TWO

Logos
(Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)
= ^
The path most needed for our thinking stretches far ahead. It leads
to that simple matter which, under the name Adyoq, remains for think-
ing. Yet there are only a few signs to point out the way.
By means of free reflection along the guidelines of a saying of
Heraclitus (B 50), the following essay attempts to take a few steps along
that path. Perhaps they can carry us to the point where at least this one
saying will speak to us in a more question-worthy way:

OUK e*uou dXXd TOU Adyou dKouoavraq

dpoAoyelv oocpdv d o T i v ' E v ndvTa.

One among the virtually identical translations reads:

When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning,

it is wise within the same Meaning to say: One is All.
(Snell)

The saying speaks of dKOiJeiv, hearing and having heard, of

duoAoyeiv, to say the same, of Adyoq, what is said and the saying, of
¿YuJ, the thinker himself as Atfyiuv, the one who is talking. Heraclitus
here considers a hearing and a saying. He expresses what the Adyoc.
says: "Ev fldvia, all is One. The saying of Heraclitus seems com-
prehensible in every respect. Nevertheless, everything about it is
worthy of question. Most question-worthy is what is most self-evident,
namely, our presupposition that whatever Heraclitus says ought to

59
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

become immediately obvious to our contemporary everyday under-

standing. This demand was probably never met even for Heraclitus'
contemporaries.
In the meantime, we would correspond sooner to his thinking if
we conceded that several riddles remain, neither for the first time with
us, nor only for the ancients, but rather in the very matter thought. We
will get closer to these riddles if we step back before them. That done,
it becomes clear that in order to observe the riddle as a riddle we must
clarify before all else what Xdyoc. and Ae'veiv mean.
Since antiquity the Adyoq of Heraclitus has been interpreted in
various ways: as Ratio, as Verbum, as cosmic law, as the logical, as
necessity in thought, as meaning and as reason. Again and again a call
rings out for reason to be the standard for deeds and omissions. Yet
what can reason do when, along with the irrational and the antirational
all on the same level, it perseveres in the same neglect, forgetting to
meditate on the essential origin of reason and to let itself into its
advent? What can logic, XoyiKif (dmorrfuri) of any sort, do if we never
begin to pay heed to the Adyoc. and follow its initial unfolding?
What Xdyoc. is we gather from XeVeiv. What does Xe\eiv mean?
Everyone familiar with the language knows that Ae'veiv means talking
and saying; Xdyoc. means X^yeiv as a saying aloud, and Xeyduevov as
that which is said.
Who would want to deny that in the language of the Creeks from
early on Xtfyeiv means to talk, say, or tell? However, just as early and
even more originally—and therefore already in the previously cited
meaning—it means what our similarly sounding legen means: to lay
down and lay before. In legen a "bringing together" prevails, the Latin
legere understood as lesen, in the sense of collecting and bringing
together. Aiyeiv properly means the laying-down and laying-before
which gathers itself and others. The middle voice, XdYeoOai, means to
lay oneself down in the gathering of rest; Xtfxoc. is the resting place;
Xdxoq is a place of ambush [or a place for lying in wait] where some-
thing is laid away and deposited. (The old word dXcfyu) (d
copulativum), archaic after Aeschylus and Pindar, should be recalled
here: something "lies upon me," it oppresses and troubles me.)
All the same it remains incontestable that Xdyeiv means, predom-

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 Logos (Heraclitua, Fragment B 50)

inately if not exclusively, saying and talking. Must we therefore, in

deference to this preponderant and customary meaning of Xeyeiv,
which assumes multiple forms, simply toss the genuine meaning of the
word, Xriyeiv as laying, to the winds? Dare we ever do such a thing?
Or is it not finally time to engage ourselves with a question which
probably decides many things? The question asks: (low does the
p r n p p r spn<;p of X f y r *n lay, mmft tn mean saying and talking?
t iv

In order to find the foothold for an answer, we need to reflect on

what actually lies in Xe'yeiv as laying. To lay means to bring to lie.
Thus, to lay is at the same time to place one thing beside another, to lay
them together. To lay is to gather [lesen]. The lesen better known to us,
namely, the reading of something written, remains but one sort oi
gathering, in the sense of bringing-together-into-lying-before, al-
though it is indeed the predominant sort. The gleaning at harvest time
gathers fruit from the soil. The gathering of the vintage involves pick-
ing grapes from the vine. Picking and gleaning are followed by the
bringing together of the fruit. So long as we persist in the usual appear-
ances we are inclined to take this bringing together as the gathering
itself or even its termination. BuLgatheringjs more than mere amassing.
T T satf»' ''"fl " " " n
, K 1 c
r ? f " ' R ^hf h
1 r f n n
brings, jijider shejter.
Accommodation governs ihe_sheltering; accommodation is in turn gov''
erned by safekeeping. That "something extra" which makes gathering
more than a jumbling together that snatches things up is not something
only added afterward. Even less is it the conclusion of the gathering,
coming last The safekeeping that brings something in has already
determined the first steps of the gathering and arranged everything
that follows. If we are blind to everything but the sequence of steps,
then the collecting follows the picking and gleaning, the bringing
under shelter follows the collecting, until finally everything is accom-
modated in bins and storage rooms. This gives rise to the illusion that
preservation and safekeeping have nothing to do with gathering. Yet
what would become of a vintage [eine Lese] which has not been
gathered with an eye to the fundamental matter of its being sheltered?
The sheltering [Bergen] comes first in the essential formation o f the
vintage.
However, the sheltering does not secure just any thing that hap-

