extradition order for Sudan’s President Omar al-
Bashir. On his return, Foreign Minister Marco Hausiku stressed that Al-Bashir would
be a welcome guest in Namibia. On 9 July 2009, the Director of the Legal Assistance
Centre, as a credible local human rights agency already active under the South West
African Administration, criticised this as a violation of legally binding international
treaties signed by the Namibian Government, such as the Treaty of Rome, which had
established the ICC. He declared that the endorsement of the AU decision suggested that
Namibia could not be trusted with its international treaty obligations and was in defiance
of its own Constitution:
Considering our recent history of violent oppression under Apartheid, of all nations, we are
expected to side with victims of mass murder, rape, mutilation and torture; not with their tyrants
and persecutors.
20 Not that the other SADC members were not guilty of having applied double standards: South
Africa, as the fiercest critic of this intervention, had at about the same time directly intervened
in Lesotho without seeking any prior approval or authorisation from SADC.
443
Henning Melber
In contrast to the government’s dubious stance in solidarity with Al-Bashir, the country’s
Permanent Representative at the UN, during the UN General Assembly debate,
vehemently demanded the strict implementation of the AU principle that governments
that seized power by means of coups should not be recognised. He led an initiative which
ruled on 25 September 2009 that the new government of Madagascar would not be
admitted to participate in the 64th session of the General Assembly’s high-level segment.
The situation in Libya, however, revived the struggle mentality of yesteryear, and the
intervention sanctioned by the UN Security Council was criticised both by members of the
Namibian Government and by leaders of the SWAPO Party of Namibia as an imperialist
conspiracy for regime change. In his speech on 21 March 2011, during Namibia’s 21st
anniversary of its independence, President Pohamba condemned the intervention “in the
strongest terms”, saying, “Our brothers and sisters in Libya are under attack from foreign
forces”. That same week, former President Nujoma added that this was a “crime against
humanity” and a violation of international law. On 11 July 2011, Minister of Justice
Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana confirmed that Namibia would not comply with the ICC arrest
warrants for Muammar Kadhafi and Al-Bashir. Namibia was among 22 countries that
objected in the UN General Assembly on 16 September 2011 to accepting the National
Transitional Council as the body officially representing Libya. On 23 September 2011,
Pohamba declared in his speech at the 66th Session of the General Assembly that the
intervention in Libya was reminiscent “of the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884/1885,
when Africa was carved up by imperial powers”.
Finally, 24–28 July 2012 saw a state visit by King Mswati III of Swaziland, accompanied
by one of his 12 wives. The rare trip, which included a hunting safari with the former
Head of State and some sightseeing excursions at Namibian taxpayers’ cost, received
much criticism.
Domestic policy aspects
As stressed by the recent high-level debate in the UN and acknowledged in the speech
by President Pohamba on that occasion (as quoted above), the rule of law is among
the pillars of a global governance system seeking to respect and secure human rights,
democracy and justice. The rule of law has both international and domestic dimensions.21
Hence, Namibia’s commitment to global governance norms and principles also has a
domestic element which can document to which extent these guiding principles are
applied in spirit and practice.
One of the most recent contentious issues in this regard was the debate about the future
of the SADC Tribunal. Established on 14 August 2001 and operational as from 2005 in
21 See Melber (2012).
444
Windhoek’s former “Turnhalle”,22 it was a major step forward in securing a subregional

rule of law among SADC member states. The Tribunal was, however, de facto suspended
at a summit in Windhoek on 16 and 17 August 2010, when SADC celebrated its 30th
anniversary and elected President Pohamba as its next Chairperson for the year to come.
This decision was in response to the case of a Zimbabwean farmer who successfully
resisted the eviction from his land by the Zimbabwean authorities by appealing to the
SADC Tribunal. A documentary film, Mugabe and the White African, recording the
stages of this battle in court and adding footage from the terror on the ground, received
worldwide attention and critical acclaim.23
Despite the Tribunal’s pronouncements, however, the Zimbabwean Government

