Luzviminda Apran Canlas, Petitioner - Republic of The Philippines, Respondent

3/29/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 739
G.R. No. 200894. November 10, 2014.*

LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS, petitioner vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; In land registration cases, the

applicants’ legal basis is important in determining the required
number of years or the reference point for possession or
prescription.—In land registration cases, the applicants’ legal
basis is impor-
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* SECOND DIVISION.
405
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Canlas vs. Republic
tant in determining the required number of years or the

reference point for possession or prescription. This court has
delineated the differences in the modes of acquiring imperfect
titles under Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009), extensively
discussed the distinction between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Same; Same; Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529); An
applicant for land registration or judicial confirmation of
incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 must prove the following requisites: “(1) that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain, and (2) that [the applicant has] been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.”—An applicant for land registration or judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 must prove the following
requisites: “(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that [the
applicant has] been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017126598b61a9033a79003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/27
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of

ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.” Concomitantly, the
burden to prove these requisites rests on the applicant.
Same; Tax Declarations; Ownership; It is settled that tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership.—It is
settled that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. Other evidence may be appreciated to determine
actual possession and occupation. Documentary evidence, such as
tax declarations, when coupled with positive and clear testimonies
of the applicant and his or her witnesses, may be weighed in favor
of the applicant.
Same; Land Registration; To solely rely on tax declarations
and payment of realty taxes would mean that petitioner’s
possession of the land should be reckoned from 1949 or the year
the earliest tax declaration was made.—To solely rely on tax
declarations and payment of realty taxes would mean that
petitioner’s possession of the land should be reckoned from 1949
or the year the earliest tax declaration was made. Such
interpretation is untenable and goes beyond the text of Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Moreover, as shown
406
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Canlas vs. Republic
in the records, petitioner, through her predecessors-in-

interest, has been in possession of the land since the early 1900s.
Remand of Cases; Generally, the remand of a case will not be
permitted if “in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court (SC)
itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it.”—
Generally, the remand of a case will not be permitted if “in the
interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the
dispute based on the records before it.” Thus, remand may not be
allowed in the following instances: “(a) where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest
demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial
court had already received all the evidence presented by both
parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said
evidence, to decide the case on its merits.” None of these are
present in this case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ceña Law Office for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision1 dated
November 10, 2011 and resolution2 dated February 23,
2012 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision dated January 30, 2008
in LRC Case No.
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1 Rollo, pp. 38-53. The decision was promulgated on November 10,

2011, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90643, and was penned by Associate
Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio and concurred in by Associate Justices
Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro, of the Special
Thirteenth (13th) Division.
2 Id., at pp. 36-37. The resolution was issued on February 23, 2012.
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Canlas vs. Republic
N-06-0033 and dismissed petitioner’s application for

registration of title:
We restate the pertinent facts in this case.
On August 22, 2006, petitioner Luzviminda A. Canlas
(Canlas) applied for the original registration of title, under
Presidential Decree No. 1529,4 of the 9,751-square-meter
parcel of land located in Barrio Macamot, Municipality of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, and technically described as
Cadastral Lot No. 11566, Psu-04-006561.5
There was no opposition to Canlas’ application.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) did not
submit its comment or opposition despite the opportunity
given by the trial court.6 The case was then submitted for
decision.7
The Regional Trial Court granted Canlas’ application8
and held that:
We GRANT the application. We ORDER the Register of

Deeds of Rizal (Binangonan) to cause the registration of the
property, described in Cadastral Lot No. 11566 of the subdivision
plan, Psu-04-006561, in the name of the applicant Luzviminda A.
Canlas with the reservation that it shall be subject of easement to

public use. Once this judgment becomes final and executory, we
shall issue a decree of registration and then order the issuance of
an original certificate of title in her name.9 (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original)
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3 This case was entitled “In the matter of Application of Registration of

Title, Luzviminda A. Canlas, Applicant” and decided by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 67, Binangonan, Rizal.
4 “Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of
Property and for Other Purposes” or the Property Registration Decree.
5 Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6 Id., at p. 41.
7 Id., at pp. 41-42.
8 Id., at p. 42.
9 Id., at p. 39, as cited in the Court of Appeals’ decision.
408

