The Journal of Value Inquiry (2020) 54:21–40

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-019-09681-w

Hedonism and the Good Life

Christine Vitrano1 

Published online: 29 January 2019

What must we do to live good lives? Are there necessary components that all good
lives share? Is happiness all that matters? These are among the questions Jean Kazez
addresses in her book The Weight of Things, where she defends a pluralist account
of the good life that includes fundamental goods such as happiness, autonomy, self-
expression, morality, and progress.1 Despite admitting that “there’s something mar-
velous about the very idea that just one thing matters in life,” Kazez rejects hedon-
ism in favor of an account that presents a roster of goods, all of which are necessary
for living well.2
I, too, admire the simplicity and intuitive appeal of hedonism, and I am surprised
it isn’t taken more seriously within the literature as a theory of well-being, consider-
ing the standard objections associated with “The Philosophy of Swine”3 and Noz-
ick’s “Experience Machine”4 have repeatedly been shown to not constitute a refuta-
tion of hedonism. I suspect some theorists’ resistance is due to the belief expressed
by Kazez that when it comes to prudential value, “Happiness really isn’t all that

1
  Jean Kazez, The Weight of Things (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
2
  Ibid., 61.
3
  I borrow this phrase from Ben Bramble (“A New Defense of Hedonism About Well-Being,” Ergo 13
(2016): 85–112). Bramble and Heathwood both offer replies to the “swine” objection to hedonism.
4
  Replies to Nozick’s “experience machine” objection to hedonism have been made by Ben Bramble,
Felipe de Brigard (“If you like it, does it matter if its real?” Philosophical Psychology 23 (2010): 43–57),
Steven M. Cahn and Christine Vitrano (“Choosing the Experience Machine,” Philosophy in the Con-
temporary World 20 (July 2013)), Andrew Forchimes (“Well-Being: Reality’s Role,” Journal of the
American Philosophical Association (2016): 456–468), Sharon Hewitt (“What Do Our Intuitions About
the Experience Machine Really Tell Us about Hedonism? Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 331–349),
Adam Kolber (“Mental Statism and The Experience Machine,” Bard Journal of Social Science 3 (1994):
10–17), Matthew Silverstein (“In Defense of Happiness: A Response to the Experience Machine,”
Social Theory and Practice 26 (2000): 229–300), Dan Weijers and Vanessa Schouten (“An Assessment
of Recent Responses to the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism,” Journal of Value Inquiry 47
(2013): 461–482), and Dan Weijers (“Nozick’s Experience Machine is Dead, Long Live the Experience
Machine,” Philosophical Psychology 27 (2014): 513–535).

* Christine Vitrano
cvitrano@brooklyn.cuny.edu
1
Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College, CUNY, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn,
NY 11210, USA

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 22 C. Vitrano

matters” and that “there are good things besides happiness, and bad things besides
unhappiness.”5
I disagree, for when it comes to well-being, I believe happiness is all that matters,
and I shall argue that pluralist accounts like Kazez’s are only attractive because the
goods on their lists tend to produce happiness. I begin Sect. 1 with a discussion of
the nature of happiness, explaining why I prefer to focus on it rather than pleasure.
In Sects. 2–5, I focus on each of the fundamental goods on Kazez’s list, challenging
their plausibility as necessary components of the good life. In Sect. 6, I consider the
question of whether the source of a person’s happiness affects her well-being, and I
argue that it does not. Finally, in Sect. 7, I conclude that hedonism provides the most
plausible account of well-being, for once the connection between the fundamental
goods and happiness is severed, they cease to be prudentially valuable, thus suggest-
ing it was the subject’s happiness that our judgments of well-being were tracking all
along.

1 Well‑Being and Happiness

Well-being refers to the general condition one has when one fares well or has a good
life. It concerns how well a life is going “for the individual whose life it is.”6 Often,
within the literature, the terms well-being, welfare, a person’s good, and prudential
value are all used interchangeably to represent this concept.7 The phrase “quality of
life” is also used to describe what makes a life good for the person living it.8 Stephen
Darwall refers to a person’s well-being as “the good of a person in the sense of what
benefits her,”9 and Matthew Silverstein explains, “To say that something contributes
to one’s well-being is simply to say that it is in one’s interest, that it is good for one,
or that it makes one’s life go better.”10
Kazez frames much of her discussion in terms of “the good life,” but she is
clearly interested in the components of well-being and how we assess the pruden-
tial value of different lives. She suggests we “get an implicit sense of the various
things that have worth by immersing ourselves in life stories” and she tells us her
goal is to produce a list of fundamental goods that are “good in their own right, not
because of anything else.”11 The fundamental goods she has in mind must make “a

5
  Kazez, 56.
6
  L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 20. See
also Silverstein, pp. 279–280; Forchimes, p. 256; Bramble, p. 136; Crisp, p. 101; Bradley, p. 3; and Feld-
man, p. 1.
7
  Sumner, ch. 1; James Griffin, Well-Being (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch. 1; James
Griffin, Value Judgment: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), ch. 2; Stephen
Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 1; and Georg
Henrik Von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1996), ch. 5.
8
  Thomas Scanlon, “Value, Desire, and Quality of Life,” in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum
and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 185–200.
9
  Darwall, 1.
10
  Silverstein, 280.
11
  Kazez, 61–62.

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Hedonism and the Good Life 23

difference to how our lives go,” because they are “relevant to a human life” and are
“necessities.”12
Although few contemporary theorists embrace hedonism,13 the importance of
happiness to a person’s well-being is widely recognized, and many pluralist accounts
incorporate satisfaction as a necessary component. For instance, Richard Arneson
defends a pluralist view of well-being, but “the objective list has the structure such
that some threshold level of subjective satisfaction must be attained (no matter how
high one’s score on other dimensions of the good life) in order for the life to qualify
as attaining a satisfactory level of overall well-being.”14 Valerie Tiberius notes that
“a person’s good requires that she not be persistently miserable or suffer pointless
distress.”15
Richard Kraut presents an example of the self-punisher, who “abandons his cur-
rent line of work, which he loves, and takes a job that he considers boring, arduous,
and insignificant,”16 in order to atone for a crime he committed that went unpun-
ished. Kraut argues, “Spending one’s days performing a task that one rightly regards
as boring, arduous and useless is not something we would ordinarily consider
advantageous, and so we can plausibly assume that when the self-punisher carries
out his plan, he is not only trying to act against his good…he succeeds in harming
himself.”17
As Robert Adams explains, it is a “truth about human well-being that is intui-
tively evident…that a person’s good is not very fully realized unless she likes or
enjoys her life in the long run. You may be very virtuous; you may be brilliant,
beautiful, successful, rich and famous; but if you do not enjoy your life, it cannot
plausibly be called a good life for you.”18 This sentiment is echoed by L. W. Sum-
ner, who explains, “Welfare measures not how well a life is going from just any
standpoint, but how well it is going for the individual whose life it is…It is the sub-
jectivity of welfare which also lends plausibility to its identification with happiness.
For happiness is undeniably subjective, since it is the condition of being satisfied or
fulfilled by the circumstances of one’s life. My life is going well for me when I can
endorse or affirm it in terms of my own priorities, which is to say, when it is making
me happy.”19