61
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

pens along: the gathering which properly begins with the sheltering,
i.e. the vintage, is itself from the start a selection [Auslese] which
requires sheltering. For its part, the selection is determined by what-
ever within the crop to be sorted shows itself as to-be-selected
[Erlesene]. The most important aspect of the sheltering in the essential
formation of the vintage is the sorting (in Alemanic [the southwestern
German dialect]: the fore-gathering [Vor-lese]) which determines the
selection, arranging everything involved in the bringing together, the
bringing under shelter, and the accommodation of the vintage.
The sequence of steps in the gathering act does not coincide with
the order of those far-reaching, fundamental traits in which the essence
of the vintage [die Lese] consists.
It is proper to every gathering that the gatherers assemble to
coordinate their work to the sheltering, and—gathered together with
that end in view—first begin to gather. The gathering [die Lese]
requires and demands this assembly. This original coordination gov-
erns their collective gathering.
However, lesen [to gather] thought in this way does not simply
stand near legen [to lay]. Nor does the former simply accompany the
latter. Rather, ffltherjng is a l r e a d y included in laying. Every gathering
is already a laying. Every laying is of itself gathering. Then what does
"to lay" mean? Laying brings to lie, in that it lets things lie together
before us. All too readily we take this "letting" in the sense of omitting
or letting go. To lay, to bring to lie, to let lie, would then mean to
concern ourselves no longer with what is laid down and lies before
us—to ignore it. However, ^tfyeiv, to lay, by its letting-lie-together-
before means just this, that jvhatever lies before us involves us and
therefore concerns us. Laying as letting-lie-together-before [bei-
sammen-vorliegen-Lassen] is concerned with retaining whatever is laid
down as lying before us. (In the Alemanic dialect legi means a weir or
dam which lies ahead in the river, against the water's current.)
The Ae\eiv or laying now to be thought has in advance relin-
quished all claims—claims never even known to it—to be that which
for the first time brings whatever lies before us into its position [Lage].
Laying, as Xtfyeiv, simply tries to let what of itself lies together here
before us, as what lies before, into its protection, a protection in which

62
 Logos (Heraclltus, Fragment B 50)

it remains laid down. What sort of protection is this? What lies together
before us is stored, laid away, secured and deposited in unconceal-
ment, and that means sheltered in uncorjcealment. By letting things lie
together before us, Affyeiv undertakes to secure what lies before us in
unconcealment. The_it£io8ai, the lying before for-itself of what is in
this fashion deposited, i.e. the KeiofJai o f unoKefuevov, is nothing
more and nothing less than _the presenting of that which lies before us
into unconcealment. In this Xtfyeiv of urtOKei'uevov, Xeyeiv as gather-
ing and assembling remains implied. Because Xtfyeiv, which lets
things lie together before us, concerns itself solely with the safety of
that which lies before us in unconcealment, the gathering appropriate
to such a laying is determined in advance by safekeeping.
Aiyeiv is to lay. Laying is the letting-lie-before—which is
gathered into itself—of that which comes together into presence.
The question arises: How does the proper meaning of Xe'yeiv, to
lay, attain the signification of saying and talking? The foregoing reflec-
tion already contains the answer, for it makes us realize that we can no
longer raise the question in such a manner. Why not? Because what we
have been thinking about in no way tells us that this word Xe'yeiv
advanced from the one meaning, "to lay," to the other, "to say."
w
» hftw ^ m > ^ 4 ^ ^ j fhp f"rp£"'ig with the transfor-
n

mation of word meanings. Bather, we have stumbled upon an event

whose immensity still lies concealed in its long unnoticed simplicity.
The saying and talking of mortals comes to pass from early on as
Ae\eiv, laying. Saying and talking occur essentially as the letting-lie-
together-before of everything which, laid in unconcealment, comes to
presence. The original Xe'yeiv, laying, unfolds itself early and in a
manner ruling everything unconcealed as saying and talking. Atfyeiv as
laying lets itself be overpowered by the predominant sense, but only in
order to deposit the essence of saying and talking at the outset under the
governance of laying proper.
That Xe'YCiv is a laying wherein saying and talking articulate their
essence, refers to the earliest and most consequential decision concern-
ing the essence of language. Where did it come from? This question is
as weighty, and supposedly the same, as the other question: How far
does this characterization of the essence of language from laying ex-

