47 SPOUSES TEVES Vs INTEGRATED CREDIT CORPORATION

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 860 4/1/20, 4:31 AM
G.R. No. 216714. April 4, 2018.*
SPOUSES GODFREY and MA. TERESA TEVES,

petitioners, vs. INTEGRATED CREDIT & CORPORATE
SERVICES, CO. (now CAROL AQUI), respondent.
Civil Law; Mortgages; Redemption; Under Section 32, Rule 39

of the Rules, on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments, all
rents, earnings and income derived from the property pending
redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor, but only until the
expiration of his period of redemption.·When the redemption
period expired on May 23, 2007, ICCS became the owner of the
subject property and was, from then on, entitled to the fruits
thereof. Petitioners ceased to be the owners of the subject property,
and had no right to the same as well as to its fruits. Under Section
32, Rule 39 of the Rules, on Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of
Judgments, all rents, earnings and income derived from the
property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor,
but only until the expiration of his period of redemption. Thus, if
petitioners leased out the property to third parties after their period
for redemption expired, as was in fact the case here, the rentals
collected properly belonged to ICCS or Aqui, as the case may be.
Petitioners had no right to collect them. Aqui acquired the subject
property from ICCS only in 2010. Thus, Aqui cannot claim the
subject rental collections from 2007, because she was not yet the
owner of the subject property at the time; they belonged to ICCS.
She is entitled to rentals collected only from the time she became
the owner of the property. However, as the substituted party in
these proceedings, this Court will allow her to collect the award of
rentals collected by petitioners but which pertain to ICCS · with
the obligation to remit the same to the latter. After all, she is
merely ICCSÊs suceessor-in-interest. Procedurally, the RTC should
not have allowed Aqui to substitute for ICCS, but should have
simply ordered her to be impleaded as additional necessary party in
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the proceedings, since ICCS still had a claim for unremitted rentals
that was pending resolution in the case. On the other hand, it
cannot simply be ignored that petitioners
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Teeves vs. Integrated Credit & Corporate Services, Co.
(now Carol Aqui)
unlawfully collected rentals from the property that did not

belong to them, but to ICCS without doubt; between this
substantive issue and the court and partiesÊ procedural faux pas,
the latter should be overlooked so that the former may be corrected.
The partiesÊ substantive rights weigh more than procedural
technicalities. „In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be conscientiously guided by the norm that on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights,
and not the other way around.‰
Same; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; The
distinction between the trial court acting as a land registration court
with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a trial court acting
as an ordinary court exercising general jurisdiction, on the other, has
already been removed with the effectivity of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree.·On the contention
that the RTC · sitting as a land registration court · does not have
jurisdiction to award back rentals or grant relief which should
otherwise be sought in an ordinary civil action, this is no longer
tenable. The distinction between the trial court acting as a land
registration court with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a
trial court acting as an ordinary court exercising general
jurisdiction, on the other, has already been removed with the
effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property
Registration Decree. „The change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the designated trial courts the

authority to act not only on applications for Âoriginal registrationÊ
but also Âover all petitions filed alter original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such
applications or petition.Ê‰ Moreover, under Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Rules, on Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers, it is
provided that · Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.·
When by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court of judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Same; Unjust Enrichment; In the eyes of the law, petitioners
clearly had no right to collect rent from the lessee of the subject prop-
495
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 495

(now Carol Aqui)
erty; they were no longer the owners thereof, yet they continued
to collect and appropriate for themselves the rentals on the property
to which Integrated Credit and Corporate Sercives Co./ICCS was
entitled. This is a clear case of unjust enrichment that the courts
may not simply ignore.·Given the above cited rule and the
pronouncement in China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada,
557 SCRA 177 (2008), it can be understood why the RTC issued the
two separate Orders of July 14, 2010 · one on the issue covering
the propriety of issuing the writ of possession sought, and another
resolving the prayer for the surrender of rentals unlawfully
collected by petitioners, who ceased to be the owners of the subject
property and thus had no right to collect rent from the lessee of the
property. The First Order was issued relative to the main remedy
sought by ICCS · that is, for the court to Issue a writ of possession.
The Second Order was issued pursuant to the courtÊs authority
under Section 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules, to the end that a patent
inequity may be immediately remedied and justice served in
accordance with the objective of the Rules to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In the
eyes of the law, petitioners clearly had no right to collect rent from
the lessee of the subject property; they were no longer the owners
thereof, yet they continued to collect and appropriate for themselves
the rentals on the property to which ICCS was entitled. This is a
clear case of unjust enrichment that the courts may not simply
ignore.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
W.B. Calamba & Partners Law Offices for petitioners.
Go & Lim Law Offices for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review1 on Certiorari assails the March