12
  Ibid., 62–63.
13
 Adherents include Ben Bradley, Well-being and Death (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Fred Feldman, Pleasure
and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and Chris Heathwood, “Desire Satisfaction-
ism and Hedonism,” Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 539–563.
14
  Richard Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16
(1999): 140.
15
  Valerie Tiberius, “Perspective: A Prudential Virtue,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002):
308.
16
  Richard Kraut, “Desire and the Human Good,” Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 68 (1994): 40.
17
  Ibid., 41.
18
  Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 95.
19
  L.W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 220). Sum-
ner rejects hedonism in favor of his “authentic happiness” theory, which identifies well-being with the
achievement of happiness that is fully informed and freely chosen. Although I will not address Sumner’s

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Kazez also recognizes the importance of happiness; she lists it as the first neces-
sary component of a good life, and describes it as “a good thing, always.” Kazez
explains, “Happiness, whether it comes about in mysterious ways, in good ways,
or in bad ways, is a fundamental good that can directly affect how our lives are
going.”20 Kazez also suggests, “Without at least some happiness, it does not seem
like we can reach the level of even minimally good lives” for such a person with-
out any happiness would be “unconscious,” “continually miserable” or “at best, of a
neutral frame of mind,” and even then, “it’s hard to imagine a person constantly in
such a state whose life could be judged positively, overall.”21
Given the importance of happiness to well-being, and the central role it will play
in my defense of hedonism, we should get clear on what this term denotes. Kazez
describes happiness as a “virtual synonym” of pleasure that “comprises pleasant
states of consciousness.”22 To illustrate, she offers several examples: “the good feel-
ing of a hot shower, the euphoria of being in love, the sensation of eating chocolate,
the pleasant sense of absorption you get from being engrossed in a good book, the
pleasure of getting a joke or satisfying curiosity, sexual pleasure, enjoying the cozi-
ness of a fire, the pleasure of listening to Mozart, the satisfaction of looking back on
a period of your life and judging that things have been going well for you.”23
I find Kazez’s description of happiness confusing, for she appears to be identify-
ing it with both pleasure and satisfaction. I agree that happiness is best character-
ized as a state of satisfaction, but I believe it is a mistake to also identify it with
pleasure. On my view, one is happy to the extent that she views her life favorably,
and the more positive one’s impression, the happier she will be.24 As Robin Barrow
observes, “happy people…are those who do not suffer from things such a despair,
dismay, alienation, loneliness, frustration or disappointment; they are content with
the world as they perceive it and with their lot in it.”25 Similarly, Richard Brandt
explains that a happy person “will not be subject…to gloom, anxiety, restlessness,
depression, discouragement, and shame, for these feelings will not occur if he likes
the total pattern of his life insofar as the parts he deems important are concerned.”26

Footnote 19 (continued)
view in this paper, the arguments I raise against Kazez with respect to the good of autonomy could also
apply to Sumner.
20
  Kazez, 64–65.
21
  Ibid., 65.
22
  Ibid., 46.
23
 Ibid.
24
  I defend a life satisfaction view of happiness in The Nature and Value of Happiness (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2014). See also Robin Barrow, Happiness and Schooling (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1980); Theodore Benditt, “Happiness”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 25 (1974); Richard Brandt, “Happi-
ness,” in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 413–414;
Roger Montague, “Happiness”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 67 (1967), pp. 87–102;
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Nicholas Rescher, Wel-
fare (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972); L.W. Sumner; Elizabeth Telfer, Happiness (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980); and Georg Henrik Von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (Bristol, Eng-
land: Thoemmes Press, 1996).
25
  Robin Barrow, Utilitarianism (Brookfield, VT, Edward Elgar Publishers, 1991), 41.
26
  Brandt, 413.

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Hedonism and the Good Life 25

Consider the person who declares that she is dissatisfied with every aspect of her
life: it would be very odd or even contradictory for her to say in the next breath
that she is happy with her life. In general, the more aspects of one’s life one finds
unsatisfactory, the less happy she will be overall. But the measures one uses to
gauge happiness, along with the importance one assigns to each of those compo-
nents, will depend on the individual. One can be satisfied with something (overall)
without being completely satisfied with every aspect of that thing; similarly, one can
be happy with her life overall, without being completely happy with every aspect
thereof. As Theodore Benditt notes, “one need only be satisfied with most of it, or
with the important aspects of it, so that on the whole one’s satisfaction with some-
thing sufficiently outweighs the dissatisfaction with it.”27
Happiness is a degree concept, and it refers to feelings that range in intensity
from mild contentment to extreme joy. Although saying that two people are happy
implies that they share the same state of mind, the degree to which they feel happy
may differ, just as the cause of their happiness may differ, and there are no objective
conditions necessary for achieving happiness. As Robin Barrow explains, “the hap-
piness that you and I experience may be different in texture, or experientially, while
nonetheless being happiness in exactly the same sense, just as the beauty of one
woman may differ from that of another, while being no more and no less an instance
of beauty in the same sense of the word.”28
Next, I would like to address the suggestion that happiness is comprised of both
pleasure and satisfaction. One problem with identifying happiness with pleasure
is the plausibility of this view depends entirely on how one defines pleasure, but
within the literature, there is considerable disagreement over the nature of pleasure.
Thus, it is not clear what including pleasure in one’s definition of happiness amounts
to, given the differing views of pleasure. Notice, this problem does not occur with
satisfaction, which maps naturally onto happiness and easily captures how we use
the word in every day discourse.
This hybrid view of happiness (as pleasure and satisfaction) is also more vulner-
able to objections than the simpler satisfaction view. For instance, if one adopts the
standard view of pleasures as experiences we enjoy,29 it is all too easy to come up
with counterexamples of pleasant experiences that do not contribute to happiness,
and unpleasant experiences that do. Consider the priest who has romantic feelings
for one of his married parishioners. If he has taken a vow of celibacy, then acting
on this desire will disrupt his entire life, jeopardizing everything he has worked so
hard for. If he truly wishes to continue life as a priest, he will be happier foregoing
such pleasures and enduring the pain of abstinence. The same reasoning applies to
all sorts of pleasurable indiscretions one might be tempted to indulge in while mar-
ried or in a committed relationship. Indulging in such affairs might be enjoyable,

27
  Benditt, 9.
28
 Barrow, Utilitarianism, 69.
29
  This view of pleasure as favorable experience originates with Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981) and is referred to as the dominant view by Fred Feldman in “On the Intrin-
sic Value of Pleasure,” Ethics 107 (1993): 452.