repeatedly declared its judgments as irrelevant. It considered the Tribunal’s rulings
not binding, claiming that not enough member states had ratified the SADC Treaty
establishing the Tribunal. On 16 July 2010, the Tribunal reiterated two earlier judgments
in the matter and concluded that the Zimbabwean state had violated its decisions; the
Tribunal was to report its finding to the Windhoek SADC Summit for appropriate action.
Instead of dealing with the Zimbabwean non-compliance with the rulings, the Summit
decided that a review of the role, functions and terms of reference of the court should be
undertaken within six months. The official communiqué added not a word more on the
matter. This was tantamount to shelving the controversial issue after the Zimbabwean
authorities had effectively been in contempt of court. However, the Summit went even
further by not endorsing an anticipated second term in office for four judges, whose
first terms were to expire on 31 August 2010. They included the Tribunal’s President,
although his presidential term was set to run until 27 November 2011. As a result, the
Tribunal ceased its activities as from the end of August 2010.
Namibia’s role with regard to the future of the Tribunal could be seen as indicative of the
government’s continuing stance with regard to upholding the rule of law in the region,
especially when other SADC member states maintain strongly antagonistic positions
on the matter. In preparation for the 32nd Official SADC Summit on 17 and 18 August
2012 in Maputo, the Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General held a meeting from
11 to 15 June 2012 in Luanda to finalise their submission on the Tribunal. Reportedly,
the Ministers held the view that human rights formed an integral part of their domestic
judicial system. By implication, this could be interpreted as the intention to return to the
22 Dating from the German colonial era in the centre of Windhoek, this historical building was
home to the so-called Interim Government established in the 1980s as an effort to counter
SWAPO’s struggle for Namibia’s independence. That it was chosen as the seat of the SADC
Tribunal had some symbolic significance in respect of reclaiming southern African sovereignty.
23 See also Freeth (2011). Namibia’s reputation in terms of its efforts to promote equality before
the law was greatly enhanced by the personal role of the Namibian lawyer Elize Ndjavera
Angula, who was part of the claimant’s team seeking justice for their clients.
445
Henning Melber
dictum of absolute national sovereignty with the aim to strip the Tribunal of its most
important role.
As a result, the SADC leaders agreed at the Maputo Summit in August 2012 that a
new Protocol was to be negotiated. Its remit was to be limited to interpreting disputes
among member states in respect of the SADC Treaty and its Protocols. This effectively
bars citizens’ from having any further individual access to the Tribunal, and allows the
Zimbabwean Government to get away with all sorts of violations despite the court’s
earlier rulings. This shelving of the Tribunal’s regional function not only raised “serious
concerns about the normative coherence and cohesion of SADC”, but also gave one
reason to worry about the lack of recognition –24
… of the primacy of people and regional citizens rather than the security of states and the
interests of their ruling elites.
The official position on the SADC Tribunal held by Namibia’s former Minister of Justice
Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana (then also Secretary-General of the SWAPO Party of Namibia
and among the contenders to succeed President Pohamba as Head of State, while holding
the post of Attorney-General at the same time) is, in this respect, revealing. At an earlier
meeting in Walvis Bay in 2011, she had already expressed the view that the Tribunal
was in conflict with international law principles, including a number of SADC member
states’ constitutions. She reiterated the wish “through appropriate measures to make
adjustments from time to time, to fit our interests”. She felt that SADC member states
were entitled to “fine-tune regional bodies” to serve them: “The instruments serve us,
they are for us, and this is not a reversible position”.25 Such blatant misconception of the
rule of law turns it again into the law of the rulers.
This unfortunate misunderstanding also seems to explain the Namibian Government’s

