Burhanuddin Muhtadi Thesis 2008 PDF

THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY:
A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH OF

THE PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) AND ITS
ISLAMIST TRANSNATIONAL FRAMING
Burhanuddin Muhtadi
July 2008
A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts of

The Australian National University
Ⓒ Copyright by Burhanuddin Muhtadi 2008
All Rights Reserved

DECLARATION
This sub-thesis is the result of original research and does not contain any result
previously published by another person or submitted for a degree or diploma at any
university except where due reference is made in the text.
25 July 2008
Burhanuddin Muhtadi
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My study at the Australian National University (2006-2008), was supported by
many people and institutions. A generous scholarship from the Australian Development
Scholarship (ADS)-AUSAID for my master program made my course of study at the
ANU possible. I am deeply grateful to the Directors and staff of ADS-AUSAID,
especially Kevin Egan, Halil Chalid, Carol Laslett, Elizabeth Turner, and Stephanie
Black, Janet Street, and many other staff members whose assistance and friendliness to
me and my family have made my stay in Canberra more convenient and productive.
My thanks also go to the Asia Foundation (TAF), especially Douglas Ramage,
Robin Bush, Budhy Munawar-Rachman and Kathleen Turner, which provided an
additional support to study at the university. I also thank to the Rector of Syarif
Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) and the Dean of its Dakwah Faculty for
allowing me to leave my teaching assignment. I am especially indebted to my senior
colleagues of UIN, Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra, Dr. Jamhari and Dr. Saiful Mujani for
their unfailing encouragement and support.
This sub-thesis could never have been completed without the help and
contributions of many people. First and foremost my special thanks go to my supervisor,
Dr. Greg Fealy, who provided insightful comments and useful criticism throughout the
writing of this work. For two and half years during my study at the ANU, he has
provided continuous encouragement and wise guidance in my scholarly endeavours. I
must confess that I could not have academically performed well without his help. I have
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benefited greatly from his support and have been deeply touched by his personal wisdom
and academic advises which I had enjoyed throughout my course of study at the ANU.
I would also like to express my gratitude to my editor, Clare Harvey, who has
been very kind in reading, editing and polishing my drafts. Several others deserve
special mention. I thank to the Dean of Faculty of Asian Studies at the ANU, Prof. Dr.
Kent Anderson and administrator Graduate and Advanced Programs for granting me
overseas fieldwork permission. I also extend my whole heartfelt appreciation and thanks
to numerous other individuals, particularly to those PKS leaders and activists who
generously gave of their time in interviews and countless discussion.
Finally, I am obliged to extend my deepest thanks to my beloved wife,
Rahmawati, S.Ag., M.Si and sons, Rayhan Adnan Musthafa and Avicenna Ananda
Musthafa for their love, prayer and patience in accompanying me during my study
abroad. Without their support, I would not have been able to finish my study on time.
As has been the rule in academic writing, I bear sole responsibility for any error
and inconsistency in my sub-thesis.
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ABSTRACT
Over the last five years, there is evidence of an emerging interest in the
application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic
movements in a broad sense. Such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the
Middle East and North Africa, but not in Southeast Asia. By applying the fundamentals
of social movement theory i.e., political opportunity structure (POS), resource
mobilisation theory and collective action frames, I will examine the emergence and the
rise of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesian politics. PKS emerged
from quiet conversations among students in secular universities who subsequently
transformed their activism into a political movement. PKS attracted public and scholarly
attention since its success in increasing vote in by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent
in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004.
I will demonstrate that social movement approach can shed important light on the
dynamics of PKS. Results of this study suggest that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of
tumultuous social and political conditions that gave rise a favourable political
opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of expanding political opportunities by
enhancing its resource mobilisation, including its organisational structures, cadres and
recruitment, financial assets, and communication networks; and (3) consciously
responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its organisational
capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.
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In addition, I argue that PKS cannot be seen as merely a political party which
only articulates its political agenda within the framework of institutionalised politics, but
it also acts as a SMO, which vigorously engages in collective action. No other party is so
active in mobilising their supporters on the streets. In this sub-thesis, I will examine the
behaviour of PKS by employing protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the
tradition of social movement research. My study captured 225 PKS collective events as
reported by Kompas, Republika, and the results suggest that PKS' collective actions have
been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support
for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously
charged issues. It is true that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in
Indonesian Muslim circles. Unlike PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti
Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions.
By using timing and sequence indicators, I found that during election time in
1999 and 2004, the number of PKS’ predecessor, PK and PKS collective actions
declined significantly. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election
process, this decrease of PKS actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid
alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration ..........................................................................................................................i
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ ii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................iv
Table of Contents ..............................................................................................................vi
List of Illustrations and Tables .........................................................................................ix
Glossary and Abbreviations ............................................................................................... x
Notes on Transliteration, Spelling and Referencing .......................................................xvi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Background ............................................................................................................... .1
1.2. The Research Question… ………………………………………….....……………5
1.3. State of Current Research………………………………………………………… 6
1.4. Significance of the Study..........................................................................................12
1.5. TheoreticalFramework..............................................................................................19
1.5.1. Social Movement Integrated Approach ................................................... …..19
1.5.2. Islamist Transnational Framing……………………………………………..22
1.6. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 25
1.7. Outline of the Report ............................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER 2
PKS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATION ......................................... 29
2.1. Three Phases of PKS' Emergence………………………………………………….30
2.1.1. Campus Dakwah Movement......................................................................... 30
2.1.2. Instituting Student Movement ...................................................................... 37
2.1.3. Political Movement ....................................................................................... 43
2.2. PKS as Islamist Social Movement ........................................................................... 46
2.2.1. What is Islamism?.......................................................................................... 46
2.2.2. Between Movement and Party ....................................................................... 48
CHAPTER 3
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION OF PKS: EXAMINING THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND PERCEPTIONS OF FAR
AND NEAR ENEMIES ........................................................................................... 53
3.1. Operational Definitions ............................................................................................ 53
3.2. Protest-Event Analysis.............................................................................................. 56
3.3. Indicators .................................................................................................................. 59
3.4. Findings ................................................................................................................... 61
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3.4.1. Timing and Sequence ........................................................................................... 62
3.4.2. Forms of Action ............................................................................................ 65
3.4.3. Main Issues ................................................................................................... 68
3.4.4. Islamist and Non-Islamist Category ..................................................................... 73
3.4.5. Far and Near Enemies ................................................................................... 75
3.4.6. Location, Participants and Leaders ............................................................... 78
CHAPTER 4
BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES: THE
EMERGENCE OF PKS AND ITS POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY
STRUCTURES .......................................................................................................... 81
4.1. Political Opportunity Structures (POS) .................................................................... 81
4.2. The Emergence of PKS and the Double Track of PKS ............................................ 84
4.2.1. International Context of Political Opportunities............................................ 85
4.2.2. Domestic Factors ........................................................................................... 90
4.3. Suharto's Changing Relationship with Islam ........................................................... 97
4.4. The Fall of Suharto and the Emergence of PK/PKS................................................. 99
CHAPTER 5
FROM CAMPUS TO POLITICAL MOVEMENT: THE RISE OF PKS
AND ITS RESOURCE MOBILISATION........................................................ 102
5.1. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) .................................................................. 103
5.2. The Birth of Jemaah Tarbiyah and Its Organisational Strength and Networks ..... 105
5.3. The PKS' Centralised Federal Structure and Leadership....................................... 109
5.4. The Network Expansion and Organisational Growth of PKS ............................... 120
5.5. The PKS Recruitment of Cadre and Its Process of Cadreisation........................... 125
5.6. The Political Financing of PKS ............................................................................. 132
5.7. Media as Communication Networks ..................................................................... 137
CHAPTER 6
"ISLAM IS THE SOLUTION": THE PKS' COLLECTIVE ACTION
FRAMES AND ITS ISLAMIST TRANSNATIONAL FRAMING ........ ..140
6.1. Key Elements of Collective Action Frames ........................................................... 141
6.2. The Diagnostic and Prognostic Framings of PKS ................................................. 142
6.3. Electoral Strategy and Non-Islamist Agenda ........................................................ 150
6.4. Islamist Issues and the Maintaining of PKS' Base ................................................. 153
6.5. PKS' Collective Action and Its Islamist Transnational Framing ........................... 156
6.5.1. Islam is under Siege by the West ................................................................. 157
6.5.2. Jewish Conspiracy ....................................................................................... 160
6.5.3. Global Umma ............................................................................................... 161
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 166
APPENDICES
1. The Declaration of Partai Keadilan……………………………………….173
2. The Declaration of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera…………………………….176
3. PKS by Laws……………………………………………………………...179
4. PKS Constitutions…………………………………………….…………..189
5. Committee’s Members of the Central Board of PKS 2005-2010………...203
6. PKS’ Cadres in the Parliament and Government…………………………207
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………210
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS, FIGURES, AND GRAPHS
Illustrations Page
1. PKS’ collective action on Palestine (TENTATIVE)
2. PKS’ collective action on the U.S. and Israel
3. PKS’ collective action on anti-pornography bill
4. Hidayat Nurwahid during interview with the author
Figures Page
Figure 1: Social movement integrated approach 22
Figure 2: Eisinger’s model of mobilisation 86
Figure 3: PKS’ organisational structure and decision-making process 116
Figure 4: The growth of PKS branches at the district and sub-district levels 118
Figure 5: Correlation between party branches and increasing votes in 2004 120
Figure 6: PKS’ cadreisation system 131
Graph Page
Graph 1: The occurrence and sequence of PKS’ collective action 64
Graph 2: PKS’ collective action from 1998-2007 66
Graph 3: Forms of PKS’ collective actions 69
Graph 4: Islamist and non-Islamist category 75
Graph 5: Perceptions of near and far enemies throughout PKS’ collective event 79
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
abangan: nominal Muslims who also adheres to pre-Islamic spiritual beliefs.

ABRI: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia.
aliran: socio-cultural “streams” or patterns of social and political organisation.
Al-Qur’an: The Holy Book of Muslims.
amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (Ar. amr bi al-ma’rūf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar): Islamic
teaching of commanding good and forbidding evil deeds.
aqidah (Ar. al-‘aqidah): faith.
asas tunggal: the requirement during the New Order that all social and political
organisations adopted Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.
baiat: (Ar. al-bay’ah): allegiance.
dakwah (Ar. da‘wa): Islamic predication or missionary activity; proselytising.
Darul Islam: literally means ‘House or Abode of Islam’; rebellion against the central
government in Jakarta which aimed to establish an Islamic state.
daurah (Ar. ad-Dawrah): training.
DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching.
An Islamic missionary organisation founded in 1967 by M. Natsir, a former
leader of Masyumi.
Din wa daulah (Ar. al-Din wa al-Dawlah): Religion and State. A common concept
among Islamists believing that there is no separation between religion and state.
DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People’s Representative Council. National
parliament.
FPI: Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender Front.
FSLDK: Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Forum of Coordination of
Campus Predication.
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Golkar: Golongan Karya. Golongan Karya, or “functional groups.” A secular political
party founded by the Suharto regime.
hadis (Ar. h. ad ī th): literally, ‘speech, report, narrative’. The traditions or reports of the
sayings of the Prophet
hajj (Ar. h. ajj): pilgrimage to Mecca required for all Muslims who can afford it.
halal (Ar. h. alāl): permitted. That which is allowed according to Islamic law.
Halaqah (Ar. al-H{alaqah): Circle
haram (Ar. h. arām): forbidden, sinful. That which is prohibited according to Islamic
law.
Hizb (Ar. al-Hizb): Party, group.
Hizbut Tahrir: (Ar. al-Hizb al-Tahrir): An Islamist movement founded by Taqiyyuddin
al-Nabhani which has promoted the restoration of a global Islamic caliphate.
HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Indonesian Students Muslim Association.
Predominantly modernist students’ association founded in 1947.
HTI: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir.
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslims Indonesia, or Indonesian Muslim Intellectual
Association, established in 1990.
Ikhwanul Muslimin (Ar. al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun). The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928.
infak, infaq (Ar. infāq): literally, ‘expenditure, disbursement.’ According to Islamic law,
infak is the charitable gifts for humanitarian purposes.
istigosah (Ar. Istighotsah): public praying
ITB: Institut Teknologi Bandung or Bandung Institute of Technology.
jamaah, jemaah (Ar. jamā‘a): congregation, community.
JI: Jemaah Islamiyah (Ar. al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah): Islamic Group. A radical Islamic
group often associated with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
kabupaten: regency; the next tier of government below the provincial level.
kecamatan: sub-district.
Kafah (Ar. al-Kaffah): Total and comprehensive.
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KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Student
Action Union. An extra-campus organisation founded by Tarbiyah activists in in
1998.
Khilafah: (Ar. al-Khilafah): Caliphate.
khutbah: sermons.
LIPIA: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or Institute for Islamic and Arabic
Studies.
liqa: meeting every week by PKS’ cadres.
LMD: Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah or Institute of Predication Strivers
mabit: staying the whole night at mosques.
Majelis Syuro (Ar. al-Majlis al-Shurah): Consultative Council.
Masyumi: An Islamic political party often associated with modernist Muslims. The
second largest political party prior to 1960.
MMI: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesia Fighters Council.
MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly. .
Muhammadiyah: Modernist Indonesian Islamic organisation, founded in 1912.
Mukhayam (Ar. al-mukhayyam): Camp.
Muktamar (Ar. al-Mu’tamar): Conference.
Murabbi (Ar. al-Murabb): religious instructor in the Islamic study group.
Nadwah (Ar. al-Nadwah): Seminar.
NII: Negara Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Islamic State.
NKK/BKK: Normalisasi Kehidupan Campur/Badan Koordinasi Kampus or
Normalisation of Campus Life/Student Coordination Bodies.
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama or Revival of Islamic Scholars. The largest socio-cultural Islamic
organisation associated with traditionalist group founded in 1926.
pahala: moral reward for a virtuous deed.
PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional or Party of National Mandate. A party linked to
Muhammadiyah.
PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang or Party of Moon and Crescent. A party linked to Masyumi.
xii
PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or the Indonesian Democratic Party –
Struggle.
Pembangunan: The New Order’s economic development program.
Pesantren: Islamic boarding school.
PHI: Persatuan Haji Indonesia or Indonesian Pilgrim Association.
Piagam Jakarta: the Jakarta Charter, compromise preamble to the Constituion of 1945
that would have given shari’a constitutional status. Omitted from the final draft
of the Constitution.
Piagam Madinah: Medina Charter, a gentlement agreement between Muslims, Christians
and Jews in Medina under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad.
PK: Partai Keadilan or Justice Party. A party established by Tarbiyah activists in 1998
and later renamed PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party in
2002.
PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation’s Awakening Party. A party often associated
with NU.
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party. A government fusion
of Islamic political parties established in 1973.
priyayi: Javanese aristocrat.
Pancasila: the Indonesian national ideology consisting belief in God, humanitarianism,
nationalism, democracy, and social justice.
PBNU: Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, the central leadership of NU.
rihlah (Ar. ar-Rihlah): Recreation.
santri: devout Muslim
syari’ah (Ar. al-Shari’ah): Islamic legal code or Islamic law.
syamil (Ar. al-Shaamil): Comprehensive; general, universal, perfect, complete.
ta’aruf (Ar. al-Ta’a’ruf): introduction.
tabligh akbar: great meeting.
tafa’ul (Ar. al-Tafa’ul): Assistance.
tafahum (Ar. al-Tafahum): Mutual understanding.
tanzim (Ar. al-Tanzdiim): Organisation
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tarbiyah (Ar. al-Tarbiyyah): Education or training model employed by Jemaah Tarbiyah
in learning its core teachings..
UGM: Universitas Gadjah Madah or Gadjah Madah University in Yogyakarta.
ulama (Ar. ‘ulamā’): Muslim religious scholars, often informal leaders.
umat (Ar. umma): community, people, nation. Within Islamic circles, it is taken to mean
the community of believers.
UI: Universitas Indonesia or University of Indonesia.
UNAIR: Universitas Airlangga or Surabaya’s University of Airlangga.
usrah (Ar. al-Usrah): Family
wakaf, (Ar. waqf): endowment for religious or social ends, usually in the form of
usufruct.
zakat (Ar. zakāt): obligatory alms tax which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1. 1. Background
After many years of authoritarian rule and hostility to political Islam1 under
President Suharto, Indonesian Muslim activists now have the public space to
develop and express their views. The resignation of Suharto on May 21, 1998
created a window of opportunity for mushrooming Islamic activism2 in the
country. Islamic activism takes a number of forms, but in this study I will
concentrate on just two. The first is the (re)birth of Islamic political parties.
Among 141 new political parties established shortly after the fall of Suharto, 42
parties—nearly one-third—were Islamic, defined here “as parties that either
explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw most of their support from Islamic
organisations.”3 Twenty of the 42 parties that eventually contested in the 1999
1
The term ‘political Islam’ here refers to “Islam as political ideology rather than as a
religious or theological construct.” See, Mohammad Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality”,
in World Policy Journal; Fall 2004; 21, 3, p. 1. Similarly, Fuller uses the terms ‘political Islam’ and
“Islamism’ synonymously to point to those Muslims who believe that “Islam as a body of faith has
something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary
Muslim World and who seek to implement this idea in some fashion.” See, Graham E. Fuller, The
Future of Political Islam, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. xi.
2
It is important to bear in mind that I do not use the terms ‘political Islam’ and Islamic
activism synonymously in this work. Borrowing from Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism is
“the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes.” He preferred this broad definition to
accommodate “the variety of contention that frequently emerges under the banner of “Islam,”
including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and
identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state and inward-looking
groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.” See, Quintan Wiktorowicz
(ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004, p. 2.
3
Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,” in
Asian Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, Sept/Oct, 2004, p. 672. See also Arskal Salim, Partai Islam dan
1
elections were ‘Islamic.’ Given that only 24 political parties qualified to compete
in the 2004 elections, the total number of Islamic parties involved in the last
election declined sharply, to only 7 parties.
Second, the post-Suharto era has also been marked by the proliferation of
Islamic movements that run the gamut from violent to peaceful, from ‘democratic’
to anti-democratic.4 Among new Islamic movements that use violence to achieve
their goals are the Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders’ Front or FPI), and
Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Troops),5 to mention a few notorious groups. Although
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) described
itself as a non-violent organisation, the group does not repudiate the use of force.
Hizbut Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) is a non-violent organisation, but it strongly
opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state.6
There have been, often unstated, assumptions which have informed much
of the discussion in the West regarding the distinction between Islamic political
Relasi Agama-Negara, Pusat Penelitian IAIN Jakarta, 1999. However, out of 42 Islamic parties,
only 20 Islamic parties qualified to compete in the 1999 elections. Moreover, out of these 20
parties, only 10 Islamic parties gained one seat or more in the people’s Representative Council
(DPR). They were PPP (58 Seats), PKB (51 Seats), PAN (34 Seats), PK (7 Seats), PNU (5 Seats),
PP (1 Seat), PPII Masyumi (1 Seat), and PKU (1 Seat). Taken together, these Islamic parties gained
37.5 percent of the votes (172 seats out of 462 seats). See, Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir
(1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilisation, and Collective Action
Frames,” unpublished M.A Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 2004, p. 2.
4
For a detailed account of the proliferation of radical Islam movements, see, for example,
Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia, Teraju,
Jakarta, 2002; Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Rajawali
Press, Jakarta, 2004.
5
Noorhaidi Hasan, “Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New
Order Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation, Universiteit Utrecht, Netherland, 2005. A short version of this
dissertation can be found in Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the
Era of Transition in Indonesia, Indonesia 73, (April 2002),
6
The most detailed account of the Hizb Tahrir in Indonesia can be found in Agus Salim,
“The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir,” 2004.
2
parties and social movements. The former is defined as the confessional dimension
of formal politics, while Islamic social movements entail non-formal politics. It
has been argued that political parties are an inherent part of normal
institutionalised politics, which include activities such as standing as political
candidates, lobbying, legislating and the like. Jenkins and Klandermans, for
instance, suggest that “social movements...constitute a potential rival to the politics
from the political representation system.”7 Katzenstein points out that “students of
social movements commonly associate institutionalisation [of politics] with
demobilisation…Social movements...are necessarily extra-institutional.”8
For this distinction to be valid, Islamic political parties would not mobilise
their supporters or sympathisers in the streets or organise other kinds of extra-
institutional collective actions. Likewise, Hizbut Tahrir, MMI, FPI, and other
Islamist groups are not allowed to use institutional methods in order to express
their discontent. Thus, it is pertinent to ask: Can a social movement be clearly
distinguished from a political party? Or, following Smith’s questions in regards to
the relationship between “movement,” “political party,” and “mass public”: To
what extent can a party be considered independent of the electoral forces which
7
J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest:
Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1995, p. 5.
8
Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, “Stepsisters: Feminist Movements Activism in Different
Institutional Spaces,” in David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, The Social Movement Society:
Contentious Politics for a New Century, Rowman & Little field, Lanham: MD, 1998.
3
back it? At what point can a social movement be said to exist and not just be an
ephemeral social spasm?9
Of the Islamic political parties in Indonesia that have used extra-
institutional actions to draw the attention of the public, the Prosperous Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) is the only one which actively mobilises its
sympathisers on the streets for non-electoral activities. In the wake of the war
against terrorism declared by U.S. President George W. Bush after the September
11 attacks, PKS has intensified its Islamist mobilisation, criticising American
foreign policies towards the Muslim world. For instance, on April 17, 2005, more
than 200,000 slogan-chanting protesters—the males in white Islamic attire, the
females in headscarves—marched through the main streets of Jakarta and
eventually converged upon the most protected site in the capital, the U.S.
Embassy.10 Banners held aloft in the demonstration accused the U.S. and Israel of
being “the real terrorists” and perpetrators of “state terrorism”.11 The most
frequently referred to issue for PKS members is the Israeli occupation of Palestine,
and they have often organised anti-Israeli and anti-America demonstrations.
Generally speaking, PKS’ collective actions are carried out very peacefully.
PKS is an unusual party in many respects. Unlike other political parties,
PKS has gained public sympathy for mobilising its constituencies on a continual
9
Gordon Smith, “Social Movements and Party System in Western Europe,” in Martin
Kolinsky and William E. Paterson, Social and Political Movements in Western Europe, ST
Martin’s Press, New York, 1976, p. 331..
10
Sadanand Dhume, “Radicals March on Indonesia’s Future,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, May Vol. 168, 2005.
11
Ibid.
4
basis and not just at election time, operating as a ‘cadre party’ which requires strict
standards of training and behaviour for members, and assisting victims of natural
disasters and poverty throughout Indonesia. An examination of the formation of
PKS and its Islamist transnational framing will unveil the various factors behind
its emergence and the process of its transformation from a social movement to a
political party.
1.2. The Research Question
Two main questions underlie this study. The first is why and how did PKS
emerge? To answer this question it is important to look at political processes and
organisational factors that may constrain or facilitate the emergence of the party.
All perspectives in the field of social movements emphasise theories of movement
emergence.12
The second is how does PKS provide clear messages of its ideology that
resonate with its target audience? As is widely known, PKS has now built its
image on a reputation for being the cleanest political party in Indonesian politics,
with a record of social work, and the championing of Islamic causes. This study
will investigate the extent to which non-Islamist issues such as fighting corruption
drive its collective action. It also examines the extent to which the Islamist issues,
12
For a detailed account of the importance of movement emergence, see Doug McAdam,
John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing
Processes: Toward a Synthetic, Comparative on Social Movements,” in Doug McAdam, John D.
Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political
Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge University Press, USA,
1996.
5
including PKS’ efforts to address geographically distant issues, are visible in its
collective action. The interplay between PKS’ ideology and its Islamist character
form a major part of this sub-thesis.
1.3. State of Current Research
Learning from its experiences in the 1999 election, PKS achieved a
considerable success in the 2004 election by campaigning on a ‘clean and caring’
image. PKS has succeeded in avoiding other typical shortcomings of political
parties in Indonesia such as inactive branches, internal fractiousness, clientelism
and excessive dependence on charismatic leaders.13 Unlike other political parties
that are derived from so-called ‘local traditions,’ PKS draws ideological influence
from the Middle East, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.
Given its novelty in Indonesian politics, PKS is not surprisingly become
the subject of a growing literature. The development of PKS and its remarkable
achievements in the 2004 election as well as the party’s political behaviour have
been interpreted in a variety of maya, many of them unflattering. From this
literature we can extrapolate that there are two main approaches in the discussion
of PKS: the first of these, which was written by journalists, can be described as a
‘journalistic approach,’ the second, which was written by academic observers,
might best be referred to as an ‘academic approach.’ Within both, we have critical

13
Amy McCreedy, “Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics,” Asia
Program Special Report, April, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003. For a
detailed account of the pitfalls of Indonesian parties, especially Islamist parties, see Greg Fealy,
“The Politics of Islam in Democratising Indonesia,” paper presented at conference, “Islam in
Modern Indonesia,” US-Indonesia Society, Washington DC, February 7, 2002.
6
and sympathetic writings. Western journalists are more commonly critical such as
Sadanand Dhume and Andrew Steele for what they saw as PKS’ hidden agenda to
eventually push for the implementation of Islamic law in public life. They suggest
that PKS is opportunistically using democratic political means to eventually hijack
it when political power is in its hand. They saw that there is no significant
difference between PKS and other Islamist groups. Dhume described it as an
“evolutionary and gradual movement to the establishment of Islamic state.” In
comparing its political ideals with the militant jihadist group Jemaah Islamiyyah
(JI), he wrote:
“Like JI, in its founding manifesto PKS calls for the creation of an Islamic
caliphate. Like JI, it has placed secrecy-the cell structure both groups
borrowed from the [Muslim] Brotherhood-at the heart of its organisation.
Both offer a selective vision of modernity, one in which Western science
and technology are welcome, but Western values are shunned”14
The main difference between JI and PKS, Dhume added, is not of goals,
but of methods. Similarly Steele warned Indonesians to take account of PKS’
hidden agenda to switch its focus from anti-corruption issues to a more
fundamentalist direction.15
Meanwhile, some academic observers are scholarly in tone and content, but
they are often still critical of PKS. For example, Platzdasch’s study examines the
nature and development of Islamism in Indonesia in the post Suharto era,16
14
Dhume, “Radicals March,” 2005, pp. 18-19.
15
Andrew Steele, “The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia. Asia Times
Online Ltd, Mar 28, 2006. Retrieved from 6 June 2008, from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Southeast_Asia/ HC28Ae03.html
16
Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.
7
focusing on the PBB (Crescent Star Party), the PPP (United Development Party)
and the PK (Justice Party). After a thorough consideration of the dynamics
between ideological idealism and political pragmatism among Islamist parties, he
concludes that pragmatism still prevails. Liddle and Mujani’s study of Islamist
parties and democracy demonstrates that so far, PKS has exploited Islamist and
non-Islamist issues or in the words of Liddle and Mujani, “the two-track strategy,
expanding its cadre network through new recruitment from the universities while
promoting its broader message through participation in national and local
government.”17 However, Liddle and Mujani asserted that the double track
strategy is not working well due to its own internal contradictions.
Other scholars focus primarily on the influence of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood upon PKS. Damanik’s work on the phenomena of the PKS’
predecessor, PK, describes it as a political party which has its roots in a campus
dakwah movement.18 He argues that the PKS’ transformation from a student
movement into a political movement was facilitated by two global influences: the
1979 Iranian revolution and the Brotherhood.19 He concluded that PKS is more
influenced by the Brotherhood ideas and activism through the writings of the
Brotherhood’s ideologues such as Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb than the
events in Iran. Likewise, Bubalo and Fealy’s work on the influence of Middle
17
R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: The Indonesian
Case,” unpublished paper. I am grateful to William Liddle l and Saiful Mujani for bringing this
paper to my attention.
18
The word ‘dakwah’ is derived from Arabic for someone who supports religious
propagation, preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings. Campus
dakwah means a wide range of dakwah activities conducted by and for university students.
19
Damanik, Fenomena, 2002.
8
Eastern sources towards Islamist movements in Indonesia affirm that PKS was
inspired by the Brotherhood. Given that PKS seeks to gain mass support from the
public, Bubalo and Fealy see that its impact is larger than salafism or radical
salafism.20 On the contrary, Furkon’s study reveals that the party cannot be seen as
an offshoot of the Brotherhood.21 He argues that, unlike the Brotherhood’s over-
reliance on Al-Banna, the party has no charismatic leaders and its political views
are in line with Islamic modernism.
In the last few years, an emerging generation of Tarbiyah or PKS
intellectuals has also contributed to the growing literature on PKS. Notable among
these was Yon Machmudi, one of the people who founded the party. His study,
extracted from his Ph.D. dissertation at the Australian National University (ANU),
offers the term “global santri” to describe the characteristics of PKS supporters.22
In his dissertation, Machmudi focuses on PKS origins, ideology and efforts to
Islamise Indonesia. In contrast to the critical camp who frequently accuses PKS of
bringing a hidden agenda to Islamise the country, he maintains the claim that
“PKS has not tried to impose shariah but rather it has attempted to revise its image
by focusing on the issues of prosperity and justice.”23
Some scholars seem to be sympathetic to PKS despite the fact that they are
not personally connected to PKS. For example, Nandang’s work, which was based
20
Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? Middle East, Islamism, and
Indonesia, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia, 2005.
21
Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum
Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer, Teraju, Jakarta, 2004.
22
Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam Politik Indonesia,
Syaamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2005.
23
Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.
9
on his master’s thesis at the University of Indonesia, relies heavily on the views of
PKS predecessor, PK on the implementation of shari’a (Islamic law).24 He sees
PK as a political vehicle for implementing shari’a within democratic processes.
Similarly Firman’s study on PKS’ political thinking and behaviour asserts that
PKS is moderate in nature. He argues that PKS operates within democratic
constitutionalism, refutes the use of violence, uses a gradualist approach, and the
like.25 In a similar vein, Elizabeth Collins sees PKS as “a moderate alternative to
radical Islamism in Indonesia.”26
Aside from the growing academic literature and journalistic writings on
PKS based on scientific inquiry, there have been abundant non-scholarly writings
on the party in the last few years. They were published for various reasons,
including for propaganda or campaign or training purposes. Some of them were
generally written by PKS key leaders and its sympathisers and were published by
PKS-affiliated publishers.27 PKS has also published many compilations of the
24
Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan, Al-Jannah
Pustaka, Jakarta, 2004.
25
Firman Noor, “Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism.”: A Study of Political Thinking and
Behavior of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1999-2005,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, Faculty of
Asian Studies, ANU, 2006.
26
Elizabeth F Collins, “Islam is the Solution:” Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia,
unpublished paper. Available at http://www.classic.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolutions.pdf.
27
For example, Abu Ridha, Negara & Cita-Cita Politik, Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Abu
Ridha, Saat Dakwah Memasuki Wilayah Politik, Syaamil, Bandung, 2003; Abu Ridha, Amal Siyasi
Gerakan Politik Dalam Dakwah, Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Abu Ridha, Islam dan Politik:
Mungkinkah Bersatu? Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Mahfudz Sidiq, Dakwah & Tarbiyah di Era
Jamhariyah, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2002; Mahfudz Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan
Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di tengah
Krisis Nasional Multidimensi, Era Intermedia, Solo, 2003; Mahfudz Sidiq, Pemikiran dan Manhaj
Politik Ikhwanul Muslimin, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003; Andi Rahmat and Mukhammad
Najib, Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus, Purimedia, Surakarta, 2001; Hidayat Nurwahid
and Untung Wahono, Pengaruh Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat Terhadap Harakah Islamiyah
10
speeches and articles of its leaders, including the chairman of the PKS’
Consultative Council or Majelis Syuro, K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin,28 President of
PKS, Tifatul Sembiring,29 the party’s general secretary, Anis Matta,30 and Sapto
Waluyo.31
Above all, the aforementioned studies, for the most part, remain isolated
from the perspectives developed by social movement theories. I have presented
briefly most literature describing the history of PKS, the influence of Middle
Eastern sources and its political stance in contemporary Indonesian politics. This
study seeks to build on the available literature by engaging in further research
according to the traditions of social movement research.
1.4. Significance of the Study
Much has been written about PKS and its tendency to be more moderate
and democratic than many other parties in the political and religious domains, but
little attention has been given to the party from the perspective of social movement
theories. It is regrettable that many students of Islamic activism and those of
political Islam have apparently ignored new developments in research on
collective action and contentious politics that could provide a theoretical basis
di Indonesia. Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2001; Muzammil Yusuf, Isu Besar Dakwah dalam
Pemilu, PT Syaamil Cipta Media and DPP PKS, 2003.
28
K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, Bingkai Dakwah di Jalur Politik, Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008.
29
Tifatul Sembiring, Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke Arah yang Lebih Baik, Arah Press and
DPP PKS, Jakarta, 2008.
30
Anis Matta, Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah, Sekjen Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah and Arah
31
Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah, 2005. This volume is basically a compilation of
his articles published mostly by the Islamic magazine SAKSI from 2002-2004.
11
relevant to understanding the Islamist movement.32 This is all the more surprising
given the pivotal importance of collective action theory in explaining the
interaction between social movements, the state, and the mass public in the
contemporary world. This theoretical approach has gained popularity among
scholars in North America, Western Europe and Latin America, but has been little
applied in Southeast Asia. The development of a social movement approach in the
contemporary perspective of conventional social sciences can be useful to
illuminate various aspects of Islamist movements such as their methods of
financing and recruitment, the political dimensions of Islamist activities and how
their ideologies and theological origins influence the formation of their collective
action frames.
Aside from the reluctance of scholars of Islamic activism to show much
interest in social movement theories, the relatively small number of studies on
Islamism from the perspective of social movement studies is due to the fact that
most students of collective action and contentious politics tend to draw their
research from many secular and religious social movements in the West, and not
from Islamist mobilisation.33 In other words, the lack of integration of Islamic
movement studies into the mainstream of social movement theory reflects the
reluctance on the part of students of social movements to include them. McAdam,
32
See, for instance, Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004, p. 3. See also, Asef Bayat,
“Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6. pp. 891-908,
2005.
33
Philip W. Sutton and Stephen Vertigans, “Islamic ‘New Social Movements’? Radical
Islam, al-Qaeda, and Social Movement Theory,” in Mobilisation: An International Journal 11 (1),
p. 101.
12
McCarty and Zald’s (1996) collection, for instance, focuses specifically on secular
movements.34 Zald and McCarthy’s (1987) compilation includes religiously social
movements, but only those in the Western tradition.35 Similarly, the recent volume
of Davis and his colleagues (2005) has no indexed references to Islam or Islamic
movements but their list of representative social movement organisations does not
mention Islamic movements.36
It comes as no surprise, as Kurzman notes, that “Over the past generation,
the fields of social movement theory and Islamic studies have followed parallel
trajectories, with few glances across the chasm that has separated them.”37 Indeed,
there is evidence of a new interest in looking at Islamism with regard to the
emergence of new social movements in the globalised world. This new interest has
much to do with the proliferation of transnational movements and the
intensification of globalisation.38 Tarrow’s (1998) book, for instance, rightly
classified Islamic fundamentalism as one of three transnational social
movements,39 but he does not explore the characterization in detail. It is true that
34
McAdam, Mc.Carthy, and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996.
35
Mayer N Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in An Organizational
Society, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1987.
36
Gerald F Davis, et al., Social Movements and Organization Theory, Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2005.
37
Charles Kurzman, “Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies,” in Wiktorowicz
(ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004, p. 289.
38
For instance, Paul Lubeck, “The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements
under Globalisation,” in R. Cohen and S.M. Rai, Global Social Movement, Athlone Press,
Brunswick: NJ, 2000.
39
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998.
13
Tarrow’s recent work (2005)40 contains many more indexed references to Islamic
movements, such as Jamaat al-Islami, but he tends to define largely Islamic
transnational movements as violent, which is a result of what Tarrow has termed
‘Qutb, al-Mawdudi and Khomeini’s political Islamism’ such as jihad, suicide
bombings, and al-Qaeda. Also, the McAdam and Snow collection (2003) includes
just one selection on Islam, that is, Kurzman’s analysis of the 1979 Iranian
revolution which uses political opportunity structures.41
Above all, however, Islamism has been isolated from the mode of inquiry
developed by social movement theories in the West. According to Bayat, this
isolation is more a consequence of ‘modernist’ interpretations that portray
Islamism “as reactive movements carried by traditional people, the intellectuals,
and the urban poor, against Western-style modernisation.”42 The modernist
framework is then divided into two43: The first group, on the right, the “clash of
civilisations” camp, asserts that Islamism is anti-democratic and regressive in
character. This group is best represented by Bernard Lewis,44 Elie Kedourie,45 and
40
Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge University Press, New
York, 2005.
41
Doug McAdam and David Snow (eds.), Social Movements: Readings on Their
Emergence, Mobilisation, and Dynamics, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997.
Kurzman’s article in the collection was initially published by the American Sociological Review;
see Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement
Theory: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61, 1994,
pp. 153-170.
42
Bayat, “Islamism,” 2005, p. 894.
43
Ibid.
44
See, for example, Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong, Phoenix, London, 2002; Lewis,
“Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990.
45
Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture, Frank Cass, Portland, 1994.
14
Samuel P. Huntington.46 The second group, on the left, accuses religious
movements, including Islamism, of being regressive utopian and anti-movement.47
This camp is represented by respected collective action theorists, Albert Melucci
and Alain Touraine. For Melucci, Islamism is a kind of religious movement,
defining its identity “in terms of the past drawing on [the] totalizing myth of
rebirth which is often at least quasi-religious in content.”48 “Totalising monism,”
he believes, “is the central distinguishing feature of regressive Utopianism.”49 In
turn, as Touraine has stated, within social movements there must exist ‘positive’
and ‘progressive’ ideas, so distinguishing them from religious movements, which
do not have such notions.50
Recent attempts by scholars such as Carrie Wickham, Quintan
Wiktorowicz, and Diane Singerman, to bring Islamic activism into the realm of
collective action theory must be noted. In so doing, the integration of religious
movements, particularly Islamism, within collective action theory can be pursued.
Further, this inclusion of Islamism does not only relate to the presence of
46
Suggesting the West is “unique”, Huntington points out the Western Christianity is the
single most important historical characteristic of Western civilization, while “Islam is still bound to
the idea that church and the state are one; in essence, God is Caesar”. Huntington and his
counterpart see the root cause of the democracy predicament in the majority Muslim countries as
lying in Islamic traditions. Islam suffers from the poverty of civil society, the lack of civil liberties,
and is more largely associated with “a spirit of collectivism” than with individualistic values. For
the Western world, however, this individualism has played a vital role in developing liberal
democracy. For more discussion, see Samuel. P. Huntington, “The West: Unique, Not Universal,”
Foreign Affairs, New York, Nov/Dec. volume 75, issue 6, 1996b: 31; Huntington, The Clash of
Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996a.
47
48
Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 104.
49
Ibid. As also quoted by Bayat, “Islamism,” p. 894.
50
15
transnational movements largely associated with violent actions, such as Al-
Qaeda, but also draws on various aspects of Islamism (i.e. ideology,
characteristics, mobilisation and female participation). In the last five years there
has been evidence of an emerging interest in the application of theories and
approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic movements in a broad
sense.51 Nonetheless, such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the
Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Egypt,52 Algeria,53 Palestine,54
Iran,55 Turkey,56 and Yemen.57
51
Among others, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilising Islam: Religion, Activism, and
Political Change in Egypt, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002; Quintan Wiktorowicz
(ed.), Islamic Activism; A Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective
Action Theory,” in Sociological Theory, 22 (1) 2004, pp. 26-37, Charles Kurzman, “Structural
Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement Theory: Evidence from the Iranian
Revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61, 1994, pp. 153-170; Charles Kurzman,
“Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies,” to mention a few important works on Islamism
and social movement studies.
52
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilising Islam; Diane Singerman, Avenues of
Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo, Princeton University
Press, Princeton: NJ, 1995; see also, James Toth, “Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a
Radical Religious Movement,” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 35 (2003), 547-
572; Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilisation: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood,” in The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 42, Number 4, pages 487-510; Mohammed M.
Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” in
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.
53
Mohammed M. Hafiz, “From Marginalization to Massacre: A Political Process
Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004; Rick
Fantasia and Eric L. Hirsch, “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the
Veil in the Algerian Revolution, “ in Bert Klandermans and Hank Johnston, Social Movement and
Culture, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1995.
54
Marwan Khawaja, “Resource Mobilisation, Hardship, and Popular Collective Action in
the West Bank,” in Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 1. (Sep., 1994), pp. 191-220; Glenn E. Robinson,
“Hamas as Social Movement,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.
55
Benyamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam, Mobilising the Bazaar in
Iran,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2005; Kurzman, “Structural Opportunities and
Perceived Opportunities,” 1994.
56
Cihan Z. Tugal, “The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District
of Turkey,” in The Sociological Quarterly, 47 (2006) 245-273; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Opportunity
Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.
57
Janine Clark, “Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social
Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen,” in Comparative Political Studies,
16
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the study of Islamist
movements that employ social movement theory in Southeast Asia.58 As is widely
known, Muslims constitute the largest religious community in contemporary
Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia. An estimated 207 million or 45 per cent
of the sub-continent’s 470 million inhabitants are Muslim.59 Of these, 90 per cent
live in Indonesia, which makes Indonesia the most populous Muslim country in
the world. Indeed the characteristics of Islam in Indonesia in particular, and
Southeast Asia in general, are among the least Arabized forms of Islam. This is
partly the result of its geographical location, with Southeast Asia being situated far
from the Middle East. Apart from this, many scholars argue that the different
characteristics of Islam in Southeast Asia are largely the result of a process of
Islamisation that was generally peaceful, gradual, and most importantly, adaptive
to local traditions.60
In recent years, however, many observers have commented that Southeast
Asia is starting to seem like the new home base for radical Islamist groups such as
Vol. 37, No. 8, October 2004, pp. 941-968; Janine Clark, “Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal
Nodes of Activism,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004; Jillian Schwedler, “The Islah
Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Party,” in
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.
58
To my knowledge, only a very few studies on Islamism use social movement theories
have been made in the region. Among others, see Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-
2004), ” 2005.
59
Greg Fealy, “Islamisation and Politics in Southeast Asia: The Constrasting Cases of
Malaysia and Indonesia,” in Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns (eds.), Islam in World Politics,
Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 153.
60
Azyumardi Azra, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism,” paper presented
at Miegunyah Public Lecture, the University of Melbourne, 6 April 2005, p. 2.
17
Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and the like.61
Interestingly, the Islamist movements in the region are not only represented by
radical groups, but also by moderate ones too. PKS, for instance, is described by
many as a moderate Islamism because the party consistently abides by democratic
process and does not use violence to achieve its goals.62 In the light of the very
small number of studies on Islamism in the region using the social movement
theory approach, this study endeavours to use this approach to convey a better
understanding of Islamism in Indonesia.
1.5. Theoretical Framework
1.5.1. Social Movement Integrated Approach
I have indicated the emerging consensus among students of social
movements regarding the importance of three factors: political opportunities,
mobilising structures or resource mobilisation and framing processes. In the social
movement research tradition, virtually all perspectives in the discipline are, first
and foremost, theories of movement emergence.63 The primary concern is with
understanding: (1) the origin of certain social movements and the factors and
processes that may shape or explain the emergence of the movement; and (2) the
61
John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front,” Foreign Affairs, July/August,
Vol. 81, Iss. 4., 2002.
62
Among others, see, Firman Noor, “Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism,” 2006; Elizabeth
F. Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”
63
McAdam, McCarthy, and N. Zald, “Introduction,” in McAdam, McCarthy, and N. Zald,
(eds), Comparative Perspectives, 1996, p. 7.
18
extent and form of the movement in its ongoing development.64 Previously, each
intellectual trend was more likely to focus on only one aspect of a movement. For
example, the proponents of resource mobilisation stress the significance of the
organisational dynamics of collective action while advocates of collective action
frames criticise resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories for
rendering too much attention on organisational and political terms, and
accordingly neglecting the importance of the social construction of ideas.
For the purposes of this analysis, I will neither discuss each factor
separately nor give added weight to one particular aspect of a movement. Rather,
these three emerging trends in the study of social movements are treated equally in
an integrated rather than fragmented fashion (See figure 1).65 According to
Lichbach, the three main perspectives are a mixture of the study of “conditions”
and “norms” as well as “means” of collective action.66 McAdam and his
collaborators identified three interrelated factors, they are: environmental,
relational, and cognitive mechanisms.67 The key reason for investigating the
“conditions” or the environmental mechanism is that the prospects of movement
activists for advancing particular claims, mobilising supporters, and affecting
64
Ibid.
65
For a more detailed account of the discussion for synthesis of the three perspectives see,
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Toward an Integrated perspective on Social
Movements and Revolution,” in March Irving Lichbach and Aland S. Zuckerman (eds.),
Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997; see also, McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996.
66
Mark Irving Lichbach, “Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion: Theories of Collective
Action and Problems of Collective Dissent,” Rationality and Socieity 6, January 1994:8-39 as cited
by Mc Adam, Tarrow and Tilly, “Toward an Integrated Perspective,” Ibid., p. 144.
67
Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 25-26.
19
influence are context-dependent.68 It focuses extensively on external factors that
affect actors’ capacities to bring about change.69 It has come to be known as the
political opportunity structure which stresses the significance of expanding
political opportunities when the state is vulnerable that allows for the instigation of
social movements.70
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that political opportunities
alone do not make a movement. As claimed by McAdam and Snow, “the most
facilitative political environment only creates a certain structural potential for
collective action.”71 When sufficient organisations and networks are absent among
the aggrieved group, the political potential is unlikely to be realized. Accordingly,
the study of “means” or the relational mechanism is crucial for activists, to provide
the supportive infrastructure they require for collective action. There are at least
three aspects of this infrastructure that are especially critical: a membership base, a
68
David S. Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” in Annual Review of Sociology,
30, 2004, p. 126.
69
John. L. Campbell, “Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanism in Organizations and
Social Movements Research,” in Davis, et al., Social Movements and Organization Theory, 2005,
p. 43.
70
The first explicit use of a “political opportunity” perspective was Eisinger (1973). In an
attempt to explain why some cities in the U.S. witnessed extensive riots about race and poverty in
the late 1960s while others did not. In order to analyze the case, he focused on the openness of
urban authorities to more political inputs. See, Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest
Behavior in American Cities,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Mar., 1973),
pp. 11-28. Building upon Eisinger’s work, Tilly provided the beginning of a more comprehensive
framework on the political opportunity structure. See, Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to
Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading: MA, 1978.
71
McAdam and Snow, “Conditions of Organisation: Facilitative Context,” in McAdam
and Snow (eds.), Social Movements, 1997, p. 80.
20
communication network and leaders.72 The study of means has come to be known
as resource mobilisation73 or mobilising structure approaches.
Finally, within the social movement approach there is an investigation into
the norms or cognitive mechanisms that deal with shared ideas and interests or
what students of social movement call “collective action frames.” Frames are
interpretative schemata that ‘’enable participants to locate, perceive, and label
occurrences.”74 In other words, frames indicate what “to look at, what is important,
and thereby indicate what is going on.”75 Thus, mobilising ideas and beliefs is seen
as important as the resource acquisition and deployment activities of movement
vehicles and the waning of political opportunity processes.
Figure 1: Social Movement Integrated Approach76
Political
Opportunity
Structure
Collective Action
Framing
Resource
Mobilization
72
Ibid.
73
This framework is strongly influenced by rational choice theory. This perspective adopts
as one of its underlying problems, that of American economist Mancur Olson’s (1968) “free-rider.”
McCarthy and Zald then offer an answer by introducing the perspective of resource mobilisation
which focuses on means available to the actors of social movements.
74
David A. Snow, D.A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, Robert D. Benford,
“Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilisation, and Movement Participation,” in McAdam and
Snow (eds.), Social Movements, 1997, p. 235.
75
Hank Johnston, “Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis,” in Bert
Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (eds.), Methods of Social Movement Research, University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002, p. 64.
76
Adapted from Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir,” 2005, p. 18.
21
Based on the above integrated perspective on social movement, I will show
that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of tumultuous social and political conditions
that gave rise to a favourable political opportunity structure; (2) was able to take
advantage of conducive social and political opportunities by enhancing its
resources mobilisation, including its organisational resources and networks, to
support the sustainability of the movement; and (3) consciously responded to the
significant increase in political opportunities and its infrastructural capacities to
mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.
1.5.2 Islamist Transnational Framing
As noted earlier, this study will also seek to grapple with the PKS’
contentious actions on the Palestinian issue and its attachment to Islamic causes in
general. Sceptics may ask: what is new and different about PKS’ protest of the
Iraq war in particular, and anti-Americanism in general? Accordingly, this study
will emphasise the international contexts of political opportunities that have
facilitated the rise of PKS. The structure of political opportunities that supported
the emergence of the party is not mutually exclusive in terms of domestic political
institutions and processes.77
In addition, this sub-thesis introduces the notion of Islamist transnational
framing. The term frame is rooted in the study of communicative interaction.

