CT 016 Olbes Vs China Banking Corporation

3/24/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 484
*
G.R. No. 152082. March 10, 2006.
RAMON R. OLBES and RICARDO R. OLBES, petitioners,

vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
Civil Law; Suretyship; No liability attaches under a contract

of suretyship for defaults occurring before it is entered into unless
an intent to be so liable is indicated.—Petitioners’ posture is valid
to a degree. It bears to point out, however, that the rule on the
retrospective application of a suretyship agreement admits of
exceptions. The Court referred to one in Willex Plastic Industries,
Corp. vs. CA, 256 SCRA 478 (1996). There, we held that no
liability attaches under a contract of suretyship for defaults
occurring before it is entered into unless an intent to be so liable is
indicated. Indeed, as we said in an old but still very much
applicable case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Foerster, 49
Phil. 843 (1926), although a contract of suretyship is ordinarily
not to be construed as retrospective, in the end the intention of
the parties, as revealed by the evidence, is controlling. Put in
another way, the rule that bonds or other contracts of suretyship
are ordinarily not to be construed as retrospective must yield to
the intention of the contracting parties as revealed by the
evidence, and does not interfere with the use of ordinary tests and
canons of interpretation which apply in regard to other contracts.
Same; Same; If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall control.—Not to be overlooked is
the fact that the “Suretyship Agreement” expressly contemplated
a solidary obligation, providing as it did that “. . . . the surety(ies)
hereby jointly and severally undertake, bind themselves and
warrant to the said Creditor. . . .” It is a cardinal rule that if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control. In the present case, there can be no
mistaking about petitioners’ intent, as sureties, to be jointly and
severally obligated with the principal maker of the notes in
dispute. As such sureties, Ramon Olbes and Ricardo Olbes are
personally liable under the suretyship agreement.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001712b0786da10e3ac7f003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/10
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 331
Olbes vs. China Banking Corporation
Same; Same; Contracts; It behooves every contracting party to

learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and
delivers it.—Having affixed his consenting signature in a contract
with full knowledge of its terms and conditions, petitioner Ricardo
Olbes is precluded from asserting, as he presently does, that he
acted under a misapprehension or in ignorance of the legal effect
of the contract, or the undertaking he assumed thereunder. He,
just like his co-petitioner, Ramon Olbes, does not appear to be
unlettered. The trial court in fact described both petitioners as
“intelligent men,” and top officers of a “corporation which has 200
affiliates worldwide,” Being an experienced businessman,
doubtless routinely dealing with commercial papers and
documents passing his table, petitioner Ricardo Olbes knew, or at
least presumed to know, the import of the documents he executed
as co-maker. He cannot be heard on his allegation of not knowing
the legal effect of what he was entering into on the pretext that
respondent bank failed to inform him about such detail. It cannot
be over-emphasized that it behooves every contracting party to
learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and
delivers it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Gana & Manlangit Law Office for petitioners.
Lim, Vigilia, Alcala, Dumlao & Orencia for
respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari

1
to set aside and reverse that portion of the Decision dated
January 31, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 56487 entitled “China Banking Corporation vs.
Olbes, Ogilvy & Mather, Inc. (OO&M), Ramon R. Olbes and
Ricardo
_______________
1 Penned by then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a

member of this Court), with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
and Sergio L. Pestaño (Ret.) concurring; Rollo, pp. 32-44.
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

R. Olbes,” holding herein petitioners Ramon R. Olbes and

Ricardo R. Olbes solidarily liable with OO&M on the loan
obligation obtained by the latter from respondent China
Banking Corporation.
The CA recites the facts, as follows:
“On four occasions in 1989 up to 1990, [herein respondent] China

Banking Corporation . . . , as lender and [OO&M] . . . as borrower
entered into loan agreements covered by promissory notes bearing
numbers T-227, T-228, T-229, T-230 and T-231 ….
The promissory notes [PNs] contain identical provisions with a
few exceptions. The identical provisions material to the present
case include the escalation clause found in the 4th paragraph of
each of the five [PNs], . . . , the name of Ramon Olbes with a
signature appearing thereon as agent of the borrower corporation,
and the name of Ricardo Olbes which was rubber stamped in the
first 4 notes as “co-maker”.
The material differences, on the other hand, concern the dates
of execution . . . , the dates of maturity . . . [of the notes], the
amounts received by [OO&M] on the 5 [PNs] (P200,000.00,
P315,000.00, P700,000.00, P100,000.00 and P200,000.00,
respectively), and the interest rates thereon per annum (19% for
[PN] T-227, 24% for [PN] T-228 and 27% for the 3 others).
To secure the payment of the [PNs], [petitioners] Ramon Olbes
and Ricardo Olbes executed on November 12, 1990 in favor of
[respondent bank] a suretyship agreement whereby they jointly
and severally undertook to pay upon maturity any and all
obligations for which the borrower corporation may then or
thereafter be indebted to the extent of one million pesos
(P1,000,000) plus interests and attorney’s fees.
Initial payments on the [PNs] were made by [OO&M] and the
Olbeses. Since March 12, 1992, however, no further payments
were made by them, and by [respondent bank’s] computation, the
5 [PNs] had outstanding balances of P88,000.00, P140,000.00,
P407,500.00, P52,400.00, P121,600.00 respectively or a total of
P809,500.00 as of that date, exclusive of interests and penalty
charges. As demands for payment proved futile, [respondent
bank] filed a complaint for collection before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 7 of Manila on December 2, 1992 against
[OO&M] and the Olbeses.
333
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 333