misguided handling of the failed secession attempt in the Caprivi in 1999.26 For more
than 12 years now, those that were originally imprisoned and accused of high treason
have been waiting for a verdict. The assumption of being innocent until found guilty
sounds very hollow under such circumstances, where none of the accused – even those
suffering from grave health problems – were granted bail. Meanwhile, more have died
24 Le Pere (2012:1).
25 Quoted in Sasman (2012).
26 This north-eastern strip of land was added to the territory in the early 20th Century as part
of the Heligoland–Zanzibar Treaty between the British and German Governments, thereby
separating parts of the Barotseland kingdom from the main centres in then Northern Rhodesia
(today the Western Province of Zambia). The local Lozi-speaking population nourished desires
for autonomy and self-determination. As a result of the recommendations of a Delimitation
Commission, redefining the voting districts and regions for the parliamentary and presidential
elections in late 2014, the region was renamed as Zambezi, much to the protest among some of
its inhabitants.
446
in custody (without being found guilty) than victims on all sides during the military
encounter in August 1999, which resulted in the – so far only – declaration of a state of
emergency. If ‘justice delayed is justice denied’, then, indeed, the more than 100 accused
behind bars for more than 12 years have fallen victim to a legal system that has failed to
offer justice to them.27
The above examples of Namibia’s role with regard to the dismantling of the SADC
Tribunal and its treatment of the prisoners accused of high treason and waiting for a verdict
for 12 years in jail shows that the track record in terms of adherence to the fundamental
values and principles of basic normative frameworks is not free of occasional flaws.
Concluding remarks: An opportunity wasted?

Given the window that opened with the internationally negotiated and implemented
transition to independence, Namibia was given every opportunity to establish a solid
reputation. As one of the latecomers to a largely post-colonial world, Namibia could
have set an example of best practices. Looking back, this chance has been unnecessarily
squandered on a number of occasions. Often, a knee-jerk response to challenges, guided
by the rhetoric (if not antics) of the anti-colonial, pseudo-revolutionary vocabulary, has
dented the image of the political leadership in charge of the protection and promotion of
fundamental values, rights and principles. Rubbing shoulders with old and new friends
who were best known for dubious track records in terms of human rights and respect for
the rule of law did nothing to enhance Namibia’s image among those concerned about
equality, democracy and justice.28
Namibia remains among those states on the continent which has reason to feel relatively
confident about its achievements since independence. But there is no reason for smugness
or backslapping, given the often only limited, relative value of such comparisons.
Instead, one should carefully question the criteria and points of reference on which such
comparative judgments are based. That there are many more countries ranking lower on
a democracy index or any similar list does not mean that everything is as good as it could
be. There are enough depressing statistics counteracting any temptation to be triumphant
or even satisfied. That states elsewhere in the world claim the moral high ground when it
comes to Namibia – while they should rather take care of their own problems at home –
27 See Melber (2009:463–481).