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but if one values the marriage or partnership, one will be much happier avoiding
such pleasures. On the other hand, not all pains detract from happiness. Consider
a woman who has struggled unsuccessfully for years to get pregnant. If she is now
finally pregnant, all of the pain and suffering she experiences with morning sickness
may not detract from her happiness at all, and this particular pain may even make
her happier.
Dan Haybron also objects to the identification of happiness with pleasure, which
he argues makes happiness too inclusive by counting every fleeting, trivial pleasure
as contributing to one’s happiness.30 Although I may enjoy drinking a warm cup of
coffee or bathing in the sun, neither of these things will make me happy with my
life if I am dissatisfied with the important things I value. Haybron also notes that
identifying happiness with pleasure makes it an “essentially episodic and backward-
looking phenomenon” whereas happiness is more forward looking, telling us about
a person’s present and future prospects, not just what has happened in her past.31
Identifying happiness with pleasant experiences also misses the important con-
nection between happiness and what we value or care about. What makes a per-
son happy will reflect her individual priorities, values, goals, and vision of how she
wishes to live her life. Thus, returning to some of Kazez’s examples, regardless of
how enjoyable “eating chocolate,” or “being engrossed in a good book” may be,
they will fail to contribute to my happiness if I am trying to lose weight or am obli-
gated to grade my students’ papers. In these cases, indulging in the pleasure of eat-
ing chocolate or leisurely reading will actually bring me further from my goals and
contribute to my unhappiness. Although pleasant experiences often make our lives
happier, happiness cannot be equated with pleasant experience, because it involves a
global view we take towards our lives that reflects our values or what we care about.
Furthermore, it may be difficult to be satisfied with a life that is completely devoid
of pleasure, but it is not conceptually impossible, for no contradiction arises if we
imagine a happy ascetic, who is able to derive satisfaction from the act of resisting
all pleasure.
Kazez’s last example, “the satisfaction of looking back on a period of your life
and judging that things have been going well for you,” suggests that she does rec-
ognize the connection between satisfaction and happiness, and considering the
objections just raised, I believe we are best-off working with a satisfaction view of
happiness. Given the uncertainty concerning the nature of pleasure, I shall follow
Silverstein,32 who follows both Nozick and Railton, and focus on hedonism solely
in terms of happiness. Thus, the view I am defending identifies well-being with
happiness.

30
  Daniel Haybron, “Happiness and Pleasure,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001):
501–528.
31
  Ibid., 510.
32
  Silverstein, 283.

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Hedonism and the Good Life 27

2 The Value of Autonomy?

Like many other theorists, Kazez argues that “Happiness is critical, but it’s not the
only critical thing.”33 According to Kazez, it is also important for us to be in con-
trol of our lives, and “there is a level of autonomy beneath which we do not want to
fall.”34 Although Kazez believes that “Autonomy is always, as such, good,” she does
admit that not every increase in autonomy results in an increase in well-being, for
people often fall prey to “foolish exercises of autonomy” that jeopardize the other
things one needs in life.35 Even with this caveat, however, Kazez counts autonomy
as one of the fundamental goods needed to live a good life.
To illustrate the significance of autonomy, Kazez presents an example involving
Caroline, a woman who works night shifts at Wal-Mart to support her mentally chal-
lenged daughter. Caroline would prefer to work as a manager, but she is repeatedly
denied promotion, and ends up quitting her job only to work irregular night shifts
at a number of other businesses. Caroline eventually loses custody of her daugh-
ter, when teachers become concerned that she is being neglected, and Caroline also
loses her home. Kazez argues that having more autonomy would have made Caro-
line’s life better, for a better work schedule would have enabled her to better address
her daughter’s needs, and attaining a managerial position would have “increased her
control over her daily activities.”36 Kazez also argues that having “the chance to ini-
tiate and innovate on the job, instead of having to follow rigidly prescribed routines”
would also improve Caroline’s life.37
My view is that autonomy, independence and self-determination are prudentially
valuable, because they often lead to increases in happiness, whereas feeling power-
less and out of control often makes people miserable. But it is not autonomy (or the
lack thereof) that is important for well-being; it is the effect on happiness. To see
why it is happiness, and not autonomy, that our judgments of well-being are track-
ing, consider an alternative scenario in which Caroline’s level of autonomy remains
exactly the same, for she has the same dead-end job doing rote work during the
night. But let’s suppose instead of having to care for her daughter alone, she quali-
fies for a free social program that provides an aide to care for her daughter when
Caroline is not home. Let’s also suppose this aide is extremely skilled at working
with the daughter, and she really flourishes while under the aide’s care. Finally, let
us suppose this program also provides Caroline with a generous stipend to care for
her daughter, so the financial pressure on Caroline is also alleviated.
In this new scenario, Caroline’s two greatest burdens (caring for her daugh-
ter and paying her bills) are reduced substantially. It is reasonable to suppose that
Caroline is happy (or at least happier) in this new scenario, and although Caro-
line doesn’t have any more autonomy, she is much better-off. The problem was not