28, 2014 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing
the
496

(now Carol Aqui)
Petition for Certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05483, as well

as its January 7, 2015 Resolution3 denying herein
petitionersÊ Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 1996, Standard Chartered Bank (Standard)

extended various loans to petitioners Godfrey and Ma.
Teresa Teves. As security, petitioners mortgaged their
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1075205 (the subject property).
Petitioners defaulted in their loan payments, Standard

extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and the
property was sold to Integrated Credit and Corporate
Services Co. (ICCS). A new certificate of title · Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-188758 · was issued in favor of
ICCS after petitioners failed to redeem the subject property
upon the expiration of the redemption period on May 23,
2007.6
ICCS filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession, docketed as L.R.C. Rec. No. 9468 Case No. 12
Lot No. 32 Blk. 3 and assigned to Branch 16 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. During the proceedings, or
in May, 2010, ICCS was substituted by respondent Carol
Aqui (Aqui),7 who appears to have acquired the property
from ICCS, and a new
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 11-25.

2 Id., at pp. 116-121; penned by Associate Justice Merilyn B. Lagura
Yap, and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Ma.
Luisa C. Quijano Padilla.
3 Id., at pp. 134-136.
4 Id., at pp. 123-128.
5 Id., at pp. 63-68.
6 Id., at p. 52.
7 Id., at pp. 52-33; „Manifestation and Ex Parte Motion‰ for
substitution of parties.
497
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 497

(now Carol Aqui)
certificate of title · Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107-

2010001206 · was issued in AquiÊs favor.8
On September 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision9 in
LRC Rec. No. 9468, Case No. 12, Lot No. 32, Blk. 3
ordering the issuance of a writ of possession over the

subject property in favor of ICCS.
On July 14, 2010, the RTC issued two Orders. The first (First
Order10) declared in part, thus:
To repeat, the duty of the court to grant a writ of possession is

ministerial. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of
the sale as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ is to be
determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of
Act No. 3135.
In the case of Philippine National Bank v. Court of

Appeals, the Supreme Court said:
ÂAn ex parte petition for issuance of a
possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is
not, strictly speaking, a Âjudicial processÊ as
contemplated above.Ê
x x x x x x x x x
ÂIt should be emphasized that an ex
parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession
is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding pursuant to
Act 3135 as amended. Unlike a judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68
of the Rules of Court, any property brought
within the ambit of
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 75, 146.

9 Id., at pp. 110-112; penned by Presiding Judge Sylva G. Aguirre-
Paderanga.
10 Id., at pp. 48-51.
498

(now Carol Aqui)
the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not

with any court of justice, but with the office of the
sheriff of province where sale is to be made.Ê
This Court having found that the procedural requirements
of law anent the ex parte motion for issuance of writ of
possession have been dutifully complied [with] and the
documents in support thereof in order, the writ of possession
was accordingly issued.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the respondentsÊ instant
Motion for Reconsideration of this CourtÊs Decision (should be
ORDER) dated 07 September 2009 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
The second Order12 (Second Order) contained the

following pronouncement:
The petitioner through counsel filed a MOTION praying

that respondents spouses Godfrey and Teresa Teves be
ordered to deliver to petitioner and/or deposit with the
Honorable Court the monthly rentals in the amount of
P50,000.00 covering the period from May 24, 2007 up to the
time respondents surrender the possession of the subject
property to herein petitioner.
It is the stand of petitioner that the grant of possession in
its favor does not only cover the physical surrender and/or
turn over of the premises of the subject property but also
includes the surrender of whatever fruits and/or rentals
realized or accruing from the subject property reckoned from
the time the redemption period to redeem the same has
lapsed; that, based on the Sheriffs Initial Report dated
October 22, 2008, the subject property is being leased to Ms.
Sarah Park for monthly rental of P50,000.00 and it is
respondent Mr. Godfrey
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 50-51.