77
McAdam introduced the term ‘international context of political opportunities’ as
opposed to the tendency among social movement scholars to reveal unintentionally a state-centered
or closed-polity bias as if it is “the structure of political opportunities almost exclusively in terms of
domestic political institutions and processes.” See, McAdam, “Conceptual Origins,“in McAdam,
Mc.Carthy, and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996, p. 34.
22
Gregory Bateson introduces the idea of a frame as a meta-communicative device
that sets parameters for ‘what is going on.’78 He demonstrates that the interaction
of individuals always involves an interpretative framework in order to ascertain
how the actions and words of others should be understood.79 Drawing upon
Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1972) and Forms of Talk (1981), Gamson,
Fireman, and Rytina introduce the notion of an injustice frame in the study of
collective action.80 In short, frames are to denote “schemata of interpretation” that
enable individuals to legitimate and motivate collective action.”81 There is an
isomorphic relationship between participants of a movement and a movement
organisation. On the one hand, movements are seen as carriers and transmitters of
beliefs and ideas. On the other hand, “they also actively engaged in the production
of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers.”82 Movements can thus be
regarded as signifying agents involved in actively shaping and structuring existing
meanings.
What I am offering by introducing the idea of Islamist transnational
framing is the notion of an Islamic identity that transcends geographical boarders.
Most Islamist movements take advantage of the concept of umma (community of
78
Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston, “What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in
Social Movement Research,” in Mobilisation: An International Journal, 2000, 4 (1), p. 40.
79
Ibid.; See also, Hank Johnston, “Verification,” 2002, p. 63.
80
For a detailed discussion, see William A Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina,
Encounters with Unjust Authority, Dorsey, Homewood, III, 1982.
81
See, Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 1997, p.
235.
82
David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant
Mobilisation,” in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriese, and Sydney Tarrow (eds.), International
Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action, Comparing Social Movement
Research Across Cultures, JAI Press, Greenwich: CT, 1988, p. 198.
23
believers) embodied in the long history of Islam as a means of religious
propaganda to appeal to Muslims throughout the world. To solidify the
relationship between Muslim countries with different nationalities and races, a
religious identity should be strengthened. In practice, however, the Islamic identity
or umma has contested meanings, “relying on discrete political, social, and
economic contexts in which particular Islamic identities have been forged.”83
What is important to understand regarding Islamist transnational framing,
is the dialectical relationship between the consciousness of ‘imagined’ umma and
transnational framing. However, even while Islamist transnational activists make
transnational claims, they still draw on the political opportunities, resource
mobilisation, and networks of the country in which they live.84 PKS’ collective
action has used an Islamist transnational framing derived heavily from the Middle
East. It is thus hardly surprising that the party has similarities with a number of the
region’s other social movement organisations. For instance, PKS’ cultural
framings on Palestine and its beliefs in a Jewish conspiracy are virtually the same
as those of Hamas in Palestine.85 As will be further explained in the following
chapter, this study will offer four elements related to the concept of Islamist
83
Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobiliser,” in SAIS Review, Vol.
21, Iss.2. Washington, 2001, p. 6.
84
Tarrow identified this point as ‘a characteristic of transnational activism,’ The New
Transnational Activism, 2005, p. 2.
85
For a detailed account of Hamas as a social movement, see Glenn E Robinson, “Hamas
as Social Movement,” in Wictorowics, Islamic Activism, 2004. Meanwhile, for detailed examples
of how the belief in the Jewish conspiracy, see Al-Muzammil Yusuf, “Hizbus Syaithan,” in Irwan
Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2002; Irwan Prayitno, “Yahudi Sebagai Hizbus Syaithan,” in Prayitno,
Kepribadian Dai, 2002; Irwan Prayitno, “IMF Perpanjangan;” in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2002,
Abu Ridha, Apakah Terorisme Itu, 2001.
24
transnational framing: (1) Islam is the solution; (2) Islam is under siege by the
West; (3) Jewish Conspiracy; and (4) Global umma.
1.6. Methodology
This study relies on two main sources of investigation: library research and
fieldwork. The library research was conducted by surveying a number of relevant
books, articles, research reports, journals, thesis, dissertation, and the like. Aside
from that, the library research was undertaken by exploration of electronic (the
Internet) and printed media (newspapers, magazines) pertinent to the subject of
this study.
Another main source of information was field research. Field work was
conducted in Jakarta, and in a number of PKS political strongholds in Depok,
Bekasi, and Tangerang. Field work was crucial in order to obtain important
materials. During my field research, I obtained documentary evidence found in
PKS’ archive, including records of party congresses and official statements by
party boards, PKS journals, bulletins, books and pamphlets available at the party’s
branches.
Thus, this study used the following research techniques by benefiting
materials obtained during my field research in Indonesia.
1. The Large-N, National-Level Analysis
I took advantage of the large-N, national-level analysis by employing
protest-event which is frequently used in social movement research. I used this
method in order to see the general pattern of PKS’ collective action in Indonesia
25
i.e. to answer these questions: When the PKS’ action takes place? This is to
develop information on the timing and sequences of collective action in regard to
political opportunity structures. What forms of the party’s action has it primarily
taken? What issues or claims has it raised? How many participants are being
involved in the action? Where the action takes place?
Accordingly, during my two-month fieldwork in Indonesia, I relied on two
national dailies, Kompas and Republika, in order to collect data on PKS’ collective
actions as a basis of the large-N, national-level analysis. This covered a span of 27
years (1980-2007). Why a span of 27 years and why Kompas and Republika?
This time-period allows me to see the variance since the emergence of the campus
dakwah movement in the late 1970s, which led to the formation of KAMMI during
Suharto’s authoritarianism (1980-1998) and the birth of PK, now known as PKS,
as the movement’s political vehicle in the-post Suharto era (1998-2007).
I selected Kompas and Republika because both are nation-wide. Kompas is
the most appropriate and most widely journal of record in the country. Republika
was established in the 1990s. Nonetheless, Republika was selected because the
newspaper is seen by many as a voice of Muslims. Not surprisingly, Republika
seems to cover a broader range of PKS’ collective actions rather than Kompas,
which includes the party’s tendency to address a broad range of Islamist issues and
international Islamism. To confirm the validity of the data and to capture PKS’
collective actions that were not reported by Kompas and Republika, I also referred
to other national and regional dailies and their electronic archives
2. Interviews
26
I conducted in-depth interviews and informal conversations with PKS key
leaders, the Majelis Syura, rank and file members, parliamentarians, and protest
participants. Regarding the process of interview, I used a semi-structured format.
That is, I had certain core topics that I wanted to address in each interview, but I
was also flexible in responding to specific cases of each of the respondents.
Accordingly, in order to facilitate this process, I employed an open-ended
approach. To appropriately investigate the key areas raised in the interview, I paid
attention to what the large-N analysis tells us about the general pattern of PKS’
collective actions.
3. Direct, Close Observation
During my field research in Indonesia, I also conducted observations of
relevant events involving the PKS such as Jakarta local elections (campaign,
elections), ‘1 Dollar Movement for Palestine’ and other PKS’ protest actions
which occured during my field work. I visited DPP PKS, the University of
Indonesia’s (UI) LDK, Al-Azhar, etc. In order to enrich the observation, I also
attended seminars, public speeches, public sermons, Friday prayers, discussions,
etc that were related to the subject under investigation.
1.7 Outline of the Report
Chapter 1 explains the background of PKS and its collective actions. The
background then raises research questions that this work will address. It discusses
existing theoretical explanations based on abundant writings about PKS in the last
27
few years. This chapter presents the importance of this study as well as explaining
social movement integrated approach employed in this study
Chapter 2 describes PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a
force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. It
explains the origins of PKS which can be found in the dakwah movement in the
late 1970s. Meanwhile Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of PKS collective
events as recorded by mass media. This chapter relies primarily on protest event
analysis which is commonly used in social movement research.
The socio-political context of the emergence of PKS will be examined in
Chapter 4. This chapter describes the origins of PKS during Suharto’s
authoritarianism and its development in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also discusses
international influences that help to explain the emergence of PKS.
Chapter 5 explores various means of mobilisation that shape the emergence
of PKS and its collective action. This chapter focuses on the importance of PKS
organisational structures, from leaders, cadres and recruitment channel, networks,
and financial assets. Chapter 6 analyses PKS’ framing process explaining the
content of its ideology and its Islamist transnational framing and how this message
is transmitted through a number of media networks. The last chapter ends with a
summary of the whole discussion in regards to the research questions.
28
CHAPTER 2
PKS AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATION
To better understand PKS, it is necessary to look at the history of its
emergence. Like other Indonesian Islamist movements formed in the early 1980s
that drew inspiration from the Middle East, PKS emerged from quiet discussions
among students in many secular universities who subsequently transformed their
activism into a political movement. PKS emerged out of an Islamist movement and
it still relies on the ‘movement’ aspect of its character by taking advantage of its
capacity and resources to mobilise huge rallies.
This chapter will describe the emergence of PKS. In the first part of this
chapter, I will present the three phases of its emergence in an attempt to show that
entering institutionalised politics was a key aim of the movement. The first is that
phase of campus dakwah or predication movement; the second is that of instituting
a student movement; and the third is that of a political movement. In addition, I
will also highlight the party’s strategy of pursuing Islamism. Analysis of PKS’
from social movement organisation to political party will be developed in the last
part of this chapter.
29
2.1. Three Phases of PKS’ Emergence
2.1.1. Campus Dakwah Movement
The origins of the PKS can be found in the so-called campus dakwah
movement.1 The campus dakwah involves a wide range of propagation activities
conducted by and for university students. Briefly, the emergence of the campus
dakwah itself can be explained as a reaction to Suharto’s hostility towards and
repression of political Islam, which became apparent shortly after he took power.
Suharto’s New Order was reluctant to rehabilitate the largest pre-New Order
Islamic political party, Masyumi, which was banned by the Sukarno regime in
1960 and whose primary objective was to establish an Islamic state. Instead,
Suharto permitted the formation of a new party, Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim
Party) to cater to Masyumi’s constituency, but prohibited Masyumi leaders from
leading it.
Realising that the Suharto regime was still hostile to ideas of political
Islam, former prominent Masyumi leaders, headed by Mohammed Natsir,
established the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council
for Islamic Preaching) in 1967. This dakwah council initially focused on a serious
attempt to conduct Islamic propagation among Indonesian Muslims in response to
1
Dakwah literally means ‘call’ to Islam or religious propagation to revive faith or to
protect Islamic society from immorality. Broadly speaking, dakwah is proselytising, missionary
work, or means of propagating ad-din (religion). The activists of dakwah are called du’ah (plural
form of da’i). This word is derived from Arabic for someone who supports religious propagation,
preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings.
30
Christian missionary efforts throughout the country.2 Subsequently, DDII also
responded to perceived threats from the so-called Cultural or liberal-minded
Muslims.3 The main aim of Cultural Islam was to reject much of the political
Islamic agenda, to redefine the relation between state and religion and to propose
tolerance between religions.4 On the contrary, DDII was a vocal proponent of
political Islam repeatedly arguing that Islam is not only a religious or theological
construct, but also a political ideology.
Driven by its religio-political agenda, but confronted by the regime’s
intolerance of political Islam and Cultural Islam’s refutation of the DDII’s ideas,
this dakwah council tried to revitalise dakwah by “creating” a subtle and fluid
social movement on campuses. This movement was relatively impervious to state
control and took advantage of campus mosques as the base camp of its Islamic
social movement in secular universities.5 The leading figures of DDII deliberately
targeted students of secular universities in order to resist the influence of thoughts
espoused by supporters of Cultural Islam.
In doing so, in late 1967, DDII began to promote campus mosque-based
Islamic study groups at the University of Indonesia, at Surabaya’s Airlangga
2
Burhanuddin, “The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for Anti-Semitism in Media
Dakwah,” Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 5: 2 (2007), p. 55. See also, Martin van
Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,’ Southeast Asia
Research, 10, 2 (2002), pp. 122-23.
3
Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,’ Southeast
Asia Research, 10, 2 (2002), p. 127.
4
Greg Fealy, “Divided Majority: The Limits of Political Islam in Indonesia,” in S
Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (eds), Islam and Political Legitimacy in Asia, Routledge Curzon,
London, 2003, p. 12.
5
Yudi Latif, “The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in the Modernization of
Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, Vol 12, Number 3, 2005, p. 391.
31
University, at Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada University, and also in Makassar and
Padang.6 At the same time, DDII initiated to recruit leaders of Islamic students
from diverse secular university backgrounds in order to be trained as religious
mentors for the mosque movement. The cadre training was conducted at the
Panitia Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Haji Committee) headquarters in Jakarta.
The major trainers were DDII leaders and intellectuals such as Mohammad Natsir,
Pranoto Mangkusasmita, M. Rasyidi and the like.7
The significant role of DDII in expanding campus predication was also
evident in Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, the Institute of Predication
Strivers).8 This institute was established by DDII’s high-profile affiliate,
Imaduddin Abdulrahim who, beginning in the 1970s, conducted intensive religious
trainings at ITB’s Salman mosque. Despite Imaduddin’s opposition to the Cultural
Islam pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid, the ideology of LMD and its curriculum
were in fact a modified version of the Nurcholish-composed NDP (Nilai-nilai
Dasar Perjuangan).9 Imaduddin gave stronger emphasis to the doctrine of tauhid
and the danger of ghazw al-fikr (intellectual warfare) which was perceived as a
Western-influenced ideological challenge to the Muslim worldviews.10 Many
Islamic student activists were attracted to the LMD trainings and began to
6
Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.
7
Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, Chapter 1, most notably in the sub-title “Predication
Movement.”
8
For a detailed discussion of LMD, see, Dra. Nurhayati Djamas, “Gerakan Kaum Muda
Masjid Salman,” in Dr. Mamat Salamet Burhanuddin, M.Ag (ed.), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di
Indonesia,” Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1989.
9
Latif, “The Rupture,” 2005, p. 393. The establishment of LMD was in part to counter
Nurcholish’s liberal-minded thought, see, Djamas, “Gerakan Kaum Muda Masjid Salman,” 1989,
pp. 250-252.
10
Ibid.
32
disseminate LMD’s ideology and curriculum on their own campuses. Aan
Rohanah, a one-time student activist and now PKS Member of Parliament,
recalled:
In fact, there was nothing new in LMD’s curriculum and materials. I was
more amazed at the way its curriculum was applied in daily activities
during the training. There had been an increasing spirit of ‘dakwah’ in my
mind after completing the training and a great desire to spread a truly
Islamic understanding in my campus at the time.11
By the late 1970s, the scope and force of the campus dakwah movement
began to enter a new chapter in the wake of Suharto’s increasing political
repression. Student political activities at the time were permanently “frozen” since
the implementation of the ‘Normalisation of Campus Life’ (NKK) and Student Co-
ordination Bodies (BKK) policy in 1978. The Suharto regime launched this
depoliticisation program on campuses as a reaction to students’ growing of and
challenge to the regime. NKK/BKK banned all students’ political activism inside
university campuses and replaced the previously independent Students’ Councils
(Dewan Mahasiswa/DEMA).12 After this clampdown on student activism, the
1980s was marked by the emergence of various types of non-political student
activism such as study groups and non-governmental organisation (NGO)
11
Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.
12
For detailed information of the 1978 student movement, see Hariyadhie, Perspektif
Gerakan Mahasiswa 1978 dalam Percaturan Politik Nasional, Citra Mandala Pratama, Jakarta,
1995; Herbert Feith, “The Indonesian Student Movement of 1977-78,” a revised of a talk at he
Contemporary Indonesia Study Group of the Monash Centre of Southeast Asian Studies on 15
March 1978.
33
activities.13 Among other forms of student activism that emerged in this period,
campus dakwah was the most popular.
Aside from that, in 1985 Suharto required all mass-based organisations,
including political parties, to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideological basis (asas
tunggal) of their organisations. These policies outraged some Islamic leaders, who
described the regime’s treatment of political Islam as “kutjing kurap” (cats with
ring-worm).14 At the height of the regime’s suppression of political Islam and
student activism, the mosque became what respected Muslim intellectual
Jalaluddin Rakhmat describes as ‘a sanctuary for the expression of political
dissatisfaction and frustration’.15 The recollections of economist Rizal Ramli,
support this notion:
“When I was at ITB in the late 1970s all student political activity revolved
around the student center. But ever since the government imposed
restrictions on campus politics, the student center had been dead. All the
activity is now funneled to the mosque. Young people need an outlet for
their political aspirations and they will find it where they can.”16
Coincidentally, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s
brought about by the collapse of American supported regime in Iran is believed to
13
The students’ study groups were loosely structured whose members were a small
number of students who met regularly surrounding campus to discuss social and political theories.
Another alternative student activism since the banning of political activity on campus was non-
governmental organisations (NGO). Furthermore, there were a small number of students who
operated clandestinely in the face of the regime’s suppression by publishing critically inclined
students’ leaflets, brochures or magazines, but thereby they were relatively easily handled by
authorities and military. For a detailed account of this, see Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto,
Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, Stanford University Press, California,
2005.
14
Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004),” 2005.
15
Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Allen & Unwin, NSW,
1994, p. 174.
16
Ibid.
34
be a significant factor of the growing level of religiosity among students. There
was a desire among students to identify themselves with the wider Muslim umma
or worldwide Islamic community.17
In the early 1980s, campus dakwah began to introduce usrah (Arabic for
‘family’) and serves as a pattern to manage and train its followers in a more
systematic way.18 Usrah are small, closely-knit groups that are connected in a
hierarchical structure. However, most members do not know members in other
usrah.19 From this kind of organisational structure campus dakwah grew rapidly
and campus mosques have since become a centre for its activities.
The use of usrah (cells) for religious training in campus dakwah was
borrowed directly from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Campus dakwah’s
association with the Brotherhood was also entrenched by student leaders
disseminating and promoting the works of influential Brotherhood figures as
primary references for study, thereby making the ideas and models of Brotherhood
activism — in Bubalo and Fealy’s words—“the cornerstone of the dakwah’s
thinking.”20
The process of transplantation of the Brotherhood’s ideas and methods into
campus dakwah groups was made possible by extensive DDII networks. Since its
17
See, for instance, Hussin Muthalib, “Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political
Implications,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 9. (sep. 1990), pp. 877-891.
18
For more discussion of the training programs, see The Department of Cadreisation’s
Team, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula PKS and Syamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2003.
19
Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and
Democratization,” in Samuel Haneman and Henk Schulte (eds.), Indonesia in Transition, Pustaka
pelajar, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 61.
20
Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan? 2005, p. 67.
35
establishment, the DDII leadership directed its attention towards the Middle East.
It had and still has strong connections with the Islamic World League (Rabithat al-
Alam al-Islami), the worldwide Islamic organisation that was funded by the Saudi
Kingdom, and to which Natsir was appointed Vice-Chairmen.21 This strong
connection along with the boom in oil prices in the 1970s gave rise to more funds
for religious scholarship programs. Many Islamic students, most notably those
with close ties to DDII were sent by Natsir to undertake overseas study in the
Middle East. Not surprisingly, they were influenced by the teachings and methods
of the Brotherhood.22
By the early 1980s, the Brotherhood’s ideas and models of activism had
been disseminated through the interactions of students returning from study in the
Middle East.23 At the same time, through the work of DDII’s intellectuals and
affiliates, most notably known as Abu Ridha and Prof. Rahman Zainuddin, the
writings of top leading figures of the Brotherhood such as Hassan al-Banna,
Sayyid Qutb and the like, had been translated into Indonesian thereby making it
possible for campus dakwah activists to access these writings in their own native
language.
21
Bruinessen, “Genealogies,” 2002, p. 123.
22
See, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Also, see Latif, “The Rupture,” 2005.
23
Damanik, Fenomena, 2002; Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Also, see Latif,
“The Rupture,” 2005.
36
2.1.2 Instituting Student Movement
Campus dakwah also took advantage of the emergence of so-called Islamic
resurgence among well-educated people, especially students of secular universities
in the late 1970s. Many of these students possessed religious and spiritual
inquiries. Not surprisingly, campus mosques became the centre of dakwah
activities, and were attended by many students who wanted to participate in
religious circles (halaqah).24 Subsequently, students developed a sense of
confidence and assertiveness to espouse Islamic ideals and values. Also, the
influence of Islamic revivalism was evident in increasing prevalence of Islamic
attire (e.g. jilbab or headscarf for female students), the greater number of students
praying at campus mosques, the increase in number of students who preferred
Islamic publishing and so on.
Campus dakwah then metamorphosed into a legalised unit of student
activity, that is, it became the Campus Predication Institute (LDK).25 More
importantly, activists of campus dakwah used this campus-sponsored religious
body for recruitment and organisational purposes. LDK benefited from being an
officially recognised student organisation in two ways. First, it received financial
support, in the same way as other registered student organisations, from the
campus administrator. This yearly financial assistance was useful for the
sustainability of the organisation and was helpful for supporting massive and
24
Halaqah is an Islamic gathering or forum to discuss religious issues.
25
The most detailed account of the LDK can be found in Damanik, Fenomena Partai
Keadilan, 2002. See also, Damanik, Tarbiyah Menjawab Tantangan, 2002; Furkon, Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera, 2004.
37
costly religious events such as the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth
(mauled) and Ramadhan-related (fasting month) events. Second, in the context of
suppression of student activism, through establishing itself as a legal student
organisation, LDK sent a clear message to the regime that it did not oppose the
status quo. It emphasised to the state that its main activity was the cultivation of
religious understanding and practice.
In the mid 1980s, LDK was established by a number of Islamic students
who were active in campus dakwah activities at the Indonesia University (UI)
under the umbrella of the so-called Forum of Islamic Studies (FSI, Forum Studi
Islam).26 FSI is a pseudo name for campus dakwah established in almost all
faculties at UI. Since FSI developed rapidly and won wide support among
students, the establishment of a well-organised forum for managing a broad range
of Islamic activities such as LDK was very important. LDK soon began to build
broader contacts with various bodies of dakwah movements on other university
campuses.27 Considering that the development of campus dakwah increased
significantly in many prestigious universities, most remarkably, in Java and
Sumatra, LDK activists tried to build a broader network of intercampus
predication by establishing the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication
(FSLDK).
26
27
For example, at ITB, activists of the campus dakwah activists operated out of the
university’s Salman Mosque and coordinated their regular activities through the so-called Family
of Islamic Students (Gamais, Keluarga Mahasiswa Islam). At the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB,
Institute Pertanian Bogor) and the Gadjah Mada University (UGM), campus dakwah activists ran
their religious activities through the Council for Mosque Cultivation (DKM, Dewan Kemakmuran
Masjid) al-Hurriyah, and the Shalahuddin Congregation (Jamaah Shalahuddin) respectively.
38
It is worth noting that LDK alone is hardly homogenous and within the
organisation there are a range of different opinions about strategies for establishing
an Islamic state and the degree of acceptance toward the ideas of democracy and
nation-state. Followers of Hizbut Tahrir (HT, the Liberation Party), for instance,
were also actively involved in LDK, particularly at IPB. HT is an Islamist
transnational movement which strongly rejects the notions of democracy and
nation-state, and whose primary objective is to rebuild a global Islamic caliphate.28
Initially, the core religious convictions of LDK were largely adopted from
the Brotherhood’s Hassan al-Banna and Jamiat al-Islamy’s al-Mawdudi views.
That is the idea that Islam is al-diin or a total, comprehensive, and all-
encompassing way of life with no separation between aqidah wa shari’ah (belief
and law), diin wa dawlah (religion and state), and diin wa dunya (spiritual and
temporal). In this regard, there is no sharp contrast between the Brotherhood-
inspired LDK activists and their HT counterparts. What makes HT very different
relative to the rest of LDK activists is the ideological framework created by its
founder Shaikh Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. Unlike the mainstream LDK who believe
28
HT’s ideas were brought to Indonesia in the 1980s by a Palestinian born activist of HT,
Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, who received an invitation from the head of Ghazali Islamic boarding
school KH. Mama Abdullah bin Nuh. Most favoured early recruits of Al-Baghdadi and Nuh’s such
as Al-Khatthath, Hafiz Abdurrahman, Ismail Yusanto, Zulia Ilmawati and Fahmi Amhar used
officially campus religious bodies for the purposes of recruitment. Among other things, Badan
Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa (BKIM) which was part of the LDK network in IPB, was the primary
institutional site of HT. There is evidence showing that HT utilized LDK to advance its ideologies
through methods of intensive training called halaqah (study circle) and daurah (training program)
and benefited largely from LDK’s networks of activism throughout campus mosques. The most
detailed account of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) can be found in Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004),” 2005. See also, Burhanuddin, “Beyond the Nation-State: The Quest
for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," in the Asian Journal of Social Science (NUS and Brill) 36:5 (2008),
forthcoming.
39
that democracy can provide a way to form an Islamic state, HT strongly opposes
the idea of democracy because it is perceived as a human-made system.29
In the mid-1980s, the name usrah came to be associated with radical
Islamist groups such as the underground Darul Islam (The House of Islam).30 This
group used a cell structure (usrah) to maintain its clandestine operation against the
state. In fact, as noted earlier, campus dakwah sought to avoid direct confrontation
with the regime by staying away from politics and focusing its activities on
cultivating religious understanding and practice among students. Given that the
association of usrah with radical organisations could harm campus dakwah, its
leaders began to call their movement halaqah, which refers to an informal
religious circle of students and their teachers.31
In other occasions, some leading figures of campus dakwah called their
movement ‘Jemaah Tarbiyah’32 in order to keep distance from politically radical
29
Interview, Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 23 February 2005.
30
Darul Islam is the oldest radical Islamic movement led by Kartosuwirjo. The DI
rebellion began in 1947 and yet the army crushed it in the 1960s. However, there were a few units
in West Java which succeeded in reviving the movement. They utilized the Brotherhood-style cell
structure (usrah) to recruit members. For a detailed account of Darul Islam, see C.A.O. van
Nieuwenhuijze, “The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2
(Jun. 1950), pp. 169-183.
31
Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”
32
The word “tarbiyah” is derived from Arabic for “the process of education, training, and
caring someone.” It is closely associated with the use of usrah (cell) or halaqah (religious circle)
that consists of ten to twelve cadres, which are led by a type of religious instructor called murabbi,
whose mission it is to form an evenly strong-mind assemblage of cadres. The word “murabbi” is a
variant spelling of “tarbiyah” derived from the same form of Arabic word, that is, rabba yurabbi
which means “to educate, to train, to care, to bring up, to maintain.” While “tarbiyah” is a mashdar
(original) form of the verb, murabbi is a fail (subject) form the verb meaning to ‘persons who carry
out the process of education or training.’ Salman, “Participation in Social Movement: Explaining
People’s Choice to Join the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia,“ unpublished MA thesis, at Syarif
Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, 2006.
40
associations.33 In fact, there is no clearly defined meaning of the word ‘tarbiyah’
issued by campus dakwah activists or the central board of PKS.34 Some argue that
this name is not a formal name of a movement.35 Jemaah Tarbiyah is used
interchangeably with Ikhwan, which refers to the Egyptian Muslim group (Ikhwan
al-Muslimin or Muslim Brotherhood) whose ideas and model of activism have
largely inspired the movement.36 In short, Jemaah Tarbiyah is used to distinguish
itself with other Islamic groups, especially those who came out of Islamic student
predication movements but have substantial differences in ideological frameworks
and methods to achieve their goals.
In a further development, despite some differences, a broad range of
streams within LDK eventually supported the establishment of the Forum for
Coordination of Campus Predication Institution (FSLDK, Forum Shilaturrahmi
Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) in 1986. FSLDK is a forum for coordinating dakwah
activities on campuses throughout Indonesia and for building broader networks
among LDK activists. Taking advantage of the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK in
Malang during 1998, which was attended by hundreds of students from various
parts of Indonesia had assembled in Malang, some LDK activists announced the
formation of the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, Kesatuan
33
Interview, a Prominent Dakwah Leader (Anonymous), Jakarta, 21 August 2007.
34
Mahfudz Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis Dakwah
Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi,
Era Intermedia, Solo, 2003, p. 84.
35
Ibid.
36
Abdul Aziz and Damanik argue that the term “Tarbiyah” and “Ikhwani” are synonymous
in this case, which refers to LDK activists whose methods (manhaj) and ideas are inspired from the
Egyptian Brotherhood. See, Abdul Aziz, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia, Pustaka
Firdaus, Jakarta, 1996. See also, Damanik, Fenomena, 2002.
41
Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia). In fact, as was clarified by the coordinator of
the FSLDK’s communication centre, the assembly itself did not formally endorse
the birth of KAMMI.37 Rather, the new organisation was based on individual
initiatives and was declared after the meeting was officially closed.38 This
rejection was voiced by those who came from Hizbut Tahrir.39 The birth of
KAMMI during the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK was seen as abusing the
conference for political interests.40 KAMMI was indeed established by FSLDK’s
activists who were closely associated with Tarbiyah such as Fahri Hamzah.
Regardless of this opposition, Tarbiyah-affiliated activists succeeded in
establishing KAMMI.
In the wake of deepening social political unrest in the latter period of
Suharto, KAMMI emerged as one of the most conspicuous student movements
voicing public grievances through massive rallies throughout the country and
pressuring for regime change. Most of all, the formation of KAMMI reflected the
evolution of the dakwah movement from mere consolidation through personal
Islamic propagation and political quietism to a more critical view of the nation’s
current condition. As explained earlier, campus dakwah had previously maintained
its strategy of distancing itself from political confrontation with the state; believing
that the path of dakwah would have a long-term impact.41 The fall of Suharto, after
37
Budi Mulyana, Gatra, 2 May 1998.
38
Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. See also, Kraince, “The Role of Islamic
Students,” 2000.
39
Interview, a Prominent Dakwah Leader (Anonymous), Jakarta, 21 August 2007.
40
Ibid.
41
See Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.
42
months of grand-scale demonstrations pioneered by a number of student
movement organisations, including KAMMI, gave proponents of campus dakwah
a chance to redesign its strategy for advancing their ideals in a relatively new
democratic environment.
2.1.3 Political Movement
Shortly after the resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998, KAMMI leaders
embarked on forming an Islamic political party. This initiative was also supported
by some campus dakwah activists who argued that the already established
networks and resources of the dakwah movement should be transformed into a
political party. They believed in the benefits of participating in the newly
democratic system. However, some activists opposed the idea and proposed to turn
the movement into a non-political organisation (ormas). An internal survey
involving core cadres of the movement resulted in the majority of activists
agreeing to establish a party.42 The party was then named “Partai Keadilan”
(Justice Party), now known as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice
Party).
It is important to keep in mind that despite the contribution of KAMMI’s
leaders to the formation of PK, KAMMI and PK claim no formal relationship, but
there is much evidence to the contrary. They acknowledge, however, that the two
42
Ibid. See also, Damanik, Fenomena, 2002
43
share a social, cultural, ideological relationship with PK and its successor PKS.43
The relations between KAMMI and PK/PKS are obvious, and it sometimes serves
as “the student wing of (PK)/PKS.”44 Furthermore, PK and its successor PKS
provide opportunities for KAMMI activists to pursue political careers. The first
chairman of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah, and his successor, Andi Rahmat, are
currently serving as PKS representatives in the national parliament (2004-2009).
Most alumni of KAMMI hold key positions of leadership in the party structure,
either in the central board or in local branches.
The first priority for the leadership of PK was how to transfer the
ideological loyalties of the campus dakwah movement to the party. The
reformulation of the relationship between the party and movement is pivotal to the
long-term success of the party.45 Like the Brotherhood and its offshoots elsewhere,
PK and its current manifestation PKS hold the view that “al-jama’ah hiya al-hizb
wa al-hizb huwa al-jama’ah”, which means “the movement is the party and the
party is the movement.” The term jamaah (Arabic for ‘movement’) was employed
by the Brotherhood followed by PK and PKS to describe an Islamic movement
that operates clandestinely to avoid regime oppression. As is widely known, the
Egyptian Muslim organisation faced harsh punishment from the regime.
Nonetheless, the term ‘jamaah’ is then no longer valid when the regime has
granted a space for democracy. Instead, the term hizb (Arabic for ‘political party’)
43
Troy A. Johnson, “Islamic Student Organisations and Democratic Development in
Indonesia: Three Case Studies,” unpublished M.A. Thesis presented at Ohio University, 2006.
44
45
Ibid.
44
is more favourable in the pursuit of Tarbiyah’s goals.46 Accordingly, in the
emergence of a new democratic regime in Indonesia in 1998, Tarbiyah activists
decided to form PK and utilize Tarbiyah’s preexisting networks and resources.
In the run-up to the 1999 elections, PK attracted many observers because it
campaigned as “the only political party with a clear program and transparent
structure.”47 Unlike other Islamic parties, which seem to rely heavily on their
extraordinary leaders, PK emphasised the egalitarianism of Islam and collective
strength, and showed less concern for charismatic leaders, while at the same time
demanding strict submission to religious norms.48
PK drew its support largely from Tarbiyah activists who are mainly from
urban areas, well-educated, younger and have an orthodox outlook. Ironically, this
party appeared to exclude a mass following, which, it is deemed by PK leaders, do
not understand Islamic principles. It was widely perceived as ‘an exclusive party’
because of the strict selection criteria for its members, and the fact that its cadres
are subjected to thorough training. Indonesianist Jim Schiller’s field research in
Jepara, for example, shows that in “the very tiny PKS [in the district] is led by
doctors, its men and women sit separately at rallies which cater more to deepening
loyalty than attracting new voters.”49
In Indonesia’s first free elections in over 30 years in 1999, PK failed to
meet the electoral law permitting parties to compete in the next elections. This
46
Ibid. See also, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.
47
Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto,” 2004.
48
Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, pp. 50-51.
49
Comment to I-Discussion email list managed by Edward Aspinall, as quoted from
Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”
45
failure was expected by many due to PK’s inability to attract new voters by
offering a broader message. After this unsuccessful campaign, the newly political
party reconstituted itself as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
or PKS) in April 2003. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, PKS succeeded in
gaining 7.34% of the popular vote or 45 out of 550 seats, a size-fold increase over
its predecessor Partai Keadilan (PK), which received only 1.4% in the 1999
elections. This remarkable success of PKS was in part due to the fact that the party
adopted so-called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist—
electoral strategy.50 This was pivotal to maintaining the party’s base of support
from its traditional and orthodox constituencies and it played a crucial role in
generating new voters by promoting universal issues such as anti-corruption and
clean government.
2.2. PKS as Islamist Social Movement
2.2.1 What is Islamism?
Having sketched the transformation of PKS from a student movement to
political party, I will emphasise the position of the party as an Islamist movement.
Before discussing PKS as an Islamist movement, one must define what Islamism
and social movements are. Islamism is the extent to which Islam is perceived as a
set of specific norms, comprehensive and superiority of Islam and, therefore, it
contains the blueprint of a social order. Hence, Islamists intend to replace the
50
Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties.”
46
present social and political order with such norms based on a certain understanding
of Islamic teachings. This may be carried out peacefully or through violent actions
that are determined by the value system of the actors.51 According to Bubalo and
Fealy, the major consequence of Islamism is the existence of an Islamic state or
system.52 This is the core element of Islamism followed by Islamic activism.53
Both characteristics of Islamism cannot easily be separated, because an Islamic
state is impossible to build without activism.
Above all, however, PKS can best be understood as moderate Islamism
instead of radical jihadist Islamism.54 This is largely because the party operates
within a democratic system as well as because it accepts the idea of nation-state.
Also, it describes itself as a peaceful movement that rules out the use of violence
in achieving its goals. In attempting to delineate the position of PKS among
various Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the former president of PKS, Hidayat
Nurwahid, describes the party as a centrist Islamic party which occupies the
middle ground between radical Islamist groups that reject democracy and Muslim
organisations committed to democracy.55 Nonetheless, no other major party would
agree with Hidayat’s claim that PKS is a centrist party. PKS is still viewed by
51
For more discussion of the indicators of Islamism, see, Saiful Mujani et al., Benturan
Peradaban: Sikap dan Perilaku Islamis Indonesia terhadap Amerika Serikat PPIM, Freedom
Institute, Penerbit Nalar, Jakarta, 2005.
52
53
Ibid., p. 10.
54
Radical jihadist is commonly defined as the Islamic armed struggle (al-jihad), which
exists in three main variants: internal (combating nominally Muslim regimes considered impious);
irredentist (fighting to redeem land ruled by non-Muslims or under occupation); and global
(combating the West). The characteristic actors are the fighters (al-mujahid). See, International
Crisis Group (ICG), “Understanding Islamism,” ICG Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37,
2005.
55
As quoted from Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”
47
many as an Islamist party, but it uses an existing democratic system to pursue its
political agenda.
2.2.2. Between Movement and Party
In this part, I will look at PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a
force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. In
order to understand the term ‘social movement,’ it is necessary to look at the
emergence of social movement theory in the early 1970s. In the 1950s and the
mid-1960s, social psychology dominated scholarship on movements, focusing
extensively on the collective behaviour approach which saw social movements as
long-lasting panics and crowds.56 Subsequently, a group of scholars, particularly
proponents of resource mobilisation, criticised collective behaviour theories and
began to formulate ideas about the importance of political structure and
organisational factors to account for social unrest.57
Maintaining the view that social movements and political parties are a
distinct category, McAdam and Snow list a number of characteristics of social
movements that include the following elements: (1) collective or joint action; (2)
56
There are at least three main differences between social movements and collective
behavior: institutional versus non-institutional, spontaneous versus planned and ephemeral versus
prolonged. It has been claimed that collective behavior is relatively characterised by its non-
institutional and spontaneous activity, but the biggest difference between social movements and the
other forms of collective behaviour concerns the duration of the social movement, that its more
long-lasting than collective behaviour. See, Gary T. Marx and Douglas McAdam, Collective
Behaviour and Social Movements: Process and Structure, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1994, p. 72.
57
The most influential account of this approach can be found in John D. McCarthy and
Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” in Mayer N
Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in An Organisational Society, Transaction
Inc., New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1987.
48
change-oriented goals; (3) some degree of organisation; (4) some degree of
temporal continuity; and (5) some extra-institutional collective action, or at least a
mixture of extra-institutional (protesting in the streets) and institutional (lobbying)
actions.58 Blending these elements together, we can draw the conclusion that social
movements are a collectivity or a group of people acting with some degree of
organisation and continuity outside of institutional procedures or the mechanisms
of formal politics, for the same purpose of challenging the authorities.59
Undoubtedly, McAdam and Snow still maintain that outsiders are the prevailing
image of the actors within social movements.
I will treat PKS as a social movement. There is a growing trend in the field
of social movements to see protest as ‘politics by other means,’ and it is now well
recognised that extra-institutional and institutional politics are intertwined and
interdependent.60 Social movements that consist of extra-institutional actions can
exist not only at election time. As noted by Goldstone, political parties and social
movements in the U.S. and Western Europe have become:
“Overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point