33
  Kazez, 65.
34
 Ibid.
35
  Ibid., 66.
36
 Ibid.
37
 Ibid.

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Caroline’s lack of autonomy, but the misery caused by her life circumstances. Once
we improved those circumstances by providing both emotional and financial sup-
port, Caroline’s well-being increased along with her happiness. But if Caroline’s
well-being improved even though her level of autonomy remained exactly the same,
shouldn’t that cause us to doubt the prudential value of autonomy independent of its
contribution to happiness?
Kazez suggests that Caroline’s life would be better if she “increased her control
over her daily activities” and was able to “innovate on the job,”38 but I would argue
these things are beneficial, because most people are happier when they have more
control over their lives and they have jobs that are interesting. Once again, it is not
the innovation or control that is important; it is the happiness. Suppose a person,
let’s call him Jack, is perfectly happy doing a job most others would find excruciat-
ingly boring, perhaps because it involves following rigid routines with no oppor-
tunity for innovation or creativity. I see no reason why our opinion regarding the
tedium of Jack’s job should detract from Jack’s well-being. I certainly don’t think
we ought to say that Jack would be better-off doing something we find more interest-
ing, creative or innovative, when Jack is perfectly happy with his life as it is. Yet this
is what one must say if one views autonomy as a necessary good.
Consider a different scenario: Marilyn works as a cashier at Wal-Mart, where
she enjoys her daily routine of chatting with customers while ringing up their pur-
chases. Marilyn’s engaging personality and ability to handle customers quickly
and efficiently are noticed by her boss, who promotes her to a managerial position.
Now, Marilyn is responsible for creating schedules, overseeing a staff of cashiers,
and deciding how products should be displayed. Marilyn’s new position increases
her autonomy significantly; she now is expected to give the orders, rather than sim-
ply receive them. She also has much more creative freedom, setting the schedules,
designing the displays, and deciding where products should be located in the store.
However, let us suppose all of this new autonomy does not make Marilyn happy, for
she finds the work overwhelming and stressful. Marilyn misses chatting with her
customers, and she has no interest in thinking about displays or product placement.
She hates “being the boss” of the cashiers, who she used to regard as friends, and
she also dislikes the pressure of having to be a “problem solver.” These new respon-
sibilities leave Marilyn feeling anxious, and she now dreads going to work each day.
I believe it is reasonable to say that Marilyn’s well-being has decreased signifi-
cantly since she has taken this new position. Marilyn is not lazy or unintelligent; she
worked diligently as a cashier, and she was very good at her job. She simply does
not have the temperament or desire to be a manager, hence her unhappiness with
the new position. Marilyn was clearly better-off as a cashier with less autonomy,
but more happiness. This example also challenges the prudential value of autonomy
independent of its contribution to happiness.
Perhaps one could argue that Kazez could agree with the conclusion of the Mari-
lyn example, for she is not committed to the view that the addition of a necessity
always makes a person’s life better. Kazez explains that some goods “jeopardize the

38
 Ibid.

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Hedonism and the Good Life 29

other things one needs in life,”39 and she notes that adding more of one necessity can
make a person worse-off if it adversely affects other necessities. Although autonomy
is a necessary good, it is not the only necessary good, and it will fail to enhance a
person’s well-being when it drastically reduces other goods, like happiness.
One way to meet this objection is to compare the lives of two people who are
equally happy (so the value of autonomy is not being offset by a loss of happiness)
but who have different levels of autonomy. If autonomy is valuable independent of
its contribution to happiness, the life with more autonomy ought to be considerably
better than the one with less. But if the two people are equally well-off, as I shall
argue, then we have evidence for the claim that the prudential value of autonomy is
derived entirely from its contribution to happiness.
Let us consider an example: Hayley has always been ambitious and driven to suc-
ceed. She graduated at the top of her class, earned a doctorate from a prestigious
university, and now works as an analyst at an investment bank. Hayley works a lot of
hours each week, but she genuinely enjoys the problem-solving and new challenges
she faces at her job. She also has a flexible schedule, so she can set her own hours,
work remotely from home, and travel as often as she likes, which is quite often.
Hayley has chosen not to have children, but she is in a committed relationship with
someone equally driven and focused on his career.
Hayley has a very high level of autonomy: as a senior member of her firm, she is
called upon to make important decisions, and her job is never routine or boring. She
also has complete control over her schedule, and her high salary provides her with
considerable financial freedom. Although her job is stressful, Hayley loves it, and
she considers herself to be a very happy person.
Next, let us consider Brian, who started his career as a cinematographer, working
on location for movies all over the world. Although he loved his job, Brian realized
his nomadic lifestyle was not compatible with raising a family, so when his first son
was born, he decided to quit working and stay at home full-time. Now Brian and his
family, which includes three young children, live entirely on his wife’s salary. Unlike
the unpredictability and excitement of his old life, Brian’s new life follows a set rou-
tine: he gets the children ready, feeds them breakfast, then takes to school. He walks
the dog, runs errands, tidies up the apartment, and starts preparing dinner. Soon, it is
time to pick the kids up from school, shuffle them to various after-school activities,
and when they finally arrive home, prepare dinner, help with homework, and make
lunches for the next day. Brian’s routine does not change much day to day, but Brian
absolutely loves his life, and he does not miss the freedom and autonomy he once
had. He also isn’t bothered by his lack of financial independence, and he considers
himself to be a very happy person.
If we compare the lives of Hayley and Brian, Hayley certainly has more freedom
and autonomy. Without children she can quite literally come and go as she pleases,
and she has significantly more financial independence. Her job also allows her to
innovate and be creative in ways that challenge her intellectually. Although child-
rearing is certainly challenging, the difficulty (especially when the children are very

39
  Ibid., 66.

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young) stems from the sheer monotony of the tasks you face, like changing endless
diapers, picking up the same toys again and again, wiping down sticky counters,
tables, and chairs, reading the same stories, and watching the same animated mov-
ies, over and over again. Children love repetition, but it can become tedious for the
adults. Thus, it is not clear Brian’s intellectual, creative or innovative capacities are
being challenged to the same degree as Hayley’s, and Brian’s family life obviously
puts a much greater restriction on his freedom. Brian is confined to a more rigid rou-
tine than Hayley, and he is also completely financially dependent on his wife.
This brings us to the crucial question: does the presence of greater autonomy in
Hayley’s life increase its prudential value? I would argue that it does not. We have
two people living entirely different lives, yet they are each well-suited for the lives
they are living. Hayley never wanted children, in part because she knew they would
inhibit her freedom. Brian, on the other hand, willingly gave up his freedom pre-
cisely because he wanted to be an actively engaged father. Both are satisfied with
their choices; both find their activities rewarding, and neither wishes to make any
changes in their lives. Therefore, both appear to be equally well-off.
But if Hayley’s life is not prudentially better, even though she has more auton-
omy, then we have evidence against the claim that autonomy is a necessary good,
and we must conclude that autonomy is prudentially valuable only because it pro-
motes happiness.