28 Neighbouring Botswana, for that matter, displays partly a contrasting approach: a state of
similarly minimal influence internationally, it has on various occasions taken the liberty to
disagree with a dubious African unity in protection of those who violate the fundamental rights
of their people in the name of national sovereignty. The new head of state in Malawi seems to be
on a similar avenue, and has already courageously resisted opportunism and stood her ground
under difficult circumstances, thereby adding tremendously to her own and her country’s
positive reputation.
447
Henning Melber
is also no excuse for not trying harder. Furthermore, that the normative frameworks and
guiding principles adopted by UN member states are often ignored is not an acceptable
reason for why one should not loyally seek to abide by them.
Thus, the existence of Guantanamo Bay29 and other places of organised state crime and
violations of fundamental principles of respect for the rule of law and human rights
does not mean that this adequately justifies locking people away in similar places, such
as Dordabis (a rural police station south-east of the capital, Windhoek) or some other
obscure locations and deny them a fair trial. Similarly, that hegemonic interests execute a
power of definition which, according to the geostrategic interests that suit those powers,
make commitments to fundamental values an opportunistic and hypocritical exercise at
best does not mean that one should not bother to sign noble declarations without seeking
to give them adequate recognition and meaning by living up to their spirit.
Namibia could have done better. Only if it vigorously pursues policies breathing life into
the kind of global governance principles and values of international solidarity which
brought about independence to the nation and its people will it deserve a more prominent
ranking worldwide.
References
Cliffe, L, with R Bush, J Lindsay & B Mokopakgosi. 1994. The transition to independence
in Namibia. Boulder, CO/London: Lynne Rienner.
Dobell, L. 1998. SWAPO’s struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991: War by other means.
Basel: P Schlettwein Publishing.
Dore, I. 1985. The international mandate system and Namibia. London: Westview Press.
Dreyer. R. 1994. Namibia and southern Africa: Regional dynamics of decolonization
1945–90. London/New York: Kegan Paul.
Du Pisani, A. 1986. SWA/Namibia: The politics of continuity and change. Johannesburg:
Jonathan Ball.
Freeth, B. 2011. Mugabe and the White African. Cape Town: Zebra Publishers
Hearn, R. 1999. UN peacekeeping in action: The Namibian experience. Commack, NY:
Nova Science Publishers.
Herbstein, D & J. Evenson. 1989. The devils are among us: The war for Namibia.
London: Zed Books.
Jabri, V. 1990. Mediating conflict: Decision-making and Western intervention in Namibia.
Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press
29 Where, under extrajudicial conditions without legal representation or a trial, the US has
indefinitely locked up persons suspected of having been involved in the September 2001
bombings of various locations in that country They have still not been tried by an international
or civil domestic court.
448
Johansen, RC. 1990. “UN peacekeeping: The changing utility of military force”. Third
World Quarterly, 11(2).
Kaela, LCW. 1996. The question of Namibia. Houndmills/London/New York: Macmillan
Press & St Martin’s Press.
Le Pere, G. 2012. “Assessing the SADC Summit in Maputo”. SAFPI Policy Brief No.
8. Cape Town: Open Society Foundation for South Africa/South African Foreign
Policy Initiative.
Lush, D. 1993. Last steps to Uhuru. An eye-witness account of Namibia’s transition to
independence. Windhoek: New Namibia Books.
M’Passou, D (Ed.). 1990. We saw it all. Windhoek: Churches Information and Monitoring
Service.
Melber, H. 2009. “One Namibia, One Nation? The Caprivi as a contested territory”.
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27(4):463–481.
Melber, H. 2012. “Promoting the rule of law: Challenges for South Africa’s policy”.
SAFPI Commentary No. 5. Cape Town: Open Society Foundation for South
Africa/South African Foreign Policy Initiative.
Melber, H & C Saunders. 2007. “Conflict mediation in decolonisation: Namibia’s
transition to independence”. Africa Spectrum, 42(1):73–94.
Nyangoni, WW. 1985. Africa in the United Nations System. London/Mississauga:
Associated University Presses.
Rocha, GM. 1984. In search of Namibian independence: The limitations of the United
Nations. Boulder & London: Westview Press.
Sasman, C. 2012. “SADC still committed to Tribunal”, The Namibian, 20 June.
Singham, AW & S Hune. 1986. Namibian independence: A global responsibility.
Westport: Lawrence Hill.
Thornberry, C. 2004. A nation is born: The inside story of Namibia’s independence.
Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan.
UN/United Nations. 1990. UNTAG in Namibia. A new nation is born. Windhoek:
UNTAG Information Service.
UNIN/United Nations Institute for Namibia. 1987. Namibia: A direct United Nations
responsibility. Lusaka: UNIN.
Vergau, H-J. 2006. Verhandeln um die Freiheit Namibias: Das diplomatische Werk der
westlichen Kontaktgruppe. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
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449
450
Namibia is neither geographically nor politically an island or otherwise
isolated, but rather an integral part of the southern African region, an
active member of the African Union, and a sovereign member state
within the international community. Namibia has always been embedded
in social, historic, economic and political relations and interactions with