Canlas vs. Republic
According to the trial court, Canlas complied with the

procedural requirements and substantiated her
10
application. She sufficiently proved that, through her
predecessors-in-interest, she has been in “open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable and
disposable parcel of land of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years.”11
The Republic of the Philippines, however, filed a notice
of appeal on February 29, 2008.12 Acting on the Republic’s
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that
Canlas was not able to prove open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the property.13
According to the Court of Appeals, Canlas failed to
discharge the burden of proof placed on applicants for land
registration.14
The Court of Appeals also found that Canlas admitted
during cross-examination that she has not resided on the
property since she got married in 1966 and left for San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City.15 During the same
cross-examination, Canlas contradicted her allegations in
the application as to knowledge of any mortgage,
encumbrance, or interest of other persons in the property
in question.16 Moreover, she did not show “any acts of
occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over

the property.”17
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision
reads:
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10 Id., at p. 42.
11 Id.
12 Id., at p. 43.
13 Id., at p. 46.
14 Id., at p. 52.
15 Id.
16 Id., at pp. 46-47.
17 Id., at p. 52, citing Wee v. Republic, 622 Phil. 944, 956; 608 SCRA
72, 83 (2009) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
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Canlas vs. Republic
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated

January 30, 2008 in LRC Case No. N-06-003 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application of Registration of Title
of Luzviminda A. Canlas is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.18 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court of Appeals denied on February 23, 2012

Canlas’ December 7, 2011 motion for reconsideration.19
Canlas comes before this court, arguing that she has
duly overcome the burden of proof by showing open,
continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession
and occupation of the property. This is allegedly shown in
the following acts of Canlas and her predecessors-in-
interest since the 1900’s: declaring the property in their
names, paying taxes due on the property, having the
property surveyed, and allowing the excavation in the
property for the retrieval and hauling of “pulang lupa” for
the making of clay pots.20
Canlas argued further that “residence” is not
synonymous with “possession and occupation” as implied
by the Court of Appeals.21 Presidential Decree No. 1529
does not require the applicant to reside on the land being
registered.22 The law also does not require that a relative of
the applicant be present to oversee the property.23
On March 4, 2013, this court resolved, among others, to
require the Republic to submit its comment, without
necessarily giving due course, within 10 days from notice.24

In its comment, the Republic argued that “[Canlas]
failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to
support her
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18 Id., at p. 53.
19 Id., at pp. 36-37.
20 Id., at pp. 24-29.
21 Id., at p. 30.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id., at pp. 86-86-A.
410

Canlas vs. Republic
application for registration of the subject parcel of

land.”25 Canlas must offer more than a bare assertion of
possession and occupation.26
In addition, the property had been sporadically and
irregularly declared for tax purposes under the name of
Honorio Apran from 1949 until 1999.27 Realty taxes on the
property were paid only in 2003.28 The Republic observed
that the tax declarations presented by Canlas had been
made a few months before the application for registration
was made and served only to establish a weak claim for a
registrable title for her.29
On October 23, 2013, this court resolved to require
Canlas to file her reply.30 In her reply31 dated December
13, 2013, she claimed that she “suddenly realized that she
has a significant document that she believes would . . .
change the complexion of the instant case.”32 This
document is the Land Registration Authority’s report and
motion dated May 12, 2009 and was allegedly prepared
after the Land Registration Authority’s receipt of the trial
court decision dated January 30, 2008.33
The Land Registration Authority, through its Director
for Registration,34 stated that the land described as Psu-04-
006561
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25 Id., at p. 117.
26 Id., at p. 119.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id., at p. 131.
31 Id., at pp. 132-136.
32 Id., at p. 132.
33 Id., at pp. 137-139. Petitioner claimed that the report and motion
was prepared by the Land Registration Authority “to be submitted to the
Regional Trial Court (Br. 67, Binangonan, Rizal) upon receipt of RTC
Decision.” (Rollo, p. 132.)
34 Id., at p. 139. Mr. Porfirio R. Encisa, Jr., signed as the Land
Registration Authority’s Director for Registration. The document was
noted by Deputy Administrator Ofelia E. Abueg-Sta. Maria.
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Canlas vs. Republic
located in Barrio Macamot,35 Municipality of