3 The Value of Self‑Expression?

The next necessity, according to Kazez, is having some unity or continuity to one’s
life. To illustrate, Kazez offers the example of “Nowhere Man,” who, although
happy and autonomous, has a “weak self” and lacks any strong preferences.
“Nowhere man” drifts from one job to the next (at a slaughter house, then an ani-
mal shelter), from Republican to Democrat, and from Buddhism to Jewish Mysti-
cism. The problem is not just the disunity of his life, but that “Nowhere man” has no
steady convictions or character traits that “control perceptions of what’s appealing
and what’s not.”40
Kazez argues that having a strong self is “critical to our lives going well,” for if
having autonomy and self-determination are important, “it must be equally impor-
tant for a person to have a self that does the determining.”41 According to Kazez,
what is necessary is “being your own person, knowing yourself, being true to your-
self, having your own center; not merely imitating, blending in, or bouncing around
mindlessly from one thing to the next.”42
I don’t share Kazez’s intuitions about the importance of having a strong sense of
self. My guess is that many people, myself included, could not live like “Nowhere
man” and be happy, so when we think about the life of nowhere man, we have a hard

40
  Ibid., 68.
41
  Ibid., 69.
42
  Ibid., 70.

13
Hedonism and the Good Life 31

time accepting his happiness. The thought of drifting around aimlessly without a set
routine or goals to look forward to, leaves me feeling depressed, and this lifestyle
would surely make me miserable. However, we should not let our personal aversions
color our judgments about the well-being of people like “Nowhere man,” who could
be more charitably described as free-spirited and unconventional.
Kazez views people who make seemingly erratic choices as having weak selves,
but I believe such people can also be seen as adventurous and open to new experi-
ences, unlike the rest of us who might be viewed as dogmatically adhering to our
ways. Perhaps some people who appear to have strong selves, because their choices
are so consistent and stable, simply lack the courage to change their lives. Consider
the couple who remains married, even though they have grown apart emotionally,
because they have invested so many years in their relationship, or are simply afraid
to be alone? Or consider the person who stays in a career she no longer enjoys,
because of the money she invested in her schooling, or because she is intimidated
by starting all over again. When people “define themselves” through their relation-
ships or careers, they are more likely to be resistant to change. But when this “strong
sense of self” causes people to remain in situations where they are no longer happy,
they are certainly better-off abandoning that rigid conception of self and embracing
change, rather than remaining miserable.
Returning to the case of “Nowhere man,” if he were chronically unhappy, and
his constant shifting from one career, political party and religion to the next was
caused by a deep dissatisfaction with life, I would agree that he ought to think care-
fully about what kind of life he wants. But the reason he ought to be more thought-
ful about his choices is not his “lack of self,” but his lack of happiness. If he were
perfectly content with his nomadic lifestyle, then however erratic those choices may
appear, I see no reason to tell him he ought to change on purely prudential grounds.
Kazez acknowledges that many people go through different phases in their lives,
where they pursue different careers, undergo religious and philosophical conver-
sions, develop new talents, or alter their priorities. She admits, “People’s lives can
exhibit considerable contrast and variety without anyone suspecting a ‘missing
self’” and she offers the real-life example of Arnold Schwarzenegger, who went
from action hero to governor. But she still maintains there must be some underlying
unity to our preferences anchored in our “sense of self” that makes them pruden-
tially valuable. My question is what value that unity has, if it doesn’t translate into
happiness? Consider people who are chronically unhappy, who describe their need
to “reinvent themselves” or to “start a new life.” The prevalence of this sentiment
is evidence that merely being consistent in your preferences or having your choices
flow from your “sense of self” is not enough to render them prudentially valuable,
especially when those very choices are what’s causing your misery. If someone who
is deeply unhappy initiates a major life change that increases her happiness, I would
argue that she is better-off for having changed, even if that means shedding her old
sense of self and adopting an entirely new one.
Kazez recognizes that a “sense of identity tends to make us happy, like the other
fundamental goods do,” but she insists they “don’t always go hand in hand” and

13
 32 C. Vitrano

there are situations in which “each of us would choose self over happiness.”43 Kazez
cites some treatments for mental illness that cause people to lose their sense of self.
Treatments like electroshock therapy can damage a person’s memory, thereby com-
promising her sense of self, but even milder treatments for depression and anxiety
can alter one’s personality, causing one to feel as though she is a different person.
Kazez suggests it is reasonable to wonder whether mood improvement is worth the
cost of an alteration in one’s identity.
I agree that some people may choose to forego happiness in favor of retaining
their sense of self, but this choice may reflect their other values, and not necessar-
ily their well-being. For instance, suppose I choose to forego medical treatment for
my bipolar disorder, because as an artist, I view the manic and depressive episodes
as inspirational for my artwork. Even if I know that I will be a lot happier once my
moods are stabilized with medication, I may still choose to forego taking it in order
to maintain my aesthetic creativity. One way to explain my choice to favor “my crea-
tive self” over a potentially happier self is that I value the creation of my art more
than my own well-being.
Consider another example: suppose a person has a moral objection to treating her
mental illness with medication, because she sees medication as “taking the easy way
out,” and she prefers more natural remedies such as herbs, diet and exercise. Perhaps
she also has a conception of herself as a depressive loner, who has always been shy
and reclusive. This person’s “sense of self” and moral beliefs justify her choice to
refuse medication, but that does not mean this choice is good for her. Although she
has chosen to “remain herself,” the reason for her choice is a moral preference, not a
prudential one.
Using that same example, suppose the natural remedies fail, and this woman has
to be hospitalized, because her depression becomes severe. Is she really better-off
for having chosen her “strong sense of self” over medication? Suppose while on
medication, she develops new interests and hobbies, becomes more outgoing and
makes friends, and is now happier. Wouldn’t we say this woman is better-off for
leaving her old depressive self behind? If having a strong sense of self were actually
a necessary component of well-being, this woman’s present state of happiness would
be offset by her loss of self. At the very least, losing her old sense of self ought to
detract from her present state of well-being, yet I see no reason to make that judg-
ment. This woman is clearly much better-off for having shed her old sense of self,
for she is now happy and engaged in life. I believe these kinds of examples suggest
the value having a strong sense of self, like the value of autonomy, is parasitic on a
person’s happiness, for when that “strong sense of self” makes one miserable, one
is better-off abandoning the old self and doing whatever it takes to become happier.
Perhaps one can object (along the same lines as with autonomy) that Kazez can
embrace what I’ve said about the well-being of the depressive woman, because she
is not committed to the view that having a strong sense of self is all that matters.
Thus, when the cost of maintaining one’s sense of self jeopardizes other goods, like
happiness, Kazez can embrace my conclusion that we are not better-off choosing the

