JD Equal Protection Digest

PEOPLE V. CAYAT, 68 PHIL.
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There must be real and substantial distinctions;

It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,

Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes,
was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639
for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it
unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a
non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,
beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-
called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the
law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the
grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an
improper exercise of police power.

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification
rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical
distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or
parentage,” as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. “The term ‘non-Christian
tribes’ refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the
geographical area and more directly, to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities.” (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet
the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure
peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies
equally to all members of the class evident from perusal
thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain
number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture,
is not an argument against the equality of its application.
1 CONSTI LAW 2 EP CLAUSE CASE DIGEST RHEYNE

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prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not
ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ, 101 PHIL. 1155 interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate not misled the legislators or the segment of the population
the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
business. conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the conventional agreement.
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates ISSUE:
international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary HELD:
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and discrimination on oppression of inequality. The real question at
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. hand is whether or not the exclusion in the future aliens for the
retail trade unreasonable. The equal protection clause “is not
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of infringed by a specified class if it applies to all persons within
Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid such class and reasonable grounds exist for making a
exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is distinction between those who fall within such class and those
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national who do not”. Aliens are under no special constitutional
economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form of nationality. The difference in status between citizens and
is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and aliens constitute a basis for reasonable classification in the
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin. exercise of police power.
Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports

to remedy really or actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to

remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from dominance and control.
Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future. Furthermore,
the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law
is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to
carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as
a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
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protection under the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537

requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and
members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the
requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in
trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the
penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months
imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY
PERSON NOT ACITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE
EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OFEMPLOYMENT OR TO BE
ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE,BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA
WITHOUTFIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT
FROM THE MAYOR OFMANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens

from being employed or engage or participate in any position
or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the
permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao
Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same
null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and

equal protection rule of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates

the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to
get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it
at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the
people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to
admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
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1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
DUMLAO V. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392 Petition granted
Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has Ratio:

received retirement benefits and is already 65 years old to run 1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer.
for the same elective local office from which he has retired. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites are
Petitioner said it is concocted and designed against him to present:
prevent him from running again. a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva c. existence of a constitutional question
Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition
30, 1980. has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a
hypothetical question.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement?
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the statutes.
Constitution. c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the
necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent,
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who and procedural regularity would require that his suit be
has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is dismissed.
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the
seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same public interest involved and the imminent elections.
elective local office from which he has retired.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
insidiously against him, and that the classification provided subject to rational classification.
therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore,
class legislation. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
candidcay of a person who was convicted of a crime given that employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
of thefiling of charges for the commission of such crimes. age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties
by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or
Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be
XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide encouraged to come in to politics.
candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has
attacked the term of office and the election period. These were already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running
Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52. for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision.
The need for new blood assumes relevance.
Issue:
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The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima
and what is emphatically significant is that the retired facie evidence against him.
employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for
the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
of mind, he would like to assume again. allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's
petition was meritorious.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result
from the application of the challengedprovision. Just as
that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it HELD: No violation of equal protection. It is subject to rational
permit such denial. classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause differently from the others. Here, persons over 65 are
does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classified differently from younger employees to promote
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat emergence of younger blood. Persons similarly situated are
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable similarly treated. It does not forbid all legal classification, what
classification is germane to the purpose of the law andapplies is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary and
to all those belonging to the same class. unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by
a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
blood in local governments. The classification in question
being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid
"even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the

constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him before
a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully
heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for
such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that

charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted of a crime with
the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima

facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is
"clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts
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not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
 Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar

central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL V. ORMOC CITY, L-23794, FEB. shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
17, 1968 subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.
In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance
4, imposing on any and all productions of centrifuga sugar EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of
tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based
other foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
protest. It subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
ordinance for being unconstitutional. classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of
the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance belong to the same class.
No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a  The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none
sale to USA and other foreign countries.” Payments for said other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enacted,
tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. the company was the only sugar central in Ormoc
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First City. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in
Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The central, of the same class as the present company,
court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later
the ordinance. Hence, this appeal. a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to the
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of company as the entity to be levied upon.
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of
uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or

things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions;
2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to
future conditions substantially identical to those present; and
4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the
same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should