Binangonan, Province of Rizal, is found entirely within the
land denominated as Lot 16 of the subdivision plan Psd-
240150 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
M-00861 and is under the name of the “Heirs of Francisco
Guido and Hermogenes Guido.”36
TCT No. M-00861 was derived from a mother title, TCT
No. 23377,37 which was the subject of Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Guido, et al.38 The case stemmed from a
complaint, filed by the Republic of the Philippines, for
declaration of nullity of Decree No. 6145, the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377, and all titles derived from
the decree.39 The Republic also prayed that the land
covered by the decree be declared in its name, except those
parcels of land validly acquired by third persons. According
to the Republic, Decree No. 6145 was spurious and false
and, in turn, the reconstituted TCT No. 23377, as well as
the derivative titles, was invalid.40 Both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found
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35 In the Land Registration Authority’s report and motion, the land

was described to be situated in Barrio “Mayamot.” (Rollo p. 137.)
36 Id., at p. 137.
37 Id., at p. 138.
38 G.R. No. 84966, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 160 [Per J.
Medialdea, En Banc].
39 Id., at p. 163.
40 Id. Petitioner Republic alleged the following in its complaint: “‘15.
The alleged Decree No. 6145 issued on September 10, 1911 and the
alleged owner’s copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 issued on
May 12, 1933, both in the name of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido, and
which supposed owner’s duplicate was made the basis of the
administrative reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (23377)
RT-M-0002 on March 29, 1976, or about 43 years later, are false, spurious
and fabricated and were never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for
registration of land, either under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, or any other law, x x x.’” (Rollo, pp.
91-92.)
412

Canlas vs. Republic
that Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were genuine
and authentic.41
This court in Republic upheld the authenticity and
validity of Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377. However,
in affirming respondent heirs’ title, this court recognized
the waiver of certain parts of the land covered by TCT No.
23377 in favor of bona fide occupants. The court held that:
Moreover, conscious of the resulting “large-scale dispossession

and social displacement of several hundreds of bona fide
occupants and their families” which the Solicitor General pointed
out, the private respondent agreed unanimously to accept the
alternative prayer of the petitioner in their joint memorandum.
(pp. 624-636, Rollo) This agreement by private respondents takes
the form of a waiver. Though a valid and clear right over the
property exists in their favors, they seemingly have voluntarily
abandoned the same in favor of: 1) those who possessed and
actually occupied specific portions and obtained torrens certificates
of titles, and 2) those who possessed certain specific portions for
such lengths of time as to amount to full ownership. The waiver,
not being contrary to law, morals, good customs and good policy,
is valid and binding on the private respondents.
However, with respect to the second set of possessors, whose
alleged bona fide occupancy of specific portions of the property is
not evidenced by Torrens Titles, it is imperative that their
claims/occupancy be duly proven in an appropriate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. No. 12933 is AFFIRMED subject to the herein declared
superior rights of bona fide occupants with registered titles within

the area covered by the questioned decree and bona fide
occupants therein with length of possession which had ripened to
ownership, the latter to be determined in an appropriate
proceeding.
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41 Id., at pp. 165-166.
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Canlas vs. Republic
SO ORDERED.42 (Emphasis supplied)
Citing the case above, the Land Registration Authority

prayed the following before the trial court in its report and
motion:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court to issue an order (1) directing the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, Binangonan, Rizal to annotate on TCT No. M-2106 the
following memorandum:
By virtue of the decision of the Court dated January 30, 2008 in
Land Reg. Case No. 06-003, LRC Record No. N-78156,
LUZVIMINDA A. CANLAS, applicant, Psu-04-006561, has been
adjudicated in favor of the applicant and pursuant to the decision
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 84966, promulgated on
November 21, 1991, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Antonina Guido, et al., (204 SCRA 160), afore-said
[sic] lot is deemed excluded from this certificate of title.
and (2) Authorizing this Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration for the land embraced in plan Psu-04-
006561, in accordance with the adjudication of the Honorable
Court in its decision January 30, 2008.43 (Emphasis and italics in
the original)
According to Canlas, she falls under the second set of