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING

tend? The question reaches into the uttermost of the possible essential
origins of language. For, like the letting-lie-before that gathers, saying
receives its essential form from the unconcealment of that which lies
together before us. But the unconcealing of the concealed into uncon-
cealment is the very presencing of what is present. We call this the
Being of beings. Thus, the essential speaking of language, Xe'yeiv as
laying, is determined neither by vocalization (qxuvrf) nor by signifying
(onpafveiv). Expression and signification have long been accepted as
manifestations which indubitably betray some characteristics of lan-
guage. But they do not genuinely reach into the realm of the primor-
dial, essential determination of language, nor are they at all capable of
determining this realm in its primary characteristics. That saying as
laying ruled unnoticed and from early on, and—as if nothing at all had
occurred there—that speaking accordingly appeared as Xtfyeiv,
produced a curious state of affairs. Human thought was never as-
tonished by this event, nor did it discern in it a mystery which con-
cealed an essential dispensation o f Being to men, a dispensation
perhaps reserved for that historical moment which would not only
devastate man from top to bottom but send his very essence reeling.
To say is Xe'yeiv. This sentence, if well thought, now sloughs off
everything facile, trite, and vacuous. It names the inexhaustible mys-
tery that the speaking of language comes to pass from the unconceal-
ment of what is present, and is determined according to the lying-
before of what is present as the letting-Iie-together-before. Will think-
ing finally learn to catch a glimpse of what it means that Aristotle
could characterize Xe'yeiv as dno<pafveo6ai? The Xdyoc. by itself bring*
that which appears and comes forward in its lying before us to
appearance—to its luminous self-showing (cf. Being and Time, § 7b).
Saying is a letting-Iie-together-before which gathers and is
gathered. I f such is the essence of speaking, then what is hearing? As
Xe'yeiv, speaking is not characterized as a reverberation which expres-
ses meaning. If saying is not characterized by vocalization, then neither
can the hearing which corresponds to it occur as a reverberation meet-
ing the ear and getting picked up, as sounds troubling the auditory
sense and being transmitted. Were our hearing primarily and always
only this picking up and transmitting o f sounds, conjoined by several

64
 Logos (Heraclittis, Fragment B 50)

other processes, the result would be that the reverberation would go in

one ear and out the other. That happens in fact when we are not
gathered to what is addressed. But the addressed is itself that which
lies before us, as gathered and laid before us. Hearing is actually this
gathering of oneself which composes itself on hearing the pronounce-
ment and its claim. Hearing is primarily gathered hearkening. What is
heard comes to presence in hearkening. We hear when we are "all
ears." But "ear" does not here mean the acoustical sense apparatus.
The anatomically and physiologically identifiable ears, as the tools of
sensation, never bring about a hearing, not even if we take this solely
as an apprehending of noises, sounds, and tones. Such apprehending
can neither be anatomically established nor physiologically demon-
strated, nor in any way grasped as a biological process at work within
the organism—although apprehension lives only so long as it is em-
bodied. So long as we think of hearing along the lines of acoustical
science, everything is made to stand on its head. W e wrongly think
that the activation of the body's audio equipment is hearing proper.
But then hearing in the sense of hearkening and heeding is supposed to
be a transposition of hearing proper into the realm of the spiritual [das
Geistige]. In the domain of scientific research one can establish many
useful findings. One can demonstrate that periodic oscillations in air
pressure of a certain frequency are experienced as tones. From such
kinds of determinations concerning what is heard, an investigation can
be launched which eventually only specialists in the physiology of the
senses can conduct.
In contrast to this, perhaps only a little can be said concerning
proper hearing, which nevertheless concerns everyone directly. Here
it is not so much a matter for research, but rather of paying thoughtful
attention to simple things. Thus, precisely this belongs to proper hear-
ing: that man can hear wrongly insofar as he does not catch what is
essential. I f the ears do not belong directly to proper hearing, in the
sense of hearkening, then hearing and the ears are in a special situa-
tion. We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e. our
bodies are equipped with ears, because we hear. Mortals hear the
thunder of the heavens, the rustling of woods, the gurgling of foun-
tains, the ringing of plucked strings, the rumbling of motors, the noises

65
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

of the city—only and only so far as they always already in some way
belong to them and yet do not belong to them.
We are all ears when our gathering devotes itself entirely to
hearkening, the ears and the mere invasion of sounds being completely
forgotten. So long as we only listen to the sound of a word, as the
expression of a speaker, we are not yet even listening at all. Thus, in
this way we never succeed in having genuinely heard anything at all.
But when does hearing succeed? We have heard [gehört] when we
belong to [gehören] the matter addressed. The speaking of the mat-
ter addressed is Xe^eiv, letting-Ue-together-before. To belong to
speech—this is nothing else than in each case letting whatever a
letting-lie-before lays down before us lie gathered in its entirety. Such
a letting-lie establishes whatever lies before us as lying-before. It estab-
lishes this as itself. It lays one and the Same in one. It lays one as the
Same. Such Xtfyeiv lays one and the same, the dudv. Such Xe'yeiv is
duoXoyeiv: One as the Same, i.e. a letting-lie-before of what does lie
before us, gathered in the selfsameness of its lying-before.
Proper hearing occurs essentially in Xe'yeiv as duoXoyeiv. This is
consequendy a Xe'yeiv which lets lie before us whatever already lies
together before us; which indeed lies there by virtue of a laying which
concerns everything that lies together before us of itself. This excep-
tional laying is the Xe'yeiv which comes to pass as the Adyoc,.
Thus is Adyoc. named without qualification: d Adyoc., the Laying:
the pure letting-Iie-together-before of that which of itself comes to lie
before us, in its lying there. In this fashion Adyoc. occurs essentially as
the pure laying which gathers and assembles. Adyoc, is the original
assemblage of the primordial gathering from the primordial Laying.'O
Adyoc. is the Laying that gathers [die lesende Lege], and only this.
However, is all this no more than an arbitrary interpretation and
an all-too-alien translation with respect to the usual understanding
which takes Adyoc. as meaning and reason? At first it does sound
strange, and it may remain so for a long time—calling Adyoc. "the
Laying that gathers." But how can anyone decide whether what this
translation implies concerning the essence of Adyoc. remains appro-
priate, if only in the most remote way, to what Heraclitus named and
thought in the name d Adyoc.?