where even long-established political parties welcome social movement
58
Doug McAdam and David Snow, “Introduction, Social Movements: Conceptual and
Theoretical Issues,” in Dough McAdam and David Snow (eds.), Social Movements: Readings on
Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997,
p. xviii.
59
Ibid.
60
Pamela E Oliver, Jorge Cadena-Roa, and Kelley D. Strawn, “Emerging Trends in the
Study of Protest and Social Movements,” forthcoming in volume 11 of Research in Political
Sociology; see also, John K. Glenn, “Parties out of Movements: Party Emergence in Post-
communist Eastern Europe,” in Jack A. Goldstone (ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: UK, 2003.
49
support and often rely specifically on their association with social
movements in order to win elections.”61
If PKS is viewed as a social movement organisation, its existence can be
explained by three crucial factors: (1) political opportunity structure; (2) resource
mobilisation; and (3) collective action frames. As will be further explained, there
are a significant number of external factors or political opportunities that gave rise
to PKS. By using the perspective of resource mobilisation, PKS is able to generate
the involvement of its sympathisers and to transform it into activism and long-time
commitment. More importantly, PKS takes on an organisational framework. In
social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as resource
mobilisation. Lastly, PKS’ collective action entails what social movement scholars
call ‘frame alignment processes,’62 which is a pivotal point of collective action
frames. This emphasises the importance of ideas in conjunction with
organisational and political opportunity factors.
In short, PKS takes the form of a movement for a number of reasons. First,
PKS has not only articulated its political agenda within institutionalised politics,
but has also translated its grievances and interests through a range of collective
actions which involve large numbers of its sympathisers. No other party has such a
high degree of engagement with extra-parliamentary activity. An investigation of
61
Jack A. Goldstone, “Bridging Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Politics,” in
Goldstone (ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements,” 2003, p. 4.
62
For a detailed account of this term, see David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven
K. Worden, Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilisation, and Movement
Participation,” in Doug McAdam and David Snow (eds.), Social Movements: Readings on Their
Emergence, Mobilisation, and Dynamics, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997, pp.
235-251.
50
PKS’ collective action will be comprehensively presented in Chapter 3. It can be
said that elements of social movement organisations i.e. collective action, change-
oriented goals, extra-institutional procedures and so on, have been apparent in
PKS’ social movement.
Second, PKS is a political party which comes out of the Tarbiyah, a
religious movement. As explained earlier, PKS utilised the already established
networks and resources of Tarbiyah to advance its political agenda. In other words,
there is no distinction between PKS and Tarbiyah. Like Tarbiyah on which it is
based, PKS is a cadre party. PKS is based on a network of cells (usrah) where
members are required to meet for Al-Qur’an reading and memorising and
discussion every week (halaqah).63 Through this process of cadreisation, PKS
demands that its members conform to Islamic ideals and norms in all aspects of
life. Members must have passed through a series of six levels ending with
takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah.64
In this regard, PKS considers itself as a vanguard rather than, in Duverger’s
term, ‘a mass party.’65 As a party, PKS actively engages its constituencies on
continual basis, not only at election times and has a remarkable record of social
work. In other words, cadres are not only an important part of PKS’ electoral
strategy, but they also play significant role in the process of mobilising the party’s
collective action. The prevalence of grand-scale demonstrations and the high level
63
Panduan Lengkap Manhaj Tarbiyah Kader PK-Sejahtera, Media Insani Press, Solo,
2005.
64
Ibid. See also, Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties.”
65
Maurice Duverger, “Caucus and Branch, cadre Party and Mass Parties,” in Peter Mair,
(ed.), The West European Party System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 37-45.
51
of participation in PKS’ collective activities have been made possible by the strong
commitment and loyalties of its cadres.
Illustration 1
Caption:
10.000 PKS sympathisers rally against Israel (date unspecified). Available at
zioneocon.blogspot.com/Indonesian%20rally.jpg.
52
CHAPTER 3
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION OF PKS:
EXAMINING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND
PERCEPTIONS OF FAR AND NEAR ENEMIES
In order to understand PKS as a social movement, we need to consider more
detailed information about actions or related events carried out collectively by PKS
supporters as recorded by the mass media. This chapter relies primarily on protest
event analysis, which is frequently used in social movement research. Nonetheless,
some excerpts from my interviews with several prominent leaders of PKS will be
presented as well to support the findings of this protest event analysis.
3.1 Operational Definitions
As noted earlier, PKS not only articulates its agenda within the framework
of institutionalised politics, but also acts as a social movement organisation, which
spiritedly engages in collective action. Given that the notion of social movement
and that of collective action are inexorably intertwined, we must adequately define
what collective action is. As described earlier, one of the most salient characteristics
of social movements is the element of collective action.1 It can be said that
collective action is one of the core elements of social movement. McAdam and
Snow argue that social movements are a form of collective action.2 Klandermans
1
See, Chapter II, especially sub-title, “Between Movement and Party.”
2
McAdam and Snow, “Social Movements,” 1997, p. xxiv.
53
states that social movements are dominated by “individuals sharing collective goals
and a collective identity who engage in disruptive collective action.”3
Hence, collective action is closely associated with the process of
mobilisation outside the mechanism of formal politics, for example petition, rallies,
marches, sit-ins, and other actions. In this sense, collective action relies on
unconventional forms of political participation as opposed to the conventional ones.
According to Kaase and Marsh, conventional participation is any activity by
ordinary people, not elites, to influence political outcomes according to relatively
settled procedures or laws such as voting, campaigning, etc.4 In contrast,
unconventional participation refers to any activity by ordinary citizens to influence
political outcomes “that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom” such
as demonstration, strikes and boycotts.5
Another characteristic of collective action is a “joint action in pursuit of a
common objective.”6 It is also worth noting that collective action is not an abstract
category. It is a real, visible movement, a “product,” and its messages are clearly
sent to opponents or the public.7 In a similar vein, Olzak stipulates a minimal
definition of collective action, that is, (1) collective (involving more than one
3
Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1997, p. 2.
4
Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, “Political Action: Theoretical Perspective,” in Samuel H.
Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.), Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies,
Sage Publication, California, 1979, pp. 39-42.
5
Ibid., p. 41.
6
McAdam and Snow, “Social Movements”, 1997, p. xxiv.
7
Dieter Rucht, “National Contexts and Movement Structures,” in McAdam, McCarty, and
Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996, p. 186
54
person),8 and (2) it makes claims in sustained sequences of interaction with
opponents or authorities.9
In investigating PKS’ collective action, I adhere to the aforementioned
characteristics, they are (1) collective; (2) making a claim while challenging others;
(3) visible and observable by the public; (4) change-oriented goals; and (5) using
extra-institutional procedures that involve some degree of mobilisation.
Accordingly, following Burstein, I will not include PKS’ political party
conventions, and the like in the list of collective action.10 However, I will not
exclude the process of mobilisation during PKS’ congressional activities or
following the party’s anniversary celebrations. Usually at the time of its
anniversary, the party mobilises its sympathisers into the streets or conducts great
meetings or public sermons addressing various issues on international Islamism.
Having said that the concept requires some degree of extra-institutional
politics and mechanism, I also exclude a huge number of reports published by both
the print and electronic media on PKS and its parliamentary members’ comments in
formal political activities from the notion of collective action. The way the party is
striving in parliament, in elections (either at the national or local levels) and at the
negotiating table cannot be seen as forms of collective actions. For instance, media
8
Students of social movement have been varied in their interpretations of the meaning of
collective in collective events. Charles Tilly proposed a minimum of 50 people. See, Charles Tilly,
From Mobilisation to Revolution, Addison Wesley, Reading: Mass., 1978. Olzak and West use at
least 2 people, but most observers choose a minimum in the range of 10 and 20. See, Susan Olzak,
“Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 15 (1989),
p. 126.
9
Ibid., p. 124.
10
See, P. Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment
Opportunity in the United States since the New Deal, University Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985.
55
reports on PKS’ support for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the run-up to the
presidential election in 2004 or an inter-party coalition that included PKS and aimed
to support a government policy called ‘Koalisi Kerakyatan’ will not be classified as
collective action. This is largely because those activities or repots are primarily
concerned with the scope of elite rather than spontaneous grass-root mobilisation.11
3.2 Protest Event Analysis
In order to examine PKS’ collective action, I take advantage of a growing
approach in the field of collective action research, that is, a study of protest events.12
Events, wrote Paige and Tilly, are a non-routine type of action repertoire,13
unconventional, collective, disruptive and public acts that involve claims on behalf
of a larger collective.14 The benefits of using event analysis are the following: (1)
events are (at least potentially) commensurate across different kinds of movements,
thus facilitating a unified theory of mobilisation; (2) an event-centred approach can
11
Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989, p. 125.
12
Most major research traditions in collective action have taken advantage of analysis of
newspaper event data. Apart from using newspaper data for conducting protest event analysis, I also
use them along with other primary sources for political discourse analysis as will further developed
in the chapter 4 and 5. For a detailed account of protest event and political discourse analyses, see
Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, “Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and
Political Discourse Approaches,” in Mobilisation: An International Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2/Fall
1999, pp. 203-221.
13
This is to distinguish with routine activities such as public discussion, religious meetings,
and so on. As is widely known, PKS has continuously built its reputation on being a so-called cadre
party (partai kader) which actively engages its constituencies on a continual basis, with a remarkable
record of social work and dealing with non-political issues such as running a number of educational
institutions both formal (Sistem Terpadu) or non-formal, and so on. PKS also manages such religious
activities as liqo (weekly meeting), mabit (spending the night at the mosque), daurah (training
program), rihlah (travel program) and the like in regular ways. These routine activities cannot be
seen as forms of collective action. Olzak even excludes anniversary marches and annual celebrations
since their timing is predetermined and not spontaneous. See, Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989, p.
126.
14
See, J.M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution, Free Press, New York, 1975; See also, Tilly, From
Mobilisation, 1978.
56
incorporate the dynamics of timing and mutual causality; and (3) as a consequence
of this, the decline or rise of mobilisation can be tested by an examination of the
relation between protest and political opportunity structures.15
While acknowledging these inherent limitations of the use of newspaper
data,16 this study will use newspaper data for the following reasons: First,
newspaper-based event data provides a rich collection of information on the
occurrence of PKS’ collective action, its duration, its participants, its targets and the
like. In other words, among other sources, “newspapers provide the most complete
account of events for the widest sample of geographical or temporal units.”17
Second, as offered by Earl and her collaborators, I used so-called ‘triangulation of
multiple sources’ to ensure a broader range of coverage, which is likely both to
capture more events (addressing description bias) and to provide multiple accounts
of each event (addressing description bias).18 Third, related to the use of multiple
15
Oliver, Cadena Roa, and Strawn, “Emerging Trends.”
16
Some scholars have criticized protest event analysis. First of all, newspaper content is not
intended or created for academic purposes so that the reliability and validity of the data might be
questioned.16 In other words, researchers, who use newspaper data, depend on the work of others to
help in providing collective events. Also, some critics argue that the protest event method that relies
heavily on newspaper data suffers from selection bias because a news desk has a number of
limitations such as space restriction to report on all events that actually occur. Likewise the
newspaper data cannot be immune from impressions and inferences of journalists or commentators
or actors thereby making such data more vulnerable to description bias. David G. Ortiz, Daniel J.
Myers, N. Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena D. Diaz, “Where Do We Stand With Newspaper Data,” in
Mobilisation: An International Journal, 10 (3): p. 397. See also, Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, John
D. McCarthy, and Sarah A. Soule, “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,”
Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 2004, pp. 68-73.
17
Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989, p. 128.
18
Earl, et al., “The Use of Newspaper,” 2004.
57
sources, I also take advantage of the increasing popularity of electronic archives as
sources of data on PKS’ collective actions.19
In doing so, I relied on two national dailies Kompas and Republika during
two-months of fieldwork in Indonesia to collect data on PKS’ collective actions
from 1980 to 2007. Given that the two print media have their own official websites,
I also took advantage of their electronic archives by using keyword search strings.
To confirm the validity of the data and to capture PKS’ collective events that were
not reported by Kompas and Republika, I also referred to other national and regional
dailies or weekly magazines and their electronic archives such as Media Indonesia,
Suara Merdeka, and Tempo. Among the 225 collective events carried out by PKS
captured in this work, 37.8% of them were reported by Kompas, 48% were covered
by Republika, and only 14.2% were obtained from other sources.
Clearly, by using more than two sources of newspaper data, this study
captured more PKS collective events and is thus able to assess differences in
reporting on the same events that are covered by more than one newspaper.
However, for the purposes of the protest event analysis carried out in this chapter, I
have just put “unique events” in the dataset where the same events are covered by
Republika, Kompas and other news agencies will be enumerated as one event.
Republika, based on the dataset, captured more PKS’ collective events than
Kompas.
19
For the benefit of electronic archives, see, Earl, et al., “The Use of Newspaper,” 2004, p.
75.
58
3.3 Indicators
In an attempt to assess PKS collective actions from 1980-2007, I use several
indicators that are commonly used in when conducting protest event analysis. The
first is when the action takes place.20 This is to develop information on the timing
and sequences of events in conjunction with theories of political opportunities. In
Indonesia’s case, the collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998 is crucial to mark the end
of political repression in the country. As will further be explained, the openness and
repressiveness of political systems are influential in determining the emergence of
movements.
The second is types of actions.21 These forms of actions are distinguished
into 12 categories; that are, demonstrations/rallies, great meetings (tabligh akbar),
fundraising, istighotsah (public praying), a devotion to social work and mobilisation
to help victims of natural disasters, public statements of opinion, flag burning,
sending of fighters (jihadits) and ‘volunteers,’ mobilisation during the party’s
declaration, anniversaries and convention and unconventional mobilisation related
to elections. This is to define the extent to which PKS conducts its collective
actions out in peaceful, disruptive or violent ways.22
20
See, Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni,
New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1995.
21
Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989.
22
Some researchers propose a wide range of definitions on collective violence. Olzak
defines events as violent if weapons or attacks are used to threaten or damage persons physically or
objects. See, Susan Olzak, “Labour Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America,
1880-1915,” in American Journal of Sociology, May, 1994. A violent event has been defined in
terms of the number of deaths during collective actions E.N Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime
Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” in American Sociology Review 50, pp. 47-61.
59
The third is that each of PKS’ collective events will be assessed on the basis
of issues or claims.23 Main issues raised through the party’s collective action are “a
much more common—if more prosaic—reason why people band together in
movements.”24 People will not risk their lives or sacrifice their time, money, or
energies to participate in PKS’ collective action unless they have good reason to do
so. To this end, I classify PKS’ collective action into two broad categories defined
based on either Islamist or non-Islamist issues. Fourth, PKS’ events to raise certain
issues will be classified as either addressing international or domestic issues.
The fifth is that each of PKS’ collective actions will be weighted by its
duration multiplied by the average number of participants.25 This is to measure
event intensity that has been operationalised in many ways, including through its
size and duration. The analysis of event intensity will also be developed to specify
any particular issues which attract PKS’ sympathisers to go to the streets. The sixth
is the involvement of actors or political leaders in PKS’ events.26 Finally, given that
an event’s location can matter in several ways, the measurement of dataset based on
the location of events will be presented as well.27
3.4 Findings
I have discussed at length that PKS as a social movement organisation
cannot be simplified as a political party. It evolved out of an informally Islamist-
23
Tarrow, Power in Movement, 1998.
24
Ibid., p. 4.
25
Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989.
26
Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, “Where Do We Stand.”
27
Ibid.
60
based movement called ‘Jemaah Tarbiyah.’ After the resignation of Suharto in
1998, Tarbiyah advocates formed a political party called Partai Keadilan (PK,
Justice Party), a predecessor PKS, as a political vehicle to advance its goals. Hence,
the term “Tarbiyah” here refers to LDK/FSLDK, KAMMI, PK, and PKS. Indeed,
FSLDK is hardly monolithic, but it is dominated by those who are affiliated with
Tarbiyah. Also, despite the claim that KAMMI has no formal relationship with
PK/PKS, the dominant trends among the leadership and membership of this student
organisation are the ideas of Tarbiyah. Further, in many instances, KAMMI
presented itself as, in Machmudi words, “the student wing of PKS.”28
Among the total collective events captured in this work, the majority of
events are held under the banner of PKS (60.9%), KAMMI (25.8%), PK (12%), and
FSLDK (1.3%). The relatively little activity carried out by FSLDK is an
unsurprising finding considering the fact that it is merely a friendship forum for
building networks to facilitate intercampus predication. PK merged into PKS in
2003 following its failure to generate sufficient votes in 1999. It comes as no
surprise that PKS draws more attention from news agencies than other forms of
Tarbiyah. Its remarkable success in the 2004 elections is a crucial reason why many
people, including media, are looking at PKS more closely.
3.4.1. Timing and Sequence
Most events carried out by the FSLDK, KAMMI, PK and PKS have been
conducted after the resignation of Suharto in May 1998. Only 6.2% of them
28
61
occurred when Suharto was still in power. These small portions of collective events
were carried out largely by KAMMI. As is widely known, KAMMI, as one of the
most influential student forces, played key role in demanding total reform actions
which subsequently led Suharto to step down in 1998. Bearing slogans demanding
‘non-violent reform’ (reformasi damai), KAMMI held massive rallies throughout
the country from April to 21 May 1998 when Suharto announced his resignation.
Still today, KAMMI is a leading force among Islamic student movements in
Indonesia. Above all, however, the grand-scale demonstrations pressuring the
government for change before 21 of May 1998, including those under the banner of
KAMMI, were made possible by the declining capacity of Suharto to sideline any
challenges. The regime’s weakened ability to suppress student demonstrations was
facilitated by the emergence of the 1997 economic crisis which created a large hole
in Suharto’s political regime and thereby created a window of political opportunity
for regime change.
The Graph 1 shows that prior to 1998 Tarbiyah did not appear publicly in
order to avoid sustained political repression. Tarbiyah then focused its activities on
cultivating religious understanding and practices in campus mosques. This finding
affirms the theory of political opportunities where it is stated that the more the
political system is opened, the more opportunities are available for the emergence of
collective action. In contrast, the more the political system is closed, the less
opportunity there is for collective action.29
29
The next chapter will further discuss the relationship between the timing of PKS’
collective actions and political opportunity by taking a closer look at the final days of Suharto.
62
Graph 1
Time of actions
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Jul-98
Jul-99
Jul-00
Jul-01
Jul-02
Jul-03
Jul-04
Jul-05
Jul-06
Jul-07
Oct-98
Jan-99
Oct-99
Jan-00
Oct-00
Jan-01
Oct-01
Jan-02
Oct-02
Jan-03
Oct-03
Jan-04
Oct-04
Jan-05
Oct-05
Jan-06
Oct-06
Jan-07
Oct-07
Apr-98
Apr-99
Apr-00
Apr-01
Apr-02
Apr-03
Apr-04
Apr-05
Apr-06
Apr-07
In addition, the graph highlights that the majority of PKS’ collective actions
were carried out in November 2006 (8.4%), July 2006 (6.2%), March 2003 (4.4%),
August 2006 (4.4%), May 2006 (4.4%), etc. Overall, 2006 was the most intensive in
terms of PKS’ events as 33% of its collective actions were conducted in that year
(Graph. 2). Interestingly, during election time in 1999 and 2004, the number of PK
and PKS’ collective actions declined significantly, respectively 2.7% and 8.9%.
Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election process, the decrease of
PKS’ collective actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid alienating
voters by appearing militantly Islamic. As will be explored, six-in-ten of PKS’
collective actions can be classified as ‘Islamist’ in substance. If the party organizes
such an Islamist-based action at election times, it would damage the image of the
party. As the national leadership of PKS decided to sell non-Islamist issues in the
2004 elections, most notably, promoting clean and caring image, the party’s refrains
from openly pushing Islamist agenda.
63
Aside from that, the answer to why 2006 became the most active year for
PKS’ actions is that the majority of PKS collective events can be classified as event-
connected collective action, which responds to certain actual issues. In 2006 for
instance, there were a number of controversies which PKS reacted to: the uproar
over cartoon portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad published by a Danish
newspaper (3.6%), the Israeli invasion against Lebanon (6.2%), George W. Bush’s
visit to Indonesia (8.9%), anti-pornography movements following the release of
Indonesian version of “Playboy” magazine (5.8%), and a proposed national anti-
pornography law. The intensity of PKS’ collective action also increased slightly in
2003 following the U.S. attacks on Iraq (6.2%) and continuing wars in Afghanistan
(1.8%).
Graph 2
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
Percent
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year_year
3.4.2. Forms of Action
Among the 12 forms of collective actions looked at in this study,
demonstration is the most preferred action of PKS, including PK and KAMMI
(51.6%). 16.9% of PKS events take the form of position statement (pernyataan
64
sikap). Another favourite type of action is a call, appeal or demand (6.2%) and a
devotion to social work in regard to natural disasters (4.9%). Aside from that, PKS’
campaigns for raising donations was made up 4% as well as organising great
meetings (tabligh akbar) (3.6%). Other actions are reported at about the same level,
on average no more than 3% of the total of PKS’ collective events gathered in this
work (Graph 3).
Almost all of PKS’ collective actions, including FSLDK, KAMMI, and PK,
are peaceful and orderly.30 Nevertheless, there is some indication that just a few of
PKS’ events are classified as “violent” such as readiness to send jihadist (fighters)
to the Middle East (1.8%).31 Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that this
readiness to send jihadist is merely a rhetorical-by-product of a larger event and
constitutes an effort to publicly display Islamic solidarities in defense of its fellow
Muslims in other parts of the world. For example, some PKS branches conducted
registration for ‘volunteers’ willing to be sent to Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and
Afghanistan. As reported by media, hundreds of PKS cadres from Kediri in East
Java were ready to leave for Lebanon to help Hizbullah troops in their struggle
against the Israeli invasion in 2006. The men were ready to leave for Lebanon at any
time while waiting for the go-ahead from the party’s central executive board. But, to
my knowledge, no one was sent to the Middle East. Apart from the rhetoric of
30
Editorial, “Aksi Simpatik Partai Keadilan,” Media Indonesia, 19 October 2001;
“Demonstrasi Itu Tertib dan Damai,” Media Indonesia, 15 September 2003; “Ketertiban Sejuta
Umat,” Media Indonesia, 31 March 2005; Dahlan Iskan, “Massa Santun di Dunia yang Bergetah,”
Suara Indonesia, 20 September 1998. For the case of KAMMI’s non-confrontational character
approach, see, Jakarta Post, 11 April 1998, p. 1; “5000-an Mahasiswa Islam Serukan Aksi Damai,”
Republika, 11 April 1998, p. 12; “Demonstrasi Sambil Tersenyum,” Merdeka, 11 April 1998, p. 1.
31
Antara, 27 July 2006.
65
sending jihadist, PKS also frequently drew attention from the public on its readiness
to send volunteers to help distribute financial and logistical assistance to its fellow
Muslims suffering from Israeli and American invasions in the Middle East.
Nonetheless, there was no clarity whether the volunteers were sent or not.
Another form of PKS actions that is rarely seen in public is flag burning
(2.7%). It is difficult to classify “flag burning” as a violent action because of the
absence of injuries and death in such action. However, given that PKS and KAMMI
are generally widely known as peaceful movements, the burning of photos of
President Bush or the U.S. and Israeli flags throughout demonstrations signaled the
growing escalation of anger among their participants. For instance, in response to
the Israeli full-scale offensive against Lebanon, local branches of student
organisations in Ambon, including KAMMI and LDK, organised thousands of
people to march through the main streets of the city while waving Palestinian flags,
chanting anti-America and Israeli slogans and burning Israeli flags. A few protesters
in the demonstration carried with them fake guns, rocket launchers, and bombs and
these people tended to cover their faces with martial “ninja” masks as is commonly
found among the radical Palestinian group HAMAS.32 In general, however, in PKS’
demonstrations it is hard to find violent actions that result in the presence of injuries
and property damage as is the case in religious vigilante groups such as Front
Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Front Defenders) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops),
who, as parts of their anti-American demonstrations, carry out sweeping operations
against Westerners in a number of Indonesian hotels.
32
Antara 21 July 2006.
66
Graph 3
Actions
60 51.6
50
40
30
16.9
20
3.6 6.2 4 4.9 4.9
10 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.4 1.3
0
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3.4.3. Main Issues
Criticism of Western domination of the global political order, epitomized by
U.S. foreign policies against the Muslim world, has been apparent in PKS collective
events. Specifically, along with the rise of anti-America sentiment that has been a
dominant issue in PKS protests (17.3%), the Palestine cause has also aroused
outpourings of Islamic solidarity among the party’s supporters. Not surprisingly,
anti-Israeli sentiment has become the most salient characteristic of PKS
demonstrations, with almost one third (29.9%) of its total events focusing on this
issue.
This figure makes PKS different from other Islamic parties and Islamic-
based mass organisations such as the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and the Muslim modernist-based organisation
Muhammadiyah. No other Islamic party has such an attachment to the Palestine
cause as well as such an enduring criticism of America as does PKS. It is true that
that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in Indonesian Muslim
67
circles. Public opinion polls conducted by a respected pollster Lembaga Survei
Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) in 2004 and 2005 suggest that many
Indonesian Muslims had an unfavourable view of America and Israel.33 Unlike
PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti-Israeli and America stance does not
manifest in direct actions. In PKS we find relatively high levels of participation in
various types of actions against America and Israel. In other words, PKS supporters
have more successfully transformed their anti-America and Israeli sentiment into
actions relative to their fellow Muslims who affiliate with other Islamic parties or
with Muslim organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah.
Other contentious events captured in this work are KAMMI’s call for
reformasi, which was followed by Suharto’s relinquishing power (5.8%) and its
rejection of Suharto’s cronies and the New Order (0.9%). Since its inception,
KAMMI successfully mobilised massive rallies and great meetings (tabligh akbar)
against Suharto in many public universities in Indonesia. Yet it is true that the
reformasi struggle was not only dominated by KAMMI’s demonstrations, since
other student groups and non-governmental organizations long active in the pro-
democracy movements also contributed significantly to demanding regime change.
Compared to other groups, “KAMMI’s demonstrations have been widely
recognized as being amongst the least prone to violence.”34 This study also looks at
the way KAMMI acted as a political pressure group against President Wahid
leading to his downfall in 2001 (3.6%)
33
Saiful Mujani, “Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Indonesia,” in Studia Islamika Vol.
12, No. 2, Jakarta, Indonesia: Centre for the Study of Islam and Society, National Institute for
Islamic Studies (IAIN), 2005.
34
Kraince, “The Role of Islamic Student Groups,” 2000, p. 15.
68
Apart from the issues mentioned above, this study also gathers data of
collective events showing that PKS has tried to build its reputation through
organising collective actions to fight against corruption (4%) and money politics
(1.8%), call for sustainability of the reformation struggle (1.3%), and the
abolishment of ABRI’s (the Indonesian Armed Forces) dual function (1.3%). As the
most disciplined political force in Indonesia, PKS also exerts its capability to send
hundreds of its tight-knit cadres to offer support in natural disaster zones (5.8%).
PKS also paid significant attention to the anti-pornography movement (5.8%) and
anti-stigmatisation of Muslims as terrorists (1.3%). Other issues raised in PKS’
demonstrations but occupied at about the same level, on average no more than 1%
of the total PKS collective events gathered in this study.
However, among the issues surveyed in this study, the principal finding is
that PKS’ collective events have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and
anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS’
preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues. It could be said that the
Palestine question is a “trademark” of the party. In fact, PKS collective actions are
generally event-based. One event may come and go, but the prevalence of PKS
actions against Israel can emerge across time and location. The Palestine question
keeps occupying the minds of PKS supporters as reflected in its everlasting large-
scale demonstrations protesting Israeli actions against Palestinians.
In other words, the high number of PKS’ actions which focus on the
Palestine cause vis-à-vis the anti-American and Israeli sentiment suggest that the
party remains preoccupied with the relatively distant issues, which is Islamist in
69
essence, rather than grappling with local issues that correspond with national
interests. The data shows that PKS uses domestic events to bring attention to
international issues, such as demanding that the government takes a firm line against
Israel and give stronger support to the Palestinian struggle. During the fiftieth
anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung on 2-24 April 2005,
PKS urged the government to address the Palestine cause. Also, during the political
turmoil of 2001, PK and KAMMI also actively mobilised its supporters to demand
the downfall of President Wahid for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal
along with their opposition against his plan to open an economic relationship with
Israel (3.6%). For some people, turning greater attention to geographically distant
issues like Palestine and Israel as the nation is still struggling with a number of
economic, political and social issues (e.g. corruption, poverty rate, oil price) is
unwise.
Nonetheless, the data shows again that PKS has paid greater attention to any
international events which relate to anti-Israel and America sentiments. Among the
total PKS’ anti-Zionist actions (29.2%), a large proportion was carried out to
condemn Israeli attacks against Palestinian militants and the Israeli military actions
against Hizbullah in Lebanon. Anti-Zionist actions are also carried out to respond to
the issue of imposing economic sanctions on Palestine and the planned
“development” of al-Aqsha Mosque dedicated to reclaiming the site. PKS even pays
a lot of attention to “small-scale” event-based issues in the Middle East such as the
Israeli incursions into Palestinian territories over the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier
and the arrest of Palestinian parliament members.
70
Interestingly, anti-Israel sentiment has been widespread among PKS cadres
who either come from the party’s central executive board in Jakarta or even from
local and small branches. As described in Graph 5, the intensity of PKS’ anti-Israeli
demonstrations, in which its participants chanted anti-Israeli slogans, held placards
equating Nazi and Zionist regime symbols and yelled Allahu Akbar (God is great),
are not exclusively conducted in Jakarta. Similar processions wound their way
simultaneously through other big and small cities across the country, such as
Surabaya, Makassar, Kediri, Gresik, and so on. This is hardly found in other Islamic
parties. Unlike PKS, many Islamic parties are rarely seen to mobilise their
supporters to go the streets. If they do so, they will usually raise issues of more
domestic relevance such as demanding the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the
preamble of the constitution.
Further, it is plausible to say that PKS are capable of increasing the
likelihood of coverage in the media. Some of its protests against Israel are not
event-based, yet receive greater coverage from news gatherers. For example, the
fiftieth commemoration of the Israeli occupation of Palestine received massive
media coverage, even though the public previously deemed this issue unimportant,
distasteful and not of interest to news readership.35
35
Just a few people are aware of this issue as PKS held huge rallies attended by hundreds of
thousands of its sympathisers in Jakarta, Surabaya, and other cities. As explained earlier, most of
PKS actions against Israel and the U.S. are conducted in response to internationally conflictual
events, which are normally followed by the presence of violence, including injuries and deaths. For
example, actions as a response to the Israeli air strike against Palestinians the U.S. unilateral attacks
on Iraq were more likely to be reported by media, since the events involved a bunch of solidarity and
addressed an actual issue.
71
3.4.4. Islamist and Non-Islamist Category
This study will also distinguish the aforementioned issues based on Islamist
and non-Islamist categories. As described earlier, such Islamist issues point to an
“active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are
held to be Islamic in character.”36 These Islamist issues range from moral reform to
transnational Islamism. Moral reform is centred upon religious values and is
characterized by coercive moralism, that is, “the stated goal of the movement is to
ensure that all citizens, regardless of their individual preferences, conform to their
group’s moral values and standards.”37
In this regard, PKS opposition to the “Playboy” magazine and so-called
deviant Islamic sects and its strong endorsement of the anti-pornography bill and the
implementation of shari’a-based laws in local governments can be included as
Islamist moral reform in character. Meanwhile, transnational Islamism refers to a
form of Islamic solidarity that transcends geographical boundaries by taking
advantage of the concept of umma as shown in PKS enduring actions against Israel
and America.
On the other hand, PKS events on anti-corruption, the reformasi struggle,
anti-money politics and the like are classified as non-Islamist issues. The data shows
that roughly six-in-ten of PKS’ collective events can be classified as Islamist
(62.2%), but just 25.8% of them were non-Islamist in essence. The gap is
36
ICG, Understanding Islamism, No. 37, 2005, p. 1. For a more detailed account of
definition of Islamism, see Chapter 1 c.q. “What is Islamism?”
37
Rory McVeigh and David Sikkink, “God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the
Legitimation of Contentious Tactics,” Social Forces, June 2001, 79 (4), p. 1431.
72
substantial, but with a very few exceptions to this distinction making it not a cut and
dry category. Curiously, PK and KAMMI’s call for President Wahid’s resignation
was not only motivated by his alleged corruption involvement as widely aired in the
public, but also his strong ties and associations with the Zionist government38 and
his controversial plan to lift the ban on Marxism, Communism and Leninism
thought.39
Graph 4
70
62.2
60
50
40
30 25.8
20
8
10
4
0
Islamist Non-Islamist Both Neither
Given that there is no other party which has such a high degree of
engagement in collective action, it is difficult to make comparisons. However, the
finding has told us something significant about PKS. The fact that six-in-ten of
PKS’ events are Islamist suggests that, in spite of PKS’ successful campaign in
2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, the party is still pushing forward its hard-line
religious views. If PKS’ “clean and caring” campaign really matters, this message
should be more visible in its collective actions, not just during election time. Graph
38
Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK dan PKS
Periode 1998-2005, Harakatuna Publishing, Bandung, 2007, pp. 181-182.
39
Marxism, Communisum and Leninism were banned with the following a decision made by
the People’s Consultative Assembly TAP/XXV/MPRS/1966 after the so-called failed coup of the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965.
73
4 illustrates that PKS’ actions on non-Islamist issues (e.g. anti-corruption, rule of
law, etc) make up less than half of the amount of the party’s Islamist views.
Through its collective actions, PKS has presented itself as being amongst the best
organised Islamist force raising geographically distant issues that correspond with
the increasingly anti-America and Israeli sentiment along with issues relatively
closer to home, which are still Islamist in essence (e.g. support for a controversial
anti-pornography bill, strong opposition to the “Playboy” magazine, etc).
3.4.5. Far and Near Enemies
Unlike other Islamic parties, PKS has shown more explicitly its concern for
the plight of fellow Muslim countries, most notably, Palestine, Afghanistan,
Lebanon and Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that PKS are only concerned
about what is happening globally. The data shows that PKS is also concerned about
what is happening in its home country.
Accordingly, a wide variety of issues addressed during PKS’ events will be
classified in both challenging the relatively far enemy and the nearer enemy. Like
Islamist movements elsewhere, PKS has extended its perceptions of “enemy” to
both domestic and foreign foes.40 The party’s strong criticism against America’s
aggressive international anti-terrorist campaign is perceived as undermining the
Muslim world as shown in its grand-scale demonstrations against Bush’s state visit
to Indonesia; American attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan; as well as its enduring anti-
40
Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, p. 55.
74
Zionist sentiment, can be classified as PKS’ tendency to challenge its distant
enemies.
Another internationally contentious event, that is, the row between America
and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, which has attracted the world’s attention,
gained only 0.4% from the total of PKS’ actions. Indeed PKS describes itself as
Sunni.41 The party’s reluctance to address the issues between the U.S. and Iranian
might be caused by the existence of Sunni-Shi’ah rivalry among PKS activists.
On the contrary, PKS events, which promise to bring a clean and caring
government, massive mobilisation of its cadres for assisting victims of natural
disasters, as well as its endorsements for the implementation of shari’a-inspired
laws in some local governments and its huge collective actions to call for the
enactment of an anti-pornography bill can be categorised as addressing the
relatively nearer enemies.
Interestingly, the data reveals that the majority of PKS events were anchored
in geographically distant enemies focusing on transnational Islamist issues rather
than on relatively nearer enemies and the national interest. Nearly half of PKS’
events as recorded by the mass media were dedicated to challenge foreign foes,
while 37.8% of them were concerned with domestic issues (Graph. 5). Hidayat
Nurwahid, former president of the party, admitted that the relatively distant enemies
(notably pro-Palestine) have been a dominant trend in PKS demonstrations.42
Another PKS key leader, Untung Wahono held:
41
Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.
42
Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.
75
We must send a strong message to Israel and the U.S. which usually favours
Israel over Palestine, that the attacks will receive more protests and
condemnation from global publics. The easiest way to show our opposition
to Israel is grand-scale demonstrations, by which our disapproval towards
Israel can be reported by Western news agencies. PKS does not need to
organise massive rallies that raise domestic issues because we have already
articulated them through a number of PKS representatives in the legislature.
In terms of PKS demonstrations, our target audience is, in fact, Westerners.43
After all, bearing in mind, this far and near enemies’ distinction is not
exclusive and there is a considerable overlap between the two. For instance, PKS’
strong opposition to the release of the Indonesian version of “Playboy” magazine
cannot be included as a merely domestic issue, since the magazine is considered by
PKS cadres as an American-influenced publication deliberately injected into
Indonesia to undermine religious and moral values.
Graph 5
60
48.9
50
40 37.8
30
20
10.2
10
3.1
0
Far Enemy Near Enemy Both Neither
3.4.6. Location, Participants, and Leaders
By wide margins, Jakarta is the most active city, where a large proportion of
PKS’ collective actions were being conducted (55.6%), but just 5.8% of them are
held in Surabaya, Bandung (4.9), Semarang (4%), Yogyakarta (3.6%). Other cities
43
Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.
76
like Solo, Medan, Cirebon, and Bekasi are reported at the same percentage (1.8%).
Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, and Pangkal Pinang share the same level (1.3%).
Other cities are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1% of the
total PKS collective events gathered in this work.
Graph 6
Places
13.7
Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, Banda Aceh, Pangkal
1.3
Pinang
1.8
Yogyakarta 3.6
Bandung 4.9
5.8
Jakarta 55.6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
There are a number of reasons why more than half of PKS’ collective
actions occurred in Jakarta. First, Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, where
Republika, Kompas as the primary sources of this study along with many news
agencies are situated. Media sources are less likely to attend and report events that
are far away because of the lack of journalists and it is more costly to cover the
events. Second, as the centre of political and economic activities and the place
where all foreign embassies are located, Jakarta provides target specific locales.
PKS’ most favoured sites for demonstrations are situated in the capital including the
U.S. Embassy, the United Nation’s representative, the Hotel Indonesia roundabout,
the House of Parliament and others. More importantly, Jakarta is a PKS stronghold,
where the party won convincingly in the 2004 elections and thus collective events
are more likely to occur in Jakarta.
77
Meanwhile, among the total of PKS events that mobilised a number of
participants (n= 141), 41.8% of them were attended by thousands of the party’s
participants and 25.5% of them were attended by hundreds of protesters.
Surprisingly, 7.8% of PKS’ events were converged on by hundreds of thousands of
its sympathisers, while 3.5% of them involved tens of thousands of people. Even
more so, there were thousands of people gathered in 5.7% of PKS actions. But there
were just 5.7% of PKS’ events that succeeded in mobilising dozens of protesters.
PKS actions that occur in Jakarta involve grand-scale demonstrations and most are
related to the virulent strain of anti-Zionist and American sentiments.
Finally, the measurement, which is based on the involvement of significant
actors or leaders in an event, is politically and culturally significant. Hence, those
events are more likely to be reported.44 In many instances, this significance may
arise because of the social status of an actor, notoriety or celebrity.45 In the case of
PKS, however, there are no outstanding leaders or extraordinary party figures.
Unlike other parties who rely on particular leaders or charismatic people such as
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for the Democrat Party, Abdurrahman Wahid for the
Nation’s Awakening Party (PKB), Megawati for the Indonesian Democracy Party-
Struggle (PDI-P), PKS seems to be less attentive politically to individual leaders.46
44
For a detailed account of the significance of actors, see David Synder and William R.
Kelly, “Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data,” American
Sociological Review, 42, 1977, pp. 105-123.
45
Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, “Where Do We Stand,” p. 399.
46
For a detailed account of the significance of political leadership in Indonesia, see R.
William Liddle & Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party and Religion,” Comparative Political Studies,
40, 7 (July, 2007), 832-857.
78
Accordingly, in order to drive up coverage, PKS tends to maximize the size
of participants in its actions.47 Nonetheless, the media, which covers PKS events,
still needs a leader or actor which can represent the party and thus become the focus
of the coverage. The data illustrates that among other leader of PKS actions
captured in this study, Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of PKS, who resigned
from the position after being elected as the chairman of the People’s Consultative
Assembly, is the most media-cited person (22.1%). Media preference also goes to
Tifatul Sembiring, which serves currently as the president of the party (19.9%). Al-
Muzammil Yusuf, a senior leader of PKS and the chairman of the Palestine caucus
in the parliament, makes up 5.1%, while Ahmad Heryawan, the leader of Jakarta
branch of PKS (4.4%). Other leaders are reported at about the same level, on
average no more than 1.5% of the total PKS/PK/KAMMI events gathered in this
work.
Graph 7
Action Leaders
35 31.7
30
25 22.1
19.9
20
15
10 4.4 5.1
2.2 2.9 2.2 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.2
5
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47
79
Illustration 2
Caption: PKS supporters march toward the United States Embassy during an anti-Israel
rally in Jakarta (date unspecified). Available at zioneocon.blogspot.com/
Indonesian%20rally.jpg.
Illustration 3
Caption: Thousands of protesters from PKS rally in front of the Danish Embassy in Jakarta
on 6 February 2006, to demand an apology for the publication of caricatures of Prophet
Muhammad (JP/Mulkan Salmona). Available at newscompass.blogspot.com/ 2006_02_01_
archive.html
80
CHAPTER 4
BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES:
THE EMERGENCE OF PKS AND ITS POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
In this chapter, I will apply the fundamentals of social movement theory to
illuminate the dynamics of PKS and reveal that the party is not an unusual social
movement organisation (SMO). In this chapter, I will discuss theories of political
opportunity structures and examine the double track of political opportunity
structures; the international contexts and domestic possibilities for political
opportunities that facilitated or constrained the emergence of PKS.
4.1. Political Opportunity Structures (POS)
Since its emergence in the late 1970s, the concept of political opportunity
structures (POS) has become popular among social and political scientists and has
spurred much research in the field of social movements. Various scholars have
pointed out the different dimensions of POS. For example, Tarrow’s formulation,
emphasizes openness or closure of a political system, while Kriesi and his
collaborators concentrate on the formal institutional structure. Tarrow defines
political opportunity structures as:
81
“[C]onsistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of
the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake
collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.
Theorists of political opportunity structure emphasise the mobilisation of
resources external to the group” (emphasis in original).1
In order to synthesize across the different interpretations of political
opportunities, McAdam provides the following broadly accepted list of
fundamental dimensions of POS: (1) the relative openness or closure of a political
system; (2) the stability or instability of a broad set of elite alignments; (3) the
presence or absence of elite allies; (4) the state’s capacity or propensity for
repression.2 In this chapter, I will use McAdam’s scheme of POS with emphasis
on his central arguments on the extent to which a political system is open or closed
and the extent to which a regime is able or unable to sideline any challenges.
According to McAdam, the openness and the closure of political systems
are amongst the most salient factors of POS, which is influential in determining
the movement emergence. Dyke supports this notion stating that “groups are more
likely to mobilise when the institutionalised political system is open to them.”3 On
the contrary, the more the political system is closed, the less opportunity there is
for collective action. However, Eisinger indicates that protest is most likely to
1
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass
Politics in the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 85.
2
McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current problems, Future Directions,” in Doug
McAdam, John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) Comparative Perspectives, p. 27.
3
Nella Van Dyke, “Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effects of Elite Allies and
Antagonists on Students Protest in the United Stated, 1930-1990,” in Jack A Goldstone (ed.),
States, Parties, and Social Movements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 226.
82
occur in a political system characterized by a mix of open and closed factors,4 as is
represented graphically in Figure 2.
Level of
Mobilisation
Closed System Open System
Figure 2 Eisinger’s model of mobilisation
In other words, Eisinger suggests that collective action is less likely to
occur in extremely closed or authoritarian systems or in extremely open or
democratic ones.5 This is largely because repression, which usually happens in the
closed political system or undemocratic regime, would discourage protest in the
prior case and would suppress the sustained interaction of collective action actors
and authorities that is the hallmark of social movements.”6 Meanwhile, a
completely open and democratic political configuration would render protest
4
Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior,” p. 15.
5
Ibid.
6
Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Actions and Politics,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 92.
83
unnecessary, because the structure of political configuration has provided a greater
access for citizens to participate.7
The idea that a partially open political system encourages protest is
vindicated in the newly democratic states or semi-democratic regimes, which have
undergone a transitional phase from an authoritarian or closed political
configuration to a more democratic regime. Under such circumstances, the
political system is not fully open or the political openness has not been
institutionalised. Nonetheless, the capacity of the regime to suppress the
movement has declined significantly, thereby opening new opportunities for
collective action.
In short, social movements do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they rely
heavily on external conditions that provide opportunities for collective action. As a
social movement, PKS is not a spontaneous gathering because before it emerged in
public there is a series of socio-political processes which overtime contributed to
its development. In the following section, I will employ the aforementioned
theoretical approach of POS to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah in the context of
Suharto’s authoritarianism and the formation of the Justice Party (PK), the
predecessor to PKS, in the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto regime.
7
Dyke, “Protest Cycles,” 2003, p. 232.
84
4.2. The Emergence of PKS and the Double-Track of POS
In order to examine external conditions that facilitated or constrained the
emergence of PKS, I will use what is called “the double track of political
opportunity structures,” that is, both international and domestic factors which
contributed to the emergence of the party. The international context of political
opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of
PKS.
4.2.1 International Context of Political Opportunities
As explained by McAdam, the international context of political
opportunities is employed to oppose the tendency among social movement
scholars to reveal, often unintentionally, a state-centred or closed-polity bias. In
this regard, alongside the domestic factors outlined above, the following
international dimensions help to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah and its current
political wing, PKS.
The first international impetus for Islamic revivalism in Indonesia that
facilitated the emergence of Tarbiyah is the triumph of the Islamist revolution in
Iran. As was suggested by many scholars, the revival of Islam was perceived as a
popular assertion of Muslim identity against Western political and cultural
dominance.8 Revivalists perceive the strength of Western culture in everyday life
8
Among other things, Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: On Interpretative History of
Modern Iran, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981; See also, Nikki Keddi, “Islamic Revival in
the Middle East: A Comparison of Iran and Egypt,” in Samih Farsoun (ed.), Arab Society,
Continuity and Change, Croom Helm, London, 1985.
85
as the highest stage of imperialism and ‘cultural invasion’ that undermines their
Islamic authenticity and cultural basis of identity. As a result of the 1979 Iranian
revolution, revivalists in many Muslim countries felt that it was now possible for
Islamic forces to overthrow Western-supported regimes —such as that of the Shah
which adopted a secular autocratic state— and they were inspired to do so in their
own countries.
Another international factor that helped the emergence of the Tarbiyah was
the strengthening of links between the modernist-Islamist groups DDII and Saudi
Arabia. As noted in the previous chapter, DDII played a vital role in establishing
the campus dakwah movement. Having said that the Iranian revolution was
proudly welcomed in many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia sought to spread its political and religious influence across the
Muslim world in order to counter the increasing dominance of Iran. DDII
emphasised the distinctions between Sunni Islam (subscribed to by Indonesian
Muslims) and Shiite Islam (subscribed to by the majority of Iranians).9 A
prominent PKS leader Abu Ridha stated:
First of all, we think that the 1979 Iranian revolution was the triumph of
Islam. Then we had been learned that the Shi’ah is the only officially
recognized sect in Iran. We then see the revolution more objectively,
claiming that it is not only a representation of Islam, but, more importantly,
the triumph of the Shi’ah on the world’s stage.10
9
10
86
Shiism was continuously described by DDII, who are close to Saudi
Arabia, as a fatal deviation of Islam.11 As discussed in chapter two, DDII utilised
its close ties with the kingdom to boost the development of campus dakwah.
Among other things, in the 1970s DDII sent a number of students to undertake
Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia with scholarships provided by the kingdom. At this
time, Islamic activism and enthusiasm, called al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah (Islamic
awakening), gripped Saudi universities.12 According to International Crisis Group
(ICG), the impetus for this phenomenon was derived from the Saudi regime giving
shelter to a large number of Brotherhood activists from Syrian and Egypt who
escaped from political persecution in their own countries.13
Aside from political considerations,14 at the time Saudi authorities also
urgently needed skilled workers and professionals following the oil price which
enabled the kingdom to improve their social, health and education sectors. The
Brotherhood activists played a key role in filling the gap, especially in education
where they designed educational systems and curriculum at schools and
universities in the country.15 The PKS ideologue Abu Ridha who was a student in
Saudi Arabia recalled that most books in university libraries in the 1970s were
11
For a detailed account of DDII’s accusation of Shiism, see Burhanuddin, “The
Conspiracy of Jews,” 2007.
12
International Crisis Group (ICG), “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?”
ICG Middle East Report No. 31, 21 September 2004.
13
Ibid.
14
According to ICG, the Saudi regime used the Brotherhood’s politicized version of Islam
as ‘a weapon in its political-ideological disputes with Nasserist [Egypt] and Baathist [Syrian]
neighbours.” See, ICG, Ibid.
15
Ibid.
87
written by the Brotherhood’s associates.16 It is hardly surprising that Saudi alumni
were then influenced by the Brotherhood’s ideas and activism. Apart from that, the
Saudi Kingdom established the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA,
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab) in Jakarta in 1980 in order to bolster
the relationship with Indonesia. Its lecturers in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly
inspired by the Brotherhood thinking and the majority of books in the library were
written by members of the Brotherhood. According to Mahfudz Sidiq, LIPIA also
played a crucial role in disseminating the Brotherhood’s approach (manhaj haraki)
in Indonesia.17
In addition, the link between Indonesian revivalists and their fellow
activists from Malaysia is another international dimension that contributed to the
emergence of Tarbiyah.18 According to Untung Wahono, many young Indonesian
revivalists in the early 1970s benefited from relations with Malaysian revivalist
groups.19 A number of writings of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and other
leading ideologues of Islamic revivalism had previously been translated into
Malay by, most notably, the Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM, Angkatan Belia
16
17
Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 2003, p. 83. A majority of LIPIA’s lecturers
are now dominated by salafist ideology.
18
For purposes of this analysis, I simply describe the benefit taken from the link with
Malaysian young revivalist groups. It is worth noting that ABIM and the National Union of
Malaysian Muslim Students (PKPIM, Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-pelajar Islam Malaysia) had
utilised the links with the leading Muslim Students’ Association in Indonesia (HMI). HMI helped
their Malaysian counterparts to organize several dakwah training trips to Jakarta and Bandung. See,
Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students, Pelanduk
Publications, Malaysia, p. 19.
19
Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007. See also, Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan
Reformasi, 2003, p. 83.
88
Islam Malaysia).20 In the early 1970s, when the present Islamic awakening was
beginning to surface, religious enthusiasm among students in Indonesian secular
campuses (which generally did not have expertise in Arabic) was greatly
facilitated by the presence of translated books made possible by their counterparts
in Malaysia. It was a high-profile DDII member and the initiator of LMD,
Imaduddin Abdulrahim, then a lecturer at the University of Technology Malaysia
(UTM) in Kuala Lumpur, who brought Malay versions of the Brotherhood books
into Indonesia.21
The influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and activism
was, not surprisingly, also visible in Tarbiyah’s political thinking and actions.
Yusuf al-Qardhawi, the influential Egypt cleric, one-time Brotherhood leader,
called Tarbiyah’s political vehicle PKS an extension (imtidad) of the
Brotherhood.22 Mashadi, a former PK legislator, admitted that PKS has drawn its
ideology and model of action from the Brotherhood, largely because the Egyptian
Islamist group offers a thorough understanding of Islamic teachings rather than
concentrating on abstract theological debates.23 Like the Brotherhood, PKS gives
priority to political actions over missionary activities. Although the influence of
the Brotherhood is much more visible in the party’s ideas and approach, a number
20
Anwar, Islamic Revivalism.
21
Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 2003, p. 83. It is worth pointing out that in
spite of bringing those translating books to Indonesia, Imaduddin had a very important role in
influencing Malaysian students toward the totality of Islam. Zainah wrote that Imaduddin
developed selected groups of Islamic students in Malaysia and began to conduct religious circles.
See, Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, pp. 19-21.
22
Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2004, p. 285.
23
Mashadi, Interview, 4 October 2007.
89
of leading figures of PKS use rhetoric to justify the relationship between the
Brotherhood and Indonesian society in general. Hidayat Nurwahid even claimed
that the Egyptian recognition of Indonesian independence was as a result of the
Brotherhood’s support.24 During an official visit to Egypt, H. Agus Salim and Dr.
HM. Rasyidi came to the Brotherhood’s headquarters and extended their deepest
thanks on behalf of the Indonesian people to Hasan Al-Banna for his support for
independence.25 Surely, this is a post-factum justification which is repeatedly
stated by PKS leaders to exaggerate the role of the Brotherhood in the
independence of Indonesia. Historical sources show that a majority of Egyptian
people and the country’s political groups in 1940s, including its socialist-
nationalist groups, strongly supported the Indonesian independence from the
Dutch.
4.2.2 Domestic Factors
Despite the fact that the development of Tarbiyah and its current political
manifestation, PKS, cannot be viewed in isolation from international contexts,
there were still domestic factors that contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah. To
begin with, I will discuss two domestic factors that directly enhanced the
emergence of Tarbiyah: Suharto’s repressive measures against political Islam, and
the regime’s restrictions on student activism in tertiary campuses. I will also point
24
25
K.H. Rahmad Abdullah, “Pengantar,” in Sa’id Hawwa, Memoar Hasan Al-Banna:
Untuk Dakwah dan Para Dainya, Hawin Murtadho, Salafuddin (translators), Era Intermedia,
Surakarta, 2004.
90
out Suharto’s formulae combining political stability and developmentalism
(pembangunan) and the impact of this on certain sociological and anthropological
changes which contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah. These domestic factors
will be discussed in the following contexts: authoritarianism since the regime’s
inception, Suharto’s rapprochement with Islam in the late 1980s, the fall of
Suharto and transition to democracy.
The first notable domestic factor that led to the emergence of campus
dakwah was the proscription of explicit Islamic political expressions. Suharto’s
hostility towards political Islam emerged shortly after he took in power in 1967.
Clear evidence of this can be found in a number of political maneuvers, including:
the formation of Parmusi instead of the rehabilitation of Masyumi, the policy of
party reduction which required all Islamic party to fuse into the United
Development Party (PPP), and the promulgation of legislation to ensure all mass-
based organisations accepted Pancasila as the sole basis (asas tunggal).
In addition to this, Suharto had repeatedly proven his capacity to suppress
dissident voices.26 Further, the regime did not hesitate to resort to military action
or harsh measures to confront Islamic opposition which often claimed hundreds of
lives.27 Notable among these was the tragedy of 12 September 1984 which took
place in a mosque in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. Hundreds of protesters led by Amir
Biki were shot at by the military as they demonstrated against military personnel
who tore down brochures advocating that Muslim women should wear Islamic
26
Asiaweek, July 5, 1996.
27
Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004),” 2005.
91
attire (jilbab). The regime also took harsh measures against a radical usrah group,
Jihad Command (Komando Jihad), headed by Imran Zein who hijacked a Garuda
Woyla flight to Thailand on 28 March 1981. Long suppressed under authoritarian
rule, a few Islamic activists became more radicalised and went underground.28
Under such circumstances, some Islamic activists instead took non-political
activities like dakwah and focused primarily on the cultivation of religious
practices.
A second domestic factor that facilitated the birth of campus dakwah in
universities was the regime’s restrictions on student activism. In the early 1970s,
student protests intensified. Student protest exploded in January 1974 during the
visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Kakuei Tanaka in Jakarta. In 1977-1978,
large-scale student unrest emerged, including at the Bandung Institute of
Technology (ITB) that led the military to occupy campuses. Several student
leaders were arrested and put in jail. In response to the wave of student radicalism,
the regime launched a depoliticisation program on campuses under the headings of
Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK) and Student Co-ordination Bodies (BKK) in
the late 1970s. These policies banned all student activism inside university
campuses, replacing the previously independent Students’ Councils (Dewan
Mahasiswa/DEMA).
The extensive use of administrative and coercive powers prevented critical
Islamic groups as well as Islamic students from engaging in explicit political
activism. As a reaction to such a hostile environment, some of them undertook to