12 Id., at pp. 43-44.
499
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 499

(now Carol Aqui)
Teves who collects the monthly rental; that Mr. Teves has no more
right to collect the monthly rental as his right ceased from the
time the right of redemption lapsed relative to the Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed before the proper court of justice
consistent with the provision of Art. 544 of the Civil Code; and
that accordingly, respondents should turn over to petitioner and/or
deposit with the Court the monthly rentals in the amount of
P50,000.00 they have collected from May 24, 2007 up to the time
of respondentsÊ surrender of possession of the subject property.
By [express] provision of the law, particularly Article 544
of the Civil Code, petitioner is entitled to the monthly rentals
of the subject property which were collected by the
respondents who have no more right over the same after the
lapse of the period for them to redeem the subject property.
Finding impressed with merit the instant motion of
petitioner, the same should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, Sps. Godfrey
Teves and Teresa Teves are hereby ordered to deliver to
petitioner and/or deposit with the Court the monthly rentals
of the subject property in the amount of P50,000.00 covering
the period from May 24, 2007 up to the time they surrender
the possession thereof to the petitioner.
Petitioners filed a Partial Motion for

14
Reconsideration of the Second Order, but in a September
2, 2010 Order,15 the RTC denied the same, ruling thus:
_______________
13 Id.
14 Id., at pp. 56-59.
15 Id., at pp. 45-47; penned by Presiding Judge Sylva G. Aguirre-
Paderanga.
500

(now Carol Aqui)
Respondents/Movants aver that the Notice of Lis Pendens

of the case of Annulment of Contract in Makati, RTC, Br. 149
annotated in the Title of the subject property binds the
subsequent buyer, Ms. Carol Aqui, giving emphasis on the
fact of termination of the Makati case by the execution of the
parties, the Sps. Godfrey and Teresa Teves as plaintiffs and
the Standard Chartered Bank as defendant, of a Compromise
Agreement wherein the Standard Chartered Bank specifically
waived its right to claim for deficiency and to settle the case
or anything arising from it; that as a successor-in-interest,
her right cannot rise above the rights of Standard Chartered
Bank which specifically waived its right to claim for
deficiency of anything arising from it.
The Petitioner through counsel filed its OPPOSITION to
respondentsÊ instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration,
contending that the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on the
subject title only involves the civil case filed with the RTC,
Makati City, Br. 149, for annulment of contracts and
damages, wherein the herein petitioner is not a party; that
the Compromise Agreement entered into by and between Sps.
Teves and the Standard Chartered Bank is limited only to the
subject Makati case and has nothing to do with the petition
for issuance of a writ of possession filed by herein petitioner
who is not a party to the said Compromise Agreement; that
the issue on possession cannot and can never be included in
the Compromise Agreement inasmuch as the Standard
Chartered Bank not being the highest and winning bidder in
the auction sale has no authority, business or concern over
the subject property; that as the highest and winning bidder,
herein petitioner is entitled to the possession of the subject
property including the right to receive the monthly rentals
from respondents.
Contending positions of the parties considered, this Court
finds the respondentsÊ instant Partial Motion for
Reconsideration to be devoid of merit.
In its Order dated July 14, 2010 which herein respondents

seek to be reconsidered, this Court finds peti-
501
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 501