66
 Logos (HeracHtus. Fragment B 50)

The only way to decide is to consider what Heraclitus himself says

in the fragment cited. The saying begins: OUK £*uoü" It begins with
a strict, prohibiting "Not . " It refers to the saying and talking of
Heraclitus himself. It concerns the hearing of mortals. "Not to me,"
i.e. not to this one who is talking; you are not to heed the vocalization
of his talk. You never hear properly so long as your ears hang upon the
sound and flow of a human voice in order to snatch up for yourselves a
manner of speaking. Heraclitus begins the saying with a rejection of
hearing as nothing but the passion of the ears. But this rejection is
founded on a reference to proper hearing.
OÜK tfpou dXXd . Not to me should you listen (as though gap-
ing), but rather "mortal hearing must attend to something else. To
what? 'AXXd TOÜ" Adyou. The way of proper hearing is determined by
the Adyoq. But inasmuch as the Adyoq is named without qualification
it cannot be just any customary thing. Therefore, the hearing appro-
priate to it cannot proceed casually toward it, only to pass it by once
again. If there is to be proper hearing, mortals must have already heard
the Adyoq with an attention [Gehör] which implies nothing less than
their belonging to the Adyoq.
OÜK fjpoü dXAd TOU Adyou dKodoavxaq. "When you have lis-
tened, not merely to me (the speaker), but rather when you maintain
yourselves in hearkening attunement [Gehören], then there is proper
hearing."
What happens, then, when such hearing occurs? When there is
such proper hearing there is duoXoyeiv, which can only be what it is as
a Xe\eiv. Proper hearing belongs to the Adyoq. Therefore this hearing
is itself a Xfiyeiv. As such, the proper hearing of mortals is in a certain
way the Same as the Adyoq. At the same time, however, precisely as
duoXoyeiv, it is not the Same at all. It is not the same as the Adyoq
itself. Rather, duoXoyeiv remains a Xcfyeiv which always and only lays
or lets lie whatever is already, as dudv, gathered together and lying before
us; this lying never springs from the duoXoyeiv but rather rests in the
Laying that gathers, i.e. in the Adyoq.
But what occurs when there is proper hearing, as duoXoyeiv? Hera-
clitus says: rxxpdv e"ouv. When duoXoyeiv occurs, then oocpdv comes to
pass. We read: orxpdv e o n v . One translates oocpov correctly as

67
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

"wise." But what does "wise" mean? Does it mean simply to know in the
way old "wise men" know things? What do we know of such knowing? If
it remains a having-seen whose seeing is not of the eyes of the senses,
just as the having-heard is not hearing with the auditory equipment,
then having-seen and having-heard presumably coincide. They do not
refer to a mere grasping, but to a certain land of behavior. Of what sort?
Of the sort that maintains itself in the abode of mortals. This abiding
holds to what the Laying that gathers lets lie before us, which in each
case already lies before us. Thus ooqtdy signifies that which can adhere to
whatever has been indicated, can devote itself to it, and can dispatch
itself toward it (get under way toward it). Because it is appropriate
[schickliches] such behavior becomes skillful [geschickt]. When we want
to say that someone is particularly skilled at something we still employ
such turns of speech as "he has a gift for that and is destined for it." In
this fashion we hit upon the genuine meaning of oxxpdv, which we
translate as "fateful" Cgeschicklich"]. But "fateful" from the start says
something more than "skillful." When proper hearing, as duoXoyefv, is,
then the fateful comes to pass, and mortal Xeyeiv is dispatched to the
Adyoc,. It becomes concerned with the Laying that gathers. Atfyeiv is
dispatched to what is appropriate, to whatever rests in the assemblage of
the primordiaDy gathering laying-before, i.e. in that which the Laying
that gathers has sent. Thus it is indeed fateful when mortals accomplish
proper hearing. But oo<pdv is not id Lcxpdv, the "fateful" is not "Fate,"
so called because it gathers to itself all dispensation, and precisely that
which is appropriate to the behavior of mortals. We have not yet made
out what, according to the thinking of Heraclitus, d Adyoc. is; it remains
still undecided whether the translation of d Adyoc. as "the Laying that
gathers" captures even a small part of what the Adyoc, is.
And already we face a new riddle: the word T6 Eocpdv. If we are to
think it in Heraclitus' way, we toil in vain so long as we do not pursue it
in the saying in which it speaks, up to the very words that conclude it.
^OuoAoyeiv occurs when the hearing of mortals has become
proper hearing. When such a thing happens something fateful comes
to pass. Where, and as what, does the fateful presence? Heraclitus
says: dpoXoyeiv ocxpdv doriv'Ev ndvxa, "the fateful comes to pass
insofar as One All."