28
Ibid.
92
revive their faith by establishing the so-called campus dakwah movement and
concentrating on non-disruptive forms of Islamic activism, which used campus
mosques as their bases. In terms of resource mobilisation, which draws primarily
upon rational choice theory, coercive force and repression raise the costs and risks
of participation and consequently depress collective action.29 Wiktorowicz called
this a “web of disincentives” which dissuades ordinary people from engaging with
social movement organisations that challenge the raison d’etre of the state or
threaten to mobilise mass-based social protest against the regime.30
Accordingly, campus dakwah then took the form of a less formally
institutionalised movement, used a non-confrontational approach, and focused on
the cultivation of religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in
prestigious universities. Hence, the presence of campus dakwah can best be
understood as a rejection of the regime. To escape from the regime’s control and
repression, campus dakwah decided to retreat to what Wiktorowicz called “the
networks of shared meaning” with secretive leadership structures and no formal
organisation to achieve its goals.31
This is particularly the case when campus dakwah, as a representation of
Tarbiyah, adopted the concept of Sirriyat al-Tandzim wa Alamiyyat al-Dakwah
(Secret Organisational Structure and Open Predication).32 This notion implies that
29
Karren Rusler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian
Revolution,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, Issue 1, February, 1996, p. 138.
30
Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, State University of New York Press, New York, 2001, p.
14.
31
Ibid.
32
Irwan Prayitno, Kepribadian Dakwah, Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, Jakarta, 2003.
93
every Muslim is obliged to perform dakwah in an open way, except in less
democratic political systems where overt dakwah risks harsh regime reprisals.33
Under such circumstances, activists of campus dakwah must keep the structural
organisation of the movement and its leadership secret.34
The secret nature of the movement in the early stages of its development
was manifested in the use of informal organisations and religious networks, which
linked its members through shared meaning about how Islamic society should be
implemented.35 These networks were embedded in everyday interactions in
religious circles and activities (daurah, liqa, etc.) Its members share beliefs like
‘Islam as the solution’ and ‘Islam as the concept beyond the nation-state.’ They
withdrew from domestic politics and paid significant attention to international
Muslim issues such as the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the like. Overall, these were all strategic choices of actions as a
result of the harsh realities of repression under the New Order.
While the first two domestic factors are related to external political
pressures imposed by the Suharto regime, the following domestic changes are
primarily concerned with the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices.
This phenomenon, referred to as “the Islamic turn,” was most notable among
students in secular universities where many students became “born again
33
Ibid.
34
Sidiq, “KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi,” 2003, p. 84.
35
Singerman distinguishes the terms “informal” and “social” to describe Islamist networks
in Cairo. She prefers “informal” to “social” to explain Egyptian Muslim networks, because “it calls
attention to the extremely sensitive and politicized nature of associational life in contexts where the
state closely and minutely supervises any formal, legal and public associations.” See, Diane
Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in Wiktorowicz, Islamic
Activism, 2004, p. 155.
94
Muslims”. Indeed the trend of Islamic revivalism among students in the early
1980s was also related to events and socio-political changes in the world-wide
Muslim community. The sources of these phenomena did, however, have local
impetus.
First of all, the phenomenon of the Islamic turn in Indonesia was fueled by
rapid economic development under Suharto.36 During this time, enormous progress
was made in education, health and poverty reduction, to mention just a few of the
most important sectors.37 In sum, tremendous socio-economic achievements
enabled more people to obtain better education.38 Among those who enjoyed
tertiary education came from what Clifford Geertz coined a “santri” (pious
Muslim) background.39 In other words, the economic achievements had enabled
36
Shortly after Suharto gained power, price stability had been achieved. The real gross
domestic product had expanded by over 450 percent compared to the previous regime.36 A
successful campaign on family planning (KB, Keluarga Berencana) reduced population growth
from an average of 2.4 percent in the period 1965-1980 to an average of 1.8 percent in 1980-
1996.36 The poverty rate declined sharply from 70 percent at the end of the 1960s to only 27
percent in the mid 1990s.36 The urban population increased significantly from under 20 percent of
the population to 35 percent in the mid 1990s.Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, “Introduction,” in Hal
Hill (ed.), Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Allen and
Unwin, Australia, 1994, pp. xxiv-xxv.
37
That is why Herbert Feith called Suharto’s regime as a repressive-developmentalist
referring to a pair of magic mantra, that is “developmentalism” (pembangunan) and political
stability, which cost political freedom and democracy. See, Herbert Feith, “Repressive-
Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities,” Prisma, No. 19 (1980, pp.
39-55.
38
One of the best Suharto’s legacies has been the expansion of education to the point
where universal primary education has been almost attained.38 The percentage of young adults with
basic literacy skills grew significantly from 40 percent to 90 percent.38 The percentage of people
completing senior high school increased dramatically from 4 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in
1990.38 More importantly, the percentage of people completing academy or university education
reached an unprecedented level from 0.4 percent in 1970 to 1.6 percent in 1990. Terrence H. Hull
and Gavin W. Jones, “Demographic Perspectives,” in Hal Hill (ed.), Indonesia’s New Order: The
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Allen and Unwin, Australia, 1994.
39
The term ‘santri’ (pious Muslims) refers to the interpretative school in Indonesian
studies pioneered by the American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in the 1950s. Clifford Geertz,
“The Javanese Village,” in G. William Skinner, ed., Local Ethnic, and National Loyalties in
95
more santri, either from small towns or rural areas, to pursue their study at
universities.
In a further development, the emergence of international events that led to
Islamic resurgence like the triumph of Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979 brought
influences to many predominantly Muslim countries. In Indonesia, as elsewhere,
the process of Islamic revivalism began to affect students in secular universities
who come from various backgrounds. Coincidentally, in the face of the
depoliticisation of the student world through the policy of NKK/BKK, many
Islamic students found campus mosques organised by Tarbiyah as a site for
fulfilling their growing interest in Islamic studies and practices. Through this
religious activism, those who came from, in Geertz’s term, abangan or less pious
Muslim backgrounds, became more conscious of their “Muslimness” and tried to
be more pious and committed to live by teachings and precepts of Islam.
The notion of dakwah, which literally means “call” as in missionary
activities, has therefore been expanded to include the task of making Muslims
better Muslims. Meanwhile those who came from modernist and traditionalist
santri backgrounds tend to merge with each other becoming what Machmudi
coined “convergent santri.”40 Since then, those Muslim students from various
backgrounds were unwilling to identify with a particular sub-group, such as the
abangan, traditionalist, or modernist Muslims. Instead, they were more likely to
call themselves Muslims without applying an adjective, in an effort not to
Village Indonesia, Cornell University Modern Indonesian Project, Ithaca, 1959. For the most
detailed account, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1964.
40
Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia,” 2006.
96
reproduce the santri-abangan and the modernist-traditionalist dichotomies as well
as means of identifying with the wider Muslim community (umma).
4.3. Suharto’s Changing Relationship with Islam
As explained earlier, the development of Tarbiyah in Indonesia has utilised
informal networks and less visible organisations. Nonetheless, the adoption of
such informal networks and institutions as part of the Tarbiyah movement’s
collective activities were only valid at times of the regime’s repression against
political Islam. Arguably, less visible organisations are often seen as “transitory
stages” in the development of a social movement, which subsequently turn into
more formal structures when the state provides a greater access for individuals to
participate.41 In this sense, the fall of Suharto in 1998 created opportunities for
Tarbiyah to transform from an informal movement to a political party promoting
their political ideals in an explicit tone by utilising formal and visible structures.
Prior to the collapse of the regime, Suharto’s changing relationship with
Islam in the late 1980s, led Tarbiyah and other Islamic groups to emerge into
public view. The formation of an intercampus predication organisation FSLDK in
1986 and the establishment of KAMMI in the 1998, which played a significant
role in the reformation struggle that led to the resignation of Suharto, proved that
41
Wiktorowicz, “The Management,” 2001, p. 8. See also, Rodney Stark and William Sims
Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects,”
American Journal of Sociology 85, 6 (May 1980), pp. 1376-95.
97
Tarbiyah began to emerge from its secretive stage adopted throughout the 1970s
and 1980s.
Since the late 1980s, the Suharto regime began responding positively to
demands from various Islamic organisations. For instance, the Ministry of
Education and Culture abandoned its long firmly held policy, that is, decree no
052/Kep/D/1982 forbidding the wearing of the jilbab or Islamic attire for women
in schools. The Ministry of Religious Affairs presented to parliament a bill
expanding the authority of Islamic courts. It also published a compilation of
Islamic law. Protests by Muslims against the state’s controlled national sport
lottery (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah or SDSB) led to the closing of
the lottery. The Catholic editor of the weekly popular tabloid Monitor was put in
jail for three years for announcing a poll which discredited the Prophet
Muhammad as the 11th most admired person below President Suharto. The birth of
ICMI in the late 1990, above all, was perceived as the most striking evidence of
the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life. In 1991, Suharto himself
moved his public identity towards Islam by undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca,
and then adopting the name Haji Muhammad Suharto. Although many scholars
view Suharto’s shift to Islam as simply a part of the regime’s strategy to generate
Muslim support,42 many dakwah organisations and activists, including Tarbiyah,
42
Among other things, William Liddle and Michael Vatikiotis works are viewed by many
as the best examples of literature which draw such a conclusion, namely that ICMI’s formation was
facilitated by Suharto due to his changing perception of political Islam. See, Michael Vatikiotis,
Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change Routledge,
London and New York, 1994. See also, R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A
Political Explanation,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, 3 (August, 1996).
98
welcomed the changing relationship with the regime and seized the momentum for
enhancing their activities in public.
4.4 The Fall of Suharto and the Emergence of PK/PKS
In mid-1997, a deep economic crisis in Asia began to affect Indonesia. The
crisis was markedly evident in the dramatic decline in the value of Indonesian
currency (rupiah). Thousands of enterprises, from small to large-scale businesses,
collapsed. Since the outbreak of the crisis, people became increasingly frustrated
by miserable socio-economic conditions. Unemployment levels jumped to the
highest level since the 1960s. As a result of the sharp increase in prices, the
number of people living below the poverty line increased to around 50 percent of
the total population.43
The deterioration of economic conditions undermined the regime’s greatest
pillar of strength and Suharto’s legitimacy built on a strong economic development
track-record had reached its lowest point. The crisis was a trigger for a series of
student demonstrations.44 In the early stages of mobilisation, student rhetoric
expressed a deep concern about the crisis. Students across the nation, including the
Tarbiyah-influenced student group KAMMI, were united by the similarity of their
43
For detailed accounts of the impact of the crisis, see Arief Budiman, Damien Kingsbury
and Barbara Hatley, Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton,
1999; Fadli Zon, The Politics of the May 1998 Riots, Solstice Publishing, Jakarta, 2004.
44
For a detailed account of the 1998 student movement, see Edward Aspinall, “The
Indonesian Student Uprising of 1998,” in Arief Budiman, Damien Kingsbury and Barbara Hatley,
Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 1999; Cypri Aoer et
al., Aksi Mahasiswa: Reformasi Total, Mentari, Jakarta, 1998.
99
discontent: high prices which then turned into a call for Suharto to resign.45 The
economic crisis, which created a window of opportunity to mount challenges
against the state, set in motion the reemergence of the student movement after
many years of suppression.
It is true that during the initial stages of student protest, the political system
was not fully open, but the capacity of Suharto’s regime to suppress the movement
had declined significantly. The crisis did not only cause an increase in poverty,
unemployment and food shortages, but also put the state in a vulnerable and weak
position unable to overcome the social tensions that escalated and exploded into
larger-scale violent riots throughout the archipelago.
Suharto was finally forced to resign from office and B.J Habibie was then
sworn in as the President of Indonesia on 21 May 1998. Facing strong opposition
from various quarters due to his close association with Suharto, Habibie was
forced to conduct a fair and transparent election as soon as possible.46 He also
abandoned the law No. 8 1985, concerning Pancasila as the sole foundation of
political and mass-organisations.47 Following these expanding political
opportunities, Tarbiyah declared the formation of the Justice Party (PK, Partai
Keadilan), now known as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice
Party). PK also seized the momentum of the removal of Pancasila as the sole basis
by announcing Islam as the official basis of the new Islamist party.
45
For detailed information, see Diro Aritonang, Runtuhnya Rezim daripada Soeharto:
Rekaman Perjuangan Mahasiswa Indonesia 1998, Pustaka Hidayah, Bandung, 1999.
46
For more discussion about the Habibie Presidency, see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “The
Habibie Presidency,” in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999, pp. 34-37.
47
Ibid.
100
In sum, the birth of PK can best be seen as a result of expanding political
opportunities following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. During Suharto’s
authoritarian regime, Tarbiyah advocates developed campus dakwah by utilising
less visible organisations and informal religious networks. By applying the
political opportunity framework, the use of these kinds of organisations is most
often seen in less democratic political systems where overt protest and visible
institutions are more vulnerable to suppression. Nonetheless, in the late 1980s,
Tarbiyah activists emerged into public following Suharto’s rapprochement with
Islam. Finally, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah advocates seized the
momentum by establishing PK, now known as PKS, to pursue their ideals within
the framework of a democratic system.
Illustration 4
Caption:
Former President of PKS and chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly
(MPR), Hidayat Nurwahid, during interviews with the author (October 4, 2007).
101
CHAPTER 5
FROM CAMPUS TO POLITICAL MOVEMENT:
THE RISE OF PKS AND ITS RESOURCE MOBILISATION
In earlier chapters I have described how political opportunity is a necessary
prerequisite to collective action. Nonetheless, political opportunities alone do not
make a movement. Even the most conducive political environment will be to no
avail if the movement does not have sufficient organisation and networks to realise
its political potential. Accordingly, the study of “means” or resources is crucial in
social movement theory in order to understand the supportive infrastructures
required for collective action. The study of means has come to be known as
resource mobilisation1 or mobilising structure approaches.
This chapter will look primarily at the various “means” of mobilisation
utilised by PKS in order to support its collective actions, and it will focus on the
importance of organisational factors or mobilisation of resources that either
facilitate or constrain the rise of PKS. In an attempt to describe the organisational
strength of PKS, I will emphasise its cadres, organisational models and leadership,
communication networks and financial assets.
1
This framework is strongly influenced by rational choice theory. This perspective adopts
as one of its underlying problems, American economist Mancur Olson’s (1968) concept of “free-
rider.” McCarthy and Zald subsequently offered an answer by introducing the perspective of
resource mobilisation which focuses on means available to the actors of social movements.
102
5.1. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT)
Scholars of social movements define resource mobilisation theory
(hereafter, referred to as “RMT”) as “collective vehicles, informal as well as
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”2 RMT
emphasises both societal support of and constraints on collective action
phenomena.3 It deals with the variety of resources that must be mobilised to
maintain collective action, the dependence of movement vehicles on external
support and the strategies used by authorities to control or incorporate collective
action.4
Having said that the concept of resources is crucial in RMT, a thorough
understanding of this approach requires presenting a clear definition of what
resources and movement vehicles are. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on
the definition of resources. In his definition, Tilly argues that one of the most
important resources of mobilisation is the formal and informal networks that
connect individuals and movement organisations.5 The term “network” refers to
social structures, that is, sets of social relationships that encourage or discourage
people’s behaviour, attitudes, and possibilities for action.6 Klandermans reveals
2
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities,
Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on
Social Movements,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.), Comparative
Perspectives, 1996, p. 3.
3
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilisation,” 1987, p. 16.
4
Ibid.
5
Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to Revolution, 1978, p. 3.
6
John. L. Campbell, “Where Do We Stand?” 2005, p. 61.
103
the importance of leadership to constitute the resource for mobilising participants.7
Maguire divides the resources into two categories, that is, tangible (money, space,
equipment, and so on) and non-tangible (leadership capacity, managerial and
organisational experience, ideological justification, tactics and the like).8
Oberschall9 along with McCarthy and Zald10 include a diverse list of resources
such as income, savings, communication networks, trust and moral commitment,
legitimacy and labor. Most commonly, resources refer to material resources, most
notably time and money.11
For purposes of this analysis, I will exclude labour and legitimacy from the
kinds of resource mobilisation that PKS relies on. Instead, I will include ‘cadres’,
given that the party proclaims itself to be a “cadre party” and the role of cadres in
PKS’ collective action is significant. In addition to this, I follow two categories of
resource mobilisation, that is, material and immaterial resources, which include:
(1) formal or informal organisations; (2) networks; (3) income generation capacity;
and (4) leadership.12
7
Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge:
Massachusetts, 1997, p. 133-134
8
See, Diarmuid Maguire, “Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partners
or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and Reform?” in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert
Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social
Movements, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995.
9
Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements, Prentice Hall, New Jersey,
1973.
10
McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilisation,” 1987.
11
McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.
12
I followed this category devised by Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-
2004),” p. 115.
104
5.2. The Birth of Jemaah Tarbiyah and Its Organisational Strength and
Networks
Among other things, organisation is one of the most important resources.13
Klandermans called organisation a means to goal-achievement,14 by which various
resources required in collective action can be accumulated and allocated.15 The
availability of organisation is also crucial in order to enhance existing networks as
well as recruit members and mobilise contention.
Nonetheless, a focus on social movement theories in Western traditions
tends to equate social movement organisations (SMOs) with formal and visible
organisations,16 thereby neglecting informal forms of collective action. Islamist
movements, in fact, tend to utilise “informal, personal networks and religious and
cultural associability to build movements.”17 Curiously, the use of less formal
networks is often found in authoritarian systems where overt protest and formal
institutions are more vulnerable to state control and repression.18
Given that PKS and Tarbiyah were born in different political contexts, I
will discuss their capacities to generate organisational resources in separate
sections. As noted in the previous chapters, PKS has become a highly visible
institution in the post-Suharto era where all barriers to collective action have been
13
McAdam, Political Process, 1982; Aldon Morris, The Origin of the Civil Rights
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, Free Press, New York, 1984.
14
Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, 120.
15
Knoke, “The Political Economies of Associations”, in Richard D. Braungart (ed.),
Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 1, 211-242, JAI-Press, Greenwich, 1985.
16
Wiktorowicz, The Management, 2001, p. 8
17
Singerman, “The Networked World,” 2004, 151.
18
Wiktorowicz, The Management, 2001, p. 8
105
removed. By contrast, Tarbiyah was formed at the height of Suharto’s
authoritarianism, when the regime utilised a combination of harsh suppression and
administrative techniques of social control in the management of Islamic activism,
which successfully contained movements challenging the state (see, Chapter 4).
I will trace the development of the Tarbiyah movement’s organisational
forms by looking at the following phases of activities: (1) a campus mosque-based
movement; (2) LMD as the initial network of dakwah activists; (3) LDK and
FSLDK as vehicles of the movement; (4) controlling student senates for
recruitment and organisational purposes; and (5) the formation of an intercampus
Islamic student movement, KAMMI. Given that these aforementioned forms of
Tarbiyah organisational activity have been mentioned in Chapter 2, in this section
I will discuss them very briefly, and just focus on the perspective of resource
mobilisation.
First of all, the spirit of Islamic revivalism among Islamic students in
secular universities began to flourish from the 1970s with the establishment of a
dakwah network centred in campus mosques. Hence, campus mosques became a
key institutional focus for the initial development of Tarbiyah’s religious and
social networks. Through mosques, the growing interest in Islamic studies and
practices among students was facilitated. They prayed together and congregated
for the khutbah (Friday sermons) in mosques as well as conducted a number of
religious study circles and trainings such as liqa (meeting every week), mabit
(staying the whole night at mosques), daurah (training program). It is clear that the
106
mosques not only serve the religious needs of students, but also create a potential
institution for further collective action.
The Institute of Predication Strivers (Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah, LMD)
also influenced the development of Tarbiyah’s networks. Imaduddin Abdul Rahim
founded LMD, which, since 1974 conducted regular trainings at ITB’s Salman
Mosque. This intensive religious training attracted a large number of students and
its alumni were spread out not only in Java, but also in Sumatra.19 Imaduddin’s
monumental training handbook, Kuliah Tauhid (Lectures on Islamic Principles)
became a key reference and was distributed on many campuses.20 After returning
from LMD, its alumni began to set up propagation training in their own campuses.
In UI, for instance, they developed a sense of commitment to the cause of Islam
and maintained a spirit of dakwah through various bodies in each faculty under
different names, such as the Integrative Studies about Islam (Integratif Studi
tentang Islam, ISTI) in the Faculty of Economics, the Integrated Islamic Studies
(Studi Islam Terpadu, SIT) in the Faculty of Letters and the Study Forum of
Islamic Principles (Forum Studi Dasar Islam, Fondasi) in the Faculty of Science.21
Having said that religious enthusiasm among students developed rapidly,
the presence of LDK in managing a broad range of religious activities was
important. Interestingly, since LDK was a formal student organisation established
on campus, it became automatically one of the Student Activity Units (Unit
19
Ibid.
20
Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Machmudi’s account was based on his interview
with Mustafa Kamal, 11 June 2003.
21
Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 2003, 71.
107
Kegiatan Mahasiswa, UKM) and it was therefore allocated funding by the
university. As an officially recognised student body, LDK was used by dakwah
activists to carry out regular recruitment campaigns among incoming students.22
Since the early 1990s, the Tarbiyah movement expanded rapidly and began
to grow in influence throughout Student Senates (SM, Senat Mahasiswa) in secular
state universities. Rama Pratama, a PKS legislator who was a the chairman of the
University of Indonesia’s (UI) student senate in 1997, for example, was one of
leading figures among dakwah activists. Zulkieflimansyah, who is currently a PKS
legislator, was also elected as the head of UI’s Student Senate in 1994.
Kamaruddin, former head of the mosque at the Faculty of Social and Political
Sciences, UI, won the student election in 1995 followed by Selamat Nurdin,
another influential figure of dakwah movement from FISIP UI, who was elected in
1996. The straight victories of dakwah activists in securing student senate
positions both at the faculty and university level at UI have inspired their
colleagues in other prestigious universities, such as ITB, IPB, and UGM to take
over the student senates on their own campuses.
Finally, notable among Tarbiyah’s organisational strengths was its close
connections to the Islamic student group KAMMI. Utilising the tenth annual
meeting of FSLDK in 1998, some LDK activists announced the birth of KAMMI.
The formation of KAMMI signaled that Tarbiyah was beginning gradually to
expand its networks with campus dakwah groups, allowing its activists to take to
22
Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 2002, pp. 129-131.
108
the streets and call for regime change following the 1997 economic crisis. The
significant role of KAMMI in the reformasi struggle, which helped to bring about
Suharto’s downfall, marked the beginning of Tarbiyah’s use of more visible and
formal networks and institutions in the pursuit of its political and social goals.
5.3. The PKS’ Centralised Federal Structure and Leadership
As noted earlier, the fall of Suharto gave the Tarbiyah movement an
opportunity to transform itself into a political party. PK, which then
metamorphosed into PKS, was seen as a formal organisation of Tarbiyah.23 Prior
to establishing PK, Tarbiyah cadres were responsible for all recruitment and
training activities. Since the formation of PK, all Tarbiyah members automatically
became PK members and all religious circles and training activities were taken
over by PK.24 In an attempt to accommodate leaders of Tarbiyah, PK set up a peak
body called the Majelis Syuro or Consultative Council, which determined all
strategic decisions within the party.25
There are many examples which point to the complexities inherent in the
transformation from Tarbiyah, an informal movement, to PK, a formalised
political party. The complexities emerged immediately after the party set up its
organisational structures. In general, Tarbiyah resembled an isolated SMO, which
had no branches and relied heavily on direct contact between its members, which
23
24
Interview, Yon Machmudi, Jakarta, 21 August 2007.
25
Ibid.
109
was understandable during the repressive Suharto period when the regime silenced
political Islam. In contrast to Tarbiyah, the leadership of PK in the post-Suharto
era resembled what McCarthy and Zald have called a “federated structure,” which
provides local branches whose contact with constituents can be facilitated by the
party’s local units or direct communication.26 In terms of decentralisation and
autonomy, federated structures can be divided into three modes: the loosely
coupled network structure,27 the pyramid structure,28 and the centralised
structure.29
In the case of PK, now PKS, the organisational model of the party is a
centralised federal and national institution. There is a Central Executive Board
(Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP), which coordinates all local branches from the
Province-Level Executive board (DPW, Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah), the District-
Level Executive Board (DPD, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah), the Sub-District-Level
Executive Board (DPC, Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) to the lowest level of the PKS
structure, that operates at the village level, called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting
(DPRa). The DPP is ultimately responsible but administratively hierarchical up to
26
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilisation,” 1987. See also,
Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, pp. 122-124.
27
This loosely coupled network structure was initially described by Gerlach and Hine.
They said that the features of the structure are the following: (1) segmentation, that is a multitudes
of different groups and organisations with different groups and organisations with different goals
and ideologies; (2) a polycephalous structure, that is, a structure with several leaders and no single
leader controls the whole movement; and (3) a reticulate structure, an availability of networks of
bonds and linkages which connect other groups or organisation. See Klandermans’ description of
Gerlach and Hine account in The Social Psychology, 1997, p. 123
28
Meanwhile the pyramid structure was introduced by Lawson (1983), in which
interaction with the local branches usually takes the forms of top-down approach. See,
Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, p. 123.
29
Ibid.
110
each level. The DPP’s main task is to manage and coordinate all activities within
the party.
The DPP is currently led by Tifatul Sembiring, who graduated from a
university in Pakistan. The formal composition of DPP is a president, a deputy
president, department heads, secretary general and treasurer. There are over 100
members on the full DPP. According to the statutes of PKS, the DPP is at the same
level as the Central Shari’a Supervisory Council (DPS, Dewan Pengawas Shari’a)
whose duty is to control party policies based on the rules and principles of shari’a
and the advisory council (MPP, Majelis Pertimbangan Partai) whose task is to
provide some degree of consultation with top members of DPP both formally, in
regular MPP and DPP meetings, and informally (see, Figure 3).
111
Figure 3
PKS’ Organisational Structure and Decision-Making Process30
Hierarchically, however, the DPP, MPP and DPS are subordinate to the
most powerful body, the Majelis Syuro. According to PKS statutes, the Majelis
30
Yudi Latif, Aay Muhammad Furkon and Edwin Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik:
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, The Reform Institute, Jakarta, 2005.
112
has undisputable power to select the party’s president (who then becomes the chief
executive of the DPP), to legalise the composition of the advisory council (MPP),
to select the daily board of the Central Sharia Supervisory Body (DPS), to
determine party policy and strategic issues and the like.31 This supreme council is
chaired by Madinah University graduate K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, PKS’ chief
ideologue. It is made up of nearly 100 representatives, which serves, according to
the Council member Aan Rohanah, like a senate/congress.32 Representatives of the
council are chosen by the highest levels of cadre called kader inti or core cadres33
to “represent the interest of members in local areas and ensure their voice is heard
at the national level.”34 However, Zulkieflimansyah and Rohanah’s accounts fail to
acknowledge the fact that not all of the representatives of the Council are elected
by PKS members. Among the Council’s 99 members, nearly half of them are
chosen by the members-elect in order to represent (1) various provinces;35 (2)
expertise and professionalism;36 and (3) cadreisation levels or tarbawi.37
31
Anggaran Dasar dan Rumah Tangga PKS, available at http://www.pk-sejahtera.org.
32
33
As noted earlier, PKS members are trained through a series of six levels ending with
takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah. The four highest levels are called kader inti, core
cadres who have the right to vote for the Majelis Syuro representatives.
34
Zulkieflimansyah, “Understanding PKS as Living Entity within Indonesia’s Democratic
Space,” in The Jakarta Post, 10 August 2007. See also, Sapto Waluyo, Pilihan Sulit PK Sejahtera,
2004, available at http://pk-sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=2644.
35
As noted earlier, PKS members must have passed through a series of six levels ending
with takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah. The four highest levels called core cadres
are granted opportunities to vote for the Council. Unfortunately, some provinces do not have
enough core cadres so that they cannot elect their own representatives in the Council. Accordingly,
in order to represent them, the elect-members of the Council select their representatives.
36
Accordingly, the Council is not made up of only conservative ulama (Islamic scholars),
but some of the Council members also come from non-ulama background such as nuclear expert,
lobbyist, and so on.
37
Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik, 2005.
113
Another driving factor to the development of PKS’ organisational
structures and its leadership is a rapid increase in party branches throughout
Indonesia. PKS has now opened provincial-level branches (DPW) in all provinces
in Indonesia. Furthermore, figure 5 shows that in 2004 PKS succeeded in
establishing district (kabupaten) or municipality (kotamadya) level branches
(DPD) across the entire country (100%). Meanwhile, the party has sub-district
(kecamatan) level branches (DPC) in 65% of 4300 of sub-districts in Indonesia
(see in details in Figure 6). Interestingly, PKS also operates at the lowest level of
government, that is, at village levels (desa or kelurahan) by forming village-level
branches called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting (DPRa).
Figure 4
The Growth of PKS Branches at the District and Sub-district Levels38
120
100 100
93
82 86
80 79
62 65 DPD
60 58
50 51 DPC
40 35 35
20
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
More so than most other parties, PKS exploited the removal of Suharto’s
floating mass policy,39 which limited party activities to the level of district and
38
Ibid.
114
municipalities (i.e., no party branches were permitted to operate at sub-district and
village levels), by establishing party branches from the central to the lowest level.
The ability of PKS to set up local party units nation-wide shows that it began
gradually to expand its organisational structures and networks in order to attract
new voters other than PKS traditional voters. In the run-up to the 1999 elections,
PKS’ predecessor, PK was widely perceived to be an exclusive party of urban
people, most notably urban educated youth and pious middle class Muslims, and
was unable to form local party units in many rural areas. Unsurprisingly, PK failed
to garner more than 2% of the popular vote in that election.
The rapid rise of PKS’ organisational structures was one of the key factors
in the good performance of the party in the 2004 elections. The PKS general-
secretary Anis Matta claimed that the party successfully increased their votes in
2004 in sub-districts or villages where new PKS branches had been found.40 It is
worth noting that PKS’ branches at sub-district and village levels were still limited
so that the party’s main support in the 2004 elections came largely from urban
areas, where the lower middle class and urban poor are numerous. Accordingly, in
the run-up to the 2009 elections, Matta predicted that PKS sub-district level
39
Suharto argued that the political parties were always trying to gain mass support for the
sake of their own political interests. Likewise, the presence of party conflicts in the past had
harmed village people. The issuance of Article Mo. 10 of Law No. 3 had clearly intended to limit
the scope of political parties’ activities. Ironically, the ruling party Golkar was exempted from this
limitation so that they could reach all the village people day-to-day activities. See, Muhammad
Ryaas Rasyid, “State Formation, Party System and the Prospect for Democracy in Indonesia: The
Case of Golongan Karya (1967-1993),” Ph.D. Dissertation at Hawaii University, 1994.
40
Anis Matta, Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah, Sekjen Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah and Arah
Press, Jakarta, 2008, p. 7.
115
branches would be 100% up from 65% in 2004 and the party’s village-level units
would be 75% from the total number of villages in Indonesia.41
Figure 5
The Correlation between Party Branches and Increasing Votes in 200442
DAKWAH SUB- DPC PERCEN VOTES SEAT