(now Carol Aqui)
tioner as entitled to the monthly rentals of the subject

property which were collected by the respondents who are
shown to have no more right over the same after the period
for them to redeem the subject property had already lapsed.
[S]uch finding was based on the respondentsÊ having no
more right to collect the rentals upon the lapse of the period
for them to redeem the property without redeeming the same,
which gave way to the auction sale in the foreclosure
proceeding of the subject property wherein the highest and
winning bidder was the herein petitioner Integrated Credit &
Corporate Services (ICCS for brevity). As such highest and
winning bidder, the petitioner is entitled to the possession of
the subject property and to collect the subject monthly rentals
from the respondents. The essence of a writ of possession is
the right of petitioner to possess the subject property which
has been duly established.
Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that the
Compromise Agreement executed by and between the parties
in the Makati case cannot bind the herein petitioner, now by
Ms. Carol Aqui as substituting petitioner, not being a party to
the said case.
Finding no cogent reason to reconsider its Order dated
July 14, 2010, this Court has to deny the respondentsÊ instant
Partial Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the
respondentsÊ PARTIAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
of this CourtÊs Order dated July 14, 2010 is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
Previously, or in 2006, petitioners filed a case for

annulment of contract against Standard before the Makati
Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-227,
The parties
_______________
16 Id.
502

(now Carol Aqui)
entered into a compromise agreement, after which the

Makati trial court (Branch 149) issued a Judgment (Based
on Compromise Agreement)17 on July 23, 2010, declaring
among others that petitioners shall drop Civil Case No. 06-
227 and surrender possession of the subject properly to
Standard, in consideration of the latterÊs waiver of a
deficiency claim against the former. Thus, in September,
2010, petitioners surrendered possession over the subject
property to Aqui.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari18 before the CA,

docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05483, claiming that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering them
to turn over the back rentals to ICCS/Aqui in a petition for
a writ of possession, and that the RTC erred in not
considering the Judgment (Based on Compromise
Agreement) in Civil Case No. 06-227 before the Makati
trial court.
In the assailed March 28, 2014 Decision, the CA
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It held:
In the instant case, the Petition filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is clearly an improper remedy. The Orders [sic]

subject of the petition partakes the nature of a judgment or
final order which is appealable under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, which states that:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.·An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
x x x x.
_______________
17 Id., at p. 55; penned by Presiding Judge Cesar O. Untalan.

18 Id., at pp. 26-42.
503
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 503

(now Carol Aqui)
To justify the filing of the petition, Sps. Teves alleged that the
assailed orders [were] interlocutory in nature[;] hence, reviewable
by certiorari.
A judicious perusal of the challenged orders[,] however[,]
[reveal] that they are final orders and not interlocutory. In
Jose v. Javellana, the Supreme Court citing Garrido v.
Tortogo distinguished between final and interlocutory orders,
thus:
ÂThe distinction between a final order and an
interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to
be done except to enforce by execution what the court
has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet
to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to

ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.Ê
In this case, the assailed orders [did] not refer to,
preliminary matters but rather they dispose[d of] the subject
matter in its entirety, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce it by execution. Clearly, it [was a] final order
subject to appeal under Rule 41. Where appeal is available to
the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative
or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, especially if oneÊs own negligence or
error in oneÊs choice of remedy occasioned such less or lapse.
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain,
504

(now Carol Aqui)
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,

certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion.
Apropos thereto, the instant petition is dismissed because
it is improperly brought before this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis in the original; citations
omitted)
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a January 7,

2015 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the
present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners submit ·
CAN COLLECTION OF BACK RENTALS BE AWARDED IN

AN EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION
UNDER ACT 3135?
ARE THE ORDERS DATED JULY 14, 2010 AND

SEPTEMBER 2, 2010 FINAL ORDERS AND NOT
INTERLOCUTORY WHICH CAN BE SUBJECTED
TO CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65?20
PetitionersÊ Arguments
Petitioners, praying that this Court set aside the July 14

and September 2, 2010 Orders of the RTC, argue that a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is not an
action as contemplated by the Rules of Court (Rules), but a
mere motion whose sole issue to be resolved is whether the
movant is
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 119-120.