68
 Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)

The text which is now current runs: £v ndvxa elvai. * The elvai is
an alteration of the sole traditional reading: év ndvxa elbevai,
understood to mean, "It is wise to know that everything is one." The
conjectural elvai is more appropriate. Still, we set aside the verb. By
what right? Because the'Ev ndvxa suffices. But it not only suffices: it
remains far more proper for the matter thought here, and likewise for
the style of Heraclitean speech. "Ev ndvxa, One: All, All: One.
How easily one speaks these words. How readily they transform
themselves into a stolid maxim. A swarming multiplicity of meanings
nestles in both these dangerously harmless words, ¿V and ndvxa Their
indeterminate juxtaposition permits various assertions. In the words Sv
ndvxa the hasty superficiality of usual representations collides with the
hesitant caution of the thinking that questions. The statement "One is
all" can lend itself to an overhasty account of the world which hopes to
buttress itself with a formula that is in some way correct everywhere,
for all times. But the'Ev Ildvxa can also conceal a thinker's first steps
which initiate all the following steps in the fateful course of thinking.
The second case applies with Heraclitus' words. We do not know their
content, in the sense of being able to revive Heraclitus' own way of
representing things. We are also far removed from a thoughtful com-
prehension of these words. But from this "far remove" we may still
succeed in delineating more meaningfully a few characteristics o f the
scope of the words ¿v and ndvxa, and of the phrase'Ev ndvxa. This
delineation should remain a free-flowing preliminary sketch rather
than a more self-assured portrayal. O f course, we should attempt such
a sketch only in reflecting upon what Heraclitus said from within the
unity of his saying. As it tells us what and how the fateful is, the saying
names the Adyoq. The saying closes with'Ev n d v x a Is this conclusion
only a termination, or does it first unlock what is to be said, by way of
response?
The usual interpretation understands Heraclitus' fragment thus: it

*See Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. (Berlin: Weid-
mannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1851), I, 161, line 17. Kranz rejects the Miller-
Comperz paraphrase el6¿vai and prints elvai. Heidegger's citation of B 50 capital-
izes *Ev n d v r a and drops elvai.—TR.

69
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

is wise to listen to the pronouncement of the Adyoq and to heed the

meaning of what is pronounced, while repeating what one has heard in
the statement: One is All. There is the Adyoq. It has something to
relate. Then there is also that which it relates, to wit, that everything is
one.
However, the'Ev Ildvia is not what the Adyoq relates as a maxim
or gives as a meaning to be understood. *Ev Ildvia is not what the
Adyoq pronounces; rather,"Ev fldvia suggests the way in which Adyoc;
essentially occurs.
" E v is the unique One, as unifying. It unifies by assembling. It
assembles in that, in gathering, it lets lie before us what lies before us
as such and as a whole. The unique One unifies as the Laying that
gathers. This gathering and laying unifying assembles all uniting in
itself, so that it is this One, and as this One, is what is unique. What-
ever is named*Ev Ildvia in Heraclitus' fragment gives us a simple clue
concerning what the Adyoq is.
Do we wander off the path if we think Adyoq as Ae'yeiv prior to all
profound metaphysical interpretations, thereby thinking to establish
seriously that Ae'yeiv, as gathering letting-lie-together-before, can be
nothing other than the essence of unification, which assembles every-
thing in the totality of simple presencing? There is only one
appropriate answer to the question of what Adyoq is. In our formula-
tion it reads: d Adyoq Xe'yei. Adyoq lets-lie-together-before. What?
r i d v i a What this word means Heraclitus tells us immediately and
unequivocally in the beginning of fragment B 7: Ei ndvra id
dvTa . " I f everything (namely) which is present . " The Laying
that gathers has, as Adyoq, laid down everything present in uncon-
cealment. To lay is to shelter. Laying shelters everything present in its
presencing, from which whatever lingers awhile in presence can be
appropriately collected and brought forward by mortal Xtfyeiv. Adyoq
lays that which is present before and down into presencing, that is, it
puts those things back. Presencing nevertheless suggests: having come
forward to endure in unconcealment. Because the Adyoq lets lie before
us what lies before us as such, it discloses what is present in its presenc-
ing. But disclosure is 'AXrjGeia. This and Adyoq are the Same. Ae'yeiv