possessors described in Republic — bona fide occupants
whose possession of specific portions for such lengths of
time amounted to full ownership but whose occupancy
must be duly proved in appropriate proceedings.44
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42 Id., at pp. 180-181.
43 Rollo, pp. 138-139. TCT No. M-00861 was cancelled, and TCT No.
M-1302 was issued in its place. TCT No. M-1302 was subsequently
cancelled, and TCT No. M-2106 was issued in the name of Antonina
Guido, et al. (Rollo, p. 138.)
44 Id., at p. 134.
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Canlas vs. Republic
In sum, Canlas changed the theory of her case from an

application for original registration of land, to a declaration
of a right to an indefeasible registrable title of the land
described in plan Psu-04-006561 and covered by TCT No.
23377.
Despite the change in Canlas’ theory, the main issues to
be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner Luzviminda A.
Canlas has proven open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land described
in plan Psu-04-006561; and 2) whether Psu-04-006561 is
covered by TCT No. 23377 wherein she is one of the bona
fide occupants whose possession and occupation ripened
into an indefeasible right to title as pronounced in
Republic.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records
of this case, this court resolves to grant the petition. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings with regard to the
determination of whether Psu-04-006561 is covered by TCT
No. 23377.
At the outset, the issue on sufficiency of evidence is
factual in nature and is generally outside the province of
this court’s review of petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.45 However, exceptions are allowed when the
findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals are
conflicting with each other46 or when the assailed judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts,47 such as the case
at bar.
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45 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Ramos, G.R. No.

179181, November 18, 2013, 709 SCRA 576, 587 [Per J. Brion, Second
Division], citing Republic v. Javier, 613 Phil. 101, 110-111; 596 SCRA 481,
491 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; Republic v. Capco de
Tensuan, G.R. No. 171136, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 367, 378-379 [Per
J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; See also Bunyi, et al. v. Factor, 609
Phil. 134, 139-140; 591 SCRA 350, 357 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].
46 See Amado v. Salvador, 564 Phil. 728; 540 SCRA 161 (2007) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
47 See Republic v. Capco de Tensuan, supra, at p. 379.
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Canlas vs. Republic
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 152948 or the

Property Registration Decree governs the applications for
registration of title to land:
Section 4. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in

the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly.

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 proceeds
from Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or The
Public Land Act, as amended, which provides for the grant
of the substantive right of title to land to qualified persons:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been

perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims
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48 This decree is entitled “Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative

to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes.”
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Canlas vs. Republic
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land

Registration Act, to wit:
....
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (As amended by P.D. 1073)

In land registration cases, the applicants’ legal basis is
important in determining the required number of years or
the reference point for possession or prescription. This
court has delineated the differences in the modes of
acquiring imperfect titles under Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic49
extensively discussed the distinction between Section 14(1)
and Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Thus,
this court laid down rules to guide the public:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
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49 605 Phil. 244, 281-282; 587 SCRA 172, 206-207 (2009) [Per J.
Tinga, En Banc].
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Canlas vs. Republic
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12

June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession,
the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject
to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person [who] acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and [the] other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession
for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)

years,
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Canlas vs. Republic
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.50
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50 Id., at pp. 285-286; pp. 210-211. In the resolution dated September

13, 2013, this court resolved petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
respondent’s partial motion for reconsideration. This court upheld the
decision dated April 29, 2009. We held that:
“To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the
disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are
not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no
longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may
be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraor
419
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Canlas vs. Republic
In Republic v. Gielczyk,51 this court summarized and

affirmed the differences between Section 14(1) and Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 as discussed in Heirs
of Malabanan:
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further

clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the
basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the
registration of his property on the basis of prescription.
Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of
the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the
second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the
Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in relation to
possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137.52
In this case, neither the trial court nor the Court of

Appeals clarified under which paragraph of Section 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 the land was being
registered. However, petitioner’s allegations in the
application filed on August
_______________
dinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private
ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.” (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013, 704 SCRA 561, 584-585
[Per J. Bersamin, En Banc Resolution])
51 G.R. No. 179990, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 433 [Per J. Reyes,
First Division].
52 Id., at p. 448, citing Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra
note 49 at p. 281; p. 206.
420

Canlas vs. Republic
22, 2006 established Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree

No. 1529 as her legal basis.53
An applicant for land registration or judicial

confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 must prove the
following requisites: “(1) that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain,
and (2) that [the applicant has] been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.”54 Concomitantly, the burden to prove
these requisites rests on the applicant.55
With regard to the first requisite, it is undisputed that
the land subject of registration is part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The trial court found
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’
report sufficient to prove the existence of the first
requisite.56 The Court of Appeals’ decision was silent on
this matter. Respondent failed to make objections on the
issue as well. Thus, we do not see any reason to deviate
from the findings of the lower courts.
As to the second requisite, petitioner claims that she “by
herself, and through [her] predecessors-in-interest, had
since
_______________
53 Rollo, p. 54.
54 Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No.
172102, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 730, 739 [Per J. Peralta, Second
Division].
55 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Ramos, supra note 45
at pp. 590-591.
56 Rollo, p. 42. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441,
452-453; 555 SCRA 477, 486 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division], this
court held that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. However, the facts and issues of that case are not on all fours
with the present case.
421
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 421

Canlas vs. Republic
June 12, 1945 or earlier[,] been in open[,] continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession of the . . . parcel of
land.”57 However, the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner failed to prove with sufficient evidence her open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of the land. Likewise, respondent argued that
petitioner’s allegations of possession and occupation were
mere conclusions and unsubstantiated.
Petitioner has sufficiently overcome the burden of proof
required in a judicial confirmation of incomplete or
imperfect title to land.
Contrary to respondent’s arguments, the trial court
specifically found that petitioner’s possession and
occupation, through her predecessors-in-interest, started
earlier than June 12, 1945. The trial court found:
Applicant’s evidence shows that she complied with the notice

requirements (Exhibits “A” to [“]M,” inclusive of submarkings)
and she was able to substantiate the allegations in her application
(Exhibits “N” to “II,” inclusive of submarkings). In a nutshell,
applicant acquired the property by inheritance from
Honorio and Gregorio S. Apran and she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in its continuous
possession since 1900 (Exhibits “Q” to “HH,” inclusive of
submarkings). . . . The testimonies of the applicant and her
witnesses proved that the applicant through her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than
30 years. After considering the report and the evidence, we find
that the applicant has sufficient title proper for registration, and
we render judgment confirming it.58 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
_______________
57 Id., at p. 54.
58 Id., at p. 42.
422

Canlas vs. Republic
Possession involves committing acts of dominion over a

parcel of land in such a way that an owner would perform
over his or her property.59 In explaining the nature of the
terms “possession and occupation” provided in law, this
court has held that:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words

are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the
law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is

broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.60 (Italics in
the original)

Moreover, to qualify as open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation, the possession must
be of the following character:
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent,

notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use
and benefit; and notorious when it is so
_______________
59 See Republic v. Gielczyk, supra note 51 at p. 456.

60 Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 186961, February 20, 2012, 666 SCRA 401, 419 [Per J. Reyes, Second
Division], citing Republic v. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607; 427 SCRA 611 (2004)
[Per CJ. Davide, Jr., First Division].
423
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 423

Canlas vs. Republic
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public

or the people in the neighborhood.61

In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court of
Appeals found that petitioner “failed to address the issue of
whether she had . . . an open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property. . . . [Petitioner] could have advanced proofs or
arguments to the contrary.”62 Thus, she “had not shown
‘any acts of occupation, development, cultivation or

maintenance over the property.’”63
This court puts more premium on the findings of the
trial court that petitioner has sufficiently shown acts of
dominion before 1945 and throughout the years. It is
settled that the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence
presented is entitled to great respect since it is in a better
position to evaluate the testimonies of witnesses.64
Petitioner has sufficiently shown that she, through her
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
9,751-square-meter parcel of land located in Barrio
Macamot, Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
since June 12,
_______________
61 Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 559 Phil. 169, 181-

182; 532 SCRA 391, 404 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division],
cited in Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012, 669 SCRA 499,
509 [Per J. Reyes, Second Division Resolution]; See Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Ramos, supra note 45.
62 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
63 Id., at p. 52, citing Wee v. Republic, supra note 17.
64 See Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 720,
730; 324 SCRA 714, 724 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division
Resolution]. This court upheld the findings of the trial court as adopted by
the Court of Appeals. See also Aclon v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 219,
232; 387 SCRA 415, 425 (2002) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division];
See Spouses Cirelos v. Spouses Hernandez, 524 Phil. 156, 169-170; 490
SCRA 625, 637 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
424