AREAS43 DISTRICT T (%)
Dakwah Areas I 1554 1009 65
NAD 237 146 62 192,469 2
North Sumatra 352 234 66 427,724 2
West Sumatra 161 149 93 236,858 2
Riau 126 89 71 135,903 1
Riau Islands 42 25 60 61,565 -
Jambi 82 70 85 68,846 1
Bengkulu 69 32 46 61,906 -
South Sumatra 149 132 89 204,870 1
Bangka Belitung 163 35 21 26,619 -
Lampung 173 97 56 290,796 2
Dakwah Areas 2 1278 818 86
DKI Jakarta 51 44 86 1,057,246 5
West Java 583 434 74 2,369,231 13
Banten 131 131 100 520,202 3
West Kalimantan 150 57 38 66,608 -
South Kalimantan 133 75 56 166,847 1
Central Kalimantan 103 1 1 25,137 -
East Kalimantan 127 76 60 129,819 1
Central Java 596 466 78 839,356 3
41
Ibid.
42
This data is my own analysis based on various sources including Pemi Apriyanto,
Database Pemilu 2004, Peta Daerah Pemilihan, Perolehan Suara dan Kursi untuk DPR RI, DPRD
Propinsi dan DPRD Kabupaten/Kota se-Indonesia, Spirit Research and Database, Jakarta, 2007
and Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik, 2005.
43
In order to organise and generate votes across Indonesia, PKS has divided the
archipelago into four dakwah territories or areas called “wilayah dakwah.”
116
DI Yogyakarta 84 78 93 141,114 1
South Sulawesi 316 196 62 146,594 1
Southeast Sulawesi 123 77 63 39,397 -
Central Sulawesi 89 32 36 42,768 -
North Sulawesi 111 44 40 18,939 -
Gorontalo 43 24 56 16,184 -
Maluku 60 29 48 47,947 1
North Maluku 55 43 78 43,772 1
Papua 168 50 30 21,872 -
West Irian Jaya 8,130 -
East Java 681 593 87 608,810 2
Bali 62 22 35 18,837 -
West Nusa Tenggara 102 82 80 111,471 1
East Nusa Tenggara 208 49 24 19,827 -
As a newly established party, the fact that PKS expanded to open offices in
the sub-districts and villages is viewed by many as a remarkable achievement.
Unlike New Order parties i.e. Golkar, PPP and PDI-P44 which took advantage of a
government decision permitting them to keep their existing assets and party
offices,45 PKS had to build up its branch structures from scratch, using relatively
new personnel and infrastructures. Other new parties, such as PKB and PAN
44
Since Megawati, now the chairwoman of PDI-P, was ousted by Suharto from the
leadership of the regime-endorsed PDI, PDI-P then relied on her former PDI loyalist and cadres.
Coincidentally, most of PDI cadres backed Megawati and her new party PDI-P, thereby enabling
PDI-P to benefit from their cadres and resources to build up new infrastructure.
45
It is worth noting that among New Order parties, Golkar is the only party that could
operate its political machine below the district level. PPP and PDI had been barred from any
political activity in the sub-district and village levels. At this point, PPP and PDI-P also
experienced financial challenges to expand their infrastructure to sub-district and village levels.
117
profited from close ties and associations with large social-religious organisations
something which PKS lacked.46
PKS is the only party that emerged after the fall of Suharto without much
of the historical legacy carried by PKB, PAN, and PBB. Additionally, unlike
Golkar, PPP, and, to a certain extent, PDI-P, PKS was not burdened by
identification with Suharto’s New Order. The aim behind PK/PKS, according to
Mutammimul Ula, was to ‘start from nil; a radical beginning.’47 Indeed PKS
profited greatly from preexisting networks of the campus-based religious
movement Tarbiyah. However, the secretive nature of Tarbiyah during Suharto
period and its lack of assets and infrastructure relative to NU and Muhammadiyah,
mean that it was less able to give PK a flying start.48
46
PKB’s nomination came from a team established by the national leadership of the
traditionalist Muslim organisation, NU. To some extent, PKB can be seen as the revival of an
earlier political party, the NU. Similarly, despite PAN styling itself as a pluralist party, it benefited
from its close links to the largest Modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah. In addition,
among Islamic political parties that tried to revive Masyumi, PBB is the largest and is officially
supported by ex-leaders of Masyumi within DDII. See, Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005. See
also, Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platdasch, “The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and
Political Exigency,” in Studia Islamika, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005.
47
Cited from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, p. 98.
48
Recently, there has been a growing tension between PKS and Islamic mass-
organisations, Muhammadiyah and NU. The two accused PKS of infiltrating their institutions such
as mosques, schools, universities, hospitals, charities and so on for the party’s political self-
interests. In the perspective of resource mobilisation theories, such accusation shows the
appearance of ‘competition’ to seize religious and social institutions. Muhammadiyah, for instance,
is well-known as the century-old, 30 million-strong Islamic organisation with its immense network
of social services. The chairman of Muhammadiyah Prof. Din Syamsuddin even issued a decree in
2007 distancing the organisation, its cadres and resources from “parties of any kind whose primary
goal is the acquisition of political power for themselves.” The decree was believed to counter the
PKS penetration to Muhammadiyah. See, Bret Stephens, “The Exorcist: An Indonesian Man Seeks
“to Create an Islam that will Make People Smile,” in The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2007,
available at http://opinionjournal.com/columnists/bstephens/?id=110009922.
118
5.4. The Network Expansion and Organisational Growth of PKS
In order to expand its social services and organisational capacities, PKS
has created numerous institutions under the coordination of its central board
(DPP). There are at least five departments in the DPP. The department of
cadreisation, whose main programs are related to recruitment, training, dakwah
activities, sport and youth, holds responsibility for coordinating and managing
such PKS-affiliated organisations as the Justice Guard (Garda Keadilan), the youth
organisation Gema Keadilan, the Indonesian Muslim Senior and Junior High
School Students’ Action Union (KAPMI, Kesatuan Pelajar Muslim Indonesia
(KAPMI),49 the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, Kesatuan
Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia),50 the Asia-Pacific Student and Youth
Foundation (YPPAP, Yayasan Pemuda dan Pelajar Asia Pasifik), and the Mission
Group for School Predication (GTDS, Gugus Tugas Dakwah Sekolah).51
The department of public policy, whose sub-divisions include politics and
defense, law and human rights, art and culture and communication and networks,
supervises PKS affiliated think-thanks and strategic institutions such as the Center
for Indonesian Reform (CIR),52 the Indonesian Advocacy Center for Law and
Human Rights (PAHAM, Pusat Advokasi Hukum dan Hak Azasi Manusia),53 the
49
For more information of KAPMI, visit these links http://kapmi.tripod.com/ and
kapmijakarta.blogsome.com/
50
For more information about KAMMI, see its official website http://www.kammi.or.id
51
Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik, 2005.
52
For a detailed description of CIR, visit its official website http://www.cir.or.id/
53
PAHAM was formed in May 1999. The organisation’s goal is “justice for all.” It
promotes social justice by providing advocacy programs to educate and empower people regarding
their rights. Despite PAHAM shares an argument that human rights are universal, but it maintains
119
Institute for Economics Studies (INFES), the Institute of Student and Youth for
Democracy (INSYD) and Yayasan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Pemuda
(CYFIS).54
Meanwhile the department of planning and human resource development,
whose primary task is to manage a number of programs related to education,
health, science and environment, formed the Indonesian Society of Scientists
(MITI, Masyarakat Ilmuwan dan Teknologi Indonesia) in 2004.55 This department
also extended its activities to include a variety of private voluntary organisations
such as charities, schools, medical clinics and day care centers. Notable among
these is the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT, Jaringan Sekolah Islam
Terpadu) which organizes hundreds of Integrated Islamic Primary Schools (SDIT,
Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu, SDIT) throughout Indonesia. Also, through the
establishment of the Islamic Medical Association and Network Indonesia (IMANI)
in 2002 PKS cadres seek to provide social welfare services to larger society.
In addition, the department of economic empowerment has endeavored to
develop the PKS-affiliated labor union Serikat Pekerja Keadilan (SPK), the
Indonesian Shari’a-based Small Cooperation (KOSINDO), and the like. PKS also
has links to a number of professional and sectoral associations such as the Network
of Indonesian Muslim Entrepreneurs (JPMI, Jaringan Pengusaha Muslim
Islam as its foundational ideology. See, Ann Marie Murphy, “The Role of Professional
Organisations in Indonesia’s Socio-Political Transformation,” in NBR Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3,
March 2008, available at www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol18no3.pdf
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid
120
Indonesia),56 the Indonesian Labor Foundation (ILF) and the Indonesian
Association of Prosperous Farmers and Fisherman (PPNSI, Perhimpunan Petani
Nelayan Sejahtera Indonesia).57 The Department of Women is responsible for
supervising the Women’s Association (Salimah, Persaudaraan Muslimah)58 and
the Women’s Group for Justice (Pos Wanita Keadilan). PKS has also extended its
activities to include social work and charities, including efforts to help the victims
of natural disasters across Indonesia by establishing social organisations such as
the National Humanitarian Foundation Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU),59 the
Ummul Qura Social Fund (DSUQ, Dompet Sosial Ummul Qura) and the
Indonesian Red Crescent (BSMI, Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia)60 that engage in
collecting donations from both internal and external contributors. These
organisations are under the supervision and coordination of the treasurer.61
56
The main aim of this professional association is ‘to enhance the skills and capacity of
Muslim entrepreneurs through seminars, provision of credit via the organisation’s networks in the
sharia banking system, and assistance in securing government contracts.” Like other Islamic
professional associations, Islam is the sole ideology of JPMI. See, Murphy, “The Role of
Professional Organisations,” 2008. For more information about this, visit JPMI’s official website,
www.jpmi.or.id/
57
Ibid.
58
For a detailed information of the Salimah, visit its official website
http://www.salimah.or.id/
59
PKPU was established in response to the multi-dimensional crises that hit Indonesia in
1997. It is a non-profit institution whose main program is to provide a relief to the social problems
of the poor (dhu’afa). For more information of PKPU, visit its official website
http://www.pkpu.or.id/homes.php
60
BSMI was established by Muslim medical professionals in response to a perception that
the Muslim victims of the conflict in Maluku were not receiving the same access to medical care as
Christian victims. BSMI claims no formal relationship to PKS, but the former president of PKS
Hidayat Nur Wahid sits on the organisation’s steering committee. See, Murphy, “The Role of
Professional Organisations,” 2008. For a detailed description of BSMI, visit this link
www.bsmipusat.net/
61
Ibid
121
It is true that other major political parties in Indonesia have similar bodies.
In terms of women’s divisions or women’s affiliated organisations, for example,
PPP has the United Women (Wanita Persatuan); PAN has the Women’s National
Mandate (Perempuan Amanat Nasional, PUAN). Other parties are catching up
with the mobilisation of youth and students too. Golkar Party, for example, has the
Multipurpose Cooperative of Mutual Assistance (Kosgoro) whose main supporters
are youth. However, most other organisations affiliated with political parties do
not function well. Unlike PKS-affiliated associations which actively engage in all
year-round activities, other political parties’ bodies mostly only engage with their
constituents during election time. This is largely because PKS is unusual parties
whose cadres are ideologically motivated people and are required to rise through a
series of intensive trainings. In short, PKS relies heavily on its highly motivated
cadres to run the party’s bodies.
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned extensive networks linked to PKS
demonstrate the proliferation of Islamic professional associations. Indeed, they are
not all professional associations nor are they —borrowing Clark’s term— “Islamic
social institutions (ISIs).” In terms of the emergence of PKS’ professional
associations, it can be seen as a result of higher rates of Muslim participation in
tertiary education since the 1970s. As noted in Chapter 4, the Suharto’s regime’s
tremendous economic achievement had allowed Muslim students to enjoy
university education, most of who were involved in the campus dakwah movement
since the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices in the late 1970s. After
122
graduating from university, “[they] move into profession and professional
associations in which they were previously underrepresented relative to the
numbers of Muslims in society.”62 They use such associations as vehicles for
maintaining their spirit of dakwah, as well as advancing their own distinctive piety
and professionalism.63
From the perspective of resource mobilisation, these Islamic professional
associations alongside PKS-affiliated organisations have played an important role
as “webs or networks of linkages, institutional or personal, in which their
associated institutions are embedded.”64 In the vocabulary of PKS, such groups are
called “wajihah” (literally means ‘cover’). Within this network of institutions,
professional and non-professional associations linked to PKS have been
particularly successful, providing social and medical services to many people.
Through its ideologically motivated cadres, PKS has also run schools called SDIT
as well as provided financial aid through small cooperatives (koperasi). Indeed,
other parties occasionally provide relief to victims of natural disasters. Unlike
PKS, however, their assistance is temporary and non-institutionalised.
By providing social services, PKS appears to be in stark contrast to other
political parties by proving that the party’s social concern is backed up by
grassroots-based regular activities. More significantly, these PKS-affiliated
organisations and professional associations have served as a tool of recruitment.