its neighbours in the region and beyond. Due to the small size of
its population and its economy, Namibia has always depended on its
vital bonds with other countries in the region, but also in the global
community. Namibia’s foreign relations and their prudent formulation
and management determine the sustainability of the country and the
economic perspectives of its people. Foreign affairs have an impact on
every person’s life.
Namibia’s
After more than two decades of statehood,and given the transformations
of the geopolitical order since then, but also considering the grave
impact of the globalisation dynamics on the degree of political and
economic interdependencies and vulnerabilities, it is relevant to ask
how Namibia has been managing these foreign and international
Foreign Relations
relations. Such an assessment is essential for reflecting on the country’s
foreign relations and adjusting them, where necessary, in order to gain Historic contexts, current dimensions,
a perspective of prosperity for the 21st Century.
In 20 chapters, Namibia’s main bilateral and multilateral relationships,
the historic and normative foundations of those bonds, their strategic
objectives and interests, and their interface with other policy fields are
critically discussed. The collective effort of this book brings together,
for the first time, academicians, diplomats and policymakers from
within and beyond Namibia with the purpose of offering a systematic
understanding of some of the most significant dimensions of the

country’s foreign relations.
It is envisaged that this scholarly publication will deepen the

understanding of Namibia’s international and foreign relations, stimulate
research, and open up the broad public discourse in order to promote
Namibia’s contribution to the global common good and the country’s
role in the world.
MACMILLAN
EDUCATION NAMIBIA

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Namibia is neither geographically nor politically an island or otherwise

isolated, but rather an integral part of the southern African region, an

Namibia’s Foreign Relations

Edited by Anton Bösl, André du Pisani and Dennis U Zaire

It is envisaged that this scholarly publication will deepen the

Konrad Konrad Adenauer Foundation

© Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the authors, 2014

Cover design: Red Sky and Anton Bösl

ISBN: 978 99916 2610 9

Macmillan Education Namibia

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

Joseph Brian Diescho

Monitoring regional integration in southern Africa Yearbook, Stellenbosch: Trade Law

Raúl Fuentes Milani

Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari

Namibia is neither geographically nor politically an island or otherwise isolated, but

Triggered by the accelerated process of globalisation and digitisation, the diffusion

Economic interdependency increases the relevance of economic diplomacy as part of

of economies and of international and national investment protection treaties, insensitive

Perspectives for the 21st Century

14 See Greenspan (2013).

15 Republic of Namibia (2004).

adaptation and regulation of international conventions and protocols in general, and to

Abstracts of the chapters

In his chapter entitled “Namibian diplomacy before Independence”, Chris Saunders,

In his address entitled “Germany’s role in Namibia’s independence”, Hans-

Peya Mushelenga, serving as Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the

Section II: Namibia’s bilateral relations

Hidipo Hamutenya, former Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–2004), in

(Movimiento Popular para la Liberacão de Angola/Popular Movement for the Liberation

In their chapter entitled “Uneven but intertwined: Namibia’s bilateral relationship

In his chapter, “From confrontation to pragmatic cooperation: United States of

Section III: Namibia’s multilateral relations

This Section discusses Namibia’s participation in international fora and multilateral

Kaire Mbuende, former SADC Secretary General (1994–1999), understands the

Section IV: Namibia’s foreign relations in perspective

Sacky Shanghala, Chairman of Namibia’s Law Reform and Development Commission,

In his chapter, “Beyond economic diplomacy: The interface of Namibia’s foreign

Parliament and/or its members in regional (SADC Parliamentary Forum), continental

“Namibia’s attitudes towards pan-Africanism” is the title of an exploration of this

In his contribution titled “Namibia: Global governance matters”, Henning Melber,

From Chiefs to organised diplomacy

SWAPO’s international diplomacy

9 See Nujoma (2001:102–103, 113, 118–119).

Participating actively in international organisations was an important aspect of SWAPO’s

18 See e.g. SWAPO Information Bulletin, June 1986.

… raised the status of Namibian representatives at every international conference as well as at

Diplomacy in the Cold War era

38 Nujoma (2001:282) emphasises the complementarity between the two.

However, the UN–Namibia relationship prior to Independence, which is the primary

Reviewing such a relationship is a delicate task. Firstly, it covers important events

This article provides a short overview of the Namibia–UN relationship prior to

11 Today, the ruling SWAPO Party of Namibia.

UN support for the petitioners

In 1961, shortly after the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

The petitioners worked under extremely difficult circumstances, including having to

In subsequent years of engagement on the question of Namibia, more African countries

The 1966 ICJ judgement on Namibia and its implications