Canlas vs. Republic
1945 or earlier.65 Documentary evidence to prove

possession was presented and substantiated by the
witnesses’ testimonies.66 There were sufficient pieces of
evidence to show that petitioner and her predecessors-in-
interest exercised specific acts of ownership such as:
farming activities; allowing the excavation of land for
“pulang lupa” to make clay pots; paying realty taxes;
declaring the property for tax purposes; employing a
caretaker; causing corrections in entries in public
documents with regard to the land; and demanding

unlawful occupants to vacate the premises.67
The fact of actual possession and occupation can also be
gleaned from petitioner’s judicial affidavit:
_______________
65 The present case must be differentiated from Tan v. Republic, supra

note 61 at p. 510, in that petitioner Canlas showed that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have exercised specific acts of ownership over the
land subject of the application for registration. This court in Tan found
that “[w]hile there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by
testimonial evidence, the same is futile and frivolous. The testimonies . . .
do not merit consideration and do not make up for the inherent
inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations submitted by the
petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what specific acts of ownership or
dominion were performed by the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest
and simply made that general assertion that the latter possessed and
occupied the subject property for more than thirty (30) years, which, by all
means, is a mere conclusion of law. The RTC should have tackled evidence
of such nature with a disposition to incredulity, if not with an outright
rejection.”
66 The following were attached to petitioner’s application: a) Approved
Plan; b) Technical Description; c) Surveyor’s Certificate; d) Tax
Declaration; e) Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati ng Lupang Labas sa
Hukuman ng Yumaong Honorio Apran na may Pagpapapaubaya sa
Karapatan; and f) Certification of Present Declared Owner and Present
Value. The testimonies of petitioner and Montano Ulang, petitioner’s
senior of 10 years who lived near the property subject of registration, were
also presented. (Rollo, pp. 56 and 74-82.)
67 Rollo, pp. 20-29 and 76-82.
425
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 425

Canlas vs. Republic
Q: When you inherited the property, who was in possession and

cultivation thereof?
A: My father? [sic]
Q: When did he possess the property?
A: When he was born thereat and lived there, and when he
grew up he cultivated it.
Q: When was he born?
A: May 16, 1918, Sir.
Q: Before your father, who?
A: My grandfather, Honorio Apran.
Q: Since when?
A: Approximately 1900’s, Sir.

Q: What was done by your grandfather on the property?
A: He tilled the land by growing palay on rainy days, and
kamatis, and sometimes watermelon on summer days.
Q: What happened to those farming activities when your
grandfather Honorio died?
A: My father continued the farming activities and so did I until
I transferred to Quezon City sometime year 2000.
Q: How young were you then in the 1900’s?
A: I was not yet even born, Sir.
Q: When were you born?
A: February 26, 1944, Sir.
....
Q: After your father, who possessed and cultivated the
property?
A: I, Sir.68
In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals found that

petitioner was not in possession of the property to the
exclusion
_______________
68 Id., at pp. 77-78.
426

Canlas vs. Republic
of others.69 It relied on petitioner’s statements during

cross-examination before the trial court on the following
matters: that a conditional sale was made between
petitioner and Maura F. Reyes and Lorenza F. Reyes in
197670 and that the property had other occupants.71 The
Court of Appeals also stated that it “received an Appeal-in-
Intervention filed by the heirs of Lorenza F. Reyes and the
[h]eirs of Maura F. Reyes.”72
The totality of petitioner’s evidence trumps any doubt as
to the exclusivity and continuity of petitioner’s possession
with regard to other occupants and an alleged failed
conditional sale executed in 1976 between petitioner and
third parties, Lorenza F. Reyes and Maura F. Reyes. We
observe that no oppositors appeared during the initial
hearing on petitioner’s application.73 Aside from
petitioner’s statement during cross-examination that the
sale did not push through due to nonpayment of the full
purchase price, the Court of Appeals did not refer to other

evidence to establish the conditional sale.
In addition, the Court of Appeals did not allow the
intervention of the heirs of Lorenza F. Reyes and Maura F.
Reyes.74 No third parties intervened in the present case.75
_______________
69 Id., at pp. 46-47.