62
Robert W. Hefner, “Introduction: Civic Platforms or Radical Springboards,” in in NBR
Analysis Vol. 18, No. 3, March 2008, available at www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/
vol18no3.pdf
63
Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.
64
Janine Clark, “Social Movement Theory,” 2004, p. 942.
123
The hope is that the disenfranchised poor who utilise social welfare services
provided by Islamic social institutions linked to PKS could be mobilised to
become its new cadres.
5.5. The PKS Recruitment of Cadres and Its Process of Cadreisation
Aside from the growth of PKS organisational structures and its affiliated
institutions, the rise of PKS in the 2004 elections can also be explained by the
expansion of its membership. After the modest performance of the party in 1999,
when there were only 5,000 core cadres and 42,000 cadres in total, its leadership
set the target of expanding to 800,000 total cadres by 2004. The hope was that
each cadre would attract five to ten new voters per-week prior to the election.65 In
2004, PKS had only 500,000 active cadres, but it received approximately 8.3
million votes in that election, a significant increase from 1.4% of the popular votes
in 1999.66 In the 2009 elections, the secretary-general of PKS, Anis Matta aimed to
expand PKS’ total cadres to two million.67
65
Al-Muzammil Yusuf, Isu Besar Dakwah dalam Pemilu, PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2003,
p. 41.
66
Tifatul Sembiring, “Berpolitik Itu Indah,” Republika, 17 October 2004. Tifatul explores
the growth of PKS cadres in more detail in Tifatul Sembiring, Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke Arah
yang Lebih Baik, Arah Press and DPP PKS, Jakarta, 2008. In other pieces, however, Anis Matta
claimed that PKS had only 400,000 cadres in 2004. See, Matta, Integrasi Politik, 2008, p. 6.
67
According to Anis Matta and Zulkieflimansyah, however, the remarkable success of
PKS in 2004 had more to do with the party’s massive campaign on clean and caring government
than with mobilisation by their cadres. The two influential leaders were interviewed by William
Liddle as quoted in Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: The Indonesian Case.”
Interestingly, Anis Matta, in other occasions, does not downplay the role of cadres in the rise of
PKS in 2004 and repeatedly stated that the party should increase the total number of cadres in the
next elections in order to generate votes. See, Matta, Integrasi Politik, 2008, p. 6.
124
To this end, like Tarbiyah on which it is based, PKS employs two
mechanisms of recruiting new participants.68 The first is the individual pattern of
recruitment (al-da’wah al-fardhiyyah), the person-to-person form of outreach,
which involves direct personal contact. Rather than approach a stranger, this
mechanism begins by persuading potential recruits among families, friends, and
neighbours. In other words, PKS recruitment is built on preexisting relationships
while at the same time enhancing a new kind of solidarity based on shared beliefs,
strong commitment and loyalty.69
Those potential recruits will be encouraged to participate in the bulk of
religious circles and training organised by PKS such as usrah (family) or halaqah
(small study group) or liqa (weekly meeting), rihlah (recreation), mukhayyam
(camping expeditions), daurah (intellectual training and Islamic workshops),
nadwah (seminars) and the like. The hope is that each new participant will know
(ta’aruf), understand (tafahum) and support (tafaul) each other.70 Given that these
organised activities are conducted regularly, it is also hoped that new participants
can be directed towards shared values and meaning.
The second is the institutional pattern of recruitment (al-da’wah al-
‘amma). There are various institutional forms of outreach involving PKS
organisational structures, PKS-affiliated organisations as well as benefiting from
religious institutions i.e. mosques as well as educational institutions i.e. schools

68
As noted earlier, after the birth of PK, all Tarbiyah’s religious training and recruitment
activities were carried out by the party structures.
69
For elements of comparison, notably in the case of Egyptian Islamist movements, see
Wickham, Mobilising Islam, 2002, pp. 130-131.
70
Hassan al-Banna, Usrah dan Dakwah, Ikhwan Agency, Kuala Lumpur, 1979, p. 4.
125
and universities. As a political party, PKS’ involvement in the national and local
governments has become a new form of recruitment. It decided to engage with the
governing coalition led by President Yudhoyono, and had three of its nominees in
the thirty-four member cabinet. Zulkieflimansyah admitted that these posts like
agriculture, youth and sports and public housing are important to expand the
party’s networks to rural areas.71 PKS has also participated in many gubernatorial
and district/municipality executive elections.
Above all, the aforementioned forms of cadre recruitment in PKS can be
divided into two categories in terms of political objectives.72 The first is aimed at
mobilising as many new members as possible, regardless of their ethnicity, race or
gender, to be PKS members, sympathisers or volunteers in all political activities
and social activities organised by the party. This mechanism of cadre recruitment
is clearly a matter of numbers given the nature of PKS as a political party, which
focuses largely on numbers, is clearly to increase PKS’ popular support in society.
The second is aimed at enlisting potential cadres in selective ways. Having
proclaimed itself to be a cadre party which sets strict standards of recruitment,
PKS requires its cadres to rise through a series of intensive trainings. These
trainings are comprised of hierarchical levels (marhalah), which consist of the
learning process (ta’lim), organisational skills (tandzim), character development
71
Zulkieflimansyah, USINDO Open Forum: Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity Party
(PKS) and Political Islam, Washington D.C., June 8, 2006.
72
Interview, Al-Muzammil Yusuf, as cited by Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi
Partai Politik, 2005.
126
and internalisation of Islamic tenets (taqwin) and evaluation (taqwim).73 In sum,
the process of cadreisation, which determines the hierarchical levels of cadres
within PKS, can be divided into six levels. As noted earlier, PKS members are
trained through a series of six levels ending with takhssus, holders of special
expertise in dakwah.
Figure 6
The Cadreisation System of PKS
TYPE SUB- DEFINITION AND LADDER OF REGISTRATIO

TYPE CADREISATION N
Tamhidi Registered These newly recruited cadres have just Tamhidi Cadres
Cadres(Be- Beginners completed the first training for the party are usually
ginners) (Terdaftar) orientation (TOP, Training Orientasi registered in the
Partai 1). list of members at
Cultivated The second category of the beginners has the sub-district
Beginners completed TOP 1 and 2. They are also level branches
(Terbina) required to attend cadres’ regular meeting (DPC)
(TRK, Taklim Rutin Kader). If they pass
through this level, they will be granted a
certificate called SKAP/KTAP (Surat
Kelulusan Anggota Pemula/Kartu Tanda
Anggota Pemula) in order to rise to the
next training called Basic Training (TD,
Training Dasar 1).
Muayyid Those who completed TD 1 and have been These cadres are
Cadres recommended by their murabbi (instructor) recorded in the
(Young) to be Muayyid Cadres. Besides attending lists of members at
TRK and participating in PKS activities, the district level
they are also required to take KISP1 branches (DPD)
(Kajian Ilmu Sosial Politik or Course for
73
Djony Edward, Efek Bola Salju Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Harakatuna Publishing,
Bandung, 2006, p. 18.
127
Social and Political Sciences).
Muntasib Cadres in this level are attending training These cadres are
Cadres and religious circles as the muayyid, but enlisted at the
(Medium) the content and intensity of trainings are district level
more advanced. They are required to pass branches (DPD)
through Advance Training (TL, Training
Lanjutan 1)
Muntazim Cadres in this level are attending training These cadres are
Cadres and religious circles as the muntasib, but recorded in the
(Adult) they are also required to pass through TL 2. Provincial level
Their murabbi have a right to recommend branches (DPW)
them to rise to the next level.
Amil Cadres These cadres have completed all required These cadres are
(Specialist) trainings and are attending the training at documented and
the specialist level. These cadres have the registered by the
right to hold high and strategic positions in Central Executive
the party. Board (DPP)
Takhassus This is the highest level of trainings These cadres are
Cadres holding special expertise in dakwah, registered by the
(Post) completing the ahli trainings. Central Executive
Board (DPP)
Honorary Those, who are regarded as being MPP has a right to
Cadres meritorious, have rendered a service and decide those who
(Kehorma- deserve to be honoured by the party. They are eligible to be
tan) are not required to pass through these honourary cadres.
series of training.
The multilayered process of cadreisation reveals that PKS employs the
organisational model of Islamism “based on intense cohesion, persuasive guidance
and conformity which together creates unanimity.”74 In order to sustain a code of
belief and to create strong identification among cadres, they need to take an oath of
74
Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, pp. 50-51.
128
allegiance (baiat).75 Likewise, the party’s cadreisation and its membership ladder
are hierarchical systems. As can be seen in figure 6, the four highest levels, i.e.,
takhassus (post), amil (specialist), muntazim (adult), and muntasib (medium), are
called kader inti or core cadres who enjoy the right to vote for the representatives
of Majelis Syuro. In addition, they have the right to hold strategic positions in the
national leadership of PKS.
Further, such cadreisation processes demand obedience from members to
the command of the party’s elite. The President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, says:
The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without loyalty, the
enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the enjoyment of
obedience will not exist without sacrifice, and the enjoyment of sacrifice
will not exist without sincerity (keikhlasan).76
Another influential figure, Zulkieflimansyah, stated cheerfully that the
cadreisation system of PKS has very much in common with “a communist party
with Islamic ideology.’77 It is clear that PKS has put weight on the issue of
cadreisation and it strongly believes that its religious and political ideals cannot be
realised without the systematic formation of devoted cadres and campaigners.
In addition to being the only cadre party in Indonesia, PKS members are
also different in terms of their demographic backgrounds. PKS has attracted many
talented Muslims in the country. They are usually young and better educated than
other political party members. Some of them have advanced degrees from foreign
75
Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 2002, p. 11.
76
Nurhasan Zaidi, “Resepsi PKS,” Republika, 30 July 2005. This excerpt is not my
translation. I cite from Firman Noor, “Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism,” 2007.
77
Zulkieflimansyah, USINDO Open Forum: Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity
Party (PKS) and Political Islam, Washington D.C., June 8, 2006.
129
universities, particularly from the U.S., England, Australia, Germany, and Japan.
PKS has also particularly found acceptance in urban areas. Many are graduates
from Indonesia’s top secular universities such as UI, ITB, and UGM. Most of their
qualifications are in the medical and natural sciences. It comes as no surprise then
that PKS members seem to be technologically savvy, often communicating and
disseminating their views on audiocassettes, videotapes, email and web pages.
One should note that PKS members have tried to improve the ‘quality’ of
individuals in terms of moral rectitude and behaviour. In Indonesia where people
smoke everywhere, it is almost impossible to find a cadre of the party who
smokes. PKS cadres strive to follow closely Islamic norms and practices by
appearing strictly Islamic in terms of wearing Islamic attire and eating halal food
(lawful food according to Islamic beliefs). In a country where most women do not
cover their heads, it is difficult to find a female PKS cadre without a jilbab (veil).
Meanwhile its male members usually wear baju koko. In connection with the halal
issue, PKS members would prefer to take the option of eating food with label halal
on it and scrutinising the ingredients. In addition, PKS members frequently use
Arabic words in their daily conversation such as ikhwan (brothers), akhwat
(sisters), siyasah (politics), hizb (party), ma’isyah (income), and so on.
130
5.6. The Political Financing of PKS
Social movement organisations require financial resources in order to
achieve the movements’ long and short-term objectives. As a social movement
which actively mobilises its supporters onto the streets, PKS faces financial
challenges to meet the needs of transporting its protesters to the site of
demonstrations, producing leaflets, logistics, and the like. Similarly, as a newly
established party, PKS is experiencing a heavy financial burden due to its lack of
business networks while at the same time it must cover the routine costs of
political party activity such as an increase in the operational expenses,
expenditures for electoral campaigning and constituency mobilisation and the
like.78 Additionally, the nature of election campaign in Indonesia has been changed
by the increasing role of the media in political campaigning through expensive
advertisements.79 Also, political parties must now spend more money on opinion
pollsters and political consultants, most of whom are professionals who have only
a loose emotional relationship to their employers.80
The argument offered by some PKS leaders that the party relies primarily
on the financial support of individual cadres through various mechanisms of
78
Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, “Piety and Pragmatism Trends in Indonesian
Islamic Politics,” Asia Program Special Report, April, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, 2003.
79
The increasing expenditures for electronic and print media advertisement can clearly be
seen in the 2004 elections, which made up at least 30 percent of the total campaign costs. Marcus
Mietzner, “Party Financing in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between State Subsidies and Political
Corruption,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2007, 29, 2. p. 253.
80
Ibid.
131
Islamic philanthropy is implausible.81 Machmudi, for instance, said that “most of
the political activities are self-funded through professional arrangements of
religious charities. Members of the party are obliged to pay religious dues, zakat
(alms), infaq (gift for specific purposes), and shadaqah (charitable gifts).”82
However, he does not supply the claims with sufficient data. Basic questions about
how these arrangements are carried out and how much money is collected from
these internal donations remain unanswered.
The head of a PKS faction in parliament, Mahfudz Sidiq, describes in some
detail how PKS has collected funds.83 In spite of internal contributions, PKS relies
financially on several mechanisms. First, PKS instructs its cadres who hold
parliamentary seats in national, provincial, and district levels to pay contributions
to the party. Anis Matta reveals that PKS has asked for 50 to 60 per cent of its
parliamentarians’ salaries.84 Furthermore PKS MPs are increasingly required to
help pay for the party functions as well as satisfying financial demands from their
constituencies which eventually reduces their take-home salary even further.85
Second, PKS is attempting to advance a spirit of entrepreneurship among cadres.86
The hope is that such attempts will encourage them to be wealthy entrepreneurs
who are maximally attached to PKS and will use their financial benefits to cover
the party’s routine costs.
81
For example, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006; Interview, Khairuddin, Jakarta,
82
83
84
Matta, Integrasi Politik, 2008, p
85
86
Ibid.
132
Third, PKS has also been open to external contributions from companies
and individuals who share religious and political ideals with the party.87 In fact,
however, ‘most donors have clearly defined political and economic interests and
they expect the party and its politicians to take those interests into consideration if
elected to public office.”88 PKS leaders repeatedly claim that their party does not
accept funds from corrupt donors and keeps distanced from politically and
economically interested sponsors.89 The party’s reluctance to engage in corruption
limits its funding. In practice, however, PKS has drawn criticism. The most
controversial of these was the nomination of Tamsil Linrung as the PKS legislative
candidate, despite his bad reputation for financial mismanagement.
This clearly indicates that, as a new party, PKS is still struggling to expand
its business networks and access to wealthy entrepreneurs. In Indonesian politics,
in fact, entrepreneurs and large corporations make up important sources of income
for most parties.90 According to the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) which
conducted a series of seven polls since the April 2004 election, the lack of PKS’
resource mobilisation, notably financial income, has partly contributed to the
declining support for the party.91
87
Ibid.
88
Mietzner, “Party Financing,” 2007, p. 240.
89
Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, “Piety and Pragmatism,” 2003.
90
Ibrahim Fahmy Badoh, “Manipulasi Dana Kampanye dan Politik Uang Pemilu.
Deskripsi dan Evaluasi untuk Perbaikan Pasal-Pasal Dana Politik dan Paket Undang-Undang
Politik,” Position Paper, Political Finance Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2005.
91
Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), “Trend Dukungan terhadap Islam Politik,” 9 October
2007, available at http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/216/peta-partai-politik-maret-2007. Hidayat and
Zulkieflimansyah admitted that such financial constraints hinder the party from making visits
throughout the entire country to spread its message. See, Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah,
“Piety and Pragmatism,” 2003.
133
Faced by such financial constraints, PKS is now selling nominations for
legislative and executive office to wealthy individuals who have no particular
connection to the party or its ideology. Notable among these was the former
deputy chief of the national police, Gen. Adang Daradjatun, who was widely
speculated to have paid considerable contributions to the party in exchange for his
nomination as a governor of Jakarta.92 Many analysts believe that Adang’s money
was almost certainly corruptly gained. Also, a prominent figure from the Institute
of Public Administration (IPDN, Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri), Inu
Kencana Syafei, told the public that he was asked to pay a large sum of money to a
PKS branch in Payakumbuh if he would run as the party’s mayor nominee in the
municipality.93 To some PKS cadres, the nomination of Adang was seen as PKS
breaking an earlier commitment to nominate its own cadres in the regions’ local
elections where it had sufficient prior electoral success, such as in Jakarta where
the party won the capital decisively in the last elections. More significantly, these
dubious fund-raising efforts have raised further questions about PKS integrity.94
92
Adang was widely reported to pay somewhere between Rp 13 billion and Rp 15 billion
and even PKS did not deny that financial compensation was involved while popularising new term
in Indonesian political financing “uang mahar.” See, Mietzner, “Party Financing,” 2007.
93
“PKS Usung Ardi-Nasrullah, Inu: Saya Tak Punya Uang Rp1 Miliar,” Padang Ekspress,
23 Mei 2007; “Inu: Mereka Bilang, Saya Pilih Rp1 M atau Rp3 M?” Padang Ekspress, 25 Mei
2007, available at http://www.padangekspres.co.id/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid
=105
94
During my interview with a chief ideologue of PKS Abu Ridha, he deeply expressed his
serious concern to the recent development of the party in regard to the involvement of money
politics. He did not apologetically deny Azyumardi Azra’s remarks on PKS saying that the party
has no different with other parties in terms of its political behaviours.
134
According to Mietzner, such illicit fund-raising efforts have partly been
caused by the cut in state subsidies for political parties in 2005.95 The Wahid
administration issued a Government Regulation on Financial Assistance to
Political Parties (PP 51/2001) by which the central board of any political party
would annually receive Rp 1,000 per vote gained in the 1999 elections.96 Likewise
local governments were also asked to pay subsidies to political parties according to
the popular vote obtained in each region.97 Based on the Rp 1,000 per-vote
scheme, PKS which inherited the popular vote of its predecessor, PK, received Rp
1.4 billion each year for its central board. Nonetheless, the current government
issued a new decree, that is, the Government Regulation 29 of 2005 stating that the
per-vote based formula would be replaced by a seat-based one. According to the
new decree, political parties were to receive annually Rp 21 million per-seat
obtained in the 2004 elections, with local authorities to issue their own regulations.
This new funding formula resulted in a significant decrease in income for any
political party.98 PKS, for instance, witnessed a decline of its central state subsidy
from the annual Rp. 1.4 billion it received until 2004 to only Rp. 945 million in
January 2006, when the first payment according to the new formula was made. If
the government uses the old funding scheme, PKS central office would receive Rp.
8.3 billion each year given its remarkable achievement in the 2004 elections.
95
Mietzner, “Party Financing,” 2007.
96
Ibid. pp. 243-244.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
135
Against this background, it comes as no surprise if political parties,
including PKS, endeavour to find alternatives forms of income to cover their rising
costs. To some extent, PKS has, more so than other mass parties, mostly funded its
activities through membership fees and small contributions made by its cadres.99
In some instances, PKS can rely on its highly motivated cadres to perform unpaid
secretarial work, electoral activities and the like. Similarly in many instances of
the party’s social movement activities, its cadres work voluntarily to mobilize
huge rallies. The model of an internal funding mechanism can reduce the
dependence of PKS on state subsidies on the one hand and external contributions
made by politically interested donors on the other. Unfortunately for PKS, Abu
Ridho admitted that “PKS is a poor party whose main base of support comes from
poor people.”100 Likewise Hidayat and Zulkieflimansyah suggest that PKS is
mainly supported by young people, who do not have ample financial resources.101
It is therefore difficult for PKS to rely primarily on its cadres in dealing with
financial constraints.
5.7. Media as Communication Networks
As noted earlier, the ideological outreach of PKS and its recruitment
channels are typically personal and based on preexisting social relationships. But
such relationships have been reinforced by other electronic and printed media as
99
For further discussion on the mass parties, see Richard Katz, Democracy and Elections,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
100
See also Abu Ridha, interview, cited in Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi
Partai Politik, 2005.
101
Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, “Piety and Pragmatism,” 2003.
136
well as the wide range of Islamic publishing, pamphlets, video cassettes, cassette
tapes and so on. Among other things, the weekly news magazine Sabili is the most
popular Islamist publication, the circulation of which in 2000 was more than one
hundred thousand per-issue.102 Although Sabili claims no formal relations with
any political party, it has links to Tarbiyah and PKS. The birth of Sabili can be
traced by the involvement of Tarbiyah’s leading figures such as Rahmat Abdullah
(the first chairman of the PKS’ Majelis Syuro), Zainal Muttaqin and so on.103 In
the run up to the 2004 elections, Sabili openly declared its support for PKS.104
In addition to Sabili, there are numerous Islamic publications linked to
Tarbiyah and PKS such as Saksi, Annida, Ummi, and Tarbawi. Saksi is the news
magazine whose primary sections are national political issues, international news,
especially from the Muslim world, and columns and opinions provided by PKS
intellectuals and affiliates. Saksi has presented itself as a publication wing of PKS
by disseminating the party’s political views. Meanwhile, Annida is a less
politically interested magazine targeting young Muslims whose rubric is mostly
dominated by Islamic short stories. However, on some occasions, Annida appeals
to its readers to help Palestinians perceived as suffering from the Israeli
occupation.
Likewise, Tarbawi offers less political news. Instead, the magazine, whose
readership mostly comes from Tarbiyah activists, focuses primarily on the
102
For a detailed account of Sabili, see Syamsu Rijal, “Media and Islamism in Post-New
Order Indonesia: The Case of Sabili, in Studi Islamika,” Volume 12, Number 3, 2005.
103
Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 2002, p. 158.
104
See, Murphy, “The Role of Professional Organisations,” 2008.
137
significance of education and religious values. The magazine often reports on
social work and activities carried out by PKS as well as featuring the personal
sides of PKS leading figures. For example, former president of the party Hidayat
Wahid’s story with his mother as well as PKS MP, Mutammimul Ula’s wife’s
efforts to raise their eleven children were given a large space in the special edition
of Tarbawi on women. Finally, as evident by its name Ummi which means “my
mother,” the magazine focuses on the cultivation of family values targeting
Muslim mothers rather than devoting its reports on divisive political issues.
According to Rijal, there are numerous indications showing the issues and views
raised by such Islamic magazines are concomitant with the characteristics of
Tarbiyah.105 In addition, many contributors and Muslim figures consulted for the
magazine have a PKS/Tarbiyah background.106
PKS also makes the most effective use of the Internet of any political party.
PKS central office and its branches, ranging from the provincial level to the village
level, promote their political views and religious values through more than 50
websites. Also, PKS special branches overseas utilise websites and mailing lists to
reinforce their networks. Some PKS leading figures and the party’s members have
also promoted their political views and affiliations through personal websites or
homepages.
In sum, the remarkable achievement of PKS in the 2004 elections and its
ability to mobilise collective action have been facilitated by the availability of
105
Rijal, “Media and Islamism,” 2005, p. 431.
106
Ibid.
138
supportive infrastructures. These infrastructures that are required for collective
action have become known as ‘resource mobilisation.’ PKS relies on a variety of
resources, which include cadres, organisational strengths, leadership,
communication networks and financial assets. PKS was formed by activists of
Jemaah Tarbiyah which seized the momentum of the downfall of Suharto regime.
During Suharto’s authoritarianism, Tarbiyah used less formal and visible
organisations and networks in order to avoid the sustained regime’s repression.
Nonetheless, the collapse of the regime created opportunities for Tarbiyah to form
PKS and thus utilising a far more visible institution and network. Since the post-
Suharto era, PKS has also endeavoured to boast its resource mobilisation,
including acquisition of income, cadre recruitment, organisational and networking
expansion, so that the party can actively engage with collective action and thus
requires no jump start at election time.
139
CHAPTER 6
“ISLAM IS THE SOLUTION:”
THE PKS’ COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES AND ITS ISLAMIST
TRANSNATIONAL FRAMING
I have argued that the development of Tarbiyah which led to the formation
of PKS, occurred under favourable conditions (political opportunities), and in a
supportive organisational environment (resource mobilisation). However, the
development of the Tarbiyah movement that led to the emergence of PKS cannot
only be treated in organisational and political terms, but also in a way to link
shared ideas, meaning and beliefs with political and organisational factors. In
social movement theory, the study of ideas and the social construction of ideas has
come to be known as collective action frames.
Many proponents of collective action frames indicate the strong relations
between frames and the role of ideology in mobilising collective action. In this
way, PKS has successfully proven its ability to produce clear summations of its
ideology that resonate with its target audience. In this chapter, I will concentrate
on PKS framing processes and dynamics. This chapter will also describe PKS’
Islamist transnational framing which is being used in the context of recruitment
and mobilisation.
140
6.1. Key Elements of Collective Action Frames
Social movement scholars use the concept of collective action frames to
define a problem in collective terms that necessitates a collective response.1 The
key point of ‘collective action frames’ is that people feel aggrieved about certain
problems in their lives and believe that through protest they can redress them.
At this point, students of social movements refer to Klandermans coined
consensus and action mobilisation by which the support or the erosion of support
for participation is influenced by attitudinal and behavioral aspects. The consensus
mobilisation is “the process through which a social movement organisation tries to
obtain support for its viewpoint.”2 Meanwhile, action mobilisation is related to the
classic social psychological problem of the relationship between attitude and
behaviour. While consensus mobilisation refers to the so-called struggle for the
minds or the ideological support of individuals, action mobilisation implies a
struggle for individuals’ willingness by offering resources such as money, time,
skills, or expertise.3
In order to understand the complexities of consensus and action
mobilisation, students of social movements introduce the concept of frame
resonance. This notion examines “the ability of a movement to transform a
mobilisation potential into actual mobilisation [which] is contingent upon the
1
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology, August 2000, Vol. 26; William Gamson,
Talking Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
2
Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, p. 7.
3
Ibid.
141
capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants.”4 Benford and Snow
identify three core elements of framing for social movements.5 The first is
diagnostic framing that entails the identification of a problem and the attribution of
responsibility and targets of blame or causality. The second is prognostic framing
that entails the articulation of a proposed solution to the problems and the
identification of strategies, tactics and targets. The third is motivational framing
that is “the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the
diagnosis and prognosis.”6
6.2. The Diagnostic and Prognostic Framings of PKS
As a social movement, PKS is heavily involved in the production of
meaning and concomitant framing processes. A crucial component of PKS
diagnostic frames is to blame the spread of Western liberal beliefs and practices
for a broad range of problems including moral decay, economic injustice and
political degradation. More specifically, PKS activists point to what they perceive
to be the root of Western values, that is, secularism, as it manifests itself in various
spheres of life. They regard this as the greatest challenge ever to the Muslim
community and Islamic values. In the words of PKS president, Tifatul Sembiring,
4
Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 2004, p. 16.
5
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes”, 2000, pp. 615-617; see
also, David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology,”1988, pp. 199-204.
6
David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology,” 1988, p. 202.
142
‘secularism is incompatible with PKS, which is also opposed to the reality of
Indonesia’s social life.’7
According to PKS, the marginalisation of political Islam in Indonesia has
to do with the adoption of secular values in the state’s national ideology, Pancasila,
marked by the failure of founding fathers to include in the preamble of the
constitution a phrase known as the Jakarta Charter,8 which would have given
shari’a constitutional status and would have acknowledged the role of Islam in
political discourse.9 In a later development, activists of political Islam were
continuously suppressed by the nationalist-secular regimes of Sukarno and
Suharto.10 For PKS, because the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, it is
imperative that Islam be given a voice in the nation as a whole.11 However, in the
minds of PKS supporters the deepening processes of secularisation has led
Indonesian Muslims to divert attention from their own religious rules and caused
them to look at Islam merely as a religion that consists of ritual and worship.
Accordingly, PKS has conducted prognostic framing to counter the
problem of sustained secularisation among Indonesian Muslims by proposing the

7
The Jakarta Post, an Interview with Tifatul Sembiring, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law:
Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006.
8
In the earliest stage of Indonesia’s independence, some Islamic figures fought for the
inclusion in the preamble to the constitution of a phrase which would have given the shari’a
constitutional status. The Jakarta Charter attributed to the preamble that proclaimed Indonesia was
based on ‘belief in God’ (Ketuhanan), followed by seven words: ‘Dengan kewajiban menjalankan
syariah Islam bagi pemeluknya’ (with the obligation to practice Islamic shari’a by its adherents).
Those serious efforts failed because of the strong opposition from the secular-nationalist-Christian
political parties. For a detailed account of the 1945 Jakarta Charter, see B.J Boland, The Struggle of
Islam in Modern Indonesia, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, pp. 25-27.
9
MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat) PKS, Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera: Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani yang Adil, Sejahtera dan Bermartabat, (no
publisher, no place, no date), p. 42.
10
Ibid., pp. 42-43.
11
Ibid., p. 47.
143
idea that “Islam is the solution” (al-Islam huwa al-hall). In its vision and mission
statement PKS proclaims itself as “a dakwah party that struggles for Islam as the
solution in the life of the nation and the state.”12 Although this frame is common
among Islamist movements elsewhere, there are crucial divergences over tactics
and strategies. Jamaah Tabligh, for example, focuses on ‘pure dakwah,’ dealing
with the transformation of individual beliefs with Islamic values, but avoid
engaging in politics. By contrast, Hizbut Tahrir is heavily involved in political
matters campaigning for Islam as the only solution for the current human-made
system i.e. democracy, secularism, capitalism.
Instead, PKS appears to frame Islam as both the solution both for the
transformation of individuals and for the so-called Islamising of the state through
formal political participation. The party offers two patterns of Islamisation.13 The
first is cultural Islamisation that involves individuals and community groups. The
basic argument is that the process of cultural imperialism through secularism has
undermined Muslim society so that they must return to the true path outlined in the
sources of Islam (al-ruju’ il al-Qur’an wa al-Hadist). Islam must be understood as
kaffah, a total, comprehensive and all-encompassing way of life with no separation
between al-diin wa al-dawlah (religion and state). In other words, PKS views
Islam as a comprehensive corpus of rules and guidelines that provides all the
spiritual and worldly needs of human beings (syamil). This conception is
12
PKS’ official website, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/v2/index.php?op=isi&id=110
13
MPP PKS, Platform, p. 48.
144
combined with the assertion that Islam is universal. Such universality of Islam will
provide a moral basis for the development of Indonesia.
Cultural Islamisation, carried out in gradual and incremental ways, is a
long process.14 Accordingly, PKS’ second type of prognostic framing is the
structural approach of Islamisation.15 Some leading figures of PKS admit that the
party’s true political objective is “a state based on Islamic law.”16 As is stated in
the paradigm of PKS, this structural pattern takes the form of formal political
participation to restructure state policies and institutions in order to implement
Islamic laws (shari’a) in society.17 The basic argument is that Islam must play a
key role within the state. To PKS, shari’a is an inherent part of Indonesian people,
which should be absorbed into national law.18
According to PKS, the implementation of Islamic values in the state is the
final step of the Islamisation process following continuous efforts to Islamise
individuals, family, neighbours, communities and other collectivities.19 In order to
advance its structural approach of Islamisation, PKS is willing to work within the
existing political system. This is the major defining trait differentiating the party
from Indonesia’s more radicalised Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir which
rejects democracy.
14
15
16
Notable among these was an interview with the president of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, The
Jakarta Post, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006.
17
18
The Jakarta Post, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006.
19
MPP PKS, Platform, p. 35
145
The structural change proposed by PKS is distinguished from “either an
Islamic state, which demands the formalisation of shari’a without considering
other believers interests, or a secular state, which is perceived as a system that
rejects the idea that shari’a be implemented within state policies.”20 Although the
definition of Islamic state is starkly at odds, PKS seems to distinguish itself from
other Islamist parties such as PPP and PBB. When the Islamic parties in the 2000
legislature pioneered by PPP and PBB raised the issue of returning to the Jakarta
Charter, which would have formalised Islam in the state, PKS predecessor, PK, did
not support the move. Instead, PK MPs proposed what they called the ‘Medina
Charter’ (Piagam Madinah), which respects all religions of Indonesia and gives
equal rights and opportunities to them to carry out their teachings.21 After the
merger of PK into PKS in mid-2003, the former president of PKS, Hidayat
Nurwahid, affirms that PKS is still committed to propose the Medina Charter
instead of the Jakarta Charter.22
This is not to say that PKS has abandoned its commitment to Islamise
society and the state. The project of Islamising the state remains a cornerstone of
the party’s struggle.23 Given that most Indonesian people are still reluctant to
support the agenda of establishing an Islamic state, PKS conveys its Islamist
20
Ibid., 50.
21
Many scholars indicate that the Medina Charter was the first ‘constitution’ formulated
by the Prophet Muhammad to regulate all inhabitants of Medina community, including Christians
and Jews, into a single polity. See, Nurcholish Madjid, “Agama dan Negara dalam Islam,” in
Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah, Paramadina, Jakarta, 1994.
22
23
146
messages in politically neutral language.24 PKS’ strategy focuses on how to
implement shari’a-based policies without declaring Indonesia to be an Islamic
state.25 To shed light on this point Bubalo and Fealy cite the opinions of a
prominent PKS leader as the following:
If the substance sufficiently represents the name [i.e., ‘Islamic state’], the
name does not need to reflect the substance…What is the use of a country
as large as Indonesia, whose Muslim population is the largest in the world,
declaring itself to be [an Islamic state]. Previously, the people ran this
nation in a secular way [but] now we want run it Islamically. That is the
essence of it. Hence, PK(S) never bears aloft the Islamic state or syariat
Islam.26
In order to intensify the two patterns of Islamisation, PKS promotes its
motivational framings by engaging in a massive Islamic outreach program called
dakwah ila Allah, literally, “the call” or “invitation” to God. Having said that PKS
has attempted to address individual and structural changes, the party draws on the
existing concept of dakwah, but adapts it for new purposes. First, the notion of
dakwah was shifted to include the task of making “ordinary Muslims” better
Muslims. Second, PKS introduced new content into the material of dakwah with
emphasis on the interpretation of Islam as more than a code governing moral
conduct; instead it is a total way of life which provides guidance for the
transformation of individual beliefs and for the organisation of society and state.27
The adoption of a new interpretation of dakwah in the realities of post-
Suharto Indonesia gives more room for political Islam to maneuver and indicates
24
Ibid.
25
26
Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan?2005, p. 71.
27
MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat) PKS, Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan PKS, no
publisher, no place, 2007.
147
the success of PKS activists to articulate and transmit messages through dakwah.
This has formed a basis for their Islamist framing process, in a way similar to the
framing defined by David Snow, that is, “conscious strategic efforts by groups of
people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that
legitimate and motivate collective action.”28 Through the medium of dakwah, the
party introduces a new conception of Islam, claiming that it is a religious
obligation (fardhu ‘ain) for every Muslim to participate in the Islamic reform of
individuals, society and state.29 Dakwah is therefore framed as Islamic activism
that demands self-sacrifice and total commitment to the cause of Islam.30 So long
as PKS cadres follow this path of dakwah, they will be rewarded for their
obedience. In the case of PKS, this reward manifests into two ways: ‘heaven’ as
was promised by God and structural positions within the party due to the fact that
merit and dakwah commitment become its usual basis for promotion.31
PKS then divides its activities of dakwah into four stages called the orbit of
dakwah (mahawir).32 The first is mihwar tanzhimi, which focuses on the
consolidation and strengthening of cadres.33 The bottom line is that change must
begin from the ability of PKS to create strong cadres through small training and
28
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities,
Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes: Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on
Social Movements,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities,
Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer
N. Zald, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 6.
29
MPP PKS, Platform, pp. 16-19.
30
Ibid.
31
Interview, Khairuddin, Jakarta,
32
K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, Bingkai Dakwah di Jalur Politik, Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008, pp.
1-5; MPP PKS, Platform.
33
MPP PKS, Platform, 30.
148
mentoring cells (usrah) to cultivate distinctive beliefs and customs. Abu Ridha,
ideologue and PKS leading figure wrote:
For an Islamic party, Islamic ideology is the foundation of all structures of