The [OO&M] denied liability on the [PNs], claiming that it had

fully met its obligation and that the alleged balance came about
due to the unwarranted application . . . of the escalation clause

provided for in paragraph 4 of each of the notes.
Both Olbeses denied any liability under the suretyship
agreement, they claiming that they signed it merely as officers of
[OO&M] and that its import was never explained to them by
[respondent bank].
Ricardo Olbes also denied liability as co-maker, he claiming . . .
that he was signing as an officer of [OO&M]. All the defendants
denied liability on the penalty charges and attorney’s fees . . . .
They thus interposed a counterclaim for attorney’s fees.” (Italics
and Words in bracket added.)
On September 12, 1998, in Civil Case No. 92-63676, the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, on the premise
that Ramon Olbes is liable on the promissory notes (PNs)
based on the suretyship agreement as is Ricardo Olbes who
is furthermore personally liable as co-maker, rendered
judgment for respondent bank, as plaintiff a quo, and
against OO&M and the Olbeses, as defendants a quo.
Therefrom, herein petitioners and OO&M went on
appeal to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 56487.
On January 31, 2002, the CA rendered the herein
assailed Decision affirming that of the trial court,
particularly its disposition on the solidary liability of
herein petitioners Ramon R. Olbes and Ricardo R. Olbes,
with the modification of disallowing the application by the
respondent bank of the escalating interest rate on the loan
transactions. In full, the dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
“ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the

appealed decision with MODIFICATION in accordance with the
foregoing discussions.
As modified, the judgment reads as follows: Defendant-
appellant corporation, as maker of promissory notes Nos. T-227,
T-228. T-229 and T-230, defendant-appellant Ricardo Olbes, as co-
334

maker thereof, and appellants Ricardo Olbes and Ramon Olbes

as sureties, are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee jointly
and severally:
1. On the first cause of action, P88,000.00 representing the

unpaid principal of the promissory note No. T-227 (Exhibit
“A”) plus 19% interest per annum from March 12, 1992,
with deductions on the said unpaid principal
corresponding to the amounts included therein by

escalating the interest rates;
2. On the second cause of action, P140,000.00 representing
the unpaid principal of promissory note No. T-228 (Exhibit
“B”) plus 24% interest per annum from March 12,1992,
escalating the interest rates;
3. On the third cause of action, P407,500.00 representing the
unpaid principal of promissory not No. T-229 (Exhibit “C”)
plus 27% interest per annum from March 12, 1992, with
deductions on the said unpaid principal corresponding to
the amounts included therein by escalating the interest
rates; and;
4. On the fourth cause of action, P52,400.00 representing the
unpaid principal of promissory note No. T-230 (Exhibit
“D”) plus 27% interest per annum from March 12, 1992,
escalating the interest rates; Defendant-appellant
corporation, as maker of promissory note No. T-231, and
defendants-appellants Ricardo and Ramon Olbes as
sureties thereof, are also hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff-appellee; and
5. On the fifth cause of action, P121,600.00 representing
the unpaid principal of promissory note No. T-231 plus
27% interest per annum from March 12, 1992, with
deductions on the said unpaid corresponding to the
amounts2
included therein by escalating the interest
rates.”
Inasmuch as the assailed decision sustained their solidary

liability with, for the loan obligation of, OO&M, petitioners
have interposed the instant recourse, ascribing to the CA
the commission of the following errors, viz.:
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 43-44.
335
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 335

“1. In holding petitioners liable retroactively for the

loan obligations of . . . OO&M under the surety
agreement.
2. In holding petitioner Ricardo Olbes liable on 4 of
the subject promissory notes as co-maker based on
a mere title of “co-maker” rubber stamped under his

name on the said promissory notes despite the
absence of any provision showing him to have
understood
3
that he was affixing his signature as
such.”
The petition is without merit.

