Reyes v. Court of Appeals GR No 118233

ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P.
OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-SANTOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and MAYOR JINGGOY
ESTRADA (JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, respondents.
(G.R. No. 118233 December 10, 1999)
FACTS
The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax
ordinances; Ordinance No. Title 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101. On May 21, 1993, petitioners
filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing the constitutionality of these tax
ordinances allegedly because they were promulgated without previous public hearings
thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. On June 10,
1993, respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of
time. Citing Section 187, R.A. No. 7160, he stated that it appears that the tax
ordinances in question took effect on September 24, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance
No. 87, until October 22, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 91 and 95, and until
October 29, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 100 and 101, or more than thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof when the appeal was filed and received by this
Department on May 21, 1993 and therefore not in accordance with the requirements
provided for under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Hence, the the
instant appeal, having been filed out of time, is dismissed. The petitioners filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition. However, respondent court
affirmed the decision of the Secretary. On December 8, 1994, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied for lack of merit.
According to petitioners, respondent Secretary erred in declaring that they failed
to file their appeal on time. Also, they assail Municipal Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100
and 101, for alleged failure of the Municipal Council of San Juan to conduct mandatory
public hearings. Because of this, they claim the ordinances are inoperative, as through
they were never passed. Consequently, no prescriptive thirty-day period to question the
validity of the ordinance could toll to bar their appeal to the Department of Justice.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
Secretary of Justice who dismissed the prohibition suit, on the ground that it was
filed out of time?
2. Whether or not lack of mandatory public hearings prior to enacting Municipal
Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101 render them void on the ground of
deprivation of property without due process?
3. Whether or not the constitutional validity of Sec. 187 of the Local Government
Code could be raised for the first time on appeal?
RULING
1. NO.
The tax ordinances in question took effect on September 24, 1992, in the case of
Tax Ordinance No. 87, until October 22, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 91
and 95, and until October 29, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 100 and 101, or
more than thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof when the appeal was filed and
received by this Department on May 21, 1993 and therefore not in accordance with the
requirements provided for under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or
legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days
from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeals, a period also of 30
days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act
thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court.
These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before
seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays
as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this
reason the courts construct these provisions of statutes as mandatory. In the case at
bar, the petitioners failed to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days as
required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160.
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose

taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues
to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the
delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently,
any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public.
It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done
within certain time frames.
2. NO.
In the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to prove that there exist no
conduct of public hearings prior to the enactment of the ordinances. Petitioner
Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were
conducted prior not the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the
Municipality of Mandaluyong claims the public hearings were indeed conducted before
the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence
to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence
of evidences showing that procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment. However, the petitioner is right in contending that public hearings are
required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance imposing real property
taxes. R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 186, provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or
charges "shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the
purpose."
Since the petitioners are the party asserting such, they have the burden of
proof. The lack of a public hearings is a negative allegation essential to
petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Since petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the
burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment
thereof, the Court are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality. For
failing to discharge that burden, their petition was properly dismissed.
3. NO.
It should be stressed and emphasized that the constitutionality of an act of

Congress will not be passed upon by the Court unless at the first opportunity that
question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case, and is
necessary to a determination of the case, particularly where the issue of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. Therefore, it should be raised first
from below before the Court may entertain the same.
The constitutional validity of a statutory provision should not be entertained by

the Court where it was not specifically raised below, insisted upon, and adequately
argued. Moreover, given the circumstances in this case, there exist no genuine
necessity to dwell on the issue of constitutional invalidity of Section 187 in relation to
issue of valid enactment of the subject ordinances, as shown in the foregoing
discussion. Suffice it now to say that, having resolved the first and second issues, there
exist no grave abuse of discretion nor reversible error in the decision of respondent
appellate court.
DOCTRINES
1. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY OF

ORDINANCES
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the
three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the
Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the
fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.
2. POWER TO TAX
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes.

The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance
and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax
measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over
tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames.
Section 186 of the Local Government Code also expressly grants local government
units the following residual power to tax:
Sec. 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees, or Charges. - Local government
units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees, or charges on any base or
subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable
laws: Provided, that the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That
the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior
public hearing conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)

3. THE REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR PUBLIC HEARING FOR THE
ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCES
It is also stated in Section 186 of the Local Government Code the requirement of
prior public hearing for the enactment of ordinances.
Sec. 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees, or Charges. - Local government

units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees, or charges on any base or subject not
otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, that the taxes,
fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to
declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes,
fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted
for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)
To sum up, R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 186, provides that an ordinance levying taxes,
fees, or charges "shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the
purpose."

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Reyes v. Court of Appeals GR No 118233

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ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P.

OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-SANTOS, petitioners,

(G.R. No. 118233 December 10, 1999)

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose

It should be stressed and emphasized that the constitutionality of an act of

The constitutional validity of a statutory provision should not be entertained by

1. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY OF

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes.

Sec. 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees, or Charges. - Local government

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