20 Id., at p. 15.
505
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 505

(now Carol Aqui)
entitled to the possession of real or personal property sought to

be possessed; that such a petition is „not an ordinary suit filed in
court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong‰;21 and that to collect back rentals, Aqui should file an

independent action · and not simply seek the same in her petition
for issuance of a writ of possession, since (a) the RTC, sitting as a
land registration court, does not have jurisdiction to award back
rentals or grant relief which should otherwise be sought in an
ordinary civil action; and (b) Act No. 3135,22 as amended by Act No.
4118,23 contains no provision authorizing the award of back rentals
to the purchaser at auction.
RespondentÊs Arguments
Respondent, in her Comment,24 essentially submits that

petitioners are guilty of delaying the proceedings precisely
so that they may continue to unlawfully enjoy the use,
fruits, and possession of the subject property; that the
Petition for Certiorari before the CA was an improper
remedy; and that what she is collecting from petitioners
are not „back rentals‰ but rents collected by the latter from
tenants of the property, which she is entitled to as a matter
of law · being the owner of the subject property.
Respondent thus prays that the instant Petition be denied
for lack of merit.
_______________
21 Citing Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils., 630 Phil. 342,

348; 616 SCRA 353, 358 (2010).
22 AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIAL POWERS
INSERTED IN OR ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES, Approved March 6,
1924.
23 AN ACT TO AMEND ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-
FIVE ENTITLED „AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIAL
POWERS INSERTED IN OR ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES,‰ Approved
December 7, 1933.
24 Rollo, pp. 146-159.
506

(now Carol Aqui)
Our Ruling
The Petition is denied.

When the redemption period expired on May 23, 2007,
ICCS became the owner of the subject property and was,
from then on, entitled to the fruits thereof. Petitioners
ceased to be the owners of the subject property, and had no
right to the same as well as to its fruits. Under Section 32,
Rule 39 of the Rules,25 on Execution, Satisfaction and
Effect of Judgments, all rents, earnings and income derived
from the property pending redemption shall belong to the
judgment obligor, but only until the expiration of his period
of redemption.
Thus, if petitioners leased out the property to third
parties after their period for redemption expired, as was in
fact the case here,26 the rentals collected properly belonged
to ICCS or Aqui, as the case may be. Petitioners had no
right to collect them. Aqui acquired the subject property
from ICCS only in 2010. Thus, Aqui cannot claim the
subject rental collections from 2007, because she was not
yet the owner of the subject property at the time; they
belonged to ICCS. She is entitled to rentals collected only
from the time she became the owner of the property.
However, as the substituted party in these proceedings,
this Court will allow her to collect the award of rentals
collected by petitioners but which pertain to ICCS · with
the obligation to remit the same to the latter. After all, she
is merely ICCSÊs suceessor-in-interest. Procedurally, the
_______________
25 Section 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending

redemption.·The purchaser or a redemptioner shall not be entitled to
receive the rents, earnings and income of the property sold on execution,
or the value of the use and occupation thereof when such property is in
the possession of a tenant. All rents, earnings and income derived from
the property pending redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor
until the expiration of his period of redemption.
26 Rollo, pp. 69-73.
507
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 507

(now Carol Aqui)
RTC should not have allowed Aqui to substitute for ICCS,

but should have simply ordered her to be impleaded as
additional necessary party in the proceedings, since ICCS
still had a claim for unremitted rentals that was pending
resolution in the case. On the other hand, it cannot simply
be ignored that petitioners unlawfully collected rentals
from the property that did not belong to them, but to ICCS
without doubt; between this substantive issue and the
court and partiesÊ procedural faux pas, the latter should be
overlooked so that the former may be corrected. The
partiesÊ substantive rights weigh more than procedural
technicalities. „In rendering justice, courts have always
been, as they ought to be conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way
around.‰27
In China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada,28 this
Court held that ·
In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, the

Court reasoned that if under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, the RTC has the power during the period of redemption
to issue a writ of possession on the ex parte application of the
purchaser, there is no reason why it should not also have the same
power after the expiration of the redemption period, especially
where a new title has already been issued in the name of the
purchaser. Hence, the procedure under Section 7 of Act No. 3135,
as amended, may be availed of by a purchaser seeking possession
of the foreclosed property he bought at the public auction sale
after the redemption period has expired without redemption
having been made.
The Court recognizes the rights acquired by the
purchaser of the foreclosed property at the public
_______________
27 7107 Islands Publishing, Inc. v. The House Printers Corporation,