its actions and, at the same time, [it works] as the axis of its political
moves. In this context, the department [of] cadreisation is responsible to
implant Islamic ideology among all cadres so that their political mind-set
unequivocally is based on ideology.34
The second is mihwar sya’bi which concentrates on attempts to encompass
wider sectors of society.35 At this point, the proliferation of Islamist social
institutions linked to PKS (wajihah) such as schools, hospitals, charities, and so on
become important sites of the party’s outreach.36 The third stage is mihwar
muassasi, when PKS cadres are pushed to reach out to penetrate public and state
political institutions.37 This stage is divided into two sectors, either dakwah in
parliament or in bureaucracy. The two are an extension of the dakwah arena where
cadres are encouraged to struggle in constitutional ways for the application of
Islamic norms through state policies and legislation.38 The forth stage is mihwar
daulah, whisch has the purpose of runing Indonesia Islamically, in a total way.39
Nonetheless, the party’s constitution and manifesto make no clear explanation of
the last crucial stage of dakwah.
Those PKS stages of dakwah are carried out gradually, starting from the
bottom up. The set of preparatory steps to Islamise Indonesia culminating with the
34
Abu Ridha, “Ideologi dan Energi Politik,” Suara Keadilan, October-November 2001.
Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.
35
36
Ibid., p. 32.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., pp. 32-33.
39
Ibid., p. 35.
149
incorporation of shari’a into the constitution are called ‘tadarruj’ (pentahapan,
gradualism). As the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, put it:
“We begin with the individual, the family, the local neighbourhood or
community, and then the society at large. When society itself has become
truly Islamic, it will be only a matter of time before Islam is extended to
the sphere of the state.”40
6.3. Electoral Strategy and Non-Islamist Agenda
As a political party seeking to extend support beyond its traditional basis
outside pious Muslim middle-class and educated people, PKS faces a major
challenge of how to appeal to wider society. PKS leaders believe that promoting
the party’s commitment to Islamist causes in Indonesia’s political discourse would
be counterproductive for electoral purposes. That is why PKS downplayed Islamist
issues in the 2004 elections and shied away from showing its Islamist stance too
plainly. Instead, the party decided to promote a clean and caring image and
emphasised “secular” themes of fighting corruption, good governance and socio-
economic equality in the last elections. This electoral strategy was successful in
2004 where PKS increased of its share of the vote to 7.34 per cent from 1.4 per
cent in 1999.
Since then, PKS has prioritised to building its reputation for
incorruptibility. Unlike other parties where structural positions or nominations for
executive or legislative offices can be “purchased” or guaranteed by powerful
40
Cited from Wickham, Mobilising Islam, 2002, p. 127.
150
patrons, advancement in PKS depends on merit and ideological commitment.41 In
the national and local parliaments, the party takes every opportunity to flaunt its
clean image. It has opposed several plans to increase salaries for legislators and
has pledged to refuse bribes. Recently, the PKS faction in DPR reported the
gratification funds its members received and returned the money to the Corruption
Eradication Commission in an attempt to promote clean government.42 In an effort
to avoid conflicts of interest, PKS leaders who were chosen as public officials
usually resigned from high party positions, such as occurred with Hidayat
Nurwahid (former President of PKS stepped down after taking over as the leader
of MPR) and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (former President of PK resigned after being
appointed as a minister during Abdurrahman administration).
To be fair, PKS is not entirely free of corruption allegations. It was
attacked for its choice of Suripto as a legislative candidate despite the fact that he
was under investigation for corruption. It has also been widely speculated that PKS
sold nominations for executive office, most notably, the former deputy chief of the
national police Adang Daradjatun who reportedly paid a large amount of money to
the party in exchange for his nomination as a governor of Jakarta. However,
relative to other parties, PKS is far more committed to the ideals of clean
government and has consistently taken an uncompromising stance in the fight
against corruption.
41
Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan?2005, p. 71.
42
Suarasurabaya.net, Fraksi PKS Kembalikan Uang Gratifikasi Rp. 2 Milyar, available at
http://www.suarasurabaya.net/v05/politik/?id=f1b34e8eb87778159edd8d9c0bb2ec91200851112
151
Furthermore PKS leaders have tried to frame their position on these non-
Islamist issues i.e., anti-corruption and social work, in religious terms. In his
interview with a Jakarta-based daily newspaper, President of PKS, Tifatul
Sembiring, held:
People often simplify shari’a as cutting off hands and stoning. Shari’a is
very broad, covering all aspects of life and having a universal nature. In our
understanding, a government creating public welfare performs amar ma’ruf
(doing what is correct) in the sense of shari’a, and one eradicating
corruption carries out nahi munkar (rejecting what is wrong) as obliged by
shari’a.43
The Muslim political mainstream represented by the two largest Islamic
organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, also take a similar stance. Along with
fourteen other Indonesian Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah called
every Muslim to perform jihad (fight) against corruption.44 They strongly believe
that fighting corruption is a part of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (Islamic teaching of
commanding good and forbidding evil deeds). PKS’ position on this issue, which
is combined with the assertion that combating corruption is informed by Islamic
norms, can be seen as an attempt to broaden its appeal to the Muslim mainstream.
Also, the agenda of eradicating corruption in Indonesia, which is a problem
deeply rooted both at the both the local and national level is attractive for
Indonesian people in general regardless of their religion and background. This is
particularly the case for PKS whose rhetoric of clean government is backed up by
its visible and steadfast position against corruption. Unsurprisingly, in the 2004
43
44
Lanny Oktavia, ‘Jihad Bushido,” available at http://www.islamlib.com.
152
elections, PKS received more than eight million votes, many of which came from
outside the party’s traditional basis.
6.4. Islamist Issues and the Maintaining of PKS’ Base
Aside from strenuous efforts to extend its base by promoting its broader
messages through the adoption of the language of clean government and social
concern, PKS seeks to preserve its traditional support by maintaining its earlier
commitment to Islamist causes. It is clear that the party has adopted what Liddle
and Mujani called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist—
electoral strategy.45
For all PKS’ efforts to moderate its image by promoting non-Islamist
issues, it is still likely seen as an Islamist party that has a ‘hidden’ agenda to
eventually push for the implementation of shari’a in public life and other
conservative legislation products.46 This can be seen from the party’s strong
support to enact the draft anti pornography bill. In addition, there are also growing
signs that local campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and
districts in Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, Banten, and South Sulawesi pushing
for laws based on Islamic norms such as regulating Islamic attire in public office,
banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. Despite some criticism against the
implementation of local laws inspired by shari’a, PKS leaders saw that the
45
Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties,” unpublished paper.
46
Steele, “The Decline of Political Islam.”
153
application of shari’a in some parts of Indonesia should not be deemed negative.47
PKS strongly argues that “any controversy over the substance of national law
against Islamic/local laws should be avoided.”48
Many analysts have been suspicious that PKS was all along masquerading
behind non-Islamist issues (i.e., anti-corruption credentials and public services),
while quietly pushing forward its Islamist agenda.49 It is clear that there are some
contradictions between the rhetoric of PKS ‘secular’ issues and its conservative
agenda. In many instances, PKS has continuously tried to burnish its image as an
open party committed to pluralism and tolerance. However, this self-proclamation
is clearly at odds with PKS training documents indicating widespread intolerant
interpretations of Islam among many of its leaders and cadres.50
The above indications of maintaining an Islamist agenda have much to do
with PKS’ attempt to convince its traditional base that it will not abandon its initial
vision of striving for Islam as the solution for the nation’s problems. As noted
earlier, PKS’ support base is among young orthodox, well-educated Muslims. In
order to understand the characteristics of PKS members and their support for
Islamist agendas, it is useful to referring to LSI’s survey findings on “Support for
Radical Religious Attitudes and Behaviour.”51 To measure support for Islamist
47
48
Ibid.
49
Steele, “The Decline of Political Islam.”
50
51
As a researcher of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), I had an opportunity to access a
number of LSI’s survey findings. The institute has conducted a nationwide survey through face-to-
face interviews with 1,200 respondents as a sample selected through multistage random sampling.
This method is used to produce a sample that enables us to make inferences and generalisations
about the national population. The number of samples was determined to account for
154
agenda, 1,200 respondents of the survey were asked about their opinions on
polygamy, bank interest, cutting thief’s hand off, and so on. It recorded that a
number of factors correlate positively with support for Islamist agendas, most
notably support for PKS compared to support for PDI-P and other large parties.52
Above all, the survey showed that PKS’ constituents are more likely to support
Islamist agendas relative to other major political parties.
LSI’s findings confirm that PKS has brought Islamist political orientations,
including support for the implementation of an Islamist agenda at the polity. In
short, despite the fact that PKS has promoted non-Islamist agendas, the party is
still committed to Islamist policies in order to reassure the party's base about its
long-term goal to Islamise Indonesian society culminating in a state based on
shari’a.
6.5. PKS’ Collective Action and Its Islamist Transnational Framing
Aside from striving to impose Islamic laws through institutionalised
politics, PKS also uses collective action, most notably large-scale demonstrations,
to maintain its Islamic image. As described in Chapter 3, roughly 60% of PKS
demonstrations can be called Islamist in essence. These Islamist issues range from
moral reform to transnational Islamism. PKS collective action on non-Islamist
approximately ± 2.9% margin of error with 95% reliability. For more detailed information of this
measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, Support for Religious Radical Attitudes and
Behaviour, 2006, available at http://www.lsi.or.id.
52
This survey asserts the term of radical and Islamist in parallel ways. For more detailed
information of this measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, Support for Religious Radical
Attitudes and Behaviour, 2006, available at http://www.lsi.or.id.
155
issues such as anti-corruption and the reformasi struggle are outnumbered by the
party’s demonstrations against anti-pornography, -Ahmadiyah—an allegedly
deviant sect, and Israel and the U.S. I have also noted that PKS remains
preoccupied by distant but religiously charged issues (Chapter 3).
Those results, which are tabulated from Indonesian daily newspapers by
utilising protest event analysis, demonstrate that PKS’ collective action is geared
more toward advancement of Islamist issues and transnational framing of
mobilisation rather than grappling with non-Islamist domestic issues that
correspond with national interests.
In the following pages, I will present three of the major Islamist
transnational frames employed by PKS. The first is that Islam is under siege by
the West. The second is there is a Jewish conspiracy to undermine Islam. The first
two frames are seen as the crux of all problems in the Muslim world and represent
PKS’ diagnostic framing. The third, replicating one of most common frames
among Islamist movements elsewhere, is the idea of the global umma as the
parameter of the Muslim identity.
These Islamist transnational framings are vital to understand the nature of
PKS’ collective action which is driven by a strong antipathy to America and
Israel. Also, these cultural framings show the ability of PKS to link its ideology
with a more specific interpretation of a situation. Students of social movement
156
have argued that frames can draw on ideology and discourse.53 In the framing
process, however, movement activists must be able to construct their ideology and
discourse with the objective of mobilising support.
6.5.1. Islam is under Siege by the West
One of PKS’ missions is to “contribute positively to uphold justice and
oppose oppression, particularly toward oppressed Muslim countries.”54 This
mission indicates that the party is greatly concerned with the perceived Muslims’
pain and misery across the world. It also suggests that PKS founders who
formulated the vision and mission of the party were driven by a strong sense of
global Muslim subjugation and suppression. They contrasted this with Islam’s
glorious past.
The invocation of an Islamic golden age is especially prevalent in the
thinking of Muslims whose outlook is shaped by a deep reverence for history.
Like most Islamist groups, PKS divides the history of Muslims into two phases.
The first encompasses the Prophet’s lifetime, the period of the Prophet’s first four
successors, the ‘rightly guided caliphs’ (al-khulafa al-rasyidun), the formation of
the first Islamic state, the phenomenal expansion of Islam out of Arabia, and the
spread of great empires under the Islamic caliphates of Umayyad, Abbasid, and
53
For discussions of the relationship between discourse, ideology and frames, see, for
example, Pamela Oliver and Hans Johnston, “What a Good Idea: Frames and Ideology in Social
Movement Research,” Mobilisation, 5 (1), 2000, pp. 37-54.
54
PKS’ official website, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/v2/index.php?op=isi&id=110
157
Uthmaniya that brought Islamic civilisation to its height.55 This phase is viewed
as an exemplary period.
The second phase is the decline of Muslim power in the late seventeenth
century exemplified by loss of territory and the period of Western colonialism.56
This period was marked by the Western cultural, economical, political and
intellectual dominance. Again, this is not a unique of PKS view. Virtually
everywhere in the contemporary Muslim world, Islamists have felt subordinate to
the West. “The trauma of modern Islam,” Daniel Pipes stated, “came about from
this disparity between medieval successes and recent troubles,” which lead to “a
pervasive sense of debilitation and encroachment in the Islamic world today.”57
The following PKS training material describes the vulnerability of the
contemporary Muslim world. It holds:
The condition of Muslims today is…pitiful and under the rule of the
enemies of Islam. Muslims as the best and grand community obviously no
longer display their grandness amidst other humankind; even appears to
wane more and more because of ignorance [jahiliyyah]…Muslims today
have deficiencies such as ethics, training, culture …organisational
management [and] intellect. This situation exists in a majority of Islamic
countries.58
To restore the past glory of Islam, Islamists, including PKS, act on the
presumption “that Muslims lag behind the West because they are not good
55
Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut
and London, 1998, p. 3.
56
Ibid.
57
Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism: Faith and Ideology,” The National Interest,
Washington, Spring 2000, pp. 87-93.
58
Irwan Prayitno, Ahwaal Al-Muslimun Al-Yaum (Kondisi Umat Islam Saat Ini), reprinted
in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, p. 155. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious
Dogma,” 2005.
158
Muslims.”59 Accordingly, PKS promotes an ‘active and comprehensive form of
dakwah’ (al-dakwah al-harakiyyah al-syamilah) to create better Muslims.
There is only one simple solution: dakwah has to tell to the umat and the
people of this country: “You are Muslims!” until they openly declare
with the conviction: “We are Muslims!” Or in other words the solution is
to REESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC IDENTITY (emphasis in original).60
Dakwah is seen by PKS as an essential instrument to re-Islamise society
and to return Indonesian Muslims to their religious identity.61 To PKS, many
Muslims are reluctant to embrace Islamic identity, because of the existence of a
Western conspiracy to undermine Muslims across the world.62 Central to this
notion of cultural undermining was al-ghazw al-fikri (war of ideas). This concept
is frequently used by PKS to counter what is perceived as Western ideological
challenges to Muslim worldviews. It holds that there is a fundamental division of
the world into two categories: Islamic and non-Islamic or jahiliyyah. The word
jahiliyyah is initially translated to ‘the age of ignorance’ and taken to refer to the
Arabian society of the century prior to the advent of Islam. Nonetheless, Sayyid
Qutb and modern Islamists expanded the meaning to a set of un-Islamic cultures in
Muslim societies.63 In a guideline written specifically for preachers and religious
59
Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism,” pp. 87-93.
60
Mahfudz Sidiq, Pemilu dan Urgensi Tarbiyatul Ummat: Agenda-agenda Besar Dakwah
Menuju Perbaikan Umat dan Bangsa melalui Kemenangan Politik Islam, Pustaka Tarbiatuna,
Jakarta, 2003, p. 35. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.
61
MPP PKS, Platform.
62
Irwan Prayitno, “Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri,” reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, pp.
3-4.
63
Ibid.
159
trainers of Islamic study groups, Irwan Prayitno, ideologue and PKS’ MP,
addresses the doctrine of jahiliyyah.
The infidels…have since looked for an alternative way of destroying the

Islamic community…The strategy they have chosen to destroy Islam is al-
ghazw al-fikri. Al-ghazw al-fikri is an ideological, cultural, mental and
conceptual attack waged continually in a systematic, organised and well-
planned fashion. The result is the emergence of a change in the personality,
lifestyle and behaviour of the Muslim community…These efforts…began
with the severing of ties between Islamic countries under the Islamic
caliphate, causing the emergence of nationalist groups and national
ideologies. The separation of religion and state, orientalism,
Christianisation, and the women’s emancipation movement are also al-
ghazw al-fikri activities...64
6.5.2. Jewish Conspiracy
Like most Islamist groups in Indonesia, PKS is fundamentally anti-Semitic.
In many PKS training documents, Jews and Zionists are conflated leading to a
tendency to see the Palestine-Israeli conflict in fundamentally religious, not
nationalist, terms. Furthermore, PKS propagates the view of Jewish control over
the world.
The Jews aspire to control the world by conquering every system owned by
each nation or nation. Whatever method the Jews may employ through
their Zionist movement, their aim is always to control the world. At
present, the world’s political, economic, legal and social systems, wherever
they have developed, are controlled by Jews. This urge to control the world
is founded on a conviction that God has appointed Jews as the leaders of
nations and the heirs of the earth and all that is legitimate in it. Islam holds
the same conviction, called a caliphate, namely that a faithful and pious
organ has been given a mandate to develop and tend the earth and all that is
in it. This conviction on the part of Muslims will motivate Jews to wage
war on Islam, because Islam has the potential to defeat the Jews. The Jews
64
Irwan Prayitno, “Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri,” reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, pp.
3-4. Not my translation. I cite from Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), Voices of Islam in
Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,
2006.
160
work hard to wage war on the Muslim community, so that Muslims will
follow them, as mentioned in the Qur’an, Al Baqarah, verse 120: “The
Jews and Christians will not be pleased with you until you follow their
religion’…To achieve this obsession they have employed all means. The
Jews are widely known to have orchestrated various secret movements.
They have also been behind many catastrophes throughout history. There
are indications that the September 11 tragedy was a Jewish conspiracy to
corner Islam, so that Israel could justify attacks on Palestinians using
terrorism as a reason…Islam does not have a history of attacking innocent
civilians…The history of the Jews is full of evil, such as cruel slavery,
arrogance, extreme patriotism, blind fanaticism to their bloodline, material
greed, a usurious economic system, and other evil behaviour such as being
suck-ups, slippery, cruel, hypocritical, with rotten intentions, stubborn,
seizing other people’s possessions by illegitimate means and obstructing
humans from the path of Islam…This behaviour is the behaviour of the
devil…The actions of the U.S. in attacking Islamic states are also the result
of the strong Jewish lobby in the U.S. The Jews control world or foreign
politics through effective way to conquer the world, which they follow, is
by economic means. History also shows that the Jews defeat other people
through their economic strength, namely through a system of bank interest
and control of assets using unjust and dishonest trade practices.65
6.5.3. Global Umma
PKS uses the rhetoric of returning society to genuine Islamic identity by
utilising the concept of umma and Muslim brotherhood, above notions of race,
blood, clan, tribe, nation, and birth place. Accordingly, the party shares a greater
sense of Islamic unity and solidarity and views Muslims in different parts of the
world within the framework of a global Muslim umma than do other Indonesian
Islamist parties. As stated in the basic policy adopted by PKS, one of principles on
65
Irwan Prayitno, “Yahudi sebagai Hizbus Syaithan Menguasai Dunia,” reprinted in
Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, p. 111. Not my translation. I cite from Fealy and Hooker (eds.),
Voices of Islam, 2006..
161
which the party’s political policies and operational activities are based, is that it is
part of global dakwah (al-‘alamiyah).66
In principle, any Islamic dakwah movement must have a global vision in

parallel to the universality of Islam. This, indeed, has been the very nature
of the dakwah. It is an activity that is not limited to certain ethnics, or by
state or regional boundaries. This recognition highlights that the existence
of our dakwah is part of the dakwah activities around the globe. It is,
therefore, essential that every policy made, program planned and step taken
is in harmony with the international dakwah strategy and follows the
sunnat al-dakwah whilst not setting aside specific issues happening
locally.67
It is true that that PKS has made no plain statement in its political platform
but this does mean that it has no desire to the idea of an Islamic caliphate. In the
founding manifesto of PK, PKS’ predecessor, however, there were calls for the
restoration of an Islamic caliphate. In the 2000 national congress of PK when the
party deliberated over policy guidelines it was revealed that the Islamic caliphate
is seen as its long-term orientation.
[We are] aware that the objective of dakwah, which will be realised, is a
large objective, that is to implement God’s religion on earth and to install
Islamic Sovereignty or state in an Islamic caliphate system of which the
results possibly can be enjoyed by following generations. Hence, every
policy…and program…connects [to] three time dimensions. The past as
lesson, the present as reality and the future as hope.68
After the formation of PKS, these calls for the resurrection of a caliphate
were written off for political purposes from the party’s political platform.
Nonetheless, the notion of global umma is still strong in the minds of PKS leaders.
66
For more detailed about PKS’ basic policy, see http://pk-sejahtera.us/index.php?option
=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=25
67
Ibid.
68
Komisi C Kebijakan Dasar Partai, Musyawarah Nasional I Partai Keadilan, 18-21 Mei
2000. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.
162
Andi Rahmat, a PKS MP, argues that PKS shares its belief in the notion of
caliphate with other Islamist groups.69 He called the idea of umma “the
foundational basis for the formation of political community.”70 Additionally, in a
PKS’ document training, there are texts referring to how the economic problems of
the Muslim world are due to the absence of an Islamic caliphate.71 It has been
argued that the caliphate is the solution of Muslims’ economic dependence on the
West.
Among Islamist groups, Hibut Tahrir is the most vocal group and widely
propagates the necessity of restoring a single and universal caliphate for all
Muslims across the world. PKS also shares this idea, but there are important
differences in strategies for rebuilding the caliphate. Andi Rahmat states that the
main difference between PKS and HTI is not in goals, but methods. In contrast to
Hizbut Tahrir which aims to resurrect the caliphate by rejecting the concepts of
nation-state and democracy, critics within PKS consider this method to be
unrealistic. To PKS, the Islamic caliphate could be realised through a gradualist
approach which has strong strategic value. Unlike Hizbut Tahrir, PKS’ approach
remains firmly grounded in political realism and thus it accepts Indonesia as the
nation-state and pursues its short-term objectives through a democratic system.
Untung Wahono summed up the differences between PKS and Hizbut Tahrir.
While Hizbut Tahrir views the Islamic global caliphate as the necessary
condition, PKS saw it as an outcome of the unity of the Muslim world. We
69
Andi Rakhmat, Interview, 27 August 2007.
70
Ibid.
71
Panduan Lengkap Manhaj, 2005, p. 321.
163
must be united first prior to rebuild the caliphate. PKS is now striving to
achieve the integration of umma.72
Based on the aforementioned Islamist transnational framings, it is hardly
surprising that PKS seems to extend the global jihad of fighting against distant
enemies. PKS’ outlook is anchored in geographically distant issues such as the
Israeli occupation of Palestine, the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and so
on. These, rather than domestic matters, have become PKS’ most favoured issues
throughout collective action. There is a growing belief among PKS supporters that
Muslims are the community’s most discriminated. A key leader of the party,
Untung Wahono, holds:
We are bonded together by no other quality than the fact of being Muslim.
When Palestinians are suffering from Israeli brutal attacks, Indonesian
Muslims should express their Islamic solidarity beyond geographical
boundaries.73
In brief, the collective action frames of PKS have provided a mechanism
for mobilising collective action. PKS’ frames, which draw primarily upon the
party’s ideology, aspire both to explain the world and to change it. PKS replicates
the most common frame among Islamist groups in the Middle East, that is, the
notion of Islam as the solution (al-Islam huwa al-haal). The vulnerability of the
Muslim world and social ills of the society are attributed to the departure from
Islamic values.
72
73
Ibid.
164
Illustration 5
Caption:
This is the PKS “One Man, One Dollar” Campaign/Demonstration (07 May 2006).
Available at: http://www. lautjenny.blogsome.com/2006/06/
165
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This sub-thesis studies the emergence and the rise of the Prosperous Justice
Party (PKS) and the nature of its collective action. The party successfully
increased its vote by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent in 1999 to 7.3 percent
in 2004. Despite its success PKS is an unusual party in many respects, most
notable is that it is not merely a political party that articulates its agenda within
institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a social movement organisation which
vigorously engages in collective action. It regularly uses collective action as a
vehicle to continuously engage with its supporters—rather than only reaching out
at election time as is the case with most other parties. No other party is so active in
regularly mobilising their sympathisers on the streets.
As described in Chapter 2, PKS takes this form as a political party partly
because it emerged out of an Islamist student movement called Tarbiyah. Founded
in the late 1970s, Tarbiyah is a loose network of student dakwah groups in state
secular universities whose activists are strongly influenced by the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and activism. Faced with the Suharto regime’s
suppression towards political Islam and student activism in the 1980s, Tarbiyah
took the form of a less formally institutionalised movement, used non-
confrontational approaches and conducted few public activities that were alyawys
apolitical. By the early 1990s, Tarbiyah began to emerge into public view
166
following the regime’s rapprochement with Islam. Following the resignation of
Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah activists seized the momentum by transforming their
movement into a political party named PK, now known as PKS.
Having this general picture in mind, I felt that it was pertinent to ask: why
did Tarbiyah eventually decide to transform its activism into a political
movement? In answering this question, I used a social movement integrated
approach, combining three emerging trends in the tradition of social movement
research, i.e. political opportunity structures, resource mobilisation theory and
collective action frames.
From these three integrated perspectives, I demonstrated that PKS: (1)
emerged from an array of unsettling social and political conditions that produced a
political opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of favourable social and
political opportunities by consolidating and enhancing its organisational resources
and communication networks to support the sustainability of the movement; and
(3) consciously and subjectively responded to the significant increase in political
opportunities and its structural capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas,
beliefs and values.
The first factor of the emergence of PKS was a significant increase in
political opportunity structure. Based on evidence gathered in this research, it is
clear that the development of Tarbiyah leading to the formation of PKS did not
occur in a vacuum. Instead, the party relied on external conditions that provided a
mechanism for collective action. In social movement theory, the study of
167
‘conditions,’ that may constrain or facilitate the emergence of a movement has
come to be known as political opportunity structure.
By using “the double track of political opportunity structures,” which
combines both international and domestic factors, this study revealed the complex
nature of PKS’ emergence. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a range of
international influences that helped to explain the emergence of the party including
the 1979 Iranian revolution, the sponsoring of DDII activities by Saudi Arabia
leading to the popularity of new Middle Eastern Islamic thinking, the link between
Indonesian revivalists and their fellow activists from Malaysia, and more
importantly, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and methods in
PKS’ political thinking and behaviour. The transplantation of the Brotherhood
ideas and methods into Tarbiyah was facilitated by DDII’s extensive networks,
including DDII-affiliated intellectuals who massively translated the works of
Brotherhoods ideologues into Indonesian.
These international contexts of political opportunities helped to structure
the domestic possibilities for the development of Tarbiyah on which PKS was
based. These domestic factors include the regime’s repressive measures against
political Islam and restrictions on student political activities in campuses. To avoid
the regime’s sustained repression, Tarbiyah organised its activities by adopting the
notion of Sirriyat al-Tandzim wa Alamiyyat al-Dakwah (Secret Organisational
Structure and Open Predication). According to this concept, every Muslim is
obliged to perform dakwah in an open way, except in less democratic political
168
environment where overt dakwah risks harsh regime reprisals. Indeed dakwah
activities faced no problems during the New Order era as long as they were not
political. Accordingly, Tarbiyah focused its activities on the cultivation of
religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in secular
universities.
The second crucial factor is PKS’ ability to generate organisational
resources. In social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as
resource mobilisation. This approach is based on a theoretical assumption that
political opportunities alone do not make a movement. As described in Chapter 5,
the rise of Tarbiyah and PKS can be explained through its capacity to improve its
organisational strength, including building a system cadre, leadership,
communication networks and financial assets. Since its emergence in the late
1970s, Tarbiyah utilised informal forms of collective action in an attempt to escape
from the regime’s control by taking advantage of campus mosques as the centre of
its activities. By the early 1980s, the use of usrah or halaqah became the main
means to propagate Tarbiyah’s core teachings and to draw students into more
intensive training and involvement. In addition, the establishment of LDK as one
of student dakwah networks across campuses is also important for managing a
range of religious activities organised by Tarbiyah activists. By the mid-1990s,
Tarbiyah activists began to take control of student senates in many prestigious
universities along with their success in establishing the student movement group,
KAMMI.
169
The collapse of Suharto regime in 1998 allowed Tarbiyah activists to use
their organisational resources for the purpose of transforming the movement into a
political party, PK, later renamed itself PKS in mid-2003. Utilising preexisting
Tarbiyah networks, the party expanded its organisational structures rapidly
throughout Indonesia. PKS has now opened provincial-level (DPD) and district-
level branches (DPD) in all provinces and districts across the entire country. This
rapid rise in party branches is seen as a key factor of PKS’ remarkable success in
the 2004 elections. Additionally, PKS has operated as a ‘cadre party,’ which
requires strict standards and intensive training of members.
The last factor shaping the emergence of Tarbiyah and PKS was the
formation of collective action frames. Frames identify targets of blame, offer
solutions to achieve a desirable world, and provide a rationale to motivate
collective action. Frames can draw upon ideology. In this way, as discussed in
Chapter 6, PKS’ ideology, which is based on selective interpretation of Islamic
theology and history, provides a basis for its collective action. The party’s
ideological roots lie deep in the notion that Islam is al-diin, al-kaffah, or a total,
comprehensive, and all-encompassing way of life with no separation between
aqidah wa shari’ah (belief and law), diin wa dawlah (religion and state), and diin
wa dunya (spiritual and temporal). Accordingly, PKS activists attribute many of
the problems besetting the global Muslim community to the spread of secularism.
To PKS, the adoption of secular values in the state’s political platform has
marginalised political Islam. Toward this end, PKS offers one of the most common
170
frames among Islamist groups worldwide, that is, “Islam is the solution” (al-Islam
huwa al-hal).
Following PKS’ successful campaign in 2004 on an anti-corruption ticket,
PKS began to downplay its ideological frames and avoid displaying its Islamist
stance too plainly. Instead, the party promotes a clean and caring image and
emphasises the ‘secular’ themes of fighting corruption, good governance, and
devotion to welfare activities. Furthermore, PKS leaders have endeavoured to
frame their position on these non-Islamist issues in religious terms. They view
shari’a in a general term, covering all aspects of live and having a universal
nature. In their understanding, fighting corruption and eradicating poverty are also
parts of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (Islamic teaching of commanding good and
forbidding evil deeds). Despite this clean and caring campaign is central to PKS’
self-image, PKS’ strenuous efforts to promote its broader message can be seen as a
way to reach out a wider audience outside its traditional base.
In addition to PKS’ attempts to extend its base by promoting non-Islamist
issues through the adoption of the language of clean government and social
concern, PKS seeks to convince its traditional supporters by maintaining its earlier
commitment to Islamist causes. Despite its success to moderate its image by
promoting non-Islamist agendas, it is still likely seen as an Islamist party
eventually pushing for the implementation of shari’a in public life and other
conservative legislation products. This is markedly evident in PKS’ strong support
to enact the draft anti pornography bill. There are also growing signs that local
171
campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and districts pushing for
the implementation of Islamic-inspired laws such as regulating Islamic attire in
public office, banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.
Aside from striving to implement Islamic-based laws through formal
politics, PKS also uses collective action to maintain its Islamic image. This study
employed protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the tradition of social
movement research to examine PKS’ collective action. The results of this study
suggest that roughly six-in-ten of PKS demonstrations can be called Islamist in
essence. As described in Chapter 3, PKS’ collective actions have been driven by a
strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the
Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously
charged issues rather than grappling with non-Islamist and domestic issues that
correspond with national interests.
It can be argued that PKS is still preoccupied with Islamist transnational
framings. As discussed in the last part of Chapter 6, these PKS’ Islamist framings
refer to the idea that Islam is under siege by the West as well as a belief in Jewish
conspiracies to undermine the Muslim community and the importance of an
integration of umma to deal with a range of problems faced by Muslims across the
world. These Islamist framings are crucial to understand the nature of PKS’
collective action which is driven by a strong antipathy to America and Israel. Also,
these framings demonstrated the ability of PKS to construct its ideology and
discourse with the objective of mobilising support.
172
APPENDIX 1
PIAGAM DEKLARASI
PARTAI KEADILAN
Bahwa sesungguhnya Bangsa Indonesia telah melintasi gelombang pasang naik

dan pasang surut, menghela beban berat penjajahan, penindasan dan
pengkhianatan.
Tahap demi tahap perjuangan panjang mengantarkan bangsa ini ke gerbang

kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan, yang pada mulanya dicitakan untuk mewujudkan
Negara yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah
Indonesia untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan
bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan,
perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, sesuai dengan semangat Proklamasi 1945.
Namun selama lima dekade berikutnya, garis sejarah itu mengalami berbagai
penyimpangan, sehingga
cita-cita besar bangsa menjadi kabur.
Kejatuhan rejim Orde Lama, diikuti dengan keruntuhan rejim Orde Baru,
merupakan tragedi yang seharusnya menyadarkan kembali bangsa ini akan cita-
cita luhurnya semula. Seluruh kekuatan bangsa wajib bergandeng tangan dengan
landasan persaudaraan, keadilan, dan berpacu dalam kebaikan, seraya
meninggalkan permusuhan, kedhaliman, dan pertikaian antar kelompok.
Gerakan mahasiswa, yang disokong penuh rakyat Indonesia, telah mengobarkan

"Reformasi Mei 1998" sebagai peretas jalan bagi terbentuknya "Orde
Reformasi";orde yang diikat dengan nilai-nilai fitri kemanusiaan berupa keimanan,
moralitas, kemerdekaan, persamaan, kedamaian, dan keadilan. Berkat rahmat
Allah SWT, kemudian dipicu semangat reformasi, tercetuslah momentum untuk
membangun kembali negeri yang besar ini, dengan cara pandang yang benar dan
meninggalkan segala bentuk kesalahan generasi terdahulu. Mari bersatu dalam
kebenaran untuk mengisi lembaran sejarah baru agar bangsa Indonesia senantiasa
berdiri tegak dan berperan serta dalam mewujudkan masyarakat international yang
berperadaban.
Kejayaan atau kehancuran suatu negeri merupakan buah dari kepatuhan atau
keingkaran penduduknya terhadap nilai-nilai religius dan universal, terutama nilai
keadilan. Pada titik ini fitrah insani bertemu dengan tuntutan reformasi dan
peluang demokratisasi. Maka perjuangan menegakkan keadilan pun menjadi
173
keharusan, sebagai manifestasi misi utama Islam untuk menjadi rahmat bagi
seluruh alam.
Demi mewujudkan cita-cita sejati Proklamasi, mengisi kemerdekaan,

mempertahankan kedaulatan dan pe rsatuan, serta berbekal semangat reformasi
dan dukungan umat dari berbagai daerah, kami selaku anak bangsa dengan ini
mendeklarasikan berdirinya PARTAI KEADIL AN.
Semoga Allah Yang Maha Kuasa membimbing dan memberi kekuatan untuk
menegakkan keadilan, mewujudkan kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran bagi seluruh
bangsa Indonesia.
"... Berbuat adillah, karena adil itu lebih dekat kepada taqwa ..." (Al-Qur-an, Surah
Al-Maidah: 8)
Dinyatakan di Jakarta
Ahad, 15 Rabi'ul Tsani 1419 / 9 Agustus 1998
Dewan Pendiri
PARTAI KEADILAN
Dr. M. Hidayat Nurwahid, M.A.

Ketua
Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, M.A.

Sekretaris
Anggota
Dr. Salim Segaf Aljufri, M.A.

Dr. Mulyanto, M.Eng.
Dr. Ir. H. Nur Mahmudi Isma'il, M.Sc.
Drs. Abu Ridho, A.S.
Mutammimul Ula, S.H.
K.H. Abdul Hasib, Lc.
Fahri Hamzah, S.E.
Dr. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, M.A.
Dr. Agus Nurhadi
Igo Ilham, Ak.
Chin Kun Min (al-Hafizh)
Drs. Arifinto
Nursanita Nasution, S.E., M.E.
174
H. Rahmat Abdullah
Dr. Ahmad Satori Ismail
Ir. Untung Wahono
Ir. Suswono
Mashadi
Dra. Sri Utami
Nurmansyah Lubis, S.E., Ak., M.M.
dr. Naharus Surur
Drs. Muhroni
Drs. H. Suharna S., M.S.
H.M. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung
H. Aus Hidayat
Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Drs. Al Muzammil Yusuf
Drs. Mukhlis Abdi
Maddu Mallu, S.E., M.B.A.
H.M. Nasir Zein, M.A.
K.H. Acep Abdus Syakur
Dr. Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, M.A.
K.H. Yusuf Supendi, Lc.
Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh
M. Anis Matta, Lc.
Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc.
Dra. Zirlirosa Jamil
Syamsul Balda, S.E., M.M.
Habib Aboe Bakar Al-Habsyi
Sunmanjaya Rukmandis, S.H.
Ahmad Heriawan, Lc.
Drs. Erlangga Masdiana, M.Si.
Didik Akhmadi, Ak. Mcom.
K.H. Abdur Roqib, Lc.
H. Abdullah Said Baharmus, Lc.
Ahmad Hatta, M.A., Ph.D.
Makmur Hasanuddin, M.A.
Dra. Siti Zainab
175
APPENDIX 2
DEKLARASI
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA
Bismilllahirrahmaanirrahiim
Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan
dalam waktu lebih dari lima dekade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan
kritis. Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah
abad, Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus
1945.
Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun
bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan
dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di
Indonesia. Orde Baru muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan
sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai
bersemi pada masa Orde Lama.
Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk
hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan
digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan
rakyat. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya
mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan kesejahteraan bagi bangsa Indonesia dari
perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.
Demokratisasi menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi

partisipasi masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran
tersebut, dibentuklah sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah
untuk mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum
muslimin khususnya beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia umumnya.
Partai tersebut bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
Semoga Allah SWT memberikan hidayah dan inayah-Nya kepada kita,

mengikatkan hati diantara para pengikut agama-Nya dan menolong perjuangan
mereka dimana pun mereka berada. Amin.
Jakarta, 20 April 2002
176
Atas Nama Pendiri Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
(Drs. Almuzzammil Yusuf)
Ketua
(Drs. Haryo Setyoko)
Sekretaris Jenderal
DAFTAR NAMA PENDIRI

Abdullah
Achyar Eldine, SE
Ahmad Yani, Drs.
Ahmadi Sukarno, Lc., MAg
Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, MA, DR
Ali Akhmadi, MA
Arlin Salim, Ir
Bali Pranowo, Drs
Budi Setiadi, SKH
Bukhori Yusuf , MA
Eddy Zanur, Ir, MSAE
Eman Sukirman, SE
Ferry Noor, SSi
H. Abdul Jabbar Madjid MA
H.M Ridwan
H.M. Nasir Zein, MA
Harjani Hefni, Lc
Haryo Setyoko, Drs
Herawati Noor, Dra
Herlini Amran, MA
Imron Zabidi, Mphil
Kaliman Iman Sasmitha
M. Iskan Qolba Lubis, MA
M. Martri Agoeng
Muttaqin
Mahfudz Abdurrahman
Martarizal, DR
Mohammad Idris Abdus Somad, MA, DR
Muhammad Aniq S, Lc.
177
Muhammad Budi Setiawan, Drs
Muslim Abdullah, MA
Musoli, MSc, Drs
Musyafa Ahmad Rahim, Lc
Nizamuddin Hasan, Lc
P. Edy Kuncoro, SE. Ak
Ruly Tisnayuliansyah, Ir
Rusdi Muchtar
Sarah Handayani, SKM
Susanti
Suswono, Ir
Syamsu Hilal, Ir
Umar Salim Basalamah, SIP
Usman Effendi, Drs
Wahidah R Bulan, Dra
Wirianingsih, Dra
Yon Mahmudi, MA
Yusuf Dardiri, Ir
Zaenal Arifin
Zufar Bawazier, Lc
Zulkieflimansyah, DR.
178
APPENDIX 3
ANGGARAN DASAR
MUQADDIMAH
Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan
dalam waktu lebih lima decade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan kritis.
Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah abad,
Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945.
Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun
bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan
dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di
Indonesia. Orde Baru muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan
sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai
bersemi pada masa Orde Lama. Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia
mengukir kembali harapannya untuk hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi
harapan ke depan dengan digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh
perjuangan mahasiswa dan rakyat.
Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya

mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan Sejahtera bagi bangsa Indonesia dari
perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad. Demokratisasi
menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi partisipasi
masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran tersebut,
dibentuk sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk
mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin
beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai
berikut.
BAB 1
NAMA, PENDIRIAN, ASAS, KEDUDUKAN DAN LAMBANG PARTAI
Pasal 1
Nama dan Pendirian
179
Partai ini bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. Didirikan di Jakarta pada hari Sabtu,
tanggal 9 Jumadil Ula 1423 H bertepatan dengan tanggal 20 April 2002 M.
Pasal 2
Asas
Islam.
Pasal 3
Kedudukan
1. Pusat Partai berkedudukan di ibu kota negara Republik Indonesia.

2. Pusat partai dapat dipindahkan dalam kondisi tertentu atas keputusan
Majelis Syuro.
3. Partai dapat membuka cabang-cabang di seluruh wilayah hukum negara
Republik Indonesia dan perwakilan di luar negeri bagi Warga Negara
Indonesia.
Pasal 4
Lambang
Gambar dua bulan sabit dengan untaian padi tegak lurus ditengah berwarna kuning
emas dalam perisai segi empat persegi panjang berwarna hitam bergambar Ka’bah.
Di bagian atas tertulis PARTAI KEADILAN dan bagian dalam kotak Ka’bah
tertulis SEJAHTERA berwarna kuning emas.
Bab 2
TUJUAN DAN USAHA
Pasal 5
Tujuan
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah Partai Da'wah yang bertujuan mewujudkan

masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridlai Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala, dalam
negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila.
Pasal 6
180
Usaha
Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut diusahakanlah hal-hal sebagai berikut :
1. Membebaskan bangsa Indonesia dari segala bentuk kezaliman.

2. Membina masyarakat Indonesia menjadi masyarakat Islami.
3. Mempersiapkan bangsa Indonesia agar mampu menjawab berbagai
problema dan tuntutan masa mendatang.
4. Membangun sistem kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara yang sesuai
dengan nilai-nilai Islam.
5. Membangun negara Indonesia baru yang adil, sejahtera dan berwibawa .
Bab 3
KEANGGOTAAN
Pasal 7
Keanggotaan
Setiap warga negara Indonesia dapat menjadi anggota partai.
Bab 4
STRUKTUR ORGANISASI
Pasal 8
Struktur Organisasi
Organisasi tingkat pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah sebagai berikut
1. Majelis Syuro
2. Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
4. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
5. Lembaga Kelengkapan Partai
Pasal 9
Masa Jabatan Pimpinan
Batas maksimal jabatan Ketua Majelis Syuro, Ketua Majelis Pertimbangan Partai,
Ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat dan Ketua Umum Partai adalah 2 (dua) periode.
181
Pasal 10
Akhir Masa Jabatan Pimpinan
1. Telah selesai menjalani masa jabatannya sesuai dengan masa kerja yang
telah ditetapkan.
2. Apabila tidak dapat lagi melaksanakan kewajiban-kewajibannya sebagai
Pimpinan Partai , maka Majelis Syuro hendaknya mempelajari kondisi
tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. Jika terlihat bahwa
penghentian Pimpinan Partai tersebut akan membawa maslahat bagi Partai,
maka hendaknya Majelis Syuro mengadakan pertemuan khusus untuk itu.
Dan keputusan penghentian Pimpinan partai tersebut harus mendapatkan
persetujuan lebih dari dua pertiga anggota Majelis Syuro.
3. Apabila ada Pimpinan Partai mengajukan pengunduran dirinya, maka
Majelis Syuro hendaklah mengundang anggotanya untuk mempelajari latar
belakang pengunduran diri tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai.
Dan apabila yang bersangkutan mendesak mengundurkan diri maka
pengunduran diri itu dapat diterima berdasarkan keputusan suara terbanyak
secara mutlak anggota Majelis Syuro.
4. Apabila terjadi kevakuman pada jabatan ketua dan wakil ketua Majelis
Syuro dalam waktu yang sama, maka Majelis Syuro melakukan pemilihan
penggantinya.
5. Apabila Ketua Umum Partai meninggal dunia atau berhalangan tetap, maka
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai menunjuk salah seorang Ketua Dewan
Pimpinan Pusat untuk mengambil alih seluruh tugas dan wewenang Ketua
Umum hingga Majelis Syuro menetapkan Ketua Umum baru.
6. Apabila Ketua Dewan syari'ah Pusat meninggal dunia, maka wakilnya
mengambil alih seluruh wewenangnya hingga habis masa jabatannya.
7. Ketentuan lain yang terkait dan atau sejalan dengan pasal ini akan
ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro Partai
Bab 5
MAJELIS SYURO
Pasal 11
Fungsi Majelis Syuro
Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga tertinggi partai yang berfungsi sebagai Lembaga
Ahlul Halli wal-Aqdi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
Pasal 12
182
Anggota Majelis Syuro
1. Anggota Majelis Syuro terdiri dari sekurang-kurangnya tiga puluh lima

orang yang dipilih melalui pemilihan raya yang melibatkan seluruh anggota
kader inti partai.
2. Pemilihan anggota Majelis Syuro dilakukan melalui pemilihaan raya yang
penyelenggaraannya dengan membentuk kepanitiaan oleh Majelis Syuro
yang sekurang-kurangnya terdiri dari:
-Seorang ketua berasal dari anggota Majelis Syuro.
-Seorang wakil ketua berasal dari anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat.
-Seorang sekretaris berasal dari Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
-Dan beberapa orang anggota.
3. Pengesahan dan pelantikan anggota Majelis Syuro terpilih dilakukan oleh

Musyawarah Nasional.
Pasal 13
Tugas Majelis Syuro
1. Majelis Syuro bertugas menyusun Visi dan Missi Partai, ketetapan-

ketetapan dan rekomendasi Musyawarah Nasional, dan memilih Pimpinan
Pusat Partai serta keputusan-keputusan strategis lainnya.
2. Membentuk Majelis Pertimbangan Partai sebagai Badan Pekerja Majelis
Syuro dan Dewan Syari'ah Pusat.
Bab 6
MAJELIS PERTIMBANGAN PARTAI
Pasal 14
Tugas Majelis Pertimbangan Partai
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai adalah lembaga pelaksana harian tugas-tugas Majelis

Syuro, dalam hal mengawasi jalannya partai agar sesuai dengan tujuan-tujuan
Partai, Ketetapan-Ketetapan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Majelis Syuro dan
Bab 7
DEWAN SYARI'AH
Pasal 15
183
Struktur dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
1. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat sebanyak-banyaknya sepertiga

anggota Majelis Syuro.
2. Ketua, Wakil Ketua dan beberapa orang anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
dipilih oleh Majelis Syuro dari anggotanya.
3. Dewan Syari'ah diberi wewenang membentuk struktur kepengurusan,
mengangkat Mudir Idarah dan melengkapi keanggotaannya.
Pasal 16
Struktur dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah
1. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sekurang-kurangnya tiga orang.