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as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has

been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
BINAY V. DOMINGO, 201 SCRA 508 comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
Facts: exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed assuring the greatest benefits.
P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has
Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the
the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and,
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope
alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare
for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to
protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals. deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
Issues: convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of
under the general welfare clause the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause police power.
Held:
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo
towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies
et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its
to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort
general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and
and convenience of the people.
respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of
corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise
the common good.
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by
the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers
the State.
may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive
varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators,
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general
down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers.
welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the
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soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should the trial be
under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon unreasonably delayed w/o the fault of the accused, he may
of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. ask for the dismissal of the case. Should this be refused, he
The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not can compel itsdismissal bycer tiorari, prohibition
complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, orma nda mus, or secure his liberty by
and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous
death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or of the preventive suspension in pending admin. investigation,
as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a not in crim. cases, as here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or that the CS law and its implementing rules shall apply to
otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, members of the PNP insofar as the provisions, rules and
1991) regulations are not inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
HIMAGAN V. PEOPLE, 237 SCRA 538 (3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is
misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon w/c the preventive
FACTS: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based
of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan, Davao City was implicated was silent w/ respect to the duration of the preventive
in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein
murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due
and attempted murder were filed w/ the RTC, the trial court process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is
issued an order suspending petitioner until termination of the charged w/ murder under the RPC and it is undisputed that he
case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975, w/c provides: falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975 w/c categorically states
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon that hissuspension shall last until the case is terminated.
the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and (4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee
substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies on National Defense relative to the bill that became RA 6975
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused a member of the PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the
from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of imprisonment and
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety w/c suspension continues until the case against him is
(90) days from arraignment of the accused. terminated.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension
relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that his suspension should be
limited to 90 days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB, and
Layno v. SB. The motion and the subsequent MFR were
denied. Hence, this petition forcertiorar i andma nda mus.
HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.

(1) The language of the first sentence is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity. xxx The second sentence xx providing the trial
must be terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment does not
qualify or limit the first sentence. The 2 can stand
independently of each other.The first refers to the period of
suspension. The 2nd deals w/ the time frame w/in w/c the trial
should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90day period,
should the suspension of accused be lifted? Certainly
no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the
phrase "be terminated w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the
law that suggests that the preventive suspension of the
accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated w/in that
period. But this is w/o prejudice to the administrative sanctions,
and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
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administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere
fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
2nd Digest : HIMAGAN V. PEOPLE
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
with Grave Felonies The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated within ninety (90)
City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the
and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is
Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who
placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or
for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy
suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal
Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension
should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary
to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal
protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA
6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other
meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of
the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six
years and one day or more shall last until the termination of
the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first
sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The
first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with
the time from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently
from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
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reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and
the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that
the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
3rd Digest: HIMAGAN
“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged

with Grave Felonies
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan,

Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted
murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed
into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides
that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case
shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should
be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right
to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal

protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated

differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally
or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended
policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is
ROBLEDO
Chair of the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM)
FACTS
- 1959: RA 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted. This

was later amended by RAs 4224 and 5946.
~ Sec. 1 Objectives – This Act provides for and shall govern
(a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b)
the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine
in the Philippines.
~ RA 2382, as amended by RA 5946, created a Board