771 Phil. 161, 168; 772 SCRA 392, 401 (2015).
28 579 Phil. 454, 472-473; 557 SCRA 177, 195-196 (2008).
508

(now Carol Aqui)
auction sale upon the consolidation of his title when no

timely redemption of the property was made, to wit:
It is settled that upon receipt of the definitive deed
in an execution sale, legal title over the property sold is
perfected (33 C. J. S. 554). And this court has also
[said] and that the land bought by him and described in
the deed deemed [sic] within the period allowed for that
purpose, its ownership becomes consolidated in the
purchaser, and the latter, „as absolute owner. . . is
entitled to its possession and to receive the rents
and fruits thereof.‰ (Powell v. Philippine National
Bank, 54 Phil. 54, 63) x x x.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale
becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to
the possession of the said property and can demand it at any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and
the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The
buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during
the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in
accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No
such bond is required after the redemption period if the
property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed
owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty
of the court. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
On the contention that the RTC · sitting as a land

registration court · does not have jurisdiction to award
back rentals or grant relief which should otherwise be
sought in an ordinary civil action, this is no longer tenable.
The distinction between the trial court acting as a land
registration court
509
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 509

(now Carol Aqui)
with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a trial court

acting as an ordinary court exercising general jurisdiction,
on the other, has already been removed with the effectivity
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property
Registration Decree. „The change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the designated
trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
Âoriginal registrationÊ but also Âover all petitions filed alter
original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or
petition.Ê‰29
Moreover, under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules, on
Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers, it is
provided that ·
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.·When by

law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court of judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these
rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law
or rules.
Given the above cited rule and the pronouncement

in China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada,30 it can
be understood why the RTC issued the two separate Orders
of July 14, 2010 · one on the issue covering the propriety
of issuing the writ of possession sought, and another
resolving the prayer for the surrender of rentals unlawfully
collected by petitioners, who ceased to be the owners of the
subject property and thus had no right to collect rent from
the lessee of the property. The First Order was issued
relative to the main
_______________
29 Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 604, 615;

377 SCRA 353, 361 (2002).
30 China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, supra note 28.
510

(now Carol Aqui)
remedy sought by ICCS · that is, for the court to Issue a writ of
possession. The Second Order was issued pursuant to the courtÊs
authority under Section 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules, to the end that a
patent inequity may be immediately remedied and justice served in
accordance with the objective of the Rules to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In the eyes of the
law, petitioners clearly had no right to collect rent from the lessee of the
subject property; they were no longer the owners thereof, yet they
continued to collect and appropriate for themselves the rentals on the
property to which ICCS was entitled. This is a clear case of unjust
enrichment that the courts may not simply ignore.
Indeed, to deprive a court of power to give substantial

justice is to render the administration thereof impotent and
ineffectual. The prevailing precept is currently embodied in
Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which categorically

provides:
Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.·
When by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or
rules.31
In a manner of speaking, courts have not only the power to
maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that
existence effective for the purpose for which
_______________
31 Go Lea Chu v. Gonzales, 130 Phil. 767, 777; 22 SCRA 766, 774-775
(1968).
511
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 511

(now Carol Aqui)
the judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do

all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality
needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of
Government. Courts have therefore inherent power to
preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure
effectiveness in the administration of justice.32
Besides, the matter of remitting collected rentals to

ICCS and Aqui does not involve the litigation and
resolution of a complex legal issue. It proceeds from the
simple fact that after the redemption period expired
without petitioners redeeming the subject property, ICCS
became the absolute owner thereof, and petitioners lost all

their rights thereto, including the right to lease out the
same and collect rentals on said lease. And when Aqui
acquired the property and became the owner thereof, she
as well became entitled to the said rentals that petitioners
unduly collected. Petitioners simply hold the amounts
collected in trust · with the obligation to return the same
to their rightful owners. These amounts and the periods
during which they were collected also appeal on record ·
as shown by the lease agreement presented and the
respective admissions of the parties · and are thus
liquidated and determinable without need of further
litigation or proof.
Contrary to petitionersÊ stance, the compromise
agreement they executed together with Standard before the
Makati trial court in Civil Case No. 06-227 did not cover
the subject rentals collected from leasing the subject
property; it referred only to a waiver of deficiency claims
rooted in the original loan transaction between them.33 As
owner of the subject property,
_______________
32 Province of Bataan v. Villafuerte, Jr., 419 Phil. 907, 916; 367 SCRA
620, 627-628 (2001), citing People v. Gutierrez, 146 Phil. 761; 36 SCRA
172 (1970).
33 Rollo, p. 55. The Makati trial courtÊs July 23, 2010 Judgment
(Based on Compromise Agreement) declares, among others:
512