Petitioners disclaim, at the outset, liability on the PNs
on the basis of the suretyship agreement they executed on
November 12, 1990 after the execution of the last
promissory note on January 23, 1990. To them, their
undertaking under the suretyship agreement cannot be
made to cover past transactions, such as the five
promissory notes in question.
Petitioners’ posture is valid to a degree. It bears to point
out, however, that the rule on the retrospective application
of a suretyship agreement admits of exceptions. The Court4
referred to one in Willex Plastic Industries, Corp. vs. CA.
There, we held that no liability attaches under a contract of
suretyship for defaults occurring before it is entered into
unless an intent to be so liable is indicated. Indeed, as we
said in an old but still very much applicable
5
case of Bank of
the Philippine Islands vs. Foerster, although a contract of
suretyship is ordinarily not to be construed as
retrospective, in the end the intention of the parties, as
revealed by the evidence, is controlling. Put in another
way, the rule that bonds or other contracts of suretyship
are ordinarily not to be construed as retrospective must
yield to the intention of the contracting parties as revealed
by the evidence, and does not interfere
_______________
3 Id., at p. 23.
4 256 SCRA 478 (1996).
5 49 Phil. 843 (1926).
336

with the use of ordinary tests and canons 6

of interpretation
which apply in regard to other contracts.
The specific suretyship agreement under consideration
provides:
“For and in consideration of the covenants hereinafter mentioned

and of the granting of credits, overdrafts, loans, discounts, trust
receipts and such further credit facilities as may from time to
time be incurred with the Creditor by the Principal(s), the
Surety(ies) hereby jointly and severally undertake, bind

themselves and warrant to the said Creditor, its successors or
assigns the prompt payment at maturity or on demand, as the
case may be, of all overdrafts, promissory notes, discounts, letters
of credit, drafts, bills of exchange, promissory notes, etc., without
any further endorsements by the Surety(ies), for which the
Principal(s) may now be indebted7
or may hereafter become
indebted to the Creditor.” (Emphasis added.)
As correctly observed by the CA, the “Suretyship

Agreement,” as couched, expressly covered both current
(may now be indebted) and future (may hereafter become
indebted) loans of the principal. In net effect, the
agreement thus executed by petitioners was intended to
secure the payments of the amounts borrowed by and for
which OO&M signed the PNs in question.
Not to be overlooked is the fact that the “Suretyship
Agreement” expressly contemplated a solidary obligation,
providing as it did that “. . . . the surety(ies) hereby jointly
and severally undertake, bind themselves and warrant to
the said Creditor. . . .” It is a cardinal rule that if the terms
of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting8 parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulation shall control. In the present case, there can
be no mistaking about
_______________
6 Willex Plastic Industries Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 487-
488.
7 Id., at p. 71.
8 Abella vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 257 SCRA 482 (2001).
337
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 337

petitioners’ intent, as sureties, to be jointly and severally

obligated with the principal maker of the notes in dispute.
As such sureties, Ramon Olbes and Ricardo Olbes are
personally liable under the suretyship agreement.
Petitioners next fault the CA for holding petitioner
Ricardo Olbes liable as co-maker on four (4) of the subject
PNs on the basis of the word “co-maker” rubber-stamped
under his name on the said notes despite the absence of
any provision indicating that he understood that he was
affixing his signature in that capacity.
The Court is far from being convinced.
What the CA wrote on petitioner Ricardo Olbes’s posture
respecting the rubber-stamping angle reads:
“And so is the finding of the court a quo that appellant Ricardo

Olbes is personally liable as co-maker of 4 of the 5 promissory
notes. Said appellant’s denial of personal liability upon the
ground that the word “co-maker” was merely stamped and not
printed as are the rest of the wordings of the promissory notes
and that it was stamped arbitrarily does not persuade. It is
presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular
(Section 3 (p), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court). It is also
basic in evidence that he who alleges has the burden of proving
his allegation. Appellant (i.e. Ricardo Olbes), therefore, had the
burden of proving that the word “co-maker” was rubber stamped
unfairly, irregularly and arbitrarily. But the record does not
support his claim. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellee’s witness
Jacqueline Azarcon testified, and appellant Ricardo Olbes failed
to refute, that the promissory notes were stamped
9
before they
were given to appellants for their signature.” (Emphasis in the
original)
Having affixed his consenting signature in a contract with

full knowledge of its terms and conditions, petitioner
Ricardo Olbes is precluded from asserting, as he presently
does, that he acted under a misapprehension or in
ignorance of the legal effect of the contract, or the
undertaking he assumed there-
_______________
9 Supra note 1, at p. 42.
338