43
  Ibid., 69.

13
Hedonism and the Good Life 33

self. But, one might argue, this example does not challenge Kazez’s claim that hav-
ing a strong sense of self is still a necessary good.
To meet this objection, we need to compare the lives of two people who are
equally happy, but only one of whom has a strong sense of self and unity to her
life. Let us begin with Jill, a free-spirit who dropped out of college (after switching
majors too many times) to attend culinary school. Trained as a chef, Jill is able to
find work anywhere, and she has been indulging her passion for travel by working
her way across Europe. Whenever Jill gets tired of being in one place for too long,
she simply picks up and moves to a new city, but she has no long-term plans other
than to see as much of Europe as possible. When she tires of Europe, she may buy
a plane ticket to Asia, and start learning an entirely new cuisine. Jill has no strong
political or religious affiliations; she is easy-going and gets along with everyone.
She loves experiencing different cultures and meeting new people, but she has no
set plan for her life. She relishes the freedom that comes with never knowing which
direction her life will go. Jill considers herself to be a very happy person.
Next let us consider Abby, whose strong sense of self comes from being raised
in a very close-knit religious community. Her parents instilled in her a strong sense
of morality that is grounded in their religion, and their customs and traditions play a
central role in Abby’s life. All of Abby’s friends are from her community and share
her religious background. Abby attended religious private schools until she got to
college, where she met some new people, but felt most comfortable with those stu-
dents who shared her faith. Abby became involved in the political causes on campus
that were supported by her religious friends, and her social life, much like at home,
was dominated by maintaining her religious traditions. Right after graduation, Abby
married her long-time boyfriend, and they have returned to the community where
she grew up, as did many of her childhood friends. With four young children, Abby
has exactly the life she always envisioned, and she considers herself to be a very
happy person.
Now, the important question: assuming Jill and Abby are equally satisfied with
their lives, is Abby’s life prudentially better, simply because she has a strong sense
of self and a unity to her pursuits? If having a strong sense of self is a necessary
good, then Abby’s life should be much better than Jill’s, but I see no reason to make
that judgment. Both women are happy with the very different choices they have
made, but neither life is obviously superior. This suggests having a strong sense of
self, like autonomy, is only valuable as a means to happiness, and should not be con-
sidered a necessary good.

4 The Value of Morality?

According to Kazez, morality is another critical component of the good life, and
“it’s not always a matter of morality making me happy – though frequently it does.
Morality seems to make a direct difference to how well my life is going.”44

44
  Ibid., 71.

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 34 C. Vitrano

Kazez also tells us, “The various goods that go into living a good life are not nec-
essarily equally good,” and when it comes to happiness, autonomy or self-expres-
sion, our “capacity for morality is more important to use than any other capacity”
and “more morality might be worth some decreases in the other life goods.”45 Kazez
does not advocate a particular view of morality; instead, she appeals to our com-
monsense intuitions by contrasting endeavors that have moral merit (“doing a favor
for an ailing neighbor, keeping a promise to a friend, avoiding roads that lead to
addiction or prostitution”) with those whose merit is non-moral (“climbing a moun-
tain, making a delicious meal, reading Russian novels”).46
Kazez also argues that we are better-off living up to our moral obligations,
because the person who ignores them would “live in profound isolation,” and “with-
out morality, you would enjoy, protect, exploit, or destroy others at your own pleas-
ure.”47 She adds, “The good of moral behavior toward others, for each of us, is the
good of being part of a richer world, in which there are many beings with independ-
ent importance” and it is “good for us because it makes us less alone.”48 Finally, she
tells us “Ethical concern is something of a cure for our sense of finitude. It’s good
to do the right thing, because it gives you an expanded life, one that encompasses
not just your own feelings and satisfactions and accomplishments, but those of other
people (and possibly animals as well).”49
To illustrate the importance of morality, Kazez refers to the character Raskol-
nikov from Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, who kills an old woman, but con-
fesses to the crime at the end of the novel. Kazez suggests, “We know his life is now
going better, even before we read the epilogue and find out what happens to him”
and “the moment when his life has become better precedes the happiness payoff.
The sheer moral improvement at the moment of his confession establishes some life
improvement before greater happiness comes along and yields more.”50
Kazez admits, however, that the connection between morality and living well
becomes more difficult to maintain as the costs of being moral increase. Although
doing what is morally right adds good to a person’s life, she admits that it also
“drives out other good things” and “isn’t the magic ingredient that always makes
a life go better on the whole.”51 However, she maintains that morality is a “life
enhancer” and is “so critical as to count as a necessity.”52
I would agree with Kazez that for many people, living well involves all sorts of
moral behavior, but that is not because morality is a necessary component of our
well-being, but because most people’s happiness is influenced by their moral val-
ues. My moral values place a constraint on how I can achieve happiness, and so
they affect my ability to live a good life. But which values one chooses to uphold is

45
  Ibid., 126 – 27.
46
  Ibid., 72.
47
  Ibid., 72.
48
  Ibid., 73.
49
 Ibid.
50
  Ibid., 72.
51
  Ibid., 73.
52
 Ibid.

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Hedonism and the Good Life 35

entirely up to the individual, and conflicts between different values will inevitably
arise. For instance, some parents leave their careers in order to care for their children
full-time. Others try to work and care for their children, while some couples choose
not to have children at all, devoting all their time to their careers. I do not believe
there is one right answer for how one should live if one wants to live well. What
matters is whether your choices make you happy. While your moral values are likely
to play some role in how you find happiness, which values are upheld at the expense
of others is entirely up to the individual.
My view is that we are living well to the extent that we are happy, and a person’s
happiness will be a function of both her moral and nonmoral values. However, there
is no necessary connection between prudential and moral value, and it is entirely
possible that one can be made miserable by doing what is morally right, as Kazez
readily admits when she discusses the costs associated with morality. Thus, I would
agree with Kazez that being morally good can enhance the prudential value of your
life, but that only occurs when living up to your moral standards is important to you
and makes you more satisfied with your life. Equally possible are situations in which
your happiness is incompatible with living up to your moral standards, and you are
forced to make a choice between them.
Consider a case in which you commit a crime, but the police do not consider you
as a suspect. If you do nothing, the crime will go unsolved, and no one else will be
unfairly prosecuted. If you confess, you will be punished with a jail sentence, and
this will cause distress to you and your family. Let us also suppose you believe your
criminal actions were justified, so you feel no lingering guilt. You have a choice:
confess to the crime and suffer the consequences or continue to live out your days
happily. From a moral standpoint, if what you did was actually wrong, you ought to
confess and be punished. However, from a prudential standpoint, it is not clear that
doing what is morally right is actually best for you.
Consider another case: you were raised in a strict religious household, but you
have fallen in love with someone outside of your faith, a highly immoral act accord-
ing to your family, who have already chosen your future husband. Should you break
off your relationship and submit to the arranged marriage, or should you marry the
person you love? Which choice leaves you better-off? My view is that the answer
depends on which choice will leave you happier in the long run. Suppose that living
up to your family’s expectations and abiding by the dictates of your religion are not
that important to you. In that case, running away to get married might be best pro-
mote your well-being, even if it is immoral.
These kinds of cases that pit one’s moral values against one’s prospects for hap-
piness are quite common,53 yet all present a problem for Kazez’s idea that morality
is a necessary component of well-being. If morality were so much more important
than the other values, then any time morality came into conflict with happiness, we
would be much better-off doing what’s moral. But these kinds of cases suggest that