2. Ketua, Wakil Ketua dan anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah dipilih oleh
Musyawarah Wilayah.
3. Struktur Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sedapatnya mengikuti Dewan Syari'ah
Pusat
4. Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah diberi wewenang melengkapi keanggotaannya
dan mengangkat Mudir Idarah.
Pasal 17
Tugas Dewan Syari'ah
Dewan Syari'ah adalah lembaga fatwa dan qadha yang bertugas merumuskan
landasan syar'i terhadap partai dalam melaksanakan aktifitasnya dan memberikan
jawaban syar'i terhadap berbagai permasalahan yang dihadapi partai dan
anggotanya serta masyarakat.
Bab 8
DEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT
Pasal 18
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Pusat sekurang-kurangnya beranggotakan sebagai

berikut
1. Ketua Umum
2. Sekretaris Jendral.
3. Bendahara Umum.
184
4. Departemen-departemen yang diperlukan.
Pasal 19
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat adalah lembaga tanfiziyah partai pada tingkat pusat yang
bertugas melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan partai dengan masa kerja selama lima
(5) tahun qomariyah.
Bab 9
STRUKTUR ORGANISASI WILAYAH, DAERAH,
CABANG DAN RANTING
Pasal 20
Organisasi Tingkat Wilayah
1. Organisasi Wilayah didirikan pada tingkat propinsi yang berkedudukan di

ibukota propinsi.
2. Struktur Organisasi tingkat wilayah terdiri dari Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah -
Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
3. Besarnya lembaga atau badan-badan tersebut disesuaikan dengan
kebutuhan wilayah.
Pasal 21
Organisasi Tingkat Daerah, Cabang Dan Ranting
1. Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat wilayah didirikan organisasi Daerah pada

tingkat kabupaten / kotamadya yang berkedudukan di ibukota kabupaten /
kotamadya.
2. Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat Daerah didirikan organaisasi cabang dan
dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat cabang pada tingkat kecamatan didirikan
organisasi Ranting.
3. Struktur organisasi yang disebutkan ayat 1 dan 2 pasal ini disusun sesuai
dengan Anggaran Rumah Tangga.
Bab 10
FORUM PENGAMBILAN KEBIJAKAN
185
Pasal 22
Musyawarah
1. Musyawarah adalah forum pengambilan kebijakan yang diselenggarakan

oleh semua elemen struktural Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.
2. Jenis dan jenjang musyawarah diatur dengan ketentuan tersendiri yang
ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.
Pasal 23
Musyawarah Nasional
Musyawarah Nasional adalah pemegang kekuasaan tertinggi Partai Keadilan

Sejahtera yang diselenggarakan oleh Majelis Syuro.
Bab 11
KEUANGAN
Pasal 24
Sumber Keuangan
Keuangan partai terdiri dari sumber-sumber berikut :
1. Iuran rutin anggota.

2. Sumbangan dan hibah dari para anggota dan simpatisan
3. Sumber-sumber lain yang halal dan tidak mengikat.
Bab 12
HUBUNGAN KEORGANISASIAN
Pasal 25
Hubungan dan Koalisi Partai
1. Ummat Islam Indonesia merupakan bagian dari ummat Islam sedunia.

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera sebagai Partai Da'wah menyatakan dirinya
merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari gerakan da'wah di berbagai
kawasan dunia.
186
2. Untuk merealisasikan kemaslahatan ummat dan bangsa, Partai melakukan
hubungan baik dan kerjasama dengan berbagai pihak di dalam maupun di
luar negeri.
3. Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga yang berwenang memutuskan koalisi partai
dengan partai atau organisasi lain.
Pasal 26
Hubungan Antar Struktur
Hubungan antar lembaga-lembaga partai tingkat pusat dan lembaga-lembaga partai

tingkat pusat dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya diatur dalam Anggaran
Rumah Tangga.
Bab 13
KETENTUAN PENUTUP
Pasal 27
Perubahan Anggaran Dasar
Perubahan Anggaran Dasar dilakukan sebagai berikut:
1. Permintaan perubahan berikut alasan-alasannya diajukan melalui

mekanisme struktural kepada Majelis Syuro untuk dinilai kelayakannya.
2. Pengubahan dianggap sah bila disetujui oleh dua pertiga anggota Majelis
Syuro.
Pasal 28
Ketentuan Anggaran Rumah Tangga
1. Hal-hal yang belum ditetapkan dalam Anggaran Dasar ini diatur dalam
Anggaran Rumah Tangga.
2. Anggaran Rumah Tangga adalah tafsir dan penjabaran Anggaran Dasar
yang direkomendasikan oleh Majelis Syuro.
Pasal 29
Pengesahan Anggaran Dasar
187
1. Anggaran Dasar ini disahkan oleh Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
berdasarkan Rapat Pendirian Partai tanggal 24 Maret 2002
2. Anggaran Dasar ini berlaku sementara sejak tanggal ditetapkan sampai
diselenggarakannya Musyawarah Nasional Pertama.
188
APPENDIX 4
ANGGARAN RUMAH TANGGA
BAB 1
TAFSIR LAMBANG PARTAI
Pasal 1
Arti Lambang Partai
Bentuk lambang partai memiliki arti sebagai berikut :
1. Kotak persegi empat berarti kesetaraan, keteraturan dan keserasian.

2. Kotak hitam berarti pusat peradaban dunia Islam yakni Ka’bah
3. Bulan sabit berarti lambang kemenangan Islam, dimensi waktu, keindahan,
kebahagiaan, pencerahan dan kesinambungan sejarah.
4. Untaian padi tegak lurus berarti keadilan, ukhuwah, istiqomah, berani dan
ketegasan yang mewujudkan keejahteraan.
Warna lambang partai memiliki arti sebagai berikut :
1. Putih berarti bersih dan kesucian.

2. Hitam berarti aspiratif dan kepastian.
3. Kuning emas berarti kecermelangan, kegembiraan dan kejayaan.
Pasal 2
Makna Lambang Partai
Makna lambang partai secara keseluruhan adalah menegakkan nilai-nilai keadilan

berlandaskan pada kebenaran, persaudaraan dan persatuan menuju kesejahteraan
dan kejayaan ummat dan bangsa.
Bab 2
SASARAN DAN SARANA.
Pasal 3
189
Sasaran
Untuk mencapai tujuan partai dirumuskan sasaran berikut :
1. Terwujudnya pemerintahan yang jujur, bersih, berwibawa, dan

bertanggung jawab berdasarkan nilai-nilai kebenaran dan keadilan.
2. Tegaknya 'Masyarakat Islami' yang memiliki kemandirian berdasarkan
sebuah konstitusi yang menjamin hak-hak rakyat dan bangsa Indonesia.
Sasaran partai yang dimaksud ayat (1) pasal ini diupayakan dalam bingkai
Kebijakan Dasar Periodik dan Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, yang
merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah
Tangga Ini.
Pasal 4
Sarana dan Prasarana
Dalam mewujudkan tujuan dan sasarannya partai menggunakan cara, sarana dan
prasarana yang tidak bertentangan dengan norma-norma hukum dan kemaslahatan
umum, antara lain:
1. Seluruh sarana dan manajemen politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya dan IPTEK
yang dapat mengarahkan dan mengatur kehidupan masyarakat serta dapat
menyelesaikan permasalahan-pernasalahannya.
2. Ikut serta dalam lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan, badan-badan penentu
kebijakan, hukum dan perundang-undangan, lembaga swadaya masyarakat,
dan lain sebagainya.
3. Menggalakkan dialog konstruktif disertai argumentasi yang kuat dengan
semua kekuatan politik dan sosial.
4. Aktif berpartisipasi dalam berbagai lembaga dan organisasi serta yayasan
yang sesuai dengan tujuan partai.
Bab 3
KEANGGOTAAN
Pasal 5
Sistem dan Prosedur Keanggotaan
Anggota Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terdiri dari :
190
1. Anggota Kader Pendukung, yaitu mereka yang terlibat aktif mendukung
setiap kegiatan kepartaian.
2. Anggota Kader Inti, yaitu anggota yang telah mengikuti berbagai kegiatan
pelatihan kepartaian dan dinyatakan lulus oleh panitia penseleksian.
3. Anggota Kehormatan yaitu mereka yang berjasa dalam perjuangan partai
dan dikukuhkan oleh Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
Sistem dan prosedur keanggotaan serta hal-hal yang terkait dengan keanggotaan
partai diatur dalam ketentuan tersendiri yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.
Bab 4
MAJELIS SYURO
Pasal 6
Anggota Majelis Syuro
1. Syarat keanggotaan Majelis Syuro sebagai berikut:

a.Umur tidak kurang dari 30 tahun qomariyah
b.Telah menjadi anggota kader inti dengan status anggota ahli
Partai
c.Melaksanakan asas dan tujuan partai
d.Komitmen dengan kewajiban-kewajiban anggota
e.Berkelakuan baik dan tidak mendapatkan sangsi dalam 3 tahun terakhir.
f.Berwawasan syar’i.
g. Bersifat amanah dan berwibawa
2. Jika ada anggota Majelis Syuro berhalangan tetap maka majelis berhak
mengangkat dan mensahkan pengantinya.
3. Majelis Syuro berhak menambah keanggotaannya dengan orang-orang
yang dibutuhkan oleh Partai, terdiri dari para pakar dan tokoh dengan
catatan tambahan itu tidak lebih dari 15 % anggotanya.
4. Jika anggota Majelis Syuro telah dipilih, maka masing-masing
mengucapkan janji setianya di hadapan Musyawarah Nasional, dengan
bunyi sebagai berikut:
'Saya berjanji kepada Allah yang Maha Agung untuk berpegang teguh
pada syari'at Islam dan untuk berjihad di jalan-Nya, menunaikan syarat-
syarat keanggotaan Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, melak
sanakan tugas-tugas darinya dan untuk mendengar serta taat kepada
pemimpinnya dalam keadaan lapang maupun sempit -selain untuk maksiat-
, sekuat tenaga melaksanakannya. Dan saya bersumpah kepada Pengurus
191
Majelis Syura untuk itu, dan Allah menjadi saksi atas apa yang saya
ucapkan.
Pasal 7
Tugas Majelis Syuro
1. Memilih dan menetapkan Ketua majelis, Wakilnya dan SekretarisMajelis

dan menetapkannya sebangai ketua, wakil dan sekretaris Majelis
Pertimbangan Partai.
2. Memilih dan menetapkan anggota Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Memilih, dan menetapkan Ketua, Wakil dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah
Pusat
4. Memilih, dan menetapkan Ketua Umum, para Ketua, Sekretaris Jendral
dan Bendahara Umum serta beberapa orang Anggota Dewan Pimpinan
Pusat.
5. Menyusun tujuan-tujuan Partai, keputusan-keputusan dan rekomendasi
6. Menetapkan klausul-klausul perubahan Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah
Tangga (AD/ ART) dan kebijakan politik.
7. Menetapkan anggaran tahunan dan evaluasi akhir dari laporan keuangan.
8. Menetapkan rencana kerja periodik partai, dan mengawasi serta
mengevaluasi pelaksanaannya.
9. Mengambil sikap tegas dan bijak dalam hal pencemaran nama baik, kritik,
pengaduan, dan tuduhan-tuduhan yang berkaitan dengan partai.
Bab 5
MAJELIS PERTIMBANGAN PARTAI
Pasal 8
Anggota Majelis Pertimbangan Partai
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai terdiri dari sebanyak-banyaknya sepertiga anggota

Majelis Syuro yang dipilih oleh Majelis Syuro dari anggotanya.
Pasal 9
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai
1. Menjabarkan ketetapan-ketetapan Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis

Syuro
192
2. Mengarahkan dan mengawasi pelaksanaan ketetapan-ketetapan
Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis Syuro
3. Menentukan sikap Partai terhadap permasalahan-permasalahan umum dan
perubahan-perubahan politik secara regional, dunia Islam atau
internasional bersama Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
4. Mempersiapkan penyelenggaraan Musyawarah Nasional dan Sidang-
sidang Majelis Syuro.
5. Merekomendasikan kebijakan program pemilihan umum dan melegalisir
calon-calon partai untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat.
6. Menunjuk perwakilan (wakil) Partai pada lembaga-lembaga, organisasi dan
kongres-kongres di dalam dan luar negeri bersama Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
7. Meratifikasi langkah-langkah yang terarah untuk melaksanakan program
kerja politik (strategis).
8. Meratifikasi anggaran proyek yang diajukan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
sebelum diajukan ke Majelis Syuro.
9. Meratifikasi pengajuan struktur dan personil Bidang Dewan Pimpinan
Pusat.
10. Mengambil tindakan tegas dalam hal fitnah, kritik, aduan, dan tuduhan
yang berkaitan dengan partai dan anggotanya.
11. Mejelis berhak membentuk komisi ad-hoc yang terdiri dari unsur anggota
Majelis Syuro dan pakar-pakar sesuai dengan bidangnya.
Bab 6
DEWAN SYARI'AH
Pasal 10
Syarat Anggota Dewan Syari'ah
1. Umur Ketua dan wakil ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat tidak kurang dari 35
tahun qomariyah.
2. Umur Ketua dan Wakil ketua Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah tidak kurang dari
30 tahun qomariyah.
3. Telah menjadi kader inti partai dengan status anggota ahli Partai.
4. Berpegang dan komitmen kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran
universal, adil, bertaqwa, sabar, jujur dan bijaksana.
5. Memiliki pengetahuan hukum-hukum syariat yang memadai, bersifat
amanah dan berwibawa.
6. Memiliki pengetahuan di Bidang peradilan dan menguasai mekanisme
pengambilan keputusan.
Pasal 11
193
Fungsi Dewan Syari'ah
1. Sebagai Lembaga Fatwa.

2. Sebagai Lembaga Qadha yang keputusan-keputusannya mengikat.
3. Pelaksana tugas-tugas khusus yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.
4. Lembaga Peradilan Banding.
Pasal 12
Tugas dan Wewenang Dewan Syari'ah
1. Memberikan landasan syar'i terhadap kebijakan-kebijakan dan persoalan-

persoalan yang dihadapi partai.
2. Melakukan pembinaan terhadap Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah.
3. Melakukan kajian terhadap perkara-perkara yang tidak terselesaikan di
Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah.
4. Melakukan investigasi terhadap isu, pengaduan, tuduhan, evaluasi dan
kesewenangan yang berkaitan dengan Pimpinan Partai dan
mengungkapkan hasilnya kepada Majelis Syuro. Khusus yang berkenaan
dengan Ketua Umum Partai atau Ketua Majelis Syuro atau Ketua Majelis
Pertimbangan Partai atau Ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat untuk kasus yang
menyangkut dirinya dilakukan oleh komisi khusus yang dibentuk oleh
Majelis Syuro.
5. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, atau Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah kepadanya.
6. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Syari'ah Pusat
kemudian mengajukannya kepada Majelis Syuro.
7. Mengajukan laporan kerja setiap dua bulan kepada Majelis Syuro.
Pasal 13
Klasifikasi Pelanggaran dan Hukuman
1. Setiap perbuatan anggota yang menodai citra partai atau bertentangan

dengan prinsip-prinsip kebenaran dan Anggaran Dasar atau Anggaran
Rumah Tangga partai adalah pelanggaran yang harus dikenakan sangsi
hukum.
2. Klasifikasi pelanggaran berikut hukuman dan cara pelaksanaannya, di atur
oleh ketentuan Dewan Syari'ah yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.
Bab 7
TUGAS DEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT
Pasal 14 :
194
Tugas Konsepsional
1. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Pusat

dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukannya
kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
2. Mengajukan rancangan perubahan Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah
Tangga kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Menetapkan Produk-produk konsepsional untuk Bidang-bidang tugas dan
lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.
Pasal 15
Tugas Stuktural
1. Menerima waqaf, hibah dan dana sukarela yang legal.

2. Menyerahkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir kepada Majelis
Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Mengusulkan daftar nama calon sementara anggota legislatif kepada
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
4. Mengajukan laporan kerja setiap dua bulan kepada Majelis Syuro.
Pasal 16
Tugas Manajerial
1. Menunjuk ketua-ketua Bidang dengan persetujuan Majelis Pertimbangan

Partai.
2. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di
bawahnya.
3. Membentuk dan mengkoordinasikan lembaga-lembaga pendukung partai.
4. Mensahkan struktur kepengurusan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah
5. Mengawasi dan mengevaluasi pelaksanaan program kerja tahunan
6. Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dan lembaga terkait lainnya.
Pasal 17
Tugas Operasional
1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah

Nasional dan Majelis Syuro.
2. Menerbitkan pernyataan-pernyatan resmi.
3. Mempersiapkan kader partai dalam berbagai Bidang.
4. Melaksanakan koordinasi anggota legislatif, eksekutif dan yudikatif yang
berasal dari anggota kader partai.
195
Bab 8
DEWAN PIMPINAN WILAYAH
Pasal 18
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah
Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah adalah lembaga eksekutif tingkat propinsi yang

berkedudukan di ibukota propinsi dengan struktur sebagai berikut :
1. Ketua Umum dan beberapa ketua.

2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara
4. Deputi-deputi.
Pasal 19
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah

Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah
dan lembaga-lembaga strutural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan kepada
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
bawahnya.
4. Menyiapkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya
kepada Musyawarah Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Wilayah sesuai dengan ketentuan
yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan
Pimpinan Pusat.
Pasal 20
Syarat-syarat Ketua Umum dan Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah
1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai dengan status anggota ahli.

2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa
dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan
persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang
memungkinkannya melaksanakan tugas.
196
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 25 tahun qomariyah.
Bab 9
DEWAN PIMPINAN DAERAH
Pasal 21
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Daerah
Dewan Pimpinan Daerah didirikan pada tingkat kabupaten/kotamadya yang

berkedudukan di ibukota kabupaten/kotamadya dengan struktur sebagai berikut
1. Ketua Umum dan beberapa ketua.

4. Bagian-Bagian.
Pasal 22
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Daerah

Daerah dan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Daerah
dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan
kepada Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
bawahnya.
4. Menyusun laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya
kepada Musyawarah Daerah.
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Daerah sesuai dengan ketentuan
Pimpinan Wilayah.
Pasal 23
Syarat-syarat Ketua Umum dan Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Daerah
1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai yang sekurang-kurangnya dengan status

anggota dewasa.
197
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syari’at yang memungkinkannya
melaksanakan tugas.
Bab 10
DEWAN PIMPINAN CABANG
Pasal 24
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Cabang
Dewan Pimpinan Cabang didirikan pada tingkat kecamatan yang berkedudukan di

ibukota kecamatan dengan struktur sebagai berikut
1. Ketua dan Wakil ketua.

4. Seksi-Seksi.
Pasal 25
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Cabang

Cabang dan Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Cabang
dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan
kepada Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.
bawahnya.
4. Menyusun laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya
kepada Musyawarah Cabang.
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Cabang sesuai dengan ketentuan
Pimpinan Daerah.
Pasal 26
Syarat Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Cabang
198
1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai yang sekurang-kurangnya dengan status
anggota madya.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang memungkinkannya
melaksanakan tugas.
Bab 11
DEWAN PIMPINAN RANTING
Pasal 27
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Ranting
Dewan Pimpinan Ranting didirikan pada tingkat kelurahan/desa dengan struktur

kepengurusan sebagai berikut :
1. Ketua dan Wakil ketua.

2. Sekretaris dana wakil sekretaris
4. Unit-Unit.
Pasal 28
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Ranting

Ranting dan Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Ranting
kemudian mengajukan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.
3. Menyiapkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya
kepada Musyawarah Ranting.
4. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Ranting sesuai dengan ketentuan
Pimpinan Cabang.
Pasal 29
Syarat-syarat Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Ranting
199
1. Telah menjadi kader pendukung partai dengan status anggota muda.
persatuan bangsa, jauh dari anatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang memungkinkannya
melaksanakan tugas.
Bab 12
KEUANGAN
Pasal 30
Sumber Keuangan
Kekayaan Partai diperoleh dari:
1. Iuran, infaq wajib, dan shadaqah yang berasal dari anggota.

2. Infaq dan shadaqah dari luar anggota.
3. Sumbangan dan bantuan tetap atau tidak tetap dari masyarakat atau orang-
orang atau badan-badan yang menaruh minat pada aktifitas Partai yang
bersifat sukarela dan tidak mengikat.
4. Waqaf, wasiat dan hibah-hibah lainnya.
Pasal 31
Pemungutan Iuran dan Infaq Anggota
Partai mempunyai hak untuk mengambil iuran, infaq dan shadaqah dari
anggotanya.
Pasal 32
Penyaluran/Pengalokasian Dana
1. Partai mempunyai hak untuk menentukan penyaluran dan atau

pengalokasian dana Partai.
2. Dana Partai yang tidak segera digunakan untuk kepentingan aktifitas
Partai, pengaturannya ditentukan oleh Majelis Syuro.
Pasal 33
Tugas Bendahara Partai
200
1. Mengatur kekayaan Partai.
2. Mencatat semua harta Partai dan membukukan pengeluaran dan
pemasukannya.
3. Mengawasi semua jenis kegiatan keuangan dan akuntansinya serta
melaporkannya kepada Dewan Pimpinan Pusat secara periodik.
4. Menyusun anggaran dan penyiapan evaluasi akhir.
Bab 13
HUBUNGAN KEORGANISASIAN
Pasal 34
Asas Hubungan Keorganisasian
1. Hubungan dengan oragisasi yang sejenis baik vertikal maupun horizontal

atas asas wala' dan ta'awun.
2. Hubungan dengan organisasi Islam atas asas ukhuwah dan ta'awun.
3. Hubungan dengan organisasi umum atas asas kemanusiaan dan
kemaslahatan umum yang dibenarkan Islam.
Pasal 35
Hubungan Antar Struktur
1. Hubungan lembaga tertinggi partai dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya

bersifat langsung.
2. Hubungan antar lembaga tinggi partai tingkat pusat bersifat langsung,
melalui Pimpinan masing-masing.
3. Hubungan lembaga tinggi partai dengan lembaga organisasi partai tingkat
wilayah bersifat langsung sesuai tingkat wewenangnya.
4. Hubungan departemen di Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dengan deputi terkait di
Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah bersifat langsung sesuai tingkat wewenang dan
kebutuhan, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
5. Apabila departemen di Dewan Pimpinan Pusat tidak mempunyai
turunannya di Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah maka departemen tersebut dapat
berkoordinasi dengan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.
6. Hubungan antar pimpinan partai tingkat wilayah dengan struktur di
bawahnya, mengikuti pola hubungan antar level kepemimpinan partai
seperti tersebut dalam ayat 2 sampai dengan 5 pasal ini.
7. Hubungan lembaga-lembaga struktural di tingkat bawah dengan lembaga-
lembaga di atasnya mengikuti mekanisme struktural yang telah ditetapkan.
Bab 14
201
KETENTUAN TAMBAHAN
Pasal 36
Ketentuan Tambahan
1. Untuk memperluas jaringan kerja dan menampung aspirasi pendukung

partai, maka:
- Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dapat membentuk kepengurusan Majelis

Kehormatandan Dewan Pakar,
- Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan Pakar,

- Dewan Pimpinan Daerah dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan
Penasehat, dan
- Dewan Pimpinan Cabang dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan
Pembina, yang diatur oleh peraturan khusus yang ditetapkan Majelis Syuro.
2. Apabila persyaratan kepengurusan tingkat Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah,

Dewan Pimpinan Daerah serta kelengkapan strukturnya tidak terpenuhi,
maka dimungkinkan pembentukan struktur dan pengangkatan kader dari
jenjang keanggotaan di bawahnya, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan
Pusat dan Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.
3. Apabila persyaratan kepengurusan tingkat Dewan Pimpinan Cabang,
Dewan Pimpinan Ranting serta kelengkapan strukturnya tidak terpenuhi,
maka dimungkinkan pembentukan struktur dan pengangkatan kader dari
jenjang keanggotaan di bawahnya, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan
Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.
4. Didirikan perwakilan Partai di kalangan warga negara Indonesia di luar
negeri sesuai dengan peraturan khusus yang diterbitkan Dewan Pimpinan
Pusat dengan memperhatikan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku
di negara bersangkutan.
Bab 15
KETENTUAN PENUTUP
Pasal 37
Penutup
Dalam hal belum dilaksanakannya Musyawarah Nasional I, maka para pendiri

partai bertindak dan melaksanakan tugas selaku Majelis Syuro.
202
APPENDIX 5
Susunan Pengurus Pusat PKS 2005-2010
Ketua Majelis Syuro / Ketua Lembaga Tinggi Partai : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin.
Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring. Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta
Lc. Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman. Badan Pemenangan Pemilu :
H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS. Ketua : DR. H. Surahman Hidayat.
Lembaga Tinggi Partai
Ketua Majelis Syuro / Ketua Lembaga Tinggi Partai : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin
Mas’ul Maktab Hay-ah Syar’iyyah/Ketua Dewan Syariah Pusta : Drs. H. Suharna

Surapranata, MT.
Mas’ul Maktab Tanfidzi/Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Pusat/Presiden Partai : Ir. H.

Tifatul Sembiring
Aminul ‘Aam/Sekretariat Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta
Amin Maali / Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfudz Abdurrahman
Badan-Badan di Lembaga Tinggi Partai :

Badan Pertimbangan Tugas dan Jabatan : ex officio
Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Supranata, MT.
Anggota : Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah,
Wilda terkait, Ketua Departemen Kaderisasi, Sekjen, Wasekjen Bidang
Organisasi.
Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi : ex officio
Ketua : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, MA

Anggota : Ketua Wilayah Dakwah terkait, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah,
Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader, Ket.Dept. Kaderisasi, Sekjen, MPP.
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta Lc.
203
Wakil Sekjen I : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA.
Wakil Sekjen II : Ir. Ade Barkah
Wakil Sekjen III : Ir. Aboe Bakar Alhabsy
Wakil Sekjen IV : Dr. Mardani
Wakil Sekjen V : H. Fahri Hamzah, SE.
Wakil Sekjen VI : Nurhasan Zaidi, S.Sos.I
Wakil Sekjen VII : Riko Desendra : SSI.
Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman

Bendahara I : P. Edy Kuncoro
Bendahara II : Masfuri, Ak.
Bendahara III : Taruna Wiyasa
Bendahara IV : H. Kiemas Taufik
Bendahara V : H. Didin Amaruddin, Ak.
Bidang Pembinaan Kader : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc

Departemen Kaderisasi : Abdul Muiz, MA
Departemen Dakwah : Thahhah Nuhin, Lc.
Departemen MDI (Ma’hid dan Dirosah Islamiyyah) Samin Barkah, Lc
Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah : H. Aus Hidayat Nur

Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sumbagut : Drs. Chairul Anwar, Apt.
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sumbagsel : Drs. M. Syahfan Badri
Departemen Wilayah DakwahBanten, DKI Jakarta, Jawa Barat : Ir. Syamsu Hilal
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Jawa Tengah dan Jogjakarta : Zubeir Syafawi, SH.I
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Jawa Timur dan Bali : Ir. Sigit Sosiantomo
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Kalimantan : Abdurrohman Amin
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Maluku, Maluku Utara, Irian : Ahmad Zaki, Ak.
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sulawesi : drs. Cahyadi Takariawan, Apt.
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah NTB, NTT : Triono, SH.
Bidang Kewanitaan : Ledia Hanifa, MS

Departemen Kajian Wanita : dra. Sri Utami, MM
Departemen Jaringan Lembaga Wanita : Netti Prasetyani
Departemen Pemberdayaan Wanita : Dwi Septiawati
Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat : drs. H. Musholi

Departemen Pendidikan dan SDM : drs. Fahmi Alaydroes, Psi, MM, Med.
Departemen Kesehatan dan Sosial : dr. H. Agoes Koos Hartoro
Departemen Kemahasiswaan : Ahmad Ariyandra, Ak.
Departemen Seni dan Budaya : H. M. Ridwan
Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan (POLHUKAM) : Ir. H. Untung Wahono,
204
Msi.
Departemen Politik dan Hankam : drs. H. Almuzammil Yusuf
Departemen Hukum dan HAM : Fitra Arsil, SH, MH.
Departemen Pemerintahan dan Otonomi Daerah : Achyar Eldine, SE,MM
Bidang Ekonomi, Keuangan, Industri dan Teknologi (EKUINTEK): DR.

Mohammad Sohibul Iman
Departemen Ekonomi, Keuangan, Perbankan : Sigit Pramono, SE,MSE.
Departemen Pembinaan UKM : Ir. H. Ruly Tisna Yuliansyah
Departemen Teknologi, Industri, LH : DR. Edi Syukur
Departemen Buruh Tani, Nelayan : Edy Zannur, MSAE.
Bidang Pembinaan Pemuda : Ir. Ahmad Faradis

Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda: Slamet Nurdin
Departemen Kepanduan : Cahya Zailani
Departemen Olahraga : Unggul Wibawa
Badan-Badan di Bawah DPP
Badan Pemenangan Pemilu : H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS.

Badan Legislatif : Hermanto, SE, MM.
Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan, drs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, MSE.
Badan Hubungan Luar Negeri : H. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, MA
Dewan Syariah Pusat

Ketua : DR. H. Surahman Hidayat
Amin Maktab (Mudir Idarah) : H. Bukhari Yusuf, MA.
Amin Mali : H. Kastiri
Laznah Qadha :
Amin Lajnah (Panitera) : drs. Muhroni
Anggota : DR.H. Muslih A. Karim, Dr. H. Mu’inuddin, H. Abdul Hasyib Hasan,
Lc, H. Amang Syarifuddin, Lc, Msi.
Lajnah Tahqiq :
Koordinator : H. Iskan Qolban Lubis, MA.
Anggota : DR. H. Idris Abdu Shamad , H. Aunurafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc, Hj.
Herlini Amran, MA, Dra. Suzy Mardiani
Lajnah Ifta
Amin Lajnah : Harjani Hefni, MA
Anggota : DR. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, DR. H. Muiduddin, H. Abdul Hasib
Hasan, Lc, H. Abdul Aziz Arbi, MA, H. Abdul Ghani Kasuba, Lc
205
Lajnah Tabrib
Amin Lajnah : H. Abdul Raqib, Lc
Anggota : A. Zairofi, Lc, drs. H. Amad Yani
Staf Sekretariat/Teknologi Informasi : Ridho Kurniawan
Majlis Pertimbangan Pusat

Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Surya Pranata, MT.
Sekretaris : Drs H. Arifinto
Komisi Organisasi dan Kewilayahan

Ketua : Ir. Memed Sosiawan
Anggota : Najib Subroto, SE, H. Refrizal
Komisi Pembinaan Kader dan Kewanitaan

Ketua : Drs. H. Abdi Sumaithi
Anggota : Mustafa kamal,Hj. Aan Rohana, Mag., H. Yoyoh Yusroh, Sag.
Komisi Kebijakan Publik

Ketua : H. TB. Sunmandjaja
Anggota : Hj.Nursanita Nasution, SE, ME., Didik Akhmadi, Ak.,M.Com,
Mutammimul Ula, SH.
Komisi Kajian Strategis

Ketua : H. Ahmad Firman Yusuf
Ketua : H. Suripto, SH, H. Ahmad Relyadi.
Dewan Pakar
Ketua : H. Suripto, SH.
206
APPENDIX 6
SUSUNAN PENEMPATAN ANGGOTA F-PKS

DI ALAT-ALAT KELENGKAPAN DPR/MPR RI
DAN KABINET
PERIODE TAHUN 2004/2005
Hidayat Nurwahid : Ketua MPR 2004-2009
Komisi I: Pertahanan, Luar Negeri dan Informasi
• Hilman Rasyad Syihab

• Suripto
• Muhammad Anis Matta
• Untung Wahono
Komisi II: Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, Otonomi Daerah, Aparatur Negara

dan Agraria
• Jazuli Juwaini
• Muhammad Nasir Jamil
• Mahfudz Sidik
• RB Suryama MS
Komisi III: Hukum dan Perundang-undangan, HAM dan Keamanan
• Agus Purnomo
• Almuzammil Yusuf
• Mutamimul Ula
• Abdul Aziz Arbi
Komisi IV: Pertanian, Perkebunan, Kehutanan, Kelautan, Perikanan dan

Pangan
• Syamsu Hilal
• Suswono
• Umung Anwar Sanusi
• Tamsil Linrung
207
Komisi V: Perhubungan, Telekomunikasi, Pekerjaan Umum, Perumahan
Rakyat, Pembangunan Pedesaan dan Kawasan Tengah
• Abdul Ghani Kasuba

• Habib Aboe Bakar Al-Habsyi
• Ahmad Chudori
• Abdul Hakim
Komisi VI: Perdagangan, Perindustrian, Investasi, Koperasi UKM dan

BUMN
• Refrizal
• Ahmad Najiyulloh
• Zulkieflimansyah
• Fahri Hamzah
Komisi VII: Energi, Sumberdaya Mineral, Riset dan Teknologi, dan

Lingkungan Hidup
• Wahyudin Munawir
• Muhammad Idris Luthfi
• Irwan Prayitno
• Ami Taher
Komisi VIII: Agama, Sosial dan Pemberdayaan Perempuan
• DH Al-Yusni
• Djalaluddin Asy-Syatibi
• Ma’mur Hasanuddin
• Yoyoh Yusroh
Komisi IX: Kependudukan, Kesehatan, Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi
• Chairul Anwar
• Mustafa Kamal
• Anshori Siregar
• Andi Salahuddin
Komisi X: Pendidikan, Pemuda, Olahraga, Pariwisata, Kesenian dan

Kebudayaan
• Aan Rohanah
208
• Abdi Sumaithi
• Yusuf Supendi
• Zubeir Syafawi
Komisi XI: Keuangan, Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Perbankan dan

Lembaga Keuangan Bukan Bank
• Nursanita Nasution
• Luthfi Hasan Ishaq
• Andi Rahmat
• Rama Pratama
Menteri-Menteri Kabinet
• Anton Apriyantono : Menteri Pertanian

• Adhyaksa Dault : Menteri Negara Pemuda dan Olahraga
• Muhammad Yusuf Ashari : Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat
Duta Besar
• Salim Segaf Al-Jufri : Duta Besar RI untuk Kerajaan Saudi Arabia dan
Kesultanan Oman
209
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235

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THINKING GLOBALLY, ACTING LOCALLY:

A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH OF

A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts of

Ⓒ Copyright by Burhanuddin Muhtadi 2008

All Rights Reserved

My study at the Australian National University (2006-2008), was supported by

Scholarship (ADS)-AUSAID for my master program made my course of study at the

ANU possible. I am deeply grateful to the Directors and staff of ADS-AUSAID,

My thanks also go to the Asia Foundation (TAF), especially Douglas Ramage,

Robin Bush, Budhy Munawar-Rachman and Kathleen Turner, which provided an

allowing me to leave my teaching assignment. I am especially indebted to my senior

their unfailing encouragement and support.

contributions of many people. First and foremost my special thanks go to my supervisor,

provided continuous encouragement and wise guidance in my scholarly endeavours. I

generously gave of their time in interviews and countless discussion.

Finally, I am obliged to extend my deepest thanks to my beloved wife,

and inconsistency in my sub-thesis.

application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic

of social movement theory i.e., political opportunity structure (POS), resource

from quiet conversations among students in secular universities who subsequently

in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004.

opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of expanding political opportunities by

recruitment, financial assets, and communication networks; and (3) consciously

responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its organisational

capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.

behaviour of PKS by employing protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the

been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support

Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions.

declined significantly. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election

alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic.

1. PKS’ collective action on Palestine (TENTATIVE)

2. PKS’ collective action on the U.S. and Israel

3. PKS’ collective action on anti-pornography bill

4. Hidayat Nurwahid during interview with the author

Figure 1: Social movement integrated approach 22

Figure 2: Eisinger’s model of mobilisation 86

Figure 3: PKS’ organisational structure and decision-making process 116

Figure 6: PKS’ cadreisation system 131

Graph 1: The occurrence and sequence of PKS’ collective action 64

Graph 2: PKS’ collective action from 1998-2007 66

Graph 3: Forms of PKS’ collective actions 69

Graph 4: Islamist and non-Islamist category 75

abangan: nominal Muslims who also adheres to pre-Islamic spiritual beliefs.

created a window of opportunity for mushrooming Islamic activism2 in the

parties—nearly one-third—were Islamic, defined here “as parties that either

organisations.”3 Twenty of the 42 parties that eventually contested in the 1999

election declined sharply, to only 7 parties.

to anti-democratic.4 Among new Islamic movements that use violence to achieve

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) described

Hizbut Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) is a non-violent organisation, but it strongly

opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state.6

of formal politics, while Islamic social movements entail non-formal politics. It

institutionalised politics, which include activities such as standing as political

instance, suggest that “social movements...constitute a potential rival to the politics

social movements commonly associate institutionalisation [of politics] with

demobilisation…Social movements...are necessarily extra-institutional.”8

their supporters or sympathisers in the streets or organise other kinds of extra-

their discontent. Thus, it is pertinent to ask: Can a social movement be clearly

distinguished from a political party? Or, following Smith’s questions in regards to