of Medical Education, comprising of:
1. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or duly
authorized representative – Chairman
TABLARIN V. GUTIERREZ, 152 SCRA 730 2. Secretary of Health or duly authorized
representative
It noted that in Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court upheld the 3. Director of Higher Education or duly authorized
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit representative
the admission to medical schools only to those who have 4. Chairman of Medical Board or duly authorized
proved their competence and preparation for a medical representative
education. 5. A representative of the Philippine Medical
Association
• It noted that the question is most usefully approached by 6. The Dean of the College of Medicine, University of
recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine has the Philippines
long been recognized as a method of protecting the health and 7. A representative of the Council of Deans of
safety of the public. Thus, legislation and administrative Philippine Medical Schools
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine must 8. A representative of the Association of Philippine
first take and pass board examinations have long ago been Medical Colleges
recognized as a valid exercise of governmental power.
~ Functions of the board are in Section 5 (as
• The regulation of access to medical schools is closely related emphasized in the case):
to that. (a) To determine and prescribe requirements for
admission into a recognized college of medicine
• Hence, in Tablarin, the Court ruled that the government is xxx
entitled to prescribe the NMAT as a means of “upgrading the (f) To accept applicants for certification for admission
selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said
the quality of medical education in the country.” certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating
fund of the Board of Medical Education
xxx
Petitioners: Teresita Tablarin, et al, on their behalf and in (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the
behalf of applicants for admission into Medical Colleges during necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation
the school year 1987-1988 and future years who have not yet of the foregoing functions.
taken or successfully hurdled the NMAT
~ Section 7 prescribes minimum requirements for
Respondents: Hon. Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez (RTC Branch applicants to medical schools:
XXXVII, Manila), Sec. Lourdes Quisumbing, in her capacity as - not convicted of any crime of moral turpitude, and
submits the following –
ROBLEDO
1. Record of completion of BA/BS degree accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonable and
2. Certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from equitable admission and academic requirements.
BME
3. Certificate of good moral character, by 2 former professors RATIO 2: The general principle of non-delegation of legislative
4. Birth certificate power must be applied with circumspection in respect of
statutes that deal with subjects that are complex and technical.
- 1985: Minister of Education, Culture and Sports issues
MECS Order No. 52, establishing the National Medical - Citing the decision in Pangasinan Transport Co., Inc. v. The
Admission Test (NMAT) as a standardized test for admission Public Service Commission penned by Justice Laurel, the
into medical schools. No applicant would be issued a Court held that there was a constantly growing tendency
Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA) without having towards the delegation of legislative power due to the growing
taken and passed the NMAT. complexities of modern society, and that there was an
accompanying trend of acceptance by the courts.
- March 5, 1987: Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory
judgment and prohibition with a prayer for Temporary - Citing Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta, the Court also held
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, to stop the that the standards set for subordinate legislation may be
enforcement of MECS Order No. 52 requiring the NMAT for explicit or implied. In the case of an implied standard, it can be
admission into medical colleges deduced from the policy and purpose of the act considered as
a whole. In the case of the Medical Act, the standards are set
- April 20, 1987: Judge Gutierrez dismissed the petition, and by the Act’s objectives, considering Sec. 5 (a) and Sec. 7 of
the NMAT was conducted as scheduled on April 27, 1987 the same Act, and taking into consideration the body of the Act
itself.
- Petitioners elevated the issue to the SC, raised the issue of
whether or not a preliminary injunction may be issued to stop RATIO 3a: The Supreme Court cannot rule on the desirability
the conduction of the NMAT pending the case. SC said that or wisdom of a piece of legislation or administrative regulation.
the case of unconstitutionality must be strong enough for the
court to issue such an injunction. - The Court held that they cannot rule on the petitioner’s
argument that the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement for
ISSUES admission into medical schools on top of all of the other
1. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, existing requirements. This is a question of the wisdom of
unconstitutional? having the NMAT as such an additional requirement, which is
2. Are Sec. 5 (a) and (f), together with MECS Order No. 52, outside the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
and undue delegation of legislative power?
3. Is the NMAT an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable RATIO 3b: The valid exercise of police power shall include
admission requirement? the regulation of access to medical schools.
4. Is the MECS Order No. 52 a violation of equal protection?
- The Court held that the important State interest in limiting
RATIO 1: To prove the unconstitutionality of an order or access to medical schools is the protection of the public from
statute, a petitioner must demonstrate to what extent or in the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance
what manner the assailed order or statute collides with the in medical practitioners. The NMAT, as an additional
Constitutional provisions. requirement for admission, is a tool to help upgrade the
selection process of those seeking to enter medical schools.
- Petitioner invokes Sec. 11, 13, and 17 of Art II (State
Policies) and Sec. 3 and 5 (3) of Art XIV (Education, Science RATIO 4: Administrative measures may remain flexible to
and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports), but the Court held meet circumstances as they change.
that the petitioners did not present even a prima facie case for
Sec. 11, 13 and 17. - The Court held that the portion of the MECS order allowing
the Board of Medical Education to determine the NMAT cutoff
- The Court also held that Sec. 3 and Sec. 5 (3) of Art. XIV, in score every year is not a violation of equal protection. Far from
the context of professional education, should be to say that the being arbitrary and capricious, different cutoff scores for
State should take appropriate steps to make quality education different school years may be dictated by the changing
ROBLEDO
circumstances and conditions surrounding the medical facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails
industry. Thus, the clause allows the Board of Medical the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
Education some flexibility needed to meet such changing ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal
circumstances. protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO: Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is
nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771
has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent
law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued
existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the
unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said
case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of
nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the
Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2)
of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in
LIM V. PACQUING, 240 SCRA 649 estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or
agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA
FACTS: The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by 90)
Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
 On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was
issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais
from local government to the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB).
 On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board
of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065
entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow
And Permit The Associated Development Corporation
To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The
City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions
And For Other Purposes.”
 On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was
issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled
“Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local
Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit
And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On
Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota,
And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof,
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC)

tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games
and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential
Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling
ROBLEDO
where there’s no substantial distinction. The distinction made
is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the judiciary and the grantees
of the franking privilege.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO, 227 SCRA

703
FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A.

No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the
Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds,
along with certain other government offices while retaining the
same for the president, VP, senators… The petitioners are
members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named
measures.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. All persons

similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require
universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact result in unequal
protection. What the law requires is equality among equals
according to valid classification. The postal service office
claims that the expense from judiciary with regards frank mails
amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The
respondents are in effect saying that franking privilege should
be extended only to those who do not need it much at all but
not to those who need it badly. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others especially
ROBLEDO
fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping
the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no
reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we
may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court
should be similarly treated as that Committee.
In the SC’s view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of
the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee
for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
2nd Digest: PHIL JUDGES ASSOC V PRADO providing for a smoother flow of communication between the
government and the people. If the problem of the respondents
Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy,
the constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking government, including those who do not need it. The problem
privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec, former others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office. between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not
franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of solved by violating the Constitution.
Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the
Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the
AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial
Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special
Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on
the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354
Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.

The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
ROBLEDO
(2) Whether or not the tax law is oppressive, confiscatory and
whimsical.
Ruling:
No, there was no violation of the due process and equal
protection clause, since petitioner did not made a case, only
allegations. The Congress has the power to determine the
rates of taxation; thus, the due process clause may be
invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no
support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can
be shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would
be a clear abuse of power. It then becomes the duty of this
Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the
exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly calls for
the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also been held that
where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of
the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a
retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject
to attack on due process grounds.
Moreover, as to the equal protection clause, the court held that