53
  See Steven M. Cahn, “Happiness and Immorality,” in Exploring Ethics, ed. Steven M. Cahn (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017) for several compelling examples of conflicts that arise between
morality and happiness.

13
 36 C. Vitrano

is not true, and what our intuitions about well-being are tracking is not how moral
we are, but how happy.

5 The Value of Progress?

The final necessity, according to Kazez, is the “good of growth, positive change,
progress.”54 Kazez offers an example of a woman who works as a piano teacher,
plays piano “splendidly” and enjoys her life, but who lives in the exact same way
from the age of 21 to 81. Her piano playing doesn’t improve; she continues to play
the same music (Beethoven) and in general, there is “no improvement in any way.”55
Kazez views this woman’s lack of progress as a “serious flaw,” and she argues that
we “value progress itself, and not just the good things that are the outcome of mak-
ing progress – like greater autonomy, happiness, and accomplishment.”56 She also
suggests we admire lives that are “transformed by adversity” and we want our lives
“to go from worse to better.”57 Although Kazez admits that it seems “puzzling” to
say that a life in which one faces adversity, and overcomes it, is better than a life that
starts and ends well, she insists that progress is a necessity, but “the progress we
need is moderate.”58 She concludes, “we must avoid complete stagnation. Wherever
we start, we should aim higher. It’s the quite ordinary types of change that we can’t
do without.”59
Valuing progress might seem compelling initially, but it leads to some troubling
implications. The first problem is that valuing progress seems to imply that a person
who has a happy childhood followed by a happy adulthood is somehow worse-off
than a person whose life begins with depravity but ends happily, because only the
second person has made real progress. This seems intuitively wrong – if you never
have to suffer from hunger, illness, abuse or neglect, that’s a good thing. Why must
we deem lives that avoid such travesties inferior?
Kazez admits this implication is “puzzling,” and she tells us “we shouldn’t seek
problems so we can rise to their solutions.”60 Hence the reason she states the pro-
gress we need is “moderate.” But what does that really mean? For most people,
doing something repeatedly (especially if they enjoy doing it) will make them better
at it over time. That’s just how most skills work – we only become good at doing
things by going out and doing them. And if you enjoy something, you are more
likely to do it repeatedly, and thus to become better at it. But I would argue what
makes your life better is doing something you enjoy; actually getting better at it is
just an added bonus. If you are not very good at playing golf (a game that is actually

54
  Kazez, 74.
55
 Ibid.
56
  Ibid., 74–75.
57
  Ibid, 74.
58
  Ibid., 75.
59
 Ibid.
60
 Ibid.

13
Hedonism and the Good Life 37

quite difficult to master) but you enjoy playing every day, I would say your life is
better for playing golf, even if your scores don’t ever improve. This whole idea of
progress seems unnecessary.
Consider the lives of many athletes, who typically peak in terms of their physi-
cal ability in their twenties. Given the physical demands of playing any sport at a
professional level, sustaining the success one achieves when one is young is not just
unrealistic, it’s impossible. How are we to evaluate the lives of professional athletes
that feature great heights but also great declines? Suppose you are able to domi-
nate a sport for years, like Serena Williams or Lebron James: your life cannot be
one of constant progress, for you will peak physically and then you will eventually
decline. Although professional athletes cannot continually progress at what they do
until they die, they also achieve a level of success most of us will never reach. If
“progress” is what matters, these elite athletes will be worse-off for having reached
such heights in their prime, because their lives will also feature great declines. That
judgment seems wrong to me.
We may admire people who are able to transcend adversities; who beat incredible
odds and manage to live happily. We may also admire people whose lives rise out
of tragedies, like refugees from war-ravaged countries, or people who survive hor-
rific abuse and neglect. But in all of these cases, although we are greatly impressed
by these people’s accomplishments, I can’t see how we can say that suffering such
indignities made their lives better. Nor should we say had they not suffered such
extreme adversity, but lived ordinary lives from the start and ended up in the same
position later in life, that their lives would somehow be worse. Both judgments seem
wrong, and therefore, we should not say that progress is a fundamental component
of well-being.61

6 Must Happiness Come from Good Things?

The final issue to consider is whether the source of a person’s happiness is relevant
to how it contributes to her well-being. Kazez believes the source of our happiness
is significant, and she disparages happiness that comes from “valueless sources” like
a “Magic Drug” or “gambling.”62 Kazez explains, “happiness is good wherever it
comes from, but in addition to wanting happiness, we also want our happiness to
come at least substantially from things that have value.”63 She adds, “What we want,
beyond happiness and other things I’ve discussed, is a link between happiness and

61
  In her discussion of the value of “progress,” Kazez appears to be gesturing towards the idea that shape
one’s life takes matters prudentially, and this view is known as the “shape of a life hypothesis” within the
literature on well-being, although Kazez never refers to it explicitly. I cannot discuss the merits of this
hypothesis here, but I do argue against it in “What Does the Shape of a Life Tell Us About Its Value?,”
Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2017): 563–575.
62
  Kazez, 75–76.
63
  Ibid., 76.