70 Id., at p. 48.
71 Id., at p. 50.
72 Id., at p. 51.
73 Id., at p. 42. Jurisprudence is clear that the absence of oppositors in
a land registration case does not automatically mean a meritorious case
absent clear and convincing evidence of actual possession and occupation.
However, petitioner has sufficiently overcome the burden of proof required
in land registration cases, as discussed earlier.
74 In its decision promulgated on November 10, 2011, the Court of
Appeals stated that it denied the appeal-in-intervention filed by the heirs
of Lorenza F. Reyes and Maura F. Reyes through its resolution dated
August 26, 2011. The Court of Appeals reiterated in the same resolution
that the case was already deemed submitted for decision pursuant to its
resolution dated June 4, 2009. (Rollo, p. 51.)
427
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 427

Canlas vs. Republic
Respondent’s claim that the tax declarations presented

by petitioner were sporadic and irregular deserves scant
consideration. The Court of Appeals observed that:
The OSG likewise claims that [petitioner] failed to show her

ownership and possession of the property in question, since the
subject property was declared for tax purposes only in 1949, 1966,
1974, 1980, 1985, 1994-1999 under the name of Honorio Apran
and in 2004 under the name of [petitioner]. . .
We do not see the point of the OSG in attacking the tax
declarations. We do not understand why it harps on the fact that
the property was declared for taxation purposes only in 1948. We
do not see any irregularity here. It would have helped Us a lot had
the OSG been more specific and did not leave Us in a guessing and
explorative game. To Our mind, what matters here is that the tax
declarations from 1948 up to the latest are in the correct series —
one tax declaration cancels the immediately previously issued tax
declaration which in effect also cancels all the previously issued
tax declarations.
Further, We find it misleading for OSG to claim that the realty

taxes were only paid a few months before the filing of the
application. Per records of this case, the recent payment was on
October 22, 2003 while the application for registration was filed
on August 22, 2006 or almost three years after.76 (Italics supplied)

It is settled that tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.77 Other evidence may be
appreciated to
_______________
75 A letter dated April 15, 2013 was sent by Edgardo Graganta,

President of Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Magkakapitbahay ng
LORECOM, Inc. (Rollo, p. 87.) He requested a copy of the latest resolution
in the case. This court resolved to note without action Edgardo Graganta’s
letter considering that neither he nor the association is a party to the case.
(Rollo, p. 95.)
76 Rollo, pp. 45-46.
77 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Ramos, supra note 45
at pp. 593-594.
428

Canlas vs. Republic
determine actual possession and occupation.

Documentary evidence, such as tax declarations, when
coupled with positive and clear testimonies of the applicant
and his or her witnesses, may be weighed in favor of the
applicant.78
The fact that a parcel of land is not declared for tax
purposes regularly, or that realty taxes are not paid on a
regular basis, does not automatically contradict the
claim of possession. Tax declarations serve as additional
indicia of ownership. It is not conclusive as to the fact of
possession, occupation, or ownership.
Likewise, to solely rely on tax declarations and payment
of realty taxes would mean that petitioner’s possession of
the land should be reckoned from 1949 or the year the
earliest tax declaration was made. Such interpretation is
untenable and goes beyond the text of Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Moreover, as shown in the
records, petitioner, through her predecessors-in-interest,
has been in possession of the land since the early 1900s.
We remand the issue of the inclusion of plan Psu-04-

006561 in TCT No. 23377, as allegedly certified by the
Land Registration Authority, to the trial court of origin.
_______________
78 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 419; 448 SCRA 442,
454 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division], this court ruled that
“possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of
50 to 60-year-old trees at the time . . . the property [was purchased] as
well as tax declarations executed . . . in 1945.” (Emphasis supplied) In
Arbias v. Republic, 587 Phil. 361, 374; 565 SCRA 582, 593 (2008) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Third Division], this court declared that “[w]ell-settled is
the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other
evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) See also Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. Ramos, id., at p. 594. These cases show that different kinds of
evidence may be considered in determining actual possession and
occupation.
429
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 429

