Positivism in Cross Sectional Surveys
Positivism in Cross Sectional Surveys
Positivism in Cross Sectional Surveys
Descriptive
A cross-sectional study may be entirely descriptive and it used to
assess the frequency and distribution of the study topic in a
certain demographic. For example, how a random sample of
Universities across a state is assessed to check for obesity
amongst women and women.
Analytical
This type of cross-sectional study is used to investigate the
association between two related or unrelated parameters. This
methodology isn’t entirely full proof though because the presence
of risk factors and outcomes are simultaneous, and their studies
are simultaneous too. For example, to validate if coal workers in
the mine could develop bronchitis only looks at the factors in the
mine. What it doesn’t account for is that bronchitis could be
inherent or may have existed from before.
In a real-life cross-sectional study, attributes from both types are
used.
The other factor is that due to the longevity of the research, there
could be attrition in the longitudinal study which skews the results
finding and the corresponding research whereas, in cross-
sectional research, there’s no chance of that happening because
the study is done with the same variables and sometimes at the
same time of collection of variables.
Positivism in Cross sectional Survey
Positivism has to do with the situation where knowledge or the
world is thought to exist independent of people’s perceptions of it
and that science uses objective techniques to discover what exist
in the world” (Sullivan, 2001 p.47). Positivism uses logical,
quantitative, more objective scientific methods to test
hypothetically deductive generalizations. On the other hand,
phenomenological or interpretive philosophy holds that “reality of
the world is thought to arise out of the creation and exchange of
social meaning during the process of social interactions” (Sullivan,
2001 p. 48). Phenomenological perspective uses qualitative, more
subjective, naturalistic approaches in inductively and holistically
to understand human experiences in context-specific settings
(Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar & Newton, 2002).
The positivist tradition however, has not met with approval and
support by all scientists, since it has produced some serious
problems as well as some questionable assumptions. Henning et
al. (2004:17), Babbie (2010:41), Rubin and Babbie (2010:15) as
well as Denzin and Lincoln (2011a:8) point out that early positivist
social scientists assumed that social reality can be explained in
rational terms, because people always act rationally. Babbie
(2010:41) in particular states that people do not always act
rationally. Nonetheless, even non-rational behaviour could be
rationally understood and predicted. Babbie (2010:42) further
alleges that everybody acts, thinks and interprets subjectively to
a certain extent. This subjectivity is unique to any individual; and
the endeavour for objectivity could best be obtained through the
discovery of intersubjective interests between individuals.
Inevitably, the positivist view would not agree with this approach.
Concurring with Gratton and Jones (2010:25), one could say that
the positivist approach undeniably has strengths, notably in terms
of precision, control and objectivity. Such sport-related theories
naturally would be the result of statistical analysis, which
removes the need for more individualistic or intuitive
interpretation. Positivist research is also generally more
straightforward in terms of planning, simply because the data are
collected in one go, and the analysis of all the data takes place at
the same time. Finally, it emerged during the literature review
that in the early years of sport-related research, such research
was dominated by the positivist approach. For reasons, which will
be outlined below, alternative approaches are now becoming
more widespread. One of these approaches is known as post-
positivism.
Post-positivism
Dissatisfaction with positivism became increasingly widespread,
thereby increasing the appeal of post-positivism (Teddlie &
Johnson, 2009:68). Because of the increasing appeal of post-
positivism, post-positivistic works gained credibility throughout
the social science community. Teddlie and Johnson (2009:68) cite
the works of post-positivists: Popper (1934; 1959), Hanson (1958),
Toulmin (1960), Campbell and Stanley (1963), Hempel (1965),
Kuhn (1962; 1970; 1996), Phillips (1987; 1990), as well as Phillips
and Burbules (2000).