there is a substantial distinction that sets apart compensation
income earners and those self employed. The court stressed
that there is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable
income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same
time reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be
SISON V. ANCHETA, 130 SCRA 654 classified into different categories. To repeat, it. is enough that
the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that
Facts: make real differences.
Petitoner filed a declaratory relief, questioning the
validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135. The assailed In addition, the Supreme Court held that what misled petitioner
provision amended Section 21 of the National Internal is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between
Revenue Code of 1977, because it provides a higher tax base a tax rate and a tax base. This is true considering that the tax
for income derive from the exercise of profession than on salaried individuals is computed based on gross
compensation income. Under this law, salaried individuals are compensation income (after deducting the allowable and
subject to a graduated tax rates from 1% to 35% whereas a additional exemptions) whereas professionals/self-employed
much higher graduated tax rates of 5% to 60% are applied to are taxed on the basis of their net income.
self-employed/Professionals. Petitioner as taxpayer alleges
that by virtue thereof, he would be unduly discriminated
against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer,
income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a- alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly discriminated
vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income
individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as as a professional, that it amounts to class legislation, and that
arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and it transgresses against the equal protection and due process
capricious in character For petitioner, therefore, there is a clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring
transgression of both the equal protection and due process uniformity in taxation.
clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal
uniformity in taxation. protection clauses, and the rule on uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive character
(1) Whether or not there was a violation of due process and as would lead to a conclusion that there was a violation of the
equal protection clause. due process and equal protection clauses. Absent such
ROBLEDO
showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and down the area within which the special privileges granted to
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of the entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Subic Naval Base” only. It has thereby excluded the residents
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated
differentitation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in
equity, similar to the standards of equal protection, it is not contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and is The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing
therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the
categories, such as recipients of compensation income as authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He
against professionals. Recipients of compensation income are adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of
not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as a valid classification.
there is no practically no overhead expense, while Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification
professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not
expenses necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample violate the equal protection clause.
justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
compensation income, while continuing the system of net absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
income taxation as regards professional and business income. groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not
be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to
all members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution
were affirmed.
TIU V. CA, 301 SCRA 278
The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that

the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives
authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business
enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the
Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and
validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of
the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the
benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable
standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and
constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses
(1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in
Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic
Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed
ROBLEDO
On All Other Taxes. — In lieu of all local and national taxes
(except import taxes and duties), allbusiness enterprises in the
SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section
12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President

issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the
area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was
operative.
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently

fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only
completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business
enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing
within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials,
capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-
free.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for

allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the
laws. This was due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic
and not to the entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred
to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case,

petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional,
while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress

was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area"
2nd case digest: Tiu v CA and not to include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas
mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
President, passed into law RA 7227. This was for the Rules of Court.
conversion of former military bases into industrial and
commercial uses. Subic was one of these areas. It was made Issue:
into a special economic zone. Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A
confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the secured area
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured
liberalized. There was also tax incentivesand duty free area is discriminatory or not owing to a violation of the equal
importation policies under this law. protection clause.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos Held. No. Petition dismissed.
issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the
application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that Ratio:
On Import Taxes and Duties. — Tax and duty-free
importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the
and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the
SSEZ Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly

ROBLEDO
occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, they claimed that Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always
the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval base only. channel their capital into it.
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification. RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining,
industrial, commercial, financial and investment center”. There
Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is will really be differences between it and the outside zone of
not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the Olongapo.
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated The classification of the law also applies equally to the
differently from another. The classification must also be residents and businesses in the zone. They are similarly
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those treated to contribute to the end gaol of the law.
belonging to the same class.
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand

absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial

distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not
be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to
all members of the same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military

reservations into productive uses. This was really limited to the
military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law
tasked the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the bases
occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory

within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3)
restructured income tax rates on business
enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control,
(5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the
grant of resident status to certain investors and of working
visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target of
the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.
Even more important, at this time the business activities

outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in
achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former
military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine
economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the
tax incentives in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not

require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are
actual and material differences between territories, there is no
violation of the constitutional clause.

ROBLEDO
the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal,
and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.
After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was
charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.