under. He, just like his co-petitioner, Ramon Olbes, does

not appear to be unlettered. The trial court in fact
described both petitioners as “intelligent men,” and top
officers of 10 a “corporation which has 200 affiliates
worldwide,” Being an experienced businessman, doubtless
routinely dealing with commercial papers and documents
passing his table, petitioner Ricardo Olbes knew, or at least
presumed to know, the import of the documents he
executed as co-maker. He cannot be heard on his allegation
of not knowing the legal effect of what he was entering into
on the pretext that respondent bank failed to inform him
about such detail. It cannot be overemphasized that it
behooves every contracting party to learn and know the
contents of a document before he signs and delivers it.
If blame has to be assigned, the faulting finger should be
pointed at petitioner Ricardo Olbes, who apparently did not
undertake the usual due diligence in the pursuit of his
business concerns. Had he done so, he would have easily

discovered that he was signing the action documents in
question either as a surety and/or co-maker. An error so
patent and obvious that nobody could have made it, or one
which could have been avoided by ordinary prudence,
cannot be invoked by the one who made 11
it in order to evade
liability, let alone annul a contract.
Lastly, petitioner Ricardo Olbes’s lament about the word
“co-maker” being stamped, instead of being typed or
printed, thus indicating, according him, an insertion or
intercalating situation, need not delay us long. Irregular or
fraudulent stamping is obviously Ricardo Olbes’s thesis.
But, as found by the CA, the PNs were stamped before they
were presented to Ricardo Olbes for his signature, a reality
arguing against the notion of fraudulent dealing on the
part of the respondent bank. Apart from this consideration,
the appellate court
_______________
10 Pages 17 and 18 of the RTC Decision; Rollo, pp. 62-63.

11 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 2001 ed., p. 487.
339
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 339

added, no evidence has been adduced to overturn the

presumption that private transactions have been fair and
regular. Needless to stress, the categorical factual
conclusion of the CA ought not to be disturbed in this
recourse. For, it is not this Court’s function to review,
examine, evaluate or weigh12anew the probative value of the
evidence presented below,
13
save for the most compelling
and cogent reasons. The exceptional circumstance does
not presently obtain.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the
assailed CA decision dated January 31, 2002 is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., On Sick Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—It is not the province of the court to alter a

contract by construction or to make a new contract for the
parties; its duty is confined to the interpretation of the one
which they have made for themselves, without regard to its

wisdom or folly, as the court cannot supply material
stipulations or read into a contract words which it does not
contain. (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 356 [1991])
By the contract of suretyship, it is not for the obligee to
see to it that the principal pays the debt or fulfills the
contract, but for the surety to see to it that the principal
pay or perform. (Paramount Insurance Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 377 [1999])
——o0o——
_______________
12 Phil. Lawin Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 374 SCRA 332 (2002).
13 Omandan vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 484 (2001).
340

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3/24/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 484

RAMON R. OLBES and RICARDO R. OLBES, petitioners,

Civil Law; Suretyship; No liability attaches under a contract

VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 331

Olbes vs. China Banking Corporation

Same; Same; Contracts; It behooves every contracting party to

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari

1 Penned by then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a

332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

R. Olbes,” holding herein petitioners Ramon R. Olbes and

“On four occasions in 1989 up to 1990, [herein respondent] China

VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 333

The [OO&M] denied liability on the [PNs], claiming that it had

due to the unwarranted application . . . of the escalation clause

On September 12, 1998, in Civil Case No. 92-63676, the

“ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the

334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

maker thereof, and appellants Ricardo Olbes and Ramon Olbes

1. On the first cause of action, P88,000.00 representing the

corresponding to the amounts included therein by

Inasmuch as the assailed decision sustained their solidary

2 Id., at pp. 43-44.

VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 335

“1. In holding petitioners liable retroactively for the

a mere title of “co-maker” rubber stamped under his

The petition is without merit.

336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

with the use of ordinary tests and canons 6

“For and in consideration of the covenants hereinafter mentioned

Surety(ies) hereby jointly and severally undertake, bind

As correctly observed by the CA, the “Suretyship

VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 337

petitioners’ intent, as sureties, to be jointly and severally

“And so is the finding of the court a quo that appellant Ricardo

Having affixed his consenting signature in a contract with

9 Supra note 1, at p. 42.

338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

under. He, just like his co-petitioner, Ramon Olbes, does

business concerns. Had he done so, he would have easily

10 Pages 17 and 18 of the RTC Decision; Rollo, pp. 62-63.

VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 339

added, no evidence has been adduced to overturn the

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.

Notes.—It is not the province of the court to alter a

which they have made for themselves, without regard to its

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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