70
 Logos (HeraclUua, Fragment B 50)

lets dXnOeo. , unconcealed as such, lie before us (cf. B 112*). All

disclosure releases what is present from concealment. Disclosure
needs concealment. The 'A-ArfSeia rests in Arf6n, drawing from it and
laying before us whatever remains deposited in AifGq. Adyoq is in itself
and at the same time a revealing and a concealing. It is 'AXrfGeia.
Unconcealment needs concealment, ArjOr), as a reservoir upon which
disclosure can, as it were, draw. Adyoq, the Laying that gathers, has in
itself this revealing-concealing character. When we can see in Adyoc,
how the'Ev essentially occurs as unifying, it becomes equally clear that
this unifying which occurs in the Adyoc. remains infinitely different
from what we tend to represent as a connecting or binding together.
The unifying that rests in Xe'yeiv is neither a mere comprehensive
collecting nor a mere coupling of opposites which equalizes all con-
traries. T h e ' E v Ildvia lets he together before us in one presencing
things which are usually separated from, and opposed to, one another,
such as day and night, winter and summer, peace and war, waking and
sleeping, Dionysos and Hades. Such opposites, borne along the far-
thest distance between presence and absence, 6iaq>epduevov, let the
Laying that gathers lie before us in its full bearing. Its laying is itself
that which carries things along by bearing them out. The'E v is itself a
carrying out.
*Ev n d v r a says what the Adyoc. is. Adyoc. says how'Ev ndvxa
essentially occurs. Both are the Same.
When mortal Xe'yeiv is dispatched to the Adyoc., duoXoyeiv
occurs. This is assembled in the "Ev, with its unifying domi-
nance. When duoXoyeiv occurs, the fateful comes to pass. However,
duoXoyeiv is never properly Fate itself. Where do we ever find, not
merely things that are fated, but the fateful itself? What is the fateful
•Fragment B 112, Dlels-Kranz I, 176 reads:
ouxppovciv dpetr) \ieyiou\, nal ocxpfn dXnOe'a Ae'veiv Kal noielv xaxd qnfoiv
e'nafoviaq.
Healthful thinking is the greatest perfection: and wisdom consists in saying the truth
and acting in accordance with nature, listening to it.
If we may venture another translation: "Thinking is the greatest arete, for what is
fateful comes to pass when, in dedicated hearkening, we let unconcealment lie before us
and bring forth [what is present] along the lines of self-disclosure."—TR.

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING

itself? Heraclitus says what it is unequivocally at the beginning of

fragment B 32:*Ev id oo<pov uoûvov, "the unique One unifying all is
alone the fateful." But if the'Ev is the same as the Adyoc, the result is:
d Adyoc id «wpdv-uoûvov- The only properly fateful matter is the
Adyoc. When mortal Xtfyeiv, as duoXoyeîv, is dispatched toward what
is fateful, it is sent on its fated way.
But how is Adyoc. the fateful, how is it destiny proper, that is, thé
assembly of that which sends everything into its own? The Laying that
gathers assembles in itself all destiny by bringing things and letting
them lie before us, keeping each absent and present being in its place
and on its way; and by its assembling it secures everything in the
totality. Thus each being can be joined and sent into its own. Heracli-
tus says (B 64): xd 6è ndvxa ofaxIÇei Kepauvdq. "But lightning steers
(in presencing) the totality (of what is present)."
Lightning abrupdy lays before us in an instant everything present
in the light of its presencing. The lightning named here steers. It
brings all things forward to their designated, essential place. Such
instantaneous bringing is the Laying that gathers, the Adyoc.
"Lightning" appears here as an epithet of Zeus. As the highest of gods,
Zeus is cosmic destiny. The Adyoc., the'Ev ndvxa, would accordingly
be nothing other than the highest god. The essence of Adyoc thus
would offer a clue concerning the divinity of the god.
Ought we now to place Adyoç.'Ev ndvxa, and Zeûç all together,
and even assert that Heraclitus teaches pantheism? Heraclitus does not
teach this or any doctrine. As a thinker, he only gives us to think. With
regard to our question whether Adyoc, f Ev ndvxa) and Zeûç are the
Same, he certainly gives us difficult matters to think about. The rep-
resentational thought of subsequent centuries and millennia has car-
ried this question along without thinking it, ultimately to relieve itself
of this unfamiliar burden with the aid of a ready forgetfulness. Hera-
clitus says (B 32):

"Ev TO Xo<pov uoûvov Xeyeoôai oik eWAei

Kai èQéXci Znvoç dvoua-
The One, which alone is wise, does not want
and yet does want to be called by the name Zeus.
(Diels-Kranz)
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 Logos (Herachtus, Fragment B 50)

The word that carries the saying, ¿66X11}, does not mean "to want,"
but rather "to be ready of itself for "; e'Be'Xuj does not mean merely
to demand something, but rather to allow something a reference back
to itself. However, if we are to consider carefully the import of what is
said in the saying, we must weigh what it says in the first line: *Ev
XtfyeoOai odic eWXei. "The unique-unifying-One, the Lay-
ing that gathers, is not ready ." Ready for what? For Xeyeodai, to be
assembled under the name "Zeus." For if in such assemblage t h e ' E v
should be brought to light as Zeus, then perhaps it would always have
to remain an apparition. That the saying under consideration concerns
Xcfyeodai in immediate relation to dvoua (the naming word), indisput-
ably points to the meaning of Xe'yeiv as saying, talking, naming. So
precisely this saying of Herachtus, which seems to contradict directly
everything said above concerning Xe'yeiv and Xdyoq, is designed to
allow us renewed thinking on whether and how far Xe'yeiv in the sense
of "saying" and "talking" is intelligible only if it is thought in its most
proper sense—as "laying" and "gathering." To name means to call
forward. That which is gathered and laid down in the name, by means
of such a laying, comes to light and comes to he before us. The naming
(dvoua), thought in terms of Xe'yeiv, is not the expressing of a word-
meaning but rather a letting-lie-before in the light wherein something
stands in such a way that it has a name.
In the first place the'Ev, the Adyoc,, the destining of everything
fateful, is not in its innermost essence ready to appear under the name
"Zeus," i.e. to appear as Zeus: odx e"8efXei. Only after that does xal
iQiXei follow: the'Ev is "yet also ready."
Is it only a manner of speaking when Heraclitus says first that
the'Ev does not admit the naming in question, or does the priority
of denial have its ground in the matter itself? For"Ev ndvra, as Adyoc.,
lets everything present come to presence. T h e ' E v , however, is not
itself one present being among others. It is in its way unique. Zeus, for
his part, is not simply someone present among others. He is the high-
est of present beings. Thus Zeus is designated in an exceptional way in
presencing; he is alloted this special designation, and appropriately
called to such an apportionment (Moipa) in the all-assembling'Ev, i.e.
Fate. Zeus is not himself the "Ev, although as the one who aims
lightning-bolts he executes Fate's dispensations.
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 EARLY GREEK THINKING