8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the

petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have
been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire
jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 301 SCRA 298 (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-
post facto statute.
Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate (3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti- of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the
Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner- determination whether the case falls within the
intervenors. Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a RULING: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4
member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot- law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found reasonable and the party who challenges the law
the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is
review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it
ROBLEDO
must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all

cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any
court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,

generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for
their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters,
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly
a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure
by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to

have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there
was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed
the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that
the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to
have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations

that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
ROBLEDO
responsibilities; (b) devoting to a specific employment or
pursuing a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (c)
indemnify the heirs of the victim Daluyong in the amount of
P98,560.
A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure to

indemnify the heirs of the victim and a supplemental motion
alleging petitioner’s commission of another crime while he was
awaiting arraignment. The trial court denied the motion and
instead directed petitioner to submit a program of payment of
the civil liability imposed on him. Based on the information
provided by the heirs of Daluyong, petitioner still failed to
satisfy his civil liability. Soriano was made to explain his non-
compliance and to submit his program of payment immediately
otherwise he would be cited for contempt. For continuous
failure to comply with the orders, his probation was revoked on
October 1994 for his failure to: (a) meet his family
responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific employment, (c)
satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d)
cooperate with his program of supervision.
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals claiming that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding petitioner contempt and revoking
his probation. The CA dismissed the petition holding that
Soriano’s “stubborn unwillingness” to comply with the orders of
the trial court “shows his refusal to reform himself and to
correct a wrong.” A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the revocation of petitioner’s probation is lawful and
proper
RULING:
YES. Revocation of probation is lawful and proper. Probation
is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests
upon the discretion of the trial court subject to certain terms
SORIANO V. CA, GR 123936, MARCH 4, 1999 and conditions. Having the power to grant probation, the trial
court also has the power to revoke it in a proper case and
Payment of civil indemnity is not violative of the equal under appropriate circumstances. Since petitioner admitted in
protection clause as this is imposed by law as a consequence violating the terms and conditions of his probation, he cannot
of the commission of a crime anymore assail the revocation of his probation.
FACTS: Soriano claims that his non-compliance was due to his poor
Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of financial condition and that it was impossible for him to
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical formulate a program as he only relies on his parents for
injuries and damage to property after being involved in a support and he was in no position to comply with the same. He
vehicular accident which killed Isidrino Daluyong. His even questioned the constitutionality of the requirement
application for probation was granted and among the terms imposed as this harped on his alleged poverty. – This
and conditions imposed were: (a) he shall meet his family requirement is NOT violative of the equal protection clause of
ROBLEDO
the Constitution. Payment of civil liability is not a condition informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the
precedent to probation. The trial court could not have done election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty
away with imposing civil liability as it is not an arbitrary candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation
imposition but one required by law. Petitioner may be poor, but where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous
this is precisely the reason why the trial court gave him the count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata
chance to make his own program of payment in contrast to the and immediately communicated the problem to the technical
cited Salgado case where a program of payment was already experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated
imposed upon the petitioner therein. machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the
problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the
Petitioner also asserts that his non-compliance with the orders names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing
of the trial court to submit a program of payment was not wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the
deliberate as the notice was received by his counsel and did printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the
not notify petitioner immediately. – NO MERIT. His refusal to automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty.
comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate as Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local
petitioner had notice of both orders and refused to comply with candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu
the trial court’s directive. Petitioner’s counsel has not been elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay
shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor
petitioner’s rights. The fact that petitioner submitted a motion Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed
for reconsideration of the said order, shows proof that he how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the
received the notice but still failed to provide the required misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some
program of payment. recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the
others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other
municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by
the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5)
municipalities were rejected by the automated machines.
These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and
Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong
sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able
to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and
recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the
entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued
Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but
only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its
implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules
LOONG V. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832 for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the
procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
FACTS:
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998
regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim ISSUE:
Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty.
Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have 1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to
invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers 2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or
ROBLEDO
not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold,
(The main issue in the case at bar) however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count? COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable? kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when
by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count? machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is the conduct of an election which is under the control and
unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that
election for the position of governor of Sulu. the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot
count the result of an election.
HELD: It is also important to consider that the failures of automated

counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in
Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused
respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute by the delay in the counting of votes
Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our (2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied
status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted. process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they
were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later
is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly submitted written position papers. Their representatives
suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated
of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the
intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are manual count from beginning to end.
enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari 3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the
jurisdiction of this Court. governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only
be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad
power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure,
the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any
regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and
in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on
arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after
automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
the automated machines. They traced the problem to the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or
printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is failure to elect.
plain that to continue with the automated count would result in There is another reason why a special election cannot be
a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the
votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the
of the sovereignty of the electorate right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The
records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties.
ROBLEDO
These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same salary rates between foreign and local hires. They claim that it
manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, is discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial
their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. discrimination.
Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid
for alikes cannot be treated unalikes. HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the equal work, persons who work with substantially equal
COMELEC and not to this Court. qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar
conditions should be paid similar salaries. If an employer
accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that
they perform equal work. Here, both groups have similar
functions which they perform under similar conditions. There is
no evidence that foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than
local hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly
accorded by the benefits they received.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL V. QUISUMBING, 333 SCRA 13
FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent

International School. The school hires both local and foreign
hires. Foreign hires are granted with more benefits and higher
salary. Respondent says this is because of dislocation factor
and limited tenure. Petitioners contested the difference in
ROBLEDO
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the
disparity in wages that they got compared to that of their
foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or
foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the
School and was the School responsible for bringing
that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local
hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits to the
foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more
pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor"
and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his
home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he
returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a
deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole
Secretary Quisimbing denied the union’s mfr.
He said, “The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection
clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle
of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of
the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants
based on reasonable classification. A classification is
reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions
and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a
substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires,
the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities
of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to join the
teaching faculty of the School.”
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and
racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign
origin. They were paid local salaries.
Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal
protection clause
2nd Digest: Int School V Quisimbing Held: Yes, Petition granted

Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a Ratio:
domestic educational institution established primarily for Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
ROBLEDO
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to local hires,
the right of all people to human dignity…” thereby such admixture will nbot assure any group the power
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every to exercise bargaining rights.
person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of The factors in determining the appropriate collective
his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
observe honesty and good faith." Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such
International law prohibits discrimination, such as as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
Rights. The latter promises “Fair wages and similarity of employment status.
equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction
of any kind.”
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and
labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality
of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term “equal pay for equal work”,
pertaining to persons being paid with equal salaries and have
similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence
here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. These relations are not
merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements
included, must yield to the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-
hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited
tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by
certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-
hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes
and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed
by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining
unit as the local-hires. It does not appear that foreign-hires
have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective
bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups
were always treated separately. The housing and other
ROBLEDO
DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC, GR 129118, JULY 19, 2000
FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations

pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act. The Act
prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city
or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that
the act violated the equal protection clause because not all
election officials were covered by the prohibition.
HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection

clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the
people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in
the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the
complicity of election officers, who are the highest
representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.
2nd Digest: De Guzman

Facts: Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations
pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s registration act. The act
prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city
or municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners claim that the
act violated the equal protection clause because not all
election officials were covered by the prohibition.
Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause
enshrined in the constitution; that it violates constitutional
guarantee on security of civil servants; that it undermines the
constitutional independence of comelec and comelec’s
constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic
constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on
3 separate readings
Issue: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is
unconstitutional
Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not
violated the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure
the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from
developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters
cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers,
who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or
municipality.
3rd Digest: De Guzman
FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided
that no election officer shall hold office in a particular
municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with
it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election
officers to other stations. Petitioners argued that the provision
was not expressed in the title of the law, which is “An Act
Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a