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 38 C. Vitrano

the other things. There’s no reason for every last drop of our happiness to be derived
from valuable things…but something’s amiss when most of it isn’t.”64
Kazez never presents a formal theory to anchor our judgments of value; nor does
she tell us what makes a source valuable or worthless. Instead, she relies on illus-
trative examples such as one involving Maggie, a hard-working nurse whose sole
source of happiness is “Magic Drug.” We are told that without this drug, Maggie
would hate her job, enter into destructive relationships and not behave charitably.
The problem, according to Kazez, is not that Maggie must take a drug in order to
derive satisfaction from her life, like many who suffer from clinical depression.
Rather, the objection is that the drug is the sole source of Maggie’s satisfaction.
In another example, Kazez describes an obsessive gambler, who, despite having a
loving wife and children, is only happy when he is at the casino (or anticipating his
next trip there). Kazez views this man’s gambling as a “blight that stops his life from
going entirely well” and she suggests his life would go better if “he were to stop
gambling and begin to derive satisfaction from spending time with his children.”65
Kazez is not alone in appealing to our commonsense intuitions to justify the dis-
tinction between activities that are valuable and those that are worthless, and her
account is reminiscent of Susan Wolf’s view that meaning in life arises from active
engagement in projects of worth.66 For Wolf, the important thing is not just that
one is happily engaged in her life, for her projects and activities must also be objec-
tively valuable. However, like Kazez, Wolf never provides us with a principled way
of identifying worthy sources, and she openly admits that she has “neither a philo-
sophical theory of what objective value is nor a substantive theory about what has
this sort of value.”67
Perhaps one could argue that even in the absence of a full-blown theory, Kazez’s
examples are compelling enough to justify her claim about how the source of a per-
son’s happiness can affect her well-being. One might even argue that my own choice
of examples suggests that I, too, am not indifferent to where happiness comes from,
for in my rewrite of the Caroline story, Caroline’s greater happiness comes from
social services that enable her to fulfill her parental duties. One could argue that a
quicker, easier rewrite would simply have Caroline take the equivalent of the Magic
Drug and feel happy despite her daughter’s problems. But, the objector might con-
tinue, happiness generated that way would not seem to make her life any better.
In response, I never claimed that we ought to be indifferent to where our happi-
ness comes from, for we all have certain values that place a constraint on how we
find satisfaction. For instance, I value being a parent who is involved in my chil-
dren’s lives, so I could not be happy pursuing a career that demanded I work eighty
hours per week. But I also value my career and could not be happy giving it up to
raise children. Our values determine how we find satisfaction, but this is precisely

64
 Ibid.
65
 Ibid.
66
  Susan Wolf, “Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life,” Social Philosophy and Policy
14 (1997): 211.
67
 Ibid.

13
Hedonism and the Good Life 39

why I find it objectionable to issue judgments about the source of other people’s sat-
isfaction, for we may not share the same values. If we are evaluating well-being, the
important question to ask is, are you happy? If you are, then I would say that you are
faring well, regardless of how you choose to find happiness.
When I rewrote the Caroline example, it was based on the sketch Kazez provided,
which I took to imply that Caroline valued being a good parent who wished she
could provide better care for her daughter. Thus, in my rewrite, I had social services
alleviate Caroline’s financial and emotional stress, thereby increasing her happiness.
However, it could have been rewritten differently. Consider two scenarios: the origi-
nal one provided by Kazez, where Caroline is miserable, because she has lost both
her home and custody of her daughter, and an alternative in which Caroline is in the
exact same situation (no home or custody of her daughter) but in this alternative, she
takes the Magic Drug so that she no longer feels miserable. I would argue that Caro-
line is better-off in the second scenario where she takes the Magic Drug.
Next, I would like to address the question of whether having a theory of value
matters. I believe the use of our commonsense intuitions to anchor judgments about
value is a serious problem for both Wolf and Kazez.68 If we are to issue consistent
judgments about people’s well-being (or in Wolf’s case, the meaningfulness of their
lives), we need some justification for criticizing their choices. Without an actual the-
ory to unify our judgments, we are left with idiosyncratic preferences, which are a
better reflection of our own biases rather than an indication of objective value. My
question for both Kazez and Wolf is, what makes a source valuable or worthless?
Kazez says that we “want our happiness to come at least substantially from things
that have value,” but what are those things? What is it about some sources of happi-
ness that makes them inferior?
The problem isn’t just the vagueness of the distinction between valuable and val-
ueless sources of happiness; it is the very idea that this distinction could be made
to work in practice. Given the vast differences in how human beings find satisfac-
tion, we cannot assume there will be any kind of agreement on which activities are
deemed worthy. What if multiple people disagree over the merit of an activity? Who
will adjudicate such disputes?
The problem with all accounts that rely on this distinction between there being
valuable and worthless ways of spending one’s time, is that within the literature,
no one wants to say what it is that makes an activity objectively valuable. No phil-
osophical account I’ve seen has explained what it is about doing philosophy, for
example, that makes it so much more life improving than doing other things (yet
notice, all philosophical accounts rate philosophy as a key ingredient of the good
life). I certainly value philosophy, but I have been told (more than once, by seem-
ingly educated people) that I should do something more practically useful. Does the
fact that some people fail to see the value of doing philosophy make it a waste of
time?

68
  I offer a more detailed criticism of Wolf’s view of meaning in “Meaningful Lives,” Ratio 26 (2013):
79–90.

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 40 C. Vitrano

In Wolf’s case, the distinction between objectively valuable and worthless pur-
suits collapses entirely when she is pressed by Jonathan Haidt on whether his former
student’s life, which revolves around her love of horses, is meaningful. In response,
Wolf admits that no one is an authority on which activities have objective value, and
she adds “If Haidt’s student finds something valuable in her web of horse-riding pro-
jects” then even if she is unable to convince others of its merits, “this does not imply
that she must be mistaken” about its value for “value can emerge from brute attrac-
tion or intent interacting with drives to excellence.”69 But this seems to imply that
it is the subject’s attraction that makes an activity worthy of pursuit, and not neces-
sarily its objective value (or what others may say about it). But this is exactly what I
have been arguing all along. Therefore, we ought to reject the idea that the source of
a person’s happiness is relevant to judgments about her well-being.

7 Conclusion

We have considered the question of whether there is more to the good life than hap-
piness, and we have found that Kazez’s fundamental goods are plausible compo-
nents of well-being only when they also promote a person’s happiness, thus suggest-
ing happiness is what’s driving our judgments, not these other values. The happy
subject may not have a life that is morally or aesthetically good, she may not accom-
plish anything of lasting significance, her projects may not be worthwhile or mean-
ingful, and she may not live a life that is admirable in any respect. But from the
standpoint of her own well-being, none of that matters, for the only important ques-
tion is whether she is happy with her life.

Publisher’s Note  Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

69
 Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why it Matters, 124–125.

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