Canlas vs. Republic
Generally, the remand of a case will not be permitted if

“in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can
resolve the dispute based on the records before it.”79 Thus,
remand may not be allowed in the following instances: “(a)
where the ends of justice would not be subserved by a
remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early
disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court had
already received all the evidence presented by both parties,
and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said
evidence, to decide the case on its merits.”80 None of these
are present in this case.
The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the
validity and authenticity of the alleged Land Registration
Authority report and motion, as well as the truth and
probative weight of the statements contained in the
document. A reading of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Guido, et al., invoked by petitioner, does not reveal the
precise metes and bounds of the property under TCT No.
23377 and whether plan Psu-04-006561 is covered by the
title.
It does not escape this court’s attention — considering
the length of time the document was in petitioner’s
possession — that the document was presented by

petitioner at this late stage in the Court of Appeals
proceedings. Records show that petitioner was aware of
this development as early as 2009 or even before the appeal
to the Court of Appeals.81 There has been no mention of
this document before the Court of Appeals or in the present
petition.
The concealment of a document that changes a party’s
theory of the case is highly improper, if not misleading, and
should not be tolerated. In Multi-Realty Development
Corpo-
_______________
79 Dela Peña v. Court of Appeals, 598 Phil. 862, 876; 579 SCRA 396,
410 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
80 Id., citing Lao v. People, 578 Phil. 679; 556 SCRA 120 (2008) [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
81 Rollo, p. 132.
430

Canlas vs. Republic
ration v. The Makati Tuscany Condominium

Corporation,82 this court said that:
[s]ettled is the rule that no questions will be entertained on

appeal unless they have been raised below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be considered by the
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule.83

However, the ends of substantial justice would be better
served when the threshing of the issue before the trial
court is allowed, to give all parties due process and avoid
multiplicity of suits in the future.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated November 10, 2011 and resolution
dated February 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is, however,
REMANDED to the trial court for presentation of evidence
to determine whether the 9,751-square-meter parcel of
land located in Barrio Macamot, Municipality of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, technically described as
Cadastral Lot No. 11566, Psu-04-006561, is included in

TCT No. 23377, and to proceed accordingly with this court’s
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Guido, et al.84
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.
_______________
82 524 Phil. 318; 491 SCRA 9 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First
Division].
83 Id., at p. 335; p. 23.
84 Supra note 38.
431
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 431

Canlas vs. Republic
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—Under Section 11 of the Public Land Act, one of

the modes of disposing public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes is by “confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.” (Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation, 666 SCRA 401 [2012])
In a judicial confirmation of title under original
registration proceedings, applicants may obtain the
registration of title to land upon a showing that they or
their predecessors-in-interest have been in (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of (2) agricultural lands of the public domain,
(3) under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, (4)
for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. (Republic vs. Ng, 692 SCRA 589
[2013])
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3/29/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 739

G.R. No. 200894. November 10, 2014.*

Civil Law; Land Registration; In land registration cases, the

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 405

tant in determining the required number of years or the

possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

in the records, petitioner, through her predecessors-in-

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

Ceña Law Office for petitioner.

1 Rollo, pp. 38-53. The decision was promulgated on November 10,

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 407

N-06-0033 and dismissed petitioner’s application for

We GRANT the application. We ORDER the Register of

Canlas with the reservation that it shall be subject of easement to

3 This case was entitled “In the matter of Application of Registration of

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

According to the trial court, Canlas complied with the

occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 409

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated

The Court of Appeals denied on February 23, 2012

necessarily giving due course, within 10 days from notice.24

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

application for registration of the subject parcel of

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 411

located in Barrio Macamot,35 Municipality of

35 In the Land Registration Authority’s report and motion, the land

412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Moreover, conscious of the resulting “large-scale dispossession

superior rights of bona fide occupants with registered titles within

41 Id., at pp. 165-166.

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 413

SO ORDERED.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Citing the case above, the Land Registration Authority

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable

According to Canlas, she falls under the second set of

42 Id., at pp. 180-181.

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In sum, Canlas changed the theory of her case from an

45 See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Ramos, G.R. No.

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 415

Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 152948 or the

Section 4. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been

48 This decree is entitled “Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 417

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12

adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.50

50 Id., at pp. 285-286; pp. 210-211. In the resolution dated September

VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014 419

In Republic v. Gielczyk,51 this court summarized and

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further