That with respect to the e'Oe'Xei the oihc is designated first suggests
that the"Ev does not properly admit of being named Zeus, and of being
thereby degraded to the level of existing as one being present among
others—even if the "among" has the character of "above all other
present beings."
On the other hand, according to the saying, the"Ev does admit of
being named Zeus. How? The answer is already contained in what has
just been said. I f the "Ev is not apprehended as being by itself the
Adyoq, if it appears rather as the ITdvTa, then and only then does the
totality of present beings show itself under the direction of the highest
present being as one totality under this [unifying] One. The totality of
present beings is under its highest aspect the°Ev as Zeus. The*Ev
itself, however, as'Ev ndvra, is the Adyoq, the Laying that gathers. As
Adyoq, the"Ev alone is td Ecxpdv, the fateful as Fate itself: the gather-
ing of destiny into presence.
If the dxodeiv of mortals is directed to Adyoq alone, to the Laying
that gathers, then mortal Acfyeiv is skillfully brought to the gathering of
the Adyoq. Mortal Xe\eiv lies secured in the Advoc It is destined to
be appropriated in dpoXoyeiv. Thus it remains appropriated to the
Adyoc,. In this way mortal Xtfyeiv is fateful. But it is never Fate itself,
i.e.*Ev n d v r a as d Adyoq.
Now that the saying of Heraclitus speaks more clearly, what it says
again threatens to fade into obscurity.
T h e ' E v n d v r a indeed contains the clue to the way in which
Adyoq in its Xdyeiv essentially occurs. Yet whether it is thought as
"laying" or as "saying," does XtJyeiv forever remain merely a type of
mortal behavior? If "Ev ndvra were the Adyoq, then would not a
particular aspect of mortal being be elevated to become the fundamen-
tal trait of that which, as the destiny of presencing itself, stands above
all mortal and immortal being? Does the Adyoq imply the elevation
and transfer of the mortal's way-to-be to that of the unique One? Does
mortal Xifyeiv remain only an image corresponding to the Adyoq,
which is itself the Fate in which presencing as such and for all present
beings rests?
Or does such questioning, which attaches itself to the guidelines of
an Either-Or, not at all apply, because its approach is from the start

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 Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)

inadequate to the inquiry here undertaken? If this is so, then neither

can Adyoc, be the overcoming of mortal Affyeiv, nor can Aeyeiv be
simply a copying of the definitive Adyoc;. Then whatever essentially
occurs in the Atfyeiv of duoAoyef v and in the Atfyeiv of the Adyoq has a
more primordial origin—and this in the simple middle region between
both. Is there a path for mortal thinking to that place?
In any case, the path remains at first confused and confounded by
the very ways which early Creek thinking opened for those who were
to follow. We shall limit ourselves to stepping back before the riddle,
in order to get a first glimpse of several of its puzzling aspects.
The saying of Heraclitus under discussion (B 50) states, according
to our translation and commentary:
Do not listen to me, the mortal speaker, but be in hearkening to the Laying
that gathers; first belong to this and then you hear properly; such hearing is
when a letting-lie-together-before occurs by which the gathering letting-lie,
the Laying that gathers, lies before us as gathered; when a letting-lie of the
letting-lie-before occurs, the fateful comes to pass; then the truly fateful, i.e.
destiny alone, is: the unique One unifying All.

If we set aside the commentary, though not forgetting it, and try to
translate into our language what Heraclitus said, his saying reads:
Attuned not to me but to the Laying that gathers: letting the Same lie: the/
fateful occurs (the Laying that gathers): One unifying All. —'

Mortals, whose essence remains appropriated in duoAoyeiv are

fateful when they measure the Adyoc, as the"Ev n d v i a and submit
themselves to its measurement. Therefore Heraclitus says (B 43):
"VPpiv xpr) opevvu'vai uaAXov it nupKairfv.

Measureless pride needs to be extinguished sooner than a raging fire.

This is needed because Adyoc, needs duoAoyeiv if present beings are to

appear and shine in presencing. 'OuoAoyeiv dispatches itself without
presumption into the measuring of the AO'YOC..
From the saying first considered (B 50) we receive a distant coun-
sel, which the last-named saying (B 43) indicates to be the most neces-
sary of all:

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 EARLY GREEK THINKING

Before you play with fire, whether it be to kindle or extinguish it,

put out first the flames of presumption, which overestimates itself and
takes poor measure because it forgets the essence o f Aeyeiv.