ROBLEDO
System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures
Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof”.
HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is relevant to DIMAPORO V. HRET , GR 158359, MAR. 23, 2004
the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the
integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for FACTS:This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo
the Comelec to follow in the reassignment of election officers. seeking to nullify the twin Resolutions of the HRET which
denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks
and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and
Others: De Guzman Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying the Motion
for Technical Examination of Voting Records.
FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration Act provided
that no election officer shall hold office in a particular Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressional candidate
municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking the
it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who were election technical examination of the signatures and thumb the
officers to other stations. Petitioner argue that the law protested precincts of the municipality of Sultan Naga
undermined the constitutional authority of the Comelec to Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged that the massive
appoint its own officials. substitution of voters and other electoral irregularities
perpetrated by Dimaporo’s supporters will be uncovered and
HELD: The law merely provides the basis for the transfer of proven. From this and other premises, he concluded that he is
an election officers and does not deprive the Comelec of its the duly-elected representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del
power to appoint its officials. Norte.
Noting that “the Tribunal cannot evaluate the
questioned ballots because there are no ballots but only
election documents to consider” HRET granted Mangotara's
motion and permitted the latter to engage an expert to assist
him in prosecution of the case, NBI conducted the technical
examination.
ISSUE: 1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal

Protection when the latter denied his motion for technical
examination.
2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural
due process or the right to present scientific evidence to show
the massive substitute voting
committed in counter protested precincts.
RULING: 1. Resolution of HRET did not offend equal

protection clause. Equal protection simply means that all
persons and things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It
follows that the existence of a valid and substantial distinction
justifies divergent treatment.
According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes
subject of his petition and that of Mangotara were both
unavailable for revision, his motion, like Mangotara’s, should
be granted.
The argument fails to take into account the
distinctions extant in Mangotara’s protest vis-à-vis Dimaporo’s

ROBLEDO
counter-protest which validate the grant of Mangotara’s motion
and the denial of Dimaporo’s.
First. The election results in SND were the
sole subjects of Mangotara’s protest. The opposite is true with
regard to Dimaporo’s counter-protest as he contested the
election results in all municipalities but SND.
Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the
election records of SND are determinative of the final outcome
of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same cannot be
said of the precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for

technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the
HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the
conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotara’s
motion for technical examination. Conversely, it found
Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasive and accordingly denied the
same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds
of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the
Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of
the House of Representatives and the Senate as the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is
original and exclusive.
2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed

Resolutions denied him the right to procedural due process
and to present evidence to substantiate his claim of massive
substitute voting committed in the counter-protested precincts,
suffice it to state that the HRET itself may ascertain the validity
of Dimaporo’s allegations without resort to technical
examination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the
ballots, election documents and other election paraphernalia
are still subject to its scrutiny in the appreciation of evidence.
It should be noted that the records are replete with
evidence, documentary and testimonial, presented by
Dimaporo. Dimaporo’s allegation of denial of due process is
an indefensible pretense.
The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ROBLEDO

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PEOPLE V. CAYAT, 68 PHIL.

There must be real and substantial distinctions;

Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,

1 CONSTI LAW 2 EP CLAUSE CASE DIGEST RHEYNE

Issue: Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports

Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to

VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270

The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates

Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has Ratio:

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima

 Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar

Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or

6 CONSTI LAW 2 EP CLAUSE CASE DIGEST RHEYNE

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has

HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.

3rd Digest: HIMAGAN

“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan,

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal

HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated

- 1959: RA 2382, or the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted. This

~ RA 2382, as amended by RA 5946, created a Board

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC)

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO, 227 SCRA

FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A.

HELD: There is violation of equal protection. All persons

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.

Moreover, as to the equal protection clause, the court held that

The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that

Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President

Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for

The appellate court concluded that such being the case,

The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress

18 CONSTI LAW 2 EP CLAUSE CASE DIGEST RHEYNE

Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial

RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military

Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory

Even more important, at this time the business activities

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not

19 CONSTI LAW 2 EP CLAUSE CASE DIGEST RHEYNE

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A.

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law,

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations

A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure to

HELD: It is also important to consider that the failures of automated

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL V. QUISUMBING, 333 SCRA 13