(now Carol Aqui)
ICCS is entitled to the fruits thereof the rentals · which were wrongly
collected by petitioners after losing their ownership; this has nothing to
do with the previous loan transaction between petitioners and Standard,
to which ICCS was a complete stranger.
Finally, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other

issues raised by the parties. They are irrelevant in the context of
the foregoing disquisition; their resolution contributes nothing to
the validity and integrity of the CourtÊs opinion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,** Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ.,

concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Leave.
Petition denied.
Notes.·The written notice requirement for purposes of

the exercise of the right of redemption is indispensable.
(Pascual vs. Ballesteros, 666 SCRA 297 [2012])
_______________
Acting on the Motion (Judgment be rendered based on the

Compromise Agreement) dated July 22, 2010 filed by the defendant
through counsel, the following terms and conditions of the Compromise
Agreement are hereunder quoted as follows:
xxxx
3. That the Second party shall absolutely waive its claim for
deficiency against First parties relative to the contracts of loan
executed on November 21 & 28, 1996, respectively.
** Designated Acting Chairperson pursuant to Special Order No. 2540
dated February 28, 2018.
513
VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 513

(now Carol Aqui)
It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial

foreclosure of real property becomes the absolute owner of
the property if no redemption is made within one (1) year
from the registration of the certificate of sale by those
entitled to redeem. (Heirs of Jose Peñaflor vs. Heirs of

Artemio and Lydia dela Cruz, 836 SCRA 292 [2017])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 860 4/1/20, 4:31 AM

G.R. No. 216714. April 4, 2018.*

SPOUSES GODFREY and MA. TERESA TEVES,

Civil Law; Mortgages; Redemption; Under Section 32, Rule 39

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

unlawfully collected rentals from the property that did not

proceedings by conferring upon the designated trial courts the

VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 495

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

This Petition for Review1 on Certiorari assails the March

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petition for Certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05483, as well

Sometime in 1996, Standard Chartered Bank (Standard)

Petitioners defaulted in their loan payments, Standard

1 Rollo, pp. 11-25.

VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 497

certificate of title · Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107-

ordering the issuance of a writ of possession over the

To repeat, the duty of the court to grant a writ of possession is

In the case of Philippine National Bank v. Court of

8 Id., at pp. 75, 146.

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not

The second Order12 (Second Order) contained the

The petitioner through counsel filed a MOTION praying

11 Id., at pp. 50-51.

VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 499

Petitioners filed a Partial Motion for

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondents/Movants aver that the Notice of Lis Pendens

In its Order dated July 14, 2010 which herein respondents

VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 501

tioner as entitled to the monthly rentals of the subject

Previously, or in 2006, petitioners filed a case for

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

entered into a compromise agreement, after which the

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari18 before the CA,

In the instant case, the Petition filed under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court is clearly an improper remedy. The Orders [sic]

17 Id., at p. 55; penned by Presiding Judge Cesar O. Untalan.

VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 503

to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,

Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a January 7,

CAN COLLECTION OF BACK RENTALS BE AWARDED IN

ARE THE ORDERS DATED JULY 14, 2010 AND

Petitioners, praying that this Court set aside the July 14

19 Id., at pp. 119-120.

VOL. 860, APRIL 4, 2018 505

entitled to the possession of real or personal property sought to

wrong‰;21 and that to collect back rentals, Aqui should file an

Respondent, in her Comment,24 essentially submits that

21 Citing Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils., 630 Phil. 342,

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Teeves vs. Integrated Credit & Corporate Services, Co.

The Petition is denied.

25 Section 32. Rents, earnings and income of property pending