The translation of Xtfyeiv as gathered-letting-lie-before, and of

Adyoc, as the Laying that gathers, may seem strange. Yet it is more
salutary for thinking to wander into the strange than to establish itself
in the obvious. Presumably Heraclitus alienated his contemporaries at
least as much, although in an entirely different way, by weaving the
words Xefyeiv and Xdyoc, so familiar to them, into such a saying, and
by making d Adyoc. the guiding word of his thinking. Where does this
word d Xdyoc—which we are now attempting to think as the Laying
that gathers—lead Heraclitus' thought? The word d Adyoc. names that
which gathers all present beings into presencing and lets them lie
before us in it.'O Adyoc. names that in which the presencing of what is
present comesjQ_pass. The presencing of present beings the Greeks
call xd ddv, that is, td elvai tulv dviuiv, in Latin, esse entium. We say
the Being of beings. Since the beginning of Western thought the Being
of beings emerges as what is alone worthy of thought. If we think this
historic development in a truly historical way, then that in which the
beginning of Western thought rests first becomes manifest: that in
Creek antiquity the Being of beings becomes worthy of thought is the
beginning of the West and is the hidden source of its destiny. Had this
beginning not safeguarded what has been, i.e. the gathering of what
still endures, the Being of beings would not now govern from the
essence of modern technology. Through technology the entire globe is
today embraced and held fast in a kind of Being experienced in West-
ern fashion and represented on the epistemological models of Euro-
pean metaphysics and science.
In the thinking of Heraclitus the Being (presencing) of beings
appears as d Adyoc, as the Laying that gathers. But this lightning-flash
of Being remains forgotten. And this oblivion remains hidden, in its
turn, because the conception of Adyoc is forthwith transformed. Thus,
early on and for a long time it was inconceivable that the Being of
beings could have brought itself to language in the word d Adyoq.
What happens when the Being of beings, the being in its Being,

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 Logos (HeracUtus, Fragment B 50)

the distinction between the two as a distinction, is brought to lan-

guage? "To bring to language" usually means to express something
orally or in writing. But the phrase now wishes to think something else:
"to bring to language" means to secure Being in the essence of lan-
guage. May we suggest that such an event prepared itself when d
Adyoq became the guiding word of Heraclitus' thinking, because it
became the name for the Being of beings?
' O Adyoq, id Atfyeiv, is the Laying that gathers. But at the same
time Xefyeiv always means for the Creeks to lay before, to exhibit, to
tell, to say. ' O Adyoq then would be the Creek name for speaking,
saying, and language. Not only this.'O Adyoq, thought as the Laying
that gathers, would be the essence of saying [die Sage] as thought by
the Greeks. Language would be saying. Language would be the gather-
ing letting-Iie-before of what is present in its presencing. In fact, the
Greeks dwelt in this essential determination of language. But they
never thought it—Heraclitus included.
The Creeks do experience saying in this way. But, Heraclitus
included, they never think the essence of language expressly as the
Adyoq, as the Laying that gathers.
What would have come to pass had HeracUtus—and all the Creeks
after him—thought the essence of language expressly as Adyoq, as the
Laying that gathers! Nothing less than this: the Greeks would have
thought the essence of language from the essence of Being—indeed, as
this itself. For d Adyoq is the name for the Being of beings. Yet none of
this came to pass. Nowhere do we find a trace of the Greeks' having
thought the essence of language directly from the essence of Being.
Instead, language came to be represented—indeed first of all with the
Greeks—as vocalization, cpuivrf, as sound and voice, hence phonetic-
ally. The Creek word that corresponds to our word "language" is
yXcuooa, "tongue." Language is cpuivri, cmuavTiicrf, a vocalization which
signifies something. This suggests that language attains at the outset
that preponderant character which we designate with the name "ex-
pression." This correct but externally contrived representation of lan-
guage, language as "expression," remains definitive from now on. It is
still so today. Language is taken to be expression, and vice versa.
Every kind of expression is represented as a kind of language. Art

77
 EARLY GREEK THINKING

historians speak of the "language of forms." Once, however, in the

beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed in the
light of Being—once, when Heraclitus thought the Adyoq as his guid-
ing word, so as to think in this word the Being of beings. But the
lightning abruptly vanished. No one held onto its streak of light and the
nearness of what it illuminated.
We see this lightning only when we station ourselves in the storm
of Being. Yet everything today betrays the fact that we bestir ourselves
only to driveJtarmsjiway. We organize all available means for cloud-
seeding and storm dispersal in order to have calm in the face of the
storm. But this calm is no tranquility. It is only anesthesia; more pre-
cisely, the narcotization o f anxiety in^the^face of thinking.
To think is surely a peculiar affair. The word of thinkers has no
authority. The word of thinkers knows no authors, in the sense of
writers. The word of thinking is not picturesque; it is without charm.
The word of thinking rests in the sobering quality of what it says. Just
the same, thinking changes the world. It changes it in the ever darker
depths of a riddle, depths which as they grow darker offer promise of a
greater brightness.
The riddle has long been propounded to us in the word "Being."
In this matter "Being" remains only the provisional word. Let us see to
it that our thinking does not merely run after it blindly. Let us first
thoughtfully consider that "Being" was originally called "presenc-
ing"—and "presencing": enduring-here-before in unconcealment.

78